Is a New Political Science wanted? And what? It is for the man or the woman with a vote to say whether their will shall prevail in this time of plenty, or the terror of Insecurity and Poverty continue.
YOU AND PARLIAMENT.

“Mankind seldom think much of any particular subject, without coming to think right at last.”

--Godwin.
YOU AND PARLIAMENT

by

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FOREWORD

IT is of no use to tell people that civilisation is heading for destruction, and that its fall is imminent, unless at the same time they can be brought to see that the events leading to this end are, in the last analysis, the deliberate acts of human individuals; that these acts can be counteracted by the exercise of the initiative of other men and women; and that, so far from any man or woman being powerless in the matter, the properly directed efforts of a sufficient number of them, whoever they may be, can certainly thwart those who, “by accident or design,” maintain the world, including our own country, in its present state of artificial impoverishment.

While it is true that a knowledge of what may be roundly termed “Finance”--and a knowledge more intensive, and certainly more accurate, than that exhibited in the published speeches and writings of apologists for the present banking system—is essential for the acquisition of more than a broad understanding of the means whereby the authors of financial policy obtain their social and political results, it is quite plainly untrue that a dissemination of this knowledge among the people must, or can, precede the
fixation of responsibility and effective demand for redress.

Devices not unconnected with the operations of Finance have conspired to constrain the individuals composing the most enlightened of democracies to behave as though they were fools; but that does not mean either that they are fools, or that, properly directed, they cannot be brought to act wisely in their own interest.

A man is not necessarily a fool because he has the misfortune to be caught in a trap. A man may merit the suspicion of folly who, being in a trap, does not at least inspect the means suggested to him for getting out.

This booklet has been written to spread the knowledge not only of the masterly and sufficient exposure by Major C. H. Douglas of the details of construction of the trap in which the governed, even in those countries most assured of “self-government,” have been caught, but of the principles elaborated under his guidance into sure means of escape.

All the details are not equally important; and from the point of view of the entrapped, who, in these islands constitute a majority of the population of about a million to one, the most important details are those which suggest means of escape.

At the time of writing these lines, the most certain means is the power, still possessed by every Parliamentary voter, of expressing choice for one rather than another of a limited number of candidates for a seat in Parliament.

It is incontrovertible that the electors can, if they will, elect representatives who truly reflect their wishes, or reject a retiring member who has shown unwillingness to reflect their wishes, or reduce Parliament, by neglect of the right to vote, to the status of a discredited institution. Since, however, the columns of “The Times” are taken up, also at the time of writing, with suggestions for the limitation of the number of candidates independent of financial assistance—a device which, with the effrontery which characterizes Finance in even the least direct of its activities, is associated by its sponsors with “the democratization of the Conservative Party”—it is evident that the “evolution” of the British parliamentary institutions is not, in the opinion of those who determine either policy or the advocation of policy, complete. Already a sufficiently elaborate instrument for the frustration of the hopes and desires of men and women, the electoral system is, at present, not a perfect instrument for the achievement of this end.

The Electoral System has not yet been made useless in the hands of British men and women as an instrument of political democracy.

But the time in which they may so use it may well be short.

The reader of this booklet may, it is hoped, learn where the instrument is weak and useless, and where it is still strong and useful; and thus he may be able to communicate this intelligence to others in a form suited to the occasion.
NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE WANTED.

CHAPTER 1.

“Democracy is a system of Government according to which every member of Society is considered as a man and nothing more.”

(WILLIAM GODWIN).

Ostrogorski headed the preface to his great work on „Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties” with this remarkable quotation from de Tocqueville:

A new political science is wanted for an entirely new world. But this is what we think very little about; placed in the middle of a rapid stream, we fix our gaze obstinately upon the ruins on the banks, while the current sweeps us along, and drives us backward towards the abyss.

de Tocqueville’s book on “Democracy in America” was published in 1835.

What was it that was new? What is the stream of which he writes? What are these ruins? What current? Which abyss?
In circumstances which convey irresistibly to the mind of every intelligent observer the same impression of inadequacy in the means taken in all human communities to meet emergent events, it is good to refer to the beliefs of this pioneer. He perceived that the course of history is determined by nothing that is accidental; and if he ascribed its order to the operation of a divine Providence with greater freedom than is customary to-day his argument remains unaffected: that the democratization of the world is inevitable; that the various occurrences of national existence have everywhere turned to its advantage; “all men have aided it by their exertions: those who have intentionally laboured in its cause, and those who have served it unwittingly; those who have fought for it and those who have declared themselves its opponents, all have been driven along the same track, all have laboured to the same end, some ignorantly and some unwillingly; all have been blind instruments in the hands of God.

He goes on to say that the gradual development of the equality of conditions is a providential fact, possessing all the characteristics of a divine decree: universal, durable, constantly eluding all human interference. Events as well as men contribute to its progress. He asks whether it is wise to imagine that a social impulse which dates from so far back can be checked by the efforts of a generation. He says his whole book has been written under the impression of a kind of religious dread produced by the contemplation of so irresistible a revolution, which has advanced for centuries over amazing obstacles, “still proceeding in the midst of the ruins it has made. . . . If the men of our time were led by attentive observation and by sincere reflection to acknowledge that the gradual and progressive development of social equality is at once the past and future of their history, this solitary truth would confer the sacred character of a divine decree upon the change. To attempt to check democracy would be in that case to resist the will of God; and the nations would then be constrained to make the best of the social lot awarded to them by Providence.” This man, himself “placed by fate on the brink of the French Revolution, stripped of the traditions of the past by one blast of that great convulsion,” and robbed by another of his hopes of the future, envisages a state of society in which “every individual being in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly reliance and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, alike removed from pride and meanness.”

He perceives “that we have destroyed those independent beings which were able to cope with tyranny single-handed.” The loss is without compensation. “In the heat of the struggle each partisan is hurried beyond the limits of his opinions by the opinions and excesses of his opponents, and holds a language which disguises his real sentiments or secret instincts. Hence arises the strange confusion which we are witnessing. I cannot recall to my mind a passage in history more worthy of sorrow and pity than the scenes which are happening under our eyes; it is as if the natural bond which unites the opinions of man to his tastes and his actions to his principles was now broken.”

He understood the dangers of that form of democracy which is founded not so much upon the love of freedom as upon the exercise of a particular kind of
power, and commented upon the paradox of his time, the unrelatedness of the actions and expressed beliefs of men to the ends they sincerely desired to attain, so that the “the high-minded and the noble advocate subjection, while the meanest and most servile minds preach independence; honest and enlightened citizens are opposed to all progress, while men without patriotism and without principles are the apostles of civilization and of intelligence.” It is to be noticed very particularly that while de Tocqueville, full of apprehension and of hopes, “despite his perception of great dangers, clung “with a firmer hold to the belief, that for democratic nations to be virtuous and prosperous they require but to will it,” his generous mind dismissed, perhaps too easily, at least one qualification which had occurred to him as a necessary condition of a better state of society than his own. He said that men were sure to retain the rights of which they were in possession. A more positive warning concludes his great work. It concerns those of his contemporaries, a great number, who undertook “to make a certain selection from amongst the institutions, the opinions and the ideas which originated in the aristocratic constitution of society as it was” for transplantation into their new world. “I apprehend,” he said, that such men are wasting their time and their strength in virtuous efforts. . . . We have. . . to strive to work out that species of greatness and happiness which is our own.”

FOR DEMOCRATIC NATIONS TO BE VIRTUOUS AND PROSPEROUS THEY REQUIRE BUT TO WILL IT.

