

PERPETUAL WAR FOR
PERPETUAL PEACE

America goes not abroad in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example. She well knows that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign independence, she would involve herself beyond the power of extrication in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standards of freedom. The fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from liberty to force.

—JOHN QUINCY ADAMS

PERPETUAL WAR FOR PERPETUAL PEACE

A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF
FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT AND ITS AFTERMATH

Edited by
HARRY ELMER BARNES

with the collaboration of

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FREDERIC R. SANBORN, AND CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL

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DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF
CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD

Tribute to
CHARLES AUSTIN BEARD

Great eagle, knower of the skies,
Of windy portents, eclipses and the dust-blown mantracks
Crossing and recrossing in quicksands and stone.
Under his scrutiny the revealed bones
And girth of the past; the string-led figures; the gods in the
machine.
The great spirit flies, sifting the air, translating earth shapes against
the moving screen.
Tame pronouncers, parrots, gulls and shamans utter cries,
Communicate their shrill distress; declare him less than the familiar
apes.
But the shadow of the spirit enfolds them all,
And here and there with shielded eyes
People have seen the steady wings and far light striking them,
And here and there recall how long ago the fire was brought,
The vultures and the rock, and will remember him.

EUGENE DAVIDSON

PREFACE

This book is a critical survey and appraisal of the development of American foreign policy during the Presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt and of its results, as they have affected the course of world history, the national interest of the United States, and the welfare of its citizens.

It was originally conceived by the editor as an answer to Basil Rauch's *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, the first full-sized effort to whitewash the interventionist foreign policy of President Roosevelt. When the prospective contributors were approached, they, without exception, questioned the logic and wisdom of directing the fire of a piece of heavy artillery against a mouse, however sleek and pretentious. They suggested, instead, a comprehensive review of the interventionist foreign policy since 1937 which would constitute an effective and enduring answer to the whitewashing and blackout contingents as a group, present and future. The editor has deferred to their superior judgment. Professor Rauch's contentions, however, receive adequate attention, not only incidentally throughout the volume but directly in the chapter by Professor Lundberg.

The book here presented is not only an account of the actual course and aftermath of Roosevelt diplomacy, such as has already been factually and courageously set forth by George Morgenstern, Charles Austin Beard, Frederic R. Sanborn, William Henry Chamberlin, and Charles Callan Tansill, but it is also a consideration of the background and results of this diplomacy, and of the great

difficulties met today by historians, social scientists, and publicists who honestly seek to discover and publish the facts relative to the foreign policies of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. But the book is not a partisan polemic. The editor and the contributors fully recognize that more can be said in defense of the foreign policy of Messrs. Roosevelt and Truman than in behalf of the fantastic policy of their bipartisan Republican supporters, who cannot even invoke realistic political expediency in support of their attitude and conduct. Even much of the Republican criticism of the Roosevelt-Truman foreign policy boils down to little more than the allegation that it has not been sufficiently aggressive, ruthless, and global.

The title of this book was suggested to the editor by the late Charles Austin Beard in our last conversation. With characteristic cogency and incisiveness, Beard held that the foreign policy of Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, and of their ideological supporters, whether Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, or Communists, could most accurately and precisely be described by the phrase "perpetual war for perpetual peace." Events since that time (June, 1947) have further reinforced Beard's sagacity and insight in this respect. George Orwell's brilliant and profoundly prophetic novel, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, has since shown how a new political order throughout the world may be erected on the premises and implications of this goal of perpetual war, presented in the guise of a global struggle of free peoples for perpetual peace.

There is already alarming evidence that this is just the type of regime into which the world is now moving, consciously or unconsciously, as a result of the foreign policy forged by Roosevelt, Truman, Churchill, and Stalin. The main practical purpose of this volume is to acquaint the American public with this fact before we reach the "point of no return" and it is too late to revise our course and resume a sane foreign policy, based on continentalism, national interest, ideological coexistence, international urbanity, and rational co-operation in world affairs. If trends continue as they have during the last fifteen years we shall soon reach this point of no return, and can only anticipate interminable wars, disguised as noble gestures for peace. Such an era could only culminate in a third world war which might well, as Arnold J. Toynbee has sug-

gested, leave only the pygmies in remote jungles, or even the apes and ants, to carry on "the cultural traditions" of mankind.

The contributors to this volume represent the outstanding living revisionist historians, social scientists, and publicists who have thus far contributed actively to the furtherance of revisionist studies relative to the second World War. Each is a specialist in the field which he treats in his chapter. An effort has been made to cover adequately all the main aspects of the recent foreign policy of the United States.

The editor deals with the blackout of material concerning the revisionist position relative to responsibility for the second World War and the cold war. Professor Tansill covers the European background of the origins of the second World War and the development of Japanese-American relations to the eve of Pearl Harbor. Dr. Sanborn describes the origins of the interventionist foreign policy of President Roosevelt, his words and actions bearing on European diplomacy prior to the outbreak of the second World War, the flagrant and ever-increasing violations of neutrality by the Roosevelt administration, and the fruitless efforts of Mr. Roosevelt to induce Germany and Italy to react to this policy by making a declaration of war on the United States. Professor Neumann treats the broader background of the American attitude of studied hostility toward Japan, as exemplified in the diplomacy of Secretaries Stimson and Hull and of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, including also the menacing naval policy of the latter. Mr. Morgenstern provides us with a succinct survey of the diplomacy and events that led into and through Pearl Harbor. Mr. Greaves relates the scandalous story of fakery and evasion involved in most of the investigations of responsibility for Pearl Harbor and the attempts to discredit such of the investigations as did honestly seek to ascertain the truth. Mr. Chamberlin handles crisply the evidence relating to the complete bankruptcy of the Roosevelt-Hull-Stimson-Morgenthau foreign policy and the incredible and enduring calamities it has imposed on the world of today. Professor Lundberg subjects to sociological analysis the contesting trends in American foreign policy: the continentalism and neutrality which gave us security, prosperity, and peace, and the global meddling which has reduced

our liberties, faced us with national fiscal bankruptcy, plunged us into two world wars and headed us ominously toward a third, destroyed our security, and undermined public morale and official integrity.

Those readers who are stimulated to pursue further the subjects touched upon in any or all of these chapters will find ample guidance to more detailed literature in the footnotes or bibliographies of these chapters. There is no probability that later evidence will require any moderation of the indictment of our foreign policy since 1914, and, especially, since 1933. If there were any still secret material which would brighten the record of the Roosevelt and Truman foreign policies, we may rest assured that their court historians and publicity agents would have revealed it to the public long ere this.

There is no doubt that the opponents of truth and realism relative to recent world history and to American foreign policy will seek to smear this book as an example of, and appeal to, isolationism. Such criticism is as silly as it is inevitable today. The authors are all widely travelled men. They are all students of world affairs and of those changes in world conditions which have brought the peoples of the world into closer relationships, at least so far as the agencies of communication and transportation and their cultural impact are concerned. They know that the world has changed since the days of Abraham Lincoln. They favor the utmost possible development in the way of international contacts, relationships, and understanding, and amicable co-operation between the United States and other countries of the world.

The only "isolationism" they embrace is isolation from global meddling and from interference in foreign quarrels which do not vitally concern the interests or security of the United States. They wish isolation from a foreign policy which has brought increasing misery, chaos, and decimation to the world since April, 1917, without any notable improvement in world conditions or in the safety and prosperity of our own country. They favor the abandonment of a policy which has increased the number and strength of our foreign enemies, reduced the number and paralyzed the power of our potential friends abroad, and undermined the economic secu-

riety and political integrity of our nation. They see no reason to doubt that our traditional foreign policy of neutrality, continentalism, and friendly collaboration is more likely to contribute to domestic felicity and military security than global meddling and interventionism, the net result of which has been brilliantly summarized by Mr. Chamberlin as "intellectual, moral, political, and economic bankruptcy, complete and irretrievable." Over against this we have the record of our traditional neutrality, which kept the United States free from any major foreign war for a century and both permitted and encouraged civil liberty, economic expansion, financial solvency, national prosperity, and governmental economy.

The editor is deeply indebted to Mr. Eugene F. Hoy, of The Caxton Printers, Ltd., for faithful, efficient, and extensive assistance in preparing the manuscript for the printer. The Index was compiled by Mr. Charles N. Lurie, of New York City.

HARRY ELMER BARNES

Cooperstown, New York

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PERPETUAL WAR FOR
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1

REVISIONISM AND THE HISTORICAL BLACKOUT

by

HARRY ELMER BARNES

The revisionist search for truth relative to the causes of the second World War is "serious, unfortunate, deplorable."

—SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, *Journal of Modern History*, March, 1947

One thing ought to be evident to all of us: by our victory over Germany and Japan, no matter what our folly in losing the peace, we have at least survived to confront the second even greater menace of another totalitarian power.

—SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, *New York Times*, October 15, 1950

The folklore of war, of course, begins long before the fighting is done; and, by the time the last smoke has drifted away, this folklore has congealed into a "truth" of a neolithic hardness.

—STEWART H. HOLBROOK, *Lost Men of American History*, p. 42

Harry Elmer Barnes was born near Auburn, New York, on June 15, 1889. He attended Port Byron High School and Syracuse University, receiving his A.B. degree from the latter institution *summa cum laude* in 1913. He received his Ph.D. degree from Columbia University in 1918. While at Columbia he was University Fellow in Historical Sociology and Cutting Travelling Fellow in History. He has taught history and historical sociology at Syracuse University, Barnard College, Columbia University, Clark University, Smith College, Amherst College, Temple University, the University of Colorado, the University of Indiana, and in many university summer schools throughout the country. His most important historical writings are *The History of Western Civilization* (2 vols., 1935); and *An Intellectual and Cultural History of the Western World* (1937). Preserved Smith declared that the former is "incontestably the masterpiece of the New History."

Dr. Barnes's chief works in the field of diplomatic history and international relations are *The Genesis of the World War* (1926); *In Quest of Truth and Justice* (1928); and *World Politics in Modern Civilization* (1930). He also edited the important series of six volumes on *American Investments Abroad: Studies in American Imperialism* (1928-35), sponsored by the American Fund for Public Service.

Of the *Genesis*, Carl Becker wrote that it was "a marvellously straight, swift, cogent presentation of facts and conclusions," and William L. Langer declared that the facts about the responsibility for the first World War "could not be more successfully presented at the present stage of our historical knowledge." He took the lead, with the above-mentioned three books and earlier reviews and articles, in arousing popular interest in the causes of the first World War, with the result that the chief authority on the literature of this subject, Dr. George Peabody Gooch, asserted that "No other American scholar has done so much to familiarize his countrymen with the new evidence, and to compel them to revise their wartime judgments in the light of this new material." In his substantial brochure, *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, he has once more become the pioneer in directing public attention to the subject of Revisionism, as bearing on the causes of the second World War, and to the great obstacles to the discovery and publication of truth in this field.

NOTE.—*The biographical material preceding the individual chapters has been written by the editor. Any superlatives or other praise accorded the contributors represent his wishes, judgment, and responsibility exclusively, except in the case of himself, where he has cited the opinions of others.*

I. HOW WAR HAS TRANSFORMED THE AMERICAN DREAM INTO A NIGHTMARE

The first World War and American intervention therein marked an ominous turning point in the history of the United States and of the world. Those who can remember "the good old days" before 1914 inevitably look back to those times with a very definite and justifiable feeling of nostalgia. There was no income tax before 1913, and that levied in the early days after the amendment was adopted was little more than nominal. All kinds of taxes were relatively low. We had only a token national debt of around a billion dollars, which could have been paid off in a year without causing even a ripple in national finance. The total Federal budget in 1913 was \$724,512,000, just about one per cent of the present astronomical budget.

Ours was a libertarian country in which there was little or no witch-hunting and few of the symptoms and operations of the police state which have been developing here so drastically during the last decade. Not until our intervention in the first World War had there been sufficient invasions of individual liberties to call forth the formation of special groups and organizations to protect our civil rights. The Supreme Court could still be relied on to uphold the Constitution and safeguard the civil liberties of individual citizens.

Libertarianism was also dominant in Western Europe. The Liberal Party governed England from 1905 to 1914. France had risen above the reactionary coup of the Dreyfus affair, had separated Church and State, and had seemingly established the Third Republic with reasonable permanence on a democratic and liberal basis. Even Hohenzollern Germany enjoyed the usual civil liberties, had strong constitutional restraints on executive tyranny, and had established a workable system of parliamentary government. Ex-

perts on the history of Austria-Hungary have recently been proclaiming that life in the Dual Monarchy after the turn of the century marked the happiest period in the experience of the peoples encompassed therein. Constitutional government, democracy, and civil liberties prevailed in Italy. Despite the suppression of the Liberal Revolution of 1905, liberal sentiment was making headway in Tsarist Russia and there was decent prospect that a constitutional monarchy might be established. Civilized states expressed abhorrence of dictatorial and brutal policies. Edward VII of England blacklisted Serbia after the court murders of 1903.

Enlightened citizens of the Western world were then filled with buoyant hope for a bright future for humanity. It was believed that the theory of progress had been thoroughly vindicated by historical events. Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, published in 1888, was the prophetic bible of that era.¹ People were confident that the amazing developments in technology would soon produce abundance, security, and leisure for the multitude.

In this optimism in regard to the future no item was more evident and potent than the assumption that war was an outmoded nightmare. Not only did idealism and humanity repudiate war but Norman Angell and others were assuring us that war could not be justified, even on the basis of the most sordid material interest. Those who adopted a robust international outlook were devoted friends of peace, and virtually all international movements had as their sole aim the devising and implementing of ways and means to assure permanent peace. Friends of peace were nowhere isolationist, in any literal sense, but they did stoutly uphold the principle of neutrality and sharply criticized provocative meddling in every political dogfight in the most remote reaches of the planet.

In our own country, the traditional American foreign policy of benign neutrality, and the wise exhortations of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams and Henry Clay to avoid entangling alliances and to shun foreign quarrels were still accorded respect in the highest councils of state.

Unfortunately, there are relatively few persons today who can recall those happy times. In his devastatingly prophetic book, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*,² George Orwell points out that one reason why

it is possible for those in authority to maintain the barbarities of the police state is that nobody is able to recall the many blessings of the period which preceded that type of society. In a general way this is also true of the peoples of the Western world today. The great majority of them have known only a world ravaged by war, depressions, international intrigues and meddling, vast debts and crushing taxation, the encroachments of the police state, and the control of public opinion and government by ruthless and irresponsible propaganda. A major reason why there is no revolt against such a state of society as that in which we are living today is that many have come to accept it as a normal matter of course, having known nothing else during their lifetimes.

A significant and illuminating report on this situation came to me recently in a letter from one of the most distinguished social scientists in the country and a resolute revisionist. He wrote: "I am devoting my seminar this quarter to the subject of American foreign policy since 1933. The effect upon a Roosevelt-bred generation is startling, indeed. Even able and mature students react to the elementary facts like children who have just been told that there is (or was) no Santa Claus." This is also an interesting reflection on the teaching of history today. The members of the seminar were graduate students, nearly all of whom had taken courses in recent American and European history which covered in some detail the diplomacy of Europe and the United States during the last twenty years.

A friend who read the preceding material suggested that laboring men would be likely to give me a "horselaugh." That some would is no doubt true, but the essential issue would be the validity of the grounds for so doing. Being a student of the history of labor problems, I am aware of many gains for labor since 1914. I can well remember when the working day was ten hours long and the pay was \$1.50. But I can also remember when good steak cost fifteen cents a pound and the best whisky eighty-five cents a quart. Moreover, the father, even if he earned only \$1.50 a day, had every assurance that he could raise his family with his sons free from the shadow of the draft and butchery in behalf of politicians. The threat of war did not hang over him. There are some forms of

tyranny worse than that of an arbitrary boss in a nonunion shop. Finally, when one considers the increased cost of living and the burden of taxation, it is doubtful if a man who earns \$8.00 a day now is any better off materially than his father or grandfather who earned \$1.50 in 1900.

For the sad state of the world today, the entry of the United States into two world wars has played a larger role than any other single factor. Some might attribute the admittedly unhappy conditions of our time to other items and influences than world wars and our intervention in them. No such explanation can be sustained. Indeed, but for our entry into the two world wars, we should be living in a far better manner than we did before 1914. The advances in technology since that time have brought the automobile into universal use, have given us good roads, and have produced the airplane, radio, moving pictures, television, electric lighting and refrigeration, and numerous other revolutionary contributions to human service, happiness, and comforts. If all this had been combined with the freedom, absence of high taxation, minimum indebtedness, low armament expenditures, and pacific outlook of pre-1914 times, the people of the United States might, right now, be living in Utopian security and abundance.

A radio commentator recently pointed out that one great advantage we have today over 1900 is that death from disease has been reduced and life expectancy considerably increased. But this suggests the query as to whether this is any real gain, in the light of present world conditions: Is it an advantage to live longer in a world of "thought-policing," economic austerity, crushing taxation, inflation, and perpetual warmongering and wars?

The rise and influence of Communism, military state capitalism, the police state, and the impending doom of civilization, have been the penalty exacted for our meddling abroad in situations which did not materially affect either our security or our prestige. Our national security was not even remotely threatened in the case of either World War. There was no clear moral issue impelling us to intervene in either world conflict. The level of civilization was lowered rather than elevated by our intervention.

While the first World War headed the United States and the

world toward international disaster, the second World War was an even more calamitous turning point in the history of mankind. It may, indeed, have brought us—and the whole world—into the terminal episode of human experience. It certainly marked the transition from social optimism and technological rationalism into the “Nineteen Eighty-Four” pattern of life, in which aggressive international policies and war scares have become the guiding factor, not only in world affairs but also in the domestic, political, and economic strategy of every leading country of the world. The police state has emerged as the dominant political pattern of our times, and military state capitalism is engulfing both democracy and liberty in countries which have not succumbed to Communism.

The manner and extent to which American culture has been impaired and our well-being undermined by our entry into two world wars has been brilliantly and succinctly stated by Professor Mario A. Pei, of Columbia University, in an article on “The America We Lost” in the *Saturday Evening Post*, May 3, 1952, and has been developed more at length by Garet Garrett in his trenchant book, *The People’s Pottage*.

Perhaps, by the mid-century, all this is now water under the bridge and little can be done about it. But we can surely learn how we got into this unhappy condition of life and society—at least until the police-state system continues its current rapid development sufficiently to obliterate all that remains of integrity and accuracy in historical writing and political reporting.

II. REVISIONISM AFTER TWO WORLD WARS

The readjustment of historical writing to historical facts relative to the background and causes of the first World War—what is popularly known in the historical craft as “Revisionism”—was the

most important development in historiography during the decade of the 1920's. While those historians at all receptive to the facts admitted that Revisionism readily won out in the conflict with the previously accepted wartime lore, many of the traditionalists in the profession remained true to the mythology of the war decade. Not so long ago one of the most eminent and revered of our professional historians, and a man who took a leading part in historical propaganda during the first World War, wrote that American historians had no reason to feel ashamed of their writings and operations in that period. That they had plenty to be ashamed of was revealed by C. Hartley Grattan in his article on "The Historians Cut Loose," in the *American Mercury*,³ reprinted in the form originally submitted to Mr. Mencken in my *In Quest of Truth and Justice*,⁴ and by Chapter XI of my *History of Historical Writing*.⁵ In any event, the revisionist controversy was the outstanding intellectual adventure in the historical field in the twentieth century down to Pearl Harbor.

Revisionism, when applied to the first World War, showed that the actual causes and merits of that conflict were very close to the reverse of the picture presented in the political propaganda and historical writings of the war decade. Revisionism would also produce similar results with respect to the second World War if it were allowed to develop unimpeded. But a determined effort is being made to stifle or silence revelations which would establish the truth with regard to the causes and issues of the late world conflict.

While the wartime mythology endured for years after 1918, nevertheless leading editors and publishers soon began to crave contributions which set forth the facts with respect to the responsibility for the outbreak of war in 1914, our entry into the war, and the basic issues involved in this great conflict. Sidney B. Fay began to publish his revolutionary articles on the background of the first World War in the *American Historical Review* in July, 1920. My own efforts along the same line began in the *New Republic*, the *Nation*, the *New York Times Current History Magazine*, and the *Christian Century* in 1924 and 1925. Without exception, the requests for my contributions came from the editors of these period-

icals, and these requests were ardent and urgent. I had no difficulty whatever in securing the publication of my *Genesis of the World War* in 1926, and the publisher thereof subsequently brought forth a veritable library of illuminating revisionist literature. By 1928, when Fay's *Origins of the World War*⁶ was published, almost everyone except the die-hards and bitter-enders in the historical profession had come to accept Revisionism, and even the general public had begun to think straight in the premises.

Quite a different situation faces the rise of any substantial Revisionism after the second World War. The question of war responsibility in relation to 1939 and 1941 is taken for granted as completely and forever settled. It is widely held that there can be no controversy this time. Since it is admitted by all reasonable persons that Hitler was a dangerous neurotic, who, with supreme folly, launched a war when he had everything to gain by peace, it is assumed that this takes care of the European aspects of the war-guilt controversy. With respect to the Far East, this is supposed to be settled with equal finality by asking the question: "Japan attacked us, didn't she?"

About as frequent as either of these ways of settling war responsibility for 1939 or 1941 is the vague but highly dogmatic statement that "we had to fight." This judgment is usually rendered as a sort of ineffable categorical imperative which requires no further explanation. But some who are pressed for an explanation will allege that we had to fight to save the world from domination by Hitler, forgetting General George C. Marshall's report that Hitler, far from having any plan for world domination, did not even have any well-worked-out plan for collaborating with his Axis allies in limited wars, to say nothing of the gigantic task of conquering Russia. Surely, after June 22, 1941, nearly six months before Pearl Harbor, there was no further need to fear any world conquest by Hitler.

Actually, if historians have any professional self-respect and feel impelled to take cognizance of facts, there is far greater need for a robust and aggressive campaign of Revisionism after the second World War than there was in the years following 1918. The current semantic folklore about the responsibility for the second World War which is accepted, not only by the public but also

by most historians, is far wider of the truth than even the most fantastic historical mythology which was produced after 1914. And the practical need for Revisionism is even greater now than it was in the decade of the 1920's.

The mythology which followed the outbreak of war in 1914 helped to produce the Treaty of Versailles and the second World War. If world policy today cannot be divorced from the mythology of the 1940's, a third world war is inevitable, and its impact will be many times more horrible and devastating than that of the second. The lessons learned from the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials have made it certain that the third world war will be waged with unprecedented savagery.

Vigorous as was the resistance of many, including powerful vested historical interests, to the Revisionism of the 1920's, it was as nothing compared to that which has been organized to frustrate and smother the truth relative to the second World War. Revisionists in the 1920's only risked a brisk controversy; those of today place in jeopardy both their professional reputation and their very livelihood at the hands of the "Smearbund." History has been the chief intellectual casualty of the second World War and the cold war which followed.

In many essential features, the United States has moved along into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" pattern of intellectual life.⁷ But there is one important and depressing difference. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four* Mr. Orwell shows that historians in that regime have to be hired by the government and forced to falsify facts. In this country today, and it is also true of most other nations, many professional historians gladly falsify history quite voluntarily, and with no direct cost to the government. The ultimate and indirect cost may, of course, be a potent contribution to incalculable calamity.

It may be said, with great restraint, that, never since the Middle Ages, have there been so many powerful forces organized and alerted against the assertion and acceptance of historical truth as are active today to prevent the facts about the responsibility for the second World War and its results from being made generally accessible to the American public. Even the great Rockefeller

Foundation frankly admits⁸ the subsidizing of historians to anticipate and frustrate the development of any neo-Revisionism in our time. And the only difference between this foundation and several others is that it has been more candid and forthright about its policies. The Sloan Foundation later supplemented this Rockefeller grant. Charles Austin Beard summarized the implications of such efforts with characteristic vigor:

The Rockefeller Foundation and the Council on Foreign Relations . . . intend to prevent, if they can, a repetition of what they call in the vernacular "the debunking journalistic campaign following World War I." Translated into precise English, this means that the Foundation and the Council do not want journalists or any other persons to examine too closely and criticize too freely the official propaganda and official statements relative to "our basic aims and activities" during World War II. In short, they hope that, among other things, the policies and measures of Franklin D. Roosevelt will escape in the coming years the critical analysis, evaluation and exposition that befell the policies and measures of Woodrow Wilson and the Entente Allies after World War I.⁹

As is the case with nearly all book publishers and periodicals, the resources of the great majority of the foundations are available only to scholars and writers who seek to perpetuate wartime legends and oppose Revisionism. A good illustration is afforded by my experience with the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation which helped to subsidize the book by Professors Langer and Gleason. I mentioned this fact in the first edition of my brochure on *The Court Historians versus Revisionism*. Thereupon I received a courteous letter from Mr. Alfred J. Zurcher, director of the Sloan Foundation, assuring me that the Sloan Foundation wished to be absolutely impartial and to support historical scholarship on both sides of the issue. He wrote in part: "About the last thing we wish to do is to check and frustrate any sort of historical scholarship since we believe that the more points of view brought to bear

by disciplined scholars upon the war or any other historical event is in the public interest and should be encouraged.”

In the light of this statement, I decided to take Mr. Zurcher at his word. I had projected and encouraged a study of the foreign policy of President Hoover, which appeared to me a very important and much needed enterprise, since it was during his administration that our foreign policy had last been conducted in behalf of peace and in the true public interest of the United States rather than in behalf of some political party, foreign government, or dubious ideology. One of the most competent of American specialists in diplomatic history had consented to undertake the project, and he was a man not previously identified in any way with revisionist writing. My request was for exactly one thirtieth of the grant allotted for the Langer-Gleason book. The application was turned down by Mr. Zurcher with the summary statement: “I regret that we are unable to supply the funds which you requested for Professor ——’s study.” He even discouraged my suggestion that he discuss the idea in a brief conference with the professor in question.

A state of abject terror and intimidation exists among the majority of professional American historians whose views accord with the facts on the question of responsibility for the second World War. Several leading historians and publicists who have read my brochure on *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout* have written me stating that, on the basis of their own personal experience, it is an understatement of the facts. Yet the majority of those historians to whom it has been sent privately have feared even to acknowledge that they have received it or possess it. Only a handful have dared to express approval and encouragement. It is no exaggeration to say that the American Smearbund, operating through newspaper editors and columnists, “hatchet-men” book reviewers, radio commentators, pressure-group intrigue and espionage, and academic pressures and fears, has accomplished about as much in the way of intimidating honest intellectuals in this country as Hitler, Goebbels, Himmler, the Gestapo, and concentration camps were able to do in Nazi Germany.¹⁰

The mental stalemate produced by this state of mind is well

illustrated in the review by Professor Fred Harvey Harrington of Professor Charles C. Tansill's *Back Door to War* in the *Political Science Quarterly*, December, 1952. Harrington, in private a moderate revisionist, goes so far as to state that there is "no documentation" for Professor Tansill's statement that the "main objective in American foreign policy since 1900 has been the preservation of the British Empire." This may be compared with the appraisal of the book by a resolute and unafraid revisionist, the eminent scholar, Professor George A. Lundberg, who, in a review in *Social Forces*, April, 1953, said with regard to the above contention by Tansill: "This thesis is documented to the hilt in almost 700 large pages."

Moreover, the gullibility of many "educated" Americans has been as notable as the mendacity of the "educators." In Communist Russia and Nazi Germany, as well as in Fascist Italy, and in China, the tyrannical rulers found it necessary to suppress all opposition thought in order to induce the majority of the people to accept the material fed them by official propaganda. But, in the United States, with almost complete freedom of the press, speech, and information down to the end of 1941, great numbers of Americans followed the official propaganda line with no compulsion whatever. This is a remarkable and ominous contrast, especially significant because it has been the "educated" element which has been most gullible in accepting official mythology, taking the population as a whole. And this situation has continued since 1945, though of course the public has been less able to get the truth from the avenues of information since V-J Day than it was before Pearl Harbor.

The opposition to Revisionism—that is, to truth in the premises—stems in part from emotional fixation on the mythology built up after 1937 and in part from personal loyalty to President Roosevelt and the naturally resulting desire to preserve the impeccability of the Roosevelt legend. In regard to the latter, the Roosevelt adulators are much more solicitous about defending their late chief's foreign policy than they are in upholding the infallibility of his much more creditable domestic program. There is, of course, a powerful vested political interest in perpetuating the accepted

mythology about the causes, issues, and results of the second World War, for much of the public policy of the victorious United Nations since 1945 can only make sense and be justified on the basis of this mythology.

In the United States it was made the ideological basis of the political strategy of the Democratic party and the main political instrument by which it maintained itself in power until 1953. It has also been accepted by many outstanding leaders of the opposition party. It has been indispensable in arousing support for the economic policies which have been used to ward off a depression, with its probably disastrous political reverberations. The eminent railroad executive and astute commentator on world affairs, Robert R. Young, has stated the facts here with realistic clarity in the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle*:

The clash between a foreign policy which makes sense to Americans and a foreign policy which makes sense to those who seek to perpetuate political office (patronage or prominence) is one which will only be resolved by prohibiting reelection. We are very naïve when we describe American foreign policy of recent years as stupid. Indeed, that foreign policy has accomplished its object for it has kept in power (patronage and prominence), election after election, those who conceived and facilitated it.

Powerful pressure groups have also found the mythology helpful in diverting attention from their own role in national and world calamity.

In addition to the opposition of public groups to the truth about responsibility for the second World War, many historians and other social scientists have a strong professional and personal interest in perpetuating the prewar and wartime mythology. One reason why numerous historians opposed the truth relative to responsibility for the first World War and the main issues therein was that so many of them had taken an active part in spreading the wartime propaganda and had also worked for Colonel House's committee in preparing material for the peacemaking. A considerable number

of them went to Paris with President Wilson on his ill-fated adventure. Naturally they were loath to admit that the enterprise in which they had played so prominent a part had proved to be both a fraud and a failure.

Today, this situation has been multiplied many fold. Historians and other social scientists veritably swarmed into the various war-time agencies after 1941, especially the Office of War Information and the Office of Strategic Services. They were intimately associated with the war effort and with the shaping of public opinion to conform to the thesis of the pure and limpid idealism and ethereal innocence of the United States and our exclusive devotion to self-defense and world betterment through the sword. Hence, the opposition of historians and social scientists to truth about the responsibility for the second World War and its obvious results is many times greater than it was in the years following the close of the first World War. Since the war several corps of court historians have volunteered to work to continue the elaboration of official mythology. In addition, the State Department and the Army and Navy have a great swarm of historians dedicated to presenting history as their employers wish it to be written, and at the present time there is a new influx of American historians and social scientists into our "Ministry of Truth."¹¹

III. HOW THE HISTORICAL BLACKOUT OPERATES

The methods followed by the various groups interested in blacking out the truth about world affairs since 1932 are numerous and ingenious, but, aside from subterranean persecution of individuals, they fall mainly into the following patterns or categories: (1) excluding scholars suspected of revisionist views from access to public documents which are freely opened to "court historians" and other apologists for the foreign policy of President Roosevelt; (2) intimi-

dating publishers of books and periodicals, so that even those who might wish to publish books and articles setting forth the revisionist point of view do not dare to do so; (3) ignoring or obscuring published material which embodies revisionist facts and arguments; and (4) smearing revisionist authors and their books.

1. DENYING ACCESS TO PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

There is a determined effort to block those suspected of seeking the truth from having access to official documents, other than those which have become public property. The outstanding official and court historians, such as Samuel Eliot Morison, William L. Langer, Herbert Feis, and the like, are given free access to the official archives. Only such things as the most extreme top secrets, like the so-called Kent Documents and President Roosevelt's communications with King George VI, carefully guarded at Hyde Park, are denied to them. Otherwise, they have freedom of access to official documents and the important private diaries of leading public officials.

Many of these important sources are, however, completely sealed off from any historian who is suspected of desiring to ascertain the full and unbiased truth with respect to American foreign policy since 1933. The man who is probably the outstanding scholarly authority on American diplomatic history found himself barred from many of the more important documents. Moreover, many of the notes which he had taken down from those documents he had been permitted to examine were later confiscated by State Department officials.

If the complete official documents would support the generally accepted views with respect to the causes and issues of the war, there would seem to be no reasonable objection to allowing any reputable historian to have free and unimpeded access to such materials. As Charles Austin Beard concisely stated the matter, "Official archives must be open to all citizens on equal terms, with special privileges for none; inquiries must be wide and deep as well as uncensored; and the competition of ideas in the forum of public opinion must be free from political interests or restraints."¹²

The importance of freedom of the archives to writers of sound historical material has also been commented upon by the editor of the London *Times Literary Supplement* of April 18, 1952, in relation to the appearance of Professors William L. Langer and S. E. Gleason's *The Struggle Against Isolation, 1937-1940*, which was produced by the Rockefeller Foundation subsidy mentioned above:

Once the principle is accepted that governments grant access to their archives to certain chosen historians and refuse it to others, it would be unrealistic to ignore the temptation that may arise in the future to let the choice fall on historians who are most likely to share the official view of the moment and to yield readily to discreet official promptings as to what is suitable, and what is unsuitable, for publication. When this happens, the last barrier on the road to "official history" will have fallen.

2. DIFFICULTIES IN PUBLISHING REVISIONIST MATERIALS

Some might sense that there is a seeming inconsistency between the statement that there has been an attempt to black out Revisionism after the second World War and the undoubted fact that important revisionist books have appeared sooner and in greater number since the second World War than they did after 1918. This gratifying situation in no way contradicts what has been said above relative to the far more vigorous opposition to Revisionism since 1945. Nearly all publishers were happy to publish revisionist volumes after 1918, or at least after 1923. But not a single major publisher has issued a revisionist book since 1945; neither is there any evidence that one will do so for years to come. Had not Charles Austin Beard possessed a devoted friend in Eugene Davidson of the Yale University Press, and had not the firms of Henry Regnery and Devin-Adair been in existence, it is very likely that not one revisionist book would have come from the press following V-J Day. For not only are historians who seek to establish the truth prevented from getting much of the material which they need, they also find it very difficult to secure the publication of books

embodying such of the truth as they have been able to assemble from the accessible documents.

It would, naturally, be assumed that the first book to give the full inside information on the attack at Pearl Harbor would have been an exciting publishing adventure and that the manuscript would have been eagerly sought after by any and all book-publishing firms. Such, however, was far from the facts. After canvassing the publishing opportunities, George Morgenstern found that the Devin-Adair Company was the only one which had the courage to bring out his brilliant book, *Pearl Harbor: the Story of the Secret War*, in 1947.¹³

Charles Austin Beard informed me that he was so convinced that none of his former commercial publishers would print his critical account of the Roosevelt foreign policy¹⁴ that he did not regard it as even worth while to inquire. He was fortunate enough to have a courageous friend who was head of one of the most important university presses in the country.

The fourth important revisionist book to push its way through the blackout ramparts was William Henry Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade*.¹⁵ The history of the publication difficulties in connection with the book showed that, in the publishing world, there was no more inclination in 1950 than there had been previously to welcome the truth with respect to President Roosevelt's foreign policy and the second World War.

Chamberlin is a distinguished author. He has written many important books and they have been published by leading publishing houses. But none of his former commercial publishers was interested in the manuscript, though it is probably the most timely and important work Chamberlin has written. The head of one large publishing house, himself a noted publicist, declared his deep personal interest in the book but stated that he did not feel it ethical to jeopardize the financial interests of his company through risking retaliation from the blackout contingent. Two university presses turned down the manuscript, though in each case the director attested to the great merit of the book. That it was finally brought out was due to the courage and public spirit of Henry Regnery, who has published more realistic books relative to the second

World War than all other American publishers combined. Yet Chamberlin's work is neither sensational nor extreme. It is no more than an honest and actually restrained statement of the facts that every American citizen needs to have at hand if we are to avoid involvement in a devastating, fatal "third crusade."

A fifth revisionist book, *Design for War*, by an eminent New York attorney and expert on international law, Frederic R. Sanborn, appeared early in 1951. It was published by the Devin-Adair Company which brought out Mr. Morgenstern's volume.

The sixth and definitive revisionist volume, Professor Charles Callan Tansill's *Back Door to War: The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941*, was published by Regnery. Professor Tansill's previous publishers were not interested in the book.

In a trenchant article on "A Case History in Book Publishing," in the *American Quarterly*, Winter, 1949, the distinguished university press editor, W. T. Couch, tells of the difficulties met with in inducing commercial publishers to print revisionist books, and he goes into detail about the problems encountered in securing a publisher for A. Frank Reel's courageous book, *The Case of General Yamashita*.

As a matter of fact, only two small publishing houses in the United States—the Henry Regnery Company and the Devin-Adair Company—have shown any consistent willingness to publish books which frankly aim to tell the truth with respect to the causes and issues of the second World War. Leading members of two of the largest publishing houses in the country have told me that, whatever their personal wishes in the circumstances, they would not feel it ethical to endanger their business and the property rights of their stockholders by publishing critical books relative to American foreign policy since 1933. And there is good reason for this hesitancy. The book clubs and the main sales outlets for books are controlled by powerful pressure groups which are opposed to truth on such matters. These outlets not only refuse to market critical books in this field but also threaten to boycott other books by those publishers who defy their blackout ultimatum.

When such critical books do get into the bookstores, the sales department frequently refuses to display or promote them. It re-

quired the personal intervention of the head of America's largest retail store to insure that one of the leading critical volumes was displayed upon the counter of the book department of the store. In the *American Legion Monthly*, February, 1951, Irene Kuhn revealed the efforts of many bookstores to discourage the buying of books critical of administration foreign policy. A striking example of how blackout pressures are able to discourage the sale of revisionist books is the experience at Macy's, in New York City, with the Chamberlin book. Macy's ordered fifty copies and returned forty as unsold. If the book could have been distributed on its merits, Macy's would certainly have sold several thousand copies.

Not only are private sales discouraged, but equally so are sales to libraries. Mr. Regnery discovered that, six months after its publication, there was not one copy of the Chamberlin book in any of the forty-five branches of the New York City Public Library. Another sampling study of the situation in libraries throughout the country showed that the same situation prevailed in most of the nation's libraries, not only in respect to the Chamberlin book, but also in the case of other revisionist volumes like John T. Flynn's *The Roosevelt Myth*.¹⁶ Some of the reasons for this are explained by Oliver Carlson in an article on "Slanted Guide to Library Selections" in *The Freeman*, January 14, 1952. As an example, the most influential librarian in the United States has described George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* as "paranoia in literature."

The attempt to suppress or exclude revisionist materials from publication extends beyond the book-publishing trade. Whereas, in the late 1920's and early 1930's, all of the more important periodicals were eager to publish competent revisionist articles by reputable scholars, no leading American magazine will today bring out a frank revisionist article, no matter what the professional distinction of the author. Most of them, indeed, even refuse to review revisionist books. The *Progressive* has been the only American periodical which has, with fair consistency, kept its columns open to such material, and its circulation is very limited.

While the periodicals are closed to neo-revisionist materials, they are, of course, wide open and eager for anything which continues the wartime mythology. If the authors of such mythology

did not feel reasonably assured that answers to their articles could not be published, it is unlikely that they would risk printing such amazing whitewash as that by General Sherman Miles on "Pearl Harbor in Retrospect," in the *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1948, and Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison's vehement attack on Charles Austin Beard in the August, 1948, issue of the same magazine.

Now, Admiral Morison is an able historian of nautical matters and a charming man personally. But his pretensions to anything like objectivity in weighing responsibility for the second World War can hardly be sustained. In his Foreword to Morison's *Battle of the Atlantic*, the late James Forrestal let the cat out of the bag. He revealed that, as early as 1942, Morison had suggested to President Roosevelt that the right kind of history of naval operations during the war should be written, and modestly offered his "services" to do the job so as to reflect proper credit upon the administration. Roosevelt and Secretary Knox heartily agreed to this proposition and Morison was given a commission as captain in the Naval Reserve to write the official history of naval operations in the second World War.

If Roosevelt and Knox were alive today, they would have no reason to regret their choice of an historian. But, as a "court historian" and "hired man," however able, of Roosevelt and Knox, Admiral Morison's qualifications to take a bow to von Ranke and pass stern judgment on the work of Beard, whom no administration or party was ever able to buy, are not convincing. President Truman's announcement in the newspapers on January 14, 1951, indicated that Morison's services have been recognized and that he is apparently to be court-historian-in-chief during the opening phases of our official entry into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" system.¹⁷ But Morison's various attacks on Beard were handled with appropriate severity by Professor Howard K. Beale in his address before the American Historical Association on December 28, 1952, published in the August, 1953, issue of the *Pacific Historical Review*.

Another example of the accessibility of our leading periodicals to antirevisionist materials was the publication of many articles smearing the reputation of Beard at the time of his death, some of the most bitter articles appearing in journals that had earlier re-

garded Beard as one of their most distinguished and highly welcome contributors.

Equally illustrative of the tendency to welcome any defense of the traditional mythology and exclude contrary opinions was the publication of the somewhat irresponsible article by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., on "Roosevelt and His Detractors" in the June, 1950, issue of *Harper's Magazine*. It was, obviously, proper for the editor to publish this article, but not equally defensible was his inability to "find space" for the publication of an answer, even by one of the outstanding contributors to *Harper's*.

Most of the professional historical magazines are as completely closed to the truth concerning the responsibility for and merits of the second World War, as are the popular periodicals. Likewise, the great majority of our newspapers are highly hostile to material questioning the traditional mythology about the causes and results of this war. The aversion of the *New York Times* to the truth about Pearl Harbor ten years later is dealt with below.¹⁸

3. IGNORING OR OBSCURING REVISIONIST BOOKS

In case a revisionist book squeezes through the publishing blackout, almost invariably as a result of the courage of the two small publishing companies mentioned above, the blackout strategists are well prepared to circumvent the possibility of its gaining any wide circulation or popular acceptance. The most common procedure is to accord such books the silent treatment, namely, to refuse to review them at all. As one powerful pressure group has pointed out, this is the most effective way of nullifying the potential influence of any book. Even highly hostile and critical reviews attract attention to a book and may arouse controversy which will further publicize it. The silent treatment assures a still-birth to virtually any volume. The late Oswald Garrison Villard recounts his own personal experience with the silent-treatment strategy of editors today:

"I myself rang up a magazine which some months previously had asked me to review a book for them and asked if they would accept another review from me. The answer was 'Yes, of course. What book had you in mind?' I replied, 'Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor*.'

“‘Oh, that’s that new book attacking F.D.R. and the war, isn’t it?’

“‘Yes.’

“‘Well, how do you stand on it?’

“‘I believe, since his book is based on the records of the Pearl Harbor inquiry, he is right.’

“‘Oh, we don’t handle books of that type. It is against our policy to do so.’”

The Henry Regnery Company of Chicago has been more courageous and prolific in the publication of substantial revisionist books than any other concern here or abroad.¹⁹ It has brought out such important books as Leonard von Muralt’s *From Versailles to Potsdam*; Hans Rothfels’ *The German Opposition to Hitler*; Victor Gollancz’s *In Darkest Germany*; Freda Utley’s *The High Cost of Vengeance*; Montgomery Belgion’s *Victor’s Justice*; Lord Hankey’s *Politics: Trials and Errors*; William Henry Chamberlin’s *America’s Second Crusade*; and Charles Callan Tansill’s *Back Door to War*. Mr. Regnery has shown me a careful survey of the treatment accorded these books by our leading newspapers and periodicals. Some have not been reviewed at all; most of them were reviewed sparingly. Almost invariably, when they have been noticed, they have been attacked with great ferocity and uniform unfairness.

The obscuring of the neo-revisionist material may further be illustrated by the space and position assigned to the reviews of Beard’s *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*, and Morgestern’s *Pearl Harbor* in the *American Historical Review* and in other leading newspapers and periodicals.

Despite the revolutionary nature and vast importance of the Beard book, it was given only a page in the *American Historical Review*, but, amusingly enough, the reviewer used the brief space at his disposal to praise the book. This was not allowed to happen again. Though Morgestern’s book was perhaps the most important single volume published in the field of American history in the year 1947, it was relegated to a book note in the *American Historical Review* and was roundly smeared.

Of all the book-reviewing columnists in New York City papers,

only one reviewed Morgenstern's book and he smeared it. The *Saturday Review of Literature* ignored it completely and so did most of the other leading periodicals. Though many infinitely less important books, from the standpoint of timeliness and intrinsic merit of content, received front-page positions therein, neither the Morgenstern book nor the Beard volume was given this place in the Sunday book-review sections of the *New York Times* or *Herald Tribune*. Had these books ardently defended the Roosevelt legend, they would assuredly have been assigned front-page positions. As Oswald Villard remarked of the Beard volume: "Had it been a warm approval of F.D.R. and his war methods, I will wager whatever press standing I have that it would have been featured on the first pages of the *Herald Tribune* 'Books' and the *Times* literary section and received unbounded praise from Walter Millis, Allan Nevins, and other similar axemen."

Mr. Villard's prophecy was vindicated after his death. When the supreme effort to salvage the reputation of Roosevelt and his foreign policy appeared in W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason's *Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*, it was promptly placed on the front page of the *Herald Tribune Book Review* of January 20, 1952, and praised in lavish fashion.

Beard's book on *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, was so challenging that it could not be ignored. But it did not gain front-page position in either the *New York Times* or the *Herald Tribune*. Though reviewed in a number of newspapers and periodicals, the majority of the reviewers sought to discredit the book rather than to examine its facts and arguments in a spirit of fairness and integrity.

Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade* was nowhere near as widely reviewed as the significance of the content of the book merited, irrespective of whether or not one agreed with all of the author's conclusions. It was the first comprehensive and critical appraisal of the nature and results of the most momentous project in which the United States was ever involved, politically, economically, or militarily. Hence, it merited careful and extended examination by every newspaper and periodical in the land. But it was reviewed in only a fraction of the leading newspapers, while most

of the important periodicals, including the *American Historical Review*, ignored it entirely. In the 1920's periodicals like the *New Republic* and the *Nation* would have reviewed a book of this type lyrically and at great length, and, in all probability, have published special articles and editorials praising it warmly. Most reviews which the Chamberlin book received were of the smearing variety. The *New York Times* and *Herald Tribune* both reviewed the book in hostile fashion, gave it very brief reviews, and placed these in an obscure position.

Frederic R. Sanborn's able and devastating *Design for War* received about the same treatment as the Chamberlin volume. It was ignored by the great majority of the newspapers and by virtually all the important periodicals. The *New York Times* reviewed the book rather promptly, if not conspicuously, but handed it over to their leading academic hatchet man, Samuel Flagg Bemis. Though prodded by Sanborn, the *Herald Tribune* delayed the review from March to August and then assigned it to Gordon A. Craig, a leading antirevisionist among the historians frequently employed by the *Times* and *Herald Tribune* in attacking books critical of Roosevelt foreign policy. Sanborn's book was not reviewed at all by *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New Yorker*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, *Harper's*, the *Atlantic Monthly*, or the *Saturday Review of Literature*, though Sanborn wrote letters of inquiry to all of them. Correspondence with the *Saturday Review of Literature* from April to the end of September failed to produce a review. If a comparable book had appeared at any time between 1923 and 1935, there is every reason to believe that the *Nation* and *New Republic*, for example, would have hailed it with near-hysterical joy and given excessive space to praising and promoting it. The *American Historical Review* did not review or even notice the Sanborn volume.

So far as can be ascertained at the time these lines are revised [December, 1952], Charles Callan Tansill's *Back Door to War* was treated by the press in essentially the same manner as it had handled the Chamberlin and Sanborn volumes, although it is the definitive revisionist contribution and deserves as much consideration as Sidney B. Fay's *Origins of the World War* received in 1928.

It received slightly more attention than did Chamberlin and Sanborn in the newspapers, perhaps because a determined effort was made to get the book in the hands of the editor of every important newspaper in the country. The majority of the newspaper reviews were of a smearing nature. As one example of such a review by an interventionist newspaper we may cite the following from the *San Francisco Chronicle* of July 27, 1952: "To bring forth a very small mouse, Professor Tansill has labored mountainously to assemble this helter-skelter collection of facts, documents and hearsay about America's prewar foreign policy. . . . This book is not history. It is awkward special pleading." The author of the review hid behind the initials "M. S."

The book failed to make the front page of either the *New York Times Book Review* or of the *New York Herald Tribune Book Review*. It was reviewed on page 3 of the former (May 11, 1952) and on page 10 of the latter (June 1, 1952), rather briefly in both cases. Even so, Dexter Perkins, who reviewed the book for the *Times*, had to request twice the space originally assigned. Among the important periodicals only the *Freeman*, the *Saturday Review of Literature*, and the *Nation* reviewed the book, the latter two rather belatedly. *Time*, *Newsweek*, the *Atlantic*, and *Harper's* gave the volume the "silent treatment," ignoring it entirely. The editor of the *New Republic* treated the book to an almost obscene smear. In the 1920's all of these periodicals (which were then in existence) would have reviewed the book promptly and at length, and it would have evoked almost frenzied ecstasy on the part of the *Nation* and *New Republic*.

The jaundiced and biased attitude of periodicals in reviewing or ignoring such books as these was well revealed at the time of the appearance of the ardently pro-Roosevelt masterpiece by W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*. In this instance virtually all of the magazines which had ignored the books by Morgenstern, Chamberlin, Sanborn, and Tansill immediately rushed into print with prominent and lyrical reviews of the Langer-Gleason volume. Among all the editors of professional journals in the historical and social science field, only Professor Howard W. Odum, editor of *Social Forces*, has been willing to

open his publication to full and fair reviewing of revisionist volumes.

One of the most impressive examples of the ignoring and obscuring of the writings of men critical of our foreign policy since 1937 is presented by the case of Francis Neilson. Mr. Neilson is a distinguished publicist and he served as a member of Parliament before he came to the United States. He was the principal "angel" of the original *Freeman* and, like John T. Flynn, was once a darling of American liberals who were, in those days, revisionists and anti-interventionists. Mr. Neilson's *How Diplomats Make War* (1915) was the first revisionist volume to be published on the first World War, and it is still read with respect.

When Mr. Neilson opposed our interventionism after 1937, his erstwhile liberal friends fell away from him. Being a man of means, he was able to publish his gigantic five-volume work, *The Tragedy of Europe*, privately. It was scarcely noticed in any review, though it was praised by no less a personage than President Robert Maynard Hutchins of the University of Chicago. In 1950 Mr. Neilson published, again privately, a condensation of the more vital portions of his larger work, entitling it *The Makers of War*. The book contains a great amount of valuable revisionist material not embodied in any other revisionist volume on the second World War. But, Mr. Neilson assured me personally, it has never been reviewed at all.

4. SMEARING REVISIONIST BOOKS

When, rather rarely and for one reason or another, a newspaper or a periodical decides actually to review a revisionist book rather than to accord it the silent treatment, it has available a large supply of hatchet men who can be relied upon to attack and smear revisionist volumes and to eulogize the work of court historians and others who seek to perpetuate the traditional mythology.²⁰ For example, the *New York Times* has its own staff of such hatchet men, among them Otto D. Tolischus, Charles Poore, Orville Prescott, Karl Schriftgiesser, Drew Middleton, and others. When these do not suffice, it can call upon academicians of similar inclination,

such as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Allan Nevins, Henry Steele Commager, Gordon A. Craig, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Dexter Perkins, and others. The *Herald Tribune* has Walter Millis, August Heckscher, and their associates on its staff, and also turns to such academicians as those mentioned above, whose gifts and talents are not limited to the *Times*.

The smearing device used almost universally in discrediting neo-revisionist books is a carry-over of the propaganda strategy perfected by Charles Michelson in political technique, and extended by Joseph Goebbels, John Roy Carlson, and others, namely, seeking to destroy the reputation of an opponent by associating him, however unfairly, with some odious quality, attitude, policy, or personality, even though this may have nothing to do with the vital facts in the situation. It is only a complex and skillful application of the old adage about "giving a dog a bad name." This is an easy and facile procedure, for it all too often effectively disposes of an opponent without involving the onerous responsibility of facing the facts.²¹ The "blackout boys" have even implied that the effort to tell the truth about responsibility for the second World War is downright wicked. Samuel Flagg Bemis declares that such an excursion into intellectual integrity is "serious, unfortunate, deplorable."²²

Inasmuch as the Morgenstern book was the first to shake the foundations of the interventionist wartime propaganda and because Morgenstern is not a professional historian of longtime standing, his work was greeted with an avalanche of smears. Virtually the only fair reviews of the Morgenstern volume were those by Edwin M. Borchard, George A. Lundberg, Harry Paxton Howard, and Admiral H. E. Yarnell. There was rarely any effort whatever to wrestle with the vast array of facts and documentary evidence which, both Beard and Admiral Yarnell maintained, bore out all of Morgenstern's essential statements and conclusions. Rather, he was greeted with an almost unrelieved volley of smears.

Some reviewers rested content with pointing out that Morgenstern is a young man and, hence, cannot be supposed to know much, even though the *New York Times* handed over to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., a younger man, the responsibility for reviewing

Beard's great book on *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*. Another reviewer asserted that all that needed to be said to refute and silence the book was to point out that Morgenstern is employed by the *Chicago Tribune*. Others stressed the fact that he is only an amateur, dabbling with documents, without the training afforded by the graduate historical seminar, though Morgenstern was an honor student of history at the University of Chicago. It was apparent to unbiased readers that most of the professors who reviewed his book departed entirely from any seminar canons of research and criticism which they may have earlier mastered. Morgenstern surely worked and wrote in closer conformity to von Ranke's exhortations than his professorial reviewers.

Other reviewers sought to dispose of the Morgenstern book by stating that it was "bitterly partisan," was composed in a state of "blind anger," or written with "unusual asperity," though it is actually the fact that Morgenstern is far less bitter, angry, or blind than his reviewers. Indeed, the tone of his book is more one of urbane satire than of indignation. Few books of this type have been freer of any taint of wrath and fury. The attitude of such reviewers is a good example of what the psychologists call the mechanism of "projection." The reviewers attributed to Morgenstern the "blind anger" that they themselves felt when compelled to face the truth.

In reviewing the book for the *Infantry Journal*, May, 1947, Harvey A. DeWeerd declared that it was "the most flagrant example of slanted history" that had come to his attention "in recent years," but he failed to make it clear that the uniqueness in the slanting of Morgenstern's book was that it was "slanted" toward the truth, something which was, and still is, quite unusual in historical writing on this theme. Probably the most complete smearing of the Morgenstern book was performed by Walter Millis in the *Herald Tribune Book Review* (February 9, 1947), though, with all the extensive space at his disposal, he made no serious effort to come to grips with the facts in the situation. He merely elaborated the smear in the caption: "Twisting the Pearl Harbor Story: A Documented Brief for a Highly Biased, Bitter, Cynical View." Gordon A. Craig, of Princeton, reviewing the book in the *New York Times*, February 9, 1947, rested content with stating that the

book was no more than anti-Roosevelt "mythology" and completely "unbelievable," though he adduced no relevant evidence in support of these assertions.

One of the most remarkable attacks on the book was made by a onetime ardent revisionist historian, Oron J. Hale, in the *Annals of the American Academy*, July, 1947. After first assailing the book with the charge of bitter partisanship and asserting that the author made only a fake "parade" of the "externals of scholarship," Hale sought manfully but futilely to find serious errors in Morgenstern's materials. He then concluded that all or most of the statements in the book were true but that the book as a whole was a "great untruth." This reverses the usual line of the current apologists for the Roosevelt foreign policy, like Thomas A. Bailey and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who now agree that most of Roosevelt's public statements thereupon were untrue but that his program as a whole was a great truth which exemplified the desirable procedure of the "good officer"—the conscientious public servant.

The fact that Morgenstern is an editorial writer for the *Chicago Tribune* and that the *Tribune* has opened its columns to revisionist writings has encouraged the Smearbund to seek to identify Revisionism and all revisionist writers with the *Tribune*. Even Beard's books were charged with being dominated by the *Tribune* policy. Only recently a reviewer in the *New Yorker* linked Beard and the *Tribune* and referred to the "Charles Austin Beard-*Chicago Tribune*" view of war origins. Max Lerner wrote that "the man who once mercilessly flayed Hearst became the darling of McCormick."

No phase of the smear campaign could well be more preposterous. Aside from being willing to accept the truth relative to Roosevelt foreign policy, Beard and the *Tribune* had little in common. The American Civil Liberties Union once warmly praised Colonel McCormick for his valiant battle against the Minnesota press gag law. There was no attempt, then, to link the Civil Liberties Union with the total editorial policy of the *Tribune*. Roger Baldwin was not portrayed as a tool of Colonel McCormick, nor was there any hint of a Civil Liberties Union-McCormick axis. Those who write in behalf of freedom of the press can always gain

access to the columns of the *Chicago Tribune*, but there is no thought in such cases of linking them with the total editorial policy of the *Tribune*.

Due to the fact that Beard was a trained and venerable scholar and, hence, obviously not a juvenile amateur in using historical documents, that he had a world-wide reputation as one of the most eminent and productive historians and political scientists the United States has ever produced, that he had served as president of the American Political Science Association and of the American Historical Association, and that he was awarded, in 1948, the Gold Medal of the National Institute of Arts and Letters for the best historical work of the preceding decade, it required more than usual gall and trepidation to apply the smear technique to Beard and his two splendid books on American foreign policy.

Yet Beard did not escape unscathed, though his facts and objectivity cannot be validly challenged. As Louis Martin Sears pointed out in the *American Historical Review*: "The volume under review is said to give annoyance to the followers of Franklin Delano Roosevelt. If that be true, their faith is scarcely founded upon a rock, for no more objective treatment could readily be conceived. The author nowhere injects a personal opinion."²³ Any testimonials as to Beard's historical prowess are, invariably, a red flag to the Smearbund bull. Only this consideration makes such things as Lewis Mumford's resignation from the National Institute of Arts and Letters, because of the award of the above-mentioned medal to Beard, or Harry D. Gideonse's explosion in the *New Leader*,²⁴ at all explicable.

The difficulty of attacking Beard relative to his status as an historian diverted most of the smearing of him into the allegation that his work is invalidated and unreliable because he was an "isolationist." The absurdity of this charge is obvious. Beard did, from 1937 onward, courageously and sanely warn against the manner in which the Roosevelt policies were deliberately leading us into a foreign war against the will of the overwhelming mass of the American people in what was supposed to be a democratic system of government. Beard's stand may not have been wise, though the facts today overwhelmingly prove its soundness, but such an attitude

has nothing whatever to do with any literal isolationism unless one defines internationalism as chronic meddling abroad and unwavering support of our entry into any extant foreign war.

Any attempt to brand Beard as a literal isolationist is, of course, completely preposterous. Few men have had a wider international perspective or experience. In his early academic days he helped to found Ruskin College, Oxford. He had travelled, advised, and been held in high esteem from Tokyo to Belgrade.

The irresponsibility of this form of smearing Beard is well illustrated by the innuendo of Samuel Eliot Morison and Perry Miller that Beard was an ignorant isolationist with an archaic and naïve view of world affairs because he was deaf and lived on a farm with his cows, thus implying that he had shut himself off from the world and human associations and did not know what was going on about him. That such charges were utterly without foundation is well known to anybody with any knowledge whatever of Beard and his mode of life and must have been known to be untrue by Admiral Morison and Professor Miller, themselves.

Beard provided himself with a most efficient hearing instrument which enabled him to carry on personal conversations with the utmost facility. He probably enjoyed wider personal contact with scholars and publicists than any other American historian down to the day of his death. He was visited at his suburban home constantly by a stream of prominent academic and scholarly admirers. He travelled widely and spent his winters in North Carolina. His deafness did not affect his personal relations or scholarly interests and activities in the slightest. His mode of life, at the most, only gave him the occasional quiet and detachment needed to digest and interpret the mass of information which came to him as a result of his wide reading and his extensive personal contacts with American and foreign scholars, both young and old. His dairy farm was located some twenty miles from his home.

I was present a few years ago at a conference on foreign affairs attended by about forty leading savants. Most of them wrung their hands about the sorry state of the world today, but only two or three were frank and candid enough to discern and admit that the majority of the conditions which they were so dolorously deploring

stemmed directly from the foreign policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt, from his Chicago Bridge speech of October, 1937, to the Yalta Conference of early 1945. Beard was assailed for his "isolationism" and "cultural lag" by both the chairman and the chief participant for no earthly reason save that he opposed the policies which had led to the chaos over which the conference was holding the coroner's inquest—but with no intention of declaring it a homicide or seeking the culprit. They vented their spleen on a man who had advised against risking the ambush which led to the murder.

It is both vicious and silly to brand a person an "isolationist" merely because he opposed our entry into the second World War. Personally, I opposed our entry with all the energy and power at my command—just as vigorously as did Beard. But it also happens that I wrote one of the longest chapters in the first important book ever published in behalf of the League of Nations and that I have ever since supported any move or policy which seemed to me likely to promote international good will and world peace. Sane internationalism is one thing; it is something quite different to support our entry into a war likely to ruin civilization mainly to promote the political prospects of a domestic leader, however colorful and popular, to satisfy the neurotic compulsions of special interests and pressure groups, and to pull the chestnuts of foreign nations out of the fire.

The whole issue of "isolationism" and the epithet "isolationist" has been a very effective phase of the smearing technique invented and applied by interventionists between 1937 and Pearl Harbor, and so naively exposed and betrayed by Walter Johnson in his book, *The Battle Against Isolation*.²⁵ The absurd character of the whole process of smearing by the method of alleging "isolationism" has been devastatingly revealed by George A. Lundberg in his article on "Semantics in International Relations" in the *American Perspective*.²⁶ Senator Taft put the matter in a nutshell when he asserted that to call any responsible person an isolationist today is nothing less than idiocy—one might add, malicious idiocy.

The only man of any intellectual importance who ever believed in isolationism was a German economist, Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783–1850), author of *The Isolated State* (1826), and

he espoused the idea only to provide the basis for formulating economic abstractions. In short, isolationism is no more than a semantic smear fiction invented by globaloney addicts.

Governor Adlai E. Stevenson, of Illinois, is reported to have said in a commencement address in June, 1952, that "Isolationism has not lost all of its emotional appeal, but it has lost its intellectual respectability." Unless one is willing to lapse completely into "Nineteen Eighty-Four" doublethink, it would seem that exactly the opposite is the truth. From Woodrow Wilson's war address on April 6, 1917, to President Truman's denunciation of cuts in the 1952 European aid allotment, interventionism has rested entirely on propaganda and emotional appeals. It has never been able to stand for a moment on the ground of empiricism, logic, and fact. If results are any test of the validity of a position, no program in human history has had less confirmation and vindication than has the intervention of the United States in foreign quarrels. On the other hand, isolationism, which means no more than international sanity and the avoidance of national suicide, has never been able to appeal to war excitement, the propaganda of fear, and other emotional fictions. It has always been compelled to rely upon reason and sanity. It may be that emotionalism is a better guide for public policy than rationality, but to claim that interventionism and globaloney can claim priority in respect to rationality is palpably preposterous.

The internationalists of the earlier era, for whom I wrote and lectured from coast to coast for twenty years after 1918, were true believers in internationalism, good will, and peace, and worked to secure these objectives. The globaloney and interventionist crowd, while prating about internationalism and peace, have done more than anybody else, except the totalitarian dictators, to promote nationalism and to revive and direct the war spirit. They have created an unprecedented spirit of interventionism, militarism, and intolerance in the United States and have helped to provoke a similar development in Soviet Russia. While blatant nationalism was checked temporarily in Germany and Italy, it has been stimulated elsewhere, from England to Indochina, eastern Asia, and South Africa. The United Nations have steadily become more

nationalistic and less united, and the world trembles and shivers on the brink of the third world war before the peace treaties have all been negotiated to conclude the second. There is all too much truth in the statement of an eminent publicist that Alger Hiss's long-continued activities as an aggressive internationalist of the recent vintage did far more harm to the United States than handing over any number of secret State Department documents which he could have transcribed and transmitted to the Russians. The columnist, Jay Franklin, has given us a good summary picture of the fruits of interventionism by contrasting the twentieth-century American casualty record under five "isolationist" Republican presidents and under three interventionist Democratic presidents:

<i>Republican Presidents</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
Theodore Roosevelt (1901-9)	0
William H. Taft (1909-13)	0
Warren G. Harding (1921-23)	0
Calvin Coolidge (1923-29)	0
Herbert Hoover (1929-33)	0
Total for 24 Rep. years	<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/> 0

<i>Democratic Presidents</i>	<i>Casualties</i>
Woodrow Wilson (1913-21)	364,800
Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-45)	1,134,527
Harry Truman (1945-53)	129,153
Total for 28 Dem. yrs.	<hr style="width: 10%; margin: 0 auto;"/> 1,628,480

Average U.S. war casualties per Republican year, 0.

Average U.S. war casualties per Democratic year, 58,160.

Though Catholic circles have been unusually fair in tolerating the truth about the causes of the second World War, the pressure on the editors was so great that even the enlightened *Commonweal* permitted Mason Wade to attack Beard in its columns. But the most irresponsible attempt to attack Beard as an "isolationist" came with almost uniquely bad taste from the pen of Harry D. Gideonse, who reviewed Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, in the *New Leader*.²⁷

Beard was a native-born American who labored mightily for over fifty years to improve many phases of American intellectual and public life. No American historian, past or present, had a more honorable record as an active and effective intellectual patriot. He had never written a word which placed the interests of other nations above those of our country. Gideonse, on the other hand, is Dutch-born, surely an honorable paternity. But there is little evidence that he has ever become completely immersed in Americanism or has taken on a thoroughly American point of view. In his public statements over many years he has always given evidence of a robust internationalism which has little primary regard for American institutions or traditions. His internationalism appears to have a twofold basis: a hangover of the Dutch imperialism of the Dutch East India Company tycoons of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,²⁸ and the virus of current American globaloney. Anyhow, it has paid off remarkably well, for Gideonse was summoned from Chicago to Columbia University and then, to the amazement even of his friends, suddenly catapulted into the presidency of Brooklyn College in 1939.

While Gideonse finds other nonfactual grounds for assaulting Beard, he holds that Beard's alleged isolationism is all that is needed to brush the book aside. Indeed, all that is required for that is the fact, as Gideonse tells us twice in the course of his review, that it has been praised as a very great book by the "isolationist" *Chicago Tribune*. It might be cogently observed that the *Tribune* has also praised the Bible, Shakespeare's works, and Einstein's writings on relativity. But Gideonse has not laughed this off yet. If praise by the *Chicago Tribune* were not enough to destroy the validity of Beard's book, then, in Gideonse's view, it would be amply disposed of by the fact that he quotes, even sparingly, statements by eminent "isolationists" like Senators Burton K. Wheeler and Gerald P. Nye. Not even the fact, which Gideonse concedes, that he also cites Eleanor Roosevelt frequently and with respect, could redeem Beard after he had revealed his acquaintance with the statements of allegedly nefarious "isolationist" personalities.

Though, as we have made clear, reviewers have, naturally, been a trifle hesitant in daring to minimize Beard's status as an historian,

Walter Millis and Gideonse have not been dismayed or sidetracked even here. In his review of Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, in the *Herald Tribune Book Review*,²⁹ Millis contended that Beard is not entitled to rank as an objective historian according to formal academic fictions, but really belongs back with Tertullian, Orosius, Gregory of Tours, and other "Dark Age" exemplars of the "Devil theory of history."

But it remained for Gideonse to sail in and seek to divest Beard of all claims to any standing as an historical scholar. Just why Gideonse should presume to pass on questions of historiography and to grade historians is not quite evident, though he has been doing so for some years. Professionally, though admittedly a very talented classroom orator and an effective "rabble-rouser" of the student body, he was only a somewhat obscure economist when he strode into Flatbush with his mace. But Gideonse did not hesitate to administer a sharp slap to the members of the American Historical Association, who elected Beard to their presidency in 1933, by pooh-poohing the general scholarly opinion that Beard was the "dean of living American historians." This notion and pretension, says Gideonse, is purely "fictitious." Actually, according to Gideonse, Beard has only been a lifelong pamphleteer, and his books on Roosevelt's foreign policy are cheap journalism.

In the light of all this, one could read with considerable amusement and sardonic humor an announcement in the *New York Times* of September 8, 1948, that Gideonse opened the college year at Flatbush with an address to entering Freshmen in which he gravely and sternly asserted that "truthfulness" is a main and indispensable quality of a college teacher; one which does not, perhaps, extend to college presidents.

There were many other attacks on Beard's last two great books. They usually took one of two forms. First, there were efforts to dispose of them by brief, casual Jovian or flippant smears, without giving any attention whatever to the facts or meeting the arguments of the books. Such was Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s smear in the *Partisan Review*,³⁰ implying that Beard sought to justify collaboration with the Nazis; Max Lerner's slur to the effect that they were "two rather weird affairs"; Perry Miller's description of them as

“two frenetic indictments of Franklin Roosevelt” (implying, if Miller knew the meaning of the words he was using, that Beard must have been insane); and Quincy Wright’s even briefer disposition of them as “a strange argument” (strange, presumably, to Wright in that the argument was based on facts).

The other type of approach has been to smother the book under a vast welter of side issues, *non sequiturs*, and irrelevant scoldings. This was well illustrated by the procedure of Charles C. Griffin, an expert on Latin American history, who was selected to review Beard’s last book for the *American Historical Review*.³¹ He buried the book under four and a half pages of impenetrable, irrelevant, and disapproving fog, rarely coming to grips with the essential facts and arguments. About the only fair and scholarly review that the book received was by the chief authority in the field, Charles C. Tansill, in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*.³²

On the occasion of Beard’s death one might have supposed that the opportunity would have been taken to pay a tribute to his greatness as a teacher, historian, political scientist, and liberal, at least in those journals to which Beard had been for years one of the most honored contributors, and that there would have been articles by writers who had long been admirers of Beard, until he began to examine Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Instead of this we were treated to an obscene performance which reminded fair observers of jackals and hyenas howling about the body of a dead lion. Especially in point were the articles by Max Lerner in the *New Republic*, October 25 and November 1, 1948; by Perry Miller in the *Nation*, September 25, 1948; and by Peter Levin in *Tomorrow*, March, 1949.

In these articles most of the smears which had been irresponsibly thrown at Beard during the previous several years were amalgamated and he was portrayed as a senile, embittered, and confused “isolationist” and a traitor to the liberal cause. There was even an effort to undermine confidence in Beard’s monumental books which had preceded his volumes on the foreign policy of President Roosevelt. Lerner held up to ridicule Beard’s social and civic ideal: “A continental economy, spaciously conceived, controlled in a common-sense way, yielding a gracious life without all the horrors of foreign entanglements.” As of 1953, such an ideal

might well evoke the heartiest enthusiasm on the part of any thoughtful American. Lerner characterized Roosevelt's foreign policy as a consistent attempt to promote "the collective democratic will reluctantly having to shape a world in which it could survive." How well it succeeded in achieving this result will be apparent from an examination of Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade*, and Chapter 8 of this volume.

The campaign of vilification and distortion against Beard has continued long after his death. One of the most absurd attacks appeared in 1952 in a book by John B. Harrison, a teacher of history at Michigan State College, entitled *This Age of Global Strife*. Harrison writes:

This prominent historian undertook in the last days of his eccentric old age to prove by ponderous documentation that President Roosevelt set out from the beginning of the war in Europe to stealthily and deceitfully maneuver the United States into a war whose outcome was of no real concern to the American people. It is a deplorable collection of half-truths and distortions. Anyone who reads it should read also Samuel E. Morison's brilliant analysis of it in the *Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1948.

A book containing material of this sort could be published by the old and reputable firm of Lippincott seven years after V-J Day.

The reception accorded Chamberlin's *America's Second Crusade* was in keeping with the blackout procedure and in line with that given to the Morgenstern and Beard volumes. Chamberlin was a too-important and well-known author to be given the silent treatment by all newspapers and periodicals, though the leading liberal periodicals tended to ignore his book. It was, naturally, glowingly praised in the *Chicago Tribune*, and equally lavishly smeared by the *New York Post*.

The *New York Times* treated the book about as badly as feasible under the circumstances.³³ While it placed a long review of a slight book by the elder Schlesinger on page 3 of the *Sunday Book Review*, it relegated Chamberlin's striking volume to page 34. It

chose as the reviewer of the book Samuel Flagg Bemis, well known as perhaps the bitterest critic of revisionist writing among the historians.

But even Bemis was unable to make much headway against Chamberlin's facts and logic. He frankly admitted that he would not "argue the case with Mr. Chamberlin." In reviewing the Morgenstern book, Bemis had written that the American situation in late 1941 constituted "the most awful danger that ever confronted our nation." He still stuck to this thesis, despite his admission that there is no factual basis for it: "That captured Nazi archives do not reveal any actual plans to attack the New World, as Mr. Chamberlin repeatedly stresses, does not make any difference. The intention was there." Bemis pictured Germany and Japan as "the two colossi whose power in victory would have closed on our freedom with the inexorable jaws of a global vise." Therefore, our second crusade was a success and a necessity, even though Bemis admits that Russia is now more powerful than Japan and Germany combined could ever have become, and its power is concentrated in one nation rather than being divided among two, who might often have clashed: "Stalin has stepped into everything that Hitler and Japan first started out to get, and more. Soviet Russia has rolled up an agglomeration of power greater than ever menaced the United States, even in 1941."

Bemis concluded his review with what is possibly the most incredible example of "foot-swallowing" in the whole history of book reviewing:

One thing ought to be evident to all of us: by our victory over Germany and Japan, no matter what our folly in losing the peace, we have at least survived to confront the second even greater menace of another totalitarian power. . . . We might not stand vis-à-vis with the Soviets today if President Roosevelt had not entertained a conviction that action against the Axis was necessary.

In other words, all the physical, financial, and moral losses of the United States in the second World War were justified and well

expended in order that we might face another world war against a far stronger enemy. With these comments we may well leave Bemis to the logicians.

The *New York Herald Tribune Book Review* handled the Chamberlin book much as did the *Times*.³⁴ It placed the review on the twelfth page, following reviews of many relatively trivial volumes. It did not seek out a professorial critic, but assigned one of its own "hatchet men," August Heckscher, to write the review. While the book was smeared as a revival of "pre-war isolationism," Heckscher was not able to succeed any better than Bemis in disposing of Chamberlin's material and arguments. He had to rest satisfied with espousing the "perpetual-war-for-perpetual-peace" program of our current internationalists. If the first and second crusades have failed to provide peace, security, and prosperity, we can "keep on trying." Other and more bloody crusades may turn the trick, though even Arnold J. Toynbee has admitted that any further crusades may leave only the pygmies—or, perhaps, only the apes or ants—to wrestle with the aftermath.

Perhaps the most remarkable example of smearing the Chamberlin book was the review which was published in the *New Leader*,³⁵ written by our old friend, Harry D. Gideonse.

The *New Leader* is a sprightly journal controlled mainly by Socialists and ex-Socialists who deserted Norman Thomas in his brave stand against our entry into the second World War, and by totalitarian liberals. Both groups were fanatically in favor of our intervention in the second World War and are now in the vanguard of those who wish us to enter a third crusade in the interest of perpetual war for perpetual peace and the suppression of Red sin throughout the world. Chamberlin writes for this periodical, though his presence seems somewhat incongruous in such an editorial group.

But the fact that Chamberlin is a regular contributor to the *New Leader* weighed less heavily with the editor than his offense in debunking our first and second crusades and his warning against our entering a third. Therefore it was decided that Chamberlin's book must be smeared, and a man was chosen to do it who could be relied upon. There was no doubt about Gideonse's depend-

ability for the task, both from his well-known general attitude toward interventionism and from his earlier elaborate smearing of Beard in the *New Leader*.

Gideonse did not let the editor down, except that he was only able to bring to bear against Chamberlin the same threadbare smears that he had used against Beard. He led off with a blanket condemnation: "This is a bitter and unconvincing book." The worthlessness of much of Chamberlin's book, according to Gideonse, required nothing more in the way of proof than to show that he agreed with Colonel McCormick and the *Chicago Tribune*: "At least half of the contents of Mr. Chamberlin's book is another rehash of the *Chicago Tribune* history of World War II." Gideonse repeated the old alarmist dud to the effect that, if we had not gone to war against Hitler, he would have made a vassal of Stalin and Soviet Russia and would have controlled the Old World "from the English Channel to Vladivostok." In the December 18, 1950, issue of the *New Leader*, Chamberlin submitted a crushing answer to Gideonse and other smearing reviewers.

The *New York Post* called Chamberlin a "totalitarian conservative" and painted him as a special favorite of the McCormick-Patterson axis. The overwhelming majority of the reviews of the book did not rise above the level of smearing, the lowest point of which was reached in the review by James M. Minifie in the *Saturday Review of Literature*.⁸⁶

That the progress of disillusionment with respect to the results of the second crusade and the shock of the Korean war may have made a few editors a trifle more tolerant of reality in world affairs was, possibly, demonstrated by the fact that Chamberlin's book was warmly praised in the review in the *Wall Street Journal* and was accorded fair treatment in the interventionist *Chicago Daily News*.

Frederic R. Sanborn's concise, elaborately documented, and closely reasoned volume, *Design for War*, devoted chiefly to an account of President Roosevelt's secret war program after 1937, was treated much like the Morgenstern and Chamberlin books, though it was more extensively ignored in the press. When not ignored, it was smeared in most of the reviews. The *New York*

Times thought that it had taken care of the matter by handing the book over to Samuel Flaggs Bemis for reviewing. By this time, however, Bemis had read the latest edition of my *Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, with its account of his foot-swallowing feat in his *Times* review of the Chamberlin volume. So Bemis, while rejecting Sanborn's version of American diplomacy from 1937 to Pearl Harbor, was relatively cautious and respectful.

Months after the book appeared, the *Herald Tribune* finally and reluctantly reviewed it, after much prodding by Sanborn. It handed it over to another warhorse among the hatchet men, Gordon A. Craig, of Princeton. He indulged mainly in the shadowboxing for which Walter Millis had shown such talent. The review, while of the smearing variety, was evasive, as had been Craig's review of Morgenstern's book in the *Times* years before. He refused to confront the facts and even went so far in historical humor as to accept Cordell Hull's statements at their face value.

The Sanborn book was smeared in most of the Scripps-Howard papers that reviewed it at all (*vide* the *Rocky Mountain News*, February 18, 1951), though this chain had been in the vanguard of prewar "isolationism." A characteristic newspaper slur was that of the *Chattanooga Times*, which proclaimed that the Sanborn book was "as impartial as the *Chicago Tribune* or Westbrook Pegler."

Felix Wittmer reviewed the book in the *New Leader* (March 26, 1951). The editors had, apparently, become bored themselves with the monotonous uniformity of the unvaried dead cats thrown at revisionist books by Harry Gideonse. The Wittmer review was a masterpiece of "doublethink." He smeared the book as "a sad spectacle," and "a biased and myopic account of diplomacy in the guise of objectivity." He accused Sanborn of "amazing ignorance of modern Japanese policies." Yet, a little later on, he expressed himself as in almost complete agreement with Sanborn's account of the crucial Japanese-American negotiations in 1941: "It is perfectly true—as Dr. Sanborn proves—that in 1941 the Japanese seriously wanted peace and that Roosevelt and Hull used every possible device to forestall it, and to provoke an open attack by Japan." He even admits that Roosevelt and Hull anticipated this

attack. He excuses all this on the ground that our entry into the war was obligatory for American security from Nazi invasion and for the salvation of humanity, and that the provocation of the Japanese was only "penetrating foresight," because Hitler and Mussolini were just mean enough not to rise to Roosevelt's war bait in the Atlantic. Hence, we had to incite Japan to attack us in order to get into the war through the Pacific back door. Even the *New Leader* felt impelled to publish a rejoinder by Sanborn.

We have already pointed out that virtually all the important periodicals—*Time*, *Newsweek*, the *New Yorker*, the *Saturday Review of Literature*, the *Nation*, the *New Republic*, *Harper's*, and the *Atlantic Monthly*—had wisely decided that they could protect the Roosevelt and interventionist legend better by ignoring the book entirely than by smearing it in reviews. The *American Historical Review* did not even mention the volume in a book note.