What is it that has happened in these hundred years since the publication of “Democracy in America?” in America, in England, in France, in the whole world, the democratization of which appeared to be “so irresistible a revolution”? Servitude or freedom, knowledge or barbarism, prosperity or wretchedness? Which of de Tocqueville’s antitheses have been realised during this century? This hundred years? Is it that that new political science which de Tocqueville thought was wanted by “an entirely new world” has failed to emerge? Seventy of those years had passed when his sentence was made the text of the most withering exposure ever penned of the impostures which may be practised upon a people. Confronted with the mass of evidence, “not deemed worthy of the attention of historians and political thinkers,” “relegated to unimportant paragraphs” in the newspapers; but nevertheless painfully collected by “personal testimony” and “direct observation,” Lord Bryce could only say that M. Ostrogorski was “a singularly painstaking and intelligent student”; scientific in method and philosophical in spirit, who had examined the facts of caucus government with exemplary diligence, described them with careful attention to the smallest details, bringing to their investigation breadth of view; minute, accurate, fair—“But!” . . . . “There follows this confession, which (if the roots of decay can be held to be meritorious) may be held by some to be so abundantly:--

“I am myself,” says Lord Bryce, “an optimist, almost a professional optimist, as indeed politics would be intolerable were not a man grimly resolved to see between the clouds all the blue sky he can.”
But again, since in our time it may not be enough to think; but rather, if we are ourselves to escape “the abyss,” we had better know, is it that this new political science required for an entirely new world has not been forthcoming? Or is it that this “new political science” has been indeed elaborated almost to perfection, an “amazing obstacle” to that very new world which requires it? If that is so, let us not merely hope that men and women will elude this “human interference.” Let us discover or expose the means available in the concrete circumstances of the present for the achievement of the end for which so many generations have striven.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND HIS GOVERNMENT.

CHAPTER II.

IT is wise to approach the discussion of the relationship between the individual and his government (his government!) with caution. There is no longer any mystery about it; but there has been great mystery about it, as much as sufficed completely to obscure, “by accident or design” both the topic and those who would judge it fairly. Most men still lift their heads to inspect it, drawing up after them a thick investment of this mystery, as a man would who lifted his head from a trough of treacle. Of set purpose I am repeating the names and citing the works of men who, with nothing but a pen in their hands, have shaken the governments of the world and armed its peoples. But chiefly they armed the peoples only for disputation; for victories but not for victory. Yet I do not believe this to be the only or indeed the chief reason for their neglect. They say too much, too directly; and the technique of modern tyrannies remains effective only so long as it is lived under without being looked at. Any staid old Party might be seen turning the corner for a decade or even for a generation—not for three centuries! Consider the feelings of
the readers of the .. Manchester Guardian, or the " Daily Herald," might they be permitted to read, as epitaph on some recent fallen government or benediction on another, new, hoped-for and unsmirched, the following :-

THE (NEW) GOVERNMENT.

That the civilization of Europe is chiefly owing to the ability which has been displayed by the different governments and to the sagacity with which the evils of society have been palliated by legislative remedies is a notion which must appear so extravagant as to make it difficult to refer to it with becoming gravity.

Indeed, of all the social theories which have ever been broached there is none so utterly untenable and so unsound in all its parts as this. In the first place, we have the obvious consideration that the rulers of a country have, under ordinary circumstances, always been the inhabitants of that country; nurtured by its literature, bred to its traditions, and imbibing its prejudices. Such men are, at best, only the creatures of the age, never its creators. Their measures are the result of social progress, not the cause of it. This may be proved not only by speculative arguments, but also by a practical consideration which any reader of history can verify for himself.

No great political improvements, no great reform, either legislative or executive, has ever been originated in any country by its rulers. The first suggestions of such steps have invariably been bold and able thinkers, who discern the abuse,

denounce it, and point out how it may be remedied. But long after this is done, even the most enlightened governments continue to uphold the abuse and reject the remedy. At length, if circumstances are favourable, the pressure from without becomes so strong, that the government is obliged to give way; and, the reform being accomplished, the people are expected to admire the wisdom of their rulers, by whom all this has been done.

They were simply the exponents of the march of public opinion. Those who knew the facts opposed the laws; those who were ignorant of the facts favoured the laws. Every European government which has legislated much respecting trade has acted as if its main object were to suppress the trade and ruin the traders. Instead of leaving the National Industry to take its own course, it has been troubled by an interminable series of regulations, all intended for its good and all inflicting serious harm. It is no exaggeration to say, that the history of the commercial legislation of Europe presents every possible contrivance for hampering the energies of commerce. In every quarter and at every moment the hand of the government is felt. Duties on importation and duties on exportation; bounties to raise up a losing trade and taxes to pull down a remunerative one: this branch of industry forbidden and that branch of industry encouraged; one article of commerce must not be grown because it is grown in the colonies, another article might be grown and bought, but not sold again; while a third might be bought and
sold but not leave the country. Then, too, we find Custom House arrangements of the most vexatious kind, aided by a complicated scheme, a scheme of such perversive ingenuity, that the duties constantly varied on the same article and no man could calculate beforehand what he had to pay. To this uncertainty there was added a severity of exaction felt by every class of consumers and producers. The tolls were so onerous as to double and often quadruple the cost of production. A system was organised and strictly enforced, of interference with markets, interference with machinery and even interference with shops. Indeed, a very high authority, who has maturely studied the subject, has recently declared that if it had not been for smuggling, trade could not have been conducted, but must have perished in consequence of this incessant interference. It will hardly be pretended that we owe much to a system which, having called into existence a new class of criminals, at length retraces its steps; and though it thus puts an end to the crime, only destroys what its own acts had created.

Whenever the diffusion of knowledge reaches a certain point the laws must fall. The merit of agitators is to assist this diffusion; the merit of Parliament is to yield. It is only with the greatest difficulty that Parliament is induced to grant what the people are determined to have, and the necessity of which has been proved by the ablest men. Posterity ought to know that great measures are extorted from the legislature by pressure from without; that they are conceded not cheerfully but with fear; and carried by statesmen who have spent their lives in opposing what they now suddenly advocate.

Besides this, every great reform which has been effected has consisted not in doing something new but in undoing something old. We owe no thanks to lawgivers as a class. For, since the most valuable improvements in legislation are those which subvert preceding legislation it is clear that the balance of good can not be on their side. It is clear that the progress of civilization cannot be due to those who, on the most important subjects, have done so much harm that their successors are considered benefactors simply because they reverse their policy, and thus restore affairs to the state in which they would have remained if politicians had allowed them to run on in the course which the wants of society required. Nearly everything which has been done has been done amiss. The effects produced on European society by political legislation compose an aggregate so formidable that we may well wonder how, in the face of them, civilization has been able to advance. That under such circumstances it has advanced is a decisive proof of the extraordinary energy of man; and justifies a confident belief that as the pressure of legislation is diminished and the human mind less hampered, the progress will continue with accelerated speed.

It would be a mockery of sound reasoning to ascribe to legislators any share in the progress; or to expect any benefit from future legislators except that sort of benefit which consists in un-

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doing the work of their predecessors. This is what the present generation claims at their hands.

The world has been made familiar with the great truth, that one main condition of the prosperity of a people is that its rulers shall have very little power, that they shall by no means presume to raise themselves into supreme judges of the National interests, or deem themselves authorised to defeat the wishes of those for whose benefit alone they occupy the posts entrusted to them.

This bold assertion of the sovereignty of the men and women who form a community was written by Henry Thomas Buckle, some time before 1867. The tense has been altered here and there, and a few sentences have been omitted or rearranged. Side by side with Buckle’s insistence upon the passive role of the legislature, there is the shadow of that real and effective government which had arisen. Finance has always advocated “freedom.” “Let me but make a Nation’s credit, I care not who makes its laws.”

For whose benefit alone do those in authority occupy the posts entrusted to them?

IF Buckle’s notion had persisted into our own time, legislation might have recommended itself to the people as rather an adroit device for alleviating the effects of unemployment. The steady rise in the employment figures among legislators is, however, to be attributed to other causes than a high estimation of the virtuousness of doing, for payment, work that is not wanted.

Buckle thought that, in so far as legislators merited any popular regard at all, it was for undoing promptly and efficiently what they had done before. In our time, the effects of their activities, if any, in this direction, are not noticeable; and indeed this is not surprising if due regard is paid to the last great act of legislation of this kind. In passing the Currency and Bank-notes Act of 1928, the Government of that year may be said to have effected the undoing of all subsequent legislation at a single stroke. This matter may be more fully understood in the light of a later section, wherein the nature of an economic environment is discussed. When a government is itself
The art of government seems to have become the art of casting shadows without substance. As the shadows deepen, their causes lose substantiality, until at last events which could not be made to occur in a room, or a village, or even in a country happen in all simultaneously through the operation of "world" causes; and it is as though weight were a property of earths but not of apples.

This sapping of the substance of democratic thinking began suddenly and grew vastly until in the present economic darkness it seems discernible only by those equipped with some special mental instrument. But this is illusion related to the peculiar quality of shadows without material cause.

The illusion must be dispelled, and can be.

Lately there came into my hands a copy of a work which had been in the possession of a great and famous Liberal of two generations ago. The greatest of English philosophers, John Locke, wrote it, and it was published in 1698. His “Essay on Human Understanding” was at one time a work popular with Boards of Governors of English Public Schools as a class prize, a circumstance which I am prompted to connect, in some subtle fashion, with the fact that one librarian in England told me there was not such a book as “A Treatise concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government.” Here, however, was the “True Original, Extent and End” by John Locke and from the library of a great and famous Liberal. Many of the pages were marked freely and with determination in pencil, some in ink, and although the volume has (it is to be hoped) been read by many, or at least some, they were all timid borrowers, precluded from the expression of their private approval by stringent regulations such as now beset the path of even the learned, and it is to be presumed that the marks were made by the dead Liberal himself. They do him credit, if they are his, and shame his descendants. To have made them, during the great industrial expansion of the last century, the great Liberal must have been an honest man and a gentleman, and the possessor of a distinguishable mind.

Nobody could think himself injured by the drinking of another man, though he took a good draught, who had a whole river of the same water left him to quench his thirst; and the case of land and water, where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.

There is the great Liberal’s line under “Where there is enough of both.”

Liberals of all parties who now stammer blinking incredulity at the notion (too novel to grasp) that
Life, not Work, is the purpose of human association may brush aside Locke’s plea on the ground that (rightly, as they think) he merely ventilated their own enmity towards the landed gentry. But they would be wrong. Not only Locke, but the Liberal who underlined his words, had in his mind no local and temporary interest but a radical principle of society. Locke says:--

This I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, viz., that every man should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without straightening anybody; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the inhabitants, had not the INVENTION OF MONEY, and tacit agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced . . .

The great Liberal’s descendants may take their choice of that. Actually, however, the doctrine which seems to have met with their illustrious ancestor’s approval was expressed in the words: That every man should have as much as he could make use of would still hold in the world, without straightening anybody. “Would still hold in the world” shares his emphasis. It meant, and still means that it had held before. Allusion has since been made by Lecky to Locke’s unqualified adhesion to the view that, in a democracy, or indeed in any conceivable form of government (and that is more important) the people are in the last analysis, their own rulers. Lecky mentions the matter as one concerning an opinion which gained his approval, showing that in his time this foundation had been undermined. There was a contrary opinion. In Locke, the facts of social structure are seen objectively and without distortion. Later, and it is still so with

us, reversing the adage concerning the incredible, the facts must be believed in order to be seen. The great Liberal’s pencil traced them out on page after page, picking so unerringly upon the point that it is idle to picture any longer any incredulous motive. Indeed, anyone else who read Locke’s essay must see in it the veritable principia of social government. I shall not refer oft again to the Liberal pencil, for all the passages here reproduced, and many more besides, were marked by it. All that I desire to be remembered is that, incredible as it may seem, at least one leading member of the Liberal Party of two generations ago knew an undefiled doctrine of democracy. It is significant that those who have referred to Locke’s views have usually picked out a single statement for inspection, without giving the argument built around it. The selected statement is the bare but radical assertion that the end of government is the good of the community. What Locke said was that:--

the end of Government being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon any body, since nobody in Government can have a right tending to any other end.

Perhaps it is almost impossible for our minds, perverted as they are by the artificial environment which has been created, like the bank-credit which enslaves it, by a minority who have subverted government, to realise intuitively and without inspection of his sentences, that there was in Locke’s mind “the good of the community, whatever it is,” and not “what WE think is good for the community,” we meaning anyone at all. Locke was an Englishman as well as a philosopher. If the logic of the situation has any force
at all (and so long as men argue and state, instead of doing, it must have unfortunately), here is the logic of the matter in its purest and most classical form:--

(1) The great and chief end of men’s uniting into commonwealths and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their property.

(2) Their power [that of the legislative] in the utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society. It is a power that hath no other end but preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave or designedly to impoverish the subjects.

(3) The supreme power cannot take from any man part of his property without his own consent: for the preservation of property being the end of government, and that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the people should have property.

(4) The power of the society, or legislative . . . can never be supposed to extend farther than the common good.

(5) Absolute arbitrary power, or governing without settled standing laws, can neither of them consist with the ends of society and government, which men would not quit the freedom of the state of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes.

(6) The legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to other hands.

(7) The power of the legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary grant and institution, can be no other than what that positive grant conveyed, which, being only to make laws, and not to make legislators, the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making laws and place it in other hands.

(8) This power . . . never is questioned . . . whilst it is in any tolerable degree employed for the use it was meant; that is for the good of the people, and not manifestly against it.

These principles, if they stand at all, do not stand on the authority of Locke; but on the unshakable foundation of necessary assent to propositions the meaning of which is inescapable. It may be that the “freedom of a state of nature” is a freedom reserved in our world for the enemies of man, for the rodent and reptile. No human being enjoys it. No human being born into a civilized community can reach it. It is not that his own early training and his cultural inheritance make return to this condition impossible, in the sense that it is impossible completely or even largely to undo what has been done by education: to reverse the process of human specialisation in individual development. With this aspect of man in relation to a state of nature, the only aspect which it occurs to most people to consider, I have nothing whatever to do. I mean, and it is, I contend, of the greatest consequence to consider that there cannot be found to-day on the face of the earth a square mile of territory where Man can break HIS flag to the winds of heaven. Man has no flag, and upon every rag of which the individual could possess himself there is levied, in perpetuity, tribute to that insatiable modern Caesar of Caesars, the banker.
For this reason alone, no human being living to-day may gain access to that blessed state which the advantages of association are alleged to have been the sole inducement of them to leave. If only a hundred, nay, ten of them, representative in regard to their physical, mental and moral fitness, should indeed enter this state, carrying with them only the memorial elements of their cultural inheritance, it is hard to imagine that any power on earth, were they but let alone, could intervene to prevent so spectacular an increase in their wealth and prosperity as would stagger mankind—assuming only their desire to stagger mankind rather than to live easily and profitably to themselves. Money is to-day the inescapable yet the only check on human progress. There are those who act as though they believed, whether they believe it or not, that a state in which the people—all the people—lived easily and profitably to themselves would be unprogressive. They are completely answered in the bare statement that when the people decide what is progressive and what is not progressive; what is desirable and what not desirable; and determine whether or not any step at all is taken in the direction of the attainment of the one or the other, then, and not until then, will a considerable progression be made towards the establishment of real democracy. All other progression is progression in tyranny.