The reviewing of the book by Charles Callan Tansill, *Back Door to War*, ran true to the form established with reference to revisionist volumes. The Tansill tome is more outspoken and more heavily documented than any other revisionist treatise. So, while it more violently enraged interventionist reviewers, it intimidated and restrained them in some cases. At least they were more restrained than they would have been if the book were not so formidable an exhibit of arduous and exhaustive scholarship.

Dexter Perkins reviewed the book about as gingerly and cautiously in the *New York Times Book Review* (May 11, 1952) as, earlier, Bemis had handled the Sanborn volume. He was, apparently, also somewhat concerned about a possible comment on his review in future editions of my *Historical Blackout*. Aside from reiterating his well-known theme, to the effect that President Roosevelt was reluctantly pushed into war by the force of an ardent and alarmed public opinion, Perkins mainly contented himself with berating the "animus" and "bitterness" shown by Mr. Tansill. This bitterness appeared to consist, actually, in producing documentary proof that the Roosevelt-Hull diplomacy constituted one of the major public crimes of human history.

The review by Basil Rauch in the *Herald Tribune Book Review* (June 1, 1952) was as brash and reckless as was Rauch's own book,

Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor. It was not unfairly referred to by one reader as "a masterpiece of misrepresentation." As the Byzantine emperor, Basil II, earned the title of "Basil the Bulgar-Slayer," so Rauch can surely be awarded the title of "Basil the Creator." As I have shown in my brochure, *Rauch on Roosevelt*, Professor Rauch, in his book, created for Mr. Roosevelt a foreign policy which bore very slight resemblance to the one which the President actually followed. So, in his review of the Tansill volume, he created a book which had little relationship to the one he was supposed to be reviewing. The book and the review must both be read to allow one to become fully aware of the extent to which this is true. Rauch accused Tansill of making statements and drawing conclusions which had no documentary support whatever, though in the book itself hundreds of footnotes and references to acres of documents were presented to buttress Tansill's statements.

Back Door to War was tardily and loftily smeared in the *Saturday Review of Literature* of August 2, 1952, by Professor Lindsay Rogers of Columbia University. Professor Rogers is not a "court historian," but he was the leading court political scientist and court jester in the original New Deal "brain trust." He pays tribute to "the enormous industry of five years which this ponderous tome required." But he tells the reader that it has been "largely wasted" because Professor Tansill has outdone the late Dr. Beard in espousing the "devil theory of history" and has interlarded his book with distressing diatribes.

The devil theory of history appears to reside in the fact that Professor Tansill adopts a critical attitude toward the Roosevelt foreign policy and that he assigns considerable personal responsibility to President Roosevelt for the course of our foreign affairs after 1933. The "datribes" are occasional penetrating comments on Roosevelt and his foreign policy which, had they been directed against the critics of Mr. Roosevelt, would have been praised by Professor Rogers as distilled wisdom and brilliant *bons mots*.

The Tansill book was belatedly reviewed at length in the *Nation* (October 4, 1952) by Professor Charles C. Griffin, who had reviewed the Beard volume in the *American Historical Review*. It is

evident from the opening sentences of the review that Professor Griffin regards any comprehensive marshalling of the facts relative to Roosevelt foreign policy as a "violent attack" upon them. The gist of the review was much the same as that by Professor Rogers in the *Saturday Review of Literature*. Both reviewers are compelled to recognize the vast amount of research which went into the preparation of the Tansill book, but Professor Griffin, like Professor Rogers, holds that all this is vitiated by Professor Tansill's cogent and penetrating characterizations, which are variously described as "opprobrious and objectionable terminology," "invective," "innuendo," "insinuation," and the like. Doubtless Professor Griffin, like Professor Rogers, would have regarded this material as brilliant and praiseworthy verbiage if it had been written in praise of the Roosevelt policy. But, at least, Professor Griffin's presentation of his views on the Tansill volume constitutes a formal and ostensible review, not a brief and casual smear, and he does concede at the end of his review that the Tansill volume has value in that it corrects the fantastic mythology which prevailed during the second World War.

The review by Arthur Kemp in the *Freeman*, May 19, 1952, was friendly and commendatory.

Professor Tansill's book was harshly reviewed in the *American Historical Review*, October, 1952, by Dean Julius W. Pratt. That the latter had lined up with our "Ministry of Truth" could have been ascertained in advance of the review by comparing his early, trenchant, anti-imperialist writings, in his books and in his articles in the *American Mercury*, with his recent *America's Colonial Experiment*. The flavor of his review could readily be anticipated. However, Dean Pratt did concede that the book was the most "weightily documented" of the revisionist works on the second World War and that "Professor Tansill has produced a book of great learning."

One statement in the review calls for corrective comment: "The fact that a scholar with Professor Tansill's well-known views on American foreign policy was allowed the free run of confidential State Department files should lay at rest the theory that there exists a favored group of 'court historians' who speak only kind

words of Rooseveltian diplomacy." While Professor Tansill did examine more documents than any other revisionist historian, he had nothing like the free access to archives and diaries which was accorded to men like Professors Langer and Gleason and Dr. Herbert Feis. Dr. Beard's attacks on the State Department favoritism eased his entry, and some of his former graduate students were in charge of important sections of the documents. Even so, he was barred from many, his notes subjected to scrutiny, and some of them confiscated.

One of the most extreme smears of the book was written by a professional historian, Professor Richard W. Van Alstyne of the University of Southern California, and published in the *Pacific Historical Review*, November, 1952. Van Alstyne concluded that *Back Door to War* is "a striking monument to pedantic scholarship, but it is built on a tiny mound of historical understanding." He did, however, make one sound point: that the book has a misleading title, in that it is more a study of the origins of the second World War than specifically of Roosevelt foreign policy.

The *New Republic* did not review the book, but the editor, Michael Straight, subjected it to the lowest and most amazing smear that any revisionist book has yet received. In the issue of June 16, 1952, Straight delivered himself of the following material, suitable for presentation by the late Mr. Ripley:

This book is part of the devious attack on American diplomacy directed by Dr. Edmund Walsh, S.J., from Georgetown University. Tansill argues that the U.S., not Germany or Japan, was the aggressor in the Second World War. . . .

These are the superstitions that occupied Beard in his senility and focused John T. Flynn's mania for hatred. It would be easily dismissed, were it not such useful material for demagogues in the 1952 campaign.

Nothing better illustrates the shift in attitude on the part of the *New Republic* since the 1920's, when it took the lead in promoting Revisionism under Herbert Croly and Robert Littell, even

though Mr. Straight's mother was also financing the journal at the time.

Very interesting and relevant, as bearing on Mr. Straight's charge that Professor Tansill's book was the product of a Catholic plot to smear Rooseveltian foreign policy, is the fact that the Catholic periodical, *America*, reflecting the interventionist wing of American Catholic opinion, published a rather bitter attack by Father William A. Lucey upon the Tansill volume in its issue of June 14, 1952.

A very amusing and instructive example of the length to which interventionists will go in quest of smears of revisionist books is provided in the case of the *Christian Register*. This periodical is edited by Melvin Arnold, a liberal Unitarian and the head of the Beacon Press which has published the books by Paul Blanchard that have so vigorously attacked Catholic political power. Yet, being an ardent interventionist and adulator of Roosevelt foreign policy, Mr. Arnold reached out eagerly for this hostile review of the Tansill book by Father Lucey in one of the leading political organs of Jesuit Catholic journalism and reprinted it in the December, 1952, issue of his own magazine.

Professor Tansill's book was reviewed in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, December, 1952, by Professor Ruhl Bartlett. Professor Bartlett had been put on the program of the American Historical Association at Chicago in December, 1950, to criticize the paper presented at that time by Professor Tansill on the background of the American entry into the second World War. He was somewhat roughly handled by Professor Tansill in the discussion that followed. All this was well known to the editor of the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*. Nevertheless, he chose Professor Bartlett to review Professor Tansill's book, and the result was just what could have been expected. The flavor of the review is shown by the closing lines: "The book is unredeemed by humor, art or insight. To read it and to write about it are unrewarding tasks."

Thus far, the *Journal of Modern History* has not reviewed the book.

In the criticisms of the Tansill volume by such professional historians as Professors Harrington, Pratt, and Van Alstyne, there

is one slightly humorous item, namely, the charge that Tansill does not support *all* of his contentions by citations from confidential archival material. As a matter of fact, the only honest and fair criticism of Tansill's procedure is that, like so many professional diplomatic historians, he relies *too much* on archival and allied materials when other sources of information are often far more illuminating and reliable. Nevertheless, his professorial critics contend that he never *proves* an assertion unless he brings archival material to his support, even though he may cite scores of more important types and sources of evidence. One might be led to suppose that Tansill could not prove the guilt of President Roosevelt relative to Pearl Harbor unless he could produce from the archives a confession signed in the handwriting of the late President.

From what has been set forth above, it is evident that not one professional historical journal has provided readers with a fair and objective appraisal of Professor Tansill's monumental volume, *Back Door to War*.

The majority of the newspaper reviews smeared the book, though it was warmly praised not only by the *Chicago Tribune* but by some other papers like the *Indianapolis Star*. In the newspaper reviews the dominant note was Tansill's alleged bias and bitterness—in other words, his devotion to candor and integrity. Interestingly enough, the editor of the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* was apparently so displeased by the unfair reviews that he wrote an editorial (June 8, 1952) praising the Tansill volume and commending Revisionism in general.

Probably the most extreme job of smearing ever turned in on a liberal who attacked the foreign policy of Roosevelt was done on John T. Flynn, whose revisionist writings were limited to two brochures on Pearl Harbor and to a few passages in his book, *The Roosevelt Myth*. Flynn had long been a special favorite of the liberal journals. He was probably the leading specialist for the *New Republic* in exposing the evils of finance capitalism. His *Security Speculation* was a masterpiece in this field. His *Graft in Business* was, perhaps, the ablest indictment of the business ideals and methods of the Harding-Coolidge era. He was one of the staff who

aided Pecora in his investigation of the sins of Wall Street. He was also an assistant to Senator Gerald P. Nye in the famous munitions and armament investigation. He was at one time a member of the Board of Higher Education in New York City and a lecturer at the New School for Social Research. Few men rated higher in the esteem of eastern Liberals.

But when Flynn became a leading member of the America First movement and began to oppose President Roosevelt's war policy, his erstwhile liberal admirers, who had taken to warmongering, turned on him savagely. Their animus increased when Flynn revealed the fascist trends in our war policy in his book, *As We Go Marching*, and when he told the truth about Pearl Harbor in two trenchant brochures. Since that time he has been the victim of incessant smearing by the totalitarian liberals and the interventionist crowd. They have done their best to drive him into penury and obscurity. Only his fighting Irish spirit has enabled him to survive. Even the *Progressive*, despite its antiwar policy, joined in the smearing.

A good sample of the irresponsibility in smearing Flynn is the statement of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in the *New York Post*, to the effect that the Yalta Conference will redound to the honor of Franklin D. Roosevelt "unless a Fascist revolution installs William Henry Chamberlin and John T. Flynn as official national historians." It so happens that Flynn has, for more than a decade now, been recognized as one of our most stalwart libertarians and individualists, and has even been smeared for being such by persons in Schlesinger's intellectual circle. One of the reasons for their frenzied hatred of him is his revelation of fascist trends in Roosevelt foreign policy and its political results. Chamberlin is also conspicuous for his libertarian trends and his protests against military state capitalism.

The blackout contingent was even more successful in their attacks on Upton Close. As a result of his candid radio broadcasts on our foreign policy he was driven off the air, from the lecture platform, and out of the press, and his books on the Far East were virtually barred from circulation.

Though I have personally written nothing on Revisionism relative to the second World War beyond several brief brochures seeking to expose some of the more characteristic methods of the blackout contingent, the Smearbund has gone to work on me far more vigorously than was the case following *all* my revisionist articles and books combined after the first World War. The silent treatment has been comprehensively applied to anything I have published recently, in whatever field. When my *History of Western Civilization* appeared, in 1935, it was very glowingly reviewed on the front page of the *New York Times Book Review*, of the *Herald Tribune Books*, and of the *Saturday Review of Literature*. The *American Historical Review* gave it a long and favorable review by the foremost American authority in the field. When my *Society in Transition* was published, in 1939, the *Times* accorded it the unique honor of reviewing a college textbook on the first page of its *Book Review*. But when my *Survey of Western Civilization* and *Introduction to the History of Sociology* were published in 1947, and my *Historical Sociology* in 1948, none of the above-mentioned publications, so far as could be discovered, gave any of them so much as a book note. Apparently the movement has gone so far that authors are being suppressed or given the silent treatment for fear that they might, *later on*, publish some little truth on world affairs. The author of this chapter was, naturally, suspect because of his writings on the first World War.

The *sub rosa* activities of the blackout Smearbund have gone much further. I have been smeared as both an extreme radical and an extreme reactionary and as everything undesirable between these two extremes. One historian smeared me as a "naïve isolationist," though, in actuality, I was working for sane internationalism at the time of his birth. The Smearbund has not only condemned my books to the silent treatment, barred me from all leading periodicals, and sought to dissuade publishers from accepting my books on any subject, but its members have also carried on extensive subterranean intrigue seeking to discourage the use of my textbooks in the fields of the history of civilization and sociology, where the content of my tomes does not touch even remotely on

the issues of Revisionism. Going beyond my writings, the blackout "Gestapo" forced the most powerful lecture manager in the United States to drop me from his list of lecturers.

The blackout boys have not rested content with smearing those who have sought to tell the truth about the causes of the second World War. They have now advanced to the point where they are seeking to smear those who told the truth about the causes of the first World War. At the meeting of the American Historical Association in Boston in December, 1949, two papers were read by Richard W. Leopold and Selig Adler that endeavored to undermine the established revisionist writings regarding the prelude to that conflict.³⁷ Adler implied that Revisionism, after 1918, was, in its origins, a sort of Bolshevik plot, and that revisionist writers were, consciously or unconsciously, dupes of the Bolsheviks and unrepentant Germans. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in an article in the *Partisan Review*,³⁸ has even gone so far as to attack those who have written in a revisionist tone on the causes of the Civil War. The next step will be to attack the revision of historical opinion relative to the causes of the American Revolution and to find that, after all, "Big Bill" Thompson was right in his views of that conflict and in his threat to throw George V into the Chicago Ship Canal. In other words, Revisionism, which only means bringing history into accord with facts, now seems to be rejected by the blackout boys as a mortal sin against Clio, the Muse of their subject. This attack on Revisionism, even with respect to the first World War, is now creeping into the routine college textbooks. It provides the *leitmotiv* of Harrison's above-mentioned book, *This Age of Global Strife*.

Not only are books concerned primarily with an honest account of the diplomacy connected with the coming of the second World War ignored and smeared, but similar treatment is accorded to books which even indirectly reflect on the official mythology in this area. For example, A. Frank Reel's splendid and courageous book on *The Case of General Yamashita* was rather generally attacked, and outrageously so by John H. E. Fried in the *Political Science Quarterly*, September, 1950. W. T. Couch, who had done splendid work as head of the University of Chicago Press, was re-

lieved of his post in part because of criticism of his publication of this book. The best book on Japan which has been published since Pearl Harbor, *Mirror for Americans: Japan*, by Helen Mears, was allowed to die quietly by its publishers after the blackout contingent began to exert pressure against it.

While the Smearbund has usually rested content with an effort to defame and impoverish those of whom it disapproves, it went even further in the case of Lawrence Dennis and sought to jail him on the charge of "sedition." Dennis, a brilliant Harvard graduate, had served in important posts in the American diplomatic service for eight years. He had been one of the first to enlist in the Plattsburg training experiment before the first World War (1915) and had served with distinction as an officer in the war. After retiring from the diplomatic service, he was employed by leading banking and brokerage firms as an expert on foreign bonds. Like John T. Flynn, he was then a favorite of left-wing American liberals and had exposed the foreign bond frauds in the *New Republic* at about the same time that Flynn was doing a comparable piece of work on the investment trusts. He incurred the wrath of the liberals by bringing out a book in 1936 entitled *The Coming American Fascism*. Here he predicted that the New Deal would wind up in a system of Fascism, whatever the name given to it, and described what the system would probably be like. The interventionists were enraged by his *Weekly Foreign Letter*, which opposed our entry into the second World War, and by his *The Dynamics of War and Revolution*, the best book written in the United States on the institutional forces pushing us into war and on the probable results of such a war. The prowar forces induced Harper & Brothers to withdraw the book almost immediately after publication.

Though Dennis is, actually, an aggressive individualist, he was accused of being an ardent fascist and was railroaded into the mass sedition trial in Washington in 1944. That the trial ended in a farce was due mainly to the fact that Dennis personally outlined and conducted the defense. But, though surely one of the most talented writers and lecturers in the United States today, he has been driven into complete obscurity; not even Regnery or Devin-Adair dares to bring out a book under his name.

IV. GLOBAL CRUSADING AND THE HISTORICAL BLACKOUT ARE UNDERMINING HISTORICAL INTEGRITY³⁹

The revisionist position bearing on the second World War is more firmly established factually, even on the basis of the materials which revisionist scholars are permitted to examine, than the Revisionism of the 1920's was by the revelations produced after 1918. But the effective presentation of revisionist contentions is frustrated, so far as any substantial influence is concerned, over any predictable future.

Certain revisionist scholars, led by the late Charles Austin Beard, have justly protested the fact that they are not permitted anything like the same access to the relevant documents as is the case with the so-called "court historians."

This is true and deplorable, but it is not a consideration of major importance with respect to Revisionism today. Revisionists already have plenty of facts. It may be safely assumed that any further revelations will only more firmly establish the revisionist position. Otherwise, all the archives and other still-secret materials would, long since, have been made available to reputable scholars, so that President Roosevelt and his administration might be cleared of unfair and inaccurate charges, founded upon limited and unreliable information. If there were nothing to hide, then, there would, obviously, be no reason for denying access to the documents. In short, the revisionist position is not likely to be shattered by any future documentary revelations. There is every prospect that it will be notably strengthened thereby, and this assumption is confirmed by some recently edited documents on the Far Eastern situation in 1937. These show that China and Japan were growing tired of friction and conflict and were about to agree that they should get

together and oppose the Communists as the chief common enemy. But the American authorities looked askance at this. Instead, they encouraged and made possible the resumption of war between China and Japan.

The development of Revisionism in connection with the second World War is placed in jeopardy mainly by the hostile attitude which exists on the part of both the general public and the historical profession toward accepting the facts and their implications with respect to world events and American policies during the last fifteen years.

The attitude and emotions of the public during wartime have been maintained without notable change by means of persistent propaganda. There has been no such disillusionment and reversal of attitude since 1945 as took place rather rapidly after 1918. The United States seems all too likely to undertake a third bloody crusade before it is fully aware of the real causes and disastrous results of the second.

The factual justification for a reversal of public attitudes and emotions is far more extensive and impressive than was the case following the first World War. But the party which was in power during the war continued to hold office until 1953, and the potency and scope of propaganda have so increased that the emotions and convictions of wartime have been perpetuated for more than a decade after Pearl Harbor. Incidentally, this is ominous evidence of our susceptibility to propaganda as we approach the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" way of life.

The historical profession is, perhaps, even less tolerant of Revisionism than is the general public. Most of those who had been leading revisionists during the 1920's espoused our second crusade, even before it exploded into war at the time of Pearl Harbor. Great numbers of historians entered into war propaganda work of one kind or another after Pearl Harbor and thus have a vested interest in perpetuating the myth of the nobility of the cause which enlisted their services. Therefore, the historical profession is oriented and powerfully fortified against any acceptance of revisionist scholarship. A number of the leading revisionists of the 1920's have now become court historians, and most of the other erstwhile revision-

ists refuse to admit that we were as thoroughly misled by the second crusade as by the first.

As a result of all this and numerous other factors and forces hostile to Revisionism, the situation is not encouraging to any historians who might otherwise be inclined to undertake honest research in the field. To do so would mean departmental antagonism, loss of promotion, and possibly discharge from their posts. Those not dissuaded by such considerations have to face irresponsible smearing. The very idea or concept of Revisionism is now anathema and is actually under fire at the hands of a number of prominent historians.

In case a few historians are not discouraged or intimidated by professional hostility or the prospect of irresponsible smearing, and remain determined to do substantial work on the actual causes and merits of the second World War, there is every likelihood that their efforts will prove futile so far as publication is concerned. Forthright revisionist material, however scholarly, is, for all practical purposes, excluded from publication in the great majority of our newspapers and periodicals. Only two small publishing houses in the United States have been willing to publish books embodying revisionist facts and conclusions, and they often require subsidies beyond the resources of the average private scholar. Few historians are going to be lured by the prospect of devoting years of research to a project and then be compelled to store away their completed manuscripts in a filing cabinet. They are more likely to be "practical" and fall in line with the court historians, which is the path to professional prestige and prosperity today.

When any scholar defies professional hostility and successfully gambles upon the slight prospect of publication for the results of his labors, there is little likelihood that his book will have anything like the same influence on the modification of public opinion as did the outstanding revisionist volumes of the 1920's and early 1930's. The probability is that any substantial and meritorious revisionist volume will be given the silent treatment—that is, it will not be reviewed at all in the majority of newspapers and periodicals.

When a newspaper or a periodical decides actually to review a revisionist book, it has available, as we have noted, a large corps of

hatchet men, both on its own staff and drawn from eager academicians, who can be relied upon to attack and smear revisionist volumes and to eulogize the works of court historians who seek to perpetuate the traditional mythology.

There is, thus, very little probability that even the most substantial and voluminous revisionist writing on the second World War can have any decisive impact upon public opinion for years to come. One only needs to contrast the enthusiastic reception accorded to Walter Millis's *The Road to War* in 1935 with the general ignoring or smearing of the much more substantial and meritorious volume by William Henry Chamberlin, *America's Second Crusade*, in 1950.

The probability is that Revisionism, in relation to the second World War, will never be widely accepted directly on the basis of its factual merit. It will only become palatable, if ever, after we have suffered some devastating economic or political disaster which causes the American public to reverse its attitudes and policies on world affairs and to seek an ideological justification through espousing revisionist contentions. But it is obvious that it will probably require a tremendous shock—a veritable military and political catastrophe—to bring about the degree of disillusionment and realism required to produce any such result.

There is infinitely greater cause for a reversal of public attitudes today than there was in 1923, when Woodrow Wilson remarked to James Kerney: "I should like to see Germany clean up France, and I should like to see Jusserand [the French ambassador] and tell him so to his face."⁴⁰ But, as indicated above, this ample factual basis for a comparable revision of public opinion has produced no substantial public or historical disillusionment with respect to our second crusade. Disillusionment has not even gone far enough to produce tolerance toward those who seek to explain realistically the historical basis of the transformation of Stalin from the "noble ally" of a decade ago into the current incarnation of Satan himself.

As is implied above, even though the tenets of Revisionism, with respect to the second World War, may at some distant time achieve popular acceptance in the wake of overwhelming national

disaster, this will not necessarily mean any reinstatement of objective historical scholarship. The probability is that any such future period may also be one in which we will have completed the transition into "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society, which will crush out all semblance of historical freedom and objectivity. As we shall point out in a moment, ominous trends in this direction have already set in.

What we may conclude from all this is that both the public and the historians seem quite likely to be effectively protected against any immediate ravages at the hands of Revisionism. But what they will pay for this "protection" may be the greatest disaster which historical science has ever encountered since the era of the cave paintings of the Stone Age.

However much we may recoil from the prospect, there seems a strong probability that we are now entering the twilight of historical science. This is the penalty which has been exacted, so far as history and historians are concerned, for ballyhooing and defending crusades rather than seeking the truth. History has been an intellectual casualty in both World Wars, and there is much doubt that it can be rehabilitated during the second half of the century. Indeed, there is every prospect that it will become more and more an instrument and adjunct of official propaganda—a supine instrument of our "Ministry of Truth."

Many will counter these assertions by contending that the elaborate development of the methodology of historical research and exposition in our day is an adequate safeguard against the eclipse of historical integrity, prestige, and independence. But technical methodology is of little significance if those who utilize it are dominated by intense emotions or personal ambition rather than by a desire to ascertain the facts. Ample footnotes are no guarantee of accuracy or objectivity. They may only document falsehood. Formal compliance with technical methodology may only enable an historian to distort or falsify material in more complicated and ostensibly impressive fashion. If one does not wish to ascertain or state the facts, then the most effective methods of locating, classifying, and expounding the facts are nullified and of no avail.⁴¹

Only a generation or so ago it was believed by most thoughtful

historians that nationalism and militarism were the chief obstacle and menace to historical objectivity. It was assumed that an international outlook would make for truth and tolerance. It was held that, if we understood the extensive and complicated international contributions to all national cultures, most forms of hatred and bias would disappear. Internationalists then stressed the blessings of peace. The great majority of them were pacifists, admired peace, meant peace when they said peace, and repudiated all thought of military crusades for peace.

Had internationalism retained the same traits that it possessed even as late at the mid-1930's, these assumptions as to the beneficent impact of internationalism upon historical writing might have been borne out in fact. But, during the years since 1937, the older pacific internationalism has been virtually extinguished, and internationalism has itself been conquered by militarism and aggressive globaloney.

Militarism was, formerly, closely linked to national arrogance. Today, it stalks behind the semantic disguise of internationalism, which has become a cloak for national aggrandizement and imperialism. Programs of world domination by great powers that would have left Napoleon, or even Hitler, aghast are now presented with a straight face as international crusades for freedom, peace, sweetness and light. Peace is to be promoted and ultimately realized through bigger and more frequent wars. The obvious slogan of the internationalists of our day, who dominate the historical profession as well as the political scene, is "perpetual war for perpetual peace." This, it may be noted, is also the ideological core of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society.

Borne along by an irresistible tide of crusading fervor for over a decade and a half, most historians have fallen in line with this ominous revolution in the nature, influence, and goals of internationalism. Among well-known historians, this transition is probably most perfectly exemplified by the ideological shift in the thinking and writings of Carlton J. H. Hayes, once an able and eloquent critic of militarism, imperialism, and international meddling. The majority of our historians now support international crusades—the "saviour with the sword" complex—with far more vehemence, ob-

session, and intolerance than were exhibited by the most ardent nationalistic historians of the past. In my opinion, Droysen, Treitschke, Lamartine, Michelet, Macaulay, and Bancroft were calm scholars and pacific publicists compared to our present-day historical inciters to global crusades such as James Thomson Shotwell, Edward Mead Earle, Thomas A. Bailey, Samuel Flagg Bemis, Henry Steele Commager, Allan Nevins, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and the like. To resist the saviour-with-the-sword program today is akin to treason, politically, and professionally suicidal for any historian. He is immediately smeared as an "isolationist," which is today a far worse crime before the bar of historical judgment than overt forgery of documents.

Some historians admit that this crusading by the nationalistic and militaristic wolf in the sheep's clothing of internationalism and its global wars for peace may eliminate objectivity from the history of recent events. But they contend that historical serenity may, nevertheless, survive when treating more remote eras and personalities. This is unlikely, because the emotions that have nullified historical objectivity in dealing with the history of the last twenty years are projected back into our portrayal and interpretations of the more distant past.

Germans from Arminius onward are now interesting chiefly as precursors of Hitler in one way or another. Since Hitler was a neurotic, and perhaps a paranoid, all German history is portrayed as a product of paranoia, and the only real solution is the elimination of all Germans.⁴² Paul Winkler has written about a "thousand-year conspiracy" of the Germans to incite wars against civilization,⁴³ and Lord Robert Vansittart would, according to his *Lessons of My Life*,⁴⁴ extend the period of plotting to nearly two thousand years. William M. McGovern, in his book *From Luther to Hitler*,⁴⁵ has already implied that everything in German history since Luther is mainly significant as preparing the way for Hitler. Bishop Bossuet, actually the great ideological apologist for paternalistic absolutism, becomes the first French fascist because his doctrines were the chief political inspiration of Marshal Pétain. Proudhon, about whom historians long wrangled as to whether he is to be most accurately classified as an anarchist or as a socialist, is now revealed by

J. Salwyn Schapiro to be a father of French Fascism. At present it seems impossible to write a biography of Ivan the Terrible without indicating the deep similarity between Ivan and Stalin, and devoting as much attention to the latter as to the former. The menace of Genghis Khan and Tamerlane has become historically important mainly as a warning against the current challenge of the Kremlin. Serious scholars have even sought to interpret Socrates, long supposed to have been the first martyr to the freedom of thought and expression, as the father of Fascism.⁴⁶ Plato, of late, has frequently been described as the outstanding Greek fascist. Even the great warriors of mid-Eastern antiquity are portrayed as prototypes of Hitler and Stalin. The conquering heroes of the Sung, Tang, Ming, and Manchu dynasties of China only prepared the way for Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, Richard Match, in the *New York Times*, December 30, 1951, suggested that the vicissitudes of Jade Star, the favorite concubine of Kublai Khan, hold many lessons "for troubled China today."

Some concede the current dangers to historical science which lie in the factors briefly described above. But they gain solace and reassurance from the assumption that the strong emotions which have gripped historical science for several decades will soon subside and that the objectivity and tolerance that preceded the first World War will ultimately reassert themselves.

Unfortunately, all the main political, social, and cultural trends of our time point ominously in the opposite direction. The discovery of politicians that the "giddy-minds-and-foreign-quarrels" strategy is the most certain key to political success and extended tenure of office is rapidly forcing the world into the pattern of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society, if, indeed, this has not already been achieved. Historical writing and interpretation are rapidly being brought into line with the needs and mental attitudes of such a political regime.

The rhetorical basis of the global crusades of our day—"perpetual war for perpetual peace"—is the most gigantic and ominous example in all history of the "Newspeak" and "doublethink" of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" semantics. We have already pointed out that it is also the cornerstone of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" ideology. The

security measures alleged to be necessary to promote and execute global crusades are rapidly bringing about the police state in hitherto free nations, including our own. Any amount of arbitrary control over political and economic life, the most extensive invasions of civil liberties, the most extreme witch-hunting, and the most lavish expenditures, can all be demanded and justified on the basis of alleged "defense" requirements, without even examining the validity of the need for such defensive measures. This is precisely the psychological attitude and procedural policy which dominates "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society.

The emotional tensions essential to the support of perpetual global crusading have facilitated the dominion of propaganda over almost every phase of intellectual and public life. The books by James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, *The Machiavellians*, *The Struggle for the World*, *The Coming Defeat of Communism*, and *Containment or Liberation?* have helped to prepare us ideologically for the reception of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" institutions, political techniques, and mental attitudes. They "soften us up" for the more willing reception of a system of military managerialism.

The hysterical reaction following Orson Welles' bogus radio broadcast on October 30, 1938, depicting an invasion from Mars, emphasizes the American capacity for credulity and shows how wartime propaganda in the next war, whether cold, hot, or phony, can readily duplicate anything of the kind portrayed in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*. Those who are skeptical on this point will do well to read Hadley Cantril's book, *The Invasion from Mars*.⁴⁷

The fact that our propaganda agencies have been able to hold public opinion fairly well within the confines of the illusions of wartime for over eight years is sufficient evidence that our propaganda machinery is equal to all the emergencies and responsibilities likely to be imposed upon it by "Nineteen Eighty-Four" conditions. From five to seven years is as long as Oceania can maintain fever hatred of either Eurasia or Eastasia in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

We have already richly developed the "Newspeak" and the "doublethink" semantics of *Nineteen Eighty-Four* where the War Department is known as the "Ministry of Peace," the propaganda

and public lying are conducted by the "Ministry of Truth," the espionage system and torture chambers are administered by the "Ministry of Love," and the department which is entrusted with the problem of keeping the masses subdued by attributing their drab life and grinding poverty to the need for defense is known as the "Ministry of Plenty."⁴⁸

Thomas A. Bailey approvingly warns us that, unless we wish to have greater deception of the public by the executive department of the Federal government, we must free the Executive of hampering congressional control in foreign affairs: "Deception of the people may, in fact, become increasingly necessary, unless we are willing to give our leaders in Washington a freer hand."⁴⁹ We appear likely to get both greater deception and more executive irresponsibility.

These ominous trends have their clear implications for the future of historical science. In *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, Orwell portrays it as necessary to intimidate and hire servile bureaucrats to falsify current history. This may not be necessary for a time, as we ourselves enter the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" way of life. Indeed, the writings and intrigues of our interventionist and war-minded historians have been a powerful force propelling us in this direction. In the opinion of the writer, James Thomson Shotwell, who has been the most influential of our interventionist historians for more than a third of a century, has done more than any other American intellectual figure to speed us on our way into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" pattern of public life. Edward Mead Earle, Henry Steele Commager, Allan Nevins, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., and a host of younger men are now following enthusiastically in his footsteps.

Among other things, Shotwell was one of the chief inventors of the myth and fantasy of an "aggressive nation" and "aggressive war," which have become a basic semantic fiction and instrument of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" international jargon, policy, and procedure. It has been adopted enthusiastically by Oceania, Eurasia, and Eastasia. This phraseology has now lost all semblance of ethics, realism, logic, and consistency, however effective it may be in international propaganda. Indeed, as Henry W. Lawrence pointed out

nearly twenty years ago, the concept of "aggressive war" never possessed any historical realism:

The harmonizing of national policies must deal with fundamentals; with the things that commonly have caused wars. The moral right to keep on possessing the best regions of the earth is directly balanced by the right to fight and capture them. It is amazing that so few people will admit this axiom of international morality. Popular opinion is widely befogged in the more comfortable countries by the childish notion that an aggressive war is wicked but a defensive war is righteous. They are, of course, precisely equal in moral quality, so long as war is the only adequate instrument by which vested wrongs can be righted and national needs supplied. The next rational step toward a tolerable world peace would be the broadcasting of this truth throughout Great Britain, France, and the United States. It is already familiar to the peoples of Germany, Italy, and Japan.⁵⁰

Since 1929, and especially since 1937, the "aggressor myth" has been made the basis of the unrealistic and hypocritical international ethics and jurisprudence associated invariably with "Nineteen Eighty-Four" semantics and propaganda in which the enemy is always an aggressor and wars are fought to stop aggression. Since the second World War the "aggressor" has become the nation or coalition that is defeated in war, whatever the responsibility for starting hostilities. Being defeated, it must be punished and its leaders exterminated. Driven home by the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, this subterfuge has given advance notice to leaders in any future wars that they must not take the risk of being defeated, no matter what horrors they have to unleash to assure victory. In this way the internationalists who falsely pose as protagonists of peace have not only produced a condition of more or less permanent war but have also made it certain that future wars will become ever more savage and devastating. No possible means of destruction can be spared to assure victory.⁵¹

The majority of the writings of our historians on recent world

history during the last decade and a half could be warmly accepted by an American "Ministry of Truth." The presidential address of Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, given before the American Historical Association at Chicago on December 29, 1950, with its eulogy of war and the myth-mongers, could easily have been an official assignment executed for such a Ministry. He even preferred to provide a picture of himself in a naval uniform to be used for the program rather than to have himself portrayed in the lowly and pacific garb of a scholar. One of the most eminent of our diplomatic historians has actually proclaimed that the most commendable result of the second World War was that it provided us with a new and stronger opponent after Hitler had been overthrown. Even our court historians work without compulsion. Few historians have been critical of the trend toward the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" patterns, and probably many of them, suffering from autointoxication with globaloney, have not even recognized the trend. Some who do recognize it are so obsessed that they eulogize it. Such is the case with Henry Steele Commager in his article, "The Lessons of April 6, 1917," appearing in the *New York Times Magazine* of April 6, 1952; and with Waldo G. Leland, who proudly details the services of American historians in our "Ministry of Truth" from the first World War to the present time in an article on "The Historians and the Public in the United States" in the *Revista de Historia de America*, June, 1952. Those who have sought to spread the alarm have been slapped down and smeared.

The impact of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" pressures on our historical writing now appears to have become more rapid and impressive than was apparent in the years immediately following the war. The newspapers on January 14, 1951, announced that President Truman was establishing a corps of court historians to prepare an acceptable official history of world events and American policy.⁵² The avowed purpose was to protect American citizens from the lies to be found in historical works written by "Communist imperialist historians." It was implied that Admiral Morison would have general direction of the group. They would operate in conjunction with the official historians already at work within the Armed Services and the State Department. It may fairly be assumed that any historians who

differ with the official texts and interpretations will be regarded as agents of "Communist imperialism," whatever their prior record of hostility to the communist way of life. It is only a step from this to the rewriting of the newspapers, which was the task of Winston Smith, the central figure in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.⁵³

There is, of course, an element of sardonic humor in all this. Actually, the "Communist imperialist historians" of Soviet Russia are almost fanatical partisans of the Roosevelt foreign policy which brought us into the second World War to aid Russia. Hence, if any American historians might be suspected of "Communist imperialist" attitudes and tendencies, it is the interventionist group who operate the blackout and oppose Revisionism.

Though this program and trend constitute probably the greatest threat to freedom and objectivity in historical writing in modern times, there has been no evidence of any alarm or protest on the part of the leading American historians. Indeed, on January 29, 1951, the *New York Herald Tribune* announced that some 875 historians and other social scientists had joined in a public statement warmly endorsing the cold war and Secretary Acheson's policy: "We support the present policy and insist that it be continued and developed without flinching. Actually, it is neither more nor less than the world-wide application of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, the Gettysburg Address, and the other basic policy declarations." This statement not only points up the apathy of historians to the threat to their professional independence but also emphasizes their levity in regard to historical accuracy. The authors of the Declaration of Independence and of the Gettysburg Address were both inveterate opponents of our being involved in "foreign entanglements."

The statement also serves potently to illustrate the transformation of the mental attitude of the members of the American Historical Association who listened with respect and warm approval, in 1916, to the noble address of its president, George Lincoln Burr, on "The Freedom of History." Indeed, there is a well-founded rumor that the idea of creating an official corps of court historians did not originate with President Truman but was passed on to him by influential antirevisionist historians who envisaged the program as an

effective way to check and intimidate revisionist scholars. That some English historians are aware of the danger is evident from the recent book of Herbert Butterfield, *History and Human Relations*, in which he criticizes the "independent" historians who are hired by the Foreign Office and other governmental departments but claim to set forth the record with complete detachment.

It is quite apparent that what our officialdom fears are not the lies of "Communist imperialist historians," which could scarcely reach, much less influence, the mass of American citizens, but the truth that might be told by native American historians of long lineage, the highest patriotic motives, and complete loyalty to the American way of life as it existed before 1937. Incidentally, this trend also means that, whereas Revisionism after the second World War is difficult and frustrated, it may be nonexistent and outlawed after the third world war.

That the new policy started bearing fruit immediately was amply demonstrated at the meeting of the American Historical Association in New York City in December, 1951. The official historians were present in large numbers and some fourteen of them were on the program. The Army historians were the most conspicuous, with eleven men on the program as compared with two for the State Department and one for the Navy. This was in addition to the quasi-official court historians, and the blackout contingent among the civilian historians, who dominated most of the programs devoted to diplomatic history.

Not only is there to be an official history of the United States and its foreign policy, conceived in terms of the wisdom and necessity of current "Nineteen Eighty-Four" trends, but there is also planned a history of all mankind along similar lines for "Oceania" (the United States, the Atlantic Pact Nations, and Latin America). The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has recently announced the plan to prepare a six-volume history of mankind at a cost of \$400,000, to be directed by Julian Huxley and edited by Ralph E. Turner. There can be no doubt from the prospectus that the gigantic work will have an international slant. Such an historical treatise might well be a great contribution to human knowledge and international understand-

ing. But the auspices and sources of support will create great difficulties for Huxley, Turner, and their associates in preventing the book from falling into a frame of reference designed to show that mankind has been moving ahead from the days of *Pithecanthropus erectus* in order to evolve the form of the world policy which is hastening us into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" system of life.

Occasionally, if very rarely, the ghost of Charles Austin Beard comes forth to stalk through the historical council chambers and to rebuke historians for their voluntary servitude in the "Ministry of Truth." A notable example was the paper read by Professor Howard K. Beale before the American Historical Association in Washington on December 28, 1952, on "The Professional Historian: His Theory and His Practice."

It is obvious that our historians, even those today most congenial to the global crusading which is leading us into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" setup, may well take warning. If the transition is followed by severe disillusionment and a reversal of existing public attitudes, the now popular trends in historical writing may be sharply curtailed or even become the vestibule to torture chambers.

Even though current trends in our world policy continue during the early stages of our entry into the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime, our historians who now warmly embrace militarism, the crusading spirit, and war hysteria, may be overconfident. In a harsh, totalitarian society, even slight ideological deviations become heresies punishable by liquidation. General sympathy with the system does not assure safety. One has only to recall Hitler's purge of June and July, 1934, and Stalin's purges of Trotskyites and his later purges even of Stalinites who did not become sufficiently aware in time of the latest interpretations of Soviet philosophy and strategy.

Henry Steele Commager, one of our most ardent interventionist historians, and, hence, one of the profession most responsible for the current intellectual atmosphere of this country, has recently protested against the growing intellectual intolerance and witch-hunting, especially in the field of education. Commager may well be reminded that such a protest may furnish the basis for his liquidation. In a totalitarian society one cannot pick and choose which elements of totalitarianism he will accept and which he will reject.

All phases must be accepted with enthusiasm and without protest.⁵⁴

Another important fact to remember is that the mature "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society is highly hostile to the very conception of history. The public must be cut off from the past so that there will be no feeling of nostalgia for the happier times of previous eras. Our first stage of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" experience may only extinguish honest historical writing, but the fully developed "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime will obliterate history entirely.

Many will doubtless regard the prediction of any imminence of our entry into "Nineteen Eighty-Four" patterns as completely fantastic, somewhat akin to astrological forecasts. The fact is, however, that, in many basic essentials, we have already arrived. With a third world war we shall be there completely and inescapably. Even the fear of a third world war may suffice. As Lewis Mumford well warned us in *Air Affairs*, March, 1947, the fear of atomic warfare may suffice to impose on us a military regime more obstructive to freedom of thought and action than either World War was able to create. By 1953 we seemed to have arrived, earlier than anticipated by most, at the precise condition that Mumford predicted. The only way of averting such a calamity both to all human deencies and to the very existence of historical science, is to reveal the facts before the chains are fastened on us and the lock is closed.

This is only another way of stating that a robust Revisionism is our only hope of deliverance, if there be one, at this late date. For this reason one may safely maintain that Revisionism is not only the major issue in the field of historical writing today but also the supreme moral and intellectual concern of our era. Those who oppose it, whether historians or others, are only hastening and assuring their own destruction.

But I believe that few revisionists could be so devoid of decent sentiments that they would welcome vindication at the hands of the ruthless bureaucrats of a "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime. Most of them would prefer timely repentance on the part of the black-out boys and the global crusaders rather than a form of vindication which would seal their own doom as well as that of their current opponents.

V. NOTE ON "NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR" CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY

In that portion of his book, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, dealing with the ideology of the totalitarian system into which the world is now slipping, Orwell describes the conceptions of history and the attitude toward the past which dominate that regime. It is obvious that these require the complete obliteration of accurate historical writing—the elimination of the very conception of any truthful history. To adopt even an historical attitude or perspective is seditious and not to be tolerated. This is the social system and intellectual pattern toward which our interventionist and global-crusading historians are rapidly, heedlessly, and recklessly driving us. Orwell thus sets forth the ideas that dominate the attitude toward history in "Nineteen Eighty-Four" society:

. . . orthodoxy in the full sense demands a control over one's own mental processes as complete as that of a contortionist over his body. . . . Applied to a Party member, it means a loyal willingness to say that black is white when Party discipline demands this. But it means also the ability to *believe* that black is white, and more, to *know* that black is white, and to forget that one has ever believed the contrary. This demands a continuous alteration of the past, made possible by the system of thought which really embraces all the rest, and which is known in Newspeak as *doublethink*.

The alteration of the past is necessary for two reasons, one of which is subsidiary and, so to speak, precautionary. The subsidiary reason is that the Party member, like the proletarian, tolerates present-day conditions partly because he has no standards of comparison. He must be cut off from the

past, just as he must be cut off from foreign countries, because it is necessary for him to believe that he is better off than his ancestors and that the average level of material comfort is constantly rising. But by far the more important reason for the readjustment of the past is the need to safeguard the infallibility of the Party. It is not merely that speeches, statistics, and records of every kind must be constantly brought up to date in order to show that the predictions of the Party were in all cases right. It is also that no change in doctrine or in political alignment can ever be admitted. For to change one's mind, or even one's policy, is a confession of weakness. If, for example, Eurasia or Eastasia (whichever it may be) is the enemy today, then that country must always have been the enemy. And if the facts say otherwise, then the facts must be altered. Thus history is continuously rewritten. This day-to-day falsification of the past, carried out by the Ministry of Truth, is as necessary to the stability of the regime as the work of repression and espionage carried out by the Ministry of Love.

The mutability of the past is the central tenet of Ingsoc [English Socialism, as fully developed in the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime]. Past events, it is argued, have no objective existence, but survive only in written records and in human memories. The past is whatever the records and the memories agree upon. And since the Party is in full control of all records, and in equally full control of the minds of its members, it follows that the past is whatever the Party chooses to make it. It also follows that though the past is alterable, it never has been altered in any specific instance. For when it has been recreated in whatever shape is needed at the moment, then this new version is the past, and no different past can ever have existed. This holds good even when, as often happens, the same event has to be altered out of recognition several times in the course of a year. At all times the Party is in possession of absolute truth, and clearly the absolute can never have been different from what it is now. It will be seen that the control of the past depends above all

on the training of memory. To make sure that all records agree with the orthodoxy of the moment is merely a mechanical act. But it is also necessary to *remember* that events happened in the desired manner. And if it is necessary to rearrange one's memories or to tamper with written records, then it is necessary to *forget* that one has done so. . . .⁵⁵

How these ideals and principles in dealing with the past were applied in the actual practices of the Ministry of Truth in *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is thus portrayed by Orwell:

. . . This process of continuous alteration was applied not only to newspapers, but to books, periodicals, pamphlets, posters, leaflets, films, sound tracks, cartoons, photographs—to every kind of literature or documentation which might conceivably hold any political or ideological significance. Day by day and almost minute by minute the past was brought up to date. In this way every prediction made by the Party could be shown by documentary evidence to have been correct; nor was any item of news, or any expression of opinion, which conflicted with the needs of the moment, ever allowed to remain on record. All history was palimpsest, scraped clean and reinscribed exactly as often as was necessary. In no case would it have been possible, once the deed was done, to prove that any falsification had taken place. The largest section of the Records Department, far larger than the one in which Winston worked, consisted simply of persons whose duty it was to track down and collect all copies of books, newspapers, and other documents which had been superseded and were due for destruction. A number of the *Times* which might, because of changes in political alignment, or mistaken prophecies uttered by Big Brother, have been rewritten a dozen times still stood on the files bearing the original date, and no other copy existed to contradict it. Books, also, were recalled and rewritten again and again, and were invariably reissued without any admission that any alteration had been made. . . .⁵⁶

Such are the "historical" ideals and practices of the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime for which our court historians are preparing us. In another portion of his book Orwell shows how well they worked out in obliterating all memory of the past. At the risk of his life, Winston Smith, the central character in the book, decided to interview an aged man in the effort to find out what the actual conditions of life had been before the "Revolution" which instituted the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" era. After prolonged questioning of the old gentleman it became apparent to Winston that this was futile. Years of subjection to totalitarian propaganda, regimentation, and thought control had obliterated all capacity to remember the general patterns of life in the earlier and happier days. All that could be recalled were trivial snatches of petty personal experiences. The past, as a social and cultural reality had disappeared forever:

Winston sat back against the window sill. It was no use going on. . . . Within twenty years at the most, he reflected, the huge and simple question, "Was life better before the Revolution than it is now?" would have ceased once and for all to be answerable. But in effect it was unanswerable even now, since the few scattered survivors from the ancient world were incapable of comparing one age with another. They remembered a million useless things, a quarrel with a workmate, a hunt for a lost bicycle pump, the expression on a long-dead sister's face, the swirls of dust on a windy morning seventy years ago; but all the relevant facts were outside the range of their vision. They were like the ant, which can see small objects but not large ones. And when memory failed and written records were falsified—when that happened, the claim of the Party to have improved the conditions of human life had got to be accepted, because there did not exist, and never again could exist, any standard against which it could be tested.⁵⁷

Many will contend that nothing like this could happen in the United States, but the fact is that the process is well under way. Much of the material in the preceding pages of this chapter shows

how it is being promoted. We have noted that there is already a veritable army of paid official historians assigned to write current history as the administration wishes it to be written, to say nothing of the many historians who voluntarily falsify the historical record, especially that of the last quarter of a century. The destruction and hiding of vital documents has already begun.⁵⁸ The Army and Navy put great pressure upon witnesses to have them change their former testimony when appearing before the congressional committee investigating Pearl Harbor. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sent Colonel Henry C. Clausen on a 55,000-mile junket to induce officers to distort or recant the evidence they had given previously on the Pearl Harbor tragedy. The vital "East Wind, Rain" message and other incriminating documents were removed from official files and presumably destroyed. The secret and all-important Roosevelt-Churchill exchanges, transcribed by Tyler Kent, have been hidden away and possibly destroyed. Legislation has been passed which would make it illegal to divulge their contents, even if the full record could be found. Once basic integrity is abandoned, there are no lengths to which falsification cannot easily and quickly proceed as the occasion and political expediency may demand. There is already a marked trend toward the rewriting of textbooks in the field of history, particularly with respect to the alteration of their treatment of the causes of the first World War and the entrance of the United States therein. Since few of the textbooks have told the truth about the events leading to the second World War and Pearl Harbor, there has been no need to alter this material.

NOTE: AN ENGLISH VIEW OF THE HISTORICAL BLACKOUT

The editor sent copies of his brochures on *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, *The Court Historians versus Revisionism*, and *Rauch on Roosevelt* to one of the most distinguished of English publicists, authors, and military historians, who wrote me the following letter relative to the historical blackout in general and in England in particular. Being aware of the retaliation which

might be meted out to him in the American scholarly and book world, I am withholding his name, but it is one that is internationally known and respected:

Thank you for your very kind letter and the pamphlets, which I have read with enthusiastic interest. I love your phrases: "The Court Historians" and "the Blackout Boys." How delightfully descriptive! But what a revelation these last seven years have been of the strength and power of both these classes of people and their myriad supporters in the Press and among the people.

To you and me, who lived in the mentally-free world of pre-1914, the determined rush of the historical Gadarenes into the sea of falsehood and distortion has been an astounding phenomenon. Which of us would have believed, in that first decade of the century, that the values which then seemed so firmly established in the historical profession could disappear so easily and rapidly, leaving only a tiny company of unheeded and derided protestors to lament their loss? And I must admit that the protestors in the U.S.A. are more numerous and courageous than they are in this blessed land of freedom which used to make such a fuss about its Magna Carta, the execution of Charles I, and other so-called landmarks in dealing with tyranny.

Here we are, a nation of 50,000,000. Our *official* historian has just published his first book on the Norwegian campaign which shows, with official authority, that we were planning exactly the same aggression against Norway as the Germans, for which later the wretched Admiral Raeder was given a life sentence. But not one voice has been raised in England to say that, now that it is known that we were just as bad as he was, he might be let out. And I know that, if I wrote to the *Times*, it would not go in. I will not deny that there are a few Beards, Chamberlins, Tansills and Barnes' over here. But they do not find publishers here as they do with you, for which I give yours full marks. In this blessed sceptical isle and

ancient land of the free, Revisionism is gagged. You must keep yours going at all costs or the darkness descends.

My correspondent's impressions need correction in one respect: apparently he imagines that American publishers are more hospitable toward revisionist books than the English. He does not realize that, aside from Dr. Beard's books, all the revisionist volumes thus far published in the United States have been brought out by two small publishers. No large commercial publisher has brought out a revisionist volume since Pearl Harbor.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 1

1. New edition, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941.
2. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949. See especially pp. 86-93.
3. August, 1927.
4. Chicago: National Historical Society, 1928, pp. 142 ff.
5. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1937.
6. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
7. See below, pp. 54 ff.
8. Annual Report, 1946, pp. 188-89.
9. *Saturday Evening Post*, October 4, 1947, p. 172.
10. The best account of the American Smearbund and its activities is contained in John T. Flynn's brochure, *The Smear Terror*, privately printed, New York, 1948.
11. See below, pp. 62 ff. One of the most conspicuous examples of the entry of historians and other social scientists into the "Ministry of Truth" is afforded by the program and work of the Rand Corporation. See *Fortune*, March, 1951, pp. 99-102, 144. See also, *American Historical Review*, April, 1953, pp. 761-62.
12. *Saturday Evening Post*, *loc. cit.*
13. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947.
14. C. A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946); *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948).
15. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950.
16. New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1948.
17. Morison has recently been promoted to the rank of admiral, thus arriving at the official stature of the famous Alfred T. Mahan.

18. See below, pp. 387 ff. and pp. 475 ff.
19. For Mr. Regnery's account of the reception and treatment of these books, see his "A Letter to the Editor of the Publishers' Weekly," February 19, 1951.
20. See the brochure by Dr. John H. Sachs, *Hatchet Men* (New Oxford, Pa., privately printed, 1947); and Oswald Garrison Villard, "Book-Burning—U.S. Style," *The Progressive*, April 28, 1947.
21. See Towner Phelan, "Modern School for Scandal," *The Freeman*, September 24, 1951, pp. 813-17.
22. *Journal of Modern History*, XIX (March, 1947), 55-59.
23. April, 1947, p. 532.
24. June 12, 1948.
25. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944. For a corrective, see Wayne S. Cole, *America First: The Battle Against Intervention, 1940-1941* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1953).
26. June, 1948, pp. 127-32.
27. June 12, 1948.
28. On this point, see his letter in the *New York Times*, January 10, 1949.
29. April 11, 1948.
30. October, 1949.
31. January, 1949, pp. 382-86.
32. December, 1948, pp. 532-34.
33. *New York Times Book Review*, October 15, 1950, p. 34.
34. October 15, 1950, p. 12.
35. November 27, 1950.
36. November 18, 1950.
37. Professor Leopold's paper on "The Problem of American Intervention, 1917: An Historical Retrospect," was published in *World Politics*, April, 1950, pp. 405-25. Professor Adler's paper on "The War Guilt Question and American Disillusionment, 1918-1928," was published in the *Journal of Modern History*, March, 1951, pp. 1-28. For my reply to Adler, see the *Journal of Modern History*, September, 1951.
38. October, 1949.
39. The following material is essentially that prepared for delivery before the American Historical Association in Chicago on December 29, 1950. Between the invitation to prepare the paper and the printing of the program, the writer was switched, without his knowledge, to the role of discussing papers read by others. Hence, the original address could not be given. Certain minor changes have been made better to adapt the material for inclusion in this book.
40. James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (New York: The Century Company, 1926), p. 476.
41. See my extended discussion, *The Court Historians versus Revisionism*, privately printed, 1952.
42. See Richard Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1943).
43. *The Thousand-Year Conspiracy; Secret Germany Behind the Mask* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943).

44. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1943. See my review of Vansittart in *The Progressive*, September 17, 1945.
45. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1941.
46. A. D. Winspear and Tom Silverberg, *Who Was Socrates?* (New York: Cordon Company, Inc., 1939).
47. Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, and Herta Hertzog, *The Invasion from Mars; a Study in the Psychology of Panic; with the Complete Script of the Orson Welles Broadcast* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).
48. See Orwell, *op. cit.*, *passim*.
49. *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 13.
50. "Peace Costs Too Much," *Christian Century*, October 10, 1934, p. 1279.
51. F. J. P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism* (Appleton, Wis.: C. C. Nelson Publishing Company, 1953).
52. This action was forecast in a letter from President Truman to Admiral Morison on December 22, 1950, read by the Admiral before he delivered his presidential address before the American Historical Association in Chicago on December 29. See *American Historical Review*, April, 1951, pp. 711-12. For a summary of the work of American historians under the aegis of our "Ministry of Truth," see W. G. Leland, "The Historians and the Public in the United States," in *Revista de Historia de America*, June, 1952, pp. 64 ff.
53. In *Time*, March 26, 1951, p. 19, it is pointed out that President Truman is very sensitive about his future "niche in history." If he is able to appoint the historians who will write the official history of his times and smear those who seek to tell the truth, he should fare very well. Indeed, Mr. Truman may not need paid official historians to prepare his apotheosis. Henry Steele Commager has already rushed to his aid in this respect and has predicted that history will vindicate the soundness of Mr. Truman's major policies, especially those connected with globaloney, the cold war, and our preparation for a "Nineteen Eighty-Four" social order. Even this, however, has not satisfied Mr. Truman's urge for the affectionate caresses of Clio. He "jumped the gun" in the spring of 1952 by coauthoring his own history of himself and his public deeds, *Mr. President* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young).
54. Interestingly enough, Commager is a renegade revisionist. One should consult his veritable "rave" review of Charles C. Tansill's *America Goes to War* in the *Yale Review*, June, 1938, pp. 855-57.
55. George Orwell, *Nineteen Eighty-Four* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1949), pp. 213-15. Quoted by courteous consent of Brandt & Brandt, New York City, trustees for the estate of George Orwell in the United States.
56. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.
58. See below, Chap. 7, *passim*.

2

THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROAD TO WAR IN EUROPE

by

CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL

We shun political commitments which might entangle us in foreign wars; we avoid connection with the political activities of the League of Nations; . . .

We are not isolationists except in so far as we seek to isolate ourselves completely from war. . . .

I have seen war. . . . I hate war.

I have passed unnumbered hours, I shall pass unnumbered hours, thinking and planning how war can be kept from this nation. . . .

I wish I could keep war from all nations, but that is beyond my power. I can at least make certain that no act of the United States helps to produce or promote war.

—FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, speech at Chautauqua, New York, August 14, 1936.

Charles Callan Tansill was born in Fredericksburg, Texas, on December 9, 1890. He received his A.B. degree from the Catholic University of America in 1912 and his Ph.D. degree at Johns Hopkins University in 1918. Here he specialized in American diplomatic history under the direction of Professor John H. Latané. This has been his main field of interest, study, teaching, and writing throughout his academic life.

He has taught American history and American diplomatic relations at the Catholic University of America, American University, Johns Hopkins University, Fordham University, and Georgetown University, where he now holds the chair of professor of American diplomatic history. He was for a time dean of the Graduate School of American University.

Professor Tansill has given special attention to the causes of both World Wars. For ten years he was technical adviser on diplomatic history to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. For them he prepared a monumental work on the causes of the first World War, which was never published. Had it been, it would have ranked with the masterly book of Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War*. His most important books on diplomatic history have been *America Goes to War* (1938); *The United States and Santo Domingo, 1798-1873* (1938); *The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, 1885-1897* (1940); and *Main Issues in Canadian-American Relations* (1944).

Far and away the most impressive of these is *America Goes to War*, probably the most exhaustive and substantial single volume contributed by any revisionist on the responsibility for the first World War. The eminent Columbia University historian, Henry Steele Commager, wrote of this book in the *Yale Review*, June, 1938 (pp. 855-57); "It is critical, searching and judicious . . . a style that is always vigorous and sometimes brilliant. It is the most valuable contribution to the history of the prewar years in our literature and one of the notable achievements of historical scholarship of this generation."

Professor Tansill has recently completed an equally definitive book on our entry into the second World War, *Back Door to War; The Roosevelt Foreign Policy, 1933-1941*, published early in 1952 by the Henry Regnery Company.

I. THE PEACE TREATIES OF 1919 INSURE THE OUTBREAK OF ANOTHER WORLD WAR

1. THE ALLIES BUILD THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES UPON THE SHIFTING SANDS OF BETRAYAL—THE VIOLATION OF THE PRE-ARMISTICE CONTRACT

It was easy for President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to talk glibly of the sanctity of treaties and contracts. It was an essential part of the international ritual that became quite popular after 1919. But, in Germany, numerous persons could not forget the fact that the Treaty of Versailles was the cornerstone of a structure that had been built upon the dubious sands of betrayal. Lloyd George and Clemenceau had reluctantly agreed to a pre-Armistice contract that bound them to fashion the treaty of peace along the lines of the Fourteen Points. The Treaty of Versailles was a deliberate violation of this contract. In the dark soil of this breach of promise, the seeds of another world war were deeply sown.

It should be kept in mind that Woodrow Wilson acquiesced in this violation of contract. His ardent admirers have contended that he was tricked into the unsavory bargain by astute European statesmen who were masters of the craft sinister. Ben Hecht, in his *Erik Dorn*, appears to accept this viewpoint and refers to Wilson at Versailles as a “long-face virgin trapped in a bawdy house and calling in valiant tones for a glass of lemonade.”¹ In truth, Wilson had ordered his glass of lemonade heavily spiked with the hard liquor of deceit, and the whole world has paid for the extended binge of a so-called statesman who promised peace while weaving a web of war.

The story of this betrayal began on October 5, 1918, when Prince Max of Baden addressed a note to President Wilson requesting him to negotiate a peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Three days later the President inquired if the German government ac-

cepted these points as the basis for a treaty. On October 12, Prince Max gave an assurance that his object "in entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application" of the Fourteen Points to the terms of the treaty of peace. Two days later President Wilson added other conditions. No armistice would be signed which did not insure "absolutely satisfactory safeguards for the maintenance of the present military supremacy" of the Allied and Associated armies. Also, a democratic and representative government should be established in Berlin. When the German government accepted these conditions, the President informed Prince Max (October 23) that he was now prepared to discuss with the Associated governments the terms of the proposed armistice. This discussion ended in an agreement on their part to accept the Fourteen Points with two exceptions. With reference to the "freedom of the seas" they reserved to themselves "complete freedom" when they entered the Peace Conference. In connection with the matter of reparations, they understood that compensation would be made "by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property, by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." These terms were conveyed to the German government on November 5 and were promptly accepted by it. On November 11 an armistice placing Germany at the mercy of the Allied Powers was signed in the Forest of Compiègne. With the cessation of hostilities the question of a treaty of peace came to the front.²

The good faith of the Allied governments to make this treaty in conformity with the Fourteen Points had been formally pledged. But hardly was the ink dry on the Armistice terms when Lloyd George openly conspired to make the pre-Armistice agreement a mere scrap of paper. During the London Conference (December 1-3) the wily Welshman helped to push through a resolution which recommended an Inter-Allied Commission to "examine and report on amount enemy countries are able to pay for reparation and 'indemnity.'" The word "indemnity" could easily be stretched to cover the "costs of the War." Although such a move was "clearly precluded by the very intent of the Pre-Armistice Agreement," Lloyd George showed an "apparent nonchalance about principle

and contract" and started on a slippery path that "led rapidly downhill into the morasses of the December elections."³

2. REPARATIONS AND RASCALITY

In his pre-election promises Lloyd George revealed a complete disregard of the pre-Armistice contract. His assurances to the British electorate were in direct contradiction to his pledge to be guided by the Fourteen Points. At Bristol, on December 11, 1918, he informed his eager audience that "we propose to demand the whole cost of the war [from Germany]."⁴ The spirit that animated the election was stridently expressed by Eric Geddes in a speech in the Cambridge Guildhall: "We shall squeeze the orange until the pips squeak."⁵

At the Paris Peace Conference Lloyd George (January 22, 1919) suggested the appointment of a commission to study "reparation and indemnity." President Wilson succeeded in having the word "indemnity" deleted but it was merely a temporary semantic victory. The French gave ardent support to the position of Lloyd George. Their schemes for the dismemberment of Germany would be promoted by a collapse caused by exorbitant financial claims. This concerted action against the pre-Armistice agreement was strongly contested by John Foster Dulles, the legal adviser of the American members on the Reparation Commission. He insisted upon a strict adherence to the pre-Armistice promises and was supported by President Wilson, who unequivocally stated that America was "bound in honor to decline to agree to the inclusion of war costs in the reparation demanded. . . . It is clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect."⁶

But Lloyd George and Clemenceau quietly outflanked the American position by the simple device of expanding the categories of civilian damage so that they could include huge sums that properly belonged in the categories of "war costs." Lloyd George insisted that pensions and separation allowances should be included in the schedule of reparations, and Clemenceau hastened to his support. It was evident to both of them that these items were excluded by the express terms of the pre-Armistice agreement. If

President Wilson had adhered to the assurances he had given his financial experts he would immediately have rejected this transparent scheme to violate the pledges of the Allied Powers. But when these same experts indicated the evident implications of the Lloyd George proposals and stated that they were ruled out by logic, Wilson profoundly surprised them by bursting out in petulant tones: "Logic! Logic! I don't give a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions."⁷

Not content with adding an undeserved burden that helped to break German financial backs, Wilson followed the lead of Lloyd George along other roads of supreme folly. At the meeting of the Council of Four (April 5), the British Prime Minister suggested that in the treaty of peace the Allies should "assert their claim" and that Germany should recognize "her obligation for all the cost of the war." When Colonel House remarked that such an assertion would be contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement, Clemenceau reassuringly murmured that it was largely "a question of drafting."⁸

This experiment in drafting turned out to be the bitterly disputed Article 231 which placed upon Germany the responsibility "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany." This so-called "war guilt clause" aroused a deep and widespread hatred in all classes in Germany against a decision that was regarded as fundamentally unfair. And then, to add insult to injury, Article 232 repeated the language of the pre-Armistice agreement with its fake formula which limited reparations to civilian damages. The ease with which this language had been twisted to Allied benefit had clearly indicated that it would be no protection to Germany.

These two American surrenders were followed by a third which meant a complete abandonment of the position that no "punitive treaty" should be imposed upon Germany. The American experts had placed much reliance upon the creation of a reparation commission which would have far-reaching powers to estimate what Germany could afford to pay on Allied claims and to modify the

manner and date of these payments. But Clemenceau wanted this commission to be nothing more than a glorified adding machine designed merely to register the sums that Germany should pay. It was to have no right to make independent judgments. The American contention that the payment of reparations should not extend more than thirty-five years was vetoed by the French who thought that fifty years might be required.⁹

During the heated discussions in the Council of Four (April 5, 1919), Colonel House was so obtuse that he did not realize the French were storming the American position until one of the French experts informed him of that fact. Norman Davis shouted to him that the French banners bore the legend, "Allied claims and not German capacity to pay should be the basis for reparations." Although this declaration was in direct violation of the principles which the American experts had been fighting for during three long months, the confused Colonel tore down the American flag and hoisted the dubious French tricolor. By this action he flouted "both the letter and the spirit of the Pre-Armistice Agreement."¹⁰ When President Wilson confirmed this surrender that had been executed by Colonel House, he indirectly extended a much-needed helping hand to Adolf Hitler who warmly welcomed impressive illustrations of Allied perfidy as one of the best means to promote the Nazi movement.

The financial experts at Versailles failed to fix any particular sum as the measure of German liability for having caused the World War. In 1921 the Reparation Commission remedied this omission by computing the amount to be approximately \$33,000,000,000. One third of this sum represented damages to Allied property, "and one half to two thirds, pensions and similar allowances. In short, Wilson's decision doubled and perhaps tripled the bill."¹¹ Germany might have been able to pay a bill of not more than ten billion dollars, but when Wilson consented to play the part of Shylock and helped to perfect a plan that would exact a pound of flesh from the emaciated frame of a war-wasted nation, he pointed the way to financial chaos that inevitably overwhelmed Germany and Europe. He also helped, indirectly, to write several chapters in *Mein Kampf*.

3. THE COLONIAL QUESTION

The colonial question was dealt with in the fifth of the Fourteen Points. It provided for a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims." At the Paris Peace Conference there was no attempt to arrive at this "absolutely impartial adjustment." Long before the conference convened there had developed in the minds of prominent publicists in Britain, France, and the United States the opinion that Germany had forfeited all rights to her colonial dominion that had been conquered by Allied forces during the war. The usual argument in favor of this forfeiture was that German colonial administrators had cruelly mistreated the natives. Professor Thorstein Veblen wrote on this topic with his accustomed pontifical certitude: "In the Imperial colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their Imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of stepchild and that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at discretion and to be made use of without scruple."¹² In Britain, Edwyn Bevan argued that the return of her colonies would not "be to content Germany but to keep up her appetite for colonial expansion; it would be to restore a condition of things essentially unstable."¹³

In 1917 the American Commission of Inquiry, under the direction of Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, asked Dr. George L. Beer to prepare a series of studies on the colonial question with special reference to German colonial policy. Beer had long been regarded as an outstanding expert on the commercial policy of England during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In an imposing series of volumes he had "presented the 'English point of view'" with regard to colonial administration.¹⁴ After the outbreak of the first World War, his sympathies were very decidedly with the Allies, and particularly with the British Empire.¹⁵

It was only natural that Dr. Beer, despite his alleged historical objectivity, would strongly condemn German colonial policy. In February, 1918, he turned over to Dr. Mezes his manuscript on the German colonies in Africa. After weighing a considerable amount of data he came to the conclusion that Germany had totally failed

to "appreciate the duties of colonial trusteeship."¹⁶ Therefore, she should lose her colonial dominions.

Dr. Beer accompanied the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as a colonial expert and it is evident that he influenced the opinions of President Wilson, who stated on July 10, 1919, that the German colonies had not "been governed; they had been exploited merely, without thought of the interest or even the ordinary human rights of their inhabitants."¹⁷

This accusation of the President was quite groundless. A careful American scholar who made a trip to the Cameroons in order to get an accurate picture of the prewar situation summarizes his viewpoint as follows:

. . . My own conclusion is that Germany's colonial accomplishments in thirty short years constitute a record of unusual achievement and entitle her to a very high rank as a successful colonial power, a view quite different from that reached in 1919. . . . I feel that if Germany had been allowed to continue as a colonial power after the war, her civil rule would have compared favorably with the very best that the world knows today.¹⁸

The Germans were deeply incensed because the Allied governments refused to count the colonies as an important credit item in the reparation account. Some Germans had estimated the value of the colonies at nine billion dollars. If this estimate had been cut in half, there would still have been a large sum that could have been used to reduce the tremendous financial burden imposed upon weary German backs. Such action would have "spared Germany the additional humiliation of losing all her overseas possessions under the hypocritical guise of humanitarian motives."¹⁹ These needless humiliations prepared the way for the tragedy of 1939. It is evident that the revelations in the Nuremberg documents concerning Hitler's plans for expansion are merely the last chapter in a long and depressing book that began at Versailles.

4. THE PROBLEM OF POLAND

In the discussion of questions relating to Poland, President Wilson had the advice of Professor Robert H. Lord, whose monograph on the *Second Partition of Poland* was supposed to make him an authority on the problems of 1919. His lack of objectivity was as striking as that of Professor Beer. It was largely a case of hysterical rather than historical scholarship.²⁰

While the President was formulating his Fourteen Points, some of the experts on the American Commission of Inquiry suggested that an independent Polish state be erected with boundaries based "on a fair balance of national and economic considerations, giving due weight to the necessity for adequate access to the sea."²¹ In the thirteenth of the Fourteen Points President Wilson changed the phraseology of this suggestion so that more stress would be laid upon ethnographic factors: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. . . ."

5. DANZIG

If Poland were to be given access to the Baltic Sea, the port of Danzig would be of fundamental importance. In order to guide the President in this difficult matter of Polish boundaries, the American experts prepared two reports (January, February, 1919).²² In dealing with Danzig, they granted it to Poland because of economic considerations. They conveniently overlooked the fact that, from the viewpoint of population, Danzig was 97 per cent German. On February 23, 1919, while Wilson was in the United States, Colonel House cabled to him concerning the disposition of Danzig: "Our experts also believe this [the cession of Danzig to Poland] to be the best solution."²³ But the President was unwilling to confirm this suggestion, so the question of Danzig was postponed until March 17, when Lloyd George carried on a brisk exchange of opinions with Colonel House and Clemenceau. Two

days later the British Prime Minister flatly refused to accept the proposal to cede both Danzig and the German Kreis of Marienwerder to Poland. He was not greatly impressed with the fact that the members of the Polish Commission and a large array of experts were in favor of this decision.²⁴

Despite pressure from Colonel House and Dr. Mezes (brother-in-law of Colonel House), President Wilson (March 28) rushed to the support of Lloyd George. On April 5, he and Lloyd George reached an understanding that the city and area of Danzig should become a free city with local autonomy under a commissioner of the League of Nations but connected with Poland by a customs union and port facilities. The foreign relations of the free city were to be under Polish control.²⁵

To the Germans this large measure of Polish control over the city of Danzig was profoundly irritating, and at times the actions of the Polish authorities in connection with foreign relations and the establishment of export duties seemed unnecessarily provocative. From the viewpoint of economics, Polish control over Danzig had the most serious implications. By altering the customs tariff Poland could seriously affect the trade of the port, and, through control of the railroads of the free city, the Polish government could extend important favors to the competing port of Gdingen.²⁶

This situation led Gustav Stresemann, one of the most moderate of German statesmen, to remark in September, 1925, that the "third great task of Germany is the . . . recovery of Danzig."²⁷ In 1931 the quiet, unaggressive Centrist leader, Heinrich Brüning, sounded out certain European governments in order to ascertain whether they would favor territorial revision at the expense of Poland.²⁸ But this pressure to recover lost territory suddenly ended in Germany on January 26, 1934, when Marshal Pilsudski concluded with Hitler the well-known nonaggression treaty.²⁹ The price Poland paid for this agreement was an immediate acquiescence in a German program aimed at the nazification of Danzig.³⁰ When Polish statesmen, after Pilsudski's death, tried to reverse this movement by courting British and French favor, they opened the floodgates that permitted the Nazi-Soviet tide quickly to inundate all of Poland.

6. THE POLISH CORRIDOR

A Polish Corridor through German territory to the Baltic Sea was distinctly forecast in the thirteenth point of the Wilson program which expressly declared that Poland should be granted "free and secure access to the sea." This wide "right of way" was to go through territory inhabited by "indisputably Polish populations." The American experts in their reports of January-February, 1919, outlined, however, a broad Polish path to the sea through the German provinces of Posen and West Prussia. They admitted the hardships this action would entail upon some 1,600,000 Germans in East Prussia, but they regarded the benefits conferred upon many millions of Poles as of more significance.⁸¹

When the reports of these experts were accepted by the Polish Commission and were written into the text of the Treaty of Versailles, it meant that the valley of the Vistula had been placed under Polish control. In order to shut the Germans of East Prussia away from any contact with the Vistula, "a zone fifty yards in width along the east bank was given to Poland, so that along their ancient waterway the East Prussians have no riparian rights. Though the river flows within a stone's throw of their doors, they may not use it."⁸²

The Corridor itself was a wedge of territory which ran inland from the Baltic Sea for 45 miles, with a width of 20 miles at the coast, 60 miles in the center, and 140 miles in the south. Transportation across it was made difficult by Polish authorities who "instead of maintaining and developing the existing excellent system of communications by rail and road, river and canal, . . . at once scrapped a large part of it in the determination to divert the natural and historical direction of traffic." With reference to conditions in the Corridor in 1933, Professor Dawson wrote as follows: "It is true that a few transit trains cross the Corridor daily, but as they may neither put down nor pick up traffic on the way, this piece of now Polish territory, so far as provision for communication and transport goes, might be unpopulated."⁸³ Traffic along the highways crossing the Corridor was also very unsatisfactory. In

1931 Colonel Powell discovered that only the main east-and-west highways were open for vehicular traffic and this was "hampered by every device that the ingenuity of the Poles can suggest. Here I speak from personal experience, for I have driven my car across the Corridor four times."³⁴

In 1938 and 1939 Hitler tried in vain to secure from the Polish government the right to construct a railroad and motor road across the Corridor. Relying upon British support, the Polish Foreign Office, in the spring of 1939, rejected any thought of granting these concessions. This action so deeply angered Hitler that he began to sound out the Soviet government with reference to a treaty that would mean the fourth partition of Poland. Polish diplomats had not learned the simple lesson that concessions may prevent a catastrophe.

7. UPPER SILESIA

During the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference the decision with reference to Upper Silesia was one of the clearest indications that hysteria and not objective history guided the conclusions of some of the American experts. This was particularly the case with regard to Professor Robert H. Lord. He was strongly of the opinion that Upper Silesia should go to Poland without a plebiscite being held to ascertain the desires of the inhabitants. When the treaty was turned over to the German delegation the Upper Silesian article was subjected to a great deal of cogent criticism. Lloyd George was convinced by the German arguments but President Wilson still gave some heed to Professor Lord, who complained that Germany had been sovereign over Upper Silesia for only two centuries. Even though Mr. Lamont countered with the remark that this territory had not "belonged to Poland for 400 years," the President retained a lingering faith in the vehement protestations of Professor Lord. But this faith received a further shock when the learned professor opposed the holding of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. Lloyd George then pertinently inquired why plebiscites were to be held "in Allenstein, Schleswig, Klagenfurt but not in Silesia."³⁵ There was no real answer Professor Lord could give to

sustain his position so a provision was inserted in the treaty with reference to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia.

But this plebiscite was held in an atmosphere of terrorism. The International Commission that took over the administration of the voting area consisted of three members: General Le Rond (France), Colonel Sir Harold Percival (Britain), and General De Marinis (Italy). France immediately sent 8,000 troops to dominate Upper Silesia and then procured the appointment of General Le Rond as the head of the civil administration. Although the Allied governments had assured the German delegation at Paris (June 16, 1919) that the International Commission would insist upon the "full impartiality of the vote," they broke faith in this regard as well as in others. Every possible concession was given to the Poles in the plebiscite area but when the vote was taken on March 20, 1921, the results were a great shock to the French and Poles: 707,554, or 59.6 per cent, voted to remain under German control, while 478,802, or 40.4 per cent, elected to be placed under Polish administration.³⁶

When one considers the indefensible tactics of the French before the plebiscite was held it is surprising that the vote was so pro-German. One of the best accounts of the situation in Upper Silesia in 1919-20 is given in the monograph by Professor René Martel, *The Eastern Frontiers of Germany*:

. . . On April 4, 1919, the Polish Supreme National Council of Upper Silesia got into touch with Korfanty. Adalbert Korfanty, a former journalist and a popular leader, was the man of action for whom Dmowski was looking to prepare and organize the rising. . . . On May 1, 1919, the Polish secret societies . . . demonstrated their patriotic sentiments by pursuing the Germans. The Terror had begun. . . . The secret organization which he [Korfanty] had built up . . . continued to exist until the plebiscite. . . . The Germans were tortured, mutilated, put to death and the corpses defiled; villages and châteaux were pillaged, burnt or blown up. The German Government has published on the subject a series of White Papers, illustrated by photographs. . . . The

scenes which have thus been perpetuated pictorially surpass in horror the worst imaginable atrocities.³⁷

When these bloody Polish outbreaks were finally suppressed, the League of Nations entrusted the task of partitioning Upper Silesia to a commission composed of representatives of Belgium, Brazil, China, Japan, and Spain. The unneutral composition of this commission is worth noting and their decision reflected their prejudices. Under its terms Poland received nearly five-sixths of the industrial area in dispute. She also was granted "80 per cent of the coal-bearing area . . . besides all the iron ore mines; nearly all the zinc and lead ore mines and a large majority of the works dependent on the primary industries."³⁸

In commenting upon the farce of this plebiscite, Sir Robert Donald remarks:

. . . Harder to bear than the material loss were the exasperating and cruel moral wrongs and injustices inflicted upon the German community. It is possible that had the Allies transferred Upper Silesia to Poland, basing their action upon no other law than brute force, Germany would have resigned herself to the inevitable. . . . But to inflict upon her the tragic farce of the plebiscite, with all its accompaniments of deceit, broken pledges, massacres, cruel outrages, carried out in an atmosphere of political putrescence, was to add insult to injury, moral torture to robbery under arms.³⁹

Despite Wilson's reassuring words about a peace that should not be punitive, Germany had been stripped and severely whipped. After these impressive examples of Allied ill-faith it was not difficult for Nazi statesmen to plan for expansion without much thought about the usual principles of international law. Law is based upon logic and at Versailles Woodrow Wilson had frankly condemned the science of right reasoning: "Logic! Logic! I don't give a damn for logic." Hitler could not have made a more damning pronouncement.