Since, however, it becomes impolite to speak, if not to think, of human good in terms so substantial as wealth and property, or so real and desired as personal freedom, it may be well to point out that the sentiments here quoted were at one time fit for a king. Locke himself was able to cite the memorable words

I will ever prefer the weal of the public, and of the whole commonwealth, in making of good laws and constitutions, to any particular and private ends of mine; thinking ever the wealth and weal of the commonwealth to be my greatest weal and worldly felicity; a point wherein a lawful king doth directly differ from a tyrant: for I do acknowledge, that the special and greatest point of difference that is between a rightful king and an usurping tyrant is this, that whereas the proud and ambitious tyrant doth think his kingdom and people are only ordained for satisfaction of his desires and unreasonable appetites, the righteous and just king doth, by the contrary, acknowledge himself to be ordained for the procuring of the wealth and property of his people.

When the plain sense of a king and a philosopher is converted into the meaningless jargon of modern politics, we may well wonder how this has come about.

“The ability with which (these opinions) were urged,” says Lecky, “and the favourable circumstances in which they appeared gave them an easy triumph, and the Revolution* made them the basis of the Constitution.”‡

—The Revolution of 1688 which drew “the whole action of the Ministers of the Crown” within the controlling power of Parliament and more especially the House of Commons.

‡ Nothing of the sort! Their triumph in our time is rightly held by Douglas to be the alternative to a major catastrophe in civilization.

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laws is placed, such is the form of the commonwealth.

The legislative is not only the supreme power of the commonwealth, but sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it; nor can any edict of anybody else, in whatever form soever conceived, or by what power soever backed, have the force and obligation of a law.

(And the hand of the dead Liberal did not spare these passages!) Yet, what it was “impossible to conceive” has occurred, notwithstanding that it is a voluntary but no legal obedience which legislators give, for in the last analysis they are obedient not to any edict; but to the restraint of circumstances artificially created by those who, making and unmaking the people’s money, hold “in the hollow of their hand” the destinies of nations. The power of the legislative is unused; but it is not alienated.

The three centuries which separate us from political wisdom were centuries occupied by the elaboration of facilities, and a facility is the means of doing things more easily. All those things which are done, or were done or will be done, proportionately to the availability of the energy to do them, can to-day be done more easily than at any previous time. Whether, in these centuries, the ease with which things can be done has been multiplied times or hundreds of times makes no matter: it has been multiplied. The “procuring of the wealth and property” of the people of England is an easier matter for fulfilment by an English legislator than ever before; but in our time every principle enunciated by Locke, every element in “the basis of the Constitution” is dissolved. School, University, Pulpit, Press, Party, Platform and the Pub, in unhallowed unison declare that all are injured by the drinking of him who does not work, and that the whole swollen river of modern industry must flow to the sea untasted lest inadvertently some heir to the unearned ‘increment of association’ of the ages quench his thirst.

“Let me but make a country’s credit, I care not who make its laws."

This embodies a truth not unsuspected by Locke himself. But he was keen to see, and to state with unerring directness the true application in democracy:--

For the form of government depending upon the supreme power, which is the legislative (it being impossible to conceive that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior, or any but the supreme make laws), according as the power of making
When men unwittingly misinterpret their perceptions, they are said to be subject to delusion. There are not larger and smaller delusions. One ordinary delusion is enough to disorder a man’s universe.

A delusion has disordered our universe. It is the delusion, detected by Locke, which, since his time has reasserted itself. Douglas not only detected it anew but devised the means for dispelling it for evermore. It is the delusion that money is wealth. Entertain this delusion, and the perspective of man’s life in society is disordered: not just a line here and there pointing in the wrong direction, but all the lines, so that the spectacle of Man’s attainment appears to the understanding as the Golgotha of Man’s ruination, his place of skulls.

This booklet is not primarily concerned with the material items of this picture: with the sabotage of things: of crops, harvests, plant, products and populations: of wealth. It is concerned with the sabotage of the social dynamic: the sabotage of the power of the individuals in society collectively to express them-

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what they like” is Machiavellian. Thinking as an occupation or as amusement is itself a mode—and a most dangerously potent mode—of mistaking means for ends. “Life’s aim is an act, not a thought.” Employ the population in thinking, especially in thinking differently, and you have a doubly powerful preventative of action. They must either not act at all or act wrongly, i.e., ineffectually. So, by accident or design, what is dignified by the phrase “individual thought” has been sedulously fostered among all who are able to practise it—and many who are not. To people capable of being amused by the exercise of their own intelligence, assent to a merely intellectual proposition is not only easy, but carries with it an illusion of almost complete finality. Regardless of the fact that little real change in their behaviour has resulted from their own intellectual conviction, they nevertheless occupy themselves with efforts to secure the like condition in others. But those whose position in society is to any degree due to lack of facility in the performance of these tricks (all thinking is a species of trick) are very numerous. They are obviously cast in a different mould. This is fortunate for mankind in its present predicament, if the distinguishing features of this majority of men and women are more favourable to the social dynamic than are the intelligences of the ‘intelligent.’ But, lest someone say I oppose intelligence, let it not be forgotten that it is unintelligent to die avoidably. Our perspective is wrong unless we see that however intricate the machine it is a bad machine unless it will run smoothly on Life’s rails.

The courtesy extended to men and women to “think

The sabotage of democracy is the whole, not the part.
The sabotage of all right ideas is merely instances of the sabotage of the idea of democracy, and the idea of democracy has to be rehabilitated and made to get up and walk about, clothed in the flesh and blood of real people before any other right idea can become fertile in human life. For generations past, the creative output of Man, what output he has been permitted, has been thrown into a sieve; and the dust in their eyes is all that has reached the people. This is so not only of present power, thwarted or perverted at every turn, but of our social inheritance in the realm of ideas. In nature, only the viable lives: only the thing done is true. The rest is imaginary or absurd. But in our financial society only the fiction prevails, as though Man’s shadow came between him and the sun.

A social dynamic cannot be created by still another attempt spuriously to intellectualise the people. It was impossible for Locke to conceive “that an inferior power should prescribe to a superior.” That superior power was derived from the people and answerable to the people. It was their right to question it, to alter it, to do what they liked with it. He understood the difference between the “good of the community” and merely someone’s idea of the peoples’ good. “The end of government being the good of the community, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that end, cannot be an encroachment upon anybody, since nobody in government can have a right tending to any other end.” Locke could keep his eye on the ball.

The significance of his words is not less but greater if it be borne in mind that they were written towards the close of a most turbulent period of our national history, when almost every form of civil government had been discredited. One remained to be discredited— as a form: the form of government which so many imagine to embody the principles which Locke enunciated and which his logic supports. Yet, no form of government has been devised, or ever will be devised while human society lasts to “embody” those principles. The principles are dynamic principles and are capable of informing (but not being embodied in) all forms of government alike: the absolute autocracy of any individual, whoever or whatever he might be, or a ‘democracy’ so enfranchised that every flea that had sucked human blood might record its vote in some centralised mechanism as efficient and impersonal as a tote. All engines which move may move in the same direction, towards the same objective. The principles which Locke stated with such care concerned this vital matter: the aim and end of government, not the form. The distinction is that between a man’s dinner in the forest and the trade mark on the bullet that secures it.

So far had we (WE!) progressed in 1861, that Mill could write: “Should a member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of his constituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments or of his own?”

“The organ of their sentiments!”

In the nature of things, the organ of a man’s sentiments must be the man himself.

Only the corrupter features—the jazz figures on the bars of the “trap set by knaves to catch simpletons”
--have been added to the design of this diabolical mechanism since Mill outlined it; and, since the ideas of parties and politicians are dominated by Mill: since it is Mill's own blind spot which is now, by an operation unknown to surgery but well known to finance, transplanted to the political retina of most men and women: since Mill is the literary source from which democratic blindness proceeds, it may be well to examine some of his passages.

It has been found that before some audiences mere reading of Mill’s words suffices to evoke ridicule; and while it may be a melancholy reflection that what excites the instant derision of sensible but untutored persons has nevertheless the power to control their lives, to keep them in subjection and penury, and their children after them for generation after generation, there is no deadlier weapon to defeat Money.

Says Mill:--

There is a floating notion . . . .which has considerable practical operation on many minds, even of Members of Parliament, and often makes them independently of desire for popularity, or concern for their reputation, feel bound in conscience to let their conduct, on questions on which their constituents have a decided opinion, be the expression of that opinion rather than of their own.

But in this country (and “most other countries,” says Mill):

Law and custom warrant a Member of Parliament in voting according to his opinion of right, however different from that of his constituents.

A “floating notion” has not yet saved a sinking people; nor is the reason far to seek if we follow Mill carefully and critically. Mill did not stop to consider when it was that “electors” had decided opinions or what their decided opinions were about, moving the conscience even of Members of Parliament. He posed a question which he thought to be a moral question: a question of “the ethics of representative government.” So it is.

Mill was full of anxiety about the answer. This anxiety has now been almost expunged from political consciousness. The blind spot, the transplant, has expanded. Mill's anxiety, however, was not entirely moral. At least, it was not concerned with his own morals, or indeed with the abstract morality of a system of government based upon the representation of the people in every imaginable respect but the one that mattered to the people. It is the morals of electors that attracts Mill's vision, and holds it.

For, let the system of representation be what it may, it will be converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose. As long as they are free not to vote, and free to vote as they like, they cannot be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex to it.

Naughty people!

They might even, when he is no longer willing to represent them,

COMPEL HIM IN HONOUR . . . . to resign his seat.

“In honour.” “Converted into.” “Are free.”
Let it be remembered that this was not before the days when Members of Parliament had become, so Ostrogorski says (what are they now?); “commercial travellers for their party in the employ of the Associations,” ceaselessly emitting an “oratorical electricity which they discharge on the masses,” steeping them in the party spirit with which they themselves are profoundly imbued.”

“Alas!” thinks Mill; and he says:

The laws cannot prescribe to the electors the principles by which they shall direct their choice.

Then, with a boldness, ill-sustained in the conclusion:

No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion, as to this matter, results from the general principles which it professes . . . . that it

seems quite impracticable to lay down for the elector any positive rule of duty.

Mill had caught himself out. Yet he had elaborated a hint which has worked for the confusion of generations the world over.

We have from the first affirmed, says Mill, and unvaryingly kept in view, the co-equal importance of two great requisites of Government: responsibility to those for whose benefit political power ought to be, and always professes to be, employed; and jointly therewith to obtain, in the greatest measure possible, for the function of Government, the benefits of superior intellect, trained by long meditation and practical discipline to that special task.

The task of government. Truly Mill himself is not quite happy about it. Hear him further:

It is so important that the electors should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom.

There may be those who, impressed, as Mill was by this “requirement” of representative government (as they understand it), ascribe the perils of our time--and its denser ignorance and poverty--to the pertinacity with which the damned have chosen men less wise than themselves. But, have they? Surely there are many among us who have received the confidential humilities of Members of Parliament on this matter?

However, "no reader of this treatise can doubt . . . .”

Mill, in any case, did not pretend to foresee that there could be any lack of superior wisdom. The electors filled the picture:

While it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have opinions, should not enter largely into their judgment as to who possesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct . . . .

“No reader of this treatise can doubt . . . .” For one word suffices to describe how the unwise, wisely dis-
Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use if they do not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study: and if it be an object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to average electors, it must be counted on that the representatives will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftener right of the two.

So, to this opinion, oftener right than his own, the elector is to “defer.”

When, by deference, the elector--nay, not the elector but the electors, plural, perpendicular and in a majority--have marvellously and deferentially elevated themselves by pulling upon the shoe-strings of their wisdom, there remains, and Mill recognises it, the “no less” necessity “that this wiser man should be responsible to them; in other words, they are the judges of the manner in which he fulfils his trust: and how are they to judge, except by the standard of their own opinions?” asks Mill. “When they HAVE opinions!”

However, political realism intrudes, for a moment, even upon Mill:

If they could ascertain, even infallibly, the ablest man (able, now; not wise), they ought not to allow him altogether to judge for them, without any reference to their own opinions. The ablest man may be a Tory . . . .!

To do Mill justice, after-thoughts of a brighter kind and better quality occurred to him. There is no need to go further with his frivolous argument. The full flavour can be tasted by any reader who reviews these extraordinary passages. But let him not forget that he is reading the reasoned argument which supports the present practice of candidates for Parliament in their resistance to the demand for results of vastly different character from those familiar to us through the recurrent wars and crises of our time.

Since Mill, a third great party has risen into favour, justified in the view of its early advocates and some at least of its present supporters by the presumed failure of the parties already in existence to represent the people. Whether Mill’s argument is more or less often heard in its ranks than in the ranks of its opponents may be a matter of opinion.

Even when one is blind to facts, logic may and in thorough hands sometimes does carry one into some logical generalisation which covers those facts, and so it was with Mill. Two of his sentences have a profounder meaning in 1935 than in 1861:--

But also democracy, in its very essence, insists . . . much more forcibly on the things in which all are entitled to be considered equally, than on those in which one person is entitled to more consideration than another.

And

A correct estimate of the relation which should subsist between governors and governed, does not require the electors to consent to be represented.
by one who intends to govern them in opposition to their fundamental convictions. If they avail themselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects, at a time when the points on which he is vitally at issue with them are not likely to be mooted [by whom?] they are justified in dismissing him at the first moment when a question arises [who is to raise it, or to refrain from raising it?] involving these . . . .

Both of these passages are important, the first perhaps even more than the second, as defining a principle, and not merely a nice point of political etiquette.

At a time when a Lord Chief Justice of England goes down to the House of Lords to say, of some manoeuvre of the power behind Parliament, that

If these odious features are not removed, then I will adjourn my court every day in order to be present here to take part in fighting the objectionable parts, not clause by clause, but line by line and word for word.

and when the same Lord Chief Justice in open court questions whether the “representatives of the people” are indeed the representatives of the people; time has passed for the nicer points of etiquette, and the time for democratic self-assertion has arrived.

THE MASTERY OF MONEY.

CHAPTER V.

You who read this book are one of the people. In the seventeenth century, “The King’s Government” was admitted to be directed to the "Right End and Aim" of all government when its end and aim was the procuring of the wealth and property of the King’s people, and Society necessarily supposed and required that the people should have property (a vastly different thing, by the way, from “Making the workers capitalists,” which is an objective proposed to the Liberal Party in search of a policy).*

This is to say that in the seventeenth century society supposed and required that YOU should have property, and your King acknowledged himself to have been ordained for the procuring of your wealth and your

* The difference is this: that wealth and property are what they say they are, namely, wealth and property that a “worker” may use or consume, while capital is something a “worker” may employ to make wealth and property that neither he nor anyone else can buy.
property. But three centuries later YOUR government, inspired by John Stuart Mill and super-inspired by the Bank of England, bids you defer to a superior wisdom which, in the nature of things you cannot perceive, but by deference, to be superior to your own, and whose superiority, in any case, lies in the choice of pre-arranged scarcity and impoverishment for you, and the taxing of YOUR property out of hand for the refundment of bank-credits, which, so far as you are concerned, is the delivering over of what wealth and property you are permitted to make or acquire into the ownership of the Bank, in return for the nod of the bank’s head which allowed you to spend your energy in doing these things. That nod “made work” for you, and the taxes recovered makes “more work” for you. England for seventy years has not had the wit to confront this “wisdom” with the plain assertion that it is wise to feed an infant. Infants have gone unfed, are going under-fed, and will go not only unfed but literally unborn for that reason; since “superior wisdom” would prefer to see England overrun by rats rather than overrun by Englishmen. It favours by its special means, which are purely financial—that is, purely fictitious—an increase in the pestiferous populations of the earth, of the boll weevil, the malaria parasite and the influenza germ, while permitting a bare subsistence to a restricted human population.