8. OCCUPATION OF THE RHINELAND

President Wilson was not always on the wrong side of the diplomatic fence at Paris. In the matter of the Rhineland occupation he adopted a vigorous role which completely blocked the execution of an ambitious French program. One of the main French objectives in 1919 was the separation of the entire left bank of the Rhine from Germany and the establishment of autonomous republics friendly to France. Wilson refused to accept this program even though it was ardently advocated by Colonel House.⁴⁰ With the support of Lloyd George he was able to write into the Treaty of Versailles a moderate provision: "German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty."⁴¹

The last contingent of the American Army of Occupation left the Rhineland in February, 1923; some of the Allied troops remained until 1930. The mere fact that German soil was occupied for a decade aroused resentment in most German minds. This resentment was turned into a feeling of outrage when France quartered a considerable number of her Negro colonial troops in private residences in parts of the Rhine territory. Their insulting and at times brutal conduct toward the German women was regarded as an indication that France would go to extreme lengths to humiliate Germany. In December, 1921, General Henry T. Allen sent to Secretary Hughes a complaint that had been filed with the High Commission by a delegation of German workingmen: "We fear to leave our homes and go to work leaving our wives and daughters in our houses with these men. This question troubles us more than houses and more food."⁴² Felix Morley, during a vacation in France in 1920, was sharply critical of French behavior: "If England and America would leave France to herself, there wouldn't be a Frenchman on German soil after a week."⁴³ Three years later, the American consul at Cologne wrote to Secretary Hughes a sharp indictment of French practices in the Rhineland. He reported that once

in a while German officials were handcuffed and the German police "beaten and kicked." At Aachen civilians and officials were "horse-whipped."⁴⁴ Memories of these insults lingered in German minds and helped to produce a climate of opinion that seemingly justified many of the items in Hitler's program of expansion and revenge.

9. THE STARVATION BLOCKADE

The Armistice of November 11, 1918, did not put an end to the Allied blockade of Germany. For many months after the war was over the Allied governments did not permit food shipments to the millions of hungry persons in Germany. This callous attitude on the part of the Allied delegations in Paris shocked the Labor party in England which sponsored the humane "save the children" movement. Funds were raised to buy food "when owing to the blockade, starvation stalked gaunt and livid through the streets of thousands of German towns."⁴⁵

In Paris, President Wilson appealed "again and again for a free exportation of foodstuffs to the half-starving populations of Central Europe, but always the French Government thwarted him. This French policy filled [Henry] White, who had small grandchildren in Germany and heard much from his daughter of the desperate plight of the people, with futile indignation."⁴⁶

The impact of the blockade upon the German people was described by George E. R. Gedye, who was sent in February, 1919, upon an inspection tour of Germany:

. . . Hospital conditions were appalling. A steady average of 10 per cent of the patients had died during the war years from lack of fats, milk and good flour. Camphor, glycerine and cod-liver oil were unprocurable. This resulted in high infant mortality. . . . We saw some terrible sights in the children's hospital, such as the "starvation babies" with ugly, swollen heads. . . . Such were the conditions in Unoccupied Territory. Our report naturally urged the immediate opening of the frontiers for fats, milk and flour . . . but the terrible blockade was maintained as a result of French insistence . . .

until the Treaty of Versailles was signed in June, 1919. . . . No severity of punishment could restrain the Anglo-American divisions on the Rhine from sharing their rations with their starving German fellow-creatures.⁴⁷

Finally, under the terms of the Brussels Agreement (March 14, 1919), provision was made for the shipment of food to Germany, but before these supplies were made available tens of thousands of Germans had gone through the tortures of slow starvation. It is estimated that about 800,000 perished as a result of the blockade. At Versailles the beads in a long rosary of hatred and despair had been forged for the Germans by the Big Four. After 1919 they were counted over numberless times by large groups of unfortunate persons whose health had been wrecked by malnutrition. They neither forgot nor forgave.

10. GERMAN REACTION TO THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES

On May 7, 1919, the German delegation in Paris was formally presented with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. When Johann Giesberts read through the long bill of indictment he burst out with vehemence: "This shameful treaty has broken me, for I believed in Wilson until today. I believed him to be an honest man, and now that scoundrel sends us such a treaty."⁴⁸ On May 12, at a great mass meeting in Berlin, Konstantin Fehrenbach, one of the leaders of the Centrist party, alluded to the attitude that future generations in Germany would adopt relative to the treaty and ended his speech with words of warning that later were implemented by Hitler: "The will to break the chains of slavery will be implanted from childhood on."⁴⁹

These chains were confirmed by the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact which bestowed a formal blessing upon the injustices of Versailles. They could be broken only by force. When Hitler began to snap them, one by one, the noise was heard around the world and the American public was solemnly informed by Secretaries Stimson and Hull that a wild German bull was breaking the choicest dishes in the china shop of world peace. At Nuremberg men were hanged

because they had planned to break these vessels filled with national hatreds. Nothing was said of the pseudo statesmen who prepared at Paris the witches' brew that poisoned German minds.

The Nazi movement had its roots deep in the fertile soil of Versailles, and its rank growth was watered by the tears of millions of disillusioned Germans.

II. AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH GERMANY, 1919-1936

1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE WORLD WAR

The American attitude toward the Weimar Republic in the years immediately after the war was one of watchful waiting. In the Department of State there was a definite fear that sparks of Bolshevism from Russia might find an easy lodgment in the broken structure of Germany and thus start a fire that would burn away all the landmarks of the old German way of life. This fear was increased by the remarks of certain Germans who had held important diplomatic posts under the Kaiser. In October, 1919, Count von Bernstorff stressed the importance of establishing close connections between Germany and Russia: "Russia is the country which we can most conveniently exploit. Russia needs capital and intelligence which our industry can provide. Above all, now that Bolshevism is beginning in Germany, we are becoming 'cousin-germans' of the Russians. We must come to terms with the Bolsheviks."⁵⁰

The mounting unrest in Germany had many unpleasant expressions. In November, 1919, there was a large demonstration in Heidelberg in which anti-Semitism and a spirit of excessive nationalism were clearly in evidence.⁵¹ By April, 1921, anti-Semitism reached a peak in certain German cities although it was strongly opposed by Catholic prelates like the Cardinal of Munich.⁵² After

1933, Hitler merely played upon prejudices that had long existed in Germany.

Fervid expressions of nationalism were in part caused by the loud talk of certain Allied statesmen with reference to holding trials for many prominent German leaders as war criminals. This talk led the ex-Kaiser, Wilhelm II, to write to President Wilson and offer to serve as a victim in place of other Germans: "If the Allied and Associated Governments want a victim let them take me instead of the nine hundred Germans who have committed no offence other than that of serving their country in the war."⁵³ There was no real need for the ex-Kaiser to make this offer. The American government was strongly opposed to any war-criminal trials. On February 6, 1920, Secretary Lansing sent a significant instruction to the American Embassy in Paris: "This Government has not yet ratified the Treaty; it is not joining in the demand of the Allies, and it is in no way backing the insistence of the Allies in the immediate carrying out of the demand [for the delivery of German war criminals]."⁵⁴

The Allies soon abandoned the project of trying Germans as war criminals. Apparently, however, they strongly resented the attitude of Secretary Lansing in this matter because they soon showed a non-co-operative spirit with regard to the payment of the costs of the American Army of Occupation. The Wilson administration had expected the payments to be made promptly out of German reparations, but this action was blocked for several years. In 1923 the British representative on the Reparation Commission expressed a doubt whether the United States, having rejected the Treaty of Versailles, could assert any just claim to be paid for the Rhineland occupation.⁵⁵ Similar statements deeply angered George B. Lockwood, secretary of the Republican National Committee, who wrote to Secretary Hughes to express his indignation at the situation. He was sure that the "haggling and pettifoggery, duplicity and downright dishonesty that has characterized the attitude of Great Britain and the other Allied Powers in their treatment of America's claims" indicated a strong desire to "bilk" the United States out of any payments for occupation costs.⁵⁶

On May 25, 1923, the governments of Belgium, Britain, France, and Italy signed an agreement with the United States providing for the reimbursement of these payments (out of German reparations) over a period of twelve years.⁵⁷ Although the Allies had finally consented to this reimbursement according to a long-range plan, Secretary Hughes noted that in their own case they had insisted that the payments for occupation be "met in full as they fell due." It seemed to him that "they should have distributed the money received for these arms costs equitably; instead, they kept these moneys and left us out."⁵⁸

In the matter of reparations there was further friction. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles provision was made for the appointment of a Reparation Commission which would determine the amount owed by Germany and prepare a schedule for "discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921." Up to that date the German government was to pay the equivalent of five billion dollars. Early in 1921 Germany claimed that she had completed this payment in the form of gold, securities, coal, and other commodities, but the Reparation Commission declared that less than half of the required sum had really been paid. The German government then appealed to the United States to "mediate the reparations question and to fix the sum to be paid . . . to the Allied Powers."⁵⁹ Secretary Hughes refused to be drawn into this dispute, but he did admonish the Weimar Republic to make "directly to the Allied Governments clear, definite, and adequate proposals which would in all respects meet its just obligations."⁶⁰

On April 28, 1921, the Reparation Commission announced that the total German indemnity had been fixed at 132,000,000,000 gold marks or approximately \$33,000,000,000. The schedule of payments was forwarded to Germany on May 5 and was promptly accepted.⁶¹ Although the first installment of \$250,000,000 was paid on August 31, the decline in the value of the mark indicated fundamental financial difficulties in Germany. During 1922 the German government asked for a moratorium extending two and one-half years. Britain was inclined to favor this request; France was bitterly op-

posed to it. Under French pressure the Reparation Commission finally declared that Germany was in default and Poincaré insisted upon reprisals.

The American government was deeply interested in this German problem. Peace between Germany and the United States had been effected under the terms of a joint resolution signed by President Harding on July 2, 1921.⁶² This action had been followed by a treaty (August 25, 1921) which went into effect on November 11 of that year.⁶³ Under the terms of these instruments all the rights, privileges, indemnities, and reparations to which the United States was entitled under the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles were "expressly reserved." Separate peace with Germany would not mean the loss of any of America's hard-won rights.

These rights would have no value in a Germany whose economic structure was destroyed. Therefore American representatives abroad looked with strong disapproval upon Poincaré's determination to press for prompt payment of impossible reparations. In Rome Ambassador Child talked the situation over with Barthou, the mouthpiece of Poincaré. He reported to Secretary Hughes that this conversation revealed that Barthou had "an anti-German prejudice so strong as to vitiate sound judgment." He thought it might be necessary for the "world to weigh the necessity of acting independently of the French Government in joint appeals to public opinion."⁶⁴

In the following month Ambassador Herrick, who was usually quite Francophile, wrote to Secretary Hughes and deprecated the attitude of Poincaré with reference to pressure upon Germany: "There is now definitely no hope of making any impression on Poincaré personally. He has learned nothing and forgotten nothing, not from lack of intelligence but rather from definite purpose. . . . He has staked his political life and reputation on his aggressive policy. If you want to do anything effective to stop this, you must in my judgment make some public utterance with the idea of helping reasonable French opinion."⁶⁵ But Hughes replied that an appeal to the French people over the head of their government was a dangerous proceeding: "Previous efforts of this sort have caused more trouble than they cured."⁶⁶

In January, 1923, French troops moved into the Ruhr as far east as Dortmund. The British government regarded this action as illegal and refused to support it. Occupation of the Ruhr would paralyze German industry and seriously affect reparations and British trade with Germany. In order to counter this French policy of pressure, German workers in the Ruhr laid down their tools. Mines and factories shut down and telephone, telegraph, and railway services were discontinued. All reparation payments to Allied governments ceased.

The American commercial attaché in Berlin looked at this French invasion of the Ruhr as an attempt permanently to "emasculate Germany as a Great Power."⁶⁷ The American ambassador reported in a similar vein: "The people have been treated as a subject and alien race; their trade has been harassed and largely destroyed; ineffectual troops have been quartered here and there in their villages. Apparently everything that would arouse hostility, and nothing that would conciliate, has been done. As a result, the Rhineland population today is savagely anti-French."⁶⁸ To Herbert Hoover the repressive policy of the French had a world impact. French interference with the coal trade of the Ruhr would upset "the entire coal market of the world and would make life more difficult everywhere."⁶⁹ The most graphic description of French terrorism in the Ruhr is given in George E. R. Gedye's *The Revolver Republic*:

In Essen I saw a boy, one morning, sobbing bitterly after being thrashed by a French officer for failing to yield the pavement to him, and in Recklinghausen the French pursued with their riding-whips into the theatre some men who had taken refuge there, stopped the performance of "King Lear," and drove out the whole audience. . . . On the night of 11th March the bodies of a French chasseur subaltern and a Régie station master were found near Buer. . . . The next morning a seven o'clock curfew was proclaimed in Buer. . . . The order to be indoors by seven had been issued on a Sunday after many people had gone off on excursions for the day. On their return, all-unwitting, they were beaten with

riding-whips, struck with rifle butts, chased through the streets by French soldiers, and shot at. A workman named Fabeck was shot dead as he stood with his young wife waiting for a tram.⁷⁰

These repressive tactics of France finally bore fruit in the agreement of September 26, 1923, when Germany promised to abandon the policy of passive resistance. But the price of victory had been very high. The British government had not looked with favor upon the occupation of the Ruhr with the consequent collapse of Germany's economic structure, and opinion in neutral countries was sharply critical. In France the fall in the value of the franc caused milder counsels to prevail. The way was thus prepared for discussions which led to the adoption of the Dawes Plan. The Inter-Allied Agreement providing for this plan was signed in London on August 30, 1924, and the evacuation of French troops from the Ruhr began immediately.⁷¹

But the Dawes Plan had some evident flaws. It was silent with reference to the total reparations bill. Therefore, in a technical sense, the old total bill of \$33,000,000,000, fixed by the Reparation Commission, was still in force. It should have been apparent to the so-called financial experts that Germany could not continue making huge annual reparations payments for an indefinite period. They should also have realized that no Great Power would be content to remain in the financial and political chains that were riveted upon Germany under the terms of the plan. In this regard the *Commercial and Financial Chronicle* made some highly pertinent remarks:

Nothing like the proposed procedure is to be found in history. Germany is to be taken over and administered in the same way as a corporation no longer able to meet its obligations is taken over by the law and transferred to the hands of the bankruptcy commissioners. . . . In reality a foreign control of internal affairs has been imposed such as never before existed either in our times or in the past. . . . Never before

has it been proposed to take such complete possession of the wealth of a nation.⁷²

Payments under the Dawes Plan increased each year until they reached (in the fifth year) 2,500,000,000 marks. The German government was able to make them only because of the large volume of foreign loans. But it should have been obvious that such a system could not continue. When this fact became evident in 1929, a new group of financial experts met in Paris with Owen D. Young as chairman. On June 7, 1929, this committee handed to the Reparation Commission, and to the governments concerned, a financial agreement that was conveniently called the Young Plan. Under its terms the total indemnity bill was reduced to \$8,032,500,000 and was capitalized at 5½ per cent. The period for its payments was limited to fifty-eight and one half years. The Reparation Commission was abolished in favor of a Bank for International Settlements which would enjoy broad powers. As a concession to Germany, the extensive financial and political controls outlined under the Dawes Plan were abandoned.⁷³

The Young Plan went into effect in 1930 but it was a panacea that failed to cure the ills of a world that was on the brink of a breakdown. Some ascribed this desperate situation to an inadequate gold supply; others thought in terms of a surplus of silver. Technology was blamed because it had enabled man to multiply the output of industrial and agricultural products to the point where the world market was flooded with cheap commodities. Aristide Briand pointed to an economic federation of Europe as the best means of surmounting the difficulties that threatened to engulf the Continent, but the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Johann Schober, expressed the opinion that it would be expedient not to push things too fast. Perhaps the best step along the road to eventual European federation would be an Austro-German customs union! In March, 1931, this proposed union was formally announced by the governments of Austria and Germany with a cogent explanation of its objectives. Although Britain was favorable to this arrangement, France affected to see political motives back of this

union and strongly opposed it. Her refusal to grant a much-needed loan to the principal bank in Austria (the Kredit Anstalt) helped to undermine confidence in the stability of that institution. This, in turn, had its effect upon the German economic structure that was already tottering under the weight of a large unfavorable trade balance.⁷⁴

Realizing that Austria and Germany were going through a period of frenzied finance, President Hoover (June 20) proposed a one-year world moratorium, from July 1, with reference to "all payments on inter-governmental debts, reparations and relief debts, both principal and interest . . . not including obligations of governments held by private parties." He made it clear, however, that this action would not mean "the cancellation of the debts" due to the United States.⁷⁵

When France delayed acceptance of this proposal the situation in Europe grew rapidly worse. During the seventeen days "that France held up the Hoover Plan, a run on the German banks and the calling in of short-term credits drained the country of some \$300,000,000. All banks in Germany for a time were closed. The Hoover Plan would have saved Germany \$406,000,000 this year."⁷⁶

With Germany in financial chaos, Secretary Stimson decided to pay a visit to Berlin in order to get a close-up of the situation. The German press, "without a single discordant note," gave him a "hearty welcome and the occasion was seized to express in front-page editorials the gratitude felt for America's . . . friendliness towards Germany."⁷⁷

Stimson had a long conversation with Dr. Bruening, the German Chancellor. It was not long before they discovered that they had fought along the Western Front in opposing forces that had repeatedly clashed. The warrior tie at once drew them close together and with President Hindenburg it was the same thing. To Stimson, the president of the Weimar Republic appeared as an "impressive, fine old man."⁷⁸

But it required more than Stimson's good will to save the Weimar Republic. The failure of the Allies to carry out the disarmament pledges of the Treaty of Versailles; the heavy burden of the Young Plan with its consequent crushing taxation, and the difficul-

ties in securing a market for manufactured goods, made the situation in Germany seem almost hopeless. In the spring of 1932 Bruening realized that generous concessions on the part of the Allies were badly needed in order to check the tide of National Socialism that was beginning to rise in a menacing manner.

In America there was little appreciation of the growing power of Hitler. The *Omaha World-Herald* scorned him as an "insignificant little man";⁷⁹ the *Boston Evening Transcript* denounced him as the "incarnation of mischief,"⁸⁰ but few Americans realized that he was an alarming challenge to Bruening. Their eyes were partly opened on March 13 when Hitler polled some eleven million votes. It was now apparent to the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* that "much as one may desire to believe that Hitlerism has received its death blow, the figures warrant no such assumption."⁸¹

The only way to banish the shadow of Hitlerism was to strengthen the supports of the Bruening government. But France refused to see this plain fact. Indeed, there is evidence to indicate that certain French statesmen conspired to destroy the Bruening government. According to Bruening himself,

. . . one major factor in Hitler's rise . . . was the fact that he received large sums of money from foreign countries in 1923 and later [France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia], and was well paid for sabotaging the passive resistance in the Ruhr district. . . . In later years he [Hitler] was paid to excite unrest and encourage revolution in Germany by people who imagined that this might weaken Germany permanently and make the survival of any constitutional, central government impossible.⁸²

In partial support of this statement by Dr. Bruening there is the following paragraph from Louis P. Lochner's intriguing book, *What About Germany?*:

If there was one foreign statesman who thoroughly misjudged Hitler and his movement, it was André François-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Berlin. From what I know of

behind-the-scenes activities towards the end of the Bruening era in 1932, I am forced to conclude that no other diplomat is more directly responsible for the elevation to power of Adolph Hitler than this brilliant, forever-wisecracking French politician. According to François-Poncet, the incorruptible Chancellor, Heinrich Bruening, was too brainy and experienced in the wily game of international politics. Hitler, on the other hand, was a fool and a political dilettante. . . . With the Nazi leader in power, he thought it would be much easier to effect deals which would be favorable to France.⁸³

At any rate, the French government, in the spring of 1932, greatly helped to bring about Bruening's fall. When the Disarmament Conference met in Geneva in February, 1932, Bruening presented a program that he thought would find favor in Germany. Ramsay MacDonald and Secretary Stimson expressed their approval of the Bruening proposal, but Tardieu, of France, resorted to the usual French tactics of delay. When Bruening returned to Berlin with empty hands, Hindenburg summoned him to the President's office and criticized him so sharply that resignation was the only course left open to him.⁸⁴

When Bruening fell, the fate of the Weimar Republic was sealed. And the fault did not lie solely upon the shoulders of France. Walter Lippmann summarized the situation in a lucid commentary:

Now that he [Bruening] has fallen, tributes will be paid . . . all over the world, and everywhere there will be great regret that so experienced and upright a statesman is no longer the German spokesman. He is the best liked and most trusted man in Europe. . . . He has lacked only men of equal stature in other countries with whom he could work. . . . Though it appears that he has fallen because of intrigues by the Nationalists [in Germany], what undermined him and made the intrigues possible was the failure of France, Great Britain and the United States to take a single constructive step toward the restoration of international confi-

dence and of the trade and credit which would depend upon it.⁸⁵

The weak governments of von Papen and Schleicher were merely brief preludes to the government of Adolph Hitler which began in January, 1933, when President Hindenburg asked him to assume the office of Chancellor.

2. DISARMAMENT REMAINS A CONSTANT FACTOR IN THE UNEASY EQUATION OF EUROPEAN PEACE

The fall of the Bruening government emphasized the difficulties surrounding the problem of disarmament. It was the same old story of broken pledges by the Allied Powers. They had the plausible excuse that the phraseology of Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations was ambiguous: "The Members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." In discussing this phraseology, Lord Davies makes the following pertinent comment: "Here is an attempt to compromise, to square the circle, to combine as a basis for reduction two incompatible principles, namely the old doctrine of absolute self-defence . . . and the alternative idea of a police function."⁸⁶

It was inevitable that statesmen would differ with reference to the interpretation of this article. André Tardieu asserted that its language did not bind France to any plan for disarmament. Although there was a "legal obligation" to which Germany had subscribed, there was nothing to which France was bound except a "desire" to reduce her armaments.⁸⁷ Aristide Briand did not agree with Tardieu in this matter. He argued that France was bound by Article VIII to agree to some plan for disarmament. She had partly carried out this pledge by making substantial reductions in her armaments, but was unable to go any further unless other nations took adequate steps to insure French security.⁸⁸

The American view relative to disarmament was clearly stated by Professor James T. Shotwell: "Germany had been disarmed with

the understanding . . . that the other signatories would also voluntarily limit their armaments with due regard to what Germany was forced to do."⁸⁹ In 1933 the American position was given cogent expression by Norman H. Davis, who told the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments that "it would neither have been just nor wise, nor was it intended, that the Central Powers should be subject for all times to a special treatment in armaments. There is and has been a corresponding duty on the part of the other Powers, parties to the peace treaties, that by successive stages they too would bring their armaments down to a level strictly determined by the needs of self-defence."⁹⁰

It was to this conference that Prime Minister MacDonald presented (March, 1933) his plan for disarmament. The proposed size of European armies was bound to arouse resentment in Germany: Czechoslovakia, 100,000; France, 200,000 for home country and 200,000 for overseas; Germany, 200,000; Italy, 200,000, and 50,000 for overseas; Poland, 200,000; Russia, 500,000.⁹¹

In order to ascertain with precision the viewpoint of Chancellor Hitler, President Roosevelt decided to send Norman H. Davis to Berlin for a conversation relative to disarmament. On the afternoon of April 8, 1933, Davis had a long conference with Hitler, who immediately referred to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which he regarded as "designed to keep Germany forever in a state of inferiority and to discredit them in the eyes of the world." He thought it was ridiculous for France to have any fear of Germany. France was the most heavily armed nation in the world; Germany had the pitifully small force allowed her under the terms of Versailles. The only reason why "France could have any apprehension of Germany was because she knew she was doing an unjust thing in trying to force Germany forever to live under treaty conditions which no self-respecting nation could tolerate." In conclusion, Hitler remarked that while he did not want "war, the Germans could not forever live under the terms of a Treaty [Versailles] which was iniquitous and based entirely upon false premises as to Germany's war guilt."⁹²

With these ominous words ringing in his ears, Davis hurried to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to discuss the MacDonald

Plan with its proposed army limitations that Germany would never accept. On April 25 he received definite instructions from Secretary Hull:

Please be guided by the broad policy of United States in consistently pressing for immediate and practical actual disarmament. Our ultimate goal is twofold: First, reduction of present annual costs of armament maintenance in all national budgets and, Second, arrival at a goal of domestic policing armaments in as few years as possible. . . . We regard the MacDonald Plan as a definite and excellent step towards the ultimate objective, but that is a step only and must be followed by succeeding steps.⁹³

In hurried attempts to expedite a solution of the disarmament problem, Prime Ministers MacDonald and Herriot paid visits to Washington, but they accomplished little. On April 26 President Roosevelt had an extended conference with Herriot during which many important topics were discussed. Herriot expressed the opinion that the most "dangerous spot in Europe" was the Polish Corridor. The President immediately observed that he could "not understand why some mechanical arrangement could not be made by which Germany and East Prussia could not be more closely united either by air communication, by elevated train service or, if necessary, by underground tunnels." But Herriot immediately responded with warm praise of the existing train and highway service between the two frontiers. He then, unwittingly, put his finger upon the real difficulty in arriving at any understanding between Germany and Poland by describing "the artistic qualities of the Poles; how difficult they were to negotiate with and how even the French . . . found them exceedingly difficult to restrain and quiet them whenever they became excited." At the end of the conference, Herriot "did not offer any suggestion for overcoming the Polish Corridor danger spot nor did he seem to feel that there was any solution to the problem."⁹⁴

It was this "danger spot" that, in 1939, was one of the prime causes of the outbreak of hostilities. Herriot realized that the "artis-

tic qualities" of the Poles made it impossible to suggest to them a real solution of the Corridor question. These same qualities were even more in evidence in the summer of 1939 when the Polish ambassador in Paris was not on speaking terms with either Bonnet or Daladier. Whom the gods wish to destroy, they first make mad!

Even with regard to disarmament the Poles were a little "mad" and their demands for an army equivalent to that of Germany caused serious uneasiness in Hitler's mind. He remembered only too well the bloody forays of Korfanty's irregulars before and after the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. A Polish army of 200,000, together with a Russian army of 500,000, constituted a most dangerous threat to Germany's Eastern Front. The MacDonald Plan was not welcomed in Berlin.

But any arguments for an increase in Germany's military forces met with instant opposition in Washington. On May 6 Dr. Schacht had a conference with President Roosevelt, who quickly informed him that "the United States will insist that Germany remain *in statu quo* in armament." At the same time he was informed that the American government would "support every possible effort to have the offensive armament of every other nation brought down to the German level." At the conclusion of the conference, the President intimated "as strongly as possible" that he regarded "Germany as the only possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty and that he hoped Dr. Schacht would give this point of view to Hitler as quickly as possible."⁹⁵

Hitler responded by calling a meeting of the Reichstag, on May 17, to hear his address on the question of disarmament. In order to influence the remarks of the German Chancellor upon that occasion, President Roosevelt hurriedly issued (May 16) a statement to the "Chiefs of State of all countries participating in the General Disarmament or International Monetary and Economic Conferences." He stressed the hope that peace might be assured "through practical measures of disarmament and that all of us may carry to victory our common struggle against economic chaos." These practical measures include the "complete elimination of all offensive weapons." In addition to this momentous step all nations "should enter into a solemn and definite pact of nonaggression."⁹⁶

On May 17 Hitler answered the Roosevelt proposals in a very general manner. He professed to find in the suggestions of the President some items he could support as a means of overcoming "the international crisis." Although Germany would still insist upon "actual equality of rights as regards disarmament," she would not resort to force in order to achieve her objectives.⁹⁷

These conciliatory remarks of Hitler brought instant relief to many Americans. The *Cincinnati Enquirer* thought that Hitler had thrown upon other shoulders the responsibility for real disarmament,⁹⁸ while the *Christian Science Monitor* expressed the belief that the movement for world peace had been greatly strengthened.⁹⁹

Encouraged by these signs of agreement, Norman Davis announced, on May 22, that the American government was ready to consult with other nations in the event of a threat to world peace and would take no action to hinder the efforts of other nations to restrain the activities of aggressor nations.¹⁰⁰ America was moving down the road to collective security.

3. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT SENDS WILLIAM E. DODD TO GERMANY AS A GESTURE OF GOOD WILL

During the first six months of his tenure as Chancellor, Hitler made many moves in the direction of a strong government. One of the most significant moves that attracted attention in America was the suppression of all political parties other than that of National Socialism. To Mr. Messersmith, U.S. Consul-General in Berlin, this dissolution "of the many parties which had brought about Parliamentary chaos and the breakdown of Parliamentary government was a helpful step toward the return of effective Parliamentary government eventually." The outlook in Germany was "decidedly more optimistic" than it had been "at any time since March 5."¹⁰¹

After reading some of these rose-colored dispatches from Berlin, President Roosevelt decided to send Professor William E. Dodd, a well-known historian, to Berlin as the American ambassador. It was an appointment suggested by Daniel C. Roper and Colonel House and it was not a happy one. Dodd knew little about the

problems of American foreign policy and less about the practice of diplomacy. He had no sympathy with the Nazi regime and found far more to criticize than to praise. There were many points of friction between Germany and the United States and one of the first that demanded prompt settlement was the matter of German defaults on American private loans.

4. FINANCIAL FRICTION BETWEEN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES

These loans poured into Germany after the Dawes Plan went into operation in 1924. Without them the German government could never have paid Allied exactions. But the world business depression which began in 1929 reached a low point two years later. Reference has already been made to French delay in accepting the Hoover Plan, with consequent economic paralysis in Germany. In January, 1932, Chancellor Bruening declared that the German government had advanced to France some 19,000,000,000 reichsmarks, while the total expenditures in France for reconstruction had amounted to only 14,000,000,000 reichsmarks. Further payments in accordance with this scale meant economic disaster for Germany and for the world.¹⁰² The Lausanne Conference (June 16-July 8, 1932) put an end to German economic thralldom.¹⁰³

But the situation in Germany under Hitler became so serious that, on July 9, 1933, Dr. Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, issued a regulation which decreed a transfer moratorium on the interest and sinking fund payments on foreign debts, estimated at approximately 17,000,000,000 reichsmarks.¹⁰⁴ Private banking interests in the United States were deeply concerned over this action because about 40 per cent of the German external debt (\$1,800,000,000) was owed to American creditors. John Foster Dulles, as the representative of American bankers, sent a sharp protest to Schacht with reference to his transfer moratorium,¹⁰⁵ but the president of the Reichsbank was evidently awaiting the outcome of the World Economic Conference before making a reply. The success of this conference depended upon a mild declaration of financial policy by President Roosevelt. When he refused to take this step he

“torpedoed” the conference and all Europe “exploded with resentment.”¹⁰⁶ He had pushed the Humpty Dumpty of world finance from the wall of expectancy and then he chided Europe because the pieces flew so far and wide.

When Dr. Schacht continued his policy of suspension of the payments due American bankers, President Roosevelt, though the fault lay on his own shoulders, was sharply critical of the president of the Reichsbank and of Germany generally. The Dodd mission to Germany had a most unfortunate background.

5. THE NAZI GOVERNMENT SHOWS ITS DISLIKE OF DODD BY MISTREATING AMERICAN CITIZENS

Ambassador Dodd was not long in Berlin before he angered the Nazi government by refusing to attend the party celebration at Nuremberg. His excuse was too transparent to be diplomatic: “I cannot absent myself from Berlin long enough to have the pleasure of accepting.”¹⁰⁷ The Nazis repaid this hostility by treating certain Americans with studied incivility. On September 9, a son of H. V. Kaltenborn, noted radio commentator, was assaulted because he did not give the Nazi salute while watching a parade of storm troopers.¹⁰⁸ When Dodd complained to von Neurath about this unfortunate incident, the Foreign Minister merely murmured: “The S.A. men are so uncontrollable that I am afraid we cannot stop them.”¹⁰⁹

6. GERMANY MOVES OUT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

This rising spirit of nationalism was given further expression in 1933 by Hitler himself. The disarmament question provided the occasion for a dramatic manifestation of it. During the summer of 1933, Norman H. Davis, the American representative at Geneva, held many conversations with British and French delegates to the Disarmament Conference in an effort to find some formula that would solve the disarmament problem. Finally, on October 14, Sir John Simon presented a plan which aimed at achieving “equality of status” in eight years.¹¹⁰ To Hitler this long postponement of

any real settlement of the disarmament question was an indication that the Allied governments had no real intention to disarm. They had made a mockery of Article VIII of the Covenant of the League of Nations with its implied promise of general disarmament and he believed the Simon plan was another exercise in deceit. In the face of many years of broken pledges on the part of League members, there was now nothing left to do but withdraw from the League. He gave assurances that this action had no aggressive implications.¹¹¹

When Ambassador Dodd discussed with Hitler this matter of the withdrawal from the League of Nations, the Fuehrer became "clearly excited" and launched into a lengthy criticism of the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. When Dodd made the soothing remark that there was "evident injustice in the French attitude," the Fuehrer immediately subsided into a mood of sweet reasonableness and the interview ended on a friendly note.¹¹²

Hitler could afford to be reasonable because he was fast moulding the German mind along the lines he desired. On November 12 there was a national election in the Reich on the matter of Germany's withdrawal from the League. The result was an overwhelming confirmation of the Fuehrer's policy. The Nazi candidates for office received some 39,500,000 votes out of a total of 43,000,000. Nazism was moving from one victory to another.¹¹³

7. FLIES IN THE OINTMENT OF DIPLOMACY

The victorious march of Nazism in Germany disturbed many Americans who believed that its implications pointed to eventual war on the Continent. The propaganda of Dr. Goebbels failed to explain in a satisfactory manner some actions of the Nazi government. The Reichsbank continued its policy of discriminating against American holders of German bonds and the Foreign Minister explained to Ambassador Dodd that it was a mere matter of international exchange. If America increased her purchase of German goods the situation could be rapidly remedied.¹¹⁴ There was a partial American boycott of German manufactures and this had resulted in an unfavorable balance of trade as far as the Reich was

concerned. In Europe, Germany enjoyed a highly favorable balance of trade with Britain, France, and the Netherlands and therefore was inclined to treat them with more consideration.¹¹⁵

Secretary Hull did not relish this lesson in economics, so he kept pressing the German government for a change in policy. On June 16 he instructed Ambassador Dodd to express the "strongest regret" that the Reichsbank was still discriminating against American creditors,¹¹⁶ and eleven days later he filed a long protest against Nazi fiscal policy.¹¹⁷ He was determined to make full use of the nuisance value of this debt difficulty. Dodd was distinctly embarrassed by this continual pressure from the State Department and at times recorded his feelings in his *Diary*: "What more can I say than I have said a score of times? Germany is in a terrible plight."¹¹⁸ In America this fact was recognized by many newspapers. The *Seattle Times*¹¹⁹ and the *Atlanta Constitution*¹²⁰ were frank in their opinion that the Nazi government had done nothing more than take a page out of the financial books of European nations that had defaulted on large loans from the American government during the World War.

But this American sympathy for hard-pressed Germany did not soften American criticism of the anti-Semitic policy of the Nazi government. Harsh decrees against the Jews evoked widespread objection throughout the United States and led to an increasingly unfavorable climate of opinion. This fact was given clear illustration when advertisements appeared in certain New York newspapers calling attention to a mock trial of Chancellor Hitler, to be staged in Madison Square Garden on March 7, 1934. When Ambassador Luther rushed to the Department of State to register a protest against this insult to the Fuehrer, he was given a cold brushoff by Secretary Hull.¹²¹ In Berlin Ambassador Dodd had a long conversation with Hitler, who was "unusually cordial." When Dodd referred to the Jewish problem in different countries the Fuehrer interrupted his discourse several times with sharp comments upon the "damned Jews." He finally informed Dodd that if the Jews continued their "activity" in Germany, "we shall make a complete end of them."¹²²

At this time Hitler's bark was far worse than his bite and he soon

decided that it was good policy to conciliate the United States by adopting a more humane policy toward the Jews. He wanted no more mock trials in New York. On March 12 he directed that Columbia House, where many Jews had been mistreated, should be closed, and he insisted that "warrants must be proved before anyone could be detained for more than twenty-four hours on any charge."¹²³ Anti-Semitism was conveniently shelved for the time being.

8. HITLER PURGES THE NAZI PARTY AND SHOCKS AMERICAN SENSIBILITIES

In the early months of 1934 there was manifest in certain circles in Germany a rising criticism of the policy of Chancellor Hitler. Some Nazi leaders had not approved the Fuehrer's softer policy toward the Jews. Others were worried over the "financial and economic situation" in the Reich,¹²⁴ and Kurt Schmitt, the Minister of Economics, complained to Ambassador Dodd that the repressive measures instituted against the Jews, Protestants, and Catholics had stirred up such "intense hostility" in America and England that the economic outlook grew bleaker each day.¹²⁵ It was widely known that Roehm was bitterly opposed to any reduction in the number of the storm troopers and some believed that he was plotting with General von Schleicher for a major change in the organization of the Nazi party. A feeling of revolution was in the air.

On June 17, at the University of Marburg, Franz von Papen made a speech that one could best understand by reading between the lines. In one significant sentence he gave a cue to Hitler's next move. After referring to the failure of the "official organs of public opinion" to throw sufficient light to dispel the mysterious darkness that hid the spirit of the German people, von Papen then remarked that it was probably necessary for a statesman to appear who would "call a spade a spade."¹²⁶

The *Springfield Republican* made the canny surmise that von Papen's speech was "the signal for some important development in the internal affairs of Germany."¹²⁷ This development was not long in coming. On June 30 Hitler inaugurated a bloody purge which

took the lives of many important Nazis who were no longer useful to the party.

In the United States there was a great deal of speculation about the implications of this purge. Drew Pearson and Robert Allen predicted a dark future for Hitler,¹²⁸ the *Buffalo News* thought that the Fuehrer might be "sitting on a powder keg,"¹²⁹ and Oswald G. Villard expressed the opinion that the purge marked "the beginning of the end of Hitler."¹³⁰ Other commentators were equally hopeful that the "Nazi nightmare" would soon end. Opinion here was so unfriendly to the Fuehrer that it was evident that the purge marked a definite point in American regard for Nazi Germany. Spokesmen for oppressed minorities in the Reich would find a credulous audience for any stories told of unbounded brutality.

9. GENERAL HUGH S. JOHNSON EXPRESSES HIS INDIGNATION AT THE BLOODY PARTY PURGE

When the news of Hitler's party purge came to General Hugh S. Johnson, he announced that such brutalities made him "physically and very actively sick."¹³¹ This acidulous criticism of Nazi political practices evoked an immediate protest from the German chargé d'affaires in Washington. Secretary Hull assured him that General Johnson was speaking "as an individual and not for the Department of State or for the Administration,"¹³² but the German press was not satisfied with this explanation and numberless attacks were made upon the General and upon freedom of speech in the United States. It was pointed out that Johnson was "the head of the NIRA" and therefore an important representative of the Roosevelt administration. His remarks, therefore, had an official color that could not be changed by glib official explanation.¹³³

10. THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT HINDENBURG IS REGARDED WITH OPEN DISMAY THROUGHOUT AMERICA

These frequent clashes between America and Nazi Germany gave deep concern to a large group of Americans who feared that eventual conflict might be caused by these serious disagreements.

Hitler was becoming increasingly unpopular in the United States, and his administration seemed a challenge to the peace of Europe. It had long been felt that President Hindenburg was an effective check upon the Fuehrer's radical tendencies, and the news of Hindenburg's death (August 1) had an ominous tinge.

Hitler made an effort to quiet these apprehensions by delivering two orations that were carefully phrased and discreetly toned down to such an extent that no challenge was discernible in either of them. His eyes were on the approaching Saar plebiscite. It would be expedient to conciliate public opinion in Europe and America. When the plebiscite was held on January 13, 1935, the vote was 477,119 in favor of union with the Reich and only 46,613 in favor of continuance of the existing regime.¹³⁴ Hitler had won another victory.

11. THE ANGLO-FRENCH DECLARATION OF FEBRUARY 3, 1935

This rapidly rising spirit of nationalism under Hitler pushed France into immediate action. In January, 1935, Laval paid a hurried visit to Rome, where he concluded with Mussolini a consultative agreement with reference to Austria. The next step in the direction of preserving the peace of Europe was the Anglo-French Declaration of February 3. This was to form the basis for a "general settlement freely negotiated among other Powers, including Germany." The more important items would be a plan for disarmament, an Eastern pact of mutual assistance, a Central European pact for maintaining the independence of Austria, and an air convention that would provide assistance to any of the signatory Powers that suffered from unprovoked aggression.¹³⁵

On February 14 Hitler gave a conciliatory answer to the British and French ambassadors in Berlin and approved in principle the terms of an air pact for the protection of the signatory Powers. But he thought that the proposed Eastern and Central European pacts should receive further discussion and elaboration. This attitude of delay was disturbing to the *New York Times* which plaintively remarked: "The Third Reich now looks forward to a long period of negotiation. For her every delay is a gain."¹³⁶

12. FEAR OF HITLER PUSHES EUROPE INTO ANOTHER TREATY PROVIDING FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY—THE STRESA FRONT

Hitler did not delay long in exciting the fear of Europe. On March 16 he denounced the arms provisions in the Treaty of Versailles. France had recently raised the term of service in her armies and Germany regarded the army of the Soviet Union (960,000) as excessively large. Because of this Franco-Russian threat he thought it necessary to increase German military strength to 550,000 troops.¹³⁷

To William Allen White this action by Hitler was "another milestone on the road to ruin which Europe has been travelling for several years. In less than a year Germany will announce that she is fortifying the left bank of the Rhine."¹³⁸

In order to prevent such a contingency, Mussolini invited representatives of Britain and France to a conference at Stresa. After a brief period of discussion the three Powers issued, on April 14, a communiqué to the effect that a common front had been erected against the German movement for rearmament.¹³⁹ The *Pittsburgh Post-Gazette* took this Stresa Declaration seriously and expressed the opinion that it represented the "best hope of peace,"¹⁴⁰ but the *New Orleans Times-Picayune* believed that the conference had left "in the air most of the questions that were considered."¹⁴¹

13. THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN PACT OF MAY 2, 1935 IS BALANCED BY THE ANGLO-GERMAN NAVAL AGREEMENT OF JUNE 18

It was soon evident that France did not place much reliance upon the Stresa Front. On May 2, 1935, the Laval government signed an important mutual assistance pact with Soviet Russia.¹⁴² This provoked Hitler (May 21) to criticize French action as a threat to capitalism throughout Europe. Capitalism and communism had no real common ground on which their representatives could meet with safety. He then indicated his willingness to become a party to treaties aimed at localizing conflicts and isolating aggressor nations.¹⁴³

This was welcome news to British statesmen who initiated nego-

tiations that led to the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of June 18. In accordance with its terms the strength of the German fleet was fixed at 35 per cent of the total tonnage of the British Commonwealth of Nations. This pact aroused sharp resentment in France and Italy, where Britain was denounced for "conniving with the Reich" in a breach of the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁴⁴ In Germany the treaty was most welcome because it permitted the Reich to have a navy not only three times as large as the naval armament allowed in the peace settlement of 1919 but it also granted eventual parity with Britain in submarines.¹⁴⁵

In the United States the *New York Times* chided Britain for "allowing itself to do what in another it condemns as a breach of international law,"¹⁴⁶ while the *Chicago Daily News* regarded the agreement as a great triumph of German diplomacy.¹⁴⁷ The Stresa Front had been broken by Britain.

14. THE "BREMEN" INCIDENT CAUSES NEW TENSION IN GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While British statesmen were breaking the Stresa Front, Communist agents in the United States were promoting further friction in German-American relations. On July 25, 1935, the Third Division of the Police Department of New York City received a copy of a circular issued by the Communist party which called for a "demonstration" on Pier 86 at midnight on July 26 "on the occasion of the sailing of the S.S. *Bremen*." All Catholics, Jews, and anti-Fascists were urged to "flood the pier with anti-fascist workers."¹⁴⁸

On the evening of July 26 some Communist agitators were able to sneak on board the *Bremen* and at 11:45 they began to assault the German sailors. When the New York police rushed to Pier 86 to stop this rioting they were attacked and firearms were freely used. During this commotion some Communists were able to reach the flagstaff of the *Bremen* and hurl the German Swastika pennon into the Hudson River.

In response to a German protest against the implications of this incident, the Department of State expressed regret that "the Ger-

man national emblem should not have received that respect to which it is entitled."¹⁴⁹ There was no assurance that Communists in New York City would not be able to repeat the insult of July 26. The Secretary of State regarded the incident as closed, but the German Foreign Office was displeased with this cool settlement of the affair and it remained an important item in unfinished business.

III. AN ITALIAN INTERLUDE: THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR

1. ITALY PLAYS THE GAME OF "REALPOLITIK" TO GOOD ADVANTAGE

Italian colonial expansion in Africa began in July, 1882, when the Italian government acquired some territory on the Bay of Assab. Using this concession as a wedge for further penetration, the Italian sphere of influence grew rapidly until in May, 1889, a nominal protectorate over Abyssinia was established.¹⁵⁰ On March 24 and April 15, 1891, an Anglo-Italian agreement was concluded which recognized Italian control over a large portion of northeast Africa.¹⁵¹

This Italian expansion was not favorably regarded by France. Munitions of war were sent to Ethiopia and the Emperor Menelik was encouraged to denounce the Treaty of Ucciali with its concessions to Italy. On March 1, 1896, he decisively defeated the Italian army at Adowa and the independence of Ethiopia was formally recognized. But the fate of Ethiopia would be decided in Europe. Political necessities required that France adopt a conciliatory policy toward Italy after the turn of the twentieth century. In December, 1900, the French Foreign Office negotiated a secret accord with Italy that earmarked Tripoli as a future Italian colony.¹⁵² Six years later, a tripartite arrangement was concluded which expressed British and French acquiescence in eventual Italian control over Ethi-

opia. When Russia then agreed to the Racconigi bargain of October, 1909, the road to Tripoli was open. Emboldened by this series of diplomatic deals, Italy provoked war with Turkey in 1911 and secured the cession of Libya.¹⁵³

By astute diplomacy Italy had been steadily increasing her colonial empire in Africa, and, when she broke away from the Triple Alliance in 1915 and entered the World War on the side of the Allies, she seemed on the road to further concessions. But her quarrel with Allied statesmen at Versailles was most injudicious, and when she temporarily left the Peace Conference a decision was made to leave her "completely out in the cold." She later received promises of "compensations elsewhere, but they were never satisfactorily forthcoming." The Allied failure to carry out these promises caused enduring bitterness in Italy "and led not only to the rape of Ethiopia in 1935 but to Mussolini's 'stab in the back' of 1940."¹⁵⁴

2. BRITAIN GIVES A FRIENDLY NOD TO ITALIAN ASPIRATIONS IN AFRICA

In 1925 the British government gave a belated nod to Italian aspirations in northeast Africa by exchanging some important notes with the Italian government. This new accord meant that Britain would support the construction of an Italian railway from Eritrea across Ethiopia to Somaliland and would recognize Italy's exclusive right to exploit the resources of western Ethiopia.¹⁵⁵ Encouraged by this British support, Mussolini went ahead and concluded with Ethiopia a pact of friendship (August 2, 1928) and an additional convention which provided for the construction of a motor road from the port of Assab to Dessie. But the government of Ethiopia soon found excuses that prevented the execution of these agreements, and this ill-faith was "one of the strongest grievances of the Italian Government against Abyssinia."¹⁵⁶

3. THE WALWAL INCIDENT POINTS TOWARD EVENTUAL WAR

The list of Italian grievances against Ethiopia received many additions from the lawless way wild tribesmen would ravage the

frontiers of Eritrea and Somaliland. The Walwal incident resulted from one of these raids. For several years Italians had been in possession of Walwal without any protest from Ethiopia. In December, 1934, hostilities broke out at this spot between Ethiopian and Italian armed forces but actual warfare did not ensue because of the obligations assumed by Italy under the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Pact of Paris. Consideration also had to be given to the procedures outlined in the Italo-Ethiopian Arbitration Treaty of 1928.

On January 3, 1935, Ethiopia made a formal appeal to the League of Nations and invoked the application of Article XI of the Covenant.¹⁵⁷ When the Council of the League met, on January 11, some action would have to be taken. In order to anticipate this action, Laval paid a visit to Rome and made a treaty with Mussolini (January 7, 1935) which gave Italy a block of shares in the Jibuti railroad; a considerable strip of territory to be added to Italian Libya, and a similar strip to be joined to Eritrea. For these concessions Mussolini agreed to consult with France in the event of any threat to the *status quo* in Europe.

These published terms of the agreement told only half the story. There is little doubt that Laval secretly granted other concessions to Mussolini. In return for Italian co-operation in Europe, he was "willing to sacrifice anything, even the League of Nations itself, as events proved."¹⁵⁸

With French support of Italian objectives in Ethiopia, Mussolini adopted tactics of delay which finally caused the Council of the League to adopt a resolution (May 25) requesting the Italian and Ethiopian governments to arrive at some settlement of their dispute by August 25.¹⁵⁹

4. AMERICAN REACTION TO THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE

The attitude of the Department of State, at the beginning of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, was colored by a background of friendly relations with Italy. In July, 1931, Secretary Stimson had paid a visit to Rome where he had friendly conversations with Mussolini and Dino Grandi, the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. The

Duce responded to Stimson's pleas for disarmament by an emphatic statement that Italy stood for both "disarmament and peace."¹⁶⁰ When Stimson left Rome he issued a press statement that stressed the "essential sympathy which exists between the people of Italy and America."¹⁶¹ In November, 1931, Dino Grandi made a trip to the United States to confirm these friendly relations.

But this amicable accord soon disappeared during the early years of the Roosevelt administration when Italy unveiled her desire to expand in Africa. After 1933 the Department of State began to look at Europe through English eyes, and Anthony Eden controlled most of that vision. In 1935 he had some significant conversations with Hugh Wilson, the American ambassador at Geneva. Eden constantly talked in high-level terms and stressed his attachment to lofty ideals. It was embarrassing for him to have to deal with such a "shifty soul" as Pierre Laval, who was willing to give Italy "a free hand" in Abyssinia in return for support against Germany. Wilson himself had conceived a certain esteem for Laval who was "developing into the type of Foreign Minister that Briand was."¹⁶²

Eden had his troubles not only with Laval but also with Mussolini. The Duce's appetite for colonial dominion was deeply disturbing to the British Foreign Secretary. He tried to curb it with a modest offer of Ethiopian territory. He thought that Haile Selassie would be willing to cede to Italy a portion of the Ogaden and would also be ready to grant certain economic concessions that might help to bolster Italy's hard-pressed economy. But the Duce rejected these very limited proposals. He flatly stated that he wished to "control Abyssinia."¹⁶³

Such a frank avowal of lust for land was a shock to the sensitive ears of Eden, who began to harbor an intense dislike for the Duce. After he left Rome, Virginio Gayda remarked in the Italian press that Eden's proposals had not satisfied "Italy's requirements for security and economic expansion." Chambrun, the French ambassador in Rome, was not in accord with the Eden viewpoint. He believed that some "gesture was essential to vindicate the honor and prestige of Italy. This could be effected by the cession of Adowa."¹⁶⁴

But Emperor Haile Selassie was not ready for concessions to

Italy. It would be better to appeal to the American government to invoke the Pact of Paris as a means of checking any Italian advance into Ethiopia. Secretary Hull made a cautious reply to this appeal: he was loath to believe that Italy would resort "to other than pacific means as a method of dealing with this controversy."¹⁶⁵

To many Americans of a one-world persuasion this reply by Secretary Hull was most disheartening. Professor Quincy Wright hurriedly informed Hull that a failure "on our part to do anything" in this crisis would be a severe "blow to the cause of peace."¹⁶⁶ Under the impact of this professional protest, Hull summoned the Italian ambassador to the Department of State and endeavored to impress upon him America's "increasing concern" over the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.¹⁶⁷ On July 12 Hull took the further step of issuing a statement that reminded the signatories of the Pact of Paris that the provisions of that treaty were still "binding."¹⁶⁸

When Secretary Hull's elaboration of the obvious was completely understood by backward European diplomats, President Roosevelt moved into the picture on August 1 by voicing the hope that "an amicable solution" would be found for the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.¹⁶⁹ Some weeks later he sent a message directly to Mussolini (August 18) in which he once more expressed the hope that the "controversy between Italy and Ethiopia will be resolved without resort to armed conflict."¹⁷⁰ The Duce at once replied that he appreciated the "character of the message and its expression of friendliness," but war with Ethiopia was inevitable.¹⁷¹ President Roosevelt was determined to have the last word on this matter of approaching conflict. On September 4 a statement was issued at the White House to the effect that "dollar diplomacy" was no "longer recognized by the American Government."¹⁷² Italy should pursue high ideas rather than material wealth!

5. PIERRE LAVAL BELIEVES THAT MUSSOLINI SHOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO SAVE FACE

Pierre Laval believed that the key to Mussolini's co-operation with France was material wealth rather than any joint pursuit of high ideals. He thought it was essential that the Duce be permitted

to gain at least one important victory in Ethiopia before pressure was exerted upon him in favor of peace. Anthony Eden was not so realistic. In Britain the peace societies, the Church, and influential members of the Labor party were calling for some effective action that would compel Italy to adopt a pacific policy. Such action might take the form of far-reaching sanctions, and these might mean war. Britain was ready to assume this risk and "do its part" if hostilities took place. There was really no need for France to ask for "specific assurances" in this regard. Britain would do her duty.¹⁷³

While Laval was pondering this indirect assurance of British support in the event of war between France and Italy, the arbitral commission that had been dealing with the Walwal incident rendered a decision that neither Ethiopia nor Italy was responsible for the brief outbreak of hostilities.¹⁷⁴ Encouraged by this dubious decision, Baron Aloisi presented to the League of Nations the case of Italy. It was a sharp indictment of the Ethiopian design for living with its dark threads of slavery and cannibalism. The League answered this indictment by appointing a committee of five to look into the Italo-Ethiopian dispute with a view of suggesting a peaceful solution.¹⁷⁵

While the committee was making its study of this dispute, Eden and Laval resumed their conversation as to the best policy to pursue. Eden was skeptical of the high-level talk of Ciano, who was insisting that Italy had a mission to benefit the whole world by unlocking the door to the vast resources of Ethiopia. Effective sanctions would probably make Ciano talk sense. But Laval was fearful that war would follow such action and he could see no reason why the peace of Europe should be broken because of a Quixotic desire on the part of Britain to protect backward Ethiopia from a civilizing Italian conquest.

To make matters worse, Laval soon discovered that he had on his hands not only Eden but Sir Samuel Hoare also. On September 11 the British Foreign Secretary addressed the Assembly of the League of Nations and made it painfully clear that Britain would support League action against aggressors with "unwavering fidelity."¹⁷⁶ These were bold words with frightening overtones for Laval.

When he pushed Hoare for some "formal commitments in Europe" with reference to a possible outbreak of hostilities over the application of sanctions against Italy, the Foreign Secretary lapsed into vague generalities that looked like counterfeit currency in the exacting market of world politics.¹⁷⁷

While Laval was pursuing the elusive Samuel Hoare, the Emperor Haile Selassie asked the American minister at Addis Ababa if the American government would serve as a mediator in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.¹⁷⁸ Hull immediately rejected this appeal because mediation was "not practicable" during a period when the League of Nations was handling this matter.¹⁷⁹ Laval and Eden would have to continue their battle of wits.

6. FRANCE FINDS IT DIFFICULT TO BALANCE BRITAIN AGAINST ITALY

Laval finally thought he might catch the wary Britons with the bait of acquiescence in their apparent desire for sanctions. On September 13, with his tongue pressed hard against his cheek, he informed the Assembly of the League that France would be "faithful to the League Covenant." She would not "fail in her obligations."¹⁸⁰

Anthony Eden was delighted with these pledges from Laval, and in France the press expressed the view that he had "turned a difficult corner, advanced the cause of peace and increased France's prestige."¹⁸¹ At Geneva, however, there was increasing apprehension over the possibility of war. Massigli, the French representative at Geneva, expressed to Hugh Wilson the fear that Mussolini was a "mad man": no argument and no threat had any effect upon him.¹⁸² Eden himself suddenly began to fear that it was "too late to stop hostilities." Where they would lead no one could tell.

7. ITALY REJECTS THE SUGGESTION OF THE COMMITTEE OF FIVE

In order to prevent the outbreak of these long-feared hostilities the League Committee of Five suggested the establishment of a League protectorate over Ethiopia. There would, of course, be some recognition of Italy's special interest in the economic develop-

ment of Ethiopia.¹⁸³ Mussolini promptly rejected this suggestion of the Committee of Five in a note which British representatives at Geneva termed "extremely brusque."¹⁸⁴ The Duce then submitted a proposal for the settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. It would undoubtedly be effective because it contemplated Italian acquisition of a large part of the Emperor Haile Selassie's dominion.¹⁸⁵

Sir Samuel Hoare felt a little outraged at this unabashed Italian bid for a large slice of Ethiopia. It was clearly necessary for the United States to assist in a concerted effort to stop Mussolini. Ambassador Bingham referred this matter to Secretary Hull, who assured Hoare that the American government would "not decline an invitation to consult through diplomatic channels with a view to the invocation of the Pact of Paris." But he thought that such consultation might appear to "encroach upon the explicit functions of the Covenant of the League" and therefore would be undesirable. In the event of hostilities between Italy and Ethiopia, Britain could count upon an embargo upon arms, munitions, and implements of war from the United States to the belligerents.¹⁸⁶

To the Emperor Haile Selassie the Department of State made a promise of "moral support."¹⁸⁷ This high-sounding verbiage awakened an echo in London. In response to a French inquiry as to what Britain would do in the event of a "violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a resort to force by some European State," Hoare replied in double talk that was far from reassuring to France.¹⁸⁸ It was apparent that there would be no real concert of Powers to resist any Italian advance into Ethiopia. When this fact was clear to Mussolini on October 2, he issued orders for his legions to cross the frontiers of the weakly defended empire of Haile Selassie. On the following day, Italian troops began a long march which many British newspapers prophesied would end in disaster. The disaster was reserved for Haile Selassie and not for Mussolini.

8. AMERICAN REACTION TO THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN WAR

Although Mussolini did not issue a declaration of war when his troops marched into Ethiopia, President Roosevelt thought that

the American government should immediately recognize that an actual state of war existed. On October 5, a proclamation was issued which placed an embargo upon the shipment of arms and munitions of war to belligerent nations.¹⁸⁹

After carrying out the terms of the Neutrality Act by this embargo, Secretary Hull then inquired about the course the British government might take in this emergency. He learned that the Foreign Office was of the opinion that eventually "there would be sanctions" invoked against Italy.¹⁹⁰

While the Department of State was considering the situation arising out of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a Committee of Six to report upon the course the League should pursue. On October 7 this Committee named Italy as an "aggressor," and the Council confirmed this decision.¹⁹¹ On October 11 the Assembly of the League took similar action and appointed a Co-ordination Committee to consider the matter of sanctions against Italy.

At this point Secretary Hull assured the League that the Department of State was deeply interested in the steps that had been taken by League authorities and would not "overlook any measures that we may be able to take consistent with our policy." It should be clearly understood, however, that the United States would act "independently in the light of circumstances as they develop."¹⁹² Anthony Eden was deeply disappointed in the attitude assumed by Secretary Hull, and he strongly urged that France and the United States take the initiative in invoking the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact.¹⁹³ But Secretary Hull adhered to his position and once more emphatically stated that the American government would continue to act upon its own initiative and would proceed "separately and independently of all other Governments."¹⁹⁴ But in order to show his good will toward the League Hull issued, on November 15, a statement that was really a declaration of economic warfare against Italy:

The American people are entitled to know that there are certain commodities such as oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron and scrap steel which are essential war materials. . . .

According to recent Government trade reports a considerably increased amount of these is being exported for war purposes. This class of trade is directly contrary to the policy of this Government. . . .¹⁹⁵

This statement was made public just three days before the League sanctions against Italy went into effect (November 18). The list of commodities referred to by Secretary Hull as "essential war materials" was more extensive than the one issued by the League and it contained the important item of petroleum. Indirectly, the Department of State was endeavoring to restrict American exports to Italy of materials that could be used for warlike purposes. It was an independent policy but its main objective was to support the League in its attempt to prevent aggression. It was also an indirect step down the road to war.

9. THE HOARE-LAVAL AGREEMENT, DECEMBER 8, 1935

Sanctions against Italy took the form of an embargo upon munitions and implements of war, another embargo against Italian exports, a ban upon exports to Italy, and a financial boycott. It was significant that coal, oil, and copper were not included in the list of exports that were forbidden shipment to Italy. There was a lot of loose talk about stopping all shipments of oil to the land of the Duce but nothing effective was accomplished. It was soon evident that sanctions would not be successful.

Despite this ineffective functioning of sanctions against Italy, the Duce felt a rapidly increasing hostility toward both Britain and France, and Premier Laval renewed his old objections to this dubious experiment. Sir Samuel Hoare believed there was a substantial basis for this Laval viewpoint so he paid an important visit to Paris and soon gave his blessing to an arrangement known as the Hoare-Laval Agreement (December 8, 1935). In accordance with its terms, Italy would be placed in a dominant position in Ethiopia.¹⁹⁶

In Britain the news of the Hoare-Laval Agreement aroused widespread criticism. The London Star called the agreement a travesty which was "horrifying men with a sense of justice,"¹⁹⁷ and multi-

tudes of shocked Britons were of the same opinion. Prime Minister Baldwin thought it was expedient for Hoare to leave the cabinet at once, and Anthony Eden was pushed into his place. *Sartor Resartus* was no longer read in England and few seemed to suspect that a mere tailor's model had moved into the Foreign Office.

Eden had no realization of the fact that the Hoare-Laval Agreement might save the Stresa Front and thus keep intact the bulwark against German aggression. He was insistent that no major concessions be granted to the Duce and thus he helped to speed the establishment of the Rome-Berlin Axis. By acting as a champion for Haile Selassie he really bore a spear for Adolf Hitler.

10. ADOLF HITLER CELEBRATES THE COLLAPSE OF THE STRESA FRONT BY MOVING INTO THE RHINELAND

The Stresa Front did not crumble at once after the League began its application of sanctions against Italy. It was a gradual disintegration and the old structure could have been saved by the cement of concessions to Italy. On March 7 Hitler announced to the world that he had liquidated the Locarno Pact and was about to occupy the Rhineland. On the day following this momentous announcement, Mussolini informed the Committee of Thirteen (of the League) that he accepted in principle their plea for a restoration of peace. It should be clear, however, that the "military situation" must be the basis for negotiations.¹⁹⁸

The American minister in Addis Ababa ridiculed these terms and strongly denied that Italy had won decisive military successes. Ethiopia was still determined to "eject the invader from her territory."¹⁹⁹ This determination existed only in the mind of the American minister. Italian armies were rapidly closing in upon Addis Ababa, and on May 2 the Emperor and family hurriedly fled from their endangered capital. Three days later, Italian troops entered the city and Mussolini issued a proclamation that the war was over.²⁰⁰ The Duce had conquered Ethiopia despite the sanctions of the League of Nations and he was now ready to cast a friendly eye in the direction of another dictator who had successfully defied the League. Anthony Eden and Franklin D. Roosevelt had accom-

plished wonders in breaking down the barriers that had separated Mussolini and Hitler. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull would continue their labors as saboteurs of any diplomatic fences that might keep Mussolini in the safe camp of the Democracies, and their theme song as they blew off self-esteem was a variation of the nonrecognition melody introduced in 1931 by Secretary Stimson in his hymn of hate against the Japanese.

11. PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN TRIES IN VAIN TO CATCH SOME BIG ITALIAN FLIES WITH THE HONEY OF DIPLOMACY

After the Italian conquest of Ethiopia in May, 1936, Chamberlain clearly realized that British opposition to the Duce's plans for expansion in Africa had helped to accelerate a *rapprochement* between Italy and Germany. In order to halt this trend, the British government adopted a new policy of conciliation. In response to increasing pressure, the League Assembly (July 4) voted to end sanctions against Italy. After this action many members of the League forgot their former opposition to *de jure* recognition of the Italian empire in Africa and issued letters of credence accrediting their envoys to "His Majesty the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia." On January 5, 1938, the Italian government published a statement which indicated that seventeen States, most of them members of the League, had granted *de jure* recognition, and eleven States, including Britain and France, had extended *de facto* recognition to the Italian absorption of Ethiopia.

On January 14, 1938, Lord Halifax frankly disclosed to President Roosevelt the intention of the British government to abandon the nonrecognition policy so dear to the heart of Secretary Hull. Three days later (January 17), the President sent a personal letter to Prime Minister Chamberlain protesting against this proposed British action. Chamberlain, believing that a policy of appeasement was vitally necessary as far as Italy was concerned, gave little heed to the President's plea and, on April 16, 1938, concluded an Anglo-Italian Agreement which completely recognized Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.²⁰¹ Britain could no longer afford the luxury of a parallel policy with the United States.

President Roosevelt was not favorably impressed with Chamberlain's realistic policy and he refused to follow his example with reference to any recognition of the Italian conquest of Ethiopia. When Mussolini sent Signor Fulvio Suvich as the new ambassador to the United States (October, 1936), the President was careful to receive him only as the envoy from the "King of Italy."²⁰² Two years later (November 11, 1938), when a birthday telegram of congratulation was sent to Victor Emmanuel III, it was addressed merely to the "King of Italy."²⁰³

The Roosevelt administration clung tenaciously to a formula of nonrecognition that could serve no useful purpose. As a distinguished authority in the field of international law cogently remarked: "Conceived of as a solution of the centuries-old problem of the cause and cure of war, it appears somewhat fatuous."²⁰⁴ Fatuity in the conduct of American foreign relations made millions of Americans later on pay a staggering price in blood, sweat, and tears.

IV. THE EVE OF CONFLICT

1. THE AFTERMATH OF LOCARNO

The Italian conquest of Ethiopia and Hitler's liquidation of the Locarno Treaty gave Europe a bad case of the jitters. On February 12, 1936, Anthony Eden had informed the House of Commons that the British government would "faithfully fulfill" all the obligations of Locarno.²⁰⁵ When Hitler boldly sent his troops into the Rhineland on March 7, many statesmen wondered what steps Britain would take to implement Eden's recent declaration. Eden himself advised against any "hasty action," and the British press supported this viewpoint. The *Observer* counseled the British public to keep "cool heads and just hearts," while the *Sunday Dis-*

patch remarked that the Locarno Treaty was a commitment to which the people of Britain had never given "their sanction."²⁰⁶

The French press was bitter over the British disinclination to take the German occupation of the Rhineland seriously. Tabouis, in *L'Œuvre*, claimed that a "strict liaison had been established between London and Berlin" and baldly stated that, during Lord Londonderry's visit to Berlin, after King George's funeral, Hitler "made known to him that the military occupation of the demilitarized zone would be accomplished early in March." Ambassador Straus then added this item to his dispatch to Secretary Hull: "The Embassy has reason to believe that Madame Tabouis' information is in the main correct."²⁰⁷

When the Rhineland matter was transferred to the League of Nations the Council adopted a resolution declaring Germany guilty of a violation of both the Versailles and Locarno treaties and the British representative voted in favor of this resolution. But French public opinion regarded the "tentative London accords" as quite "fragile,"²⁰⁸ and Eden's assurances, in his speech of March 26, did not dissipate their fears of a British sellout to Germany.

Hitler's far-reaching peace plan of March 31 was also looked upon by France with deep suspicion.²⁰⁹ At Geneva, the French representative expressed the opinion that all efforts to conciliate Germany should cease, but Eden insisted that the British government should take time to explore the possibilities suggested by the recent Hitler peace proposals.²¹⁰ This exploration soon proved futile. Germany would not agree to suggestions that she consent to a nonaggression pact with Soviet Russia and she would not give a pledge to respect the remaining operative clauses of the Treaty of Versailles. This non-co-operative attitude on the part of the Nazi government made Europe fear that a second World War would not be long delayed, and Prime Minister Van Zeeland, of Belgium, confided to Ambassador Bullitt that he regarded the future "most pessimistically."²¹¹

Worst of all, the shadow of bolshevism now began to creep slowly over Europe. To Ambassador Dodd, in Berlin, French lack of farsighted leadership had largely been responsible for this dangerous situation:

Under French leadership the League itself became partisan and only emphasized the duration of the dictated peace of Versailles and divided Europe into opposed camps. Germany's refusal in March, 1935, longer to endure this situation shattered the delicately poised artificiality and . . . all of Europe was thrown into a ferment and a scramble for adjustment.

Heretofore the Bolshevik menace in Europe has been typified by the subterranean activities of the Third International. . . . Latterly, however, . . . there seems to have been a significant and aggressive change in Russian sponsorship of World Revolution. . . . Through the Franco-Soviet alliance, through the apprehensions felt in many quarters in Europe over Germany's renaissance, and through Russia's adroit diplomatic maneuvers, the Soviets have been able to pose as the saviour to those States in Europe most fearful of the re-birth of a powerful Germany.²¹²

2. HITLER AND MUSSOLINI REACH AN IMPORTANT ACCORD OCTOBER 25, 1936

In the face of the growing Communist menace and because Franco-British pressure upon Mussolini had shattered the Stresa Front, it was inevitable that the Fuehrer and the Duce should reach some political accord. The visit of Lloyd George to Berchtesgaden in the summer of 1936 delayed for a short time the German drift toward Italy,²¹³ but Eden never seemed to be sure of his political inclinations and could not be counted upon as a constant factor in the equation of European politics. While Eden was hesitant about making advances toward Germany, Ciano hurried to Berlin and showed Hitler a telegram from Sir Eric Phipps to the British Foreign Office in which the German government was stigmatized as a group of "dangerous adventurers." Hitler flew into the expected rage and the agreement of October 25, 1936, was the result of this stratagem.²¹⁴

When this was followed by the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact of November 26, European diplomats began to fear the

establishment of a strong Rome-Berlin-Tokyo Axis. In the United States the *Baltimore Sun* expressed the fear that "most of the world Powers are rushing pell-mell towards war,"²¹⁵ while the *Cleveland Plain Dealer* was apprehensive that the pact might become "the opening wedge of the next war."²¹⁶ To the *Des Moines Register* it seemed evident that the United States might have to abandon its historic policy in the Far East or become involved in war.²¹⁷

3. EUROPEAN STATESMEN GROPE AIMLESSLY IN THE DIRECTION OF A NEW LOCARNO

There was a possibility that this drift toward war might be checked by a comprehensive *rapprochement* between France and Germany. Dr. Schacht, in Berlin, began to work feverishly in favor of some arrangement with France, and the German Foreign Minister had some "amicable conversations" with the French ambassador. When Premier Blum seemed inclined to take these peace feelers seriously, Anthony Eden paid a hurried visit to Paris and abruptly stopped this budding peace movement.²¹⁸ On January 19 Eden made a speech in the House of Commons in which he developed the thesis that peace in Europe was indivisible. It could not be preserved by a series of bilateral agreements. He referred to Germany as a nation that had "exalted race and nationalism into a creed which is practiced with the same fervour as it is preached."²¹⁹ On January 24 Premier Blum, in a speech at Lyon, repeated many of the arguments used by Eden. He was certain that "no engagements limited to France would guarantee the security of France."²²⁰

But, despite this speech of Blum, the French Foreign Office did not put a great deal of trust in the British government. Delbos, the Foreign Minister, was leaning toward a closer accord between France and Germany and he did not like the way Britain always checked such *rapprochement*. He expressed to Bullitt his dislike of British policy which aimed at "keeping France and Germany hostile to each other though not at war."²²¹

This French suspicion of British policy made it easier for Hitler to take a more commanding tone in his relations with European Powers, and this fact made Belgium place a low estimate upon the

military potential of Britain and France. In April, 1937, the Belgian ambassadors in London and Paris made it very clear that their government would not permit "the foot of a German, British or French soldier to be placed on her soil." Belgium was strongly opposed to any British or French plans that would make her soil "the battleground of the next war."²²²

The announcement of the Belgian government that it would follow a policy of neutrality in the event of a new European war was a shock to many European Foreign Offices. Czechoslovakia, France, and Poland immediately began to resurvey the situation. But they soon discovered they could elicit from Britain no definite promises of support in the event of an outbreak of a war in Europe caused by German aggression. The search for a new Locarno had proved fruitless.

4. MAYOR LA GUARDIA DOES HIS BEST TO EMBITTER GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While European statesmen were fumbling for some formula that would guarantee the peace of Europe, Mayor LaGuardia was doing his best to embitter German-American relations. On March 3, 1937, in an address before the women's division of the American Jewish Congress, he proposed that the 1939 World's Fair in New York City should have a temple dedicated to religious freedom: "Within that temple I'd have a Chamber of Horrors and as a climax I'd have a figure in it of that brown-shirted fanatic who is now menacing the peace of the world."²²³

When the counselor of the German Embassy presented to the Department of State a protest against this verbal assault of Mayor LaGuardia upon Hitler, he was assured by Mr. Dunn, chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, that Secretary Hull "considered it most unfortunate that a city official should express himself in terms which might cause offence to a foreign government."²²⁴ On March 5, Secretary Hull himself issued a statement to the effect that he very earnestly deprecated the utterances which had "given offence to the German Government."²²⁵

When the ebullient mayor repeated his critical remarks of Hitler,

the German press responded with such scurrility that Secretary Hull instructed Ambassador Dodd to make a formal protest against the "coarse and wholly indecent character" of these press attacks.²²⁶ American relations with Germany developed a new tension.

5. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT PROPOSES AN INTERNATIONAL QUARANTINE AGAINST AGGRESSOR NATIONS

This tension between Germany and the United States was increased when the President decided to denounce aggressor nations. In July, 1937, war broke out in the Far East after a clash between Chinese and Japanese troops. This conflict was really precipitated by Chinese Nationalist forces after they had come to an understanding with Russia. Stalin was delighted that the troops of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Communists could launch a common offensive against the Japanese who were trying to establish defensive positions that would hold back the Red tide.

Although Ambassador Grew in Tokyo urgently requested the President to take a neutral stand in the undeclared war in the Far East, there were certain economic and political factors that propelled Mr. Roosevelt into action. The appointment of Hugo Black to the Supreme Court took on dangerous political overtones when it was learned that at one time he had worn the robes of a Klansman. Public attention must be diverted from this dangerous fact and from any real understanding of the economic crisis that was shaking the whole New Deal structure. The American gaze should be shifted from unsavory domestic scenes to distant lands where wicked dictators were threatening the foundations of the social order.

Although a considerable portion of the American press supported a Presidential proposal to quarantine aggressor nations,²²⁷ an even larger portion voiced a protest against such action because of the evident danger of American involvement in a second World War. The *New York Herald Tribune* feared that the President's "restless and adventurous nature" might be leading the United States into a very difficult situation.²²⁸ The *New York Sun* criticized the "hectoring and supercilious" tone of the President's address;²²⁹ the

Boston Herald insisted that America should not "embark on another costly attempt to reform the world";²³⁰ the *Detroit Free Press* was certain that the President's word would "accomplish nothing good";²³¹ while *America*, the leading Catholic periodical, expressed the opinion that "the people of the United States positively are opposed to foreign imbroglions."²³²

6. HITLER MAKES A FRIENDLY GESTURE TOWARD THE UNITED STATES

After the German ambassador in Washington assured his Foreign Office the President's address was "mainly, if not exclusively, directed against Japan,"²³³ Hitler decided to make a friendly gesture toward the United States. He had been considering for some time whether the activities of the German-American Bund in the United States were a help or a hindrance to his policies. Finally, he decided to withdraw all official recognition from the Bund. On February 10, 1938, the Foreign Office instructed Ambassador Dieckhoff to inform Reich-Germans that they could no longer be members of the German-American Bund or of any substitute organizations.²³⁴

Some weeks after Germany had made this friendly gesture, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop had a conversation with Ambassador Wilson. When Ribbentrop complained of the continued hostility of the American press, Wilson assured him that this animosity was largely confined to the press on "the East coast which was dependent on banks and trusts." In the hearts of the American people as a whole there was still "much sympathy for Germany."²³⁵

7. HITLER PLAYS HOST TO LORD HALIFAX AT BERCHTESGADEN

While Hitler was making friendly gestures toward the United States he was planning a very different policy toward Austria. On November 5, 1937, he had an important conference with a group of trusted counselors in the Reich Chancellery—Field Marshal von Blomberg, Colonel General Baron von Fritsch, Admiral Raeder,

Colonel General Goering, Baron von Neurath, and Colonel Hossbach. During the discussion at this conference Hitler insisted that the prime need for Germany was *Lebensraum*. This could be solved "only by way of force." Germany's first aim should be to "conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously." The date which appeared to him "as a possibility was the summer of 1938."²³⁶

In order to carry out these campaigns successfully it was advisable to keep on friendly relations with Great Britain. In the autumn of 1937 General Goering, as game warden of the Reich, extended a cordial invitation to Lord Halifax to visit Berlin in order to attend the International Exhibition of Hunting. As a well-known master of foxhounds, Halifax should greatly enjoy this exhibition.

Before leaving for Berlin, Halifax had a long talk with Ambassador Ribbentrop. It was obvious that this visit to Germany would not be confined to hunting exhibitions. He was scheduled to have some important conversations with Hitler at Berchtesgaden, and they would deal mainly with the "Austrian and Czech questions."²³⁷

Halifax arrived in Berlin on November 10 and soon had a talk with General Goering, who frankly confided to him that Germany's immediate objective was the incorporation of Austria and the Sudetenland into the Reich. After being briefed by Goering with reference to the probable contents of his approaching conversations with Hitler, Halifax left for Berchtesgaden. On November 19, he had his momentous meeting with the Fuehrer.

Hitler prefaced his remarks to Halifax with an attack upon the "French democracy" which was very difficult to deal with in a satisfactory manner. He was of the opinion, however, that it would be possible to make some arrangement between Britain, France, Germany, and Italy that might preserve the peace of Europe. But, first of all, Germany should be treated as a nation that "no longer bore the moral or material stigma of the Treaty of Versailles." He then adverted to the question of the return of German colonies and remarked that it would be difficult to arrive at a just solution of this problem because the British Conservatives would oppose important concessions. Lord Halifax at once challenged this asser-

tion and stoutly maintained that in Britain the government was not the "slave" of politicians with demagogic views.

In answer to a question from Lord Halifax, Hitler stated that he did not know if Germany would ever be interested in a re-entry into the League of Nations. As far as Austria was concerned, he professed to believe that the Austro-German Agreement of July 11, 1936, might "lead to the removal of all difficulties." With reference to Czechoslovakia, the Czechs themselves were in a position "to clear away existing difficulties."²³⁸ It is apparent that Hitler, after carefully planning the absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia, was endeavoring to lull any suspicions that might arise in the mind of Halifax. In this he was highly successful because Halifax assured Prime Minister Chamberlain that Hitler was anxious to achieve his aims in an orderly fashion.