The science of political economy which, rightly understood, has been said to be the study of the economy of energy required for the satisfaction of human needs, has been turned into an art of government, the art of denying to men and women, in the name of “wisdom,” the satisfaction of their needs by means which are unavowed, indirect and imposturous. Since our rulers “ought not to employ force and cannot employ reasoning,” they have been obliged as Rousseau said, “to have recourse to authority of a different sort, which may draw without compulsion and persuade without conviction.” Surely, as Godwin remarks, “a very indirect method of rendering them sober, judicious, fearless and happy.”

The demand of de Touqueville has been fulfilled. He has had his “new political science.” It is the hegemony of Finance. There is no rulership more conducive to sobriety; none, it seems, more “injudicious” to resist. What fears it permits or engenders do not, certainly, include fears of itself, and its happiness is its own.

“But does not the history of all oppression teach you,” asks Mazzini, “that those who oppress rely always for their justification upon a fact created by themselves?” In our time justification and fact are dissolved in a self-justifying fiction, and the personal oppressor has dispensed even with himself. Why is the world in chains? There is no reason. Like all forms of government, all scape-goats are discredited. The sole reality which appears to remain is the inescapability of a peril which has no existence in nature or in fact; but which nevertheless draws without compulsion and persuades our race without conviction to its doom.

The first reaction of men and women in our time to any proposal to remedy their condition is more and
This is the end which has been reached by nearly three centuries of ever-widening enfranchisement, ever more and more “representative” government and a practical success so spectacular that its results during only one-sixth of this period “would be visible to an observer as far off as the moon.”* The point of every weapon democracy has won for itself has been turned without detection against it, parties, unions, schools, erudition and intelligence itself. The hand that underlined Locke with grave and patient attention is dead, and the volumes it held, their hopes unrealised and their perceptions blurred, are distributed in charitable parcels to public libraries, where plain sense, dissolving in an ocean of error and confusion, is diluted to a condition of complete ineffectuality. The whole force and passion of mankind for freedom is “sublimated.” The very art of government (why government?) is bereft of personality. Education is “a process of psychological rape,” and human industry and science an embarrassment to legislators. As Buckle said of Locke: “If this profound writer were now alive, what a war he would wage against our great universities and public schools; where innumerable things are taught, which no one is concerned to understand and which few will take the trouble to remember.”

* Francis Galton: Enquiries into Human Faculty, London, 1883.

**Lord Eustace Percy attributes this representation of his view to the ingenuity of “a witty critic.”

The transition from the majestic realism of Locke to the moralistic frivolities and irrelevancies of Mill is merely “what no one can understand.”

Wars are not waged any longer. They are financed. The war for human liberty has been no exception. It has not been waged; it has been financed, and, in consequence, the children of each new generation as it comes to manhood, in circumstances ever more superabundantly favourable to life and fertility and excellence must:

“Pledge themselves afresh.”
“Face a bleak world.”
Shoulder a more difficult task “than their fathers found it.”
Stand “perplexed and baffled before the new situation and the new problems.”
Suffer once more “the primeval dread of the unknown,” . . . “the dark irrational forces of the past . . . stalking forward from their obscure background.”
Be “wounded in its very soul.”
Doubt “the principles on which our civilisation is built, without confidence in ourselves and our destiny, and with no clear vision of the road before us.”
“Sharpen wits.”
“Test our courage and manhood.”
“Stand probably the most awful ordeal to which [the ‘human soul’] has ever been subjected in its long history.”
“Suffer until they are abdicating their rights as individuals.”
But NOT “leave the field”; abandon “the age-
long battle”; “the inescapable programme for the future.”*

There are in our community many who surmise and suspect rather than know and understand the nature of the anti-climax which thus terminates generations of heroic effort. They cannot harmonise the unfailing and spectacular success of man the discoverer, inventor, contriver and enricher in the real world of material difficulties with his complete frustration as talker, writer, arguer and agitator in the unreal world of immaterial political and financial difficulties. Nor can they comprehend this immaterial obstruction--to peace, prosperity, business, getting-a-job, getting-on: to living socially and individually--as a whole. It is just there, immense, sinister and incomprehensible. They discern, or imagine that they discern a personal instrument: the priest, the agitator; the idler, the capitalist; the land-owner, the industrialist; the newspaper-magnate, the enemy, the alien, the Jew; more rarely the banker. At such times the voice of the people is raised, usually in response to judicious stimulation, demanding some curtailment of the freedom of these individuals in the discharge of their function. Religion is taxed, agitators fined; the idler is made to share his idleness with the worker; both are taxed to reward the ingenuity of administrators; the capitalist

• Thus General the Right Hon. J. C. Smuts has lately attempted to seduce the public into the acceptance of the objective of “creative freedom” as a substitute for its unqualified opposite. Freedom would do. “The VISION” of freedom, he says, provides the “lure of our race” in its ceaseless striving. It is perhaps characteristic of the obsession in favour of “economy” that it would economise ever in impostures.

is taxed and the industrialist; the land-owner dispossessed. The press lord knows his own bondage, and being his own tongue may hold it. The enemy is execrated and impoverished (after a paradoxical and temporary enrichment in everything but life and the liberty of the subject); the alien interned, the Jew reviled, the banker threatened. And as each new limitation is imposed, each new burden fastened, each new scapegoat penalised, each new timorous effort at individual self-assertion scotched; as each new deal with the old pack fails and each new government falls,

We fix our gaze obstinately upon the ruins on the banks, while the current sweeps us along, and drives us backwards towards the abyss.

What is to stop it?

This peril--the mastery of money--which threatens the whole of our civilisation with destruction is a “fact created by itself.” Its inescapability is now a dogma of the working classes (largely unemployed and restricted in their access to the overburdened shelves of the shopkeepers); and it is the belief of the professional and middle classes and the professed opinion of legislators, condemned in our time to unprofitable employment in allaying the fears which they create. Whig and Tory, Liberal and Conservative, Labour and Communist, Parliamentary Government or Dictatorship--it is all one.

Since the time of Cromwell, excluding the short Restoration, the financial policy of the British Government has been based on a theory of scarcity.
MAN MUST MOVE.

CHAPTER VI.

One may be tolerant of Mill if one grasps the fact that the wisdom so necessary yet so impossible of attainment to mere electors was, in practice, impossible of attainment by the elected. Even Mill did not attain to it. This is perhaps not very astonishing. At least there is authority for asserting that he shared his failure with Solomon. Consulted on essentially the same issue that confronted Mill (although Mill never so much as glanced at the issue to see what it was). Solomon--wisely?--referred to it as the decision of natural affection. Reputed wise, Solomon was at least, one might say, wiser than Mill. In those days God had not descended to the Bank of England.

Consider: to whatever party wheel you are chained, whatever mutilation your mind has suffered to render you adaptable to the unnatural environment created by misguided human government,

if there is not enough to go round, is it wise that you should go short? Is your wisdom enough to determine the answer to this question? If not, whose wisdom is? And how are you wise enough to know?
If, on the contrary, there is enough to go round, is it wise that you should go short? Is your wisdom enough to determine the answer to this question? If not, whose wisdom is? And how are you wise enough to know? Mill should not have stripped the Almighty of His prerogative merely to invest the Liberal Party with it. The questions he never faced are answerable, if at all, in the light of human knowledge, not of human wisdom. Unfed infants die. This is knowledge gained from experience—experience, let us say, of the operation of “wisdom” in human society: Rothschild’s wisdom, Baring’s, Barruch’s, Montagu Norman’s, Gladstone’s, Smuts’, Balfour’s, Asquith’s, Mill’s, MacDonald’s, Henderson’s, Cripps’, Baldwin’s, Shaw’s, Wells’s, your’s, mine.