8. CHANCELLOR SCHUSCHNIGG GETS A TASTE OF BERCHTESGADEN HOSPITALITY

After having given assurances to Lord Halifax with reference to the objectives of German policy, Hitler next sent an invitation to Chancellor Schuschnigg, of Austria, to visit Berchtesgaden. From the moment of his arrival, on November 12, he was subjected to a long list of indignities. After eleven hours of unceasing pressure he finally broke down and signed an agreement that marked the beginning of the end of Austrian independence.²³⁹ Dr. Artur Seyss-Inquart was taken into the Austrian cabinet as Minister of the Interior and Public Security. With such an indefatigable Nazi in an important position it would not be long before Austria would be ready for German absorption.²⁴⁰

Schuschnigg himself accelerated this Nazi objective by suddenly announcing, on March 9, that he would soon (March 13) hold a plebiscite on the question of Austrian independence. Lord Halifax defended this announcement in a spirited conversation with Ribbentrop. When the German Foreign Minister attacked this action of Schuschnigg, Halifax remarked that it seemed astonishing to him "to assert that the head of a State should not have a plebiscite if he wanted one." Henderson, in Berlin, agreed with Halifax that

German methods were "indefensible," but he thought that Schuschnigg's sudden determination to call for a plebiscite was "precipitous and unwise."²⁴¹

Chamberlain agreed with this Henderson judgment and stressed more than ever the importance of a policy of appeasement. During a luncheon with Ribbentrop he assured the German Foreign Minister that he desired Hitler to know of Britain's "most sincere desire for an understanding with Germany. Halifax interjected himself into this luncheon and excitedly remarked that Nazi threats of force in Austria constituted an "intolerable method" of exerting pressure upon Schuschnigg. He then inquired whether a plebiscite on the "pattern of the Saar" vote could be held on a later date. Chamberlain at once cut him off with the remark that this procedure did not "seem required by the situation." This rebuff sobered Halifax, who mildly declared that he would not insist upon the matter of a plebiscite.²⁴² He had recently assumed the duties of Foreign Secretary after Eden's resignation (February 20), and he was not in any position to hold out against the Prime Minister.

9. THE NAZI LEGIONS MARCH INTO VIENNA WITHOUT MEETING THE OPPOSING FORCES OF A SINGLE EUROPEAN STATE

This anger on the part of Lord Halifax concerning Hitler's pressure upon Austria was apparently short-lived. In the spring of 1938 Chamberlain was ardently pursuing a policy of appeasement and Halifax knew this fact before he entered the cabinet. In a note to Dino Grandi, the Italian ambassador in London, Chamberlain emphasized his desire to work along with the Rome-Berlin Axis which he considered a "most valuable pillar of European peace." This conviction, he was "happy to confirm," was shared by his friend "Lord Halifax." He wished the Duce to know that he wished not only to conclude a "strong and permanent treaty" with "Fascist Italy" but also with "National Socialist Germany."²⁴³

Hitler, however, had no time to negotiate this "strong and permanent treaty" with Britain. He had his eyes upon Austria and had to make an immediate deal with Mussolini. On March 11 he

sent Prince Philip of Hesse to Rome with a letter to the Duce alleging that Austria was rapidly cementing close ties with Czechoslovakia and that the resulting menace to German security made Austrian absorption necessary.²⁴⁴

This specious letter was accepted by Mussolini at face value and Hesse telephoned to the Fuehrer that the Duce had remarked that the fate of Austria was "immaterial to him." The impact of these reassuring words upon Hitler was so great that he became hysterical with gratitude. He requested Hesse to inform Mussolini that he would never forget this acquiescence in Nazi plans: "If he should ever need help or be in any danger, . . . I shall stick to him . . . even if the whole world were against him."²⁴⁵

The final step was to insist that President Miklas appoint Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor. When this was done, German troops crossed the Austrian frontier (March 12), and on March 14 Hitler entered Vienna in triumph. The Nazi program was being carried out, item by item.

10. AMERICAN REACTION TO THE NAZI ABSORPTION OF AUSTRIA

According to the dispatches of Ambassador Dieckhoff, Secretary Hull, on March 12, did not seem to be unduly disturbed by the news from Vienna and did not utter a single word of disapproval during a conversation with the German ambassador. Two days later Secretary Hull was still courteous, but Sumner Welles gave "expression to a sort of malevolent bitterness."²⁴⁶

In Berlin Dr. Goebbels, during a conversation with Ambassador Wilson, deprecated the hostile tone of the American press but thought that German-American relations could be definitely improved. Wilson then remarked that in former years American affection for Germany had been unusually strong. This affection had been seriously weakened by recent friction with the Reich: "The bonds between the two lands went so deep that we could not regard what happened in Germany with indifference." The situation resolved itself into an ambivalent love-hate complex. Goebbels was impressed with this "new and interesting point of

view" presented by the American ambassador and asked him to make frequent visits so they could discuss matters of common interest.²⁴⁷

It was evident to Ambassador Wilson that the German government was anxious to remain on friendly terms with the Department of State. He was entirely willing to return some of the friendly gestures that were being made in his direction, so he decided to accept the invitation that had been extended to him to attend the Nazi party celebration in September at Nuremberg. As soon as the B'nai Israel Centre of Brooklyn, New York, heard of this decision, a strong protest was made to the Department of State. Attendance at Nuremberg would be a "tacit condonance of the Nazi program of racial and minority persecution."²⁴⁸ Secretary Hull refused to accept this viewpoint, so Ambassador Wilson went to Nuremberg with his British and French colleagues.

It was the last Nuremberg celebration that any American ambassador would attend. In the United States the press continued its unceasing attack upon the Nazi way of life and at times there were, in many parts of the country, strong evidences of contempt that were not overlooked by German officials. At certain amusement parks caricatures of Hitler were used at archery stands and in certain cities the Fuehrer was depicted on toilet paper and on other articles of toilet use. These vulgarities indicated a hostile climate of opinion that would ultimately end in the devastating storm of war. This storm would not be long delayed.

11. GERMAN PRESSURE UPON CZECHOSLOVAKIA PRODUCES THE MAY CRISIS

German absorption of Austria was merely the first item in the German program of expansion. The second item was the Sudeten question in Czechoslovakia. In this regard it must be conceded that Beneš had pursued a policy toward the large German minority in the Sudetenland that had aroused deep resentment and thus prepared the way for the Nazi program. Much of Henlein's "misery propaganda" was based

on fact. There is far more unemployment in the German districts than in the Czech, and the Germans are inadequately represented in official posts. . . . The Czechs foolishly adopted a policy of unification instead of a loose federalism. By the Minority Treaties and by the Czech constitution, the Germans were promised equality of rights. They took this to mean equality in a triune state of Czechs, Slovaks, and Germans; whereas Masaryk formed a "National State of the Czechs and the Slovaks," with the Germans . . . possessing only the rights of a minority. In no sense partners, the Germans felt themselves tricked from the beginning. In their resentment they lodged nineteen petitions before the League of Nations in six years, but without much result. . . . From the autumn of 1933 onwards, Konrad Henlein rallied them in the S.D.P. [*Sudeten Deutsche Partei*].²⁴⁹

In 1938 Hitler decided to use this *Sudeten Deutsche Partei* for his own purposes. In his conversation with Konrad Henlein and Karl H. Frank, he informed them that he "intended to settle the Sudeten German problem in the not-too-distant future." In the meantime Henlein was to make demands upon the Czech government that could never be satisfied.²⁵⁰ The Karlsbad Programme, issued by Henlein on April 24, was prepared in accordance with the Fuehrer's instructions and was far-reaching in its implications. A few days before this program had been published, Hitler had an important conference with General Keitel in which a plan of operations against Czechoslovakia was discussed at length.²⁵¹ Sudeten discontent and German preparations for war would proceed hand in hand.

While Hitler was preparing for action against Czechoslovakia, Prime Minister Chamberlain was still clinging to his policy of appeasement. On March 22 Lord Halifax informed Sir Eric Phipps, in Paris, that the French government should clearly understand that a German attack upon Czechoslovakia would not automatically bring a British army into the field to defend the Czech frontiers.²⁵² Two days later Chamberlain confirmed Halifax's statement, and then at an informal luncheon party given by Lady Astor

to American and Canadian correspondents, he frankly confessed that Britain would not fight for "Czechoslovakia in the event of German aggression, and that the Czechoslovak State could not continue to exist in its present form."²⁵³

The Czech government did not seem greatly concerned about the reluctance of Britain to assume any responsibility for checking German aggression. If pushed too far by Germany, it had decided to fight and, in order to indicate its intention in this regard, a partial mobilization was ordered on May 20. The crisis deepened when a Czech policeman fired upon and killed two German motorcyclists who did not answer his challenge. News of this incident infuriated Foreign Minister Ribbentrop who warned Nevile Henderson that Germany would not wait "much longer and if provocation continued her 75 millions would act as one man."²⁵⁴

Britain now tried to restrain Germany by indirect threats. During a conversation with the German ambassador in London, Halifax stated that if German troops crossed the Czech border, France would hasten to the aid of Czechoslovakia. In the "event of a European conflict it was impossible to foresee whether Britain would not be drawn into it."²⁵⁵

This British warning had a definite effect upon Hitler's plans. He lost no time in giving assurances to the Czech ambassador in Berlin with reference to Germany's intentions. Czechoslovakia had won a diplomatic victory, but it was not long-lasting. On May 30 Hitler issued a directive for "Operation Green." This was to be carried out by October 1, 1938, at the latest." Munich was in the making.

12. LORD RUNCIMAN DECIDES THAT CZECHOSLOVAKIA IS AN "ACCURSED LAND"

It was obvious to the British government that the May Crisis in Czechoslovakia had not ended upon a note of confidence for the future. The friction between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans was increasing each day and it needed only a small incident to produce war. Perhaps a special mission by some distinguished Britisher might accomplish some good! With this idea in mind, Chamberlain decided to send Lord Runciman to Prague to study the situa-

tion. In order to satisfy Czech sensibilities he was to serve merely as a "mediator and adviser."

After talking the situation over with President Beneš, he had several conversations with Sudeten German leaders and took careful note of their arguments. He discovered that the National Minorities Statute, passed by the Czech Parliament, did not meet the demands of Hitler, and the so-called Czech "Plan No. 2" was unacceptable to the Sudetens. Sir Nevile Henderson, in Berlin, thought that the only way to break this deadlock was for the Czech government to offer concessions that were so reasonable that Hitler could not reject them. This plan of appeasement would have to be formulated at once by Czech leaders because German patience was wearing very thin. Beneš, it should be remembered, was a "small man" whose position in his own country was fast growing "quite untenable."²⁵⁶

Under British pressure, Beneš produced his "Plan No. 3." The British Minister at Prague was "very much disappointed" at its contents,²⁵⁷ and Lord Runciman was so disturbed by the course of events that he confessed to Lord Halifax that Czechoslovakia was an "accursed land" in which there were many signs of "bad government."²⁵⁸ He found Konrad Henlein, the Sudeten leader, a "courteous, friendly and honest man. It might be expedient for Britain to support the eight points of the Karlsbad Programme."²⁵⁹

Newton, the British minister in Prague, supported the Runciman viewpoint. He strongly advised President Beneš to go to "the limit of concession" and this limit "ought not to stop short of the eight Karlsbad points if a settlement could not be obtained otherwise." In his dispatch to Lord Halifax, Newton had some sharp words to say about Czech insincerity with reference to former promises that had not been fulfilled. The failure of President Beneš to live up to these promises to the Sudeten Germans had made a "very bad impression."²⁶⁰

13. PRESIDENT BENEŠ PURSUES A POLICY OF DELAY

Even under British pressure Beneš moved very slowly along the road to concessions to the Sudeten Germans. On September 4 Mr.

Newton talked to him "pretty plainly" about his "delays" in presenting terms to Henlein. Lord Runciman complained to Lord Halifax about Beneš: "Nothing can excuse his [Beneš'] slow movements and dilatory negotiations of the past five months."²⁶¹

Prime Minister Hodža became so concerned about the actions of Beneš that he removed from his hands (September 6) the control of the negotiations with the Sudeten leaders. But it was too late. The Sudeten German delegation was impressed with the sincerity of Hodža, but because of certain incidents that had just occurred at Maehrisch-Ostrau all negotiations would have to be broken off until that matter was "cleared up."²⁶² They were never resumed.

On September 13, after outbreaks in the Sudetenland, the Czech government declared martial law in that area. Nevile Henderson was now certain that war was just around the corner unless something substantial was done for the Sudeten Germans.²⁶³ After Prime Minister Chamberlain read these telegrams from Berlin and Prague he felt he must make an immediate move in the direction of appeasement. He sent a message to Hitler suggesting a conference at which the problems clamoring for settlement could be discussed. The Fuehrer replied that he was "absolutely at the disposal" of the Prime Minister.²⁶⁴ Berchtesgaden would soon have another distinguished visitor.

14. PRIME MINISTER CHAMBERLAIN PREPARES THE WAY FOR CAPITULATION AT MUNICH

Chamberlain's decision to go to Berchtesgaden nipped in the bud a plot to push aside Hitler and prevent the outbreak of a second World War. Appeasement at Munich made Hitler's policy seem so successful that it was impossible at that time to stage a Putsch against him. If Chamberlain had acted "tough" and rejected all thought of further concessions, the plot, involving many of the most important officers in the German Army, might have succeeded. His generous attitude made war inevitable on Hitler's terms.²⁶⁵

It is apparent that he was inclined to give the Fuehrer the benefit

of every doubt and, as Keith Feiling points out, he probably carried with him to Berchtesgaden a none-too-favorable view of the conditions of affairs in Czechoslovakia under the administration of Beneš.²⁶⁶ It was time for a change.

In his conversations at Berchtesgaden with Hitler it was made plain to him that the Sudetenland would have to be ceded to the Reich or there would be war. The Fuehrer was clear on the point that he "did not want a lot of Czechs, all he wanted was Sudeten Germans."²⁶⁷

Chamberlain felt he could not make any decision on the Sudetenland problem until he had discussed the matter with his cabinet. This conversation on September 15 had been like a diplomatic skirmish. He now knew what Hitler apparently wanted and he would place the terms before his cabinet colleagues.

After discussing with Prime Minister Daladier and Foreign Minister Bonnet all the angles of the diplomatic situation, he was ready for further conversations with Hitler. Britain and France were now agreed that the Sudetenland districts "mainly inhabited by Sudeten-Deutsch" should be transferred to the Reich. The details covering these transfers could be settled by some "international body including a Czech representative."²⁶⁸

When these terms were sent to Prague, on September 19, the Czech government replied the next day in a note that requested Britain and France to reconsider the situation.²⁶⁹ On September 21 the Czechs were bluntly told to accept the terms outlined in the Franco-British note or else not to count upon any assistance from those nations. This was an ultimatum that the Czech cabinet had to accept, even though it was an invitation to disaster.

The way was now open for Chamberlain's second conversation with Hitler. This took place at Godesberg-on-the-Rhine because of its convenient location. The date was September 22, a time of year when the weather along the Rhine could prove Mark Twain's assertion that summer in Germany "is the perfection of the beautiful." But Chamberlain soon discovered that Hitler was not primarily interested in esthetic considerations. He was in a more exacting mood than he had been at Berchtesgaden. He was now insistent that a frontier line be drawn "at once" indicating the

areas that should be ceded to Germany. The Czechs should withdraw immediately from these districts which should be occupied by German troops.

On the morning of September 23 Chamberlain sent a note to the Fuehrer expressing a fear that if German troops "in the immediate future" should occupy any Sudeten areas there would be a clash with Czech troops and war might ensue.²⁷⁰ Hitler's answer contained such a small compromise that Chamberlain, on the evening of September 23-24 had his second conversation with the Fuehrer. It was largely fruitless. Hitler did, however, make one small concession: he promised to postpone the date of the entry of German troops into the Sudetenland until October 1. He also gave an assurance that the annexation of this portion of Czechoslovakia would satisfy his territorial ambitions in Europe.²⁷¹

15. CHAMBERLAIN MAKES A PLEA FOR PEACE

When Chamberlain returned to London after this unsatisfactory meeting at Godesberg, he had important conversations with Premier Daladier and General Gamelin, the French Chief of Staff. After extending to them a pledge that the British government would not "see France overrun or defeated by Germany," he wrote a letter to Hitler (September 26) requesting him to arrange for a meeting between representatives of Germany and Czechoslovakia for the purpose of settling by agreement "the way in which the territory [Sudetenland] is to be handed over."²⁷² On this same day, after receiving an urgent dispatch from Ambassador Kennedy indicating the importance of some American action, President Roosevelt sent a personal message to Beneš and to Hitler.

Roosevelt pointed out the terrible destruction that a second World War would entail upon Europe and referred to the fact that even distant America could not escape some "measure of the consequences of such a world catastrophe." He then called attention to the obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and appealed to both Hitler and Beneš to continue negotiations looking to a "peaceful, fair and constructive settlement of the questions at issue."²⁷³

President Beneš sent a prompt and favorable reply. Hitler was busily engaged upon the task of putting the finishing touches upon a speech he was to make at the Sportspalast in Berlin on the evening of September 26. He had no time for an early reply to the President's plea.

Chamberlain did not place too much reliance upon the favorable effect of President Roosevelt's plea to Hitler. In a further effort to preserve peace, he sent Sir Horace Wilson to Berlin to have a final audience with the Fuehrer. He was armed with an instruction that definitely indicated that Britain would follow France in giving assistance to Czechoslovakia if she were attacked by Germany. Owing to Hitler's excitable mood it was thought best not to confront him with this British ultimatum. During the conversation which both Sir Horace Wilson and Nevile Henderson had with the Fuehrer there were many explosions of anger from Hitler. Finally he shouted that the Sudetenland must be "free on 1st October," and he must have an affirmative reply to this demand "within two days."²⁷⁴

On the following day (September 27) Hitler had a second conversation with Sir Horace Wilson, who now communicated to him the British ultimatum. The Fuehrer promptly went into one of his characteristic rages and shouted: "If France and England strike, let them do so."²⁷⁵

But despite these bold words, Hitler began to have some misgivings about the effect of British intervention in a European war arising out of German aggression upon Czechoslovakia. Perhaps a few honeyed words would weaken Chamberlain's resolute stand! On September 27 he sent a letter to the Prime Minister in which he stated that if he gained his objective with reference to the Sudetenland he was ready to give a "formal guarantee for the remainder of Czechoslovakia."²⁷⁶

He also decided that it was time to send a formal answer to President Roosevelt's appeal for peace. In this communication he stressed his adherence to the principle of self-determination and sharply criticized President Wilson's betrayal of it during the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference. When officials in Washington

had gained a better understanding of the problem of the Sudetenland they would adopt a different attitude.²⁷⁷

Hitler's telegram evoked a second plea from the President in favor of world peace. He tried to convince the Fuehrer that it was a waste of time to look back upon alleged mistakes committed at Versailles. The fate "of the world today and tomorrow" was the question that demanded an immediate answer. A second World War was as "unnecessary as it was unjustifiable." If the Fuehrer followed a path to a peaceful settlement of the Sudetenland difficulty he would gain the gratitude of "hundreds of millions throughout the world."²⁷⁸

The President also directed an appeal to Mussolini to lend his assistance in this search for a formula of peace.²⁷⁹ A second World War would mean the useless "destruction of millions of men, women and children in Europe."

16. APPEASEMENT AT MUNICH

On September 28 Prime Minister Chamberlain made his appeal to Mussolini to support British efforts for peace.²⁸⁰ The Duce responded by sending a message to Hitler asking him to postpone action "for at least 24 hours" so that the search for peace could be continued.²⁸¹

In Berlin, Hitler had received another letter from Prime Minister Chamberlain. He now suggested the calling of a conference between the representatives of Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, and Italy for the purpose of discussing the Sudeten problem.²⁸² From France came a note even more conciliatory than the one from Chamberlain. Under the pressure of these appeals, Hitler felt constrained to invite Mussolini, Prime Minister Chamberlain, and the French Premier (Daladier) to Munich for a conference on the following day (September 29).

This conference did little more than underwrite the program of appeasement already agreed upon by Britain and France. On the morning of September 30 the articles of agreement were formally signed after a preliminary debate in which Daladier, apparently to impress posterity, showed a combative spirit which was soon tamed

by General Goering. The Sudetenland was ceded to Germany. It was divided into four zones whose occupation by German troops would commence on October 1 and continue until October 7. The details of the settlement were entrusted to an international commission whose members would include representatives of Britain, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, and Italy.²⁸³

In America, Secretary Hull was cautious about evaluating the outcome at Munich. On September 30 he issued the following noncommittal statement: "As to immediate peace results, it is unnecessary to say that they afford a universal sense of relief. I am not undertaking to pass upon the merits of the differences to which the Four-Power Pact signed at Munich on yesterday related."²⁸⁴

Sumner Wells was not so cautious. In a radio address, on October 3, he described the steps taken by President Roosevelt just prior to the conference and then remarked that "today, perhaps more than at any time during the past two decades, there was presented the opportunity for the establishment by the nations of the world of a new world order based on justice and law."²⁸⁵

The role of Roosevelt in this Munich settlement is difficult to establish. His appeals to Hitler and Mussolini made little impression upon these dictators. Chamberlain and Daladier were undoubtedly affected by his pleas for peace and were anxious to find some formula that would prevent the outbreak of war. But, in the event of war, Chamberlain thought that he would have the support of President Roosevelt. On August 30 he had a conference with Ambassador Kennedy relative to the crisis in Europe. Kennedy made the comment that "if Hitler seized Czechoslovakia 'it will be Hell!'" He then assured Chamberlain that if France went to the aid of the Czechs and if Britain had to "go in too, the United States would follow before long." As the conversation proceeded, he made a final important observation: "He was convinced that President Roosevelt had decided to 'go in with Chamberlain; whatever course Chamberlain desires to adopt he would think right.'"²⁸⁶

This assurance was certainly a blank check given to the British Prime Minister at a critical moment before his capitulation at Munich. It is possible that it confirmed his obvious tendency

toward appeasement and thus played into the hands of Hitler. It gave him confidence that, if war developed later, he could count on American aid. Some writers regard Roosevelt's messages as the most powerful factor inducing Chamberlain to refrain from resisting Hitler by force at this time.

In Washington, Roosevelt made no rash promises. On September 15 he sent a personal letter to Ambassador Phillips in Rome. In the event of war, he believed that the American people would be 90 per cent "anti-German and anti-Italian." He would not encourage "them to be neutral in thought" but instead would strongly stimulate "their natural sympathy while at the same time avoiding any thought of sending troops to Europe."²⁸⁷

The Polish government took advantage of German pressure upon Czechoslovakia by making a demand for the cession of the area around Teschen. This action disturbed President Roosevelt, who sent a memorandum to Secretary Hull with the request that the following thought be conveyed unofficially to Foreign Minister Beck of Poland: "The President feels that he can, as an old friend, suggest his disappointment at the Polish record of the past week. . . . He did not like what came very close to being a threatening attitude."²⁸⁸

The Polish government continued its threatening attitude and on October 2 secured the cession of the Teschen district. There was no further presidential admonition to Foreign Minister Beck. The settlement at Munich had averted a definite threat of war and the Chief Executive luxuriated in that fact. In a letter to Prime Minister Mackenzie King, of Canada, he gave voice to this feeling of relief: "I can assure you that we in the United States rejoice with you, and the world at large, that the outbreak of war was averted."²⁸⁹ A week later he confided to Ambassador Phillips, in Rome, that he was "not a bit upset over the final result."²⁹⁰

It is usually agreed that Munich was a significant victory for Hitler. For this reason it is a little disturbing to read this Roosevelt comment upon the results of Munich. To the Polish Ambassador in Washington, Jerzy Potocki, this comment had a perfectly clear meaning:

I can only say that President Roosevelt, as a clever player of politics and a connoisseur of American mentality, speedily steered public attention away from the domestic situation in order to fasten it on foreign policy. The way to achieve this was simple. One needed, on the one hand, to enhance the war menace overhanging the world on account of Chancellor Hitler, and, on the other hand, to create a specter by talking about the attack of the totalitarian states on the United States. The Munich pact came to President Roosevelt as a Godsend. He described it as the capitulation of France and England to bellicose German militarism. As was said here [Washington]: Hitler compelled Chamberlain at pistol-point. Hence, France and England had no choice and had to conclude a shameful peace. The prevalent hatred against everything which is in any way connected with German National Socialism is further kindled by the brutal attitude against the Jews in Germany and by the emigré problem. In this action the Jewish intellectuals participated. . . . They want the President to become the champion of human rights, . . . and the man who in the future will punish trouble-mongers. These groups, people who want to pose as representatives of "Americanism" and "defenders of democracy" in the last analysis, are connected by unbreakable ties with international Jewry. For this Jewish international, . . . to put the President of the United States at this "ideal" post of champion of human rights, was a clever move. . . . It is extremely convenient to divert public attention from anti-Semitism which is ever growing in the United States."²⁹¹

During a conversation with Ambassador Bullitt, on a brief leave of absence from Paris, Potocki got a glimpse of the main objectives of the Roosevelt administration: "(1) The vitalizing foreign policy, under the leadership of President Roosevelt, severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries; (2) the United States preparation for war on sea, land, and air which will be carried out at an accelerated speed . . . will consume the colossal sum of 1,250 million dollars; (3) it is the decided opinion of the President

that France and Britain must put an end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries. They must not let themselves in for any discussions aiming at any kind of territorial changes; (4) they have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war."²⁹²

17. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS TAKE A DEFINITE TURN FOR THE WORSE

While the world was speculating upon the results of the Munich surrender, certain events happened that made German-American relations take a turn for the worse. On November 7 a Jewish refugee from Poland (Herschel Grynszpan) paid a visit to the German Embassy in Paris and shot Ernst vom Rath, the third secretary, who died three days later. This assassination touched off a new series of anti-Semitic laws in Germany with a consequent impact upon the United States. At a press conference, President Roosevelt vehemently denounced the Nazi government for their harsh measures against the Jews and immediately recalled Ambassador Wilson from Berlin in order to get a "first-hand picture" of the situation.²⁹³ The German government responded by recalling Ambassador Dieckhoff from Washington, and thus relations between the two countries were seriously strained.

But the Nazi leaders had no wish for war with the United States. Goering invited Mr. Gilbert, the American *chargé d'affaires*, to his private residence for a friendly conversation. According to Gilbert, the "most cordial and friendly" atmosphere prevailed, and Goering stressed repeatedly that he was anxious to find a solution of "the Jewish problem." Outside of that difficulty he saw "no concrete problems which should trouble relations between the two countries."²⁹⁴ Goebbels and Schacht made similar gestures of friendship and it was obvious that they hoped to conciliate American opinion.

18. HITLER PLACES CZECHOSLOVAKIA UNDER PROTECTIVE CUSTODY

These friendly German gestures were set at naught by the basic Nazi objectives in Europe. Hitler was laying plans for the absorp-

tion of Czechoslovakia, although he knew that such action would arouse deep resentment in the United States. On January 21 he had an important conference with M. Chvalkovsky, the Czech Foreign Minister, and abruptly informed him that he would have to pursue a policy parallel to that followed by Germany. Moreover, the Czech Army would have to be radically reduced.²⁹⁵

On March 13 the Slovak premier, Monsignor Tiso, had a long conversation with Hitler and hurried home to Bratislava where he issued a proclamation of Slovak independence. President Hácha, of Czechoslovakia, received the next grim invitation to Berlin. When he arrived in the German capital, on the evening of March 14, he was rushed to the Chancellery to face Hitler. The alternatives were placed before him frankly: the Czechs could resist and suffer dreadful punishment or they could gracefully submit and be given some measure of autonomy. After some hours of resistance, Hácha finally agreed to Hitler's demands. Two days later Hitler entered Prague in triumph.²⁹⁶ The Nazi timetable was working to perfection.

In Britain, Chamberlain at first seemed to acquiesce in the Nazi coup but on March 17, at Birmingham, he sounded a note of sharp criticism. Whether this change of front was in response to American pressure can only be surmised. At any rate, he stated that if British security were imperilled the nation would not hesitate to go to war.²⁹⁷

19. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

In this new and exalted mood Chamberlain moved rapidly in the direction of a momentous pledge to Poland. In March, 1939, Hitler was exerting strong pressure upon Poland in favor of concessions which seemed quite reasonable. He wished to incorporate Danzig within the Reich (after confirming Polish economic privileges in the city) and desired permission to construct an extra-territorial motor road across the Corridor. In 1933 President Roosevelt had spoken of the possibility of a German elevated railway across the Corridor. But, in 1939, the Polish Foreign Minister refused to grant these concessions, and war clouds gathered along the Polish horizon.²⁹⁸

In this case it would have been wise for Chamberlain to advise the Polish Foreign Office to make some show of conciliation toward Germany. Instead, he announced in the House of Commons (March 31) that if Germany attacked Poland, Britain would support the Poles with all her power. On April 6 he concluded an Anglo-Polish defensive agreement which made this British pledge more specific.²⁹⁹

Chamberlain then tried to drive a wedge between Hitler and Mussolini by making new concessions to Italy. The Duce took advantage of this attitude of weakness by seizing control of Albania (April 7). In the United States, Secretary Hull denounced the Italian invasion of Albania as an "additional threat to the peace of the world."³⁰⁰ The next day (Easter Sunday, April 9), as President Roosevelt was leaving Warm Springs, Georgia, for Washington, he made a significant remark to some friends who followed him to the railway station: "I'll be back in the fall if we don't have a war."³⁰¹

This blunt announcement appeared to infuse new courage into Chamberlain, who announced in the House of Commons (April 13) that Britain had decided to include Greece and Rumania in her pledge of assistance against Nazi aggression.³⁰² When it is remembered that up to this time Britain had not even made provision for conscription for the purpose of augmenting her pitifully small army, it is obvious that Chamberlain was either criminally deluding the small nations of Europe with promises of aid that could not be effective, or he was definitely counting upon American intervention in a second World War.

This hope of American intervention was given additional strength on April 14 when President Roosevelt, apparently working for a "good record," in case the United States entered a second World War, made an address in which he trenchantly criticized the Fascist and Nazi methods of expansion: "Do we really have to assume that nations can find no better methods of realizing their destinies than those which were used by the Huns and Vandals 1500 years ago?"³⁰³

While he was making this address he was also sending by cable an appeal to Hitler and Mussolini against any further aggressive moves that might lead to war. He asked them to give assurance

that their armed forces would "not attack or invade," for a period of ten years at least, the territories or possessions of a long list of nations.³⁰⁴ Mussolini made no direct answer to this appeal, but, on April 20, in addressing a meeting of influential Fascists in Rome, he stated that Italy was not impressed "by Messiah-like" messages.³⁰⁵ Hitler's reply was given in an address to the Reichstag on April 28. He rejected completely the President's proposals.

Hitler apparently delayed his address until he could present statements by a number of the countries listed by President Roosevelt that they did not fear any attack by Germany. He stressed the betrayal of Germany by Wilson after the Armistice and he directed attention to subject peoples ruled by the so-called "democratic states." In his concluding passage, Hitler stated that: "I cannot feel myself responsible for the fate of the world, because this world had taken no interest in the pitiful state of my own people." Hitler's satirical handling of the Roosevelt proposals is authentically reported to have made the President extremely angry.

20. RUSSIA MAKES A SECOND WORLD WAR POSSIBLE BY ENTERING INTO A TREATY WITH HITLER

As Chamberlain began to realize more clearly that neither Hitler nor Mussolini was interested in a program of peace, he slowly turned in the direction of another dictator—Josef Stalin. But Soviet Russia was a very dubious partner for a democracy. On April 11 Lord Halifax had a conference with Maisky, the Russian ambassador in London, and found him quite "cynical about the whole situation." But the Foreign Office was determined to go ahead, despite its suspicions of Soviet good faith. On April 15, Sir William Seeds, the British ambassador in Moscow, presented to Litvinov a suggestion that the Soviet government, following British and French action, should make upon its own initiative a public declaration that "in the event of any act of aggression against any neighboring State to the Soviet Union which that State were to resist, the assistance of the Soviet Government would be given if the desire for it were expressed."³⁰⁶

The Soviet government replied with a counterproposal that

Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and France conclude an accord for immediate military support in case of aggression similar to the pact recently concluded between Great Britain and Poland. According to Polish authorities, the terms of the Russian proposals also included permission for Soviet troops to enter Poland by northern and southern routes, and a declaration by Britain that her guarantee of Poland applied only to her western frontier. Finally, it was said that Russia demanded a "free hand in the Baltic States" and a Polish-Russian treaty of far-reaching implications.³⁰⁷

In the meantime discussions were being carried on in Berlin and Moscow with reference to a treaty that would settle all questions at issue between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. On July 6 Soviet-German talks made a real advance when Dr. Karl Schnurre, head of the Eastern European Division of the German Foreign Office, outlined to the members of a Soviet economic mission to Berlin a scheme for a gradual *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia. By August 4 Molotov became definitely interested in this new political alignment and six days later Astakhov, head of the Soviet economic mission, told Dr. Schnurre that he had received from Moscow instructions stressing the desire of the Soviet government for better relations with Germany. When the British and French military missions reached Moscow on August 11, they soon found it impossible to satisfy Soviet demands which included permission for Russian troops to pass through Poland. On August 19 a Soviet-German commercial agreement was signed in Berlin and on the twenty-third a nonaggression and consultative pact was signed in Moscow. Hitler was now ready for war with Poland and was assured of Russian co-operation.³⁰⁸

To meet this rapid thrust of strong, well-trained, and well-armed German forces, Poland had only her own weak army. Chamberlain, despite his brave words, could not send a single soldier to Poland to stem this German tide. Moreover, it was not until April 26 that Chamberlain announced a plan for military conscription. Although the House of Commons approved a bill for conscription on April 27, this measure merely added some two hundred thousand troops to the British Army, and it was not until July that the first contingent of British recruits was called to the colors. The French Army

was tragically weak, so far as an air force was concerned, and it should have been apparent that none of the loud boasts of General Gamelin could be effectively implemented. Poland was betrayed by both Britain and France and her own statesmen were too stupid to understand the simplest lessons in *Realpolitik*.

21. BRITAIN BLOCKS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SECURE A MORATORIUM ON WAR

While the British were delaying the important matter of implementing conscription they were also showing a hostility toward the idea of a moratorium on war. This situation is clearly shown in their attitude with reference to the efforts of Hamilton Fish to postpone any thought of war until the Interparliamentary Union could search for a formula of peace.

In the summer of 1939 Representative Fish led a large delegation of Americans to the meeting of the Interparliamentary Union at Oslo. The sessions of the Union were to begin on August 15. In order to secure a close-up of the situation in Germany, Mr. Fish stopped off at Salzburg on August 14 for a talk with the German Foreign Minister. He found Ribbentrop "gracious and charming" and blessed with an unusual command of English. After a detailed review of the Danzig question, the Foreign Minister frankly informed him that "unless Danzig was restored and German minority rights guaranteed war would break out in ten days." He ignored Mr. Fish's arguments for "a peaceful settlement of the Polish dispute and would offer no suggestions as to the preservation of peace through any action that might be initiated at the Interparliamentary Union conference." After a brief resumé of Hitler's attempts to arrive at an understanding with Britain, he remarked that, as a result of repeated British rebuffs, "Hitler would stop at nothing to destroy the British Empire, even to the last German soldier."³⁰⁹

Hitler may have made such a statement about the British in a moment of hysterical anger, but it surely did not represent his real attitude toward the British Empire, which he held in highest esteem. His real attitude toward the destruction of the British Empire, when the destruction would have been an easy matter for

Hitler, is best expressed in his conversation with German General Blumentritt, immediately after Dunkirk:

He [Hitler] then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of the Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but "where there is planing there are shavings flying." He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church—saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany's position on the Continent. The return of Germany's lost colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in any difficulties anywhere.⁸¹⁰

Since this statement agrees with Hitler's measured statements elsewhere and with his diplomatic and military actions, it may be accepted as sincere. It disposes for all time of the repeated assertions of Churchill and others that Britain had to fight against Hitler for sheer self-preservation. A competent publicist has graphically but accurately contrasted the attitudes of Hitler and Stalin toward Britain: "Hitler merely wanted to 'crash' the Carleton Club [the select club of British officials and aristocrats]; Stalin wanted to smash it."

To return to Mr. Fish, when he arrived at Oslo on the morning of August 15, he found the British just as stubborn as the Germans with regard to any concerted efforts to preserve peace. On August 17 he addressed the Interparliamentary Union on the subject of "the peaceful settlement of international disputes." At the conclusion of this address he introduced a resolution calling for "a moratorium on war for thirty days or more with a view to the settlement of international disputes by arbitration, mediation, and peaceful methods."⁸¹¹

The leader of the British delegation at Oslo, Colonel Arthur

Evans, showed prompt opposition to the resolution introduced by Mr. Fish and proposed an amendment to it.³¹² The objections of Colonel Evans found a convenient mouthpiece in Mr. C. J. Hambro, of Norway, who was both fluent and insulting. In the face of a long record of generous contributions to pressing problems of relief in Europe, Mr. Hambro accused the United States of being very niggardly in the matter of contributions for the help of refugees. After this sneering and unjustified attack, Hambro then turned to the resolution offered by Hamilton Fish:

I admire his [Mr. Fish's] optimism. . . . Can we facilitate the task of responsible statesmen by adopting any such resolution? Can we make the atmosphere clearer, . . . or shall we make it more nebulous . . . and provoke new propaganda against an international body for adopting resolutions felt by some states to be outside the sphere of its competence? . . . There is one thing especially that to my mind makes it absolutely impossible for any delegate from a small state to vote for any such resolution. We protest altogether against the very idea that four great Powers may be called upon to settle any conflict which touches our vital interests.³¹³

In the face of this Anglo-Norwegian opposition to his resolution, Mr. Fish immediately withdrew it from consideration and thus perished another attempt to halt the tides of war. They were rising high on the continent of Europe and strong barriers would have to be erected at once if their destructive course were to be checked. They could not be erected by untimely sneers at the United States.

22. ANOTHER WORLD WAR ENGULFS EUROPE

As the last week in August approached it was evident to most European diplomats that the existing crisis was fast moving toward war. The news of the nonaggression pact between Germany and Soviet Russia was a clear indication that Britain and France would have to withdraw their pledges to Poland or prepare for conflict. But Chamberlain had no intention of withdrawing his pledge and

he sent Nevile Henderson to Berchtesgaden on August 23 to tell Hitler that Britain was determined to fulfill all her obligations to the Polish State.³¹⁴ Two days later he entered into a new treaty with Poland that had far-reaching implications. Should "one of the Contracting Parties become engaged in hostilities with a European Power in consequence of aggression by the latter against the Contracting Party, the other Contracting Party will at once give the Contracting Party engaged in hostilities all the support and assistance in its power." The treaty also obligated Britain and Poland to maintain the status quo in vast areas of Europe.³¹⁵ With the wretchedly weak British Army then in existence this obligation could not possibly be implemented and the treaty was merely a tragic farce.

On the very day this treaty was signed, Hitler sent for Nevile Henderson to discuss the grave situation that was moving toward war. After stressing the "immediate necessity" of a settlement of the dispute between Germany and Poland, he adverted to the possibility of an Anglo-German alliance. He spoke "with calm and apparent sincerity" and described his proposals as a "last effort, for conscience' sake, to secure good relations with Great Britain." After Henderson reminded Hitler that Britain could not "possibly go back on its word to Poland," the Fuehrer put a plane at the British ambassador's disposal for a flight back to London for a conference with Chamberlain.³¹⁶ On August 28 he returned with the message that His Majesty's Government could not, "for any advantage offered to Great Britain, acquiesce in a settlement which put in jeopardy the independence of a State to whom they have given their guarantee." Direct negotiations between Germany and Poland were then suggested, and the opinion was voiced that a "reasonable solution of the differences between Germany and Poland could and should be effected between the two countries."³¹⁷

On August 29 Hitler had another conference with Henderson and handed him a note which indicated an acceptance of direct negotiations with Poland. But the German government now insisted upon "the return of Danzig and the Polish Corridor to Germany." Moreover, a representative of the Polish government was expected on the following day to discuss these terms.³¹⁸

While this crisis was developing, the smaller European Powers tried desperately to find some formula for peace. In a last-minute attempt to bring hope to millions of terror-stricken people on the Continent, King Leopold, of Belgium, speaking for the so-called "Oslo Powers" (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), broadcast an appeal "to those in whose hands rests the fate of the world" to avoid "the catastrophe which threatens humanity."³¹⁹ On the following day (August 24), Pope Pius XII issued a fervent plea for peace.³²⁰ From Washington, President Roosevelt sent several vain appeals for a pacific solution of existing difficulties. On August 23 he addressed King Victor Emmanuel, of Italy, in "behalf of the maintenance of world peace." The unheard voices of "countless millions of human beings ask that they shall not be vainly sacrificed again."³²¹ To Hitler he sent a similar message, and on the same day dispatched an appeal to President M \acute{o} scicki, of Poland.³²² M \acute{o} scicki replied that he would be glad to accept President Roosevelt as a mediator in the German-Polish dispute, and this led the President to send a second appeal to Hitler.³²³ The Fuehrer replied that he had "left nothing untried for the purpose of settling the dispute between Germany and Poland in a friendly manner. Even at the last hour he accepted an offer from the Government of Great Britain to mediate in this dispute. Owing to the attitude of the Polish Government, however, all these endeavors have remained without result."³²⁴

In the light of the fact that President Roosevelt had encouraged Britain, France, and Poland to take a stand relative to Germany that was likely, if not sure, to bring war, it is probable that his peace pleas in 1939 were made "for the record," in a manner comparable to his plea for peace to the Japanese Emperor, dispatched on the morning of December 7, 1941.

According to Hitler's note of August 29, which he handed to Sir Nevile Henderson, the Polish government was to send an emissary to Berlin within twenty-four hours. In the meantime the German government would draft proposals "acceptable to them, and, if possible, will make such proposals available for the British government also before the Polish negotiator arrives." Throughout August 30

the British ambassador waited for these proposals. He knew that Poland would not send an emissary to Berlin where he would face a decidedly hostile atmosphere. In this regard both Poland and Britain made a serious blunder. It should have been obvious to them that the August crisis was no time for heroics. Neither Britain nor France could place a single soldier in Poland. Germany could crush the Polish Army in a matter of weeks, and with Russian assistance Poland would be completely defeated and partitioned. Danzig and the Polish Corridor were questions that had stared German statesmen in the face ever since 1919 and their solution in favor of Germany was inevitable. For Chamberlain and Halifax to bolster Poland's courage in this matter of defiance to two Great Powers that were poised to strike, was criminal folly.

At midnight on August 30 Sir Nevile Henderson called upon the German Foreign Minister who refused to invite the Polish ambassador to see him. Ribbentrop then picked up the German proposals for a negotiated settlement with Poland and read them rapidly to Henderson:

. . . When he had finished, I accordingly asked him to let me see it [the text of proposals]. Herr von Ribbentrop refused categorically, threw the document with a contemptuous gesture on the table and said that it was now out of date since no Polish Emissary had arrived in Berlin by midnight. I observed that in that case the sentence in the German note of the 29th August to which I had drawn his and the Fuehrer's attention on the preceding evening had, in fact, constituted an ultimatum in spite of their categorical denials. Herr von Ribbentrop's answer to that was that the idea of an ultimatum was a figment of my own imagination and creation.³²⁵

On August 31 Mussolini proposed the calling of a five-power conference "with the object of reviewing clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which are the cause of the disturbance in the life of Europe." This peaceful gesture gave pause to Hitler's plans to invade Poland, but on the early morning of September 1, after news of

some "frontier incidents," he ordered his troops to cross the Polish border. At ten-thirty that morning he also informed the Reichstag that he had been compelled to repel "Poland's attack" upon Germany. On the afternoon of September 2, Sir Nevile Henderson left at the Foreign Office a copy of Chamberlain's speech which laid down certain conditions of peace. On the following morning at nine o'clock he called at the Foreign Office and delivered an ultimatum which announced that unless assurances were given before eleven o'clock of the suspension of hostilities and the withdrawal of troops from Poland, Great Britain would be at war with the Third Reich from that hour.³²⁶ At twelve o'clock the French ambassador presented an ultimatum with a time limit fixed at five o'clock. When that hour arrived, Germany was formally at war with both Britain and France.³²⁷ World War II was ready to engulf all Europe and usher in the eventual triumph of Red Russia.

In the early days of the conflict, the reports from British Military Intelligence were rosy and General Ironside was inclined to be optimistic concerning the campaign in Poland. German strategy had been based upon the expectation of a quick victory. But some of the terrain leading into Poland was quite rugged, and if the Poles made it "tough" for the invading Germans "so that it required a couple of months to make any headway," Hitler's "hordes would have great difficulty in retreating or advancing."³²⁸

The American military attaché in Berlin was equally optimistic with regard to checking the progress of the German military machine. The Poles were following a preconceived plan that envisaged "delaying the German advance with covering forces and stubbornly holding fortified areas. . . . They are making the Germans pay dearly for every kilometer gained and are exhausting the best German divisions." The Polish defense was "being carried out as planned by the Poles and the French and British missions, and appears to be succeeding."³²⁹

These dispatches from Berlin read like chapters from *Alice in Wonderland*, and in 1939 it appeared as though Neville Chamberlain was assuming the role of the Mad Hatter when he could not send even token assistance to the hard-pressed Poles. But nowadays it seems evident that the real Mad Hatter was Franklin D. Roose-

velt, who pressed Chamberlain to give promises to the Poles when there was no possibility of fulfilling them. According to some reports, it was William C. Bullitt who cast Roosevelt in this grotesque role.

I recently received from Mr. Verne Marshall, former editor of the *Cedar Rapids Gazette*, a letter in which he made the following statements:

President Roosevelt wrote a note to William Bullitt [in the summer of 1939], then Ambassador to France, directing him to advise the French Government that if, in the event of a Nazi attack upon Poland, France and England did not go to Poland's aid, those countries could expect no help from America if a general war developed. On the other hand, if France and England immediately declared war on Germany [in the event of a Nazi attack upon Poland], they could expect "all aid" from the United States.

F.D.R.'s instructions to Bullitt were to send this word along to "Joe" and "Tony," meaning Ambassadors Kennedy, in London, and Biddle, in Warsaw, respectively. F.D.R. wanted Daladier, Chamberlain and Josef Beck to know of these instructions to Bullitt. Bullitt merely sent his note from F.D.R. to Kennedy in the diplomatic pouch from Paris. Kennedy followed Bullitt's idea and forwarded it to Biddle. When the Nazis grabbed Warsaw and Beck disappeared, they must have come into possession of the F.D.R. note. The man who wrote the report I sent you saw it in Berlin in October, 1939.³³⁰

After receiving this letter from Verne Marshall I wrote at once to Mr. Bullitt and inquired about this instruction from the President. He replied as follows: "I have no memory of any instruction from President Roosevelt of the nature quoted in your letter to me and feel quite certain that no such instruction was ever sent to me by the President."³³¹

Mr. Joseph Kennedy sent to me a similar negative answer with reference to this alleged instruction from the President, but the

Forrestal Diaries would indicate the probability that Bullitt did strongly urge President Roosevelt to exert pressure upon Prime Minister Chamberlain and that this request evoked a favorable response from the White House. The following excerpt has far-reaching implications:

27 December 1945

Played golf today with Joe Kennedy [Joseph P. Kennedy, who was Roosevelt's Ambassador to Great Britain in the years immediately before the war]. I asked him about his conversations with Roosevelt and Neville Chamberlain from 1938 on. He said Chamberlain's position in 1938 was that England had nothing with which to fight and that she could not risk going to war with Hitler. Kennedy's view: That Hitler would have fought Russia without any later conflict with England if it had not been for Bullitt's [William C. Bullitt, then Ambassador to France] urging on Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 that the Germans must be faced down about Poland; neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it had not been for the constant needling from Washington. Bullitt, he said, kept telling Roosevelt that the Germans wouldn't fight; Kennedy that they would, and that they would overrun Europe. Chamberlain, he says, stated that America and the world Jews had forced England into the war. In his telephone conversations with Roosevelt in the summer of 1939 the President kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside. Kennedy's response always was that putting iron up his backside did no good unless the British had some iron with which to fight, and they did not. . . .

What Kennedy told me in this conversation jibes substantially with the remarks Clarence Dillon had made to me already, to the general effect that Roosevelt had asked him in some manner to communicate privately with the British to the end that Chamberlain should have greater firmness in his dealings with Germany. Dillon told me that at Roosevelt's request he had talked with Lord Lothian in the same general

sense as Kennedy reported Roosevelt having urged him to do with Chamberlain. Lothian presumably was to communicate to Chamberlain the gist of his conversation with Dillon.

Looking backward there is undoubtedly foundation for Kennedy's belief that Hitler's attack could have been deflected to Russia. . . .³³²

Mr. Kennedy is known to have a good memory and it is highly improbable that his statements to Secretary Forrestal were entirely untrustworthy. Ambassador Bullitt was doing a lot of talking in 1939. In January, 1939, he had a long conversation with Count Jerzy Potocki, the Polish ambassador in Washington, and confided to him that the new foreign policy of the President "severely and unambiguously condemns totalitarian countries." The President had also decided that Britain and France must put an end to "any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries."³³³ In February, 1939, Bullitt talked with Jules Lukasiewicz, the Polish ambassador in Paris, and assured him that, in the event of another world war, the United States would soon intervene "on the side of France and Britain."³³⁴

President Eduard Beneš reveals in his memoirs that he and President Roosevelt discussed the prospect of a European war when he, Beneš, visited Hyde Park on May 29, 1939. Beneš earnestly insisted that the United States would have to enter such a war if Hitler were to be defeated.

These excerpts from the *Forrestal Diaries*, and from the dispatches of the Polish ambassadors in Washington and in Paris, afford a clear indication of the fact that President Roosevelt, through Bullitt, was exerting steady pressure upon Britain and France to stand up boldly to Nazi Germany. When this policy led to a war in which Nazi armed forces easily crushed French resistance, it is easy now to understand the poignancy of Premier Reynaud's pleas in 1940 to Roosevelt for prompt assistance. He and Daladier had taken the assurance of Bullitt seriously and the hysterical tone of Reynaud's repeated wires to the White House indicates a feeling of betrayal. From the battered walls of Warsaw there were loud murmurs about broken British promises. When

their muted echoes reached London, Neville Chamberlain must have remembered the "constant needling from Washington" in favor of a more resolute stand against Hitler, and Joseph Kennedy must have had reluctant recollections of the many occasions when the President "kept telling him to put some iron up Chamberlain's backside." Germany had been baited into a war with Britain and France when she would have preferred a conflict with Russia over the Ukraine. Chamberlain got plenty of iron up his backside, but it was Nazi hot metal that seared him and all Britain and helped to break into bits a proud empire that all the King's horses and all the King's men can never put together again.

There would seem to be only one logical explanation for Roosevelt's insistence on peace at the time of Munich and his pressure for an Anglo-French-Polish stand which he knew meant war in 1939, namely, that he did not want any war to start in Europe which might terminate so rapidly that the United States could not enter it. In September, 1938, the French, British, Russian, and Czech armies could have faced Hitler and might have defeated him rather rapidly. By summer, 1939, the situation had drastically changed. Russia became aligned with Germany and the Czech Army had been immobilized. War, in 1939, might stretch on indefinitely and afford Roosevelt ample time to involve the United States. No one at the time expected Hitler to crush France and England as quickly and easily as he did. Indeed, but for Hitler's stupidity in playing soft with Britain in 1940, the war would probably have ended so rapidly in German victory that Mr. Roosevelt could not have found his way into the conflict.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 2

1. Oscar Cargill, *Intellectual America: Ideas on the March* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), p. 504.
2. The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed

- in full in *Foreign Relations*, 1918, Supplement I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-81, 382-83, 425, 468-69.
3. Paul Birdsall, *Versailles Twenty Years After* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., 1941), pp. 35-36.
 4. David Lloyd George, *Memoirs of the Peace Conference* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1939), I, 306-9.
 5. Harold Nicolson, *Peacemaking, 1919* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1939), p. 18.
 6. Charles Seymour (ed.), *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928), IV, 343.
 7. Philip M. Burnett, *Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), I, 63-64; Colonel E. M. House and Charles Seymour (eds.), *What Really Happened at Paris* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), pp. 271-72.
 8. Burnett, *op. cit.*, p. 69.
 9. *Ibid.*, pp. 832-33.
 10. Birdsall, *op. cit.*, p. 258.
 11. Thomas A. Bailey, *Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), p. 240.
 12. Thorstein Veblen, *An Inquiry Into the Nature of Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1917), p. 261.
 13. Edwyn Bevan, *The Method in the Madness* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1917), pp. 305-6.
 14. Arthur P. Scott, "George Louis Beer" in the *Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography*; edited by W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), p. 315.
 15. *Ibid.*, p. 319.
 16. George L. Beer, *African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference*; edited by Louis H. Gray (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1923), pp. 58-60.
 17. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 163.
 18. Harry R. Rudin, *Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914; a Case Study in Modern Imperialism* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419.
 19. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 167.
 20. It is significant that most of Professor Lord's colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was "excessive." Birdsall, *op. cit.*, p. 178. See also David Hunter Miller, *My Diary at the Conference of Paris* (21 vols.; privately printed by the Appeal Publishing Company, 1924-1928), I, 289.
 21. Ray S. Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1922), III, 37-38.
 22. Miller, *op. cit.*, IV, 224-26.
 23. Seymour (ed.), *op. cit.*, IV, 334-35.
 24. Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, II, 637-42.
 25. René Martel, *The Eastern Frontiers of Germany* (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd., 1930), pp. 49-50.

26. William H. Dawson, *Germany Under the Treaty* (London: Longmans, Green & Company, 1933), pp. 149-52.
27. Gustav Stresemann: *His Diaries, Letters and Papers*; edited and translated by Eric Sutton (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1935-37), II, 503.
28. Casimir Smogerzewski, "Poland: Free, Peaceful, Strong," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1935. At this time Bruening was holding the office of Chancellor.
29. *Documents on International Affairs, 1934*; edited by John W. Wheeler-Bennett (New York: Oxford University Press, 1935), p. 424.
30. M. S. Wertheimer, "The Nazification of Danzig," *Foreign Policy Reports*, June 1, 1936.
31. Miller, *op. cit.*, IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52.
32. E. Alexander Powell, *Thunder Over Europe* (New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1931), p. 62.
33. Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-9. See also I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, *The Peace Settlement and the German Polish Borderlands* (London: Oxford University Press, 1936).
34. Powell, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
35. Baker, *op. cit.*, III, 482-84. Apparently Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, *Henry White: Thirty Years of American Diplomacy* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1930), p. 423.
36. In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, *The International Experiment of Upper Silesia* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany, 479,359 for Poland.
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38. Dawson, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-9.
39. Sir Robert Donald, *The Polish Corridor and the Consequences* (London: Thornton Butterworth, Ltd., 1929), pp. 197-98. See also Sarah Wambaugh, *Plebiscites Since the World War* (Washington, D. C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933); W. J. Rose, *The Drama of Upper Silesia* (Battleboro, Vt.: Stephen Daye Press, 1936); Colonel Graham S. Hutchinson, *Silesia Revisited, 1929* (London: Simpkin, Marshall, Hamilton, Kent & Co., Ltd., 1930).
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41. Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, *The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), I, 254-55.
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43. Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives.
44. Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives.
45. Dawson, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
46. Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 372. See also Herbert Hoover, "The Economic Administration During the Armistice," in *What Really Happened at Paris*, pp. 348-69.

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49. *Ibid.*, pp. 98-100.
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52. R. D. Murphy to the Secretary of State, January 5, 1924. 862.4016/12, MS, National Archives.
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55. Mr. Wadsworth to Secretary Hughes, Paris, May 16, 1923. 462.00R-294/210, MS, National Archives.
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57. *Foreign Relations*, 1923, II, 180.
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95. Secretary Hull to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham), May 8, 1933, *ibid.*, pp. 130-31.
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155. Robert G. Woolbert, "Italy in Abyssinia," *Foreign Affairs*, XIII (October, 1935), 449-508.
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185. Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 25, 1935. 765.84/1380, MS, Department of State.
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207. Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, March 11, 1936. 740.0011, Locarno Mutual Guarantee/412, MS, Department of State.
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228. October 8, 1937.
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230. October 8, 1937.
231. October 7, 1937.
232. October 16, 1937.
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 238. Conversation between Lord Halifax and Chancellor Hitler, November 19, 1937, *ibid.*, pp. 55-56.
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 303. Department of State, *Press Releases*, April 15, 1939, XX, 294-96.
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314. Henderson, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-70.
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322. President Roosevelt to Chancellor Hitler, August 24, 1939; President Roosevelt to President Mósicki, of Poland, August 24, 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 477-79.
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332. *The Forrestal Diaries*, edited by Walter Millis and E. S. Duffield (New York: Vanguard Press, 1951), pp. 121-22.
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334. Ambassador Jules Lukaszewicz to the Polish Foreign Minister, Paris, February, 1939, *ibid.*, pp. 43-45.

3

ROOSEVELT IS FRUSTRATED IN EUROPE

by

FREDERIC R. SANBORN

No matter how well we are supported by neutrality legislation, we must remember that no laws can be provided to cover every contingency, for it is impossible to imagine how every future event may shape itself. In spite of every possible forethought, international relations involve of necessity a vast uncharted area. In that area safe sailing will depend on the knowledge and the experience and the wisdom of those who direct our foreign policy. Peace will depend on their day-to-day decisions.

At this late date, with the wisdom which is so easy after the event and so difficult before the event, we find it possible to trace the tragic series of small decisions which led Europe into the Great War in 1914 and eventually engulfed us and many other nations.

We can keep out of war if those who watch and decide have a sufficiently detailed understanding of international affairs to make certain that the small decisions of each day do not lead toward war, and if, at the same time, they possess the courage to say "No" to those who selfishly or unwisely would let us go to war.

—FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, speech at Chautauqua, New York, August 14, 1936.

Governments . . . do not always take rational decisions. Sometimes they take mad decisions, or one set of people get control who compel all others to obey and aid them in folly.

—WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 603

Frederic R. Sanborn was born on February 14, 1899. He received the A.B. degree with high honors from Columbia University in 1919. Two years later he was awarded the degree of A.M., with a major in international law and diplomacy, by Columbia University, and the degree of LL.B. by the Columbia University Law School in the same year. While at Columbia, he studied international law and diplomacy under the leading American authority in the field, John Bassett Moore. He then went to England for further study at Oxford University, where he specialized in legal history and international law under the guidance of the eminent legal historian, Sir William Holdsworth. He received his Ph.D. degree in law from Oxford in 1924. Even before he finished his legal studies at Oxford he was awarded a Carnegie Fellowship in International Law in 1923 for further study and research at the Sorbonne. But he declined this grant in order to return to New York and establish his law practice. He is now a member of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Skidmore, one of the oldest law firms in New York City.

In addition to his increasingly important law practice, Dr. Sanborn taught law in the postgraduate department of the Brooklyn Law School of St. Lawrence University from 1927 to 1938, and international law in the postgraduate department of St. John's University School of Law from 1928 to 1930.

Dr. Sanborn's interest in international law and diplomacy led him to prepare his book on the *Origins of the Early English Maritime and Commercial Law*, sponsored by the American Historical Association and published by The Century Company in 1930, and his important analytical volume, *Design for War; A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941*, published by the Devin-Adair Company in 1951. The latter is one of the most important books yet to appear on the diplomacy which led the United States into war in December, 1941. It is characterized by both careful scholarship and commendable restraint in statements and generalizations. It will remain one of the impressive monuments of American historiography following the second World War.

I. INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS AND HYPOTHESES: THE ABANDONMENT OF AMERICAN NEUTRALITY

It is difficult to rise from a contemplative study of the history of American power politics during the last fifteen years without experiencing a profound feeling of melancholy. When one has meditated upon the myriads of deaths, the human suffering, the destruction, the waste—human, economic, and of opportunity—which have ensued from the decisions erroneously made by those who were in power during those tragic years, and when one contemplates the bleak vistas which now lie before all of us as the remorseless consequence of those erroneous decisions, one is tempted to echo the epitome of the Roman emperors—*nihil non commiserunt stupri, saevitiae, impietatis*.

Mr. Roosevelt's share in making those decisions was considerable, and, so far as the people of the United States were concerned, it was preponderant. Many of Mr. Roosevelt's acts and negotiations were secret, sometimes so secret that even the Secretary of State was not informed about them,¹ and in consequence Mr. Roosevelt acted for the most part without consultation or counselling from others. His policies were therefore very largely personal, and his adulators were at least true in their aim when they praised him for the authorship of the policies which were nominally called American.

And so, similarly, now that the time has come to take an audit of the great balance sheet of history, the debits must stand largely against the same man to whom the credits were once awarded.

Largely, but not entirely, for a reason which requires some brief elaboration. Like almost every one else, Mr. Roosevelt was the child of his own times, and of the *Zeitgeist*. In consequence of this we

must refer to certain misdirected developments in the sphere of international law in the late twenties and in the thirties. A natural revulsion against war had followed the first World War, and this feeling was partly expressed in the Kellogg-Briand Treaty of Paris by which war was renounced by many nations as an instrument of national policy. The collateral concept of collective security found sincere advocates, and there developed along with it the concept of an aggressor nation. In this discussion space does not permit the elaborating upon or the criticizing of these concepts, but one must add that as their natural consequence it was urged by a considerable number of domestic writers and teachers that the traditional cornerstone of American foreign policy, the doctrine of neutrality, had now become obsolete; it was ignoble and should be abandoned in favor of collective warfare against an aggressor. Such views did not lack able criticism, but, notwithstanding, they prevailed in quantity, if not in quality, in certain academic and other spheres. They were the academic ancestors of what later was called interventionism, and it seems not unlikely that they contributed to weakening Mr. Roosevelt's waning belief in neutrality.

Notwithstanding these palliatory observations it still remains true that the credit or the blame for American power politics must remain largely with Mr. Roosevelt. As the years have passed by, and as the unfortunate results of his policies have become too visibly apparent either to be denied or concealed, the defenders of the wisdom of his policies have been compelled to shift over from unqualified praise to mildly critical apology. And in going over to the defensive there has been an interesting shift in the position of their battle lines.

Their first line of defense has always rested and still rests upon a foundation blended of faith, emotion, and hypothesis.

The justification of Mr. Roosevelt's admittedly unneutral policy toward Germany which was originally offered for public consumption was to claim the necessity of self-defense against an almost immediately anticipated attack. But when the immediately anticipated attack did not eventuate, a more satisfactory and more indefinite hypothesis became requisite. Some sincere but uninformed people have faith in the revised justification to this very day.

The revised hypothesis was amplified into a claim of the necessity of an anticipatory self-defense, and it had variant versions as propounded at different times. In one form the story ran that Hitlerite Germany was planning to attack the United States in a military way at some unspecified future date. In another variant the military attack was to be made by a conspiratorial combination of Fascist nations² after they had first conquered the rest of the world. In yet another variant the attack was not to be military at all, but rather a kind of economic strangulation of America by embargo or boycott.

The variants of this second justification were more useful, propagandawise, than was the first hypothesis. The new hypotheses were more indefinite; they ranged more widely in futurity, and they aroused more emotional response in those who believed in them on faith.

Looking as they did to a far more distant future these revised hypotheses were quite incapable of contemporaneous disproof. Consequently it was impossible for skeptics to contest them at the time of utterance, and therefore Mr. Roosevelt's intended course of action could not be prevented or hindered by any rational argument based upon known facts. Moreover there was always the happy chance, from Mr. Roosevelt's point of view, that even though such hypothetical justifications were not true when made, they might come true at some later date in consequence of his repeated unneutral and hostile activities.

With the passage of the years the texture of these widely propagandized fears is seen to be a shabby fustian. Tons and tons—quite literally—of the German archives, and of their top-secret plans, memoranda, and correspondence fell into the hands of the victors at the end of the war. These documents were winnowed and studied with care for months and months by dozens of investigators in a meticulous search for every shred of evidence which could be presented at the Nuremberg trials. After a lengthy and minute ransacking it transpired that nowhere in these papers was there to be found any evidence of any German plans to attack the United States. Quite to the contrary, the embarrassing fact developed from the secret papers that for many months prior to Pearl

Harbor Chancellor Hitler was doing all that he could to avoid conflict with the United States!

This incontrovertible fact has shaken the faith of some, although not all, of the true believers. The more rational amongst those whose faith in the old hypotheses has diminished have now evolved a new hypothesis, that America could not have stood by as a passive neutral, and let Britain, France, and much of Western Europe fall into the power of Nazi tyrants. This new hypothesis is emotionally seductive, like the abandoned hypotheses, and from the viewpoint of its propounders it has the merit of excessive oversimplification.

Merely in order to list a few of these oversimplifications, one might ask (1) To what extent did Mr. Roosevelt overurge Britain or France to adopt various courses of conduct which would tend to war? (2) To what extent did Mr. Roosevelt's own maladroit diplomacy contribute to avoidable participation in the war by certain countries? (3) Did Mr. Roosevelt have in mind only limited political objectives, which could have been more swiftly attained, such as the downfall of the Nazi government, or vaster objectives requiring a prolonged war, such as the total destruction of Germany? (4) Did not Mr. Roosevelt overestimate the danger to Western Europe to be anticipated from Fascist tyranny, while underestimating the potential menace of Communist tyranny? (5) In this connection, how accurate—or inaccurate—was Mr. Roosevelt's estimate of the probability of a conflict in the near future between tyrant and tyrant, Hitler versus Stalin, in which the evil power of both might have been sapped? Many similar questions will occur to the informed reader as he considers the shortcomings of the last hypothesis. But perhaps the most potent objection to this hypothesis is one which could be validly posed to the conduct of much of our power politics of recent years: Mr. Roosevelt's policy was based upon a supposed friendship, and not upon the national interest of America. In power politics there are no friendships; there are only interests. Much American disillusionment has arisen and will continue to arise from ignorance or disregard of such an elementary principle. George Washington said, in his Farewell Address to the people of the United States:

Observe good faith and justice towards all Nations; Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . .

In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The Nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. . . . The peace often . . . of Nations has been the victim.

. . . Sympathy for the favorite Nations, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. . . .

But Mr. Roosevelt, and also Mr. Hull,³ consistently violated these true and simple precepts which had been expressed for many decades in the traditional American policy of neutrality. Instead, Mr. Roosevelt elected to play the game of secret politics in our foreign affairs. "The wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its results."⁴ Judged by this canon Mr. Roosevelt's foreign policy was not successful, and if this much is acknowledged then even the latest apology of his defenders fails.

Indeed, one is tempted to ask, how could the traditional American policy of neutrality have produced results which could have been any worse?

In 1914 Mr. Wilson had appealed to all Americans for neutrality even in their personal thoughts, uttering ". . . a solemn word of warning . . . against that deepest, most subtle, most essential breach of neutrality which might spring out of partisanship, out of passionately taking sides."⁵ Whatever Mr. Wilson did later, his appeal was in the highest tradition of George Washington and of the established pattern of American diplomacy. Mr. Roosevelt

knew what neutrality was, "in the highest sense—not to help one fellow more than the other."⁶ But Mr. Roosevelt issued no Wilsonian appeal to the American people, perhaps because he felt that it was unnecessary. Many months later he acknowledged this fact: "There can be no question that the people of the United States in 1939 were determined to remain neutral in fact and in deed. . . ."⁷ Right up to Pearl Harbor this sentiment of the American people themselves did not change, as one of Mr. Roosevelt's recent apologists has acknowledged: ". . . It was the first war in American history in which the general disillusionment preceded the firing of the first shot. It has been called, from the American point of view, 'the most unpopular war in history.' . . ."⁸ And the apologist then offers his own brief theory as to why this feeling existed. It would seem more probable that the "general disillusionment" of which he speaks was due to quite different causes.

As a whole, the American people had never accepted the new scholastic theory of more or less "collective" warfare against an alleged aggressor. Perhaps the people's intuitive common sense had already suggested to them that in any future "collective" action the other nations would expect America to assume almost the entire burden involved. Perhaps they esteemed the wise advice of George Washington more highly than the new theory. But apart from such conjectures it is clear that they believed in our established policy of neutrality. Semantic propagandists have tried to belittle that doctrine by calling it what they hoped would be a smearing name—"isolationism." Name calling is not intelligent or rational and this device of propaganda did not deceive the majority of the American people who continued to be "isolationist" in their desire to remain neutral and to live in peace, as every poll of public opinion conclusively showed. Their "general disillusionment" was, in fact, due to their ultimate realization that Mr. Roosevelt in some unperceived way, and at some unknown time, had abandoned his professed policies of neutrality and peace and had secretly adopted a design for war.

The turning point is probably to be found in the "quarantine the aggressors" speech which Mr. Roosevelt delivered at Chicago on October 5, 1937.⁹ Prior to that time Mr. Roosevelt's public declara-

tions had been very clearly isolationist.¹⁰ After that time a change becomes apparent. But at the outset Mr. Roosevelt apparently contemplated only action which would have aided China against Japan,¹¹ rather than any intervention in Europe.

Yet the one ultimately led to the other. In the aftermath of the Chicago speech Mr. Roosevelt found himself in closer touch with high British personalities,¹² and these relationships continued to develop rather quickly, with the British naturally being more interested in the affairs of Europe, into a policy of active although unacknowledged co-operation with Britain which was in effect before January, 1938.¹³ It was in December, 1937, that Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll, then director of the Navy's War Plans Division, was sent to Britain by Mr. Roosevelt to discuss possible Anglo-American co-operation in case of war.¹⁴ Out of these meetings some kind of an understanding or agreement developed. It was also in 1937 that the studies were commenced for the highly secret Industrial Mobilization Plan,¹⁵ which contemplated that no less than twenty thousand factories should be earmarked for the production of war materials. Space hardly permits a detailed narration of the further steps which commenced in 1938 and looked toward the preparation in quantities of the necessary war materials. Likewise, only brief mention can be made of Mr. Roosevelt's political maneuvers, ultimately successful, but only by a narrow margin,¹⁶ to oppose Congressman Louis Ludlow's proposal that there should be a national referendum vote as a prerequisite to a declaration of war.

Immediately after the German annexation of Austria, Mr. Hull¹⁷ made a speech on March 17, 1938, in which he advocated "collaboration" along "parallel lines" in order to prevent the spread of the "contagious scourge of treaty breaking and armed violence." These propaganda efforts were continued during the spring and summer by Mr. Roosevelt and by others. By April, 1938, Mr. Emil Ludwig, whose biography of Mr. Roosevelt was almost official, knew enough about his plans to be able to state that, if there was a war in Europe, America "would probably supply the European democracies with everything except troops."¹⁸

In late June, 1938, Mr. Roosevelt publicly announced¹⁹ that the Navy, long concentrated in the Pacific, would in due course be

concentrated in the Atlantic. In August secret negotiations, which have never been sufficiently investigated, were commenced with British representatives. For public consumption it was stated on November 17, 1938, that only trade agreements were being signed, but there were many hints cast out of underlying and unrevealed political commitments.²⁰ It seems certain that by that time Mr. Roosevelt and his associates were already secretly deep in the power politics of Europe, and a showdown had come earlier than they had anticipated, because of the events which culminated at Munich on September 30, 1938.

In early August even minor British officials knew that "at present Great Britain can count on close co-operation with [the] United States."²¹ The American naval attaché at Lisbon, said to be a personal friend of Mr. Roosevelt, stated at that time that the possibilities for speedy aid to Great Britain and France were being studied in America, and that this aid would include many airplanes.²² Evidently there had been some diplomatic leakage as to this information, because on September 9, 1938, Mr. Roosevelt found it necessary to deny that the United States was allied with European powers in a stop-Hitler movement.²³ It is interesting to speculate upon his reasons for omitting his denial from his published papers at a later date.

II. ROOSEVELT AND MUNICH

And now it becomes necessary to narrate the melancholy story of Munich. Even among historians it does not seem to be generally known that Mr. Roosevelt must bear a portion of the responsibility which has been attributed entirely but erroneously to Mr. Chamberlain. When the summer of 1938 began, Chancellor Hitler was preparing to press new demands upon Czechoslovakia, but he was careful to note that he intended to avoid war: "However, I will

decide to take action against Czechoslovakia only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will not march and therefore England will not intervene."²⁴ As the situation became intensified in late August, Mr. Churchill, although not in office, wrote to Lord Halifax²⁵ and suggested that Britain, France, and Russia should address a joint note to Germany intimating that an invasion of Czechoslovakia "would raise capital issues for all three powers." And Mr. Churchill also advised that Mr. Roosevelt should be induced "to do his utmost" in approaching Chancellor Hitler only, and in urging upon him a friendly settlement. In the outcome, the only deviation from Mr. Churchill's plan was in its last item.

As September lengthened the situation became more acute, but on the whole the tendency was for Britain, France, and Russia to stand more firmly together. On September 12, 1938, Foreign Minister Bonnet repeated the latter part of Mr. Churchill's suggestions, and urged that Ambassador Wilson at Berlin be instructed to make representations to Germany only.²⁶ Mr. Chamberlain had gone to see the German Chancellor on September 15 at Berchtesgaden and again on September 22 at Godesberg, but his tendency, and that of the British cabinet, toward appeasement after the first interview was checked by the more exorbitant demands made at the second meeting.

On the night of September 23, 1938, general mobilization was ordered in Czechoslovakia, and the next day Prague informed London that the German demands were absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable. On September 24 Ambassador Kennedy telephoned from London to Mr. Hull. He reported that while the British cabinet was split, some of its members were of the opinion that Britain would have to fight.²⁷ On September 25 the American Minister to Prague telegraphed Mr. Hull a request from President Beneš to Mr. Roosevelt that he should urge Britain and France not to desert Czechoslovakia.²⁸ Meanwhile France was at last preparing to perform its treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia, and partial mobilization was ordered.²⁹ Similarly Britain, on September 26, had announced its decision to assist France if France would stand by Czechoslovakia, and the mobilization of the British fleet was

ordered on September 27 for the following day. Russia notified Prague³⁰ that she would honor the obligations of the 1935 treaty, and arranged with Rumania (which, with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, formed the Little Entente) for the passage of her troops. Russia had already delivered three hundred war planes to Czechoslovakia,³¹ and in addition several squadrons of Soviet planes were on the Czechoslovak airfields.³² In consequence Lord Halifax, still on September 26, 1938, issued this statement: "If, in spite of the efforts made by the British Prime Minister, a German attack is made upon Czechoslovakia, the immediate result must be that France will be bound to come to her assistance, and Great Britain and Russia will certainly stand by France."³³

Here was a momentary climax of power. It was a turning point of history, for there was bitter controversy in the opposite camp. The German people were at this moment, September 27, 1938, devoid of enthusiasm either for Chancellor Hitler or for the prospective conflict.³⁴ The German generals were convinced that Germany would be defeated and were preparing a *Putsch*³⁵ to depose Chancellor Hitler. The Chancellor wavered and, on the night of the twenty-seventh/twenty-eighth, the German radio broadcast an official denial that Germany intended to mobilize. Later, on the morning of the twenty-eighth, a similar statement was issued by the official German news agency.³⁶ The era of appeasement had apparently ended, and it seemed as if Great Britain, France, Czechoslovakia, and Russia had called Chancellor Hitler's bluff just in the nick of time.

At this critical moment Mr. Roosevelt intervened and wrecked the entire situation. For some time he had been eager "to make personal appeals to the heads of the European Governments concerned." There had been a conflict in the State Department: "Welles kept pushing the President on, while I [Mr. Hull] kept advising him to go slow."³⁷ Mr. Roosevelt decided to go ahead, and on September 26, 1938, he sent identical messages not only to Chancellor Hitler, but also to the President of Czechoslovakia, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and to the Premier of France, asking that the negotiations might continue to settle the questions at issue, and that war might be avoided. The inner meaning of Mr.

Roosevelt's intervention could not have been misunderstood by any informed person. Mr. Roosevelt had earlier been requested to apply his pressure only against Germany, but now he was applying it against Germany's opponents too. It was thus clear that Mr. Roosevelt was not only opposing their military preparations to go to war against Germany: he was also lending the support of his influence to those who, in the divided counsels of the British and French governments, were opposed to war—to those who have since been called the appeasers.

After all, there was nothing to negotiate except Chancellor Hitler's demand for Czechoslovakian territory, for no country was then demanding any territory from Germany. The military preparations of Czechoslovakia, which Mr. Roosevelt's message equated with those of Germany, were purely defensive, so that this was hardly quarantining the aggressor.

Mr. Roosevelt possessed the power as President to declare American neutrality, and by embargoing the shipment of munitions of war to both belligerents to deny them the aid of America's vast productive and financial power. Even if Britain and France had not been divided in their counsels they would hardly have dared to antagonize Mr. Roosevelt under such critical circumstances. Quite unexpectedly the appeasers found themselves in the drivers' seat, and Chancellor Hitler's bluff gained an unanticipated supporter. Messrs. Chamberlain, Daladier, and Beneš cabled back "their complete accord with the President's views and their willingness to negotiate for peace" on September 26, 1938.³⁸ Mr. Chamberlain's request to broadcast a message—no doubt of explanation—to the American people on the following night, September 27, 1938 was denied by Mr. Roosevelt.³⁹

Nor was this all. Chancellor Hitler's reply, which was received in America on the night of September 26, was inconclusive. Consequently, Mr. Roosevelt thought it expedient to find additional support for his proposal. Circular instructions were therefore sent on September 27 to American diplomats in other countries, requesting them to ask the governments to which they were accredited "to send comparable appeals to Germany and Czechoslovakia"⁴⁰ (emphasis supplied); nineteen other governments

(seventeen being in Latin America) obliged. Also on September 27 Mr. Roosevelt besought Premier Mussolini to urge the use of negotiations, and to Chancellor Hitler Mr. Roosevelt sent a further message urging that a conference be called. So the stage was inescapably set for Munich by Mr. Roosevelt's personal actions and maneuvers, and Mr. Chamberlain received a full award of general opprobrium in which, if justified, Mr. Roosevelt deserved a considerable share.

Mr. Roosevelt's reasons for this grievous blunder must remain conjectural until all of the secret diplomatic discussions and approaches are revealed. Meanwhile we have some clues, all of which point in the same direction, namely, that Mr. Roosevelt did not regard Munich as any final settlement with Hitler but believed that it might lead to war at no distant period. Hence, he continued his plans for a vast armament program, with emphasis on airplanes, which would help to provide Britain and France with the sinews of war and make the United States ready for possible involvement in the impending struggle.

Colonel Charles Lindbergh had reported before September 24, 1938, both to our State Department and to the British, that Germany was easily capable of combating the combined air force of all other European countries.⁴¹ Ambassador Kennedy had not been too confident as to whether the French and the British were in good shape to fight.⁴² Most revealing is the account given by General Arnold.⁴³ On September 28, 1938, Mr. Roosevelt called a meeting, which "was plainly a bolt from the blue," to discuss aircraft production and air power in general. Mr. Roosevelt

came straight out for air power. Airplanes—now—and lots of them! . . . A new regiment of field artillery . . . he said sharply, would not scare Hitler one blankety-blank-blank bit! What he wanted was airplanes! Airplanes were the war implements that *would* have an influence on Hitler's activities!

The total air power of Britain, France, Germany, and Italy was estimated, and Mr. Roosevelt said that he wanted to create the capacity to manufacture 20,000 military planes a year, with the ac-

tual production of 10,000 planes (the approximate estimated combined total strength of Germany and Italy) a year as the immediate goal. The tremendous expansion of the Air Corps made General Arnold feel that it had "achieved its Magna Carta." It was not wholly unexpected to him; about a fortnight earlier Mr. Roosevelt had sent Mr. Hopkins to make a secret survey of our capacity to build military aircraft because Mr. Roosevelt "was sure then that we were going to get into war and he believed that air power would win it."⁴⁴ As something of a by-product of this activity General Marshall was secretly supplied with diverted relief funds in order to procure machinery to manufacture ammunition.⁴⁵

Another important clue is that in 1940 Mr. Kennedy delivered a speech in which he stated that "if Mr. Chamberlain had had five thousand first-line planes at home when he conferred at Munich we would have truly seen 'peace in our time.'"⁴⁶

All of this procedure makes it evident that Mr. Roosevelt did not believe that the Munich settlement meant permanent peace or even "peace in our time," but apparently was convinced that it would lead to war in the not distant future.

All of these clues lead in the same direction, and unless and until they are superseded by better evidence their implication would seem clear. Mr. Roosevelt apparently believed, in the autumn of 1938, that the air power of Britain and France was dangerously insufficient, and that those nations ought not to assume the risks of war with Germany at that time. In consequence he intervened at a critical moment in a delicate and almost balanced situation. The result of his intervention was tantamount to compelling the Allies to agree to grant Chancellor Hitler's demands, instead of resisting them by war.

Mr. Roosevelt's intervention was therefore equivalent in its result to appeasement, so that, in the phraseology current in those times, Mr. Roosevelt was, in effect, the most decisive appeaser.*

*EDITOR'S NOTE.—As is evident from the closing paragraphs of Professor Tansill's preceding chapter, Dr. Sanborn's interpretation of President Roosevelt's motives for appeasement in the Munich crisis is open to serious challenge. To imply that Mr. Roosevelt could have believed that France and Britain were in better condition to battle against Hitler in August, 1939, than in September, 1938, is veritably to charge him with incredible ignorance, if not sheer mental

III. THE AFTERMATH OF MUNICH

This intervention was, of course, not neutrality. It was also a resounding defeat in the sphere of power politics, and Mr. Roosevelt was never a man to forgive or forget such a defeat. It was not long before he began to attempt to move forward once more against Chancellor Hitler.

By mid-November, 1938, both the American ambassador to Germany and the German ambassador to the United States had been

defect. With the Russian and Czech armies ready to aid France and Britain in September, 1938, it is unthinkable that an attack by these four powers on Germany in the fall of 1938 would not have resulted in a quick and crushing defeat of Germany. As Langer and Gleason point out, as late as September, 1939, Hitler had available for the attack on Poland only three partly mechanized divisions and not one fully motorized division. One liberal journalist, much in personal favor with Mr. Roosevelt in 1938, even ventured the opinion at the time of Munich that the Czech army alone could defeat Hitler. Now we know that France and Britain, combined, had more tanks and war planes than Hitler possessed in September, 1938. Mr. Roosevelt must have known this at the time unless guilty of near-criminal neglect and incompetence.

The only explanation for Mr. Roosevelt's intervention in the Munich episode which would seem to accord with facts, logic, and reason is that he felt that a military attack on Hitler in September, 1938, would lead to so rapid a termination of the war (in the defeat of Germany) that he would not have time to involve this country in the great conflict. By the end of August, 1939, with the Czech army immobilized and Russia aligned with Germany, it looked like a long war, well suited to Mr. Roosevelt's interventionist program. We now know that the powerful German generals opposed to Hitler had given top-level British statesmen and diplomats definite and reliable information before the Munich crisis that an army revolt would take place in Germany against Hitler if he risked war in the autumn of 1938.

Having submitted this rejoinder, the editor re-emphasizes his respect for Dr. Sanborn as a conscientious and learned scholar. His views should be stated without restraint and are entitled to respect. In any event, Dr. Sanborn, Professor Tansill, and the editor are in full agreement upon the main point, namely, that President Roosevelt exercised a decisive influence in leading Britain and France to appease rather than forcibly to resist Hitler at the time of the Munich crisis.

recalled. The feelings of officials in Washington were rising portentously high against Germany: it was like 1916-17.⁴⁷ Ambassadors Bullitt, Kennedy, and Phillips were also brought back from their posts for post-mortem conferences, and it was secretly agreed that the time had come to stop Germany and to assist Britain and France.⁴⁸ Mr. Morgenthau now managed to intrude himself into the military aircraft production program and commenced making the arrangements to give away our newest aircraft to foreign countries. Early in December, 1938, a French mission came secretly to the United States in order to inspect our newest attack bomber, and Mr. Morgenthau arranged for the necessary clearances.⁴⁹

The secrets of power politics are rarely hidden for long from the insiders. It is only the people themselves who are not permitted to know what is being secretly planned and what is secretly done. Word of the American plans no doubt percolated through to Premier Mussolini in due course, and at the commencement of 1939 his thinking changed; he then considered that a clash with the Western democracies was inevitable, and he decided to try to transform the Anti-Comintern agreement into an alliance.⁵⁰ The "American lack of political sense"⁵¹ in international affairs may well have affected that fateful decision.

In a chapter limited by space we cannot pause to trace the development of Mr. Roosevelt's propaganda in his "methods short of war" annual message to the Congress on January 4, 1939, or in his special message on defense in early January, 1939. But the trend of his thinking at this time is clear. On January 23, 1939, a bomber crashed and an injured member of the French mission was pulled from the flaming wreck.⁵² This suddenly revealed to the American public the presence of secret military missions. In the ensuing furore Mr. Roosevelt called the Senate Military Affairs Committee to the White House, swore them to secrecy, and said that our frontier in the battle of the democracies against Fascism was on the Rhine,⁵³ or (according to another version) in France.⁵⁴ This, too, leaked, and the furore became greater.

The percipient reader will have noted already that while Mr. Roosevelt referred to Fascism he made no mention of the peril of Communism. That obvious omission was contemporaneously

noted by the Polish ambassador to the United States in a dispatch which showed brilliant insight upon that particular topic. On January 16, 1939, the Polish ambassador reported to Warsaw that he had had a long talk with Ambassador Bullitt, who was about to return to his post in Paris. Mr. Bullitt stated that Mr. Roosevelt's policies included rearmament "at an accelerated speed"; "that France and Britain must put [an] end to any sort of compromise with the totalitarian countries," and that "They have the moral assurance that the United States will leave the policy of isolation and be prepared to intervene actively on the side of Britain and France in case of war. America is ready to place its whole wealth of money and raw materials at their disposal."⁵⁵

Several weeks later the Polish ambassador to France reported as to another conversation with Mr. Bullitt, from which he concluded ". . . that the policy of President Roosevelt will henceforth take the course of supporting France's resistance, to check German-Italian pressure, and to weaken British compromise tendencies."⁵⁶

On March 14, 1939, Chancellor Hitler had called in the Czechoslovak President and Foreign Minister and had forced them to agree to a German protectorate and to occupation by German troops. This came as a great surprise: even Mussolini did not know it had been planned. It left him feeling flat-footed and ridiculous,⁵⁷ and in consequence he determined to seize Albania. Apparently American diplomats were unaware of this strained relationship between Hitler and Mussolini, and instead of capitalizing upon such divergencies they maladroitly brought the parties together by scolding messages⁵⁸ and by attempts to constitute a "democratic bloc."⁵⁹

From Paris Mr. Bullitt wrote to Mr. Roosevelt on March 23, 1939,⁶⁰ urging that "some nation in Europe" should stand up to Germany "quickly," and the next day he had a conversation with the Polish ambassador. The Pole expressed the opinion, among others, that British foreign policy was ". . . not only concerned with the defense of these states which find themselves menaced by the new methods of German policy, but also with an ideological conflict with Hitlerism, and that the ultimate aim in the pursuit of its actions is not peace but to bring about the downfall of Ger-

many."⁶¹ The Pole also objected that neither Britain nor France were taking sufficiently firm military measures at that time, and that in consequence their proposals to Poland were highly dangerous to that country. Mr. Bullitt then inquired whether Poland "would accept a common alliance in the event that France and England proposed it." The Polish ambassador replied guardedly and in substance that it would depend upon how much power Britain was prepared to use to back up the guarantee.

Mr. Bullitt then telephoned Mr. Kennedy at London on March 25, 1939,⁶² and instructed him to call on Mr. Chamberlain and repeat the conversation. Ambassador Kennedy did so on March 26, 1939,⁶³ and telephoned his report to Mr. Bullitt at Paris. The Polish ambassador at Paris expressed doubt as to how far Britain would go and expressed to Mr. Bullitt the ". . . hope that the United States possesses means by which it can exercise efficacious pressure on England. He added that he would seriously consider assembling these means." Someone—we may assume that it was Mr. Bullitt—was telephoning to Mr. Roosevelt at this time,⁶⁴ and the upshot of all this maneuvering was that, on March 31, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain stated to the House of Commons that Great Britain and France would fight if Germany invaded Poland. Some light is cast upon this decision by the contemporary report of the Polish ambassador in London as to Mr. Kennedy's conversation with Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Kennedy, it was said, ". . . emphasized that America's sympathies for England in case of a conflict would depend to a great extent upon the determination with which England would take care of European states threatened by Germany."⁶⁵

Meanwhile, in late March, Lord Halifax had approached Mr. Kennedy, saying that the British commitments in Europe were so substantial that a previous promise made to Australia to send a fleet to Singapore could not be kept;⁶⁶ would America oblige? Ambassador Bullitt supported this request from France on April 11, 1939, stating that France would refuse to join Britain in taking action to resist Germany if the British Mediterranean Fleet was sent to Singapore.⁶⁷ Mr. Roosevelt took the requested prompt action; on April 15, 1939, the American fleet was ordered into the Pacific.⁶⁸

On May 17, 1939, Ambassador Phillips delivered a warning to Count Ciano, stressing one point, ". . . that the American people . . . intend unanimously to concern themselves in European affairs, and it would be folly to think that they would remain aloof in the event of a conflict."⁶⁹ Ambassador Davies is supposed to have made a somewhat comparable assertion to Stalin,⁷⁰ but the limited scope of this chapter forbids any attempt to trace the involved paths of the tortuous negotiations conducted almost simultaneously by Soviet Russia with both Britain and Germany, which eventuated in the public and secret treaties of August 23, 1939, between Germany and Russia, and which were the immediate prelude to the outbreak of the second World War.

Meanwhile, in the United States, Mr. Roosevelt was unsuccessfully attempting to abolish the restraints which the Neutrality Act laid on him. King George VI and Queen Elizabeth had visited him in early June, 1939, but the nature of the conversations which were held at that time are still secret. That Mr. Roosevelt's purposes had not changed is shown by the despairing and prophetic summary which Professor Raymond Moley wrote during the summer of 1939, in the course of which he observed that the administration was "up to its neck in the game of power politics," and he also stated that "the evidence has all pointed to our active and tireless participation in the game . . ."⁷¹

At a much later date it was revealed that during the summer of 1939 Mr. Bullitt was frequently urging upon Mr. Roosevelt the opinion that the Germans would not fight about Poland if they were faced down.⁷² Mr. Roosevelt asked Mr. Clarence Dillon to get in secret touch with the British, to urge that Mr. Chamberlain should have greater firmness in dealing with Germany, and Mr. Dillon spoke to this effect to Lord Lothian. Mr. Roosevelt also delivered similar messages to Mr. Kennedy over the transatlantic telephone during the summer of 1939. Mr. Kennedy's view was that the British did not have enough to fight with, and that any conflict between Germany and Britain was superfluous because Germany would later attack Soviet Russia. And Mr. Kennedy later reported that Mr. Chamberlain had said that America and the world Jews had forced Britain into the war.

Indeed, as it has a bearing upon Mr. Roosevelt's aggressive purposes, it should be noted that at a secret conference at Tokyo on May 23, 1939, between Baron Hiranuma and Mr. Eugene H. Doo-man, the counselor of the American Embassy, the Japanese Prime Minister suggested that he might sound out Germany and Italy, if Mr. Roosevelt was prepared to approach Britain and France, in order to hold a conference to try to solve the troubles of Europe.⁷³ Mr. Hull viewed this approach as "amazing," and brought it to Mr. Roosevelt's personal attention.⁷⁴ But a reply was delayed for the better part of three months, by which time circumstances had changed, and a great opportunity which had been neglected was wasted—or evaded.

American preparations for war were proceeding silently and secretly. On June 23, 1939, a secret barter agreement was made with Britain;⁷⁵ "a good deal of money" was spent to buy various war materials;⁷⁶ nineteen new merchant ships were launched by August 9; contracts were about to be let for one hundred more;⁷⁷ and on August 10 a War Resources Board was created.⁷⁸

IV. AMERICAN POLICY AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The diplomatic confusion and maneuverings which preceded the outbreak of the second World War can only be touched upon briefly here. But this much should be pointed out. The Russo-German treaties of August 23, 1939, were not only unpopular in Europe; they met with a hostile Japanese response, and Italy at the last moment refused to fight,⁷⁹ so that on August 25 Chancellor Hitler cancelled the mobilization orders.⁸⁰ It therefore seems to be a legitimate hypothesis to suppose that if American diplomacy had previously been more friendly and affirmative toward Japan and toward Italy, and if the German generals and others who were so

earnestly opposed to the Chancellor had been encouraged and supported, the focusing of all this combined strength and opposition might then have led to his immediate downfall. Instead, as we all know, the final result of this political confusion and diplomatic ineptitude was war, after the failure of sincere last-minute Italian efforts to reach a peaceful settlement.⁸¹ Two days after the invasion of Poland, Britain declared war on Germany, and France reluctantly followed the British lead a few hours later.

Very shortly thereafter Mr. Roosevelt decided to ignore the regular procedure of transmitting diplomatic communications through ambassadors and Secretaries of State. Mr. Churchill has stated that on September 11, 1939, Mr. Roosevelt had requested him to send him personal sealed communications through the diplomatic pouches,⁸² and that there were about two thousand,⁸³ or seventeen hundred,⁸⁴ of these exchanges. The most important business between Britain and America was ultimately transacted through this personal and secret correspondence, and almost all of it has been kept secret to this day.

Meanwhile Mr. Roosevelt held press conferences, made a fireside chat to the nation, and issued various proclamations, including a neutrality proclamation. At all times his protestations of a desire to keep America at peace were strong and profuse. This was the appearance; the reality was otherwise.

A deceitfully named "neutrality patrol" of American waters was initiated by or before September 22, 1939,⁸⁵ but it was not long before American naval vessels were unneutrally directing and escorting British warships to capture German prizes.⁸⁶ Wholly contrary to the established rules of international law a so-called neutral zone was extended anywhere from three hundred to one thousand miles out to sea⁸⁷ in order to benefit Britain against Germany. Later, on October 18, 1939, the submarines of all the belligerents, except Russia, were forbidden to enter American ports, except in case of *force majeure*.⁸⁸

Secret preparations were made for American entry into the war.⁸⁹ By necessary implication Mr. Roosevelt had lost some of his earlier faith in the overwhelming effect of air power, because plans for the

draft were being worked on in September, and by early October they were essentially in the form in which they were enacted about a year later.⁹⁰ Wartime taxation was being studied, as was some form of war risk insurance.

Meanwhile Soviet Russia joined in the attack on Poland, and Polish resistance collapsed. Foreign diplomats thought that peace was quite possible, but Mr. Roosevelt was strongly opposed to a negotiated peace.⁹¹ The German attempt to make peace failed, and the period of the "phony" war began.

Mr. Roosevelt had called a special session of Congress for September 21, 1939, in order to amend the Neutrality Act,⁹² and, after assuring the country that it was "a shameless and dishonest fake" to assert that any "person in any responsible place . . . in Washington . . . has ever suggested in any shape, manner or form the remotest possibility of sending the boys of American mothers to fight on the battlefields of Europe," and that the United States "is neutral and does not intend to get involved in war,"⁹³ he managed to get the cash-and-carry amendments through on November 3, 1939.⁹⁴ British and French purchasing commissions were already here, awaiting the passage of the amendments in order to open up. In Mr. Morgenthau's opinion⁹⁵ they did not arm speedily enough, but in about a year it transpired that they had ordered arms far in excess of their capacity to pay for them.

We must hasten over the German surrender of the three little Baltic states to Russia at the end of September, 1939, and the invasion of Finland on November 29, 1939. Likewise space limitations forbid more than a passing reference to Mr. Myron C. Taylor's mission to the Vatican in February, 1940, and Mr. Sumner Welles's trip to Italy, France, Germany, and Great Britain in February and March, 1940. Peace negotiations were in the air, but Mr. Roosevelt, still opposing a negotiated peace, refused to let Mr. Welles participate in them.⁹⁶ By March 19, 1940, Mr. Roosevelt was allowing our advanced types of aircraft to be sold to Britain and to France,⁹⁷ while starving the American Army and Navy of them for many months to come. General Arnold often refers⁹⁸ plaintively but timidly to this problem, which was finally so acute that Secre-

tary Knox wrote in his secret report to Mr. Roosevelt, soon after the Pearl Harbor disaster:

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.⁹⁹

Prior to the attack on Denmark and Norway Mr. Roosevelt had arranged for loans to those countries.¹⁰⁰ During May, 1940, along with Mr. Churchill and M. Reynaud, he tried often but secretly¹⁰¹ to keep Italy from entering the war, at first by covert threats, which made Mussolini feel compelled to act quickly, and later by promises of territorial accessions in the Mediterranean area which Mr. Roosevelt offered personally to guarantee. When these secret promises failed, Mr. Roosevelt returned to his original policy of threats, which became much more specific and included a thinly veiled statement of American military intervention.

On May 10, 1940, Germany had opened her attack upon the Low Countries and France, and Mr. Churchill had become Prime Minister. On May 15, 1940, Mr. Churchill cabled Mr. Roosevelt¹⁰² a long list of requests for tangible aerial, naval, material, and diplomatic help, asking for almost everything except an expeditionary force, and including the abandonment of American neutrality. None of these requests was explicitly refused by Mr. Roosevelt, although he temporized as to granting several of them. The very next day, May 16, Mr. Roosevelt asked the Congress for additional appropriations "for National Defense,"¹⁰³ the first in a 1940 series. And on May 17, 1940, Mr. Roosevelt ordered the remaining older destroyers to be recommissioned.¹⁰⁴ It was his first step toward the destroyer deal, but it was not swift enough to please Mr. Churchill, whose demands soon became importunate and were coupled with intimations that under some circumstances the British Fleet might be surrendered to Germany. One cannot give even a résumé of the

correspondence and subsequent negotiations here;¹⁰⁵ it ultimately resulted in the destroyer-bases deal of September 3, 1940.

On May 28, 1940, King Leopold III surrendered the Belgian armies, and next day the evacuation through Dunkirk began. On June 1, Mr. Roosevelt ordered the Army and the Navy to investigate the quantity of arms which could be transferred to Britain, and on June 3 General Marshall authorized sending to Britain half a million rifles, 80,000 machine guns, 900 field guns, and much in the way of other munitions.¹⁰⁶ On June 5, 1940, the Attorney General rendered an opinion that 600,000 rifles and 2,500 field guns, with ammunition, might be sold to Britain as "surplus." From time to time thereafter more and more weapons were sent, so much more that in early 1941 Mr. Churchill gaily cabled brief thanks to Mr. Hopkins for a "packet" containing a mere quarter of a million rifles and half a billion rounds of ammunition.¹⁰⁷

On June 10, 1940, Italy declared war against France, and on the same day Mr. Roosevelt delivered the speech at the commencement of the University of Virginia in which he said, "the hand that held the dagger has struck it into the back of its neighbor."¹⁰⁸ France resisted Italy with far more ease than Germany, and M. Reynaud was now asking Mr. Roosevelt urgently for help.¹⁰⁹ So was Mr. Churchill, who also asked Mr. Roosevelt that hope be held out to France. In France, as resistance began to fail, Mr. Churchill held out the possibility even of an American declaration of war.¹¹⁰ Mr. Roosevelt, on June 13, 1940, cabled M. Reynaud, promising much more material aid and urging that French resistance should continue,¹¹¹ but he refused to permit his cable to be made public.¹¹²

So France sought an armistice, and almost immediately Mr. Roosevelt began to threaten the French in various ways in order to force them to get their navy out of the way of the Germans before signing an armistice.¹¹³ For many months thereafter these threats were renewed from time to time.¹¹⁴

V. AMERICAN AID TO BRITAIN "SHORT OF WAR"

On June 20, 1940, Mr. Woodring was ousted as Secretary of War because he had refused to strip the nation of its defenses in order to aid the Allies; he was replaced by Mr. Stimson, a confirmed interventionist and an advocate of peacetime conscription. On that same day the draft act was introduced in the Senate, because, if enlistments in the Army are any criterion of public opinion, the country was still overwhelmingly opposed to Mr. Roosevelt's policies. The Army's recruiting was a failure;¹¹⁵ only nine thousand men had enlisted after a six weeks' drive.

On July 2, 1940, Mr. Roosevelt by proclamation prohibited the export of munitions of war and many other goods, except under license. This measure, he later expressly acknowledged,¹¹⁶ was to promote "the policy of helping Great Britain"; by necessary implication it was intended to prevent any exports to Germany and to Italy. It was about at this time that a naval and military mission was sent to Britain. Nominally it was an exploratory mission,¹¹⁷ but out of it the secret joint Anglo-American staff plans of January, 1941, ensued.

On July 19, 1940, Chancellor Hitler appealed to Great Britain to make peace.¹¹⁸ His offer was serious, and competent observers believed that Britain would have been tempted to accept it, had it not been for Mr. Roosevelt's opposition.¹¹⁹ Russo-German relations were already deteriorating, and German plans to attack Russia were in the earliest stage of their formation.¹²⁰ Chancellor Hitler wanted, and expected to obtain, peace with Britain. When peace was rejected hasty plans to attack Britain were initiated in July,¹²¹ disputed between the German navy and the German army in August, and abandoned in September¹²² in order to concentrate upon the Russian adventure.¹²³

In the United States Mr. Roosevelt was busily occupied in finding a way to circumvent the Congress¹²⁴ and consummate the destroyer deal, in undertaking the defense of Canada, in helping Mr. Churchill with a variety of relatively minor diplomatic intrigues, and, most particularly, in winning the third-term election by giving more profuse and more sweeping promises "again and again and again" to maintain "peace during the next four years"¹²⁵ and "to keep our people out of foreign wars."¹²⁶ Along with these activities Mr. Roosevelt deceived the Congress into authorizing, in late August, that the National Guard be ordered into active service for "training efficiency."¹²⁷ He also managed to secure the passage of the first peacetime conscription act by September 16, 1940,¹²⁸ but it was limited to twelve months of "training" and the draftees could not be sent outside of the Western Hemisphere.

Once the election was won "on which our fate . . . depended,"¹²⁹ Mr. Churchill had further demands to make. It took him over three weeks to compose a letter, almost ten pages long when printed,¹³⁰ which was delivered to Mr. Roosevelt on December 9, 1940. The requests were more formidable and contemplated the continuance of the war for at least two more years; this was the genesis of lend-lease.

By December 12, 1940,¹³¹ joint staff conversations with the British had been secretly commenced in London, Manila, and Washington. They continued through the early part of 1941, and out of them the American-British-Dutch war plans were developed. The first war plan was against Germany; the second war plan was against Japan, and Mr. Roosevelt approved both of these plans "except officially,"¹³² as Admiral Stark put it. Continued secrecy still prevents a positive statement as to the constitution of a formal alliance at this time, but the distinction between a formal alliance and a gentleman's agreement which had been established and approved, "except officially," seems trifling.¹³³ What is of vastly greater concern is that neither the American people nor the Congress were allowed to know the truth. The vital implications of these joint staff conferences in regard to the involvement of the United States in the war were fully sensed by Admiral Stark. At the close of the conferences he wrote to his fleet commanders that

"The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*."^{133a}

In early January, 1941, Mr. Hopkins had flown to London to confer with Mr. Churchill. Mr. Hopkins' laconic report, "I told of my mission,"¹³⁴ is expanded in Mr. Churchill's version of it to a more sweeping undertaking:

The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it.

He has sent me here to tell you that at all costs and by all means he will carry you through, no matter what happens to him—there is nothing that he will not do so far as he has human power.¹³⁵

Meanwhile Mr. Roosevelt had asked the Congress for lend-lease, and on January 10, 1941, the bill, drafted in the offices of Mr. Stimson and of Mr. Morgenthau,¹³⁶ was introduced. Space forbids an extended account of all the political maneuvering which accomplished it.¹³⁷ One can only state three matters in a summary way: first, that vague terror stories about an invasion crisis facing Britain—in the event, a quite false and synthetic crisis—were employed as one of the propaganda devices to secure its enactment; second, that in consequence of its passage on March 9, 1941, the Congress surrendered the war-making power to Mr. Roosevelt, and enabled him to make war, declared or undeclared, anywhere in the world; and third, that lend-lease, like most of Mr. Roosevelt's other measures, was wholly unneutral and contrary to the elementary rules of international law.

In mid-January, 1941, another and more fateful thread was woven into the pattern. The American State Department, at Mr. Roosevelt's specific instruction, warned¹³⁸ the Russian ambassador, Mr. Constantine Oumansky,¹³⁹ of the contemplated German attack, and these warnings were later repeated.¹⁴⁰ By early February, 1941, the eastern movement of the German troops was well known.¹⁴¹ Everything pointed toward an extension of the war by a German attack on Russia, but Anglo-American power politics succeeded in delaying it for five weeks.¹⁴² The great cost of the

sacrifice, made in order to obtain this small delay for Soviet Russia's benefit, was the loss of Yugoslavia, Greece, and Crete, the crippling of the British Mediterranean Fleet,¹⁴³ and the British defeat in Libya.¹⁴⁴ In the diplomatic intrigues in Greece and in Yugoslavia Americans¹⁴⁵ played a substantial and quite successful part in opposing Germany. Later, as the time approached for the commencement of the attack on Russia, Mr. Churchill meditated upon what his policy should be and concluded that he should "give all encouragement and any help we can spare." He cabled this to Mr. Roosevelt,¹⁴⁶ who replied in the sense of *carte blanche*—he would publicly endorse "any announcement that the Prime Minister might make welcoming Russia as an ally."

In the autumn of 1938 the French military experts had expressed¹⁴⁷ to Mr. Bullitt the view that ". . . the war would last at least six years and would . . . end in the complete destruction of Europe, and with communism reigning in all States. Undoubtedly, at the conclusion, the benefits would be taken by Russia." So far as can be ascertained neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Churchill had such prudent misgivings in June, 1941. Or, if they did, their strong antipathy toward Germany prevented them from acting with the cold and detached realism which is so necessary in the successful practice of power politics.

After the passage of the Lend-Lease Act Mr. Roosevelt seemed to view the United States as being in the European war "except officially."¹⁴⁸ But in the light of the many campaign promises which he had made, and also of the explicit pledge contained in the Democratic party's platform, he felt that he could not enter the war officially unless and until he could persuade the nation that there had been an "attack" by Germany. Until that time came he would engage in a secret and undeclared war,¹⁴⁹ hoping to drive the Germans into shooting first.¹⁵⁰

It was on March 6, 1941, that Mr. Roosevelt expressed a portion of his purposes to the Polish ambassador, saying, ". . . we Americans will have to buy this war as such. Let us hope at the price of Lend-Lease only. But who can say what price we may ultimately have to pay?"¹⁵¹

In March, 1941, American officers went to Britain to select naval

bases for use in convoying,¹⁵² and air fields, and as soon as they had been selected the construction work began. Damaged British warships were to be repaired in American navy yards. In April two million tons of shipping were obtained and sent through the Red Sea in order to aid the British campaigns in the Mediterranean area, and a large supply base was secretly set up at Basra.¹⁵³ Also in that month the movements of American war vessels were coordinated with those of the British and arrangements were made for secret intercommunication.¹⁵⁴ And finally it was on April 18, 1941, that Mr. Roosevelt extended out to 26° West—over two thousand miles from New York—the claimed boundary of the Western Hemisphere¹⁵⁵—wherein American warships would aid the British. The order providing for this action was issued on April 24, 1941.¹⁵⁶ In March, 1941, American army planes began patrolling the North Atlantic, out of Newfoundland,¹⁵⁷ against German submarines; in April, 1941, Greenland was occupied;¹⁵⁸ in May, 1941, plans were made,¹⁵⁹ and later abandoned, to seize the Azores and Martinique. Meanwhile Mr. Roosevelt debated whether to order American submarines to attack and sink the German battleship *Bismarck*.¹⁶⁰ In June Mr. Roosevelt agreed with Mr. Churchill to relieve the British troops in Iceland,¹⁶¹ and this was done on July 7, 1941. It was also in June, 1941, that Mr. Roosevelt ordered the closing of all the German and Italian consulates in the United States.

In the middle of May Mr. Roosevelt had announced publicly that twenty-four cargo ships were about to depart for the Red Sea in spite of the German proclamation of a war zone in that area.¹⁶² These vessels had to sail between Africa and South America, and in that general area the *Robin Moor* was sunk a few days later. Mr. Roosevelt had successfully provoked an incident, and in a message to the Congress he called it an “act of piracy,” and “the act of an international outlaw,”¹⁶³ but the American public declined to be aroused.

Meanwhile the German Fuehrer was taking no chances over the creation of any incident. He had long since prohibited unrestricted submarine warfare and the sinking of passenger ships;¹⁶⁴ he had also strictly forbidden any injury to friendly nations' vessels or to

those of the United States, outside of the war zone closely adjacent to the British Isles.¹⁶⁵ When the so-called neutrality patrol in the "neutrality zone" was established, Chancellor Hitler secretly ordered all German warships to avoid any incidents in it.¹⁶⁶ When Mr. Roosevelt extended the boundaries of the Western Hemisphere much further to the east, the Fuehrer still continued to prohibit the creation of any incidents.¹⁶⁷ Nevertheless Mr. Roosevelt was still hoping in early June that he could "drive the Germans into shooting first."¹⁶⁸

Late June and July, 1941, were largely concerned with the aftermath of the German attack on Russia. Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Hopkins, and others rushed in to swamp Russia with offers of American aid. Theirs seems to have been the extremely simple policy of giving unlimited and unconditional aid not only to the true enemies of Germany but also to that nation's former accomplices.¹⁶⁹ Mr. Churchill could at least speak tartly¹⁷⁰ of the Communists' view "that they were conferring a great favour on us by fighting in their own country for their own lives," but when Mr. Hopkins went to Russia "in return for the offer of such aid he asked nothing."¹⁷¹ Fulfillment of the Russian demands was given a first priority by Mr. Roosevelt over everything else,¹⁷² and materials and equipment were diverted to Russia in late 1941 over the opposition and in spite of strong protests from the Armed Forces.¹⁷³

The diminution of American supplies to Britain in consequence of this prospective diversion was only one of the reasons which led Mr. Churchill to seek the Atlantic Conference meeting which was held about mid-August, 1941.¹⁷⁴ Mr. Churchill had frequently attempted to bring the United States into the war as a belligerent. The British had hoped for this in June, 1940; they had expected it a few days after the third-term election was won;¹⁷⁵ they had looked for it again about the first of May,¹⁷⁶ and Mr. Churchill sought to obtain it at the conference.¹⁷⁷ There is some reason to believe that the American Chiefs of Staff felt that their forces were not as yet ready for war and that they dissuaded Mr. Roosevelt from taking drastic action immediately.¹⁷⁸

However, the Atlantic Charter, in providing for Anglo-American

co-operation in "the policing of the world" during a transitional period following the close of the second World War, assumed by a tacit but inescapable implication that the United States would presently become involved in the war. This implication is fortified by the preponderance of the top military and naval staff personnel who were present. What was on their agenda has never been fully disclosed, but it included war plans generally¹⁷⁹ and specific discussions about expeditions to seize the Azores, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands.¹⁸⁰ The activities of the American navy were to be extended in the North Atlantic,¹⁸¹ and Mr. Roosevelt repeated to Mr. Churchill his predilection for an undeclared war, saying, "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months."¹⁸² There was also a long discussion of Far Eastern affairs, which falls outside the scope of this chapter.

VI. THE "SHOOTING WAR" BEGINS

Within a fortnight after the termination of the Atlantic Conference—on August 25, 1941—Mr. Roosevelt gave secret orders to the Atlantic Fleet to attack and destroy German and Italian "hostile forces"; this was the putting into effect of War Plan 51.¹⁸³ Ten days later, on September 4, 1941, there was an incident between an American destroyer, the *Greer*, and a German submarine. If the *Greer* obeyed her secret orders she necessarily attacked the submarine, but it was stated for public consumption that she was attacked. This was doubted at the time. The Navy Department, it should be noted, refused to furnish the log of the *Greer* to the Senate,¹⁸⁴ and thus establish whether the official claim was the truth.

Mr. Roosevelt capitalized on this incident in a fireside chat delivered on September 11, 1941.¹⁸⁵ He claimed it was an attack,

“piracy legally and morally,” and that the Nazis were “international outlaws.” And he said,

. . . When you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck before you crush him.

These Nazi submarines and raiders are the rattlesnakes of the Atlantic. . . .

. . . From now on, if German or Italian vessels of war enter the waters the protection of which is necessary for American defense, they will do so at their own peril.

This was the shoot-on-sight speech, and it publicly announced a small portion of the substance of War Plan 51, which was already secretly in effect. Mr. Churchill mentioned in a “most secret” letter to General Smuts¹⁸⁶ that the American people had been kept quite ignorant of “the vast area to which it is to be applied.” Here, indeed, was undeclared war. On September 13 Mr. Roosevelt ordered the Atlantic Fleet to escort convoys in which there were no American vessels.¹⁸⁷ It was also at about this time that Mr. Roosevelt agreed to furnish Mr. Churchill with “our best transport ships”—twelve liners and twenty cargo vessels, manned by American crews—to transport two British divisions to the Middle East.¹⁸⁸ At an earlier date fifty American tankers¹⁸⁹ had been transferred to Britain, and four to Russia, which led to a gasoline shortage and a curfew in the eastern United States.

Another incident occurred on October 17, 1941, when an American destroyer, the *Kearny*, dropped depth charges on a German submarine,¹⁹⁰ which replied to the attack by torpedoing the *Kearny*. Ten days later Mr. Roosevelt, who again claimed that this was an unprovoked German attack, delivered a “scare-mongering election-eve”¹⁹¹ type of speech in which he claimed that “. . . the shooting has started, and history has recorded who fired the first shot.”¹⁹² Then, in a passage the importance of which seems to have been overlooked at that time, he guardedly hinted that the Republic was bound by his secret commitments, saying significantly, “Very simply and very bluntly—we are pledged to pull our own oar in the destruction of Hitlerism.” (Emphasis supplied.) Mr. Roosevelt

claimed to have news of a German plan to abolish all religions in Germany, and throughout the world—"if Hitler wins." Also he claimed to have a map proving the German intention to conquer Latin America and redistrict it into five vassal states—but at his next press conference¹⁹³ he made excuses and refused to reveal it.

On October 31, 1941, an older destroyer, the *Reuben James*, was torpedoed about seven hundred miles eastward of Newfoundland,¹⁹⁴ and more lives were lost. The American public's reaction to it was expressed by Admiral Stark in a confidential letter to Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor: "Believe it or not, the *Reuben James* set recruiting back about 15%."¹⁹⁵ This illustrates the continuance of public opposition to involvement in the war. In mid-August the length of service required under the draft act had been extended, in violation of the obligations of good faith toward the draftees. The administration had had to use all of its political and patronage powers to force this extension, and, even so, the vote in the House was 203 to 202.¹⁹⁶ From New England, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, across the Midwest and out to the Northwest, every single state (except Rhode Island, Connecticut, and Montana, which split fifty-fifty) voted two to one, or by larger majorities, against the extension of the draft act.¹⁹⁷ Public opinion was, of course, far more preponderantly against involvement in the war than this vote showed.

By the time that October, 1941, had ended, Mr. Roosevelt's undeclared war in the Atlantic had become a reality and was in full swing. But this was not enough. The war powers could not be exercised under our Constitution until there was a formal and declared war, and of that there was no immediate prospect. As Count Ciano had noted, when at the German General Headquarters, ". . . The Germans have firmly decided to do nothing which will accelerate or cause America's entry into the war. . . ."¹⁹⁸ Because of this German attitude Mr. Roosevelt, as of the end of October, 1941, had no further ideas how to get into a formal and declared war: ". . . He had said everything 'short of war' that could be said. He had no more tricks left. The hat from which he had pulled so many rabbits was empty. . . ."¹⁹⁹ The only thing that he could think of to do was to continue to stall,²⁰⁰ for the front door to war

in Europe appeared to be firmly barred. Germany and Italy seemed resolved to decline the progressively increasing challenges of Mr. Roosevelt's unneutral actions and policies.

But there were back doors as well as front doors. There was always the uneasy state of affairs in the Far East. On the one hand a peaceful solution of the Japanese problem would have released much American power for use in Europe. Moreover, it seemed incredible—at least to Mr. Churchill²⁰¹—that Japan would commit political suicide by going to war with the United States and Britain. On the other hand, if this view was correct and if certain American diplomatic officials were not mistaken in believing that Japan could be quickly defeated, perhaps a Japanese war would solve Mr. Roosevelt's problems without involving too much delay in his purpose to conquer Germany. Maybe the longest way round was the shortest way home.

It was complicated. Either way there were pros and cons. But Mr. Roosevelt was a complicated man, too, not a simple one. His intentions were complex and his "plans were never thoroughly thought out."²⁰² Therefore it may be true that there was a complex ambivalence, not thoroughly thought out, in Mr. Roosevelt's attitude toward the expedience of peace or war with Japan. It is quite possible that he did not fully commit himself to the latter choice until late in November, 1941. By his own express declarations we know that he deliberately temporized. Temporizing is sometimes merely a way to postpone making a decision, but it may also be a method of awaiting a favorable opportunity to put into effect a decision already made.

By November 25, 1941, Mr. Roosevelt and his cabinet²⁰³ were debating how to "maneuver [the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." On December 1, 1941, Mr. Roosevelt very secretly issued the needless order to send the Cockleshell Warships²⁰⁴ to their appointed positions for destruction. But other and mightier events were in motion: before an entire week had passed Mr. Churchill²⁰⁵ could go to bed and sleep "the sleep of the saved and thankful. . . . So we had won after all! . . . Britain would live . . . and the Empire would live. . . . United we could subdue every-

body else in the world. . . . We might not even have to die as individuals.”

So may it be! But designs, least of all designs for war, do not always eventuate as their planners intend. The design for the war which began at Pearl Harbor was a zigzag growth rooted in secrecy, unneutrality, misrepresentation, and deceit. Morally speaking, such a tree could not have been expected to bear good fruit, and it did not.

As it eventuated, Japan was not an easy conquest; she was the last enemy to surrender to us. And always a malign miasma seemed to haunt that air. It was against Japan that we dropped the atom bombs and thus revealed their existence to the world—needlessly, as it transpired. And needlessly, as it also transpired, the secret deals and agreements were made with Russia at Yalta. Thus Russia came into Manchuria, China, and North Korea. The end of that story is a tale yet to be told. Perhaps future historians will some day trace there the origins of the third world war, but if they do so, they will not be entirely correct. The roots run more deeply than that. They run back to Mr. Roosevelt’s abandonment of neutrality; they involve his diplomatic maladroitness, and they involve his lack of ability to think out his plans thoroughly. Not least, there remains Mr. Roosevelt’s penchant for secrecy and for the deceit of his own people as well as of others. Perhaps it may be true—perhaps it may yet be generally agreed—that even in the conduct of foreign affairs honesty is the best policy.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 3

1. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs*, (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, 790. It was later believed that Mr. Roosevelt’s telephone calls, at least to Ambassador Bullitt, were intercepted by the Germans. See *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (39 parts; Washington, D.C.:

- Government Printing Office, 1946) Part III, p. 1213. (The Hearings will hereinafter be designated *Pearl Harbor Attack*.)
2. For a condensed résumé of facts proving the absence of any planned conspiracy, see Frederic R. Sanborn, *Design For War* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1951), p. 58, 60, 173, 268. Cf. H. L. Trefousse, *Germany and American Neutrality* (New York: Bookman Associates, 1951), p. 150. Even the judgment at the Nuremberg trials admits that no "single conspiracy" could be proven: 6 Federal Rules Decisions, pp. 111-12. See also *The United States at War* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), pp. 507-8.
 3. *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, Department of State, Publication 1853 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 47.
 4. Sumner Welles, *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), p. 288.
 5. Charles Cheney Hyde, *International Law Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1922), II, 765.
 6. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*; edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (13 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), VII, 249-58; interview of April 20, 1938.
 7. *Ibid.*, VIII, xxxviii-xxxix.
 8. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, An Intimate History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 438.
 9. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VI, 406-11.
 10. For a résumé, see Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-19.
 11. John T. Flynn, *Country Squire in the White House* (New York: Doubleday, Doran & Company, Inc., 1940), p. 103; cf. William D. Leahy, *I Was There* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), p. 64.
 12. Winston S. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 247; Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 549, 573.
 13. Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 379. See Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 684, which acknowledges the existence of this point of view.
 14. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, pp. 4272-76.
 15. *New York Times*, October 24, 1947, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
 16. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 563-64.
 17. *Ibid.*, I, 576-77; *Peace and War*, pp. 54-55.
 18. Emil Ludwig, *Roosevelt* (New York: The Viking Press, 1938), p. 272.
 19. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VII, 413.
 20. *New York Times*, November 18, 1938, pp. 1, 12, 13.
 21. *The German White Paper*; full text of the Polish documents issued by the Berlin Foreign Office; with a foreword by C. Hartley Grattan (New York: Howell, Soskin & Co., 1940), p. 15. This condition was equally well known to the Germans at that time; see *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), III, 281.
 22. *German White Paper*, p. 16.

23. Adolf Hitler, *My New Order*; edited with commentary by Raul de Roussy de Sales (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1941), p. 504.
24. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, I, 525.
25. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 293.
26. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 589.
27. *Ibid.*, I, 590.
28. *Ibid.*, I, 590-91.
29. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 310.
30. Waverly Root, *The Secret History of the War* (2 vols.; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1945), I, 6, 10. Exactly this hostile combination had been foreseen by the Germans about a month previously; see also *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, III, 280.
31. Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics, An Autobiography* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1941), p. 556.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 570.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 570; see also Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 309.
34. William L. Shirer, *Berlin Diary* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941), pp. 142-43; see also Hans Bernd Gisevius, *To the Bitter End* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947), p. 324.
35. Gisevius, *op. cit.*, pp. 319-26; see also Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, pp. 311-14.
36. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 314.
37. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 591.
38. *Ibid.*, I, 592.
39. *Ibid.*, I, 593.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, I, 590.
42. *Ibid.*, I, 592-93.
43. H. H. Arnold, *Global Mission* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), pp. 177-79.
44. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
46. Fischer, *op. cit.*, p. 564.
47. *German White Paper*, pp. 19-21.
48. Moley, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-80.
49. Arnold, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
50. *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*; [his] complete unabridged diaries; edited by Hugh Gibson; introduction by Sumner Welles (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1946), p. 3.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
52. Arnold, *op. cit.*, 185.
53. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, p. 55.
54. *German White Paper*, p. 44.
55. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-33.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
57. *The Ciano Diaries*, pp. 42-44.
58. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-60.
59. *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 49.
60. Trefousse, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

61. German White Paper, pp. 51-54.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*
64. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VIII, 185-86.
65. German White Paper, p. 59.
66. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 630.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Ibid.*
69. *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 83.
70. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, VI, 890.
71. Moley, *op. cit.*, p. 382.
72. Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 121-22.
73. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XX, p. 4139.
74. *Ibid.*, Part XX, p. 4168. Nine years later Mr. Hull claimed that he was "more than skeptical" of this proposal; see *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, I, 631. But no suggestion of skepticism appears in his 1939 memorandum to Mr. Roosevelt.
75. *Peace and War*, p. 61; *International Transactions of the U.S.*, etc., p. 27; Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 625.
76. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VIII, 568.
77. *Ibid.*, VIII, 438.
78. *The United States at War* (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 16.
79. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, p. 85.
80. Ulrich von Hassell, *The Von Hassell Diaries, 1938-1944* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), p. 63.
81. *The Ciano Diaries*, pp. 129-30, 132, 134, 136; *The Von Hassell Diaries*, p. 73.
82. Churchill, *The Gathering Storm*, p. 440.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
84. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, p. 23.
85. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VIII, 525-27.
86. *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy* (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1947), II, 48; Trefousse, *op. cit.*, p. 42.
87. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 689-91.
88. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VIII, 52-54.
89. *The United States at War*, pp. 21-22.
90. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, p. 92.
91. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
92. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, VIII, 512-22.
93. *Ibid.*, VIII, 554-57.
94. *Ibid.*, VIII, 524.
95. "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, CXX (October 18, 1947), 72.
96. *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 222; cf. Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 135, 139.

97. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, pp. 104-8.
98. Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 190, 193, 196-98, 203, 215, 241, 245, 251, 256, 258, 264-67.
99. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XXIV, p. 1753. This report is not dated, but from other evidence it would seem that it should be dated about December 15, 1941.
100. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 51.
101. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 108-10.
102. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, pp. 24-25.
103. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 198-205.
104. *Ibid.*, IX, 213.
105. See Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 117, 129, 135, 140-42, 170-71, 179-84; Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 234-35; cf. pp. 230, 232.
106. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., *Lend-Lease, Weapon for Victory* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944), pp. 24-25. "The subterfuge was obvious . . ." wrote Mr. Stimson. See Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 356. See also Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 775.
107. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 127; cf. 732, 741.
108. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 259-64.
109. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 767-75.
110. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, pp. 179-81.
111. *Peace and War*, pp. 74-75; Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, pp. 183-84; Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 145. Mr. Sherwood's version differs from Mr. Churchill's; which one is not paraphrased?
112. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, p. 187.
113. *Peace and War*, p. 76.
114. Leahy, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
115. *Life*, IX, No. 1 (July 1, 1940), 7.
116. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 281.
117. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 137.
118. Adolf Hitler, *My New Order*, pp. 809-38; especially pp. 836-38.
119. Shirer, *op. cit.*, pp. 453, 457-59, 550-52, 561; *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 227; cf. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 844-45.
120. Shirer, *op. cit.*, pp. 450, 550; *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, V, 741.
121. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, III, 399-400.
122. *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 296.
123. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, III, 406-7; see also the Fuehrer Conferences, II, 22-23.
124. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 175.
125. *The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 541-43.
126. *Ibid.*, IX, 530-39.
127. *Ibid.*, IX, 313-14.
128. *Ibid.*, IX, p. 428.
129. Churchill, *Their Finest Hour*, p. 187.
130. *Ibid.*, pp. 558-67.

131. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, p. 984; Part XX, pp. 4075-76: Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 271-73.
132. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2391; Part III, pp. 994-97.
133. Compare Mr. Sherwood's simile of a common-law marriage, *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, p. 270. Note General Arnold's observation, *Global Mission*, p. 244—"we were forming a very close alliance with the British."
- 133a. On April 3, 1941; *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVII, p. 2463.
134. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
135. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 23.
136. "The Morgenthau Diaries," *Collier's*, CXX (October 18, 1947), 74; Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 873; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 228.
137. For a fuller account, see Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-33.
138. Franklin D. Roosevelt and Pius XII, *Wartime Correspondence*; with an introduction and explanatory notes by Myron C. Taylor (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947), p. 49; Victor Kravchenko, *I Chose Freedom; the Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), pp. 352, 363; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 967-68.
139. For Mr. Oumansky's background, see W. G. Krivitsky, *In Stalin's Secret Service* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), pp. 37-38. Mr. Hull (*Memoirs*, I, 743, 807, 809; II, 971) dryly appraised the Russian ambassador as "a walking insult when at his worst"—"sarcasm poured from the Ambassador like wheat from a thresher"—he "thought that firmness meant rudeness."
140. Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 968, 973; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 367. Mr. Root's account of the Russian preparations, *The Secret History of the War*, I, 499-519, seems to be predicated upon General Stalin's intention of attacking Germany at a slightly later date, *op. cit.*, p. 510.
141. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, V, 740; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 26.
142. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression*, V, 740; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 192.
143. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, pp. 4299-300.
144. Cf. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 104, 110, 205.
145. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 253-55.
146. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 369.
147. *German White Paper*, p. 20.
148. See the views of Admiral Stark, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVII, pp. 2462-63; and of General Arnold, *Global Mission*, p. 259.
149. *New York Times*, May 17, 1941, p. 1, col. 8, continued on p. 4, col. 2; Blair Bolles, *Foreign Policy Reports*, August 1, 1945, p. 145.
150. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
151. Jan Ciechanowski, *Defeat in Victory* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1947), pp. 1, 5-6. One is tempted to recall Mr. H. L. Mencken's hard saying (*Life*, XXI, No. 6 [August 5, 1946], 46) about Mr. Roosevelt's error in "pulling ashore the corpse of the British Empire."
152. Trefousse, *op. cit.*, p. 88; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 138.

153. Churchill, *ibid.*, pp. 254, 754.
154. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
155. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 291-92, 310; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 14^o-45.
156. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2293; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 144-45, 244.
157. Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan & Pearce, 1946), pp. 14-15.
158. Ernest J. King, *Our Navy at War*, p. 6; cf. *Peace and War*, pp. 99-100; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 935-39; note I, 754-58.
159. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2113; Part XVI, pp. 2168-70; Part III, pp. 1077, 1436-37; Part XV, p. 1631.
160. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
161. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 149-50; Hull, *op. cit.*, II, 947; cf. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-12.
162. *New York Times*, May 17, 1941, p. 1, col. 8; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 282-83.
163. *New York Times*, June 6, 1941, p. 1, col. 8; text on p. 6, cols. 4-6.
164. Trefousse, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37.
165. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
166. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-41, 61, 85-87.
167. *Ibid.*, pp. 88-89.
168. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, p. 265.
169. *New York Times*, May 28, 1941, p. 2, cols. 2-8; Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 298.
170. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 388.
171. William C. Bullitt, *The Great Globe Itself* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1946), p. 11.
172. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
173. *The United States at War*, p. 82.
174. Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 22, 33.
175. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, p. 972; Part XVI, pp. 2448-50.
176. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 263.
177. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 593; Elliott Roosevelt, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-30, 41.
178. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVI, pp. 2182-83.
179. Arnold, *op. cit.*, pp. 249, 255.
180. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, pp. 1275-1278; Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 437-38.
181. Churchill, *ibid.*, pp. 441, 517.
182. *Ibid.*, p. 593.
183. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, pp. 1400-1401; Part V, pp. 2294-96.
184. *Ibid.*, Part XVI, p. 2210.
185. *New York Times*, September 12, 1941, p. 1, cols. 6-7; text on p. 4, cols. 2-5.
186. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 517.
187. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2295.
188. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 492-93. Note Admiral Stark's regrets, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVI, p. 2221.

189. *Newsweek*, August 18, 1941, p. 14.
190. Trefousse, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
191. Mr. Lindley's characterization in *Newsweek*, November 10, 1941, p. 21.
192. *New York Times*, October 28, 1941, p. 1, col. 1; text on p. 4, cols. 2-6.
193. *Ibid.*, October 29, 1941, p. 1, cols. 2-3.
194. Admiral King, *op. cit.*, p. 6.
195. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVI, p. 2224.
196. *The United States at War*, p. 72.
197. *Newsweek*, August 25, 1941, pp. 16-17.
198. *The Ciano Diaries*, p. 398.
199. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 383; cf. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 539.
200. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 420.
201. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 603.
202. Frances Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew* (New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1946), p. 163.
203. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XI, p. 5433; Part XX, pp. 4113-14.
204. Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 515-18.
205. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, pp. 606-8.



4

HOW AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD JAPAN CONTRIBUTED TO WAR IN THE PACIFIC

by

WILLIAM L. NEUMANN

Japan has never harmed us. Japan is not threatening us. Japan has treated us better than any other world power in the matter of paying debts, courtesy to our visitors and residents, and never attempting to meddle in our affairs. Japan is the only world power that has paid back all sums borrowed without delay or default on a single penny. If we are going to answer this fair treatment of us by enmity, no incentive is left for any country to treat us well in the future.

—CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE ON PACIFIC FRIENDSHIP, November, 1937

Today we have fallen heir to the problems and responsibilities the Japanese had faced and borne in the Korean-Manchurian area for nearly half a century, and there is a certain perverse justice in the pain we are suffering from a burden which, when it was borne by others, we held in such low esteem. What is saddest of all is that the relationship between past and present seems to be visible to so few people. For if we are not to learn from our own mistakes, where shall we learn at all.

—GEORGE F. KENNAN, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*

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Dr. Neumann has taught history at the University of Michigan, Howard University, the University of Hawaii, and the University of Maryland. He acted as executive secretary of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs and was editor of *American Perspective* until it ceased publication in the autumn of 1950.

The main interest of Dr. Neumann in history has been in the field of international relations and diplomatic history. He wrote a brochure on *The Genesis of Pearl Harbor* in 1945 which was one of the very first examples of revisionist historical writing as applied to the second World War. He is also the author of *Recognition of Governments in the Americas* (1947) and *Making the Peace, 1941-1945* (1950). The latter is the best account we have to date of the wartime conferences which saw the loss of the peace for the United States and its Allies. Dr. Neumann is about to publish a comprehensive study of the relations of the United States with Japan from Commodore Perry to the present time.

I. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN THE JAPANESE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES

The war between the United States and Japan was neither, as official and semiofficial histories paint it, a struggle between good and evil nor a contest between a peace-loving nation and an arrogant proponent of aggression and chaos. These are the conventional labels used by nations to describe their enemies. Every victorious power attempts to certify similar interpretations of recent wars as eternal truths. While such moralistic simplifications have their value as nationalist propaganda, they have no place in an honest attempt at an unbiased study of international issues. Righteousness has never been the exclusive preserve of any one nation, nor has virtue been completely wanting among even the most chauvinistic peoples. If the Pacific conflict is to be the subject of moralizing, it might better be described as a tragedy of errors and as the unwanted offspring of false assumptions and follies on both sides of the Pacific.

The errors and fallacies of Japanese policy have often been set forth for Americans with a rich collection of assorted invectives. Stripped of all gratuitous adjectives and adverbs, Japan's course is clear and the errors of Japanese assumptions then become patent. An island nation with a growing population, stimulated by Western penetration, found its resources inadequate to achieve its aspirations for a higher standard of living. Following the Western pattern, Japan looked abroad for land, markets, and raw materials. Japan also developed aspirations for the status of a major power, again stimulated by Western influences, particularly by the humiliating experiences of the early post-Perry decades. It was in these formative years that Japan learned how helpless a small power could be in the face of energetic Western imperialism, backed by hostile naval squadrons. These two aspirations combined to create an expansionist movement in Japan which looked

primarily to Asia for its fulfillment. When economic penetration of Asia was checked by political obstacles in the form of intransigent Chinese war lords, Japan turned to the ultimate weapon of imperialism, military force.

Japanese expansionism also brought to the fore a chauvinistic group of military leaders who developed a racialist concept of Japan's manifest destiny. They believed that Asia was at last to find peace and economic progress under Japanese leadership in the form of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity sphere. No alien nation, neither Russia nor the United States, was to be permitted to stand in the way of this goal. To this end Japan fought a border war in Manchuria against the Soviet Union from 1937 to 1939. When the United States, from 1931 onward, stood firmly behind the Chinese Nationalist government, Japan's best customer became Japan's enemy. When other methods seemed unavailing, Japan prepared for a trans-Pacific war to remove the American barrier to an area which Japan believed was vital for national security and prosperity. But the willingness of the people of the United States, once attacked, to fight a long and costly war over a cause remote from their shores was not foreseen by Japan's leaders. This was the fatal error of Japanese policy. This was the false assumption which was to bring that nation to defeat and to destroy the accomplishments of two generations of vigorous diplomacy.

Americans have given little attention to the errors of their own Far Eastern policies. Self-examination is not a characteristic of the victor, even when the fruits of victory prove bitter. Most studies of the coming of the Pacific war by Americans still accept the official assumptions as valid.¹ The United States is seen as a force exerted in behalf of peace and stability in Asia. American attempts to maintain the *status quo* and uphold the integrity of China are judged wise even though they failed. More important, the basic premise of American policy from 1931 onward—that the United States had a vital national interest in blocking the expansion of Japan in Asia—is seldom questioned. Yet on this premise any justification of the diplomacy of Secretary of State Henry Stimson or of the foreign policy of the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration must make its case.

With the passage of time the propaganda of the war years will fade and a more objective appraisal of the issues will be possible. International antagonisms and friendships directly influence the writing of national histories. The shifting of these international alignments requires a rewriting of the past to keep pace with the orientations of the present. New enemies are treated no more objectively than the old, but former enemies then have the opportunity to receive less biased treatment. In due course these influences will lead to a reinterpretation of Japanese-American relations even in the officially sponsored histories. The shifts in international alignments are already in process. China and the Soviet Union are rapidly replacing Japan as the foci of American antagonism in Asia. Japan, by contrast, is almost attaining the status of an ally by the leasing of territory for American air and ground bases. Although the reorientation of the historiography of Japanese-American relations may lag behind these events, the influences of the new alignments cannot be long escaped. The historian may soon be in a position to view the course of American relations with Japan free from nationalistic preconceptions.²

Already it is possible to outline the misconceptions of American policy makers and to see in what respects they were blinded to basic facts and key relationships in Far Eastern international policies. No consideration was given to the historic ambitions of Russia in Asia nor to the expansionist element in Stalinist Communism. As a result there was a complete disregard for the role which a strong Japan played in the Far Eastern balance of power. Gross errors were also made in calculating that Japan could be coerced by economic pressure and naval force to follow American bidding in its relations with China. The political and economic importance of China for Japan was not grasped, despite the fact that Japanese leaders spoke of it as a national interest to be defended regardless of costs. This blindness to the importance of China for Japan contrasts with the gross overrating of the importance of a Japan-free China for the United States. It was assumed by some key figures in the Roosevelt administration that this objective was worth the blood and toil which a costly trans-Pacific conflict would entail. Behind this premise was another, equally

invalid. This was the assumption that the power relationships of Asia of the 1920's could be maintained—or, after 1931, restored—despite the rising power of Japan and the Soviet Union and the internal political disintegration of the Chinese Nationalist government. The instrument of maintenance or restoration was not to be forces within Asia itself but the pronouncements and threats of American power with its center thousands of miles from Asia's shores. Faith in the growth of American naval power under the Roosevelt administration disregarded the strength by which the Japanese navy sought to counter American building.

The history of American policy in the Far East from 1931 onward is largely a story of these blunders and fallacies in the interpretation and implementation of American interests. It was Henry L. Stimson, twice Secretary of War, who, as President Hoover's Secretary of State, first set the course of American opposition to Japanese expansion. When Japan established in Manchuria a puppet government to protect its economic interests in that area, Stimson announced to the world that the United States would not accept the legality of the new government established by force. Japan was charged with a violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 as a result of its undeclared war with China. In taking this step Stimson set the direction of American diplomacy for the next decade. The influence and, finally, the force of the United States was to be employed in the hopeless task of maintaining the disintegrating status quo of Asia.

Stimson recalls informing the Hoover cabinet in 1931 that the Western-made treaties no more fitted the situation in the Orient than "a stovepipe hat would fit an African savage."³ The Kellogg-Briand Pact had already been violated by the Soviet Union in 1929 when an undeclared war had been launched against China along the Manchurian-Siberian border. The clash demonstrated that the pact was in Asia "essentially as meaningless as an agreement not to raise umbrellas except in rainy weather."⁴ Not only in Asia but in Europe as well the powers which signed the antiwar pact made enough reservations to indicate that they accepted the pact as a statement of principle rather than a commitment to action.

Stimson's nonrecognition doctrine differed little from the earlier

effort of the Woodrow Wilson administration to enforce stability and to preserve the *status quo* in Latin America by refusing to recognize governments established by force. That effort had been a painful failure and Stimson himself criticized what he called the "misplaced morality of Woodrow Wilson" and Wilson's efforts to reform the world according to his own views.⁵ According to Stimson the true line of American recognition policy was that enunciated by Thomas Jefferson who, in 1792, had warned against any effort to differentiate between *de facto* governments on grounds of illegality. Yet the *de facto* government established by Japan in Manchuria was to go unrecognized because of its illicit origins.

Although Stimson's nonrecognition doctrine is thus attacked by his own statements, Hoover's Secretary of State was able to overlook the inconsistency of his position in an effort to play Marquis of Queensberry to the warring nations of Asia. In justifying his policy Stimson agreed that if the Sino-Japanese conflict had occurred two generations earlier it would have had little meaning for the United States. But in 1931, he said, American economic and political interests in the Far East were "considerable." The United States did have, in 1931, an important and profitable trade with Asia. The chief source of that profit was not China, however, but Japan, where large quantities of American cotton were purchased and paid for by Japanese silk exports to the United States. The total value of American exports and imports to and from Japan in the 1930's was three to four times the value of exports and imports from China. In the peak years, 1927-30, American exports to China never exceeded 4 per cent of the total American exports while imports from China were less than 5 per cent of the total. Even as late as 1938 American sales to Japan reached over \$230,000,000 while China, in the same year, purchased only some \$56,000,000 worth of American goods.

American investments in China itself were also relatively small and never reached 2 per cent of the total American foreign investment. In 1935 the value of Chinese private securities held by Americans reached only \$16,700,000 while Americans held over \$323,000,000 worth of Japanese private securities. Of \$2,600,000,000

in foreign investments in China, Japan claimed the larger amount, while most of the remainder was held by Great Britain. As late as 1943 a census of American-owned assets in China totalled only \$122,000,000. It was for this small economic stake in China that the profitable trade relationship with Japan was to be endangered and finally destroyed by the Stimson and Roosevelt policies.

American interests in China were often discussed in future terms rather than in present realities. To some extent this dream was a projection of the past, of the early New England trade with Canton and of the great fortunes made by a few score families from the trade in teas and silks. Roosevelt himself showed signs of this type of thinking. After Stimson, in January, 1933, had won the President-elect's support for his nonrecognition policy, two of Roosevelt's advisers, Raymond Moley and Rexford Tugwell, tried to dissuade him from committing his administration to a policy they considered futile and dangerous. To their plea Roosevelt answered with the remark that his ancestors had traded with China and for this reason he had the deepest sympathy for the Chinese.⁶ The President's mother had lived in China as a small girl and the President repeatedly told the story of the business dealings of his family in the China trade of the early nineteenth century.⁷

A less romantic argument for the future economic importance of China and for American prosperity was developed in Marxian terms. Expressed most forcefully by Nathaniel Peffer's *Must We Fight in Asia?*, this line of argument stressed the inevitable collapse of American capitalism if it failed to capture new markets. China with its more than four hundred million potential customers was thus essential to the continuation of the American economic system. War with Japan over China was necessary to preserve a capitalism which could no longer live on its domestic markets. Short of turning the United States into a socialist state and sharing the surplus with the American worker, a war of imperialist powers for China was said to be inevitable—so the argument ran.⁸

Whether the argument was made in present or future terms, phrased in romantic aspirations or Marxian dialectic, the assumption was made by the makers of American policy that this country's economic stake in China, along with the political stake, con-

stituted a vital national interest. Yet six years after the end of the war against Japan, American trade with China had practically disappeared and American investments in China were largely liquidated. Similarly, American political influence within China itself had reached a twentieth-century low. No noticeable damage had been done to the American economy and few would argue that a war to replace the Communist rulers of China by a pro-American regime was essential to American security. Historical developments have thus illustrated the falsity of the Stimson-Roosevelt assumptions.

Arguments were also presented in behalf of American intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflict which went beyond the traditional political and economic concepts of national interest. World peace, in which the United States was said to have a vital stake, was also to be preserved by the Stimson-Roosevelt Far Eastern policy, according to its supporters. Stimson believed that American sponsorship of the Kellogg-Briand antiwar pact called for active steps to maintain peace by opposing Japanese expansionism. Secretary Hull thought along similar lines. In January, 1938, the Secretary was asked for statistics by the Senate on American economic interests in China. The Secretary replied that there was in China "a broader and much more fundamental interest—which is that orderly processes in international relationships must be maintained." Spokesmen for the Roosevelt administration frequently made similar claims for their policy's peace-spreading characteristics.

Two assumptions were made in these arguments. The first was that peace between two Asiatic powers was a matter of direct concern for the United States and an important enough national interest to justify the risk of spreading the war. The second assumption was again the optimistic one that a third power, far from the seat of conflict, could adjust the differences of the warring powers by supporting the weaker against the stronger. For over a century the American policy of neutrality had been based on the assumption that peace was divisible and that it was to the interest of this country to avoid wars in which national security and national prosperity were not endangered. That policy, dating back to the precepts of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson, was now

discarded on the assumption that neutrality was no longer a workable policy and that the use of American political, economic, and military strength could effectively check wars on other continents by exerting pressure on one of the contestants. The validity of these assumptions can most objectively be tested by their results.

Initially Stimson thought of this program—refusing to recognize Japanese success in Manchuria—as a moral weapon. It was originally aimed, he said, more at assuring China of American sympathy than at bringing Japan into line and restoring the pre-1931 *status quo*. But when Japan consolidated its conquest of Manchuria, Stimson decided that the United States should go a step farther and impose economic sanctions on Japan. President Hoover, however, realized that to place an embargo on supplies to one fighting nation while sending aid to the other was a dangerous breach of neutrality. It implied, if it did not explicitly suggest, that the United States was willing to move farther and, if necessary, go to war with Japan. Hoover saw this—as did Stimson—and with the support of other members of his cabinet he adhered to what Stimson called “the tradition of American foreign policy” which had always insisted that American interests in the Orient were not worth a war.⁹ On this ground Hoover refused Stimson’s repeated pleas for sanctions and an embargo.

When Stimson found himself unable to win the support of the President to the use of American economic power against Japan, he turned to what he called “a bluff of force.” Here Stimson was turning to an American tradition which dated back as far as Commodore Perry in 1853. In writing his instructions for that famous naval expedition which opened up the ports of Japan to the Western world, Perry said: “It is manifest, from past experience, that arguments or persuasion addressed to this people, unless they are seconded by some imposing manifestation of power, will be utterly unavailing.”

This concept of naval diplomacy was frequently applied to Japan by the United States and by European powers in the nineteenth century. Even in the twentieth century naval diplomacy had been given a vigorous trial by Theodore Roosevelt who, in 1908, sent the United States fleet to the shores of Japan itself. Stimson revived a

tradition which was to see its fullest application under the Franklin Roosevelt administration.

Stimson's use of the navy was limited to his last year as Secretary of State. He suggested and carried out an arrangement with the British Foreign Office whereby the ships of the United States Asiatic Fleet, usually based at Manila, were concentrated with British vessels at Shanghai when hostilities broke out at that city between the Japanese and Chinese forces. More significant was his success in convincing the Secretary of the Navy that the main body of the Pacific Fleet should remain at its Hawaiian base some weeks after it had completed its annual maneuvers. Stimson later suggested that this had a deterrent effect on Japan. More competent evaluations, taking into consideration the state of the fleet and its limited range of operation west of Hawaii, conclude that Stimson's view of his naval diplomacy was naïve.¹⁰ In Japan, however, the chauvinistic press seized upon the American naval operation as proof that the United States was preparing for a trans-Pacific war.

II. THE AMERICAN NAVAL THREAT TO JAPAN

When the Hoover administration was replaced in March, 1933, the direction which Stimson had tried to give to American policy in the Far East was at last accepted and greatly expanded. Not only was there to be political and economic pressure on Japan but the United States Navy was to be greatly increased in strength and the building program pointed directly at Japan.

The position taken by the Roosevelt administration in its relations with Japan was in large part determined by the President himself. The naval program in particular was his personal interest. It was the product of the President's previous convictions about Japan and his strong admiration for the ideas of that great exponent of naval imperialism, Admiral Alfred T. Mahan. From Mahan,

Roosevelt not only received guidance in the use of the navy as an instrument of diplomacy but also confirmation of his belief that Japan was one of America's major enemies.

When Franklin Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Navy by Woodrow Wilson in 1913, he came to Washington at a time of public tension between Japan and the United States. Although Theodore Roosevelt had seemingly quieted the anti-Japanese agitation of the Pacific Coast States by his "gentleman's agreement" in 1907, severely restricting Japanese immigration, new difficulties developed in 1913. The state of California, under the pressure of powerful interest groups, passed legislation forbidding the sale or long-term lease of land to Japanese residents. The Japanese government protested this legislation to Washington and the irresponsible press magnified this protest into a threat of war. Although Secretary of State Bryan remained calm, an attempt was made by the Joint Army-Navy Board to force a mobilization of American forces in the Pacific. President Wilson forbade such a step and rebuked the Joint Board for its swordrattling by forbidding it to meet again without his permission.¹¹

A group of naval officers, led by Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, took the lead in the anti-Japanese agitation. Although Secretary of the Navy Daniels refused to give his support to the plans of this clique, they found a more sympathetic ear in the person of Assistant Secretary Roosevelt. With a background of sentimental attachments to China, young Roosevelt was more prone to be drawn into an anti-Japanese position. For Roosevelt and Daniels, Fiske prepared a memorandum in May, 1913, giving a number of reasons why Japan would be likely to go to war with the United States to secure the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands. Roosevelt also secured naval intelligence reports for 1911 and 1912 giving accounts of alleged Japanese activity in Mexico in preparation for war with the United States. So moved was he by this agitation that he personally sketched some rough plans for naval operations against the Japanese forces.¹²

Roosevelt later wrote to Mahan that during the war scare he had also tried to get the American warships in the Far East concentrated at their base in the Philippines.¹³ Wilson and Bryan, how-

ever, felt that any move of the American naval forces might add to the tension of the situation and orders were sent out to the Far Eastern commander to that effect, over the Assistant Secretary's protest. In his correspondence with Mahan, Roosevelt found additional support for his feeling about the imminence of war with Japan. In June, 1914, Mahan wrote the Assistant Secretary that he felt that "our danger in the Pacific much exceeds that in the Atlantic." Roosevelt wrote in reply: "I wish it were possible to speak quite frankly and in public, about the excess of our danger in the Pacific over that in the Atlantic. I agree with you most heartily that the European powers are not disposed to interfere with us. . . ." Even after the outbreak of war in Europe in August, 1914, Mahan continued to warn Roosevelt about the dangers of war with Japan. Although the Navy Department soon found its attention drawn to the Atlantic and to the problems of submarine warfare, the end of the war in 1918 was once more followed by Japanese-American tension. And again the Assistant Secretary was supplied with lengthy intelligence reports showing the dangers of sudden attack by Japan.

In the 1920's Mr. Roosevelt modified and revised some of his views on Japan. By 1923 he could write a letter to the *Baltimore Sun* in which he said: "Japan and the United States have not a single valid reason, and won't have as far as we can look ahead, for fighting each other." That same year he even rejected some of the tenets of Mahanism and in a private letter he said in regard to Japan: "To enter into a new competition by the building of new fortifications and new navies will be a step backward which will do harm not only to the governments immediately concerned, but to the general future peace of the world." As late as 1928 Mr. Roosevelt complained about the extravagant naval building plans of the Coolidge administration, but this was at least in part a political criticism which may have lacked conviction.¹⁴

The man who took office in 1933, from all indications, was a reversion to the Roosevelt of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy days in his attitude toward Japan and naval power. Within a year in office the President was to launch the largest naval building program in the history of the United States. Two months before

he took office the President-elect announced that he would give his support to the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition of the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo. When this announcement was made the *New York Daily News* editorialized: ". . . he had better begin building up the Navy the moment he becomes President. You cannot make a war-provoking policy stick unless you have warlike weapons and plenty of them. . . ." The logic of the editorial writer's assumption seems to have been fully accepted by Roosevelt in his first years in office.

As his Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt selected Claude A. Swanson, who was known in Congress for his faithful support of increased naval appropriations.¹⁵ There were two requirements, according to Raymond Moley, for Roosevelt's Secretary of the Navy: one was an interest in a big navy and the other was a high degree of susceptibility to Roosevelt's suggestions. Swanson seemed to combine both and, as delegate to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1932, he had spoken in behalf of an American navy second to none.

In his first press conference on March 7, 1933, the new Secretary of the Navy stated that his building policy was to expand the fleet "as quickly as possible" to the London Treaty limits. During the historic first "Hundred Days" of the New Deal the President was too busy with more pressing economic matters to back up his Secretary's plan. But on June 16 Roosevelt issued an executive order allotting \$238,000,000 of the National Recovery Administration's funds to increasing the size of the Navy. The President's critics were quick to question the value of spending these funds in shipyards when there were areas of more pressing needs. But such complaints from the supporters of the President's economic program went unanswered. Before the first year of his administration was over, liberal critics were suggesting that the New Deal was "Drifting into Militarism."¹⁶

Although the new ships to be built with N.R.A. funds would not bring American strength beyond the 1930 treaty limits, Tokyo and many European capitals viewed the American program as again starting the world on a naval race. Naval building had been declining in all countries as national budgets were cut under the stress of

the world depression. Japanese appropriations for new naval construction declined from \$40,900,000 in 1930-31 to \$33,500,000 in 1931-32, and were further cut to \$26,900,000 in 1932-33.¹⁷ The Roosevelt administration, by beginning the largest single program of naval construction undertaken by any nation since the end of World War I, was taking the initiative in reversing the trend.

In January, 1934, the Roosevelt administration presented new evidence that assumptions about the use of naval power in dealing with Japan played an important part in its thinking. Congressman Vinson at that time introduced a bill authorizing a building program over the next five years to bring the navy up to the maximum tonnage permitted by the Washington and London treaties in all categories. As finally passed, the Vinson-Trammell Act authorized the construction of over a hundred new vessels at an estimated annual cost of \$76,000,000. No battleships were contemplated; the 1935 program began with an aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, fourteen destroyers, and six submarines.

When he signed this bill, Roosevelt assured Americans that it was not a law "for the construction of a single additional United States warship." Its purpose, he said, was only to give general congressional approval to a future program. His administration still favored the limitation of naval armaments, Roosevelt argued, despite appearances to the contrary.

As seen from Japan, the American building program of 1933-34 had radically different implications than those offered by its sponsors. Admiral Osumi, Minister of the Navy, declared that the American program left Japan no alternative but to build more ships if national security was to be maintained. The new American ships thus provided the basis for a campaign by the naval expansionists of Japan. Despite pressure for cuts in the national budget, the Japanese naval estimates were the only ones to survive the Diet's economy slashes virtually intact. Some Japanese also assumed that the American effort at naval intimidation meant eventual war. Admiral Suetsugo, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, told Japanese reporters early in 1934 that his country must now be ready for an attack from a large air force carried across the Pacific by the American fleet.¹⁸

In October, 1934, preliminary conversations opened between the United States and Japan with regard to the 1935 naval conference. For weeks the exchange of views continued without progress in reaching any agreement. Japan was unwilling to accept a continuation of the 5-5-3 ratio system laid down in 1922, which set its capital-ship strength at 60 per cent of that of the United States and Britain. The increase in the cruising range of battleships as well as the great advances in naval aviation so favored the attacking fleet that the Japanese felt that their forces had to be more nearly equal to those of their potential enemies. As an alternative to increasing naval strength, Japan called for the abandonment of "offensive" naval strength and the establishment of top tonnage limits for "defensive" fleets. Aircraft carriers, battleships, and cruisers with eight-inch guns were all listed as "offensive" vessels while submarines and destroyers were considered to be defensive. Japan aimed at the maintenance of clear defensive advantage in the western Pacific while leaving the United States unchallenged supremacy within the American defensive triangle in the eastern Pacific.

Although this arrangement would have provided security for both nations, it would have nullified the power of the American fleet as an instrument of diplomacy in Japanese-American relations. The Perry-Stimson-Roosevelt assumption about the achievement of American objectives in Asia by threats of force would have had to be discarded. Since it would have no longer have been possible for the United States to intervene in behalf of China, the assumption in regard to vital American economic and political interests in the Sino-Japanese dispute would also have had to be pushed aside.

The American refusal to alter substantially the 5-5-3 ratio had implications for the future of the Philippines as well. With a Japanese navy that was not considerably weaker than the American fleet, defense of these islands would have been obviously impossible. Many American strategists, official and unofficial, had already written off the Philippines as indefensible.¹⁹ The long and vulnerable supply lines and the lack of good natural bases in the islands had forced that decision on American war planners.

Without rejecting these assumptions, the United States could

not change its position on maintaining a strong offensive naval superiority to Japan. The Japanese, seeing no hope of securing their ends by conference, announced late in 1934 that their country would no longer be bound by the Washington agreements after the two years' warning stipulated by the treaty. Shortly after the Japanese announcements, the Secretary of the Navy stated that American naval maneuvers for 1935 would be conducted in Far Eastern waters.

The timing of the American announcement suggested a new attempt at intimidation although the relationship of the two events was denied by official American spokesmen.²⁰ In Japan, however, the American action contributed to the rising chauvinistic spirit. Many American organizations protested the location of the war games as an uncalled-for provocation, but appeals to President Roosevelt to halt the maneuvers were without avail.

In his annual message to Congress in January, 1935, the President was optimistic. He said that:

There is no ground for apprehension that our relations with any nation will be otherwise than peaceful. Nor is there ground for doubt that the people of most nations seek relief from the threat and burden attaching to the false theory that extravagant armament cannot be reduced and limited by international accord.

But immediately after this statement Roosevelt sent to Congress a budget message calling for the largest military appropriations in the peacetime history of the United States—\$485,000,000 for the Navy alone—a rise of \$180,000,000 over the previous year. Counting the sums spent by P.W.A. on shipbuilding in 1934, this was an increase of almost 40 per cent for the fiscal year of 1936 over that of 1934. Such expenditures, liberal critics pointed out, could only be aimed at Japan and would stir the people of that nation to arm with corresponding speed.²¹

In view of the background of events and the uncompromising positions taken by the Japanese and American governments prior to the opening of the London Naval Conference in December,

1935, there was small possibility on reaching a new limitation agreement. Two months earlier, Secretary Hull told the Japanese ambassador that the United States had not changed its attitude since the 1934 conversations and did not recognize any significant developments since that date.²² It would be, said Hull, "very difficult if not impossible" to reach a comprehensive naval treaty. The only hope expressed by the Secretary of State was for a limited agreement to tide over the situation until circumstances were more favorable.

In Japan there were some marked differences between the Navy Ministry and the Foreign Office. The latter was less adamant on the achievement of parity. Both ministries, however, insisted on the abolition of the ratio system. As Ambassador Saito said earlier, 5-5-3 sounded to Japanese ears like "Rolls Royce-Rolls Royce-Ford." There were indications, however, that, with the ratio system abolished, the Japanese Diet would be unwilling to foot the bill for a "Rolls Royce" navy.

While the American delegation was en route to London, Secretary Swanson released his annual report, strongly recommending continued building up to the 1930 treaty limits. But in his opening speech in London, Norman H. Davis, chief of the American delegation, said that the American building program was "essentially one of replacement" and, therefore, consistent with a desire for naval reduction.

The Japanese proposal was the first item of the agenda, but it met with strong opposition from Britain and the United States. The British charged that setting a common upper limit would lead to an increase in the size of the major fleets even though the Japanese were willing to set this limit low enough to require substantial cuts in their own navy. Such a reduction would have made it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese as well as the British and Americans to operate offensively outside their home waters. Consequently, the British stated bluntly that they would have to stand for a high upper limit for the defense of their empire. Both the British and Americans argued against the Japanese plan, contending that their strategic needs were far greater than those of Japan and that their navies would consequently have to be

much larger. This concept of naval needs did not move the Japanese, who considered only the problem of defending themselves against a larger attacking force.

The chief alternative proposal was made by the British. Each nation was to declare the minimum tonnage it needed for security and also the upper limit beyond which it would not build. In effect, this meant the restoration of naval competition and offered no satisfaction for Japan. After the tenth session of the conference, with their proposal rejected, the Japanese delegates withdrew, leaving only an observer.

In the United States Japan was given the blame for the breakup of naval limitation agreements. But the fact cannot be overlooked that Japan offered to cut tonnages to a point where naval war between the three biggest powers would have been impossible. This, however, was not a major consideration for the British and American delegations.

With the closing of the London Conference, the Roosevelt administration continued its drive for a greatly enlarged navy. In the spring of 1936 Congress was asked to give the Navy Department \$530,000,000 for the next fiscal year. Although this figure was cut a few millions in committee, the final bill still set a new high for peacetime naval spending. The Naval Appropriation Act provided for the construction of twelve destroyers, six submarines and some three hundred naval planes. Two battleships were also authorized, if either Britain or Japan began the construction of capital ships.

If, at any point in history, the die is finally cast after years of preparation, that point had been reached in Japanese-American relations in the years 1936 and 1937. In Japan the political and economic developments assured a continuation of the policy of expansion. In the United States the Roosevelt administration committed itself to programs which meant eventually going to war to stop Japanese expansion. It was, thereafter, only a question of time until the two policies converged and exploded into war.