Knowledge is one step nearer to Truth than wisd—but man is capable of one step nearer still. It is action. Jesting Pilate answered the question “What is truth?” by action. He did not wait for an answer. He moved.

In our time, and very soon; Man must move. He must move, or be entombed for ever within a husk compounded of his own intellectual excrement: an abortive species: a tale that is told: a corpse in a woven prison of mystery and imagination: a false idea in the mind of a banker.

Can man move?

There is no Man! There are but men and women. Yet, happily—“Democracy is but a system of government according to which every member of society is considered as a man and nothing more.”

Clearly, men and women are confronted with this task—to constitute a democracy and to give it motion. In the words of Douglas:

“What is urgent in this world, with an urgency that transcends any other urgency, is a study and practice of the science of Social Dynamics.”

The plans planned and the devices devised in accordance with a ruling principle which is false, and has been false for centuries, if not indeed for the whole period of man’s civilised history, cannot transfer themselves to the service of another ruling principle of their own accord. Plans and principles are mutually independent. Any plan may be perfect of its kind and capable of indefinite extension in its uses. Thus the means devised and in use for the disinfection of dwellings, depending upon the generation of gaseous poisons, are as efficacious for the depopulation of towns: and these different results may be secured not by any modification in the technical means available to sanitary authorities but according to whether the population is induced to remain in the dwellings during their disinfection, or to leave them for the time being.

On the other hand, any plan may be totally discordant with the principle determining its use. Thus the human energy used to distribute a volatile cyanide on the floors of dwellings may as efficaciously be employed distributing sand on an icy pavement; but common sand will not disinfect a house. If, by pseudoreligious teaching, the population were induced to believe that the killing of micro-organisms was immoral: if, by political agitation, the population were
induced to return a government unfriendly to the chemical industry: or if, by economic pressure, the population were precluded from the use of disinfectants, wit and ingenuity in the persuasion of the people to “buy more salt” would not affect the death rate from diphtheria, although bank loans to the salt industry, unless offset by compensating disadvantages inherent in our present monetary system, might affect it considerably by inducing greater resistance to disease through an increase in the community’s power to buy good food.

There is in this and other countries at the present time a large and increasing number of people competent to answer most questions that an elector, whether intelligent or unintelligent, might ask concerning the effect upon himself of any plan, political or economic, proposed or likely to be proposed during the next few years.

A much larger number of people in this and other countries is incompetent in this respect, or, whether competent or not, will and do supply the electors with the wrong answers. Despite the anxiety of Mill to witness either an increase in wisdom or in deference to the right persons, the British elector does not and, practically speaking, cannot distinguish between the competent and the incompetent or the honest and the dishonest in these matters. Yet, as plainly, it is not merely possible but easy for every question which concerns the competency of elected persons to receive absolute and final answer in the result.

A “representative” of the people who does not find the means of securing to the people what they want in respect of economic freedom and security is an incompetent representative, a useless servant. This is as true of every “thing in which all are entitled to be considered equally” if it is physically attainable (as economic freedom and security are in our time), and it is true of every demand which can be imagined as arising spontaneously from the sum of individual wills in a human community concerning an end possible of attainment.

A further complication of the present crisis in political democracy may be illustrated by reference to the well-known but unfriendly story of the physician who, confirming the worst but baseless fears of his patient, said: “Yes, take hope; your condition, I admit, is serious, but I will do all I can to promote your recovery if you will follow my advice.” The patient took the doctor’s advice and was only too glad to pay well for it, since he lived, if not in perfect health, at least in no greater discomfort than before, and attributed his continued existence to the skill of the doctor who gained greatly in reputation. This device of government is justifiably known as a “doctor’s mandate.” In justice to a profession upon whose members a false economic system bears as heavily as upon anyone else, it may be said that while this trick is rare enough to be the subject of remark on “its native heath” it is so much the life and practice of politics as almost entirely to escape notice.

Yet all the imaginary ailments which the politician and the economist between them can invent are, in fact, stolen from that Pandora’s box of ruin and destruction, the dogma of real scarcity.
While the margin between capacity and achievement has been enormously increased by modern devices for the application of “the powers in nature to the use and convenience of man,” there was, as Locke discerned, a margin long before the invention of the steam engine. “Money intervened.”

The fact should excite comment that no matter how sudden or how great each increase in the margin, the power to disguise it and to prevent it from becoming apparent, let alone realised, increased proportionately, and it is only since the War that the “paradox” of “poverty in the midst of plenty” has become widely known. In other words, as the power to satisfy human needs has assumed titanic proportions, so the power to prevent human beings from satisfying their needs has grown correspondingly. It, too, is titanic. Action and reaction are equal and opposite; and the measure of the dynamic required to move mankind away from the brink is exactly equal to the force impelling it to the brink (figuratively assuming mankind to be on the brink at the present moment “in a state of rest.”)

Yet the slightest excess impelling in either direction will produce movement in either. The creative and the destructive forces in human society oppose one another on the brink of destruction: Man against Mammon: Man pressed into the service of Mammon against Mammon: Man sworn in the service of Mammon against Mammon: Man ardently serving Mammon with apparently every faculty against Mammon. Is it any wonder that our parlour socialists stand fascinated by the interminable to-and-fro, yet fearful that the multitude should have a full diet of anything but Ism?

It would be well that democracy should know (but it cannot know) what lies behind the following, quoted from Playfair by Brewster in his “Life of Sir Isaac Newton”:

“In the universities of England, though the Aristotelian physics had made an obstinate resistance, they had been supplanted by the Cartesian, which became firmly established about the time when their foundation began to be sapped by the general progress of science, and particularly by the discoveries of Newton. For more than thirty years after the publication of these discoveries, the system of vortices kept its ground, and a translation from the French into Latin of the Physics of Rohault—a work entirely Cartesian—continued at Cambridge to be the text for philosophical instruction. About the year 1718 a new and more elegant translation of the same book was published by Dr. Samuel Clarke, with the addition of notes, in which that profound and ingenious writer explained the views of Newton on the principle objects of discussion, so that the notes contained virtually a refutation of the text; they did so, however, only virtually, all appearance of argument and controversy being carefully avoided. Whether this escaped the notice of the learned Doctor or not is uncertain, but the new translation, from its better Latinity and the name of the editor, was readily admitted to all academical honours which the old one had enjoyed. Thus the stratagem of Dr. Clarke completely succeeded . . . .”

There is more in this than the mere resistance to a new idea. This was a particular new idea: in this fashion the seedling whence has spread the vast forest
of our modern cultural inheritance went unwatered. The forest is no more marvellous than the seedling. Each new fruit that ripens there bears some new and astonishing quality. Here is the pace-maker for Professor Clarence Skinner’s hurrying and skurrings across the Atlantic. The secret of such fruitfulness could be kept from men and women and the fruits denied to them so long as the central principle could be kept out of politics. Douglas has opened the door to it and has let it in.

VOX POPULI VOX DEI.

CHAPTER VII.

The principles of social dynamics look as odd and unsophisticated to the eye of political orthodoxy as Newton’s lemmata did to theologians.

Whether or not it is desirable that individuals should be competent to give advice concerning the means whereby their complex wants should be supplied, no one living is, so that all collectively cannot be. Their competence may be, and is, distributed among them.