The continuation of the external political and economic pressures upon Japan during the first half of the 1930's, coupled with the world-wide increase of militarism, gave more strength to the Japanese army's hold on the government. In February, 1936, a

coup was attempted by military extremists. Important government buildings were seized and held for several days before the revolting troops and their leaders surrendered at the command of the Emperor. As a result, one extremist group in the army, the Kodoha, was eliminated. But this left in power the Control Faction, a rival group which was also chauvinistic but avoided extra-legal means in its striving for power.

Military domination of the government was now almost complete. In May, 1936, an imperial ordinance required that all officers filling either the Ministry of War or Navy be on active status. The army and navy could thus make or break cabinets as they pleased, and the political parties were helpless in attempting to form a cabinet which did not have military approval. When members of the Seiyuki party early in 1937, attacked the dictatorial program of the army and the signing of the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, the army forced the resignation of the War Minister and the collapse of the Hirota cabinet. Even though the electorate, in May, 1937, repudiated the next cabinet headed by General Hayashi, there was little hope for effective action by the *status quo* forces which favored *rapprochement* with Britain and the United States.

It was on the basis of these facts that a review of American policy toward Japan was called for in 1936-37. The issue of peace or war for the American people now hung on the question of whether or not it was of vital national interest that future Japanese expansion in Asia be blocked. It was clear, even that early, that there was only the remotest of possibilities that this expansion could be checked by methods short of war. The dreams and proposals of amateur strategists for forcing Japan to her knees by economic means merited little consideration by serious students of Japanese character and foreign policy.

In naval as well as in diplomatic policy, two courses were open to the United States. One was the continuation of the American building program on the Roosevelt-approved Mahan hypothesis that the cure for the curse of navalism would be found in more navalism. Accepting this assumption, to win victory at a minimum cost, the United States had to build a tremendous offensive navy,

one which could carry the conflict across the Pacific, cutting off Japan's trade routes and threatening the home islands. As Charles Beard phrased it, the navy had to be either for "defense or portent." If the latter, the Pacific Fleet had to be strong enough to sweep the Pacific if Japan reacted to a threat of force as proud nations hitherto responded to this type of diplomacy.

The other course promised peace in the Pacific but peace for a price. It involved recognition of the fact that Japan was in at least portions of China to stay for the foreseeable future. It involved acceptance of the word "parity" in naval relations, but with the knowledge that this did not of necessity mean a change in the actual power relationship. On these terms, friendship with Japan was assured, the security of the Philippines was unlikely to be questioned, and America's profitable economic relations with Japan could continue undisturbed.

Congress, as well as the American people as a whole in 1936-37, assumed that American interests in China were far too small to justify war or even a risk of war with Japan. The apathy and lack of warlike spirit in response to the sinking of the U.S. gunboat *Panay* by Japanese planes in December, 1937, testified to the disinterest in Asia. If the issues of war or peace had been stated clearly, the overwhelming popular as well as congressional vote would have favored nonintervention in Asia.

It was different, however, when it came to appropriating funds for a navy which might eventually fight an unwanted war. At this level Congress and the voter only briefly and infrequently glimpsed the relationship between naval expansion and the administration's diplomatic aspirations in the Far East. As a result the Mahanist hypothesis was accepted without serious challenge and continued large-scale naval building met with little resistance.

In January, 1937, the President announced that he had approved the construction of two new battleships, an answer to British construction and the first American capital ships to be built since the Washington Conference. Here and there an influential voice questioned the concept of "defensive purposes" advanced by the President. The *New York Herald Tribune* could see no necessity for these "spectacular increases in our naval burden," and even the

New York Times admitted its inability to see the justification for the Roosevelt action. Congress, however, was again generous in meeting the Navy Department's requests for funds in 1937. Occasionally a question was asked on the floor of Congress about the purpose of the naval increases but the usual arguments about national defenses were given in reply. Navy spending for the fiscal year 1938 continued to set new highs, falling just short of six hundred million dollars.

In the next Congress the President was even more successful in stepping up the pace of his program. At Roosevelt's request, a second Vinson bill was passed, raising the total authorized tonnage 20 per cent above the 1934 goals and giving the President authority to replace all vessels designated as overage. The President had initiated his new armament campaign in his annual message to Congress early in January, 1938, when he stressed the need of keeping "adequately strong in self-defense." A week after the House voted \$547,000,000 for the Navy, the President sent another message to Congress, calling on it to meet the arms increases in other parts of the world with even larger appropriations and by immediately increasing the authorized size of the Navy.

No nation was named by the President, but there were numerous indications that the building program was aimed in part at Japan. In the first place the President's message came a month after the sinking of the *Panay*, when diplomatic negotiations were still in process for the indemnification of that loss. On the day of the President's arms message, the State Department released an eleven-day-old note to the Japanese Foreign Office, sharply protesting the disregard shown for American rights in China by the Japanese forces. And at the same time the Department gave the press news of the slapping of an American diplomat in Nanking by a Japanese soldier.

These three events, coupled with the arms message, clearly suggested a relationship between rearmament and Japanese expansion in the mind of the administration despite the continued protestations that arms were for defense only and not for overseas intervention. An influential minority in Congress, at times verging on a majority, began to ask whether there was any inconsistency be-

tween the congressional position of hands-off in Asia and naval expansion. When hearings were held on the naval increases early in 1938, a number of distinguished citizens appeared to inquire into the purpose of the bill. Admiral Leahy, chief spokesman for the Navy, parried all questions about the relationship of the building program to foreign policy. The Admiral insisted that the Navy was for defense only and that there was no intention of using it to police the world. As for taking action against Japan, Leahy said that it would require "at least three times the proposed increase" to make that possible.

On the floor of the Senate, Hiram Johnson of California, no lover of Japan, also asked questions about the meaning of the building increases and whether they were intended for overseas operations. Senator Pittman, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a Roosevelt spokesman, gave strong assurances that the President's policy was still that which he enunciated in 1933, "noninterference and nonintervention in the affairs of other governments." The Senator went so far as to repudiate the President's "quarantine speech" of October, 1937, and to insist that foreign policy could not be judged by the use of that suggestive word. By quarantine, he said, the President meant to ostracize the outlaw nations rather than to place an embargo on them.

In the House, four members of the Naval Affairs Committee submitted a minority report attacking the proposed naval increases, but the committee majority gave it full support. The bill passed the House over one hundred dissenting votes and went through the Senate by a vote of fifty-six to twenty-eight. Big Navy interests succeeded in surpassing even the President's request by making three thousand naval planes the minimum rather than the maximum to be built and by adding a new dirigible to the naval air force at the cost of three million dollars.

The Japanese press, while remaining silent on Japan's own building plans, devoted much space to the American debate over the 20 per cent increase in the building program. Japanese newspapers argued that the American move was a direct threat to Japan. Navy Minister Yonai assured the Japanese people that their navy was keeping pace with the Americans in building.

In February, 1938, Japan was given a hint that in a future war there would be joint British-American naval operations conducted in the western Pacific. The new British naval base at Singapore was dedicated that month with only three foreign vessels on hand; all three were ships from the United States Navy. News also leaked out on the floor of Congress about a secret mission to London in January, 1938, by Captain Ingersoll, chief of the Navy War Plans division. Although the details of the Ingersoll conversations were then unknown, correct surmises were made in Congress that the purpose of the visit was the planning of joint operations against Japan.²³ In Japan these surmises strengthened suspicions that the Japanese navy must be strong enough to resist an Anglo-American blockade which would cut off Japanese trade with Europe and southeast Asia.

III. USE OF THE U. S. NAVY IN FAR EASTERN POLICY

After 1938 the increase of Hitler's power in Europe and the fall of Austria and Czechoslovakia made it easier to overcome congressional opposition to naval building and to administration pleas for a two-ocean navy. For the fiscal year of 1939, total arms expenditures mounted to more than twice those of 1935. The Navy also drew on the Treasury for over \$670,000,000 in 1939, almost \$900,000,000 in 1940, and for over \$2,000,000,000 in the fiscal year ending in June, 1941. Authorizations later that year, moved by the fall of France, almost doubled the Navy's building goals.

As the Navy grew larger, there was increasing confidence that American naval power could easily threaten Japan into submission or, if necessary, crush the Japanese forces with a minimum of losses for the United States. There was no expectation that the war would be a long one or a hard one. The American racialist stereotype of

the Oriental, assuming basic inferiority on the part of the yellow races, did not permit any consideration of the possibility that the Japanese might be a formidable opponent. The surprise victory of the Japanese over the Russians in 1904-5 was forgotten, even though it had once raised the stature of Japan in American eyes.

In July, 1937, shortly after Japan renewed its warfare against China, President Roosevelt began work on a plan to force the Japanese into submission by a joint British-American naval blockade to cut off Japanese trade.²⁴ The opposition of many of the leading admirals to such a bold plan, which they believed meant war, as well as the adverse public reactions to the famous "quarantine speech" in October, 1937, led the President to put his plan aside.

In 1938 a new joint Army-Navy Plan was drafted for use against Japan. It assumed that Japan might begin hostilities against the United States after a period of strained relations and without a formal declaration of war.²⁵ Among the American fleet's tasks was a westward movement from Pearl Harbor to capture and establish control over the Caroline and Marshall Islands. The Ingersoll conversations in London had already explored the possible use of the new British naval base at Singapore for operations against Japan.

In mid-April, 1939, the United States fleet, which had been moved to the Atlantic three months earlier, was suddenly ordered by the President to return to the Pacific. The Atlantic transfer had been considered as only a temporary one but the fleet was to have remained longer and to have been part of the New York World's Fair. In the fall of 1939, despite the outbreak of war in Europe, reinforcements were also sent to Admiral Hart, commander of the Asiatic Squadron, consisting of a half dozen new submarines and a squadron of planes. Hart had asked for a heavy cruiser squadron because of the increased dangers of operation in the western Pacific, but this much strength could not be spared for the Pacific Fleet.

While in the Pacific, the fleet was based on the California coast. But in October, 1939, a substantial number of ships—eight heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and eighteen destroyers—were detached from the West Coast and stationed at Pearl Harbor. In April, 1940, the fleet was moved in its entirety to Hawaii for the

conduct of the annual maneuvers. Although the fleet's plans called for a return to the West Coast in early May, orders were given to postpone the return for two weeks. Before that period expired, the fleet was assigned to Pearl Harbor for an indefinite period. For two decades, since its assignment to the Pacific in 1920, the fleet had been based on the West Coast. This move, shifting the center of American naval power some 2,500 miles closer to Japan, was a highly significant event in the history of the power relations of the two countries.

In October, 1940, the commander in chief of the fleet outlined a new war plan which aimed at intercepting trade between Japan and the Americas.²⁶ To achieve this extensive operation, major reinforcements were to be sent to the Asiatic Squadron which would retire to the East Indies area where it would operate in conjunction with British and Dutch naval forces. Another American detachment was to patrol the North Pacific from Hawaii to the Aleutians, sweeping the sea for Japanese commerce and raiders. The remaining forces would reconnoiter the Caroline and Marshall Islands preliminary to offensive operations against these Japanese outposts.

The naval movements could be interpreted only as efforts to coerce Japan or as preparations for actual hostilities. For the most part the initiative for these movements did not originate in the Navy Department but with the President and the State Department. In the case of the shifting of the fleet base to Pearl Harbor, both the Commander in Chief of the fleet, Admiral Richardson, and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, were in opposition. Richardson was also critical of any stick-waving at Japan which might end in hostilities. He argued that Pearl Harbor was not adequately equipped and that the Japanese knew that the American forces were not sufficiently supported with auxiliary ships to conduct offensive operations. Another factor, generally overlooked, was that, in the 1938 fleet maneuvers, the aircraft carrier *Saratoga* had launched a successful surprise attack on Pearl Harbor from a position only a hundred miles away.

Roosevelt's decision to use the naval power of the United States in an effort to squeeze concessions from Japan, or to engage in war, if necessary, came not only from his own assumptions about Amer-

ican interest and American superiority, but also at the urging of the British government. As early as March, 1939, Lord Halifax, British Foreign Secretary, was urging that the American fleet be returned to the Pacific and that this step be so timed as to have maximum psychological effect on Japan.²⁷ The British also assumed that war was likely with the Japanese, but at the same time they were eager to keep most of the strength of the Royal Navy in European waters.

One British objective was to strengthen Singapore with detachments of the American navy. Five days after he became prime minister on May 10, 1940, Churchill sent a personal message to Roosevelt asking for American ships to be dispatched to Singapore.²⁸ In early October of the same year, after the fall of France had drawn most of Britain's Far Eastern ships to the Mediterranean, Churchill again urged that American power be shifted to the western Pacific. He suggested the reinforcement of the Asiatic Squadron with battleships and once more offered Singapore as a base. In late November, 1940, another request came from London for the division of America's Pacific forces and a greater extension of power west of Hawaii. If war came as a result, Britain's First Sea Lord, Sir Dudley Pound, argued that the Japanese navy could be stopped north of the Dutch East Indies. The British ambassador to Washington told Hull that British naval experts had also figured out that the American fleet, if based at Singapore, could, on the opening of war, reach Japan before the Japanese navy attacked in the South Pacific.²⁹ This optimism about the ability of the American fleet to move boldly into Japan's home waters was, fortunately, not shared by top American naval commanders. Admiral Leahy, formerly Chief of Naval Operations, told the President in October, 1940, that any reinforcements sent to the Asiatic Squadron would be lost in the event of war.³⁰ Later it was revealed that the Singapore base lacked the equipment to effect major repairs on capital ships and would have been inadequate as a center of American operations in Far Eastern waters. The November, 1940, request was not filled, but before the year closed some further reinforcements were ordered to Admiral Hart's Far Eastern Squadron.

In Washington the amateur naval strategists not only included

President Roosevelt but also Secretary Hull and one of his aides, Stanley Hornbeck, State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs. Hornbeck, according to Admiral Richardson, was exercising more influence over the disposition of the United States fleet in 1940 than was its commander in chief.³¹ When part of the fleet was moved west, to be based in Hawaii in October, 1939, this order was sent with the strong approval of the State Department.

The major decision, the retention of the entire fleet at Pearl Harbor, was apparently made by the President himself. When the fleet commander asked the meaning of this move, he was told by the Chief of Naval Operations that it was to have a "deterrent effect" on Japanese moves into the East Indies. Admiral Richardson doubted, however, whether the intended effect could be obtained. Japanese espionage in Hawaii, he was certain, was effective enough to inform Tokyo that the American fleet had assembled with only an 85 per cent complement and without the train of auxiliary ships needed for offensive action west of Hawaii.³² When the admiral presented this argument to the President in person, he found that Roosevelt was certain that the contrary was true and was determined not to permit a withdrawal to the West Coast bases. Admiral Stark agreed with Richardson on the inadvisability of keeping the fleet at Pearl Harbor.

Several Japanese newspapers pointed out that the decision to move the fleet base was an effort to stop rumored Japanese moves toward the Dutch East Indies. But they also suggested that it would be difficult for the fleet to remain at Pearl Harbor because of limited facilities. The information now available on the formulation of Japanese foreign policy, in 1940, gives no support for the President's belief in the effects of his strategy.³³ Roosevelt admitted some uncertainty about his policy, but held out against the opinion of his two top naval commanders and told Stark that he would "sit tight" on his decision.

As an amateur naval strategist, Roosevelt had other ideas about employing the Navy against Japan. For the most part he vastly underrated the ability and strength of the Japanese navy and expressed overly-optimistic views about the capabilities of the American fleet. In October, 1939, discussing the possibility of Japan's

moving into the Dutch East Indies, he said that "we could easily intercept her fleet"—an operation which American forces would have had to conduct some five thousand miles from their nearest major base.³⁴ A year later, in October, 1940, the President's optimism went so far as to touch on the realm of fantasy. At that time he told the Secretary of the Navy that he was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and the Western Hemisphere if Japan took action against British possessions as a result of the opening of the Burma Road. This blockade could be achieved, thought the President, by a patrol of light ships stretching across the Pacific vastness in two lines. One would run from Hawaii to the Philippines and the other from Samoa to Singapore. Admiral Richardson, when the Secretary of the Navy told him of the President's plans, said that war would surely result, that the fleet was in no condition to carry out such an operation, and that to attempt it would expose many ships to certain destruction. Richardson's objections "hurt the President's feelings," according to Secretary Knox, and Richardson was shortly after relieved of his post.³⁵

Before being relieved of his command, Admiral Richardson drafted a tentative plan for carrying out a limited blockade, based on a more realistic measure of the fleet's limitations. His plan, however, called for the shifting of some ships from the Atlantic to facilitate operations and it never received the President's approval. Richardson was himself doubtful whether any offensive operations could be successfully conducted in Japanese waters without major increases in American strength.

Despite Richardson's doubts, the American public received assurances from many quarters that the Japanese navy was not to be feared. A study of naval power in the Pacific by an American officer, published in May, 1941, stated that a surprise attack on the Pacific Fleet had already been averted.³⁶ Pearl Harbor was already on a war footing, this authority believed, and, referring to Japan's successful surprise attack on the Russian navy in 1904, he said that there would be "no American Port Arthur." Only a few weeks before December 7, a popular writer on military affairs told a national radio audience that Japan was in no position to fight the United States. The Japanese navy was said to be hopelessly handicapped

by lack of air support and Japanese air power was termed "almost nonexistent." Six months earlier, Admiral Turner, director of the War Plans Division, told a British-American staff conference that the American navy could keep Japanese strength at home merely by cruising in mid-Pacific waters.³⁷

This myth of overwhelming fighting superiority lulled many Americans into the passive acceptance of the coming conflict. Although it was obvious to many that the Roosevelt administration was taking a position which would force a military showdown, opposition voices were softened or stilled by a belief in a quick and inexpensive victory. The traditional assumptions of white or Anglo-Saxon superiority made it easy for the public as well as for government leaders to believe that an Oriental nation could not equal or outdo the West in adapting itself to the techniques and machines of modern warfare. It was this belief that also contributed to the unpreparedness of Hawaii and the Philippines.

IV. ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON JAPAN

The underrating of Japanese strength and morale also dominated the last phase of American peacetime relations with Japan. Like the naval program, the Roosevelt administration's economic program was based on the assumption that threat and pressure would achieve American ends in dealing with Japan.

The first call for the use of economic pressure against Japan followed the issuance of the Stimson doctrine in 1932. Proponents of sanctions advocated striking two blows at the Japanese, one by an embargo on arms and munitions and the other by a boycott on Japanese goods sold in the United States. The latter appealed particularly to the American manufacturing groups who were facing the competition of inexpensive Japanese merchandise which, in the depression years, seemed to be selling widely on the American

market. Neither program was successful, however, because of the unwillingness of Congress and of the public to interfere in the Asiatic conflict in the early 1930's.

When Japan struck at China again in 1937, the movement for economic measures was revived with great strength. Former Secretary of State Henry Stimson, now a private citizen, took the lead with a letter to the *New York Times* in October, 1937. Stimson called upon the United States to end the sale of arms to Japan and claimed that in this manner the conflict could be brought to a halt. In contrast to the views later expressed in his memoirs, he argued that aid could be given to China "without serious danger to us." There was no thought of sending troops to participate in the Sino-Japanese conflict, Stimson said. With a rare bit of foresight he wrote that to attempt to send American troops "would do much more harm than good." After repeating the various assumptions about American interests in China (these were also the Roosevelt administration assumptions), Stimson closed by expressing the hope that the President's "quarantine speech" at Chicago meant that America would carry through with its "responsibilities" in the Far Eastern crisis.

Stimson's call for action found enthusiastic support from various groups. Self-interest combined in some instances with a desire to aid China. Labor, for example, was glad to campaign against cheap foreign manufactures which undersold American products. Both the C.I.O. and the A.F. of L., in their 1937 conventions, passed resolutions favoring a boycott of Japanese-made goods. Business interests in competition with Japan also gave some support to Stimson's call for action. But when *The Nation* promoted a consumer's boycott on all purchases of silk stockings, American hosiery manufacturers who depended on Japanese silk imports denounced the boycott as a blow to American industry.

Arguments in behalf of an arms embargo and a consumers' boycott were also furnished by books like *Japan's Feet of Clay*.³⁸ The author of this volume pleaded for the United States and Britain to call Japan's bluff and to cut off all trade with this imperialist nation. Japan was to collapse within a few weeks, her feet of clay crumbling under the strain of economic hardship, thus bringing the war in

China to an end. Like other pleas for economic sanctions, this book claimed that such action would lead to peace. Any possibility of a conflict was denied, for the author believed that the Japanese were really mediocre fighting men whose characters were unfit for the strains of modern war.

These specious pleas were used by administration spokesmen in Congress in behalf of legislation which would give the President the power to curtail or suspend American economic relations with Japan. But Congressmen were hesitant to act, reflecting on the uncertainty of public opinion. Despite the preference of the majority of Americans for a Chinese victory, a public-opinion poll in October, 1937, found that fewer than 40 per cent of those questioned felt strongly enough about the Asiatic conflict to stop their purchases of Japanese goods.

The application of the so-called "moral embargo" by the Department of State in 1938 was the first official achievement of the supporters of economic sanctions. The decision, in 1939, to terminate the 1911 commercial treaty with Japan was an even greater victory. Within the Roosevelt cabinet the movement for embargoes grew in strength. Secretary Morgenthau was the strongest advocate of ending American trade with Japan, and he gained a strong supporter in Henry Stimson when the latter entered the cabinet in the summer of 1940. Six months earlier, Stimson had written another letter to the *New York Times*, again appealing for an end to the sale of war materials as the first step to a firmer policy. He assured his fellow Americans that Japan did not want war with the United States and that an embargo was the road to peace.

This simple program for winning a bloodless victory over Japan, with its "having one's cake and eating it" solution, began to win wider public support. Public-opinion polls were able to produce larger and larger percentages in favor of embargoes on trade with Japan. The administration kept pace with this movement of opinion and, by its licensing program, made successive inroads on the sale of strategic materials to Japan. By the end of 1940 the only item vital to Japan's effort being shipped by the United States was oil. The sanctionist groups therefore concentrated their efforts in

1941 on ending the trade in oil and in nonessential commodities.

In mid-June of 1941 oil supplies grew so short on the east coast of the United States that all shipments from east-coast ports were prohibited. Although the reason for this action was a genuine domestic problem, restricting purchases to West Coast ports produced a major cut in Japan's oil shipments.

The Navy, and Admiral Stark in particular, argued strongly against cutting off Japanese oil purchases. Little hope was placed by the navy in this method of forcing a reversal in Japanese policy. The shortage of domestic oil supplies was expected to force Japan into war for the Dutch East Indies oil and into war with the United States as well. The Navy, heavily burdened by its operations in the Atlantic in the convoying of arms to Britain, did not consider itself ready for war in the Pacific. Secretary Hull was also for months reluctant to give the approval of the State Department to this drastic move.

Secretary Morgenthau, warmly supported by Stimson, continued his fight against the moderates in the Roosevelt cabinet and called for the ending of Japanese trade by the freezing of Japanese assets. Outside the government he found many strong supporters. "Squeeze Japan Now!" was the title of one typical exhortation by a Far Eastern specialist.³⁹ In a masterful oversimplification this writer promised that "terrorization of Japan by levying of penalties in advance as a token of what may come" was the only way to keep the European war from spreading to Asia.

President Roosevelt was finally moved to carry out the Morgenthau-Stimson program. On July 26, 1941, following the movement of Japanese troops into Indochina, he issued an order freezing Japanese assets and cutting off all Japanese trade. Britain and the Netherlands followed suit. Pressing the point home, American oil was then sent to the Soviet Union via Vladivostok by American tankers which passed not far from the shores of oil-hungry Japan.

Japan now had no alternative but to bow to American demands or fight for the resources by which her economic and military strength was to be maintained. Short of a miraculous revolution, overthrowing army leadership, no change of course could be ex-

pected from the Japanese government. The war with Japan, which Admiral Ingersoll said the navy had confidently expected for the last twenty years, was now at hand. The only question which remained to be answered was where and at what hour the attack would come. Pearl Harbor, the Philippines, and Guam were obvious Japanese objectives. But the vigor which had been applied to pressuring Japan in the previous months was not now applied in preparing to meet the results of that policy.

V. AMERICA'S FALSE AND COSTLY ASSUMPTIONS

The Far Eastern policy of the Roosevelt administration was born of an exaggerated conception of American political and economic interests in China. It was based on dream stuff rather than on the facts of Far Eastern history and statistics of American trade. It was based on the oft-disproved assumption that one major power can intimidate another by rapidly increasing its striking power without an arms race as the chief result. Yet this was the assumption stated most bluntly by Norman H. Davis, perennial American delegate to the naval disarmament conferences and one of Franklin Roosevelt's closest advisers in the realm of foreign affairs. In a memorandum which he prepared for the President in July, 1937, after the outbreak of war in China, Davis advocated the construction of two or three additional battleships "for the sake of peace and ultimate disarmament. I do not hold to the theory that the best way to preserve peace is to prepare for war, but I am convinced that the bigger our navy is the more influence we could bring to bear for disarmament."⁴⁰ By these means American intervention in the Sino-Japanese conflict was to restore the pre-1937 or even the pre-1931 status quo of the Far East. When war appeared finally as an almost inescapable certainty, there was still faith in the validity of American policy since out of war were to come order and progress for

China and more abundant economic opportunities for the United States.

These assumptions dominated the thinking of President Roosevelt and key figures in his cabinet. When challenged by political opponents and others who were concerned with the maintenance of peace in the Pacific, the assumptions were dogmatically reaffirmed. On the basis of materials now available, there is no evidence that these assumptions were seriously re-examined at any time from 1933 down to Pearl Harbor. The warnings of Ambassador Grew and other students of the Far East, who managed to free themselves from the official frame of reference and the prevalent stereotypes, went unheeded. In 1935, for example, a former chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs warned his superiors that the defeat of Japan ". . . would merely create a new set of stresses, and substitute for Japan the U.S.S.R.—as the successor of Imperial Russia—as a contestant (and at least an equally unscrupulous and dangerous one) for the mastery of the East. Nobody except perhaps Russia would gain from our victory in such a war. . . ."41

This profound prophecy was ignored. The President and his policy makers went ahead with a program of resistance to Japan which was logical and consistent, if their assumptions were accepted, but could only end in war.

Any study of the wisdom of American Far Eastern policy must note the unpleasant facts of its results. The end of all foreign policies is the protection and advancement of national interests. If American policy was sound, the results should testify to that soundness. But its results have only been negative. Into the vacuum created by the destruction of Japanese power moved the power of the Soviet Union. In place of Japan, the Soviet Union became the dominant force in the Far East and a China under Soviet influence has yielded far less for American interests than did China under Japan. A war with the "Open Door" as one of its objectives ended with the door closed more tightly than ever. Not only were American interests in China destroyed but in the war the more valuable trade with Japan was eliminated and Japan turned into a subject nation, dependent far into the foreseeable future on an American

subsidy for its economic existence. Lastly, instead of bringing peace and order to Asia, World War II let loose in that vast area—as World War I did in Europe—all the passions of long-suppressed nationalism to create tumult and strife for decades to come.

“Wars begin in the minds of men,” the framers of the UNESCO constitution concluded. So America’s war with Japan began as much in the minds of Stimson, Roosevelt, and other architects of American policy, in the decade before Pearl Harbor, as in the minds of the leaders of Japan. It is unfair to ask that American leaders be endowed with superhuman powers of prediction and the ability to foresee all the results of their acts. But it is the responsibility of statesmen and diplomats to avoid war and warmaking policies unless there is a high degree of probability that unquestionably vital national interests can only be protected by war. A war policy must then be justified by the sanest of estimates of the outcome, evaluating the experience of the past and weighing the costs in blood and sweat against the benefits to present and future generations. By the standards of results—mankind’s score sheet—the policies of Roosevelt and Stimson failed in their estimates of national interest and of the methods of achieving that interest. Their policy, paid for in American lives and resources, netted nought but ruin for Japan and assisted in the birth of an Asia more determined than ever to eject the Western interloper.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 4

1. Cf. Walter Millis, *This Is Pearl! The United States and Japan* (New York: William Morrow & Company, Inc., 1947) and Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950).
2. An example of progress in this direction is furnished by George F. Kennan’s *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), in which a major State Department policy

- maker deals very critically with the "legalistic approach" of American diplomacy to Far Eastern problems.
3. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 233.
 4. A. Whitney Griswold, *The Far Eastern Policy of the United States* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1938), p. 393.
 5. Stimson and Bundy, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-79.
 6. Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), p. 95.
 7. Sumner Welles, *Seven Decisions That Shaped History* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), p. 68.
 8. The Peffer book was published in 1935 and a refutation of its arguments, made by Paul T. Homan, "Must It Be War With Japan?" appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly*, LIII (June, 1938), pp. 173-85. Peffer himself later argued against and, finally, for war with Japan on other grounds.
 9. Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 244. Stimson says that he could not deny "that anything more than verbal action to check Japanese aggression might well lead to war." *Ibid.*, p. 233.
 10. Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1942), p. 157.
 11. An account of this war scare and its background is to be found in Josephus Daniels, *The Wilson Era: Years of Peace, 1910-1917* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), pp. 167-68.
 12. This plan as well as other evidences of Roosevelt's concern with Japan are presented in detail by Frank Freidel, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Apprenticeship* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1952), pp. 222-27.
 13. This and the successive letters quoted are to be found among the unpublished materials in the Franklin D. Roosevelt library.
 14. Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy, A Democratic View," *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1928), pp. 573-86.
 15. Swanson was also chosen in order to open a Senate seat for a rising Virginia politician, Harry Byrd, who was later to become a bitter foe of the New Deal domestic program.
 16. This was the title of an article by Mauritz Hallgren in *The Nation*, October 4, 1933, pp. 373-75.
 17. U.S. Naval Intelligence figures, cited in the *Congressional Record*, May 20, 1933, 73 Cong., 1 sess., p. 3826.
 18. *Japan Advertiser*, January 18, 1934.
 19. Theodore Roosevelt reached this conclusion as early as 1907 when he called the Philippines America's "heel of Achilles." Henry F. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1931), p. 408. The same conclusion was reached by Admiral Fiske in drafting war plans against Japan in 1913. See Bradley Fiske, *From Midshipman to Rear Admiral* (New York: The Century Company, 1919), pp. 528-29.
 20. Admiral Morison considers the issuance of the American announcement to have been "purely by chance" in following closely on the Japanese

- step. What resulted he calls a "curious tension." Samuel E. Morison, *The Rising Sun in the Pacific* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1948), p. 12. For the Japanese reactions, see J. K. Kasai, *The United States and Japan in the Pacific* (Tokyo: Kokusai Press, 1935), *passim*.
21. "Our Navy Madness," *The Nation*, January 23, 1935; "We Must Not Arm Against Japan," *ibid.*, March 13, 1935. These criticisms should be contrasted with the later evaluations of a large-navy proponent like Commodore Dudley W. Knox who could say that Japan's actions "did comparatively little to stir us into active naval building." See S. E. Morison, *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II: The Battle of the Atlantic, September, 1939-May, 1943* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1947), I, xxxviii.
 22. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan: 1931-1941*, Department of State Publication 2016 (2 vols.; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), I, 277-78.
 23. *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (39 parts; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), Part IX, pp. 4274-77. (The Hearings will hereinafter be designated *Pearl Harbor Attack*.)
 24. Welles, *op. cit.*, pp. 71, 76.
 25. This was known as Orange (1938) and is printed in part in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XV, pp. 1423-25.
 26. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, pp. 1006-12.
 27. Cordell Hull, *Memoirs* (2 vols.; The Macmillan Company, 1948), I, 630.
 28. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
 29. Hull, *op. cit.*, I, 914.
 30. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, p. 265.
 31. *Ibid.*, Part I, p. 297.
 32. *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 265-66, 298-300.
 33. The most thorough study of Japanese foreign policy in 1940 as yet available, that of Herbert Feis, *op. cit.*, makes no mention of the fleet movement as a consideration by the makers of Japanese policy.
 34. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
 35. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, pp. 323-24.
 36. Commander William D. Puleston, U.S.N., *The Armed Forces of the Pacific* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 116-17.
 37. Major General Sherman Miles, "Pearl Harbor in Retrospect," *Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1948, p. 65.
 38. The author was an English publicist, Freda Utley, whose book was issued in the United States in 1937.
 39. Nathaniel Peffer in *The Nation*, August 2, 1941. This publication carried many similar articles and editorials throughout 1941. Cf. "Call Japan's Bluff," August 9, 1941.
 40. This memorandum, initialed "N. H. D.," is dated July 30, 1937, and is included among the President's papers in the Hyde Park library.
 41. Quoted in Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

5

JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1921-1941; THE PACIFIC BACK ROAD TO WAR

by

CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL

It is . . . peculiarly to our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. Alliance with China, in view of China's absolute military helplessness, means, of course, not an additional strength to us, but an additional obligation which we assume.

—THEODORE ROOSEVELT, to President William Howard Taft, December 22, 1910.

America provoked Japan to such an extent that the Japanese were forced to attack Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on history to say that America was forced into war.

—CAPTAIN OLIVER LYTTTELTON, British Minister of Supplies, June 20, 1944.

. . . It is beyond doubt that President Roosevelt wanted to get his country into the war, but for political reasons was most anxious to insure that the first act of hostility came from the other side; for which reason he caused increasing pressure to be put on the Japanese, to a point that no self-respecting nation could endure without resort to arms.

—CAPTAIN RUSSELL GRENFELL, *Main Fleet to Singapore*, 1952

I. PRESIDENT WILSON CARRIES ON A POLICY OF PRESSURE UPON JAPAN

The path to Pearl Harbor was a long and much-travelled one. President Theodore Roosevelt put Japanese feet upon that path in September, 1905, under the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth. Control of the South Manchuria Railway meant control of the economic life of Manchuria. Then, in order to check Japanese immigration to the Pacific Coast and to keep Japan from casting acquisitive eyes in the direction of the Philippines, Roosevelt, in the Root-Takahira Agreement (November 30, 1908), gave her a "free hand in Manchuria."¹ The advantages accruing to Japan from her special position in North China were clearly recognized by the American ambassador in Tokyo in 1910:

The war with Russia left in the hands of Japan as the chief fruits of her success substantial rights in the Chinese provinces of Manchuria. . . . None of the Powers stood in the way of her peace treaty and all understood that to enjoy the benefits of her acquisition a certain superiority over other nations must be conceded.²

Theodore Roosevelt had been willing to make this concession, but President Taft rejected all thoughts of "appeasement" and tried to preserve the territorial integrity of China by endeavoring to place a strong financial flooring under the province of Manchuria.³ He succeeded merely in destroying the structure of "balanced antagonisms" erected by Roosevelt and abruptly pushed suspicious Japan into the reluctant arms of Russia.⁴

President Wilson carried on this policy of pressure upon Japan. His Minister to China, Paul Reinsch, sent to the Department of State a series of dispatches so critical of the Japanese Twenty-One

Demands that they helped to create in the American mind a fixation of Japanese wickedness and thus broadened the path to Pearl Harbor. Under Wilson, a Secretary of State whose fame as a pacifist encircled the globe, sent to Japan (May 11, 1915) a note with a delayed fuse of nonrecognition that exploded into war some twenty-six years later. Then, in order to make Japanese hostility a constant factor in the uneasy Far Eastern equation, Wilson sent General William S. Graves with a small army to Siberia to check expansion in that quarter.⁵ Thanks to this American intervention, the maritime provinces of Siberia were saved for the avaricious regime of Red Russia.

Finally, during the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference, President Wilson led a determined assault upon the Japanese position in Shantung in the face of his acquiescence in the secret treaty that bound Britain to support the Japanese claims to economic domination of that province. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement (November 2, 1917) recorded this acquiescence, and Wilson's later actions at Paris and his subsequent denial of any knowledge of any secret treaties must have convinced Japanese statesmen that he was implementing the maxims of Machiavelli.⁶

Secretary Lansing had a much clearer view of the realities in Far Eastern politics than did President Wilson. To him there was a definite basis for the Japanese fear of the spread of bolshevism in the Far East and he understood their desire to control the maritime provinces of Siberia as a bastion of defense against the tide of communism:

My belief is that they [the Japanese] will send reinforcements to Siberia and attempt to strengthen Seminoff's force [of White Russians]. I cannot see how the Japanese Government can adopt any other policy in view of the very real peril to Japan if the Bolsheviks should gain a foothold in Manchuria and co-operate with the Korean revolutionists. Certainly in the circumstances we ought not to raise any objection to Japan sending a sufficient force to check the Bolshevik advance, for the spread of Bolshevism in the Far East would be a dreadful menace to civilization.⁷

In the following year, when the anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States reached high tide, Lansing shrewdly remarked:

I have little patience with these people who are forever on the verge of hysterics about the deep and wicked schemes of Japan. They imagine some of the most preposterous things and report them as facts. I would be inclined to think that some of these enemies of Japan were mentally unbalanced but for their sanity on all other subjects. Unfortunately, they are listened to by many Americans whose reason ought to warn them against believing such tales without better evidence.⁸

This hostile sentiment in the United States toward Japan gave great satisfaction to Lenin, who hoped for eventual war between these enemies of bolshevism. Perhaps the bait of economic concessions in Siberia might serve a useful purpose in this regard! In November, 1920, the *New York Times* printed a news item to the effect that W. B. Vanderlip had been granted the exclusive use of a large area in Siberia for mining purposes.⁹ The reason for this concession was explained by Lenin to his intimate associates: "We shall give America a territory for economic use, in a region where we have no naval or military forces. In this way we incite American imperialism against the Japanese bourgeoisie."¹⁰

Few Americans had the slightest conception of the devious schemes of Lenin to sow seeds of suspicion between Japan and the United States. Secretary Lansing was well acquainted with the menace of bolshevism in the Far East but was compelled to leave the Wilson cabinet in February, 1920, and his successor did not enjoy a similar knowledge of all the implications of Soviet policy.

II. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN UNDER THE REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATIONS OF HARDING, COOLIDGE, AND HOOVER

Secretary Hughes maintained the tradition of the Wilson administration. In the field of foreign relations the "normalcy" so dear to the heart of President Harding meant hostility toward Japan. The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was primarily called as a means of checking Japanese expansion in China and the Japanese delegation must have winced under the verbal lashing of Secretary Hughes as he read his long recital of Japanese misdeeds. But even Hughes realized that there were limits to this policy of pinpricks and pressure. In 1924, when Congress passed an exclusion law against the immigration of Japanese laborers into the United States, he wrote a letter of protest to Senator Lodge who had been a strong supporter of this legislation. To Hughes it seemed obvious that it was unwise to arouse in the minds of large numbers of Japanese a feeling of bitter resentment against the United States: "I dislike to think what the reaping will be after the sowing of this seed."¹¹

Further seeds of resentment were sown in the fields of finance. In October, 1927, the South Manchuria Railway Company applied to Morgan and Company for a loan of \$40,000,000 to be used for the development of transportation facilities in Manchuria. Inasmuch as this railway was largely controlled by the Japanese government, the loan assumed a political character. Before the application for this loan had been filed, Thomas W. Lamont, of Morgan and Company, made a trip to Manchuria to look into the situation. He found the province was the "only stable region in all China." The Japanese were developing "Manchuria not chiefly in the military sense but in an economic way." Development was working out "in

the interest of the Chinese" who were pouring into Manchuria to "escape the banditry, looting and despoiling to which they are subjected elsewhere."¹²

When the government of Chiang Kai-shek entered a vigorous protest against this proposed loan, Ferdinand L. Mayer, the American chargé d'affaires in Peking, wrote to Secretary Kellogg some words of sage advice: "From a purely humanitarian viewpoint it would be advantageous for China to have America participate indirectly in Japanese development of Manchuria." Then with his eyes on the Russian advance he continued: "The Powers cannot . . . let China drift on in her present anarchy indefinitely . . . if the Russian influence is not curbed."¹³ A few days later Mayer made the following significant remark: ". . . after all what has the so-called especially friendly attitude of the Chinese ever meant to us? It has not furthered our commercial interests . . . nor has it saved us from the horrors and insults of Nanking."¹⁴

Although Ambassador MacVeagh, at Tokyo, expressed the opinion that the Department of State should "use the first opportunity to convince the Japanese of our honest desire to help them when we can legitimately do so,"¹⁵ the opposition from China was so strong that Morgan and Company lost all interest in the loan. This action caused some of the seeds of distrust sown by American officials to sprout into small plants of active dislike. It was Henry L. Stimson who fertilized these seedlings into luxuriant growth.

The opportunity for Secretary Stimson to bedevil the situation in the Far East came with the outbreak of hostilities between China and Japan on September 18, 1931. This was not a plain case of Japanese aggression. Ever since 1915, successive Chinese governments had strongly contended that the treaties growing out of the Twenty-One Demands were invalid because they had been signed under duress. The Japanese responded by pointing to Versailles. The war lord of Manchuria, Chang Hsueh-liang, was deeply in debt to Japanese bankers and, instead of showing some appreciation for financial favors, he courted Chiang Kai-shek. Japan could not afford to have Nationalist armies move across Manchuria and leave a trail of destruction like the one that marked their entry into Tsinan and Nanking. But the most important factor that propelled Japan

into action in 1931 was the fear that Russia was threatening the Japanese life line in Manchuria. Chinese raids in 1929 upon the Russian consulate in Harbin had disclosed vast quantities of propaganda designed to win the populace over to Communism. In the undeclared war of 1929 Communist armed forces had quickly crushed the weak resistance of the Chinese war lord and compelled him to sue for peace. These Communist thrusts could be repelled in the future only by Japanese military strength based upon more strategic frontiers in Manchuria.¹⁶

To Japan it appeared that Manchuria was essential to her as a defensive position and as the keystone of her economic structure. Her statesmen hoped that the Department of State would recognize that North China was just as important to Japan as the Caribbean area was to the United States. The American government had sent military forces to Haiti and the Dominican Republic for the purpose of establishing administrations that would be responsive to American desires. This armed intervention had been so recent and so effective that it led the American chargé d'affaires in Peking to close a dispatch to Secretary Kellogg with a very suggestive comment: "We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone—the Caribbean."¹⁷

Admiral Toyoda, of Japan, and the American chargé d'affaires at Peking had much the same viewpoint. There was a definite identity of interest between Americans and Japanese with reference to checking the expansion of Communism in the Far East. In a letter to Ambassador Forbes, Admiral Toyoda stressed this common interest and then remarked that the Pacific area would eventually witness some of the important clashes between capitalism and Communism. The nature of this future conflict would exclude any idea of compromise:

We, or our near posterity, will have to decide between Sino-Russian Communism or the Anglo-Saxon capitalism. If China should fall under the rule of Communism, and if Japan keep up her present policy, which she certainly will, the chance is she will be forced to play the role of Iki and

Tsushima as the advance posts of the Anglo-Saxon capitalism.¹⁸

Secretary Stimson lacked the clear vision of Admiral Toyoda. He read the situation in the Far East with his prejudices rather than with his eyes. The fact that, in 1932, Russia had already consolidated her control over Outer Mongolia and was fast infiltrating the province of Sinkiang appeared of little consequence to him. The rapid rush of the Red tide over vast stretches of North China left him serene, but he moved to instant action when the Brown tide of Japan rolled forward in Manchuria.

The story of the Stimson challenge to Japan is too familiar to be repeated here. It should be clearly understood, however, that the Japanese government had not desired a conflict with China in 1931. China had a large chip on her shoulder and, when it suddenly became dislodged, she loudly accused Japan of aggressive measures. George Sokolsky, who was on the scene in 1931, remarks as follows concerning the outbreak of hostilities:

It needs to be recalled here that in 1931 the last efforts were made to reconcile these countries [China and Japan]. Actually, I was an instrument in that attempted reconciliation, going to Japan from China to hold meetings with Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others. I can say that the Japanese attitude was conciliatory; the Chinese, on the whole, antagonistic. . . . Two forces were at work to keep China and Japan quarreling: Soviet Russia and the League of Nations. Soviet Russia had been engaged since 1924 in an active program of stirring hate among the Chinese people against all foreigners except the Russians, but particularly against the British and the Japanese. The League of Nations secretariat was developing in China a field of widespread activity through its agent, Dr. Ludwic Rajchmann, who was spending most of his time in China. Rajchmann was violently anti-Japanese, although Japan was a member of the League of Nations and Rajchmann an employee. Rajchmann is a Pole and is now associated with the United Nations.¹⁹

Japan's conciliatory attitude was lost upon Secretary Stimson, who became obsessed with the idea that the Japanese government had become aggressive under the pressure of a military clique in Tokyo. Aggression should be denounced and punished and, in looking around for a convenient club to castigate Japan, he came across the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. It took his fertile brain to find a martial meaning in the pacific phrases of that pact and it was not long before he succeeded in transforming that formula of peace into a clarion call to arms. In the Far East the Japanese government paid little attention to the stop signal flashed by Stimson. Their Manchurian war machine had gained too much momentum to be halted by an American traffic cop who blew a tin whistle of nonrecognition.

A distinguished professor of international law has condemned the Stimson formula as "fatuous,"²⁰ and a famous American diplomat who watched at Geneva while its application drove Japan out of the League of Nations, filed a sharp indictment against it: "For the first time . . . I began to question the non-recognition policy. More and more as I thought it over I became conscious that we had entered a dead-end street."²¹ But, on January 9, 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt, the President-elect, entered that dead-end street by accepting the Stimson formula over the spirited protests of two of his closest advisers, Rexford G. Tugwell²² and Raymond Moley.²³ It was not long before that dead-end street became a road to war.

In distant Tokyo, Ambassador Grew saw definite shadows across the path of Japanese-American relations. To him they seemed to be cast by Japanese statesmen who had no real understanding of moral obligations. He believed that this "callous disregard of the pledged word" could be traced to the fact that in Japanese jurisprudence there was "nothing to correspond to the rules of abstract justice contained in the old Roman law." This critical viewpoint was immediately challenged by Mr. Grew's own Counselor of Embassy, Edwin Neville. To him it was apparent that Japanese policy was the resultant of certain forces in the Far East. One of the most important of these was Chinese disregard of their treaty obligations. To the Japanese Foreign Office the situation in 1931 "ap-

peared worse than ever as the Chinese had used borrowed money to operate railways to the detriment of the Japanese line; their various agreements with the Chinese remained unimplemented. . . . The Chinese are in no position to bring up any of the Washington settlements. They have defaulted on their obligations thereunder and do not come into court with clean hands."²⁴

But Secretary Stimson never worried about dirt on Chinese hands. He felt outraged, however, when he discovered some Manchurian mud under the fingernails of Japanese statesmen. When Matsuoka, the head of the Japanese delegation at Geneva, whispered to Hugh Wilson that impatience with American policy was reaching a breaking point in Tokyo, Stimson regarded this warning as an idle threat. Japan might choke on the formula of nonrecognition but it would be a paroxysm that would lead to peace rather than to war.²⁵ His supreme confidence that he could handle Japan in his own way led him to look coldly upon a Japanese suggestion that a meeting be arranged "at some point between the continental United States and Japan, such as Honolulu, between some prominent American statesman and a prominent Japanese" for the purpose of seeking some basis for an understanding. Mr. Hornbeck, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, thought such a meeting might do more harm than good, and Stimson finally agreed with this viewpoint.²⁶ History would repeat itself with tragic consequences in 1939 and 1941.

Although Stimson's bedevilment of the Far Eastern situation finally came to an inglorious close in March, 1933, his influence upon Japanese-American relations went so deep and spread so far that, soon after he assumed office, President Roosevelt began to talk of the possibility of conflict with Japan. On March 7, during a cabinet meeting, Postmaster General Farley noted in his diary that the "President discussed possible plans of action in the event of war" with Japan.²⁷ He was already picking out the first notes in a *marche militaire*.

It is significant to note that the Stimson-Roosevelt policy of pressure upon Japan had the support of the German government even after Hitler became chancellor.²⁸ The support of the Italian government was equally significant, especially with reference to the

question of placing an embargo upon the export of munitions of war to Japan. On January 10, 1933, President Hoover sent a message to Congress²⁹ recommending that legislation be passed empowering the Executive at his discretion, after consultation with such other nations as he might deem necessary, to impose an embargo on the export of arms and munitions of war to any nation or nations which he might designate. A resolution embodying the President's suggestion was unanimously passed by the Senate, but in the House of Representatives no action was taken on a similar resolution.

The dangers in this policy of pressure were indicated by Ambassador Grew in a warning telegram to Secretary Stimson. Japan believed that Manchuria was the "life line" of her empire and she was determined to support the new state of Manchukuo at all costs. Her "long strained exasperation with the former chaotic conditions in Manchuria and the failure of the Chinese to fulfill their treaty obligations" had convinced most Japanese statesmen that a policy of conciliation was futile. There was "no bluff" in the firm attitude of the Japanese government. The decision had been made to "fight rather than to surrender to moral or other pressure from the West."³⁰

This warning dispatch from Grew gave President Hoover serious concern. He immediately lost all interest in an economic embargo upon Japan. In a letter to Secretary Stimson he remarked that he was "inflexibly opposed to the imposition of any kind of sanctions except purely public opinion. The imposition of any kind of sanction, military or economic, would in the present state of mind of the Japanese people, provoke the spread of the conflagration already in progress and might even involve the United States."³¹

This firm statement imposed a definite check upon the plans of the belligerent Secretary of State. When the British ambassador inquired on February 24 if the United States would follow a parallel policy with Britain in the Far East with special reference to the imposition of an embargo upon the shipment of munitions of war to Japan, Stimson cautiously replied that Congress had failed to pass legislation to empower such action. Stimson was able, however, to persuade the President to refrain from the publication of

any statement that would make clear to the world the fact that the American government had no intention to "ever engage in sanctions other than that of public opinion." The President had been hopeful that such a declaration would relax the tension "to some extent." But Stimson had no desire for this tension to relax. Japan would have to bend or break and he regarded with satisfaction the action of the League in chiding Japan in such caustic terms that Matsuoka marched out of the meeting of the Assembly.³²

III. ROOSEVELT AND HULL ADOPT THE ANTI-JAPANESE POLICY OF STIMSON

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull shared the Stimson rather than the Hoover viewpoint with regard to embargoes upon the shipment of munitions of war to belligerent countries. On March 11, 1933, Secretary Hull informed the British ambassador that the Roosevelt administration was ready to "press for the passage" of legislation that would prohibit the export of munitions of war from the United States to "such country or countries as he [the President] may designate."³³ In the meantime Signor Ruspoli, of the Italian delegation at Geneva, in a conversation with Hugh Wilson, indicated his strong support of the American viewpoint that an embargo "on two parties to the dispute is almost certain to hurt the innocent party more than the guilty one since the aggressor will have taken the precaution to store up stocks of war materials."³⁴ On March 11 Secretary Hull indicated to Wilson that he should convey to Ruspoli the fact that the Department of State "concurred in the view of his Government."³⁵ Apparently there was a spirit of sweet accord between the United States and dictator nations like Germany and Italy.

This same spirit was sadly lacking in the relations between the President and Congress. In accordance with the desires of the

Chief Executive, legislation was introduced into Congress giving the President the power to forbid the shipment of munitions of war to "such country or countries as he may designate." On April 17 this proposed legislation passed the House of Representatives, but in the Senate there was strong opposition to giving such large discretionary powers to the President. Senator Key Pittman, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, informed Secretary Hull that members of his committee were fearful that the imposition by the President of an embargo upon munitions of war to a belligerent country might have "a strong tendency to involve the United States to such an extent that a condition of war might arise."³⁶ These fears led the committee to report (May 30) an amendment that all embargoes upon the shipments of war materials should "apply impartially to all the parties in the dispute."³⁷ This action was displeasing to the President, who had no interest in legislation that did not give him wide discretionary powers. The drive against Japan had temporarily stalled, but he hoped it would gain new momentum in the next Congress.

Action against Japan, however, would now have to wait upon the next session of Congress. One very effective way to challenge Japan was through the exercise of the recognition power. Since 1917 the Department of State had refused to extend recognition to the Soviet government. Japan was particularly fearful of the Red menace in the Far East. American recognition of the Red regime would seriously embarrass Japan and make her fearful of her position in North China. It would make her increasingly anxious to conciliate America.

The first step in this new drive against Japan was the refusal to accept a good-will mission from the Japanese government (October, 1933).³⁸ Secretary Hull next closed his ears to timely warnings from Mr. Neville, in Tokyo, concerning Russian designs in Outer Mongolia.³⁹ Russia was to be courted, not criticized. Ambassador Grew had written in detail about the friction between Japan and Russia concerning Communism: "Japan considers herself as the bulwark against the spread of communism southward and eastward. Given sufficient provocation, the Japanese could readily be aroused to enter Siberia with the intention of completely destroying a

regime which it fears and detests."⁴⁰ The Roosevelt administration did not share this detestation of communism. Indeed, it was ready to recognize the government of Stalin that had recently shocked the world by the mass murder of millions of Kulaks, or well-to-do peasants in Russia. On November 16, 1933, recognition was formally extended to Soviet Russia with all its wide implications of a joint policy against Japan. In Tokyo, Edwin Neville saw the dangers of a Russian victory in the Far East: "In the light of Russian activities in Outer Mongolia and the behavior of Soviet agents in intramural China, it is open to question whether a Russian military victory . . . would be of any value in preserving or restoring the political and administrative integrity of China."⁴¹ Ambassador Grew, without the clear vision of Neville, looked at the situation in the Far East more through administration eyes. He thought the recognition of Russia had been an astute political move. As a result the President had gained an "entirely new and more friendly orientation of Japanese policy toward the United States."⁴² Mr. Grew refrained from adding any comment to the effect that recognition of the Soviet regime would prove an asset to China. At times his silences were more significant than his words.

In Japan the action of the Roosevelt administration indicated the necessity of adopting a bold, independent policy in the Far East. On April 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Office proclaimed a Monroe Doctrine for Eastern Asia. Japanese statesmen were fully acquainted with the far-reaching implications of the Olney corollary of the Monroe Doctrine, and they realized that American acquisition of the Panama Canal zone in 1903 had often been justified on the basis of the doctrine. The message of 1823 had been implemented by repeated American interventions in Latin American states and the right to do so was not abandoned until 1936. In 1934 the Japanese government merely extracted an important page from the American book of diplomatic practice and underscored the paragraph that asserted hemispheric supremacy. Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, hurriedly prepared a memorandum of guidance for Secretary Hull. He advised against sending a strong protest to Japan with reference to the recent proclamation of a Monroe Doctrine for the Far East:

"I do not think that the United States should 'stick out its neck' and become the spearhead in opposition to Japan."⁴³

Secretary Hull rejected this cautious advice. On April 28 he sent to Ambassador Grew an *aide-mémoire* which bluntly challenged the new position taken by the Japanese Foreign Office.⁴⁴ It reached Tokyo on the following day. Although it was Sunday and the Emperor's birthday, Grew thought the urgent note sounded by the *aide-mémoire* was so significant that he requested the Foreign Minister to grant him an interview. Hirota graciously acceded to this request and, after reading the verbal broadside of Secretary Hull, he quietly remarked that in the United States there was a "great misunderstanding" of Japanese policy.⁴⁵

The British government was ready to take Japanese promises and explanations at face value and it stressed the viewpoint that it was untimely to invoke an Anglo-American parallel policy to meet the situation. The British ambassador informed the Department of State that the Foreign Office "believed that each power should state its own views."⁴⁶ This desire of the British government to follow an independent policy in the Far East was fully appreciated by Mr. Hornbeck who summarized the position of the Foreign Office in a long memorandum: "It is of advantage to us to know . . . that Great Britain cannot be counted on to make with us a united front of opposition to Japan and may on the contrary be expected to endeavor to make compromises with Japan both in reference to China and in reference to naval matters. . . . In a sense the British may be regarded as being in the act of 'letting us down.'"⁴⁷

IV. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

This British refusal to take concerted action with the United States in formulating a policy to fit the Far Eastern situation did

not deter Secretary Hull from firing repeated blasts at the Japanese position in Manchukuo. He was particularly disturbed by the thought that the Japanese government was slowly closing the Open Door in that region. It was true that monopoly rights had been granted to certain Japanese corporations with reference to the distribution of petroleum products, but this preference had not prevented the volume of American exports to Manchukuo from increasing in a significant manner. In 1932 these exports were only \$1,186,000. In 1935 they reached the respectable figure of \$4,188,000 and in 1937 they rose rapidly to the impressive total of \$16,061,000. The Open Door was really straining at its hinges in order to admit this flood of American products.⁴⁸

But concessions to America paid such poor diplomatic dividends that, on September 17, 1934, the Japanese Foreign Minister informed Ambassador Grew that his government had decided to "give notice before December 31, 1934, to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty." This action greatly angered Secretary Hull. When preliminary conversations began in London in October, 1934, relative to the renewal of the Naval Treaty of 1930, he instructed Norman Davis to give no encouragement to the Japanese delegates to expect "any concessions."⁴⁹ When the British objected to this abrupt tone, Hull finally consented that "conversations should not be broken off right away," but he insisted that Davis "refrain from doing anything which would diminish the embarrassment of the Japanese."⁵⁰ In the face of this feudist spirit there was nothing left for Japan to do but inform the Department of State on December 29, 1934, of its official decision to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922.

Disagreement at London with reference to naval limitations led the Japanese government to pay more attention to the situation in Manchuria. In 1935 it sponsored an independence movement that aimed at the autonomy of the five northern provinces of China. This action brought a prompt protest from Secretary Hull and a lecture from President Roosevelt, who admonished Japan to endeavor to attain her objectives "by an appeal to the finer instincts of world justice."⁵¹

While Japan listened to these pious admonitions she noticed

that Russia had not only absorbed Outer Mongolia but had made Sinkiang a "Soviet colony in all but name."⁵² The Soviet army in the Far East had increased to an imposing force of more than 300,000 seasoned troops,⁵³ and could count upon an equally large army of Chinese Communists for support in any action against Japan. In order to make this threat to Japan more potent, Moscow then arranged an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek. When he was taken prisoner at Sian, in December, 1936, by his puppet Chang Hsueh-liang, Moscow quickly intervened and secured his release. It suited Soviet policy for the time being to save Chiang Kai-shek and use his Nationalist armies in a joint crusade against the Japanese. When his usefulness was over he could be shot as a "fascist-militarist."

Under the impact of this growing accord between Chiang Kai-shek and the Communist leaders, Japan concluded on November 25, 1936, the well-known Anti-Comintern Pact. Assurances were given to Ambassador Grew that this treaty had no implications that menaced America, and he noted in his diary on New Year's Day, 1937, that there were no current controversies "of prime importance" between Japan and the United States. He also noted that the Japanese Prime Minister, Hirota, was making strenuous efforts to preserve friendly relations with the United States.⁵⁴ But these relations were always endangered by any friction that might arise between Japan and China, and the Chinese government, in the autumn of 1936, was acting in an unduly provocative manner. On October 30 David Berger wrote to Secretary Hull that he had learned from an official of the Chinese government in Nanking that there was "now a desire to bring about what might be called a Soviet orientation in Chinese foreign affairs."⁵⁵

There was little doubt that Nationalist China was showing toward Japan an increasingly belligerent attitude. Alarmed by this martial spirit, Anthony Eden called on the Chinese ambassador in London and requested him to "urge his Government not to overplay its hand." In Tokyo the Chinese ambassador talked in such a boastful manner that Grew believed China was "feeling its oats" and would refuse to listen to any pacific overtures from Japan.⁵⁶ Undismayed by this unfriendly attitude, Japan sent Kenji Kodama,

the former president of the Yokohama Specie Bank, to China in an attempt to cement closer economic ties between the two countries. Chiang Kai-shek assured him that Chinese industrialists would follow the footsteps of Japanese industrial experts "so that China's culture and economy" might rise to the "same plane with Japan for the stability of oriental peace."⁵⁷ But Chiang did nothing to implement these fair words. Indeed, by April 30, 1937, Grew wrote from Tokyo that China's attitude had "stiffened as a result of Japan's conciliatory gestures."⁵⁸

In June, 1937, Mr. Andrews, second secretary of the American Embassy in Tokyo, had a conversation with Dr. Mar, who was connected with the Chinese Embassy in the same city. Mar's evident "truculence" toward Japan clearly indicated that China was looking toward some outbreak of violence between Chinese and Japanese troops in North China. This took place on the night of July 7, 1937, when some Japanese troops near the Marco Polo bridge (Peiping) became involved in a sharp fight with some units of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army.⁵⁹

A new drama that would end on a curtain line announcing Russian domination of the Far East, had opened with an ominous fanfare. The whole world became an interested audience with few of the spectators realizing that the progress of the play pointed toward a Russian conclusion. Chinese, Japanese, and Americans would move across the Far Eastern stage in intricate patterns that finally proclaimed a definite Muscovite motif. The Moscow theater never staged a more effective puppet show.

Communist instigation of this outbreak of war in North China was indicated by the Chinese ambassador in Moscow. During a conversation with the American diplomatic representative he remarked that he had arrived in Moscow in November, 1936, as a "firm supporter of Chinese-Soviet friendship." One of the purposes of his mission had been to "obtain assurances from the Soviet Government that *if China pushed Japan so far as to make war inevitable, the Soviet Union would support China with supplies and armed forces.*" When he questioned Litvinov on this point he had received the answer that the Soviet government preferred to have this matter settled at Nanking. In this regard it

was significant that, during the spring and summer of 1937, the Russian ambassador at Nanking endeavored to "make the Chinese Government believe that if it would undertake to offer armed resistance to Japan it could confidently expect the armed support of the Soviet Union."⁶⁰

During a conference between Viscount Ishii and the British ambassador in Rome, December, 1937, Ishii stated as a matter of fact that when Chang Hsueh-liang had taken Chiang Kai-shek prisoner, "part of the latter's release was that he should co-operate with the Communists against Japan. This arrangement had been kept secret, but Chiang . . . had carried out his promise fully."⁶¹

It is certainly true that, in the early months of 1937, a more combative spirit was manifest in Chinese official circles. The clash between Chinese and Japanese armed forces on July 7 was followed by a Chinese attack upon Japanese troops at Lanfang and at the Kwang-an Gate of Peking. Other attacks were the prelude to the dispatch of some thirty divisions of Chinese soldiers to North China. To meet this situation and to prepare for the possible intervention of Russia into the conflict, the Japanese government sent large military forces to Manchuria.⁶²

The attitude of Russia toward the outbreak of conflict in North China was of particular interest to the Department of State. On October 14 Secretary Hull had a conversation with the Chinese ambassador and embraced the opportunity to inquire "very confidentially" as to the position of Russia toward "Outer Mongolia and with respect to observing the integrity of China generally." He received the vague answer that Outer Mongolia still "claimed herself as a part of China." It was apparent to Hull that the ambassador was somewhat complacent about Russian penetration of North China while showing great perturbation about the advance of Japanese armies in the same region.⁶³

When Sumner Welles talked with the Russian chargé d'affaires on the Manchurian matter he quickly discovered that the Soviet government was quite dissatisfied with the cautious attitude of the Department of State. Oumansky wished to know if the American government would co-operate with other governments in connection with the possible "imposition of military or economic

sanctions" upon Japan. Welles made the chilling reply that the Russian representative seemed to have "completely misunderstood the whole basis of the United States policy . . . of taking no sides in the present conflict." Oumansky mumbled that such a policy was a "very discouraging one" and hurriedly left the Department of State.⁶⁴

This neutral attitude was greatly appreciated by the Japanese government and Ambassador Grew expressed to Secretary Hull the hope that there would be "no departure by our Government from its present official attitude and methods." He thought that the Department of State should aim to "avoid unnecessarily sacrificing our present relations" with Japan. There was no use in hampering America's "future interests, and perhaps our own future helpfulness in working for peace by creating among the Japanese people a renewed antagonism against the United States."⁶⁵

V. THE UNITED STATES MOVES TO WAR AGAINST JAPAN

1. PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT DELIVERS A QUARANTINE SPEECH DIRECTED AGAINST JAPAN

Grew's dispatch reached the Department of State on October 5. On this same day President Roosevelt made a famous address in Chicago in which he advocated a quarantine against aggressor nations.⁶⁶ His words of criticism and warning were directed chiefly against Japan and their baleful effect was all that Grew had feared. It was really big talk in a high key. He was actually far more worried about party reverses at home than about Japanese movements in Manchuria. An economic recession in the United States had made it clear that the big ballyhoo of New Deal politicians had suddenly turned very sour. The Morgenthau diaries give in-

disputable proof of the deep concern the administration felt with regard to the wide break in the economic structure of the nation.⁶⁷

Joined with this bad news from the economic front was the hostile reaction in the press over the appointment of Senator Hugo Black to the Supreme Court. In September it was made known that Mr. Black had once hidden his face under the wide hood of a Klansman. In dismay he fled to Europe and President Roosevelt found it convenient to make a hurried trip to the Far West. It was highly expedient for him to make some address that would divert public attention from the widespread effects of economic recession and to cover the flight of the nimble Justice Black. A sharp denunciation of the Japanese advance in North China would draw a big herring across a noisome trail and, if it led to eventual war, there was the bright consolation that the war powers of the President are so indefinable and far-reaching that they would insure a long period of dictatorship.

The quarantine speech of October 5 had many macabre overtones designed to frighten the American people. Many parts of the world were experiencing a "reign of terror," and the "landmarks and traditions which have marked the progress of civilization toward a condition of law, order and justice" were being "wiped away." "Innocent peoples and nations" were being "cruelly sacrificed to a greed for power and supremacy" which was "devoid of all sense of justice and humane consideration." If this sad condition of affairs existed in other parts of the world it was vain for anyone to "imagine that America will escape, that it may expect mercy, that this Western Hemisphere will not be attacked, and that it will continue tranquilly and peacefully to carry on the ethics and the arts of civilization."

This attempt to frighten the American people and thus make them forget conditions at home was only partly successful. It is true that Justice Black was soon a "forgotten man" but business conditions grew so steadily worse that they could not escape notice. Moreover, a large part of the American press expressed the view that, if conditions abroad were so bad, it would be wise for America to adopt an isolationist attitude and stay away from trouble. There is no doubt that the President was "disappointed by the failure

of the people to respond to his Chicago speech."⁶⁸ It was a bit of globaloney with such a strong smell that it took some years for American nostrils to get accustomed to it.

It is true, nonetheless, that the President's challenge to Japan marked a tragic turning point in our relations with that country. He had inaugurated a policy of pressure that eventually pushed America down the road to Pearl Harbor. Japan erected the first milestone along this road by the bombing of the *Panay* on December 12, 1937. A prompt apology and a large indemnity indicated that the Foreign Office was still anxious for peace, but the fact that such an incident had occurred gave support to the President's program of pressure upon Japan.

2. THE PRESIDENT PUSHES A PROGRAM OF PRESSURE UPON JAPAN

The first item in this new program aimed at Japan was the sending of Admiral Royal E. Ingersoll to London in the latter part of December, 1937, with instructions to "explore with the British what we could do if we both found ourselves involved in war in the Far East with Japan."⁶⁹ When asked why he was sent to London in 1937 the Admiral replied that "everybody knew" that "sooner or later, we were all going to be involved in a war in the Pacific which would include the Dutch, the Chinese possibly, the Russians, the British, and ourselves." The only tangible result of these Anglo-American conversations in London was a "distribution of codes and ciphers."⁷⁰ It should be remembered, in this regard, that similar secret conversations between British and French officials in 1905 constituted the first link in the chain that bound the British to a policy of war with Germany in 1914.

While Admiral Ingersoll was engaged in conversations in London, the President had a press conference on January 8, 1939, in which he expressed the significant opinion that the time had arrived for "Congress to enact legislation aimed at the equalization of the burdens of possible war so that the whole nation will engage in war if we unfortunately have one."⁷¹ Congress did not follow this suggestion. A majority of the members of both houses

were still thinking of peace, not war. But the martial mood of the President and Secretary of State became apparent on July 1 when the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control sent a letter to "148 persons and Companies manufacturing airplane parts" stating that the "Government of the United States is strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes or aeronautical equipment which would materially aid or encourage" the practice of "bombing civilian populations from the air." The Japanese had been guilty of such a practice and therefore the Department of State would "with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines" or aircraft accessories to Japan.⁷² This "moral embargo" invoked against Japan led to further measures that forged an iron ring around that island empire and pushed it strongly in the direction of war with the United States.

In September, 1938, the President was so sure that the United States would soon "get into war" that he sent Harry Hopkins on a tour of airplane factories to see how production could be expedited. When Hopkins returned to Washington he was visited by Brigadier General George C. Marshall, who was later made Chief of Staff through the influence of Hopkins and Pershing. Marshall quickly caught the belligerent mood of the circle close to the President and it was not long before "several millions of dollars of WPA funds were transferred (secretly) to start making machine tools for the manufacture of small arms ammunitions."⁷³

While America was thus secretly preparing for what the President regarded as an inevitable war, the Japanese government was making pacific overtures to the United States. On May 16, 1939, a prominent Japanese made an important approach to Ambassador Grew concerning an improvement in Japanese-American relations. If the "democratic nations, especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, . . . those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened."⁷⁴ On the following day the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hachiro Arita, commented upon the dangerous

activities of the Soviet government and the negotiations then going on in Moscow for an alliance between Britain, France, and the Soviet government. He then remarked that "there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to 'strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact' until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some 'gesture of welcome.'" Arita stressed the fact that Japan was "very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe," but it was impossible to ignore the fact that "Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its [Russia's] policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other." It was possible that the danger of a tripartite pact between Britain, France, and Russia might compel Japan to enter into some arrangement with Germany and Italy. He could assure Mr. Grew, however, that the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy "would contain no military, political or economic clauses."⁷⁵

On May 18, 1939, Grew had a long talk with Arita who once more insisted that an alliance between Britain, France, and Russia would probably push Japan into a closer understanding with Germany and Italy. He was equally insistent that Japan, in joining hands with Germany and Italy, had "no other purpose than to combat the destructive activities of the Comintern." If the United States, "not understanding the true position of Japan on this point, should base her future policies on such misunderstanding, it would bring about a deplorable situation not only respecting the relations between the United States and Japan but also in respect of the peace of the world."⁷⁶

The next step by the Japanese government was an invitation to the United States to adopt a program whereby the two nations would jointly attempt to find a peaceful solution of the political differences that were leading to war in Europe. In discussing this matter with Prime Minister Hiranuma, Mr. Dooman, the American chargé d'affaires in Tokyo, asked the pertinent question whether the head of the Japanese cabinet "believed it likely that the American people would look with favor on American collaboration with

Japan in approaching the difficulties in Europe when Japan herself was considered to be guilty of the same acts of which Germany and Italy stood condemned." Hiranuma replied that "if the Powers could come together to find by negotiation a solution of the world's troubles these issues involving American rights in China could be disposed of without difficulty." With reference to the conflict in the Far East he expressed the hope that "the American Government at least realized that Japan had not intended or expected to engage in war with China."⁷⁷

Secretary Hull's answer, which did not arrive in Tokyo until the end of July, was negative and tart. Japan was advised to use its "influence toward discouraging among European governments, especially those governments with which your Government may have special relations, the taking of any action, or the pursuance of any policy, that might endanger the general peace." The establishment of world peace was made more difficult by "the continuance of armed conflict" in the Far East. The intimation was clearly given that if Japan was sincere in her desire to help the cause of peace in Europe she should give a better example in eastern Asia.⁷⁸

In order further to emphasize the hostile attitude of the United States toward Japan, the Department of State, on July 26, 1939, gave notice to the Japanese government that, after six months, the treaty of February 21, 1911, would expire.⁷⁹ This action was a severe blow to a Japanese cabinet that was desperately striving to arrive at some understanding with the United States. But Prime Minister Hiranuma disregarded this sharp rebuff and made another attempt to effect more friendly relations between Japan and the United States. On August 26, 1939, the Japanese ambassador (Horinouchi) had a long conversation with Secretary Hull. He gave assurances that his government "had decided to abandon any further negotiations with Germany and Italy relative to closer relations under the anti-Comintern Pact to which they have been parties for some time." After this conciliatory statement, he reiterated his "personal desire to clear up any misunderstanding or differences between our two countries and to restore the friendly

relations heretofore existing." Mr. Hull's answer was one more example of his usual moral platitudes and the Japanese gestures of good will were in vain.⁸⁰

While Secretary Hull was prating of peace, President Roosevelt was constantly thinking of war with Japan. Ambassador Grew saw this fact clearly in September, 1939. During the course of a conference with the President he took pains to point out that, if America placed an embargo upon oil exports to Japan, the result might be a Japanese effort to take the Dutch East Indies and thereby control the rich oil resources of Borneo. The President's reply showed that he was already thinking of war. If Japan decided upon such a step, American naval forces could "easily intercept her fleet."⁸¹

But Grew wished to prevent rather than provoke war with Japan. While the President was talking this belligerent bombast, Grew was confiding to his diary that the Department of State should "offer the Japanese a *modus vivendi*" and then commence negotiations for a new commercial treaty. In Japan the Shidehara policy of conciliation had once existed: "It can exist again."⁸² To Grew the Japanese program, with its insistence upon "strategic protection against a future attack by Soviet Russia," did not appear too unreasonable. If America wished to change this program it should not try to do so through the employment of sanctions: "There must be no tone of threat in our attitude."⁸³

It is evident that Grew did not appreciate the fact that the President's dislike of Japan had gone so deep and spread so far that it would lead inevitably to war. In defiance of Grew's advice against sanctions, a White House statement was issued once more invoking a moral embargo upon the shipment to Japan of "airplanes, aeronautical equipment and materials essential to airplane manufacture."⁸⁴ This statement of December 2 was followed by another one of December 20. This later pronouncement issued from the Department of State and contained the significant formula that "national interest suggests that for the time being there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required

for the production of high quality aviation gasoline.”⁸⁵ In 1940 there was a series of statements issued by the Administrator of Export Control which indicated a drastic curtailment of exports to Japan.⁸⁶ If embargoes could produce war the administration was determined to overlook no opportunity to exert pressure upon Japan along that line.

3. BRITAIN AND FRANCE ADOPT A POLICY OF APPEASEMENT TOWARD JAPAN

American pressure upon Japan was followed by Japanese pressure upon Britain and France. On March 30, 1940, Japan set up a “new Central Government of China” to be headed by Wang Ching-wei. Secretary Hull immediately announced that the Department of State would continue to recognize the government of Chiang Kai-shek “as the Government of China.”⁸⁷ But the British Foreign Office was more conciliatory. On March 28, Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador in Tokyo, delivered an address in which he stated that Britain and Japan were “striving for the same objective, namely, a lasting peace and the preservation of our institutions from extraneous, subversive influences.”⁸⁸ This address keynoted British policy. On July 17 the Burma Road was closed to shipments of war matériel to China.⁸⁹ France had already acceded to demands for a similar embargo upon supplies going to Chiang Kai-shek through Indochina. The Nationalist government in China was being effectively shut off from aid that was essential to her continuance in the war against Japan.

4. JAPAN CONCLUDES AN ALLIANCE WITH THE ROME-BERLIN AXIS

While Japan was exerting pressure upon Britain and France she was making overtures to the Rome-Berlin Axis. An alliance with these European dictatorships had been long in the making. Its most important Japanese sponsor was General Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese ambassador to Germany. He and Ribbentrop were on intimate terms. In the summer of 1938 Ribbentrop inquired if

Japan would be willing to sign a treaty aimed at all the potential enemies of the proposed Rome-Berlin-Tokyo triangle.⁹⁰ Tokyo rejected this broad proposal⁹¹ and in February, 1939, Prince Ito was sent to Berlin to acquaint Ribbentrop with the decision that Japan wished to limit the proposed treaty to action against Russia alone.⁹²

In order to speed a decision by Japan to enter into an alliance with the Rome-Berlin Axis, Heinrich Stahmer hurried to Tokyo and insisted that the prime purpose in effecting the new political alignment was to keep America out of war.⁹³ Stahmer succeeded in silencing all Japanese opposition to the tripartite pact which was signed with great pomp in Berlin on September 27, 1940.⁹⁴ Article III pointed straight at the United States: "Japan, Germany and Italy . . . undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict."⁹⁵ There is evidence, however, that Japan extracted from Stahmer a secret oral understanding that she retain for herself the right to decide whether the *casus foederis* existed in any situation that might arise.⁹⁶

5. JAPAN IS READY TO SACRIFICE HER POSITION IN CHINA FOR THE SAKE OF PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES

But this tripartite pact of September 27, 1940, did not mean that Japan had abandoned all hope of a satisfactory arrangement with the United States. Quite the contrary! In November, 1940, Foreign Minister Matsuoka asked Bishop James E. Walsh, Superior General of the Catholic Foreign Mission Society of Maryknoll, New York, and Father J. M. Drought, of the same order, to undertake a special mission to Washington in order to impress upon the President and Secretary Hull the fact that the Japanese government "wished to negotiate a peace agreement: (1) an agreement to nullify their participation in the Axis Pact . . . (2) a guarantee to recall all military forces from China and to restore to China its geographical and political integrity." Other conditions bearing upon the relations of Japan and the United States were to be ex-

pled and agreed upon "in the conversations that it was hoped would ensue."

Bishop Walsh and Father Drought then had a conference with General Muto, the director of the Central Bureau of Military Affairs, who assured them that "he and his associates in the Japanese Army were in accord with the efforts to reach a peace agreement."

Bishop Walsh and Father Drought hurried to Washington where (on January 23, 1941) they placed the whole matter before President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull during a long conference of more than two hours. They were told that the matter would be "taken under advisement,"⁹⁷ and thus ended an anxious effort on the part of the Japanese government to find a path to peace, even though this path led to a renunciation of Japan's objectives in China and a tremendous loss of face. It seems quite possible that the Far Eastern Military Tribunal brought to trial the wrong persons. It might have been better if the tribunal had held its sessions in Washington.

6. BLUEPRINT FOR ANGLO-AMERICAN CO-OPERATION IN THE WAR ON JAPAN

Instead of acting upon the proposals of Bishop Walsh and Father Drought, the President and Secretary Hull initiated Joint Staff conferences in Washington from January to March, 1941. Delegations from Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand surveyed with American representatives the many questions involved in the defense of the Pacific area against Japanese attack. During the session, which resulted in the ABC-1 Staff Agreement, the British delegation ardently argued that the defense of Singapore was so essential that the United States should be willing to divide the Pacific Fleet for that purpose. Although this proposal was rejected, the agreement did outline for American task forces some important operations that would be beneficial for Britain in the event both powers were involved in war with Japan.

The ABC-1 Staff Agreement was promptly approved by the Secretaries of the Navy and War; the President gave it no explicit

approval.⁹⁸ It was soon apparent, however, that American military plans were profoundly affected by it.⁹⁹ The changes made in them were far more than mere technical details: they indicated a close community of thought and proposed action between Britain and the United States. A blueprint had been drawn for an Anglo-American parallel policy. It would be carried out as soon as the President could find a pretext for doing so.

7. JAPAN PRESSES FOR PEACE WITH THE UNITED STATES

As Hitler moved toward war with Soviet Russia he began to think more and more of Japanese assistance in this projected struggle. In March, 1941, Ribbentrop strongly argued that Japan, in its own interest, should enter the war "as soon as possible." This intervention would not only destroy England's key position in the Far East but it would also "keep America out of the war."¹⁰⁰ On March 26 Matsuoka, the Japanese Foreign Minister, arrived in Berlin. On the following day Ribbentrop plied him with the usual Nazi line of argument. It would be "very advantageous if Japan should decide as soon as possible to take an active part in the war upon England." Japanese intervention would be "most likely to keep America out of the war." When Matsuoka bluntly inquired about the attitude of Germany toward America after Britain was defeated, Ribbentrop quickly answered that "Germany did not have the slightest interest in a war against the United States."¹⁰¹

Japan also did not have the "slightest interest in a war against the United States." The appointment of Nomura as ambassador to the United States was an indication of this fact. Admiral Nomura had been the Japanese naval attaché in Washington during the first World War and had formed a friendly relationship with Franklin D. Roosevelt, then serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. His reception at the White House was cordial but the President frankly referred to the fact that relations between Japan and the United States were steadily "deteriorating."¹⁰² At the State Department he soon discovered a studied policy of "coolness toward the Japanese."

On March 8 Hull and Nomura had their first conversation on

Japanese-American relations. Subsequently they met more than forty times in vain endeavors to find some firm ground on which to build a new structure of friendship. Hitler viewed these negotiations with frank alarm. As Ribbentrop later remarked:

The Fuehrer . . . saw the attitude of the United States "short of war" and he was worried . . . about groups in Japan who wanted to come to an arrangement with America. He was afraid that if an arrangement would be made between the United States and Japan, this would mean, so to speak, the back free for America and the expected attack or entry into the war by the United States would come quicker.¹⁰³

Japan paid little attention to this pressure from Berlin and Nomura carried on his talks with Hull without much thought of the desires of the Rome-Berlin Axis. The Japanese government was willing to give two important pledges: (1) to use only peaceful measures in the southwest Pacific; (2) to go to the support of Germany only in the event that she was the object of aggression. In return for these pledges Japan wished America (1) to restore normal trade relations between the two countries; (2) to assist Japan to secure access to basic raw materials in the southwest Pacific area; (3) to exert pressure upon Chiang Kai-shek so that he would consent to certain peace terms; (4) if Chiang refused to yield to this pressure the American government would withdraw support from his regime; (5) and, finally, to lend friendly diplomatic assistance aimed at the removal of Hongkong and Singapore as doorways "to further political encroachment by the British in the Far East." Secretary Hull countered with a memorandum emphasizing the following points: (1) respect for the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of each and all nations; (2) support of the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries; (3) support of the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity; (4) nondisturbance of the *status quo* in the Pacific except as the *status quo* may be altered by peaceful means.¹⁰⁴

The discussion of these bases for a friendly accord was not

helped by occasional verbal pyrotechnics on the part of Matsuoka. On May 14 he had a conversation with Ambassador Grew during the course of which he sharply criticized the attitude of the United States toward Germany. American attacks upon German submarines might bring into action Article III of the tripartite pact of September 27, 1940.¹⁰⁵

This conversation was the subject of comment by Sumner Welles during a conference with the British ambassador. Lord Halifax inquired as to the progress of the Hull-Nomura talks. Was there any chance that they would have a successful outcome? Welles thought that the "chances might not be better than one in ten." He then handed to Halifax a copy of a letter Matsuoka wrote to Grew immediately after their conversation on May 14. It was written in such a rambling style that Halifax thought it "bore evidences of lunacy." Welles shared this impression but finally came to the conclusion that "it might be due to the fact that Mr. Matsuoka was understood to be drinking extremely heavily at this time and the mental state apparent in the writing of this letter might be momentary rather than permanent."¹⁰⁶

It is apparent that Matsuoka's belligerent state of mind was a result of the pressure from Berlin. Hitler would soon launch his attack upon Russia and he was particularly anxious that America remain neutral. But this Japanese threat failed to restrain Roosevelt. On June 20 an announcement was made in Washington that no more oil would be exported from American eastern ports (including the Gulf of Mexico) except to the British Empire and the Western Hemisphere. Two days later, Hitler's armies crossed the Russian frontier and the German offensive began to roll. When the news reached Tokyo, Matsuoka rushed to the Emperor and strongly argued that Japan should support Germany by immediately attacking Russia. He readily admitted that his program implied possible war with the United States.¹⁰⁷

Although Konoye wished to apply a brake to the forward tactics of Matsuoka, the Japanese army leaders were restive, and liaison conferences on June 25 and July 2 mapped a new and dangerous program: (1) Japan should not rush into a conflict with the Soviets; (2) the triple alliance should not be abandoned; (3)

Japan should move south into Indochina.¹⁰⁸ Knowledge of this decision reached Washington during the first week in July. The Japanese code had been broken and from July to December, 1941, the President and Secretary of State could read the instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura.¹⁰⁹ The projected Japanese drive to the south was soon familiar in all its details.

8. ROOSEVELT FREEZES JAPANESE FUNDS IN THE UNITED STATES

On July 16 the Japanese cabinet resigned. When Konoye was asked to form a new cabinet he dropped Matsuoka and named Admiral Toyoda as the new Foreign Minister. Toyoda was particularly fearful of further American embargoes upon the export of essential commodities to Japan. In the third week in July he sent an ominous instruction to Nomura in Washington: "Should the U.S. . . . take steps at this time which unduly excite Japan (such as . . . the freezing of assets), an exceedingly critical situation may be created. Please advise the United States of this fact and attempt to bring about an improvement in the situation."¹¹⁰

The efforts of Nomura to this end were in vain. On July 26 an order was issued freezing Japanese funds in the United States. This meant an end to the export of oil to Japan. When Nomura called at the Department of State to inquire about the situation, Welles received him in his best frigid manner. Nomura expressed the hope that this restriction would not mean any "further deterioration in the relations of our two countries," but Welles parried this indirect query by remarking upon the extraordinary patience "which the United States had demonstrated in its relations with Japan during recent years." The Japanese ambassador quietly stated that he believed the best thing under the circumstances was to adopt some "compromise solution which would prove acceptable to both sides." Welles crisply replied that there was not the "slightest ground for any compromise solution."¹¹¹

9. THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE PUSHES AMERICA CLOSER TO A BREAK WITH JAPAN

Any thought of a compromise solution of Japanese-American difficulties was made more difficult by the decisions of the Atlantic Conference between Churchill and President Roosevelt. On August 9, 1941, in the Newfoundland harbor of Argentia, the first conference between these two statesmen was held. It was soon apparent that Britain was deeply disturbed about conditions in the southwest Pacific. According to a British suggestion, America was to state very frankly to Japan that any "further encroachment" in the direction of Malaya or the Netherlands East Indies would compel the United States to take measures that might lead to war. Welles wished to broaden the scope of American action. He would have the United States play the role of policeman in a very wide area in the Pacific. American forces should be ready to repel any Japanese thrust whether it was directed "against China, against the Soviet Union or against British Dominions or British colonies, or the colonies of the Netherlands in the Southern Pacific area." Churchill and Roosevelt were in hearty agreement with this wider formula, but the President was too cautious to broadcast it to the American public.¹¹²

Churchill did not secure at Argentia all the items in his program but he at least secured pledges that relieved many of his fears. In a speech in Parliament, January 27, 1942, he remarked: "The probability, since the Atlantic Conference . . . that the United States, even if not herself attacked, would come into a war in the Far East, and thus make final victory sure, seemed to allay some of these anxieties. . . . As time went on, one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific, we should not fight alone."¹¹³

10. ROOSEVELT REFUSES TO MEET PRINCE KONOYE

In a statement he handed to the Japanese ambassador on August 17, Roosevelt carried out his pledge to Churchill. It was phrased

in language that carried a definite warning against Japanese expansion:

If the Japanese Government takes any further steps in pursuance of a policy . . . of military domination by force or threat of force of neighboring countries, the Government of the United States will be compelled to take immediately any and all steps which it may deem necessary toward safeguarding . . . the safety and security of the United States.¹¹⁴

A new issue now came up with reference to a meeting between Roosevelt and Prince Konoye. As early as August 7 the Japanese government had asked for such a meeting. It was now informed (August 17) that if it was ready to "suspend its expansionist activities" the Department of State would "endeavor to arrange a suitable time and place to exchange views."

In Tokyo Ambassador Grew was deeply impressed with the importance of a meeting between Konoye and Roosevelt. In a dispatch to Secretary Hull he thought such a conference would present an opportunity for "the highest statesmanship."¹¹⁵ In the State Department, however, there was little enthusiasm for a Konoye-Roosevelt conference. In the Division of Far Eastern Affairs a memorandum was prepared which flatly stated: "The holding of the meeting between the President and the Japanese Prime Minister on the basis of the present status of the discussions between this country and Japan would result in more of disadvantage than of advantage as regards this country's interests and policies."¹¹⁶

Ambassador Grew strongly contested this viewpoint and cogently argued against a firm stand by the Department of State upon an inflexible program of principles in advance of a meeting between Roosevelt and Konoye. Political differences could be expressed in subtle shades that would not affront sensitive nations that objected to the conventional pattern of black and white. It would be best to go to such a meeting in a spirit that welcomed adjustment of existing difficulties; not in a spirit of challenge.¹¹⁷ But Secretary Hull paid little attention to these admonitions from

Grew. On October 2 he handed to Ambassador Nomura a statement that vetoed any idea of a Roosevelt-Konoye meeting. Before such a conference could be agreed upon there would first have to be a definite meeting of minds upon the agenda.¹¹⁸ Sir Robert Craigie, the British ambassador in Tokyo, was sharply critical of the Hull attitude:

By pursuing a policy of stalling, the United States is arguing about every word and every phrase on the grounds that it is an essential preliminary to any kind of an agreement. . . . It would be very regrettable indeed if the best opportunity for the settlement of the Far Eastern problem since I assumed my post here, were to be lost in such a manner. . . . Both the U.S. Ambassador in Japan and I are firmly of the opinion that it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude.¹¹⁹

11. GENERAL MARSHALL AND ADMIRAL STARK OPPOSE AN ULTIMATUM TO JAPAN

When Hull insisted upon a continued "unduly suspicious attitude" toward Japan, the Konoye Ministry resigned (October 16). In the new cabinet General Hideki Tojo assumed the post of Prime Minister, with Shigenori Togo as the new Minister of Foreign Affairs. The story of the attempts of the Tojo cabinet to find some path to peace is a twice-told tale that does not have to be repeated here.¹²⁰ It has long been equally obvious that the highest officers in the American Army and Navy were deeply concerned about the rapid drift toward war and wanted to postpone the conflict for at least three months. But Chiang Kai-shek began a drive to hasten American intervention. On November 2 the Generalissimo wrote to Roosevelt that a new Japanese offensive against Yunnan might shake the morale of the Chinese Army and the Chinese people "to its foundation." For the first time in "this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible" if the Japanese drive succeeded in taking Kunming.¹²¹ But General Marshall and

Admiral Stark resisted this Chinese pressure to push America immediately into the war. On November 5, after a review of the situation in the Far East, they strongly recommended that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan."¹²²

12. JAPAN IS "MANEUVERED" INTO FIRING THE FIRST SHOT AT PEARL HARBOR

The rejection of the Konoye-Roosevelt meeting was a real ultimatum to Japan, and after October 16 tension in Tokyo rapidly mounted. On November 5 instructions were sent to Nomura that November 25 would be the deadline in the negotiations in Washington.¹²³ This deadline was repeated in instructions on November 11.¹²⁴ From the intercepted Japanese radiograms, Secretary Hull knew all about this deadline. On November 15 Hull handed Nomura another one of his long oral statements. He knew that it could not be accepted by Japan. The bases for an agreement were a challenge. Complete control over "its economic, financial and monetary affairs" should be restored to China, and Japan should abandon any thought of preserving in China a "preferential position."¹²⁵

Japan realized that this was really a challenge, but a last attempt was made to preserve peace. Saburo Kuruusu was sent to Washington to assist Nomura. He had served as consul in Chicago and New York, and his happy marriage to an American girl had given him a personal interest in finding some road to accommodation. But Hull was hell-bent for war. The constant needling by Chiang Kai-shek had gotten under his skin and President Roosevelt felt pressure from his administrative assistant, Lauchlin Currie, also a warm admirer of Soviet Russia. At this point Owen Lattimore, American adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, sent a strongly worded cablegram against any *modus vivendi* or truce with Japan: "Any *modus vivendi*" now arrived at with Japan would be "disastrous to Chinese belief in America."¹²⁶ For a week Currie had been "terribly anxious" because he feared that "Hull was in danger of selling China and America and Britain down the river."¹²⁷ In Chungking, Madame Chiang Kai-shek became "unrestrainedly critical" of the

American government for its failure to "plunge into the war" and thus aid China.¹²⁸ From London word came from Churchill with reference to the situation in China: "There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?"¹²⁹

Under the impact of these cablegrams Hull became hysterical. During a telephone conversation with Secretary Stimson he remarked that he had just about made up his mind about any thought of a *modus vivendi* or truce with Japan—he "would kick the whole thing over."¹³⁰ This is just what he and President Roosevelt did on the following day, November 26. On that afternoon Hull handed to the Japanese diplomatic representatives a ten-point proposal which amounted to a sharp ultimatum: "The government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and Indochina."¹³¹ Both Hull and the President knew the Japanese government could not accept such a proposal: it was an invitation to war. It was not long before that invitation was accepted.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 5

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6

THE ACTUAL ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR

by

GEORGE MORGENSTERN

During the war our habit was to treat Pearl Harbor day as, in F.D.R.'s words, "a day of infamy." This newspaper throughout the war protested against any such observance. The appellation was almost Oriental in its masochism—unworthy of us, a travesty of truth. It gave a totally wrong impression of a peace-loving, unoffensive, noninterfering America suddenly set upon by a bully with whom we had no quarrel. No historian will ever accept the interpretation.

—Editorial in the *Washington (D.C.) Post*, December 7, 1951

Japan was meant by the American President to attack the United States. . . . It is very questionable whether the word treachery is a legitimate one to use in these circumstances.

—CAPTAIN RUSSELL GRENFELL, *Main Fleet to Singapore*, 1952

It is for peace that I have labored; and it is for peace that I shall labor all the days of my life.

—FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, August 1, 1944

George Morgenstern was born in Chicago on May 26, 1906. He received his Ph.B. degree at the University of Chicago, graduating as president of the undergraduate society of Phi Beta Kappa. He studied history under, among others, Ferdinand Schevill, James Westfall Thompson, William T. Hutchinson, José Vasconcelos, and Carl Dorn. He has been a newspaper writer for twenty-four years and, since 1941, has been a member of the editorial board of the *Chicago Tribune*, specializing in comment on foreign affairs and international relations.

During the second World War Mr. Morgenstern served as a captain in the Marine Corps. He was attached to Headquarters as officer in charge of the news section of the Division of Public Information, supervising the work of combat correspondents. He is now a lieutenant-colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve. His *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War*, published in 1947 by Devin-Adair, was the first extended revisionist study of the roots of American participation in the second World War.

Though bitterly smeared by the "blackout boys," Mr. Morgenstern's book was, perhaps, the most brilliant and impressive monograph on diplomatic history ever turned out by a nonprofessional student of the subject. Charles Austin Beard stated that it would remain "a permanent contribution to the quest for an understanding of the tragedy of Pearl Harbor." Charles Callan Tansill declared that it "discloses with great ability the lessons of secret diplomacy and national betrayal." Admiral H. E. Yarnell, former commander in chief of the United States Asiatic Fleet and former commandant of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base, frankly asserted that "Mr. Morgenstern is to be congratulated on marshalling the available facts of this tragedy in such a manner as to make it clear to every reader where the responsibility lies." The Admiral held that Morgenstern's conclusions are "supported by the evidence." George A. Lundberg maintained that "this is undoubtedly the most important book that has come thus far [1947] out of World War II. In fact, it deserves a place with Machiavelli's *The Prince* as a concrete case study of the principles developed in that classic."

I. ROOSEVELT ADOPTS THE STIMSON POLICY TOWARD JAPAN

In a statement read to his cabinet late in 1931, after Japan had moved its military forces into Manchuria, President Hoover enunciated a policy explicitly rejecting a program of collective sanctions put forward by his Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson. Said Mr. Hoover:

Neither our obligations to China, nor our own interest, nor our dignity require us to go to war over these questions. These acts do not imperil the freedom of the American people, the economic or moral future of our people. I do not propose ever to sacrifice American life for anything short of this. . . . We will not go along on war or any of the sanctions, either economic or military, for those are the roads to war.¹

Before Mr. Hoover yielded office in March, 1933, Secretary Stimson twice met with President-elect Roosevelt.² Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of State for the first ten years of the Roosevelt administration, asserts that Roosevelt and Stimson saw "eye to eye."³ Seven years later, when the time had become opportune, Stimson was brought into the Roosevelt cabinet as Secretary of War.

With the renewal of Japanese military action in China in 1937, according to Welles, "the President grew increasingly restive." He had the Navy place large-scale maps of the Pacific in his office. "He had come to a conclusion about something that could perhaps be done. . . . This was no less than to impose upon Japan a trade embargo to be enforced by units of the American and British Navies stationed at strategic points in the Pacific."⁴ In fact, this was the Stimson program, which, as Assistant Secretary of State

Raymond Moley had foreseen, "endorsed a policy that invited a major war in the Far East. . . ." ⁵

Roosevelt was dissuaded then. He tried another gambit. He proposed, in an address on October 5, 1937, dedicating the Outer Drive bridge in Chicago, that aggressor nations be subjected to "quarantine." ⁶ This was his first public attempt to discard the doctrine of neutrality for the United States in favor of a policy in concert with what later were to be known as "peace-loving nations" —among them, as history relates, Soviet Russia.

With what Welles called "the stubbornness that was so characteristic of him," ⁷ Roosevelt cherished his plan of blockading Japan for three more years. Admiral J. O. Richardson, commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, learned from Secretary of the Navy Knox in Washington on October 10, 1940, that "the President was considering shutting off all trade between Japan and America and establishing a patrol of light ships in two lines, one from Hawaii west to the Philippines, and the other from Samoa to the Dutch East Indies." ⁸ Amazed at the proposal, Richardson inquired whether a declaration of war was contemplated. The Secretary was "displeased" at the reception accorded the President's plan by the fleet commander. ⁹

Nor was Roosevelt more successful with the "quarantine" proposal. He could not carry the people with him. It proved "wholly impossible for him for a period of exactly four years to carry out the program that he himself believed to be vitally important to our security," Welles stated. "Isolationists" would have none of it. "That kind of thinking," Welles confesses, "still prevailed in the Congress and throughout the country up to and including the final days before Pearl Harbor." ¹⁰ The people did not want their elected servants to thrust war upon them.

Roosevelt was thus compelled to trim his sails to the prevailing wind. The party platform he accepted in 1940 pledged that war would be shunned "except in case of attack." In his celebrated speech at Boston on October 30, 1940, the third-term candidate promised American parents "again and again and again" that "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." ¹¹ His speech writer, Robert E. Sherwood, later confessed that, although the

pledge was deceitful, "I . . . urged him to go the limit on this, feeling as I did that the risk of future embarrassment was negligible as compared with the risk of losing the election."¹²

Although by this time Mr. Roosevelt's primary concern may have been Hitler's Germany, Japanese statesmen were not unmindful that their country always occupied a share of his attention. Years before they had endeavored to convince the government of the United States that Japanese action in China was not entirely divorced from American interest, for "we, or our near posterity, will have to decide between Sino-Russian Communism, or the Anglo-Saxon capitalism. If China should fall under the rule of Communism, and if Japan keeps up her present policy, . . . the chance is she will be forced to play the role of . . . the advance posts of the Anglo-Saxon capitalism."¹³

When the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition drove Japan out of the League of Nations on January 7, 1932, Japan made the first of three overtures for a meeting to be arranged "at some point between the continental United States and Japan, such as Honolulu, between some prominent American statesman and a prominent Japanese" for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the basis for an understanding.¹⁴ The proposal came to nothing.

In the spring of 1939 Washington rejected a second and similar overture which, if given consideration, might have produced a profoundly different course in world history. The details were not revealed until a year after Japan's surrender to the United States. On May 18, 1939, Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, in Tokyo, reported to Washington a proposal made to him in behalf of the Prime Minister, Baron Hiranuma, by Hachiro Arita, Japanese Foreign Minister.¹⁵ This expression referred to gathering war clouds in Europe and looked with dread upon the possibility that civilization would be destroyed. It was the duty of the United States and Japan, as the principal Powers outside the scope of the European conflict, Hiranuma suggested, to "prevent the occurrence of such catastrophe." By this joint endeavor, said the Prime Minister, there would arise "the possibility of much closer co-operation between Japan and America as well as the foundation of a deeper mutual understanding between the two nations."

The Prime Minister had one delicately phrased suggestion: ". . . it is the ardent wish of Japan that nations should have their own proper places in the world and thus the true world peace might be established and maintained." To Herbert Feis, at that time State Department adviser on international economic affairs, this was an invitation to appeasement which could have meant "a payment by Britain and France to Germany and Japan."¹⁶ Treating as irrelevant the subsequent payments by Roosevelt to Russia at the expense of China, Japan, Poland, etc., Mr. Feis infers that any such proposal was immoral. This, of course, was long precedent to the United States and United Nations disposition of 1951 to obtain a peace in Korea by rewarding Chinese Communist aggression.

The proposal of Baron Hiranuma was made at a time when Germany was pressing Japan to extend the Anti-Comintern Pact into a military alliance. By the testimony of Toshikazu Kase, the expert on American affairs in the Japanese Foreign Office, the Hiranuma cabinet devoted more than seventy sessions to this question.¹⁷ As late as April 19, a month before Hiranuma's proposal, Grew was assured that there would be no alliance.¹⁸ On May 22, four days after Arita communicated Hiranuma's message, Germany, impatient of the long delay, signed a military alliance with Italy which excluded Japan.

Before Grew's departure on leave for the United States that night, with the Embassy in the hands of Counselor Eugene Dooman, the ambassador expanded upon his discussion with Arita. He said that he had been assured that the new agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy would not contain military or political commitments binding upon Japan, "except such as may apply directly to combating Communistic activities." "Japan," he continued, "desires to avoid European entanglements. Nevertheless, Japan regards the Soviet Government and the Comintern as identical, and if Soviet Russia should become involved in a European war Japan herself might find it impossible to avoid involvement."¹⁹

On May 23 Dooman reported that he had dined privately with the Prime Minister. Baron Hiranuma said that Japanese public opinion "would not permit of the settlement of the conflict in

China being made a condition precedent to the American-Japanese move that he had in mind," but he proposed that he would sound out Germany and Italy for the purpose of a conference "to save the world from chaos" if Roosevelt was prepared at the same time to sound out Great Britain and France.²⁰

In referring Dooman's detailed report of the conversation to Roosevelt, Secretary of State Hull termed it "amazing" and described it as "in effect, a private *démarché* of the Prime Minister to us."²¹ Although in a previous dispatch Dooman had conveyed the substance of the proposal, his extended report added other information. Japan sought "a gesture of welcome" from the United States. Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and, whether Japan liked it or not, Japanese policies and actions "form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act on each other." As Dooman had been informed in other quarters, Japan feared involvement with the United States, "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe."²²

Hull kept the Japanese waiting almost three months for an answer, and by the time the Secretary's note of rejection was transmitted, Hiranuma did not need the reply to know the American attitude. On July 26, 1939, the United States gave notice of its intention, effective six months from date, to abrogate the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan.

In the light of the fixed refusal of Washington authorities to accept the fact that, in a world where no one was pure, Japan was not unique in its impurity, subsequent diplomatic history is redundant if not wholly unreal. The keynote of subsequent American negotiations with Japan—"looking," in Roosevelt's later pained statement, "toward the maintenance of peace in the Pacific"²³—was adequately struck by Hull in a memorandum of June 28, 1940:

I said that this country has been progressively bringing economic pressure to bear on Japan since last summer, now a year, and I enumerated the different steps and methods, which are familiar to all, and added that our fleet is now somewhere in the Pacific near Hawaii. I said that we have and are doing everything short of a serious risk of actual mili-

tary hostilities to keep the Japanese situation stabilized, and that this course during the past year is the best evidence of our intentions and activities in the future.²⁴

This campaign of economic pressure had begun with the suspension of the 1911 trade treaty, effective January 26, 1940. Ambassador Grew had remarked, "I have pointed out that once started on a policy of sanctions we must see them through and that such a policy may conceivably lead to eventual war."²⁵

In order to see them through, Roosevelt brought into his cabinet (June 20, 1940) as Secretary of War the inventor of the policy of sanctions—the Republican, Mr. Stimson, who had convinced him of the efficacy of that policy back in January, 1933. At the same time Roosevelt also snared Colonel Frank Knox, Republican Vice-Presidential candidate in 1936, and made him Secretary of the Navy, thus furthering the illusion of "bipartisan" unity.

With the advent of Mr. Stimson in the cabinet, the program of sanctions proceeded apace. On July 2, 1940, Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act, authorizing the President to license or prohibit the export of essential defense materials. He acted at once under these powers. The recent fall of France and of Holland had emboldened the Japanese to seek concessions in Indochina and economic guarantees from Indonesia. These appear to have sufficed in the minds of American authorities to provide justification for a tougher course. On July 31, exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were restricted.

This process was speeded by the dispatch, September 12, of what Ambassador Grew called his "green light" telegram—"perhaps the most significant message sent to Washington in all the eight years of my mission to Japan."²⁶ He had felt, on July 2, when Japan was addressing various demands to Indochina and the Dutch East Indies, that "they must be met—or else."²⁷ On August 1 Foreign Minister Matsuoka announced a "Greater East Asia" foreign policy with Japan leading the way to a "common prosperity." At the end of that month the French ambassador in Tokyo signed an agreement granting Japan military concessions in Indochina.

Accordingly, Grew, who since the autumn of 1939 had sought to persuade the American government "to divert this indicated course of events"²⁸ and had been encouraged by Hull late the following May to talk reform and co-operation to the Japanese, now hardened his mind. Referring to the evident risks of a doctrine of sanctions, especially applying to oil, Grew, after many circumlocutions, nevertheless advised Washington to go about putting Japan through the economic wringer.

The sequel was that, on September 26, an embargo, effective October 16, was imposed by President Roosevelt on all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western Hemisphere. Scrap had been moving across the Pacific in prodigious quantities and Japan, terming the embargo "an unfriendly act,"²⁹ warned that further trade restrictions would make relations "unpredictable"³⁰—a familiar diplomatic term expressing likelihood of war. Certainly the embargo had an immediate result, for on the following day Japan, overcoming the scruples of many months, signed up as partner with Germany and Italy in the Tripartite Pact.³¹

According to Kase, Prince Konoye, the Japanese premier, hoped to use this alliance as a means of improving Japan's diplomatic position vis-à-vis Britain and the United States. Nothing was further removed from Konoye's mind, Kase says, than to engage in war with them. Konoye's notion was that the United States, especially if Russia could be brought into the alliance, would be restrained from intervening in the European war and the China embroilment might be brought to a "peaceful settlement." "He wanted," says Kase, "to keep both the United States and Japan out of the European arena and, if possible, to exercise a joint mediation between Germany and Great Britain."³²

But such subtleties of purpose were lost upon Washington. The program of sanctions was entered upon in the belief that there was no purpose of trifling with a transgressor: "*Les Chrétiens ont droit et les païens ont tort*" sufficed.

On October 8, 1940, Roosevelt, at a White House conference, informed Admiral Richardson, commander in chief of the United States fleet and of the Pacific Fleet, that, "if the Japanese attack

Thailand, or the Kra Peninsula, or the Dutch East Indies, we would not enter the war; that even if they attacked the Philippines he doubted whether we would enter the war, *but that they could not always avoid making mistakes, and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war.*"³³

So, waiting in the Pacific, as in the Atlantic, for someone to "make a mistake," Mr. Roosevelt, now elected for a third term on the pledge that "your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars," continued during 1941 to tighten the economic vise, a little at a time, the while his assistance to China constantly expanded. As early as January 27, 1941, Grew suggested the nature of the coming "mistake," reporting that he had learned from the Peruvian ambassador that Japan meditated an attack upon Pearl Harbor.³⁴ Two days later, in preparation for the eventualities arising from such a "mistake," military staff conversations with the British opened secretly in Washington.³⁵

Mr. Roosevelt had been in touch with Winston Churchill when the war in Europe was barely a week old,³⁶ and this partnership had flourished as Churchill rose to the post of Prime Minister and as the President's sympathy for England became more outspoken. American-British staff talks had been instituted as early as the summer of 1940.³⁷ What Sherwood calls a "common law marriage"³⁸ was developing. The implication is that the union was real and binding, however much public acknowledgement or official ratification might be lacking. Congress was not consulted, and had the nature of the liaison been known, "demands for the impeachment of Roosevelt would have been a great deal louder."³⁹

What Sherwood terms "the real American-British staff talks"⁴⁰ began in Washington on January 29, 1941, and lasted until March 27. These produced "a plan, known as ABC-1, which suggested the grand strategy for the war,"⁴¹ calling for a principal concentration of American force against Germany while a containing war of attrition was being waged against Japan. As later explained by Rear Admiral Richmond K. Turner, chief of Navy war plans, it was the intention, if the United States became engaged in war with Japan without the involvement of Germany, that the Roosevelt govern-

ment "would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be able to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe."⁴² "The staff conference assumes," its report said, "that when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany, it will at the same time engage in war with Italy. In these circumstances, the possibility of a state of war arising between Japan and an association of the United States, the British Commonwealth, and its allies, the Netherlands East Indies, must be taken into account."⁴³

The important word was "when." There was no "if."

The Washington staff talks were followed by a similar conference at Singapore, April 21-27, to draft an American-British-Dutch war plan for the Pacific in conformity with the master plan drafted in Washington.⁴⁴ The report of this conference, known as ADB, accepted the Washington decision that the Pacific was to be considered a secondary front. It held that the Philippines were of "subsidiary interest" to maintaining the security of Singapore and of sea communications. Only a token defense of Luzon was to be made by American naval surface and air units, after which they would head southward to pass under British command.

These staff agreements have been a continuing source of embarrassment to defenders of Roosevelt's course. Sherwood makes the usual formal disclaimer that there was any intent in the Washington talks to violate the Constitution. He denies that undercover commitments were implied. His rationalization is that secrecy had to be preserved because of the uproar that would have followed if Congress and the press had brought the facts before a nation still fondly believing that the peace would be kept by its leadership.⁴⁵

The members of the British delegation to the Washington conferences wore civilian clothes and disguised themselves as "technical advisers to the British Purchasing Commission"⁴⁶—another illustration, no doubt, of what former Assistant Secretary of State A. A. Berle calls the Rooseveltian idea that "diplomacy is a people's prerogative."⁴⁷

The Washington staff report nowhere specified that notice be given Congress that any such conversations had occurred, or that ratification be sought of the Senate of any terms reached. The

Singapore report worked both ways from the middle, first denying that any political commitment was implied, then specifying that the agreed arrangements were to implement the war plan previously adopted in Washington, which provided for no congressional approval.

General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, approved, in secret, ABC-1, which called for no congressional indorsement.⁴⁸ Inasmuch as ADB was drafted to implement ABC-1, its approval, as a subsidiary instrument, was comprehended in the Marshall-Stark confirmation. According to Stark, the President approved these plans, "except officially."⁴⁹

As soon as the staff agreements were drafted, the Army and Navy drew up a series of supplementary war plans of their own based on these reports, envisioning concerted military action with the British and the Dutch. There was no separate over-all plan for the simple defense of American possessions against Japan.⁵⁰

Herbert Feis is constrained to admit: "To all effects and purposes, the President permitted it to be understood that he approved (the Washington staff report); and he allowed American military plans and arrangements to be guided, if not governed, by the plan." Feis says that "had the American government refused to play its part" in the execution of the plans drafted at the staff conferences, "the British and Dutch would have felt themselves wronged. . . . If once a nation (or individual) enters deeply, as adviser or sharer, into the troubles or dangers of others, it must accept the duty of partner or name of shirker." He indicates his belief that Sherwood took the way of political convenience in saying that the plans "bound nobody."⁵¹

The reports of the staff conferences plainly showed a preoccupation with Germany. A long series of steps, all looking toward the creation of an "incident" in the Atlantic, marked the succeeding months of 1941. Hitler failed to rise to the bait. He imposed restrictions on his navy. The reports of conferences he held with his admirals reflect his determination to avoid drawing the United States into the conflict.⁵² One of these notations observes, "It is unmistakable that the United States government is disappointed

with this curious attitude on the part of Germany, since one of the most important factors in preparing the American people for war is thus eliminated."⁵³

Although Mr. Roosevelt, in September, 1941, promoted the occasion to issue a "shoot on sight" order to the American navy in the Atlantic, that was as far as he progressed. The President's accounts of German "attacks" on American naval vessels were challenged, and prospects for all-out war in the Atlantic were "beclouded by crimination and recrimination."⁵⁴ Attention shifted back to the Pacific and to Japan. As the Japanese ambassador, Admiral Nomura, remarked, "I understand that the British believe that if they could only have a Japanese-American war started at the back door, there would be a good prospect of getting the United States to participate in the European war."⁵⁵

Nomura and Hull had been negotiating since February, but it was obvious that tension between the United States and Japan was constantly mounting. It rose another notch when the Japanese moved into Indochina.

Although, on April 9, Greenland, a possession of German-occupied Denmark, was put under American military protection, and, on July 7, United States Marines were sent to Iceland, also a possession of German-occupied Denmark, further Japanese steps in Indochina, a possession of German-occupied France, did not seem in Mr. Roosevelt's mind to bear any correspondence to his own dispositions.

When, on July 21, Vichy France accepted Japan's demand for military control of French Indochina, Acting Secretary of State Welles lost little time in informing Nomura that the United States considered Japan "was taking the last step before proceeding upon a policy of totalitarian expansion in the South Seas and of conquest in the South Seas through the seizure of additional territories in that region." Welles then expressed the view of Secretary Hull that "the latter could not see that there was any basis now offered" for further pursuing conversations looking toward a peaceful settlement between the two countries.⁵⁶

Having thus slammed the door, the Roosevelt government slammed it twice more in succession. On July 25 it froze Japanese

assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end.⁵⁷ One week later Roosevelt embargoed the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan.⁵⁸ The order did not put it that bluntly, but that was the effect.

The effect of economic sanctions was well understood by all responsible American officials. Grew, in the autumn of 1939, had warned Roosevelt "that if we cut off Japanese supplies of oil and that if Japan then finds that she cannot obtain sufficient oil from other commercial sources to ensure her national security, she will in all probability send her fleet down to take the Dutch East Indies." To this Roosevelt replied, "Then we could easily intercept her fleet."⁵⁹ Grew was under no illusions after the imposition of the embargo concerning what the effect would be: "The obvious conclusion is eventual war."⁶⁰

Roosevelt had further advice on this subject from the Navy, which would bear the initial brunt of any Japanese retaliation. On July 20 the President received a study signed the previous day by Admiral Turner which prophesied: "It is generally believed that shutting off the American supply of petroleum will lead promptly to the invasion of the Netherland East Indies. While probable, this is not necessarily a sure immediate result . . . Japan has oil stocks for about eighteen months' war operation."⁶¹

Turner stated that an "embargo on exports will have an immediate severe psychological reaction in Japan against the United States. It is almost certain to intensify the determination of those now in power to continue their present course. Furthermore, it seems certain that, if Japan should then take military measures against the British and Dutch, she would also include military action against the Philippines, which would immediately involve us in a Pacific war."⁶²

For these and other reasons, Turner's recommendation read: "That trade with Japan not be embargoed at this time." In forwarding this memorandum to the executive branch, Admiral Stark jotted the notation, "I concur in general."⁶³

The idea that sanctions meant war seems to have been grasped, not reluctantly, by Mr. Roosevelt. He described himself as

“pleased” with the Turner memorandum.⁶⁴ Three days after perusing it, and a week before the final embargo on oil to Japan, he warned Ambassador Nomura that if Japan “attempted to seize the oil supplies by force in the Netherlands East Indies, the Dutch would, without the shadow of a doubt, resist; the British would immediately come to their assistance, and war would result between Japan, the British, and the Dutch, and in view of our own policy of assisting Great Britain, an exceedingly serious situation would immediately result.”⁶⁵ Thus, having determined on a measure which his advisers assured him would force Japan to take military countermeasures, Roosevelt warned the Japanese that if they acted against countries which he accepted as unacknowledged allies, they must reckon with the United States. However veiled in the language of diplomacy, this was a threat of war.

That the Japanese also fully grasped the meaning of these moves and accepted the fact that Roosevelt was forcing them into a situation which, according to his own terms, would bring the United States down upon Japan, is attested by a dispatch of July 31 by Foreign Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura: “Commercial and economic relations between Japan and third countries, led by England and the United States, are gradually becoming so horribly strained that we cannot endure it much longer. Consequently, our Empire, to save its very life, must take measures to secure the raw materials of the South Seas.”⁶⁶

Mr. Roosevelt and his associates, through the fortunate circumstance that Intelligence had cracked the Japanese diplomatic code, were privileged to read this message. [The transcripts of these decoded messages were known as “Magic.”] The Roosevelt circle was unmoved by Toyoda’s further observation: “I know that the Germans are somewhat dissatisfied over our negotiations with the United States, but we wished at any cost to prevent the United States from getting into the war, and we wished to settle the Chinese incident.”⁶⁷

II. WASHINGTON PERSISTENTLY REJECTS THE JAPANESE OVERTURES FOR PEACE

The Japanese persevered in the hope of a diplomatic solution, trusting that where the efforts of intermediaries were unproductive a direct meeting of the responsible leaders of the two nations might still succeed. On August 8, 1941, Nomura, acting on instructions from Konoye, suggested to Hull that Roosevelt and Konoye confer.⁶⁸ Konoye's announced purpose was that "we sincerely desire maintaining peace in the Pacific," and he thought the proposed meeting might produce "a way out of the present situation."⁶⁹

In a series of telegrams to Washington, Grew mustered strong arguments for favorable consideration. The Japanese Foreign Minister, Admiral Toyoda, informed him that although Konoye was "fully aware of the objections in certain parts of this country," his overture to the President was "the expression of his strongest desire to save the civilization of the world from ruin as well as to maintain peace in the Pacific. . . ." Toyoda expressed conviction that it would "be possible to reach a just and equitable agreement."⁷⁰ Grew supported the argument, "with all of the force at his command," that this proposal "not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration." He said that it offered the chance of "avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States." It was, he said, "unprecedented in Japanese history" and demonstrated that "Japanese intransigence is not crystallized completely."⁷¹

Again, on September 27, Foreign Minister Toyoda appealed to Grew, warning that "without Prince Konoye and the present cabinet under him, an opportunity for Japanese-American rapprochement is likely to be lost for some time to come."⁷² Grew echoed this opinion in a message to Washington, praying that "so pro-

pitious a period be not permitted to slip by" and arguing that the "time has arrived" when "liberal elements in Japan might come to the top." Grew warned that continued foot dragging in Washington would force the conclusion in Japan "that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time." He said the result would be that the Konoye cabinet would be discredited and that a revulsion of anti-American feeling "probably will lead to unbridled acts," making it "difficult to avoid war."⁷³ Mr. Grew's forebodings were an accurate appraisal of events to come.

Ambassador Nomura first tendered the Konoye proposal to Hull on August 8, when Roosevelt was five days on his way to another and more congenial conference—that in the Atlantic, with Prime Minister Churchill of Britain. Obviously, he was not averse to meeting other heads of states who intrigued his fancy, and he was, so he indicated not too long afterward, not inhospitable to such meetings even when they concerned heads of state who, in his view, had no great qualities to commend them.

In this connection he informed Ambassador Carlton J. H. Hayes that "he would be willing to meet and talk with General Franco in the Canary Islands or elsewhere outside of Spain . . . if a real crisis threatened. . . . He was, he said, a strong believer in the advantages to be derived from personal contacts between chiefs of state." Hayes thought it quite obvious that the President "would go to unusual lengths to forestall Spain's co-operation with the Axis."⁷⁴ Indeed, by later example at Tehran, Yalta, Casablanca, and Quebec, Mr. Roosevelt showed himself to be a strong believer in the advantages to be gained by personal contacts between chiefs of state, although it was not entirely apparent from these excursions that the advantages redounded to the United States.

If a meeting with Franco were deemed to justify going to unusual lengths to forestall co-operation with the Axis, there was something to be said for a conference with the Japanese premier, for he represented an Axis partner which, through a reasonable reading between the lines, was seeking encouragement to withdraw from its Axis commitments. Ambassador Grew, in his telegram of September 29, vouched for the fact that "the Japanese

government, though refusing consistently to give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance membership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance adherence to a dead letter. . . ."75 The same intention was vouchsafed by numerous other officials on both the American and Japanese sides.

Despite such significant earnestness of intention, the meeting never came off. Konoye resigned, Tojo acceded, and less than two months later the United States and Japan were at war. Roosevelt and Hull avoided the meeting by a haggling insistence on "agreement in principle"⁷⁶ in advance of any conference, which, in effect, meant that they expected Konoye to make a public confession of error and repentance for Japan's whole diplomatic course. In view of the touchy national sensibilities of Japan, any such self-abasement was out of the question.

An intervening event which exercised a fateful influence on the course of American-Japanese relations was the Argentinia meeting which brought Roosevelt and Churchill together early in August. The evidence is that Churchill sought, primarily, two commitments from Roosevelt. The first, initiated through the Atlantic Charter, the inspiration and first draft of which were Churchill's, was intended—as it did—to announce that the nonbelligerent United States was already in league with belligerent England to the end of accomplishing "the final destruction of Nazi tyranny."⁷⁷ The whole tenor of this declaration, speaking of a coming condition of "victors and vanquished," of future dispositions of territory, economic privileges, the disarmament of aggressors, and a new world organization ("a wider and permanent system of general security"), implied that the United States was committed to take a hand in the war; otherwise, such statements of hope and intention were entirely devoid of meaning. "The fact alone of the United States, still technically neutral, joining with a belligerent Power in making such a declaration was astonishing," Churchill later observed. Roosevelt's subscription to the intended destruction of Germany "amounted to a challenge which in normal times would have implied warlike action."⁷⁸

The Prime Minister then pressed for his second objective—a blunt warning to Japan that further encroachments in the south-

western Pacific would compel the United States to resort to countermeasures, "even though these might lead to war between the United States and Japan."⁷⁹ Mr. Roosevelt acquiesced. It was the understanding of Mr. Churchill and himself that this declaration might deter Japan for thirty days.⁸⁰ (A pair of journalists who were in Roosevelt's favor later represented his intention to be that of "babying" Japan along for ninety days.)⁸¹ Britain and the Netherlands were to make parallel declarations, but evidence is lacking that they fulfilled this commitment according to the prescription outlined by the British for Roosevelt.

Upon his return to Washington Mr. Roosevelt summoned Admiral Nomura on August 17 and read him a variant of the agreed declaration, which had been toned down in language but not softened in effect.⁸² Under Secretary Welles agreed at the Pearl Harbor investigation that the two instruments meant the same thing in diplomatic language.⁸³ Secretary Stimson once expressed himself as believing that Roosevelt's warning to Nomura was virtually an ultimatum to Japan. This threatening greeting met Admiral Nomura when he presented himself to submit Prince Konoye's proposal for a meeting with the President. It brought Konoye's diplomacy to a dead end.

Ever since the inauguration of Hull's talks with Nomura in February, the professed American terms for agreement had revolved around three primary demands. They were:

1. That Japan openly forswear its Tripartite Pact pledge to intervene if the United States barged into the European war, but that the United States be privileged to rationalize such action as "self-defense."

2. That Japan remove troops from China and Indochina and pledge that it would leave Thailand and other "neighboring countries" alone. This meant Russia, the British and Dutch colonial territories, and, of course, the Philippines.

3. That the contemplated Japanese idea of a "new order" or "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere" be junked in favor of Hull's fixed notion that free trade was a cure-all for man or beast.

The Japanese were disposed to go a very considerable way toward meeting these requirements, but even a conciliatory government

could not shout its acquiescence in advance from the housetops.

To Japan's statement that it could not yield on the right to station troops in Inner Mongolia and North China for resistance against "Communistic activities,"⁸⁴ Hull said that "although in matters affecting only this country there might be some latitude of decision as to the qualifying of rights, the matter under discussion affects the sovereign rights of a third country, and accordingly it is felt that this Government must be most scrupulous in dealing with such a matter."⁸⁵

This was, indeed, a sound rule of political morality, and it is entirely regrettable that it was not later applied by the government for which Mr. Hull spoke in decisions affecting the disposition of Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and even China itself.

Concessions offered by Japan on Hull's other points were considerable and, to a reasonable and conciliatory mind, offered the basis for a settlement infinitely preferable to a terrible universal war. It is clear that if accepted they would have presented a chance to spare the United States enormous sacrifices in a two-front war, and, as is now known, illimitable future difficulties and anxieties. Even if this promise had not been fully realized in the event, still the chances under the proposed terms of agreement could not possibly have been worse than those which materialized in the absence of any attempt whatever at settlement.

Such considerations seemingly did not trouble the minds of Mr. Hull or his principal. Long after the end of the war, when a cumulative series of blunders, disasters, and interminable vexations and hazards had been disclosed as the fruits of the policy of these statesmen, Mr. Hull could remark, with immense self-righteousness and satisfaction, that "my policy of being deliberate, while also being on time, resulted in a record that many of the best-informed persons say was without a major blunder."⁸⁶

Because of disquieting surmises that the United States actually sought no agreement, and because of rapidly shifting developments in the European conflict, contributing to the uncertainty of the Japanese position, four conferences before the Throne were called in the latter half of 1941. Japan's decision was to engage in a

“southward advance” and to prepare for war with the United States and England if diplomatic negotiations should break down. The conferences grew out of the confusion which resulted from Germany’s unannounced attack upon Russia, which, Konoye said, caused “utter consternation” in Japan.⁸⁷ The decision with reference to Germany and the Axis relationship was that Japan should act independently.⁸⁸

The program struck off was ambitious but was qualified by the outlook of the Prime Minister, Prince Konoye, that it was “not only necessary to continue the present negotiations with America . . . it was also necessary to bring them to a successful conclusion.” Military opinion was cited concerning the “almost insurmountable difficulties” of trying to fight America and the Soviets simultaneously, and it was Konoye’s view that it would be wise to abandon, if possible, the move into Indochina.⁸⁹

The program was based on contingencies; it was an operating plan only to the extent that, if the worst came to the worst, Japan would have a plan of action to satisfy requirements of what was deemed necessary to the nation’s preservation. Inasmuch as the government had to prepare for eventualities in the light of what was obviously a deteriorating situation, some preparatory action was indicated. The move in Indochina was representative. If diplomatic relations were to fail and war with Britain and the United States became inevitable, Japan would be installed in a strategic staging point.

The second Throne conference, that of September 6, was chiefly to confirm a decision that if by the early part of October agreement had not been reached with the United States on terms of a general settlement, “we will immediately make up our minds to get ready for war against America (and England and Holland).”⁹⁰ The Emperor, on the preceding day, had handled the Chiefs of the Supreme Command rather roughly, taxing them with the hollowness of their promises four years before on the estimated duration of the China operation. “If the Chinese hinterland was extensive,” he said, “the Pacific is boundless.”⁹¹ At the meeting before the Throne he exacted a pledge from them that they were giving precedence to diplomacy rather than to war. They responded that they

“advocated a resort to armed force only if there was no other way out.”⁹²

One of the requirements of the Japanese program adopted at this time was that the United States and Britain were not to obstruct a settlement of the China Incident.⁹³ Yet two days before the imperial conference the Chinese ambassador, Dr. Hu Shih, informed Secretary Hull that “China did not desire any peace at this time.” The ambassador harbored the belief that Japan was showing signs of weakening and might be obliged to abandon aggressive military activities and seek peace. Hull assured him that no American settlement would be considered until the matter had been fully discussed with China, as well as with Britain, Holland, and Australia.⁹⁴

As an extraordinary sequel to the imperial conference, Konoye arranged a secret meeting with Grew and Counselor Dooman that same evening. He said if he failed to achieve concord with the United States “no succeeding Prime Minister, at least during his own lifetime, could achieve the result desired.” He again urged an early meeting with Roosevelt. Time, he said, was of the essence: “resentment is daily mounting in Japan over the economic pressure being exerted by other countries.” Given the will, he said, the way could be found.⁹⁵ The will was not found, and Konoye departed from the government.

On the eve of the third imperial conference, November 5, high Washington officials were apprised through interception of a secret message from Foreign Minister Togo to Ambassador Nomura that diplomatic proposals to the United States forthcoming from the meeting on the morrow would be “indeed, the last.” Procrastination was no longer possible, but “we have decided . . . to gamble once more on the continuation of the parleys.” If a quick accord could not be reached, “the talks will certainly be ruptured. Then, indeed, will relations between our nations be on the brink of chaos. . . . In fact, we gambled the fate of our land on the throw of this die.” If Japan’s yielding were interpreted as a reflection of weakness, the Foreign Minister said, the United States would be disabused: “. . . when it comes to a question of our existence and honor, . . . we will defend them without recking the cost.”⁹⁶

Further instructions underscored the urgency of the situation. "Time is becoming exceedingly short and the situation very critical. Absolutely no delays can be permitted. . . . We wish to avoid giving them the impression that there is a time limit or that this proposal is to be taken as an ultimatum."⁹⁷ And then, on the same day, Nomura was given the "difficult" but "unavoidable" order that "it is absolutely necessary that all arrangements for the signing of this agreement be completed by the 25th of this month."⁹⁸

By copious evidence in their hands, high American authorities were placed on notice that if a settlement was to be attained averting, or at least delaying, war, the hour of decision was before them. Alternative approaches were given for submission through Nomura. The first, termed "Proposal A," was described as "our revised ultimatum . . . to meet, in so far as possible, the wishes of the Americans."⁹⁹ This was a document for bargaining. Its terms represented the most that Japanese leaders, in an excess of optimism, might have hoped to obtain, and more than they knew they ever would. Yet, in the light of subsequent American diplomatic passages, notably those of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam, where negotiation supposedly proceeded among allies and friends, the terms were not unreasonable.

They were unreasonable only when brought up against the prevailing rigidity of mind in Washington. Nor, considered in the light of the terms acceptable to the American government in the United Nations proposal of January 13, 1951, for a cease-fire agreement with the Communists in Korea, were these proposals of a character to warrant dismissal out of hand. Yet, as Feis, a spokesman for the contemporary outlook of the administration, subsequently remarked, Proposal A "was, in truth, dead before it was delivered."¹⁰⁰

Proposal B, also relayed by Tokyo to Nomura on November 4, was put forward as a substitute plan in the event of rejection of the initial proposal, and was described as "a last effort to prevent something from happening."¹⁰¹ This "something" could hardly be regarded as anything else than an open break and war.

A series of feverish consultations now took place in Washington. At a meeting on November 1, Hull asked the Army and Navy if

they "would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department." He offered the opinion that "there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up."¹⁰² The reply of the services, in a memorandum addressed by Marshall and Stark to Roosevelt on November 5, strongly counseled against warlike action against Japan and recommended that "no ultimatum be delivered to Japan." The chiefs said that American naval, air, and submarine strength in the Pacific would be on a better footing by the middle of December, but that Army air forces in the Philippines would not achieve projected strength before February or March, 1942.¹⁰³

Hull was thus under the restraint of advice from the military leaders that the force to support radical diplomatic action was lacking—which was the information he professed to seek. Had he tailored his policy to the facts presented by staff leaders and played a waiting game, the American cause would certainly not have suffered. For, as soon as the attack came on Pearl Harbor, December 7, Hitler abandoned the pretense that Moscow would fall to his forces and withdrew to winter positions. The Germans had run a bluff to encourage Japanese military action by representing that the Moscow campaign was on the verge of success.

By December, it could not be long sustained, and Japanese impetuosity would, without a doubt, have yielded to cautious reflection when German retreat became apparent. By February or March, 1942, the American position, together with the prospects of averting war, would have been greatly improved. But such considerations required the moderation of inflexible attitudes which had been long in developing, and there was no disposition of that kind in Washington.

In fact, at a cabinet meeting on the afternoon of November 7, the day on which Nomura submitted Proposal A to Hull, Roosevelt polled his cabinet on the question "whether the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there and what the tactics should be."¹⁰⁴ The vote was unanimous that the people would support the administration. This was a peculiar exercise in reference to the constitutional requirements relating to war, and was even more strange as a method of sampling public opinion. Stimson

noted that the sentiment would have been even stronger: "if the Cabinet had known—and they did not know, except in the case of Hull and the President—what the Army is doing with the big bombers and how ready we are to pitch in."¹⁰⁵

In this state of mind, Proposal A was quickly brushed aside, and there could be little doubt that a similar fate awaited Proposal B. Indeed, the fears of Ambassador Grew, far away in Tokyo, were in process of being fulfilled. In an earnest message to Hull on November 3, he rejected the thought that economic pressure would bring Japan to its knees and warned that refusal to support conciliation would lead to an "all-out, do-or-die attempt" by Japan, "actually risking national *hara-kiri*." He asked whether "war with Japan is justified by American national objectives," but recognized that this consideration had been rendered irrelevant: "The Ambassador does not doubt that such a decision, irrevocable as it might well prove to be, already has been debated fully and adopted, because the sands are running fast." In the circumstances, he cautioned that a belligerent Japanese response "may come with dangerous and dramatic suddenness."¹⁰⁶

Grew followed this warning with a memorandum for Hull on November 7 reporting an indirect communication from Foreign Minister Togo that "the Tojo government has decided the limits to which it will be possible to go in an endeavor to meet the desires of the United States," but urging that negotiations not be permitted to break down.¹⁰⁷ This was no news, of course, to Washington, which had had word from "Magic" that Japan was submitting "our absolutely final proposal."¹⁰⁸

Grew's exertions, as he later despondently remarked in his diary, "brought no response whatsoever; they were never even referred to, and reporting to the Department was like throwing pebbles into a lake at night; we were never even permitted to see the ripples."¹⁰⁹

With the arrival on November 15 of Saburo Kurusu, who had come to assist Nomura, Japan moved to play out the last of its string. On November 18 Nomura suggested to Hull, and requested Tokyo's approval of, the restoration of the situation as it was before July, which would embody lifting of the American embargo

and freezing restrictions and removal of Japanese troops from French Indochina.¹¹⁰ It seemed to him that Hull was not "particularly receptive,"¹¹¹ although the device would have offered a *modus vivendi* for carrying on negotiations on disputed points which Nomura felt could not possibly be settled within "any specified time limit."¹¹² Nomura's purpose obviously was to escape the imposed time limit of November 25 set by his government, to keep the talks going, to avert war, and "to enable the peaceful leaders in Japan to get control of the situation . . . and to assert their influence."¹¹³

If Hull was not particularly receptive to Japanese proposals—he said at one point in the conversation that he "frankly did not know whether anything could be done in the matter of reaching a satisfactory agreement with Japan"¹¹⁴—the Japanese government did not feel that this was the time to shift the premises upon which it had been proceeding. It directed Nomura to present Proposal B,¹¹⁵ which was looked upon as a tentative "arrangement" subject later to being "embodied in the final agreement."¹¹⁶ Its terms were:

1. Both Japan and the United States to agree to make no armed advance anywhere in southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific area (except that part of French Indochina where Japanese troops already were stationed).

2. Japan to withdraw its troops from French Indochina either when peace is restored between Japan and China or when an equitable peace is established in the Pacific. (In the meantime, upon conclusion of the agreement, Japan would move its troops in southern French Indochina to the northern section.)

3. Japan and the United States to co-operate in acquiring the goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.

4. Japan and the United States to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of Japan's assets, with the United States supplying Japan a required quantity of oil.

5. The United States to refrain from such measures and actions as will be prejudicial to restoring general peace between Japan and China.¹¹⁷

The merit of these proposals could be established only by ref-

erence to utilitarian and empirical tests, among them whether the United States was willing to accept war as an alternative, whether it was militarily prepared for war, whether its national interests were sufficiently concerned to warrant a decision for war, whether acceptance would enhance the security both of its own territory and of the positions occupied by associated nations, whether the agreement encouraged Japanese aggression or gave promise of tending to contract it, whether Japan could be expected as a result of this agreement to withdraw from former courses and treaty commitments, whether the United States was called upon to make concessions substantially less than those of Japan, whether those concessions were in fact no concessions at all but represented merely a reversion to practices and methods of intercourse previously countenanced between the countries, in return for which Japan agreed to affirmative limitations upon national action.

It is possible on all of these counts to contend that the United States would have lost nothing and stood to gain much by use of the Japanese paper as a basis for possible adjustment. Not the least important commodity to be gained was time, during which the dust in Asia and the snow around Moscow might have found time to settle.

That some attention was given to these conceptions is attested by three proposals originating within the Washington official circle in November to effect a *modus vivendi* which would divert a crisis. Roosevelt himself suggested this approach on November 6, and in an undated memorandum proposed trading points which might carry matters along six months.¹¹⁸ These did not differ too greatly from what Japan offered on November 20. Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau, despite his previous advocacy of freezing Japanese funds, was not enthusiastic over what might have appeared to him, primarily interested as he was in Europe, to be the distraction of a Pacific war. He suggested proposals.¹¹⁹ So did the Far Eastern Division of the Department of State.¹²⁰

The Japanese proposal was "clearly unacceptable"¹²¹ to Hull, although he professed to know the consequence: Japan would not "stop short of war with the United States if by November 25 we had not agreed to her demands."¹²² But, despite this knowledge,

he regarded the Japanese proposal as "so preposterous . . . that no responsible American official could ever have dreamed of accepting it."¹²³

Mr. Hull is more reticent about the possibility that any responsible Japanese official could dream of accepting his counterproposal of November 26, but the Japanese reaction and his own estimate of the evolving situation provide an adequate answer. The Secretary considered his course with the full knowledge that, if a constructive solution were to be attained, it must be reached very soon. An intercepted message from Tokyo to Nomura and Kurusu on November 22 extended the deadline previously fixed at November 25 to November 28, Washington time. This message told the Japanese ambassadors that "there are reasons beyond your ability to guess" why the settlement must be achieved within a fixed time, but that "this time we mean it, that the deadline absolutely cannot be changed. *After that things are automatically going to happen.*"¹²⁴ Hull's interpretation was not mistaken: "After that, war."¹²⁵ And, he observed, "The sword of Damocles which hung over our heads was therefore attached to a clockwork set to the hour."¹²⁶

The Secretary's method was not to try to stay the hands of the clock. He improved his time drawing up both the outline of a *modus vivendi* and a ten-point statement incorporating American demands for a general settlement. The Chinese improved their time by raising an hysterical clamor against even the thought of a tentative agreement with Japan. Hull was in a mood to complain about these activities and voiced his grievances to colleagues and to Lord Halifax, the British ambassador. He expressed the belief to Halifax that Churchill, in giving countenance to the Chinese outcry, had let him down.¹²⁷ From other testimony, Chinese accusations of "appeasement" hit Hull in a tender spot and were influential in his decision to drop the *modus vivendi*.¹²⁸

On the morning of November 25, however, when he conferred with Stimson and Knox, Hull displayed to them "the proposal for a three months' truce." Stimson thought it "adequately safeguarded our interests," but thought it unlikely Japan would accept.¹²⁹ Nevertheless, as Admiral Stark later remarked, it was "nothing like

so drastic as the so-called ten-point note which he handed to the Japs on the 26th."¹³⁰

Following the meeting of the three Secretaries, the "War Cabinet" met at the White House, where Roosevelt expressed the belief that "we were likely to be attacked perhaps (as soon as) next Monday, for the Japanese are notorious for making an attack without warning, and the question was what we should do."¹³¹ Stimson restated this dilemma in a now celebrated form: "The question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition."¹³²

Interestingly enough, on the basis of a careful examination of Stimson's *Diary* and private papers, Professor Richard N. Current has shown in an article in the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, June, 1953, that Stimson, himself, was impatient with the idea of sitting idly by and waiting for Japan to attack at Pearl Harbor or elsewhere. Rather, he advocated a policy of getting us into the war by executing a Pearl Harbor in reverse. He recommended that American planes should attack the Japanese fleet without warning from the Philippines.

The discussion centered about what could be done if the Japanese moved southward. Chiang Kai-shek had forecast new Japanese action to attack Yunnan through French Indochina.¹³³ Other possible movements might be toward Thailand or toward the British and Dutch possessions. The preoccupation arose from the fact that such action would not involve a direct attack upon United States territory and therefore would fail to present a constitutional cause for counteraction. It is implicit in this discussion that the President and cabinet were thinking of the contingencies for American military action envisioned in the staff agreements early in 1941. Although it has always been studiously asserted that these were without binding effect, Marshall and Stark, in their memorandum of November 5 to the President, urging avoidance of diplomatic action tending to hasten war, had, nevertheless, acted upon the assumptions of the Singapore paper in stating that the United States should fight in the following contingencies: (1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory of the

United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies; (2) the movement of Japanese armed forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East, or south of 10° North, or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.¹³⁴

How to reconcile these secret undertakings with constitutional methods and to obtain the necessary public support to execute them was, as Stimson said, indeed "difficult."¹³⁵ He "pointed out to the President that he had already taken the first steps toward an ultimatum in notifying Japan way back last summer that if she crossed the border of Thailand she was violating our safety and that therefore he had only to point out (to Japan) that to follow any such (southward) expedition was a violation of the warning we had already given."¹³⁶

Undertaking to explain all this to the congressional committee in 1946, Stimson said, "In spite of the risk involved, however, in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in any one's mind as to who were the aggressors. We discussed at this meeting the basis on which this country's position could be most clearly explained to our own people and to the world, in case we had to go into the fight quickly because of some sudden move on the part of the Japanese."¹³⁷

General Marshall stated the same dilemma in saying that "it was the accepted thought in all of our minds at the time that if we were forced to take offensive action, immediate offensive action, that it would be a most serious matter as to its interpretation by the American people, whether we would have a united nation, or whether we would have a divided nation in getting into a world conflict."¹³⁸

Not until after his return to his office following the White House meeting did Stimson receive reports that some five Japanese divisions from Shantung and Shansi had boarded transports at Shanghai and were headed south.¹³⁹ This intelligence had not entered into the cabinet discussion, and, although Stimson communicated the information to Hull, it does not appear to have influenced the Secretary of State's decision to abandon the *modus*

vivendi in favor of his ten-point proposal.¹⁴⁰ When Hull informed Stimson on the twenty-sixth of his intention to "kick the whole thing over," he mentioned Chinese objections to the *modus vivendi* but said nothing about Japanese movements.¹⁴¹

Stimson also sent a copy of the intelligence summary reporting the Japanese troop movements to Roosevelt. The summary expressed the opinion of Military Intelligence that, in the absence of other information, "this is more or less a normal movement." Military Intelligence had a further significant estimate: "From the foregoing it appears evident that the Japanese had completed plans for further aggressive moves in southeastern Asia. *These plans will probably be put into effect soon after the armed services feel that the Kurusu mission is a definite failure.*"¹⁴² As an indication, even in advance of any possible Japanese reaction to the Hull proposals, which were not tendered until the following day, this is an interesting disclosure of what store Washington authorities were inclined to put in American diplomatic action as a means of keeping peace.

When Hull outlined his proposals of November 26 to the Japanese he knew what the outcome would be, for, reporting to Stimson that he had "broken the whole matter off," he informed the Secretary of War, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."¹⁴³ He repeated this estimate on November 29 in telling Lord Halifax that "the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan was virtually over and that the matter will now go to the officials of the Army and Navy." He also forecast that "Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise."¹⁴⁴

The Hull proposals of November 26 were of a nature to justify the Secretary's belief that the frock coat would now be replaced by the tunic. In another place he conceded, "We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26. I said at the time that there was only the barest possibility of her accepting it." But, Hull contended, "She would have proceeded to attack us whether we had presented that proposal or any other proposal—unless it had been one of humiliating and abject surrender."¹⁴⁵

The note of November 26 was cleared by Hull with Roosevelt before submission. The major points called for complete Japanese withdrawal from China and Indochina, for Japan to support only the Nationalist government of China, with which it had been in conflict for four years, and to interpret its pledges under the Tripartite Pact and the Hull program so that Japan would be bound to peace in the Pacific and to noninterference in Europe, while the United States should be free to intervene in Europe.¹⁴⁶ These proposals went far beyond Roosevelt's warning of August 17. They were not confined to the necessities of safeguarding purely American territory or even the territory of the Western imperialisms, but embodied an application of the Stimson doctrine on such an extended scale that everybody's business became America's business, and represented, not a limited approach to outstanding problems between two nations, but what has appropriately been called "the maximum terms of an American policy for the whole Orient."¹⁴⁷

Defenders of this course have employed many ingenious legalistic and casuistical explanations of this document. These exercises, while seeking out the protections of verbal forms, sedulously avoided the plain effect which the conditions had upon the recipient nation. Grew was told in Tokyo that the impression was "that Washington has delivered an ultimatum to us."¹⁴⁸ Foreign Minister Togo, in a defense deposition at the Tokyo war crimes trial, said of the Hull note, "The reaction of all of us to it was, I think, the same. Ignoring all past progress and areas of agreement in the negotiations, the United States had served upon us what we viewed as an ultimatum containing demands far in excess of the strongest positions theretofore taken."¹⁴⁹

Admiral Nomura brought up substantially the same point in immediate response to Hull, noting that the conversations had been concerned with relating previous Japanese and American positions and that Hull's new conditions were "vastly different from either."¹⁵⁰ Upon hearing the conditions, Nomura and Kurusu said they despaired of the reception that could be expected of their government, which "would be likely to throw up its hands." Kurusu said he considered the American response to be "tantamount to meaning the end" and asked whether America was not interested

in a *modus vivendi*. Hull curtly said, "We have explored that."¹⁵¹

To Tokyo Nomura reported that he and Kurusu had been "dumbfounded" at "such hard terms," suggesting, with considerable justice, that England, the Netherlands, and China had put the United States up to it.¹⁵² Tokyo, on November 28, referred to the terms as "humiliating."¹⁵³

In a doting account of this fateful episode, entitled "On the Rock of Principle," Basil Rauch contends that in its decision to make no counterproposal of a *modus vivendi* but to present the Hull conditions "the Roosevelt administration met the supreme test of its statesmanship in service of the policy of collective security against aggression. . . . The Roosevelt administration refused to make a deal with Japan affecting China's fate without its consent. It refused to ignore the rights of China as Chamberlain had ignored those of Czechoslovakia at Munich."¹⁵⁴

This judgment looks a trifle strange in the light of later events, such as Mr. Roosevelt's disposition of Chinese territory and rights at Yalta without representation or knowledge of the Chinese government. The Truman administration also was able to view the later forced submission of its wartime ally—the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek—to Communist arms with detachment. Finally, there was the savagely ironic stroke by which the United States, having fought a war to liberate China from foreign domination, ended by finding herself engaged in war with Communist China. Strange, indeed, are the workings of "collective security."

After November 26 the fact that war was certain was apparent to both sides. The Japanese had already made contingent military and naval dispositions. On November 25 the Japanese First Air Fleet sailed from Hitokappu Bay, Etorofu Island, in the southernmost part of the Kuriles, at almost the very hour that the White House conference which had been considering how to "maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot" was dispersing.¹⁵⁵ This fleet had the mission of striking at Pearl Harbor if Japanese-American negotiations proved unsuccessful. At the fourth and final conference before the Throne December 1 the military was authorized to proceed.¹⁵⁶

On November 21, while the fleet was assembling in the Kuriles,

orders were given that if the negotiations were successful the fleet was to be ordered back immediately.¹⁵⁷ As late as December 2 inquiry was made whether the fleet could be recalled in the event of a belated settlement being reached in the Washington negotiations. Assurances were given that it could.¹⁵⁸

Meanwhile, the Japanese divisions which had come to Stimson's notice on November 25 were proceeding south along the China coast on an undisclosed mission which Army Intelligence thought would go into effect when the Japanese armed services felt "that the Kurusu mission was a definite failure."¹⁵⁹

That the mission was a failure, in the light of the proceedings of November 26, was attested by a great variety of Japanese cryptographic communications which were intercepted and decoded by United States Intelligence. High Washington authorities had the privilege of reading Japanese intentions by this convenient means.

Having been apprised on November 22 that, in the absence of a successful conclusion to the diplomatic negotiations by November 28, "things are automatically going to happen," it may be conjectured that Washington authorities awaited with no little interest a disclosure of the nature of these "things." Another storm warning had been posted November 19 when a weather code relating to wind directions and atmospheric conditions had been established "in case of emergency (danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations), and the cutting off of international communications." This code was to apply to possible courses of action involving the United States, England, and Russia. Overseas Japanese agents were to look for the signal during short wave Japanese language news broadcasts.¹⁶⁰

Whether the "winds" code meant war or severance of diplomatic relations has been debated, but the obvious inference is that it meant war. The conditions under which it was to be invoked—"emergency: danger of cutting off our diplomatic relations"—anticipated a severance of relations and denial of the usual channels of communication. There was no point in using the code to warn overseas agents of the very condition which would necessitate using the code.

III. ON THE EVE OF PEARL HARBOR

Evidences of Japan's decision were not long in arriving. On the day Hull submitted the American terms, Washington learned that they were unacceptable. On November 28 Tokyo informed Nomura and Kurusu that within two or three days "negotiations will be *de facto* ruptured." The emissaries were instructed: "However, I do not wish you to give them the impression that negotiations are broken off. Merely say to them that you are awaiting instructions. . . . From now on do the best you can."¹⁶¹

The deadline for accomplishing a settlement having passed without result, things now were "automatically going to happen" and the ambassadors were instructed to stall in an attempt to mislead Washington—which certainly had no excuse now for being misled.

Other intercepted messages in ensuing days to various Japanese outposts throughout the world clearly indicated war with Britain and the United States, referred to pledges of Germany and Italy to act with Japan in the war, and conveyed instructions to various diplomatic offices to destroy codes and code machines—the invariable prelude to war. Predictions were read in Washington that the new war "may come quicker than any one dreams." An invasion of Thailand in defiance of Roosevelt's August 17 warning was discussed. "Magic" also designated the United States, Britain, and Netherlands Indies as "enemy countries." In various other forms decoded dispatches made the Japanese decision abundantly clear.¹⁶²

On December 4, three days before the Pearl Harbor attack, the "winds" signal was intercepted by the Navy radio receiving station at Cheltenham, Maryland.¹⁶³ The purloining of the original typescript of this notice of the existence of unadmitted war and of all copies, the efforts made by Washington officials to silence those

who had seen it or to induce them to change their earlier sworn testimony concerning its existence, and the political denial of the receipt of this communication, are among the great scandals of Pearl Harbor. Only one witness, Captain L. F. Safford, chief of Navy Communications Intelligence, stuck to his story from first to last that the "winds execute" message had been received, that "it meant war—and we knew it meant war," and that it was translated: "War with England (including N.E.I., etc.). War with the U.S. Peace with Russia."

The significance of this intercepted signal was that it removed the last possible doubt concerning what was coming and gave Washington authorities seventy-two hours in which to order every outpost in terms allowing of no equivocation to go on an all-out alert against approaching war. This was not done.

While the evidence was accumulating that Japan would strike, not at Britain alone, not at the Netherlands Indies alone, not at the United States alone, but at all of them, the attention of the Washington official circle was focused on the progress southward of the Japanese troop transports whose movement had been reported November 25. On the twenty-sixth, the Joint Army and Navy Board, with Marshall and Stark in attendance, met to consider the situation, actuated by the primary conviction that "we should not precipitate a war."¹⁶⁴ As Marshall put it, "I was hunting for time."¹⁶⁵

On the basis of decisions reached at this meeting, a memorandum was drafted for Roosevelt¹⁶⁶ on the twenty-seventh, too late to head off the Hull proposals to Japan. Among other points, it stated that "the most essential thing now . . . is to gain time," adding, "Precipitance of military action on our part should be avoided as long as consistent with national policy." What "national policy" was considered to be was suggested by succeeding references to the terms of agreement which had been reached at the secret American-Dutch-British staff conference at Singapore in April. Roosevelt was advised:

After consultation with each other, United States, British, and Dutch military authorities in the Far East agreed that

joint military counteraction against Japan should be undertaken only in case Japan attacks or directly threatens the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies, or should the Japanese move forces into Thailand west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

Japanese involvement in Yunnan or Thailand up to a certain extent is advantageous, since it leads to further dispersion, longer lines of communication, and an additional burden on communications. However, a Japanese advance to the west of 100 degrees East or south of 10 degrees North, immediately becomes a threat to Burma and Singapore. Until it is patent that Japan intends to advance beyond these lines, no action which might lead to immediate hostilities should be undertaken.

It was therefore recommended that "prior to the completion of the Philippine reinforcement, military counteraction be considered only if Japan attacks or directly threatens United States, British, or Dutch territory as above outlined; in case of a Japanese advance into Thailand, Japan be warned by the United States, the British, and the Dutch governments that advance beyond the lines indicated may lead to war; prior to such warning no joint military opposition be undertaken; (and) steps taken at once to consummate agreements with the British and Dutch for the issuance of such warning."

This paper demonstrated that, whether described as binding or not, the conditions stipulated at the secret Singapore conference were those upon which American military leaders determined to act; that these conditions envisioned American military action if Japan struck at British or Dutch territory, or beyond certain limits in Thailand, but not necessarily against American possessions, and that no legislative authorization for such action was contemplated. The high command was entirely silent on this vital constitutional point.

Before these recommendations went to the President, they were

scrutinized by Secretary Stimson, who consulted, in the absence of Marshall, who had gone to North Carolina to observe maneuvers, with General L. T. Gerow, Chief of the War Plans Division, General Staff. "The Secretary," stated Gerow, "wanted to be sure that the memorandum would not be construed as a recommendation to the President that he request Japan to reopen the conversations. He was reassured on that point."¹⁶⁷ As Stimson observed, "I also would be glad to have time, but I did not want it at the cost of humiliation of the United States or of backing down on any of our principles which would show a weakness on our part."¹⁶⁸

In the estimation of the Secretary of War, therefore, the Hull terms of the twenty-sixth had brought the diplomatic negotiations to an end—a conclusion in which he had been confirmed "the first thing in the morning" when Hull informed him, "I have washed my hands of it and it is now in the hands of you and Knox—the Army and the Navy."¹⁶⁹ This view of the moribund status of the conversations was fortified later on the twenty-seventh by the nature of a celebrated message (No. 472) sent to Army commanders in the Pacific by Stimson, Gerow, and Colonel Charles W. Bundy.¹⁷⁰

"The President himself . . . had now actually directed the sending of the message," recounted Stimson; so "in order that it should be strictly accurate, I called up Hull myself on the telephone and got his exact statement as to the status of the negotiations, which were then incorporated in the first sentence of the message,"¹⁷¹ as follows: "Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibility that the Japanese Government might come back and offer to continue."¹⁷²

The Army Board's judgment was that this entire message was so ambiguous and contained so many conflicting instructions that it could only be characterized as a "Do-or-don't" message.¹⁷³ The Majority Report of the congressional investigation also was constrained to lay down the rule that henceforward "communications must be characterized by clarity, forthrightness, and appropriateness." Dispatches, it said, "must be unmistakably clear, forthright, and devoid of any conceivable ambiguity."¹⁷⁴

Among other things, General Short in Hawaii and other com-

manders were instructed: "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."¹⁷⁵ This "was a direct instruction from the President," said General Marshall.¹⁷⁶ General Gerow explained that "the President had definitely stated that he wanted Japan to commit the first overt act."¹⁷⁷ Roosevelt apparently was very mindful of his pledge not to send Americans into foreign wars "unless we are attacked."

Together with this admonition was the instruction that, while commanders were not to jeopardize their defense, they should not "alarm civil population or disclose intent." In combination, these various warring wishes and commands contrived to tie General Short's hands and to confuse him concerning what was wanted. He reported to Marshall, in response, that he had instituted an alert against sabotage (the least urgent of three conditions of alert which he had devised) and effected liaison with the Navy.¹⁷⁸ If these measures were inadequate, it was Marshall's responsibility, as he later admitted, to correct Short's misapprehensions.¹⁷⁹ Stimson and Gerow also saw the report. If they were dissatisfied, all they had to do was give an order. Nobody did anything, and Short, confused further by subsequent warnings pointing to subversive activities and sabotage, was convinced that he had taken the action Washington considered appropriate.

On the same day the Navy sent a message to the Pacific which was received by Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor, among others.¹⁸⁰ This was introduced with the statement: "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning." It said "negotiations with Japan . . . have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days"—against the Philippines, Thai, or Kra peninsula, or possibly Borneo. Nothing was said about danger to the fleet or Hawaii, and Kimmel interpreted the instruction to "execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL-46" as orders to get ready to send an expedition against the Japanese mandated islands. The dispatch, however, did not place the Navy war plan in effect. As to the phrase "war warning," which in the context of the dispatch did not herald war directly against the fleet and forces in Hawaii, Admiral Kimmel said that he had construed all of the messages he had

previously received as "war warnings." Two other orders Kimmel received on the twenty-seventh suggesting use of his carriers to ferry 50 per cent of the Army's pursuit planes in Hawaii to Wake and Midway Islands¹⁸¹ also tended to confirm his reading that no likelihood of an attack on Hawaii was foreseen by Washington. Otherwise, so much of the striking defenses against air attack would not have been ordered removed from Pearl Harbor.

Admiral Thomas C. Hart, commander in chief of the Asiatic Fleet, seems to have read Washington's veiled intentions correctly. His explanation of how he interpreted the order to "deploy" was:

The Asiatic Fleet had to await attack. It could not attack. So, manifestly, the measure was to so dispose ourselves that when the attack came it would inflict as little damage as was possible; and under the circumstances that obtained out there, the only way to do that was to follow the principle of dispersal and concealment. That is what we did.

The submarines, in which lay the main power of the Asiatic Fleet—their concealment is inherent in the type. The surface ships were dispersed and disposed in a southerly direction,* where they would be farthest away from what would have to be the points from which the Japanese would jump off, and that was about all there was to it.¹⁸²

Admiral Kimmel was not so clairvoyant in interpreting the Washington intention, although the suggestion was later made by Admiral Turner, director of Navy War Plans, that, under the order to execute a preparatory deployment, Kimmel should have "taken his fleet to sea."¹⁸³

General Marshall later remarked in a reflective moment:

So far as public opinion was concerned, I think the Japanese were capitalizing on the belief that it would be very difficult to bring our people into a willingness to enter the

*He sent them into the Netherlands Indies, "ostensibly to get fuel," "informally" notifying the Dutch commander, Admiral Helfrich, and never brought them back.

war. That, incidentally, was somewhat confirmed by the governmental policy on our part of making certain that the overt act should not be attributed to the United States, because of the state of the public mind at the time. Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific Fleet.¹⁸⁴

Little reading between the lines is required to discern what was sought: a belligerent act by Japan to unify American public opinion for war without sustaining a crippling blow. Prudent politicians found it difficult to formulate this prescription in sufficiently precise terms without exposing themselves to the possibility of re-tribution. The consequence was to credit the commanders in the field with the necessary discernment to fill in the gaps of what otherwise must have appeared as a highly ambiguous series of directives.

That Pearl Harbor might be expected to serve as the locus of the "overt act" was clearly established by the Japanese coded traffic out of Hawaii which was intercepted and deciphered by Intelligence. This fact was also supported in logic, for Japan could not afford to undertake major operations anywhere in the Pacific while leaving the American fleet loose on its flank. The official War Department history of prewar plans and preparations of the General Staff asserts that the "specific peril to Hawaii . . . should have been discerned in the messages because the invaluable fleet was based there."¹⁸⁵ This source further states that "the strategic planners of Army and Navy themselves in estimating Japanese intentions failed to make a surmise which in retrospective clairvoyance seems to have been almost inescapable, namely, that a crippling raid on the U.S. Fleet could be regarded as a necessary preliminary to any major Japanese campaign in the Pacific."¹⁸⁶

The coded dispatches to and from Honolulu, where Japan maintained a consular staff of two hundred, showed an interest in fleet movements and berthings extending to no other American base.¹⁸⁷ On October 9, 1941, when a message from Tokyo to Honolulu was translated in Washington, it was found that the consul was under instructions to divide the waters of Pearl Harbor into five subareas,

specifying the vessels in port in each area, with special interest for warships tied up at wharves, buoys, and in the docks.¹⁸⁸ As the diplomatic situation grew more tense, the consul was ordered to make his "ships in harbor report" at the rate of twice a week.¹⁸⁹ On November 29, after the deadline when "things are automatically going to happen" had passed, he was notified: "We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements."¹⁹⁰ Related to Tokyo's previous interest in the position of the ships in harbor and how moored or docked, this was a tipoff that it was interested in picking off sitting ducks.