To take an example, and a simple example (since generations of effort have been expended upon confusing the public mind on this plain issue):--

Let us define a “want” as something which ceases when it is “supplied”--and ceases only when it is “supplied” in circumstances completely free from restraint. e.g., If nothing in the circumstances could be assigned to restrain ten children from eating buns, and in a period of time the ten children ate $22 \frac{1}{2}$ buns, $22 \frac{1}{2}$ cease to be (as buns) and the “want” of $22 \frac{1}{2}$ buns has been “supplied.” The children “got what they wanted” and what they
got was what they wanted. Here $22 \frac{1}{2}$ buns equal one want. (The reader’s sympathy with academic economists who do not know the meaning of these long words, “buns,” “got,” “wanted,” is, alas! wasted.)

And now to our illustration:
Postulate ten wants (as defined), one means of supplying each want, and ten men each requiring to be supplied in respect of the ten wants. (The writer’s own sympathy with academic economists permits him to offer the “crib.”: there are ten wants).

All the elements are present of a complex society which might have a tyrannical form of government, or a democratic form of government, or no form of government at all.

Let each of the ten men know how to supply one want, or let each of five of them know how to supply two, or let one know how to supply ten: then,
(1) Each man does not know how to supply nine of the wants, or
(2) Five men do not know how to supply eight of the wants and five do not know how to supply any want, or
(3) Nine men do not know how to supply any want and there is nothing material that one man does not know.

Now if it is necessary for a majority to have knowledge of how to do things in order that they may be done correctly, case by case.

(1) Ten men ignorantly determine nine questions each = 90 ignorant determinations; ten men determine a question apiece with knowledge = ten determinations in the light of knowledge: a nine to one majority against a correct determination of the correct means to supply all the wants of the society.

(2) Five men ignorantly determine eight questions each = 40; and five men ignorantly determine ten questions each = 50. Total 90 ignorant determinations. Five men have knowledge to determine two questions a piece = 10. Ratio 90:10.

(3) Nine men ignorantly determine ten wants apiece = 90 ignorant determinations, while one man determines 10 in the light of knowledge: as before a nine to one majority against a correct determination.

Except by the operation of “deference” this society would not go to the polls twice unless the period between elections were very short and all the electors had a good meal immediately before the first election.

While the demonstration is conclusively against the practicability of the democratic settlement of technical matters (in our community a few men know how to do what millions do not know how to do), it will doubtless be contended that by some subtle device means are reduced in number to a few “key” means, and some indeed will contend that these may be further reduced to a simple “master-key,” e.g., Socialism, Communism, Liberalism, Conservatism.
It is not necessary to contest this issue, for the simple reason that such “master keys” are as indefinitely definable before the electorate as before the acid test of results. It is not possible to turn a lock with the colour of a piece of paper borrowed for the purpose of designing a key: and these master-keys are mere colour—Red, Tricolour, Yellow, Blue. They test nothing unless the public’s capacity for deception. The test is the turned lock and the open door.

Returning then to our little community. There are:

(1) Ten men,

(2) Ten wants,

(3) Ten means.

What is required to keep that community alive and perfectly functioning is that the ten means should be so applied as to supply the ten men with their ten wants. In other words, what is required is to get it going.

This is a matter of social dynamics.

Lest it should interfere with complete understanding of the point, the “willingness” of some or any of the ten men in respect of the supply of wants is not assumed. “The means” are assumed. They may not involve the men at all.

What does involve the men is this, and, in the last analysis, nothing but this:—That the ten wants are, in fact, supplied: that the mechanism goes to the end for which it was designed.

In our time the concept of design in society has largely been replaced by that of growth. The substitution is unimportant. Locke considered the ends of society and government as things

“which men would not quit the State of nature for, and tie themselves up under, were it not to preserve their lives, liberties and fortunes.”

In Douglas’s words:

“The end of man, while unknown, is something towards which most rapid progress is made by the free expansion of individuality . . . Therefore economic organisation is most efficient when it most easily and rapidly supplies economic wants without encroaching on other functional activities.”

Whichever formula one may prefer, few men, if any, will deny that society exists for the convenience of men and women.

“By accident or design,” what would not be contradicted in words is effectually counter-acted in the event; and human communities have become the soulless instruments for the defeat of all human ends. While the food to feed, the clothing to cover and the materials to house, and a vast excess to support the enrichment of man’s life in every imaginable respect is available, man may not even be fruitful and multiply.

At a time when dissatisfaction with the ends attained in society is general, and the dangers which threaten it, imperfectly functioning as it is, are apparent to all and the grave concern of many, the adaptation of means to ends in the political sphere has never
been more assured of success. The ground is prepared. Finance-capitalism is a self-defeating mechanism, every movement of which is retreat to ever more and more absurd and precarious foothold. Yet its ground is Society’s own, so long as, shackled by debt, the world’s governments take step after step to perdition, dragging their peoples with them. Their peoples! Only so long as those peoples consent to forego their most fundamental right.

Policy, the end to be attained by legislators, is the sale part of government wholly within the competence of the people to determine.

And it is the sole part from which, while they do not will the contrary, they are ever to be excluded.

The issue, then, is clear as Douglas has expressed it:—

“Just as Economic Democracy demands that economic initiative as to objectives shall be governed by consumers’ requirements, so Political Democracy, if it is to become an effective reality, requires that political initiative, not as to means, but as to objectives, shall be vested in the people, not as a concession but as a dynamic right.”

Yet who is to “vest” it? There is none but the people. Denied in every office of government, in every counting-house, and in every bank-parlour, the directive of human progress and development lies in the vital intention of men and women, most irresistible when most opposed. It lies in the masses of the people. To them there remains one facility for expres-

sion: their parliament. For all practical purposes they have lost their power to choose who their representatives shall be or what capacities they shall possess. The caucuses have these powers fast in their hold. The people have not acquired and, in the nature of things, cannot acquire knowledge of how things they desire to be done can be done. “Time, the limitations of the human mind and the infinite complexity of modern technique prevent it. Yet they can say—

This I want done: this first: this before all other things:—
Abolish Poverty--mine and everyone’s. Do it!

Ingenious means for giving release to this evident and most certain and effective demand of the people--all people, for all are poor, in proportion to their capacity for creative enjoyment)--have been provided through the Electoral Campaign organised by the Social Credit Secretariat. Its details are now becoming familiar to thousands of English men and women every week. Through them there is being mobilised the will of the people, not shattered by the devices of government, great in disastrous resource as these have proved, but like the strawberry underneath the nettle

“Unseen, yet crescive in its faculty.”

No plans, no victory, no defeat, no modification or extension of the forms of government, no expectation and no hope have mattered or can matter until the sum of individual wills in our society can be added up to say “This way we go. This the aim of our endeavour, the crown of our achievement, the purpose of our lives. These are ours: our efforts, our strivings, our lives: our own. We will define the uses to which we
shall put them: our uses: at least not any other man’s."

Not the defeat but the attainment of democracy is the necessity of our time. Its will alone can restore a direction and a mind to “the insane body” of our generation. This is “the limited objective.”

Attained, the path of Evolution will be resumed among men. A natural environment, richer in opportunity than any race of creatures has ever inhabited, will be substituted for the narrow grooves which, consciously or unconsciously, by accident or design, by ignorance or by arrogance, have been “economically determined” for us for centuries. Whither these grooves lead is becoming more and more impressively and terrifyingly apparent. Whither the new and inevitable order will lead us is known to none.

Yet this we know: that man will continue to inhabit (if he chooses) this planet, and be limited and restrained by the same natural circumstances as now. There is one decisive rule which all living creatures must obey. They must be, and they must be viable. Being and living, capable of life, Man has the freedom of the earth, and from his new platform of material security may and inevitably will explore the possibilities of his freedom. If, in fertility and variety, he fall far short of the rest of nature he may, in material freedom, begin to emulate it. The new order is born. It matters not whether it have the loveliness of the lily or of the star. It will be.

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