These messages, to the minority in the congressional investigation, "meant that the ships of the Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor were marked for Japanese attack. No other American harbor was divided into subareas by Japan."¹⁹¹ The minority report very logically noted that such meticulous detail was not necessary to enable Japan to keep track of the fleet for general purposes; that the messages were sent to Tokyo for the execution of a purpose obviously originating from there—air or sea attack; that they could not have been for purposes of sabotage, for the saboteurs would have to be in Hawaii, not Tokyo, and they needed no "bomb plot" because they could depend on local observation; and that the only purpose of sending out such information would be to guide external operations.¹⁹²

Nevertheless, some defenders of the Washington circle contend that only certain messages from Honolulu referring to the absence of barrage balloons and anti-mine nets, and to the fact that the fleet air arm was conducting no air reconnaissance, which Intelligence stated were not translated until after December 7, could have been interpreted as forecasting attack. One of these, reported to have been translated one day late, said, "I imagine that in all probability there is considerable opportunity left to take advantage for a surprise attack against these places."¹⁹³

It is argued by at least one Roosevelt administration sympathizer that the information contained in all of the previous messages "was well within the requirements of a Japanese plan of sabotage by Japanese agents."¹⁹⁴ Leaving aside such questions as how saboteurs

expected to crash the confines of a heavily guarded naval station burdened down with quantities of explosives capable of wrecking powerful warships, this suggestion is ludicrous, for the hypothetical saboteurs were on the spot to see for themselves where the ships lay and had no need to relay to Tokyo information on matters which would depend upon their own execution in Hawaii.

The "bomb plot" intercept was distributed to Roosevelt, Knox, and high Army and Navy officials,¹⁹⁵ but no word on any of these espionage reports was ever conveyed to Admiral Kimmel or General Short before the attack.¹⁹⁶ All the word they had from Naval Intelligence was that, as of December 1, Japanese "major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers"¹⁹⁷—an estimate that could not have been more wrong, for six carriers with 351 planes were bearing down on Pearl Harbor.

Despite all assurances of "Magic" that the United States would be involved in Japanese plans of attack, the Roosevelt circle remained concerned lest Japan restrict belligerent action to British, Dutch, or neutral territory. This would bring the administration face to face with the obligation to discharge undertakings to Britain and Holland which, while covert and devoid of the sanctions appertaining to treaty commitments, were yet being acted upon by Roosevelt's military leaders as if fully binding, and were being regarded in the same light by the President and cabinet. How to discharge them, when and if sprung upon an unsuspecting Congress and public? This consideration may have had much to do with the "terrible moral problem" which Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins noted was burdening the President during these difficult days.¹⁹⁸

Having decided in their own minds as of November 7 that "the people would back us up in case we struck at Japan down there," the Roosevelt official family continued to fret over this and to endeavor to reassure one another. As the Japanese forged through the South China Sea, Stimson, on November 28, hurried to Mr. Roosevelt before he was out of bed. The President said that "there were three alternatives and only three that he could see before us.

I told him I could see two. His alternatives were—first, to do nothing; second, to make something in the nature of an ultimatum again, stating a point beyond which we would fight; third, to fight at once. I told him my only two were the last two, because I did not think any one would do nothing in this situation, and he agreed with me. I said of the other two my choice was the latter one.”¹⁹⁹

Stimson returned to the White House at noon for a meeting of what had been designated for some time as the “War Cabinet,” consisting of the President, Knox, Stark, Marshall, and himself. The Secretary of War confided to his diary:

It was now the opinion of every one that if this expedition was allowed to get around the southern point of Indochina and to go off and land in the Gulf of Siam, either at Bangkok or further west, it would be a terrific blow at all of the three Powers, Britain at Singapore, the Netherlands, and ourselves in the Philippines. It was the consensus of everybody that this must not be allowed. Then we discussed how to prevent it. It was agreed that if the Japanese got into the Isthmus of Kra, the British would fight. It was also agreed that if the British fought, we would have to fight. And it now seems clear that if this expedition was allowed to round the southern point of Indochina, this whole chain of disastrous events would be set on foot of going.

It further became a consensus of views that rather than strike at the Force as it went by without any warning on the one hand, which we didn't think we could do; or sitting still and allowing it to go on, on the other, which we didn't think we could do—that the only thing for us to do was to address it a warning that if it reached a certain place, or a certain line, or a certain point, we should have to fight.²⁰⁰

Roosevelt's mind ran toward a message to the Emperor of Japan, Stimson's to a message to the people of the United States, indicating “what the real nature of the danger was.” Stimson thought the best form of message would be “an address to Congress, reporting

the danger, reporting what we would have to do if the danger happened." The decision finally was to address both a message to the Emperor and a speech to Congress, and Hull, Knox, and Stimson were asked to "try to draft such papers."²⁰¹

Mr. Roosevelt then took himself off to Warm Springs, where he made a speech, very conservatively predicting that "in days like this it is always possible that our boys at the military and naval academies may actually be fighting for the defense of these American institutions of ours." Another year, he added, might see American boys at war.²⁰²

In Tokyo the same day the Premier, General Tojo, spoke more vehemently to the effect that Britain and the United States were seeking "to fish in the troubled waters of East Asia" and promised "to purge this sort of practice from East Asia with a vengeance."²⁰³ Hull telephoned Roosevelt and the President said he would be back on December 1.²⁰⁴

The week end was improved by Hull, Stimson, and Knox in drafting the projected message to condition Congress and the people. Prime Minister Churchill attempted to jog matters by sending a message²⁰⁵ to Roosevelt professing to "realize your Constitutional difficulties" but urging, nonetheless, that Roosevelt inform Japan that "any further Japanese aggression would compel you to place the gravest issues before Congress"—which, of course, was to say that the President would ask a declaration of war.

While these activities were in progress, Tokyo instructed its ambassadors in Berlin and Rome on November 30 to notify the German and Italian governments that conversations with the United States "now stand ruptured—broken." The dispatch warned that "there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and . . . that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than any one dreams."²⁰⁶ Part of this message was never intercepted, but related evidence suggests that the Japanese went on to invoke the mutual obligations of the Tripartite Pact and to seek assurance that Germany and Italy would enter the war at Japan's side. Germany had already indicated its willingness on November 29 and Mussolini did so on December 3.²⁰⁷

Mr. Roosevelt's interest in Tokyo's dispatch to Rome and Berlin was sufficient to cause him to retain his copy, which was not in accordance with his usual practice.²⁰⁸ On the night of December 7, when he summoned cabinet members and congressional leaders to the White House, he showed that he knew what he had been reading. "We have reason to believe that the Germans have told the Japanese that if Japan declares war, they will, too," he said. "In other words, a declaration of war by Japan automatically brings. . . ." ²⁰⁹ Although he was interrupted, he had expressed his foreknowledge that a warlike act by Japan meant war with all of the Axis.

Upon his return to Washington, Mr. Roosevelt, shortly before noon of December 1, conferred with Hull and Stark, and Harry Hopkins left a hospital bed to come to the White House for lunch. The product of these huddles appears in the extraordinary instruction subsequently dispatched by Admiral Stark to Admiral Hart of the Asiatic Fleet:

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt of this dispatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol." Minimum requirements to establish identity as U.S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in West China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue, one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Cape St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of *Isabel* authorized by President as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out President's views.²¹⁰

Hart, in response, recommended against using the *Isabel* because of her short radius but said he was looking for chartered ships, although he could not estimate the time required to obtain them

and equip them with radio. He deemed it improbable that he could start the ships within two days.²¹¹ Stark, in a return message, approved substituting a chartered ship for the *Isabel*, but in the outcome the *Isabel* was the only ship ever to start on this venture.²¹² The Japanese attack came along when she was a few hours out and she abandoned the mission, no longer necessary.

Admiral Stark put on a deadpan display before the congressional committee four years later, saying that the dispatch read that the "patrol" was to be sent out for information; so that was its sole purpose.²¹³ Adults will persist in the belief that Roosevelt was attempting to rig a lynching which would relieve him of his embarrassments by putting this sacrifice force in the path of the Japanese fleet, where it would be run down or shot up. The formula was ingenious as a means of procuring "the first overt act" and inducing Japan to fire "the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." The Democratic platform reservation—"except in case of attack"—would be fully met, and Mr. Roosevelt would be free to embark on his crusade for the Four Freedoms "everywhere."

Representative Keefe, at the conclusion of the Pearl Harbor investigation, in a statement of "Additional Views," devoted extended consideration to the various slippery devices contemplated by Roosevelt to produce a war incident that would unify public opinion behind his policy of intervention.²¹⁴ The President meditated sending a detachment of vessels to the Far East and "leaking" the news, saying that he would not mind losing one or two cruisers, but that he did not want to take a chance on losing five or six. He thought of the scheme of ordering Admiral Kimmel to send a carrier load of planes to a Russian Asiatic port through waters contiguous to Japan. Kimmel's response, "If we have decided upon war, it would be far better to take offensive action. *If for reasons of political expediency, it has been determined to force Japan to fire the first shot, let us choose a method which will be more advantageous to ourselves,*"²¹⁵ was a model of sound counsel in an amoral intellectual climate.

On December 1 it was reported that the Japanese expedition had landed near Saigon, Indochina,²¹⁶ instead of continuing into the

Gulf of Siam, which, according to the decision of the "War Cabinet" on November 28, required that "we would have to fight." Roosevelt, however, ordered Sumner Welles, acting in Hull's temporary incapacity, to demand through the Japanese envoys "what they intended by this new occupation of southern Indochina—just what they are going to do."²¹⁷

While these "complicated moves"²¹⁸ were in train, the President and Hull continued to cultivate the pretense for home consumption that all was serene between the United States and Japan. Although affecting injured innocence at his press conference of December 2 over Japan's new move southward, Roosevelt described that nation as "a friendly power with which the United States was at peace."²¹⁹ Hull, on December 3, emphasized that negotiations were still in progress and called Nomura and Kurusu his "friends."²²⁰ On December 4 Stimson flew up to New York to see his dentist,²²¹ an act which failed to suggest that any immediate tasks confronted the military establishment, and, upon his return, said he had done so in the assurance that "the conversations were still in progress."²²²

While Hull said insistently that the conversations were exploratory and tentative,²²³ he knew that Japan considered them final and formal, that Japan's secret messages showed them "ruptured" and "broken," that the Japanese continued to talk only to mask something Tokyo had promised would "automatically" happen, and that Japan had announced to its diplomatic agents and Axis partners that it soon would be fighting the United States—"quicker than any one dreams."

Who was fooling whom? The Japanese weren't fooled. The President, Hull, and their associates weren't fooled; they knew. Could it have been the American people who were intended to be fooled?

Indeed, when Hull, on November 29, forwarded, as part of the program of conditioning public opinion for war, the draft of the proposed address to Congress and a message to go to Hirohito, he showed his real opinion of the value of both of them. The message to the Emperor would be "of doubtful efficacy, except for the

purpose of making a record."²²⁴ Of the other the Secretary said, "I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostilities, has been reached."²²⁵

This stage was now at hand. On December 3 the American Embassy in Tokyo was instructed to destroy its code machine.²²⁶ The "East wind, rain" intercept arrived December 4.²²⁷ On December 5, Mr. Roosevelt, in a note to Mr. Willkie, who had shadowboxed him in the campaign of 1940, looked for the "next four or five days" to decide whether there would be "an armed clash."²²⁸ In a cable to London for the attention of Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who was bound for Moscow, Roosevelt talked as if the United States were already at war by the side of England and Russia. He expressed his view on the spirit in which "the post war settlement" would be approached by these three nations "upon the conclusion of hostilities."²²⁹ On every hand codes, ciphers, and confidential files were being destroyed—from Tokyo and Bangkok to Panama and Washington.²³⁰

Now, on December 6, the Roosevelt circle received intelligence that gave it a cold sweat. On December 1 reports indicated that the Japanese expedition headed southward had shown evidence of disembarking at Saigon. This would stop it short of crossing the "line" which, in the opinion of the "War Cabinet" on November 28, would require the United States to fight. Certainly Mr. Roosevelt and his associates were not averse to hostilities, but hostilities without "the first overt act" coming from Japan were not what they wanted. Congress and the people could be persuaded only with difficulty, if at all, of the necessity of war simply because an imaginary "line" drawn on distant waters were transgressed. So, upon news of the Saigon landing, short of the "line," there was general relief. "This appeared to give us a little respite," said Stimson.²³¹

But on Saturday, December 6, Roosevelt and his colleagues learned that the previous intelligence had been wrong. The Japanese were not only proceeding but they had crossed the invisible line which, by the terms of the Singapore staff conference, the

recommendations of November 5 and 27 by Marshall and Stark, and by the "consensus" of Roosevelt, Stimson, Hull, Knox, Marshall, and Stark, required the administration to go to war.

The first word came from Ambassador Winant in London in a message marked "Triple priority and most urgent" and "Personal and secret to the Secretary (Hull) and the President." It reached the hands of Roosevelt and Hull at 10:40 A.M. December 6, almost twenty-seven hours before the attack on Pearl Harbor. The dispatch read:

British Admiralty reports that at 3:00 A.M. London time, this morning two parties seen off Cambodia Point, sailing slowly westward toward Kra, 14 hours distant in time. First party 25 transports, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers. Second party 10 transports, 2 cruisers, 10 destroyers.²³²

By the previous unanimous decision of the "War Cabinet," the United States—at least, in the estimation of the six men who thought they had the power of that decision—was at war as of 10:40 A.M. that day. These six were at war, with one hundred and forty million Americans ignorant of the fact, with no constitutional warrant from Congress for making war, and with no certain knowledge of how to obtain public and legislative support. They knew what the other Powers of the ADB agreements would be expecting of them, and they were bound, in a thousand ways, by their whispered assurances, their spoken words, their warnings and threats, and their compacts among themselves.

Winant again reported at 3:05 P.M. This dispatch gave either Kra or Bangkok as the Japanese destination and noted the latter would not be reached before Monday—a time factor which prompted some erroneous calculations by Roosevelt. The interesting passage in this message was: "British feel pressed for time in relation to guaranteeing support Thailand fearing Japan might force them to invite invasion on pretext protection before British have opportunity to guarantee support but wanting to carry out President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax."²³³

Late on December 5 Halifax had called on Hull to set forth

Foreign Secretary Eden's view "that the time has now come for immediate co-operation with the Dutch East Indies by mutual understanding . . . [in] the matter of defense against Japan."²³⁴ But what the "President's wishes" were, as conveyed on this subject or any other by Welles to Halifax, is a mystery. Welles later said he didn't remember.

From the tenor of the Winant dispatch, however, certain things seem evident. The first was that the British were complaining that Roosevelt was holding them up in offering a guarantee to Thailand and preparing to take military action against Japan. The second is that they were confident of Roosevelt's backing but were forced to submit to delay in accordance with his "wishes." The British complaint had reference to time being lost by reason of humoring these "wishes," not to uncertainty concerning the President's position in events that were fast developing. By inference, therefore, the British already had Roosevelt's support in joint action, but they did not have it from him publicly and that is what they wanted and what they were waiting on.

There is powerful, if controverted, evidence to sustain the belief that this was the precise state of affairs. On December 6 Admiral Hart in the Philippines radioed Stark: "Learn from Singapore we have assured Britain armed support under three or four eventualities. Have received no corresponding instructions from you."²³⁵

The occasion for this radiogram was a message received by Hart from the American naval observer in Singapore, Captain John M. Creighton. The Creighton dispatch read:

Brooke Popham received Saturday from War Department London:

"We have now received assurance of American armed support in cases as follows:

"A) We are obliged execute our plans to forestall Japs landing Isthmus of Kra or take action in reply to Nips' invasion any other part of Siam.

"B) If Dutch Indies are attacked and we go to their defense.

"C) If Japs attack us, the British.

“Therefore, without reference to London, put plan in action if, first, you have good info Jap expedition advancing with the apparent intention of landing in Kra; second, if the Nips violate any part of Thailand.

“If N(etherlands) E(ast) I(ndies) are attacked, put into operation plans agreed upon between British and Dutch.”²³⁶

The testimony of Captain Creighton before the congressional committee reads a good deal like that of an officer who has, in the navy saying, a finger on his number. At one point he suggested that his testimony might sound “a little odd.”²³⁷ It does. He had been preceded on the witness stand by Admiral Hart, then a member of the United States Senate. Hart testified that his inquiry to Washington concerning American military commitments to Great Britain had been predicated on a dispatch to him signed by Creighton at Singapore.²³⁸

Creighton said that when he read in the newspaper of Hart’s testimony “it meant nothing to me at all, nor could I remember what he was referring to.” He told Hart that “I could not support his evidence by recalling the matter.” Hart responded, “Well, you sent it all right because I can produce a copy of it.” He authorized his secretary to give Creighton a key to his office file so that he could obtain the original dispatch. Another Navy officer, Captain John Moser, accompanied Creighton to Hart’s office. He had been Creighton’s assistant in Singapore. They found the telegram but “after reading it I am sorry to say that our memory is no more clear.”²³⁹ Creighton identified the dispatch as his own because “I have such a trust in the fidelity of the Navy communication system.” He conceded that it was signed with his code signature in Singapore.²⁴⁰

Creighton identified Sir Robert Brooke-Popham as an air chief marshal who commanded the Royal Air Force and the British Army Forces in Malaya in December, 1941. Brooke-Popham was, in fact, no obscure or transitory figure, but was British Commander in Chief, Far East, and British representative at the Singapore staff conference in April, 1941. Captain Creighton said, however, that he was not well acquainted with Brooke-Popham and his

business in Singapore was to maintain liaison with the British admiral in charge but not with Brooke-Popham.

He then said that he "never knew Brooke-Popham intimately enough to have received from him directly such information as this, nor did I receive this information directly. . . . I haven't the faintest idea at the moment to be able to tell you who Brooke-Popham had told that to—who told me that Brooke-Popham had told him of those things."²⁴¹

Having testified repeatedly that he could remember nothing about the dispatch, Creighton then termed its contents "a matter of hearsay."²⁴² When Chairman Barkley, later Democratic Vice-President, finally accommodated the captain with the suggestion that the information "was really nothing more than rumor," Captain Creighton agreed: "That is right."²⁴³

On this subject Charles A. Beard cogently remarks:

Respect for the elementary principles in the law of evidence calls for a question: How could Captain Creighton remember that the information in the dispatch was nothing more than hearsay and/or rumor just a few minutes after he had testified that he could remember nothing whatever about the dispatch and that he did not remember who sent it, on what information it was based, where the information came from, the nature of the information, or whether Brooke-Popham had ever said what was ascribed to him in this dispatch? Given Captain Creighton's total loss of memory with regard to the dispatch in 1946, only one rational conclusion is admissible, namely, that his testimony about the dispatch as hearsay and/or rumor is worthless, that the dispatch is to be taken as it stands for whatever it is worth, and that the authenticity of the information contained in it is to be tested by a huge array of collateral evidence and undoubted facts which have a bearing on it.²⁴⁴

And again Beard observes: "It is scarcely credible that such a definite commitment on the part of the United States was passed around in British Army circles in the Far East without any

authorization whatever from London.”²⁴⁵ After all, Creighton was considered a responsible officer, and a responsible officer would hardly have sent a message conveying such momentous intelligence if it rested on, say, hearsay picked up at the bar of the Raffles Hotel.

Another point which bears on the authenticity of the message is that it is stated in quotations of a form that the British authorities in London would use in addressing other British officers in Singapore. If these were not, in fact, true and direct quotations, why such locutions, as “We have now received assurance of American armed support,” “us, the British,” “our plans,” “without reference to London,” etc., and why a discussion of Britain’s exclusive plan of military co-operation with the Dutch?

At this point in the proceedings, the distraction of the Japanese southward movement seems to have occupied the concerned attention of everyone in Washington. The reason was obvious: the time had come to put up, and there was considerable less certainty than there had been that “the country would support us.” One effect of this anxiety was to divert, for the moment, attention from Hawaii, despite the growing evidence that the attack would take place at Pearl Harbor.

The “President’s wishes,” judging from the evidence of what was said and done, tended toward obtaining sufficient delay in the face of importunities from the British, the Dutch, and his own officers in the Asiatic sector to carry out a program that would serve to condition public opinion and cushion the reaction to what he and the “War Cabinet” felt called upon to do. In this endeavor it is apparent that his wishes ran to the kind of “parallel action” with the British which had been outlined at the Atlantic Conference.

Thus, in the late afternoon of the sixth, the Australian minister, Richard G. Casey, conferred with Roosevelt and learned that the President planned the following steps:

1. President has decided to send message to Emperor.
2. President’s subsequent procedure is that if no answer is received by him from the Emperor by Monday evening, (a) he

will issue his warning on Tuesday afternoon or evening, (b) warning or equivalent by British or others will not follow until Wednesday morning, after his own warning has been delivered repeatedly in Tokyo and Washington.²⁴⁶

The Australian government relayed this information to the British Secretary for Dominion Affairs, saying that "subject to condition that President gives prior approval to text of warning as drafted and gives signal for actual delivery of warning," Australia would go along with a warning Churchill had drafted and proposed to address to Japan in the name of Britain and all Dominion governments.²⁴⁷ This promised war if the Netherlands Indies or Malaya were attacked or if Japan entered Thailand. "Should hostilities unfortunately result," the declaration concluded, "the responsibility will rest with Japan."²⁴⁸

In the execution of his program, Roosevelt, on the night of the sixth, ordered the final draft of a message prepared by Hull and others sent to Hirohito at once.²⁴⁹ As Hull had indicated in submitting the preliminary draft to the President, the message was of "doubtful efficacy, *except for the purpose of making a record.*"²⁵⁰ The note of the sixth got into the Emperor's hands about twenty minutes before the Pearl Harbor attack.²⁵¹ Mr. Roosevelt's cardinal observation was that none of the people of East Asia or the Pacific "can sit either indefinitely or permanently on a powder keg."²⁵² The Emperor's dry response, communicated through Foreign Minister Togo after the attack on Pearl Harbor, was that peace "in the Pacific and consequently in the world has been the cherished desire of His Majesty, for the realization of which he has hitherto made the government to continue its earnest endeavors."²⁵³

IV. GENERAL SHORT AND ADMIRAL KIMMEL ARE NOT WARNED CONCERNING THE IMPENDING JAPANESE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

Meanwhile, Intelligence had been learning through "Magic" that the blowoff impended. By 2:00 P.M. on December 6 a "pilot message" from Tokyo had been decoded informing the Embassy in Washington that, having "deliberated deeply on the American proposal of the twenty-sixth of November," it was transmitting a reply in fourteen parts which was to be kept secret pending receipt of later instructions relative to the time when it should be transmitted to the United States government.²⁵⁴ This notice was in the hands of Hull, Stimson, and others by 3:00 P.M.²⁵⁵

The first thirteen parts were transmitted and were in the hands of Navy Communications Intelligence by 2:51 P.M.²⁵⁶ They were transmitted that night to Mr. Roosevelt, Secretary Knox, and various high officers of the Army and Navy. It is a disputed point whether Secretary Hull saw them the night of the sixth. The evidence indicates that he was at least informed of their purport by Secretary Knox.²⁵⁷ Secretary Stimson professed inability to recall whether they were delivered to him, but Knox twice called him after 8:30 that night.²⁵⁸ As a result of these conversations, Stimson asked the Navy Department on Saturday evening to furnish him by nine o'clock Sunday morning the following information: *Compilation of men-of-war in Far East: British, American, Japanese, Dutch, Russian; also compilation of American men-of-war in Pacific Fleet, with locations, with a list of American men-of-war in the Atlantic without locations.*²⁵⁹

The testimony is clear, however, that the "pilot message" was delivered in the afternoon to everyone of importance.²⁶⁰ How,

under the circumstances, knowing that the ensuing message in fourteen parts would mark the *de facto* rupture and breaking of negotiations, any of these officials could have remained indifferent to its contents is a mystery. Especially should this have been true because, in all Japanese wars of modern times, the severance of relations was timed to coincide with the outbreak of hostilities and this, in turn, was inaugurated by a surprise attack on the enemy fleet. This had been true in the war with China in 1895, the attack on Port Arthur opening the war with Russia in 1904, and in the war with Germany launched at Tsingtao in 1914. These facts had been pointed out and should have been familiar to all responsible officials.²⁶¹

Yet, according to statements before the congressional committee, not only did Secretaries Hull and Stimson fail to receive the thirteen parts on the night of the sixth but the operating chiefs of the Army and Navy, General Marshall and Admiral Stark, also did not.²⁶² Stark, having been apprised that this vital message was coming in, went to dinner and the theater.²⁶³ General Marshall suffered a famous case of amnesia and never was able to recall for certain where he was the night of the sixth.²⁶⁴ When the thirteen parts were submitted to the Secretary of the General Staff, Colonel (later General) Walter Bedell Smith, he took no steps to bring them to Marshall's immediate attention,²⁶⁵ although, as the Army Board remarked, war by then "was not a question of fact; it was only a question of time."²⁶⁶

What about the President? The thirteen parts were taken to the White House the night of the sixth. Roosevelt was having a dinner party for a British vice admiral. The message was left with the request "to get word to the President that this was very urgent." The naval aide on duty was to interrupt Roosevelt's dinner party and let him see it as soon as possible.²⁶⁷ Shortly after 9:30 P.M., Lieutenant L. R. Schulz, assistant naval aide, delivered the intercept to Roosevelt in the President's study. With Roosevelt was Harry Hopkins, who paced back and forth as the President read. Having finished, Roosevelt handed the papers to Hopkins, who also read them. According to Schulz, Roosevelt then turned to Hopkins and said in substance, "This means war."²⁶⁸

Hopkins, in reply, said that since war was imminent and that the Japanese intended to strike when they were ready, at a moment that was most opportune for them, and that since war was going to come at their convenience, "*it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise.*"*

The President nodded and then said, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice. He said, "*But we have a good record.*"*

Roosevelt, while Schulz was still in the room, asked the White House operator to attempt to reach Admiral Stark. Informed that Stark was at the theater, he said he would reach the Admiral later—that he could get him "within perhaps another half hour in any case"—and that he "*did not want to cause public alarm.*"²⁶⁹

Familiar themes run through these comments. It was "too bad," but it was undeniably a fact, that "we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise." Japan was being given the first blow, and, with it, the opportunity for surprise, for it was necessary (according to orders sent to the field at the President's direct instruction) that Japan "commit the first overt act." As phrased by Stimson, "The question was how we should maneuver them into firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves." So, when it was remarked that it was "too bad" that the United States would not fire the first shot and head off the surprise, the President could only echo, "No, we can't do that." And when he said, "But we have a good record," to whom was he referring? To the American people, who had no record at all, because no voice, in moves toward war, or in the situation that had developed in relation to Japan? Or to himself, his administration, and his close associates, who had made the record and had managed it so cleverly that now they were about to be liberated from the party platform pledge, "We will not participate in foreign wars, and we will not send our Army, naval, or air forces to fight in foreign lands outside of the Americas, *except in case of attack*"?*

For the moment of liberation was here: "This means war." The President knew it.

Convinced of that fact, knowing that Japan was soon to get in

*Italics supplied.

the first shot, knowing that the blow would fall within the territory and possessions of the United States, knowing that Japan was being allowed the opportunity of surprise, what did Roosevelt do? The attack would not come at Pearl Harbor for almost sixteen hours. Much can be done in sixteen hours. One thing that the President did was to talk on the telephone to Stark upon his return from the theater. Stark professed inability to recall this fact independently. Another naval officer, Captain Krick, who had been in the theater party, jogged his memory. Stark could recall nothing of the conversation, so he said.²⁷⁰

Captain Krick said Stark went to his upstairs study and returned after five or ten minutes. Krick was not told, but deduced, that Stark must have talked to the President. All that Stark told him was that "conditions in the Pacific were serious . . . that conditions with Japan were in a serious state . . . something of that sort. . . ."

Stark could "only assume," on the basis of having been told by Krick, that when he talked with Roosevelt the President mentioned the thirteen parts, but that "*he did not, certainly did not, impress me that it was anything that required action.*"²⁷¹ So, accepting Stark's account, the President, having decided that "this means war," did not think that that "was anything that required action."

Some fascinating intimations appeared in various statements of Secretary Knox that this was not all that happened on the night of December 6. When, soon after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Knox went to Hawaii to investigate personally, he asked Admiral Kimmel whether the Admiral had received "our dispatch" of the night before the attack. Kimmel told Knox he had not. He then quoted Knox as saying, "Well, we sent you one—I'm sure we sent one to the commander of the Asiatic Fleet."²⁷² There was no such message in Kimmel's files. Admiral W. W. Smith, Kimmel's chief of staff, corroborated the fact that Knox had made the inquiry. Told that no such message was received, Knox, according to Smith, remarked, "That's strange. I know the message went to Admiral Hart and I thought it was sent to Hawaii."²⁷³

Knox's naval aide said he had the "impression" that there had been a "midnight warning" on December 6.²⁷⁴ In his report to

Roosevelt, dated December 15, 1941, following his return from Pearl Harbor, Knox had two confused references to such a "midnight" warning. He stated: "General Short told me a message of warning sent from the War Department on Saturday night (December 6) at midnight, before the attack, failed to reach him until four or five hours after the attack had been made."²⁷⁵ Again he said that "a special war warning sent out by the War Department at midnight December 7th to the Army was not received until some hours after the attack on that date."²⁷⁶ This statement was obviously in error, for midnight of December 7, in Washington, would have been almost eleven hours after the attack, and no one would have sent any warnings then. Although Kimmel and Smith were given to understand by Knox that the warning was to the Navy commanders in the Pacific, Knox, in his report to the President, indicated that it was to the Army in Hawaii. There is no evidence that Roosevelt disputed that there was such a message.

Stark, however, testified that he never heard of any conference at the White House the night of December 6 "and Colonel Knox never mentioned any such thing to me."²⁷⁷ It was still his belief that there was nothing that night "that required action."

On the following morning, despite overnight developments, very few people acted as if anything required action. Marshall, still supposedly ignorant of the first thirteen parts of the Japanese final reply, went on a leisurely two-and-one-half-hour horseback ride²⁷⁸ and did not reach his office until 11:25 A.M.,²⁷⁹ two hours before the impending sunrise attack at Pearl Harbor. Stark was in his office somewhere between 8:30 and 11:30 o'clock. Accounts vary.²⁸⁰

Hull, Stimson, and Knox, apparently by appointment of Knox the previous night, gathered at the State Department at 10:00 A.M.²⁸¹ In the newspapers that morning was a summary of Knox's annual report as Secretary of the Navy. It said that the American people "may feel fully confident in their Navy," that it was "without superior" and "second to none."²⁸²

The picture presented by Mr. Roosevelt, after breakfast and before lunch, was one of studied ease. He had "dedicated this day to rest. Today, tieless and in shirt sleeves, he hoped to catch up with his neglected stamp collection. The President might have

been any one of a million Americans putting in a loafing Sunday with a crony and a hobby. Mr. Roosevelt expected war—but not this week end.”²⁸³ The crony was Hopkins.

Meanwhile, much had been happening, but nothing was done about it. At five o'clock that morning the message fixing the time of delivery of the Japanese note was available in the Navy Department.²⁸⁴ It read: “Will the Ambassador please submit to the United States Government (if possible, to the Secretary of State) our reply to the United States at 1:00 P.M. on the 7th, your time.”²⁸⁵

Other messages from Tokyo disclosed that the showdown was at hand. “All concerned,” said one, “regret very much that due to failure in adjusting Japanese-American relations, matters have come to what they are now. . . .”²⁸⁶ Another referred to the “unprecedented crisis,” suggesting that what was to come was a test unique in the annals of Japan, and praying that Japanese officials in the United States “will continue in good health.”²⁸⁷ Inasmuch as none had complained of poor health, the implication was that they faced an altered condition not of a happy nature. An internment camp was the obvious answer. Still another directed Ambassador Nomura to destroy his sole surviving cipher machine and all machine codes and secret documents—an act invariably associated with the coming of war.²⁸⁸

Why, in view of all these messages, and what had gone before, Mr. Roosevelt and everyone around him should not have expected war on this particular week end is not easily explained.

Finally, before 8:00 A.M., Navy Intelligence had ready for responsible members of the government and high command the fourteenth and final part of Japan's memorandum.²⁸⁹ If it had taken no expert interpretation to determine that the first thirteen parts “meant war,” as the President had determined, the concluding section of the message made that unmistakably clear, for it used bellicose language in reference to Anglo-American designs and declared that the hope of Japan “to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American Government has finally been lost.”²⁹⁰ When peace and the hope of peace are lost, what is left? What, indeed, but war?

The first order of business of subordinate officers in possession of the decoded messages was to seek out the high officers of the government and of the Army and Navy who would be concerned with the momentous decisions arising from these statements. It was the earnest desire of some, at least, of these officers to communicate their ideas of how the messages were to be evaluated, with specific reference to the military deductions that were to be drawn from them.

But the duty of evaluation already reposed with the ten men in Washington—²⁹¹ the high officials of the government and the Army and Navy. By official order, delivery of the English texts of the intercepted messages was confined, within the War Department, to the Secretary of War (Stimson), the Chief of Staff (Marshall), the Chief of the War Plans Division (Gerow), and the Chief of the Military Intelligence Division (Miles); within the Navy, to the Secretary of the Navy (Knox), the Chief of Naval Operations (Stark), the Chief of the War Plans Division (Turner), and the Director of Naval Intelligence (Wilkinson); to Mr. Roosevelt in the White House, and to Harry Hopkins.²⁹²

General Miles testified that this restricted circulation was the result of a policy of "closing in on the secret."²⁹³ The commanders at Oahu were denied the flow of code messages,²⁹⁴ although Admiral Kimmel received a few texts irrelevant to his station—enough, only, to constitute "affirmative misrepresentation,"²⁹⁵ for he had asked for all vital information, and these few messages persuaded him that he was getting it.

In relieving the commanders in Hawaii of the opportunity of evaluating "Magic," the high officials in Washington inescapably assumed the responsibility, especially the responsibility of instructing their field commanders in the light of information in their possession alone. What, on the morning of December 7, was the nature of this information, and what the responsibility? To this fundamental question, the Navy Court of Inquiry answered: "In the early forenoon of December 7, the War and Navy Departments had information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and, by inference and deduction, that an attack in the Hawaiian area could be expected soon."²⁹⁶

That the Court confined its reference to knowledge by the War and Navy Departments was a direct result of limiting orders that it should report "whether any offenses have been committed or serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the Naval service," thereby removing from the sphere of its inquiry the determination of responsibility of civilian officials.²⁹⁷ Despite the fact that it was hardly likely that any board of officers would have had the temerity to criticize the President, the Secretaries of War and Navy, or the Secretary of State, the Army Pearl Harbor Board, operating under somewhat broader terms of reference than the Navy Court, did just that. Among those responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster, it listed Secretary Hull.²⁹⁸

Officers entrusted with the distribution of the latest intercepts on the morning of December 7 were at no loss in determining that this information was of a vital and threatening character, demanding immediate action. Colonel R. S. Bratton, chief of the Far Eastern section, Military Intelligence, stated that when he saw the one o'clock delivery message he dropped everything, as it meant to him that Japan planned to attack the United States at or near one o'clock that day.²⁹⁹

Other officers concerned with bringing to the attention of high Washington authorities these crucial decoded Japanese messages in the final hours before action had even shrewder and more specific surmises relative to their meaning. Among them were Captain A. H. McCollum, head of the Far Eastern section of Naval Intelligence, and Captain Alwyn D. Kramer, who occupied the Japanese desk in Naval Intelligence.

Captain McCollum testified that on the morning of December 7, perhaps as early as 8:30 o'clock, he discussed the significance of the fourteenth and final part of the Japanese memorandum with Admiral Stark and with Admiral Wilkinson, chief of Naval Intelligence. While they were talking, the instruction to Nomura directing one o'clock delivery was brought in. Stark "immediately called the White House on the telephone, and the draft was taken over to the Secretary of State and the White House." To this McCollum added, "At the time, the possible significance of the time of delivery was pointed out to all hands."

As McCollum later explained, "all hands" meant Stark, Wilkinson, Admiral Ingersoll, assistant chief of operations under Stark, and Captain Schuirmann, liaison officer with the State Department. But all of these officers had responsibilities to the civil leaders of government, and Stark called Roosevelt.

What was the "possible significance," as pointed out by McCollum to his fellow officers? It was that 1:00 P.M., Washington time, was about 7:30 in the morning, Honolulu time. It was also very early morning at that hour in the Far East, and "if an attack were coming, it looked like the timing was such that it was timed for operations out in the Far East and possibly on Hawaii at the time. . . . We felt that there were important things which would move at that time, and that was pointed out not only to Admiral Stark but I know it was pointed out to the Secretary of State."³⁰⁰

Captain Kramer, who went over with the completed fourteen-part message and the one o'clock delivery dispatch for delivery to Hull, Stimson, and Knox, had "instructions to point out the time business to the Secretary [Hull]." This was an order. So important were these final dispatches that the Navy undertook to deliver them to the Secretary of State although that was the Army's job. Stark and his subordinates did not want to lose a moment's time.

"Now, the danger wasn't in Washington," pointed out Senator Ferguson. "The danger wasn't in Washington, because of which you were delivering this message out of the ordinary rules to the Secretary of State. The danger was on our fronts, was it not, and our outposts?"

McCollum agreed. Suggestion, he said, "*was definitely made that a dispatch be sent to the Fleet pointing out that something could be expected to happen at that time.*"³⁰¹

The suggestion was that the dispatch be sent to the fleet. The fleet was at Pearl Harbor. So the interpretation of the one o'clock delivery was that something—obviously, attack—could be expected at the corresponding hour in Pearl Harbor and no place else. Suggestion was not made that a warning be sent anywhere else. Directly after this suggestion, Stark tried to get in touch with Marshall by telephone, but the Chief of Staff was still out cantering.³⁰²

At or about 10:00 A.M. Captain Kramer arrived at Hull's office, where the Secretary of State was sitting down with Stimson and Knox. Stark had already called Hull. Kramer bore the crucial Japanese messages. It was Kramer who first pointed out the significance of the one o'clock delivery:³⁰³ One o'clock, Washington time, was dark night over East Asia and 2:00 A.M. at Manila, but 7:30 A.M., an hour and four minutes after sunrise, at Hawaii. That hour was "probably the quietest time of the week aboard ship at Pearl Harbor." A large percentage of the crew would be ashore. The crew would be in the process of being piped in for breakfast.³⁰⁴ It was a military axiom that the hour around dawn was the most favorable period for surprise air attack. And Sunday, as the quietest time of the week aboard ship, was the most favorable day.

At the State Department Kramer pointed out that one o'clock in Washington meant dawn, or 7:30 A.M., in Hawaii.³⁰⁵ Spread before Stimson was the information he had requested the previous night from the Navy Department: the compilation of all men-of-war in the Far East, also the compilation of American men-of-war in the Pacific Fleet, with locations. Tying together the one o'clock delivery time factor pointing to Pearl Harbor and the location of the bulk of the Pacific Fleet, also at Pearl Harbor, was an elementary mental exercise—all that was required to show where the danger lay. This computation had been worked out by Captain McCollum.

"Were you surprised when the Japanese attacked on Sunday morning at Hawaii?" asked Senator Ferguson.

"I was not surprised at the Japanese attack, sir," the Captain responded. "I was astonished at the success attained by that attack, sir."

Captain McCollum had "for many years felt that in the event of an outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Japan that the Japanese would attempt to strike the Fleet at or near the commencement time of these hostilities." If the fleet had been at San Pedro, he would have anticipated the attack there. "I felt that the fact that the Japanese intended to go to war carried with it the possibility of an attack on the Fleet wherever it might be, sir."³⁰⁶

The one o'clock delivery time merely reinforced a deduction long entertained.

So, with all of these intimations of what was afoot, with three hours still in which to get a warning to the fleet commander, what did Hull, Knox, and Stimson discuss or do? By way of action, they did nothing. They discussed, by the showing of Stimson's diary, the progress of the Japanese troop transports into the Gulf of Siam,³⁰⁷ upon which their minds in these last days had so constantly dwelt—dwelt because here was a conflict between the private determination of Roosevelt and his "War Cabinet" that "we must fight" and the constitutional impediments to executing that decision.

Yet, though Mr. Stimson indicates no consideration of the danger to Pearl Harbor, he was to say, after the attack, "Well, I was not surprised!"³⁰⁸ The three conferees carried on, by the Secretary of War's showing, a highly irrelevant seminar expressing their doubts and fears concerning what might impend in southeast Asia.

In his diary notations, Stimson said, "Today is the day that the Japanese are going to bring their answer to Hull, and everything in Magic indicated that they had been keeping the time back until now in order to accomplish something hanging in the air. . . . Hull is very certain that the Japs are planning some deviltry and we are all wondering where the blow will strike. We three stayed in conference until lunch time, going over the plans for what should be said or done. The main thing is to hold the main people who are interested in the Far East together—the British, ourselves, the Dutch, the Australians, the Chinese."³⁰⁹

Hull gave "the broad picture of it" and Knox "also had his views as to the importance of showing immediately how these different nations must stand together." Stimson had them record their statements. Hull argued that "the defense must be commenced within the South Sea area at such time and places as in the judgment of naval and military experts would be within sufficient time and at such strategic points as would make it most effective. In no other way can it be satisfactorily determined that the Pacific area can be successfully defended."³¹⁰

This was a brief in support of Presidential declarations of war at

the discretion of the Executive and his military advisers. It had no possible reference to the constitutional requirement that only Congress "shall have power . . . to declare war." Further, it takes but slight acquaintance with the decisions of the Singapore staff conference and with the recommendations of Marshall and Stark on November 5 and 27 to detect that Hull was engaged in special pleading in support of a course of action which would take the Administration off the hook—dangling, as it was, between the commitments it had extended to other Powers and the constitutional limitations upon Executive action.

Knox dictated the familiar view that America's destinies were tied up with the fate of the British and Dutch colonial possessions, postulated that "any threat to any one of the three of us is a threat to all of us," and declared for a warning to the Japanese "that any movement in a direction that threatens the United States will be met by force"—a *non sequitur* of majestic proportions in view of what had gone just before.³¹¹

Then Knox got himself into accord with Hull on the desirability of giving the President a free hand in deciding when the United States should be at war. "The President," he said, "will want to reserve to himself just how to define this." Then, as "suggestions to shoot at," he repeated the lines of prohibition upon Japanese military movements originally defined at the Singapore conference and repeated twice in November by the Chief of Staff and Chief of Naval Operations.³¹²

Some time before this edifying seminar was adjourned for lunch, Marshall, having parted from his horse and scrubbed himself in the shower, turned up at his office, where he found the "pilot message," the fourteen parts, and the one o'clock delivery message all awaiting his attention. After considering these intercepts, with General Gerow, General Miles, and Colonel Bratton, among others, contributing to their elucidation,³¹³ Marshall professed to see "some definite significance" pointing to the fact that "something was going to happen at 1 o'clock."³¹⁴ He then drafted a dispatch to General Short in Hawaii and to other Pacific outposts. This message read:

"The Japanese are presenting at 1 P.M. Eastern Standard Time,

today, what appears to be an ultimatum. Also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately. Just what significance the hour set may have we do not know, but be on alert accordingly."³¹⁵

Marshall informed Stark of his intention to dispatch this message. Stark put up the phone, thought it over, and then called Marshall back, requesting him to have the message transmitted to naval commanders in the Pacific. Marshall added the instruction.³¹⁶

The Chief of Staff completed this message at 11:58 A.M., one hour and twenty-seven minutes before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.³¹⁷ It was typed for clarity, encoded, and finally sent off by commercial radio. The explanation for this decision was that the Army radio in Hawaii had been having difficulty that morning communicating with the War Department. But Marshall knew that the time was short. The FBI radio was available.³¹⁸ When he talked with Stark, the Admiral volunteered the use of the powerful Navy transmitter.³¹⁹ Above all, there was on Marshall's desk a scrambler telephone by which he could have reached Hawaii in a matter of minutes.³²⁰ He refrained from using it, he said, because of the "possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department."³²¹ How the State Department could be embarrassed to any greater degree than by having Mr. Hull's diplomacy rewarded with war, and what conceivable effect the embarrassment would have had on negotiations already broken off, are matters which General Marshall may be able to explain, but which elude normal processes of ratiocination.

The message reached Honolulu at 7:33 A.M. and was being carried through the streets by a bicycle messenger when the first Japanese bombs began to drop. It was delivered to the signal office of the Hawaiian Department of the Army at 11:45 A.M., two hours after the last Japanese plane had retired, and, because it was not marked "Priority" or "Urgent," as were other waiting coded messages, it was laid aside and not decoded until 2:58 P.M., seven hours and three minutes after the attack.³²² It finally reached the hands of General Short eight hours and twelve minutes after being filed for transmission.

At 7:55 A.M., the Japanese carrier planes, having received no

word from Tokyo to withhold their attack because of a successful outcome of negotiations with the United States, struck the fleet at Pearl Harbor and Army and Navy air fields on Oahu.³²³ The surprise was complete. Eight American battleships and several smaller naval vessels were knocked out, most of the Army planes were destroyed on the ground, and 2,326 soldiers, sailors, and marines were killed. Japan lost a relatively small number of planes and a few midget submarines.³²⁴

V. "WE WERE ATTACKED. THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT."

Word of the disaster reached Secretary Knox, who reported to Roosevelt. "No!" the President is supposed to have cried.³²⁵ The reaction would suggest that he was surprised. "Of course, he was surprised," said Jonathan Daniels much later. Daniels was the President's administrative assistant and press secretary. Then this trusted subordinate of Roosevelt made some revealing remarks: "*The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be. . . . But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price. . . .*"³²⁶

Looking back over an extended history of the private thoughts of the President and his intimates, one encounters markers in the mentality that produced Pearl Harbor:

" . . . except in case of attack."³²⁷

" . . . again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."³²⁸

" . . . they (the Japanese) could not always avoid making mistakes, and that as the war continued and the area of operations expanded, sooner or later they would make a mistake and we would enter the war."³²⁹

" . . . there might be a possibility of war with Japan without the involvement of Germany . . . and it was determined that in such

a case the United States would, if possible, initiate efforts to bring Germany into the war against us in order that we would be able to give strong support to the United Kingdom in Europe."³³⁰

". . . the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act"³³¹—inserted as "a direct instruction from the President."³³²

"The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."³³³

"Of course, no one anticipated that that overt act would be the crippling of the Pacific fleet."³³⁴

"The blow was heavier than he had hoped it would necessarily be. . . . But the risks paid off; even the loss was worth the price. . . ."³³⁵

To this collection members of the President's close circle added other glosses.

MRS. ROOSEVELT: "December 7th was like any of the later D-Days to us. We clustered at the radio and waited for more details but it was far from the shock it proved to the country in general. We had expected something of the sort for a long time."³³⁶

SECRETARY OF LABOR PERKINS: ". . . in spite of the terrible blow to his pride, to his faith in the Navy and its ships, and to his confidence in the American Intelligence Service . . . [Mr. Roosevelt] had, nevertheless, a much calmer air. His terrible moral problem had been resolved in the event."³³⁷

SECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON: "We three [Hull, Knox, Stimson] all thought we must fight if the British fought. *But now the Japs have solved the whole thing by attacking us directly in Hawaii.*"³³⁸

And, again, STIMSON: "When the news first came in that Japan had attacked us, my first feeling was of *relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis had come in a way which would unite all our people.* This continued to be my dominant feeling in spite of the news of catastrophes which quickly developed. For I feel that this country united has practically nothing to fear; while the apathy and divisions stirred by unpatriotic men have been hitherto very discouraging."³³⁹

MRS. CHARLES HAMLIN, for many years a close friend of Mr.

Roosevelt and a guest in the White House in November and December, 1941: The President, the night of his broadcast to the nation on the coming of war, "looked relieved, as if a load was off his mind at last, now that fate and the Japanese had finally settled everything that had been brewing for so long."³⁴⁰

MRS. HAMLIN: "His cigarette was tipped at its usual jaunty angle."³⁴¹

MRS. HAMLIN, quoting the President at his dinner of December 22, 1941, with Prime Minister Churchill and Lord Halifax as honored guests: "I have a toast to offer—it has been in my head and on my heart for a long time—now it is on the tip of my tongue—'To the common cause.'"³⁴²

MRS. HAMLIN: "The band played 'God Save the King' and then 'The Star-Spangled Banner' . . . Every night we drank to the health of the United States and Great Britain and then to the common cause."³⁴³

POSTMASTER GENERAL FRANK WALKER: "I think the boss really feels more relief than he has had for weeks."³⁴⁴

MR. ROOSEVELT, the night of Pearl Harbor: "Well, we were attacked. There is no question about *that*."³⁴⁵

MR. ROOSEVELT, in a message on December 8 asking Congress to declare the existence of a state of war with the Japanese Empire: "Yesterday, December 7, 1941—a date which will live in infamy—the United States of America was suddenly and deliberately attacked by naval and air forces of the Empire of Japan. . . . Always will we remember the character of the onslaught against us."³⁴⁶

MR. ROOSEVELT, in a radio message to the nation on the night of December 9: "We are all in it—all the way."³⁴⁷

CAPTAIN OLIVER LYTTTELTON, Minister of Production in the Churchill cabinet, June 20, 1944: "America provoked Japan to such an extent that the Japanese were forced to attack Pearl Harbor. It is a travesty on history to say that America was forced into war."³⁴⁸

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL to Prime Minister Smuts of South Africa, November 9, 1941: "I do not think it would be any use for me to make a personal appeal to Roosevelt at this juncture to enter the war. At the Atlantic meeting I told his circle that I would rather have an American declaration of war now and no supplies

for six months than double the supplies and no declaration. When this was repeated to him, he thought it a hard saying. We must not underrate his Constitutional difficulties. He may take action as Chief Executive, but only Congress can declare war. He went so far as to say to me, "*I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war, they might argue about it for three months.*"⁸⁴⁹

CHURCHILL: "The President and his trusted friends had long realized the grave risks of United States neutrality . . . and had writhed under the restraints of a Congress whose House of Representatives had a few months before passed by only a single vote the necessary renewal of compulsory military training. . . . Roosevelt, Hull, Stimson, Knox, General Marshall, Admiral Stark, and, as a link between them all, Harry Hopkins, had but one mind . . . A Japanese attack upon the United States was a vast simplification of their problem and their duty."⁸⁵⁰

CHURCHILL: "No American will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States at our side was to me the greatest joy . . . I knew the United States was in the war, up to the neck and in to the death. So we had won after all! . . . We had won the war. England would live; Britain would live; the Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire would live. . . . We should not be wiped out. Our history would not come to an end. . . . I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful."⁸⁵¹

JESSE JONES, associated with the Roosevelt administration for twelve years and a member of the Roosevelt cabinet for five: "He changed his tactics whenever politics seemed to dictate, and with no intention of leaving the White House until voted out—or carried out. . . . Regardless of his oft-repeated statement, 'I hate war,' he was eager to get into the fighting since that would insure a third term."⁸⁵²

Such are the appearances and realities, moral, political, intellectual, and philosophical, of the "date which will live in infamy."

EPILOGUE: THE *NEW YORK TIMES*' WHITEWASH OF GENERAL MARSHALL

(by Harry Elmer Barnes)

On December 2, 1951, commemorating the tenth anniversary of Pearl Harbor, the *New York Times* published an article on "Ten Years Ago This Friday," by Cabell Phillips of the Washington Bureau of the *Times*. It was a very interestingly written article but repeated most of the old myths about That Day, even though the Editor of the *Times Sunday Magazine* assured the readers that Mr. Phillips had "combed the 39 volumes of the Pearl Harbor Report and consulted with eye-witnesses on the spot to prepare this article."

While naturally annoyed, I did not write to the Editor of the *Times*. When, however, in the *Sunday Times* of December 16, Mr. Phillips, in answer to a query by a correspondent, alleged that General Marshall had no way of communicating speedily with General Short on December 7, 1941, I was moved to send the Editor a letter, which was mailed on January 3, 1952. The *Times* did not print the letter but sent it on to Mr. Phillips in Washington. He sent me a short letter on January 15, and enclosed a letter of the same date which, he informed me, he was sending to the *Times* for publication. This was published in the issue of January 20. In reply to this letter, I mailed Mr. Phillips a rather detailed reply on February 6. This correspondence follows and is printed in order to clear up this vitally important and disputed point for all time. Mr. Percy L. Greaves also wrote a letter on this same subject to the *Times*, which is printed at the close of the following chapter by Mr. Greaves. It hardly needs to be said that the *Times* did not print Mr. Greaves' letter.

Cooperstown, New York
January 3, 1952

Editor of the New York Times

Sir:

It has been a long time since I have written a letter to the New York Times. I have avoided any controversy regarding responsibility for the second World War, recognizing the futility of any such activity in the "blackout press" of our day. I even avoided any temptation to comment on the article by Cabell Phillips on Pearl Harbor, though I regarded it as the most misleading article on that episode to be published in any reputable journal since the facts became available. The only close runner-up is the chapter on the same subject which Jonathan Daniels contributed to the symposium *The Aspirin Age* back in 1949.

But my patience and restraint ran out after reading Mr. Phillips' arrogant and irresponsible answer to the letter of Mr. Dekkers Davidson in the Times, December 16, 1951. Mr. Phillips writes: "The Army had no direct telephone communication with Pearl Harbor—scrambler or otherwise—in December, 1941. Naval communications with Pearl Harbor were not available to General Marshall on that Sunday."

How any responsible person could dare to make so indefensible a statement before a literate reading audience is beyond my understanding. Many alibis have been offered by the Army and Navy for their failure to inform General Short and Admiral Kimmel of the danger of an immediate attack on Pearl Harbor, but I have never before read or heard of this one.

General Marshall had a scrambler telephone on his desk with which he could have reached General Short in the matter of minutes, unless connections with Pearl Harbor had been cut off. General Marshall never made any effort to find out. When he was deeply embarrassed before the Congressional Committee, investigating Pearl Harbor, he made no attempt to excuse himself by alleging that the telephonic connections had been cut off.

Further, both the Navy Department and the FBI had available powerful radio transmitters that could have been used to send a priority message to Pearl Harbor with great speed. Admiral Stark

offered General Marshall the use of the Navy transmitter, but Marshall declined the offer. The message was sent by ordinary radio, not even marked "urgent," just as Marshall might have sent a birthday greeting to his grandmother. It reached General Short seven hours and three minutes after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor began.

Had Mr. Marshall been as alert as his knowledge of events warranted, he could have warned Short at least twelve hours before the attack. Indeed, he could and should have warned him three days before the attack, when the "East Wind, Rain" Japanese coded message announcing the impending attack was intercepted by our Naval Intelligence.

The Times states that Mr. Phillips "combed the 39 volumes of the Pearl Harbor Report." If so, he must have combed them with his eyes closed, for there is little resemblance between his article and the facts disclosed in that Report.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY ELMER BARNES

THE NEW YORK TIMES
WASHINGTON BUREAU
Albee Bldg., Washington, D. C.

January 15, 1952

Harry Elmer Barnes, Esq.
Cooperstown, N.Y.

My dear Sir:

Your letter of January 3 concerning my article on Pearl Harbor was forwarded to Washington while I was away on vacation, and I am only now able to reply to it.

I am rather shocked but not particularly distressed by the vehemence of your communication. There have been so many inquiries of a similar nature, however, that rather than undertake to answer them individually I have prepared a letter to the editor of the Magazine covering the main points in dispute. This letter probably will be published in the forthcoming issue of the Magazine, and I am enclosing a copy herewith for your information. I hope this

is sufficient to persuade you that I did not, as you put it, comb the 39 volumes of the Pearl Harbor report with my eyes closed.

Sincerely yours,

(Signature)

CABELL PHILLIPS

Washington Correspondent
Sunday Department

January 15, 1952

To the Editor of The New York Times Magazine:

Since the publication of my article on Pearl Harbor, "Ten Years Ago This Friday—," in the issue of December 2, I have received a number of letters from readers demanding, with varying degrees of vehemence, to know why I did not point out that General Marshall "muffed" the last minute warning to General Short in Hawaii of the impending disaster.

Several of these correspondents have asked "why General Marshall didn't pick up the scrambler telephone on his desk and call General Short directly." Others have demanded to know why he did not avail himself of Admiral Stark's "offer" of the use of Navy communications facilities instead of depending on the commercial wires. The implication in several of these letters is that either I didn't have my facts straight or that I was covering up General Marshall's dereliction.

I am happy to be able to claim innocence on both counts.

As to the scrambler telephone. I am informed by authoritative sources in the Pentagon that there was no such device in existence in December, 1941 (which I pointed out in an earlier letter in this space). What the Army did have was a "speech converter" (Western Electric model B-3) which was capable of reversing telephonic speech at the receiving instrument only; it gave no security in the course of transmission. Furthermore, it could be used for distant communications at that time only over commercial wires or radio channels.

So even if General Marshall had had such an instrument available to him (which is not conclusively shown by the printed testimony of the Pearl Harbor investigation) it would have offered no advantage either in speed or in secrecy in communicating with General Short.

Now, as to why Naval communications were not used.

On pages 223-224 of the investigating committee report it is clearly shown that General Marshall called Admiral Stark at about 11:40 that morning and asked that he join him in a warning message to all army and navy commanders.

"Admiral Stark hesitated," the report states, "because he regarded the theater commanders as already alerted and he was afraid of confusing them further. General Marshall nevertheless wrote in longhand the draft of the message. . . . He instructed Colonel Bratton to take the message immediately to the message center. . . . As Colonel Bratton was leaving the room Admiral Stark called General Marshall to request that there be placed in the dispatch 'the usual expression to inform the naval officers'. . . ."

This seems to me to establish without question that General Marshall did seek the cooperation of his opposite number in the Navy in this last minute warning, and that this cooperation was for a time withheld. I have found no reference in the report to an "offer" by Admiral Stark of the use of Navy communications facilities.

It is not an unreasonable conjecture under these circumstances, therefore, that General Marshall did not feel free to ask the use of Navy communications for a message to Army commanders exclusively. There was no reason, indeed, why he should have made such a request. The Army had its own radio. He did not learn until after the message had gone commercial that the Army radio was temporarily out of commission.

CABELL PHILLIPS

Cooperstown, New York
February 6, 1952.

Mr. Cabell Phillips
New York Times
Washington Bureau
Albee Bldg., Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Phillips:

The statements in your letter of January 15 to me concerning General G. C. Marshall's handling of the final message of December 7 to Hawaii reflect such a lack of familiarity with the Pearl

Harbor record as to raise serious doubts in my mind whether you are qualified to write on that subject at all.

You "claim innocence" both to the allegation that you may not have had your facts straight, or that you endeavored to cover up some dereliction on Gen. Marshall's part. It would be unprofitable to explore your possible motives, but the question of fact is certainly subject to verification, and here, I regret, I find you hardly precise.

You refer to Admiral Stark's "offer" (quotations yours) of the use of Navy communications facilities to General Marshall. The use of the quotation marks implies that there was no such offer. You rely here on the Majority Report of the Congressional Committee (page 224) to suggest that the only proposal made by Stark was that a line be added to Marshall's message directing that Naval commanders in the field also be informed of the contents of the Marshall message.

As any one at all familiar with the subject knows, the Majority Report is hardly the best evidence, for political partisanship dictated most of its composition. The printed Record of the Congressional Committee, however, sets forth the evidence as it was actually presented by the witnesses concerned, and it tells a different story.

Admiral Stark did, in fact, offer General Marshall the use of the Navy radio. About that there can be no possible dispute, for the Admiral himself so testified. I quote from the Record, Part 5, page 2133, Stark speaking: "I asked him (Marshall) if his communications were such that he could get it (the message) out quickly because our communications were quite rapid when the occasion demanded it." And again from the testimony of Admiral Stark, Part 5, page 2184: "I also asked General Marshall, knowing that the time was rather short, whether or not he could get it out quickly. I told him our system under pressure was very fast. And, he said, no, that he was sure he could get it out quickly also. And with that I did nothing more." Stark then responded as follows to questions of William D. Mitchell, committee counsel:

Mr. Mitchell: What is your system?

Admiral Stark: Radio.

Mr. Mitchell: You had a powerful sending apparatus, did you?

Admiral Stark: Yes, sir; very.

There is also the testimony of General Marshall himself on this

point. I quote from the Record, Part 3, page 1110: "Admiral Stark tells me, and I am quite certain he is right—I do not recall it but he is undoubtedly right—that he asked me at the time of our second conversation that morning, or he said that they had rapid means of communication and if I wished to use it, and I told him no. That must be a fact—I do not recall—that must be a fact."

You do not seem to be aware that the Army Pearl Harbor Board took General Marshall very severely to task for his handling of the December 7 message. You will find the pertinent references in the Record, Part 39, pp. 94-95. There it is set forth that the War Department radio was of much lower power than those of the Navy and Federal Bureau of Investigation, both of which were available; that the War Department radio on the morning of December 7 could not get through to Hawaii, but that General Marshall did not even ascertain this fact; that there was also available for rapid communication a scrambler telephone with a direct connection to the Hawaiian Department; and that General Marshall's use of only one form of communication in dispatching the final, vital message of warning "violated all rules requiring the use of multiple means of communication in an emergency." This was the judgment of a board of regular general officers who spoke from thorough acquaintance with prescribed Army practices relating to emergency communications. Certainly it will not be contended that General Marshall was less well informed than they about the requirements under the emergency circumstances which he confronted.

Your dismissal of this phase of the subject with the implied fact that all Admiral Stark did was to extend his "cooperation" in the phrasing of the message, after first withholding it, and that you "have found no reference in the report of an 'offer' by Admiral Stark of the use of Navy communications facilities," is rendered incompetent and irrelevant by the record. You offered a judgment without attempting to inform yourself of the facts.

Your further observation that Marshall did not "feel free" to ask the use of Navy facilities, and that he felt no requirement to do so because he did not learn until later that the Army radio was out of commission, is no excuse for his slipup, or, as you say, with evident distaste, his "muffing" the warning. It was his business, as the effective chief of the Army and the author of the message, to make certain, personally or through his subordinates, what

facilities were available, how the message would go out, and how it could be sent the fastest way. General Marshall was sufficiently impressed with the urgency of the situation to write the message; the same sense of urgency should have impelled him to the understanding that the writing of the message was the least important part of his responsibility: that the message could only be translated into effective action by its prompt receipt in the field. Yet he did not bother to inform himself concerning whether the message would be transmitted by the speediest means to guarantee prompt receipt and action.

As to the scrambler telephone, the information which you cite as currently provided by the Pentagon is news to me, and, in fact, would appear to have been news to all the witnesses and investigating committees which have so far dealt with the Pearl Harbor affair. The present explanation that the instrument scrambled messages only at the receiving end hardly makes sense, for the very purpose of the scrambler was to render confidential communications unintelligible if intercepted in transit. If the Army did, indeed, select an instrument which rendered the communication unintelligible only to the intended recipient, for whose benefit and information it was transmitted, then, indeed, the ways of the Army are even more mysterious than they usually appear.

It could be, of course, that the present Pentagon explanation of the communications situation obtaining in 1941 may be another of the all too frequent attempts to provide an ex post facto justification of General Marshall's behavior. The State Department's China White Book of August, 1949, has sometimes seemed to have had that intended purpose with reference to the General's ill-starred mission to China, which was originally regarded as of such moment that the New York Times wrote at least one indignant editorial berating members of the Congressional Committee for detaining him from departing for Cathay. These members of Congress, of course, were acting in the not unreasonable hope that the General might give some coherent explanation of his strange activities at or about the time of the Pearl Harbor attack.

Such conjectures, admittedly, do not materially advance our inquiry; so, again, it will be more fruitful to refer to the record. On pages 94-95 of Part 39, the Army Pearl Harbor Board notes: "The Hawaiian Department had a scrambler telephone connection direct with Washington by which you could ordinarily get a message

through from Washington to Hawaii in ten or fifteen minutes. After the attack on December 7, Colonel Fielder (G-2) himself talked to Washington twice on this phone and received a call from Washington on the same phone." General Marshall is quoted by General Short as having explained that he did not employ this telephone because of the "possibility of a leak which would embarrass the State Department." Of Marshall's final message, the Board states: "We find no justification for a failure to send this message by multiple secret means either through the Navy radio or F.B.I. radio or scrambler phone or all three."

On page 95 of Part 39 the Board quotes General Short as testifying: "If they had used the scrambled phone and gotten it (the message) through in ten or fifteen minutes we would probably have gotten more of the import and a clearer idea of the danger from that message and we would have had time to warm up the planes and get them in the air to meet any attack."

The Board clearly concluded that General Marshall was remiss in his conduct on December 7 and so stated unequivocally (Part 39, pp. 145, 146).

Marshall's own explanation for his failure to use the scrambler phone is to be found in Part 3, pp. 1111-13, 1212-13, and 1289. His several statements are, to some degree, contradictory and confusing. Originally, he said he made no inquiry about reaching Hawaii on the telephone, implying that he did not consider that means of communication. Later, he seems to suggest that he ruled out the telephone on the ground that the Japanese might possibly have broken security by intercepting a telephonic message. Again, he says that he could not say with certainty "what was going on in my head at that particular moment."

The suggestion, dropped by the General once, that if Japan had overheard his final message on a telephonic call the Japanese might have cited the message itself as an "overt act" justifying their resort to war, does not appear rooted firmly in logic. The Japanese intended to attack anyway. The mere fact of intercepting a telephone call would neither add to nor subtract from that decision. It could not have affected or altered the decision. The same judgment applies to the contention that Japanese eavesdropping might have constituted "a leak which would have embarrassed the State Department." The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor very forcibly brought home the fact that American diplomacy had not succeeded

in its professed intentions. How could the State Department have been more deeply embarrassed than by the evidence of this fact provided by the attack?

It is not my purpose to try to reduce General Marshall's statements to crystal clarity—a task which, in any event, would exceed my powers of interpretation. But I do think that what he said in his sworn testimony is relevant to your contention that it "is not conclusively shown by the printed testimony of the Pearl Harbor investigation" that he had at his disposal a scrambler telephone. He testified that he did, and other witnesses testified to the same fact.

Certainly, also, you cannot stand on your contention that this telephone would have offered no advantage in speed in communicating with General Short. The incontrovertible evidence is that General Marshall's message, by the method of transmission which he approved, did not reach General Short until eight hours and twelve minutes after it was filed for transmission, and seven hours and three minutes after the attack. The finding of the Army Board was that Hawaii could ordinarily be reached on the scrambler telephone in ten or fifteen minutes, and that even after the attack on December 7, calls were put through on this instrument, despite heavy traffic on the wire, within an hour as a maximum. As to the security of the scrambler telephone, the Army Board, comprised of professional experts, referred to this instrument as one of the "multiple secret means" which General Marshall should have employed. If there was any danger of communications being intercepted by a hostile power, if spoken over this phone, this board of general officers showed not the slightest awareness of it. We may therefore conclude that the danger, if it existed at all, was negligible, and we may inquire, if it did exist, what difference it would have made—except, perhaps, that of giving the American forces at Pearl Harbor a fighting chance to meet the enemy.

Sincerely yours,

HARRY ELMER BARNES

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 6

1. R. L. Wilbur and A. M. Hyde, *The Hoover Policies* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), p. 601.
2. Sumner Welles, "Roosevelt and the Far East," *Harper's Magazine*, February, 1951, p. 27.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
5. Raymond Moley, *After Seven Years* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939), pp. 93-94.
6. *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*; edited by Samuel I. Rosenman (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), VI, 408 ff.
7. Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 31.
8. *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), Part I, p. 305. (The *Hearings* will hereinafter be designated *Pearl Harbor Attack*.)
9. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
10. Welles, *op. cit.*, p. 37.
11. *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 517.
12. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 201.
13. Admiral Tejiro Toyoda to Ambassador Cameron Forbes, Tokyo, March 3, 1932. 793.94/4877, *Confidential file*, MS, Department of State.
14. Endorsement of Secretary of State Stimson upon the memorandum of Stanley K. Hornbeck, January 28, 1933. 793.94/6063, *Confidential file*, MS, Department of State.
15. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XX, pp. 4135-38.
16. Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 20.
17. Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the "Missouri"*; edited with a foreword by David Nelson Rowe (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1950), p. 38.
18. Joseph C. Grew, *Ten Years In Japan* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1944), p. 281.
19. *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941*, Department of State Publication 2016 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), II, 2. (Hereinafter referred to as *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, I or II.)
20. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XX, p. 4139.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 4168.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 4144-64.
23. Message to Congress, December 8, 1941. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, p. 793.
24. *Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941*, Department of State Publication 1983 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943), pp. 559-60.
25. Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 295.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
28. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
29. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, p. 224.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 225.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-65.
32. Kase, *op. cit.*, p. 41.
33. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, p. 266. (Italics supplied.)
34. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, pp. 1042-44.
35. Mark S. Watson, *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Division, Department of the Army, 1950), pp. 367 ff.
36. Winston Churchill, *The Gathering Storm* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), p. 440.
37. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 271.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
39. *Ibid.*
40. *Ibid.*, p. 272.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
42. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XXVI, p. 265.
43. *Ibid.*, Part XV, p. 1489.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 1551-84.
45. Sherwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 273-74.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 273.
47. "Roosevelt's Rendezvous with History," *New York Times Book Review*, June 4, 1950, p. 23.
48. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XXVI, p. 264; Part XV, p. 1485.
49. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2391.
50. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views* (unnumbered volume), p. 14.
51. Feis, *op. cit.*, pp. 168-69.
52. These documents were published by the Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy, in a series of volumes covering the years 1939 through 1945 under the title *Fuehrer Conferences on Matters Dealing With the German Navy*. They are also printed with certain omissions and textual differences in *Brassey's Naval Annual, 1948*; edited by H. G. Thursfield (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948).
53. *Fuehrer Conferences 1941* (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, Office of Naval Intelligence, 1947), I, 69; Annex 1 of "Conference of the Commander in Chief, Navy, with the Fuehrer at the Berghof on 22 May 1941: The Present Problem of Naval Warfare in the Atlantic in View of the Attitude of the U.S.A. May 1941." (Omitted in *Brassey*.)

54. Charles A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 175.
55. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, Nomura to Tokyo, No. 703, Part 2, p. 17.
56. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 525.
57. Press release issued by the White House, July 25, 1941, at Poughkeepsie, N.Y.; Executive Order No. 8832 signed the following day.
58. White House Release No. 1892, August 1, 1941; Department of State *Bulletin*, August 2, 1941, p. 101.
59. Quoted by Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 41, from unpublished section of Ambassador Grew's diary. Senators Brewster and Ferguson of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, *Minority Views*, p. 7, note that the diary of Ambassador Grew was "denied to the Committee," together with the complete diary of Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. They termed this denial "particularly obstructive because these principals placed excerpts of the diaries in the record and withheld the rest. This was contrary to the prime rule in American law that if part of a document is put into the record by a witness in his own behalf, the court is entitled to demand the whole of the document. Concerning each of these diaries the Committee, by majority vote, refused to issue subpoenas for their production." Feis, in his Preface, p. v, notes that he had access to the "full private diaries" of Grew, Stimson, and former Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr.
60. Quoted by Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 248, from unpublished Grew diary.
61. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2383.
62. *Ibid.*
63. *Ibid.*, p. 2384.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 2382.
65. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 527.
66. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 9: No. 433, Part II.
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 550.
69. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 12; Tokyo to Washington, No. 452.
70. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 563. This entire dispatch, beginning at p. 560, is of the utmost interest. Note especially Points 11 and 12 of Toyoda's exposition.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 565.
72. *Peace and War*, p. 754.
73. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 645-50.
74. C. J. H. Hayes, *Wartime Mission in Spain*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. 11.
75. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 650.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 588 ff.
77. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), pp. 427, 433-34; Sumner Welles, *Where Are We Heading?* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1946), p. 6.
78. *The Grand Alliance*, p. 444.
79. *Ibid.*, pp. 438-40.

80. *Ibid.*, pp. 439, 441; *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, p. 1283: Memorandum of conversation of August 11, 1941, prepared by Sumner Welles.
81. Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, *How War Came* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942), p. 10.
82. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 554-57.
83. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part II, pp. 460-61, 484-85. In *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part III, p. 1253, Capt. R. E. Schuirmann, Navy liaison officer with the State Department, is quoted as describing the President's August 17 declaration to the Ambassador of Japan as "an ultimatum to Japan."
84. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 485.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 486.
86. *Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, third installment, January 28, 1948, as serialized in the *New York Times*. The *Memoirs*, as published by The Macmillan Company, New York, 1948, show a variation in text from the preceding serialization. This passage is rendered (Vol. I, p. 185): ". . . my policy of being deliberate, while also being on time, resulted in a record containing less of error than would otherwise have been the case." (Italics supplied.) Between serialization and book publication, Hull, or his editors, evidently thought it advisable to modify the original fatuous judgment pronounced by the Secretary on his own work.
87. "Memoirs of Prince Konoye," *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XX, p. 3993.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 4019.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 3994.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 4022, Appendix V, Paragraph 1.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 4004.
92. *Ibid.*, p. 4005.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 4022: Annex Document, Section 1, Paragraph 1.
94. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XX, pp. 4085-87.
95. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 604-6.
96. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, pp. 92-93: Tokyo to Washington, No. 725.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 99: Tokyo to Washington, No. 735.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 100: Tokyo to Washington, No. 736.
99. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-96: Tokyo to Washington, No. 726.
100. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 304.
101. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, pp. 96-97: Tokyo to Washington, No. 727.
102. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1063.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 1061-62.
104. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5432.
105. *Ibid.*
106. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 701-4.
107. *Ibid.*, pp. 705-6.
108. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 99: Tokyo to Washington, No. 735.
109. Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 298: cited from unpublished section of Grew diary for December, 1941.

110. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, p. 750; *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, pp. 146, 149, 152.
111. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 146: Washington to Tokyo, No. 1127.
112. *Ibid.*
113. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 750.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 745.
115. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, pp. 155-56: Tokyo to Washington, No. 798.
116. *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 431; *Peace and War*, p. 802.
117. Paraphrase of the text as printed in *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 755-56; and *Peace and War*, pp. 801-2.
118. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, pp. 1108-9.
119. *Ibid.*, Part XIX, pp. 3667-82.
120. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, pp. 1097-1102, pp. 1110-21.
121. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), II, 1069.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 1057.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 1070.
124. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 165: Tokyo to Washington, No. 812. (Italics supplied.)
125. Hull, *op. cit.*, p. 1074.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 1077.
127. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, pp. 1194-95. (Cf. other documents in Exhibit 18, Part XIV, for a résumé of Chinese importunities and Hull's reaction to them.)
128. *Ibid.*, Part V, pp. 2329-31; Part XI, p. 5434.
129. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5433.
130. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2316.
131. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5433.
132. *Ibid.*
133. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1079.
134. *Ibid.*, pp. 1061-62.
135. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5433.
136. *Ibid.*
137. *Ibid.*, pp. 5421-22.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 5188.
139. *Ibid.*, pp. 5422, 5433-34.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 5434.
141. *Ibid.*
142. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1336.
143. *Ibid.*, Part XI, pp. 5434-35.
144. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1196.
145. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5392.
146. Text in *Foreign Relations*, II, 768-70.
147. Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 238.
148. Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 486.
149. Record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1946), Exhibit No. 3646.

150. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 183: Washington to Tokyo, No. 1191, Part I.
151. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 764-66.
152. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 182: Washington to Tokyo, No. 1189, Part II.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 195: Tokyo to Washington, No. 844.
154. Basil Rauch, *Roosevelt From Munich to Pearl Harbor*, (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), pp. 471-72.
155. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, pp. 184, 192, 220.
156. *Ibid.*, Report of the Joint Committee, unnumbered volume, p. 414; *Record of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East*, Exhibits 2954-55.
157. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIII, p. 395.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 417.
159. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1336.
160. *Ibid.*, Part XII, p. 154: Tokyo to Washington, Circular No. 2353.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 195: Tokyo to Washington, No. 844.
162. Cf., code intercepts in *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 195 ff.
163. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part VIII, pp. 3579-91.
164. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1083; Part IX, p. 4259.
165. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5197.
166. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1083.
167. *Ibid.*, Part XV, p. 1471.
168. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5423.
169. *Ibid.*, Part XI, pp. 5422, 5434.
170. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1328.
171. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5423.
172. Cf., Note 170.
173. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 85.
174. *Ibid.*, Report of the Joint Committee, unnumbered volume, pp. 259-60.
175. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1328.
176. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1310.
177. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 85.
178. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 90.
179. *Ibid.*, Part III, pp. 1420-24.
180. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1406.
181. *Ibid.*, Part VI, pp. 2518, 2520.
182. *Ibid.*, Part X, p. 4812.
183. *Ibid.*, Part IV, pp. 1950-51.
184. *Ibid.*, Part VII, p. 2935.
185. Watson, *op. cit.*, p. 497.
186. *Ibid.*, p. 499.
187. Printed as Exhibit No. 2, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII.
188. *Ibid.*, p. 261: Tokyo to Honolulu, No. 83.
189. *Ibid.*, p. 262: Tokyo to Honolulu, No. 111.
190. *Ibid.*, p. 263: Tokyo to Honolulu, No. 122.
191. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, *Minority Views*, unnumbered volume, p. 518.
192. *Ibid.*, p. 519.
193. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 269: Honolulu to Tokyo, No. 253.

194. Rauch, *op. cit.*, p. 466.
195. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, p. 4196; *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, pp. 518-19.
196. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, p. 519.
197. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part VI, p. 2521.
198. Francis Perkins, *The Roosevelt I Knew*, (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 380.
199. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XI, p. 5435.
200. *Ibid.*, p. 5436.
201. *Ibid.*
202. *New York Times*, November 30, 1941, 1:5.
203. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 148-49.
204. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XI, pp. 5400-5402.
205. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1300.
206. *Ibid.*, Part XII, p. 204: Tokyo to Berlin, No. 985.
207. *Ibid.*, pp. 202, 229.
208. *Ibid.*, p. 9, 4072.
209. *Ibid.*, Part XIX, p. 3506.
210. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1407.
211. *Ibid.*, Part VI, pp. 2670-71.
212. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2190.
213. *Ibid.*, pp. 2190-91.
214. *Ibid.*, Report of the Joint Committee, unnumbered volume, pp. 266-N, 266-O.
215. *Ibid.*, p. 266-O. (*Italics supplied.*)
216. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5427.
217. *Ibid.*, p. 5437.
218. This description of Mr. Roosevelt's operations was used by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in a memorial address at Harvard University in April, 1945, in which the statement was made that "while engaged in this series of complicated moves, he (Roosevelt) so skillfully conducted affairs as to avoid even the appearance of an act of aggression on our part."
219. *New York Times*, December 3, 1941, 1:8.
220. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1941, 4:3.
221. *Ibid.*, December 6, 1941, 3:1.
222. *Ibid.*
223. *Ibid.*, December 4, 1941, 4:3.
224. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIV, p. 1202.
225. *Ibid.*, p. 1203. (*Italics supplied.*)
226. *Ibid.*, p. 1409: No. 40; *Ibid.*, Part III, pp. 1317-18.
227. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 223-26: *Top Secret Report of Army Pearl Harbor Board*; Part VIII, pp. 3579-91. For a concise summary of the evidence on this controverted signal, cf. Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 532-36.
228. *Ibid.*, Part XVII, p. 2457.
229. *Ibid.*, Part XIX, pp. 3648-51.
230. *Ibid.*, Part XII, pp. 236, 237, 249; Part II, pp. 744-45.
231. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5427.
232. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1246.

233. *Ibid.*, p. 1247-48. No explanation could ever be obtained from Welles or others concerning the nature of the "President's wishes in message transmitted by Welles to Halifax." But see below.
234. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5472.
235. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1412.
236. *Ibid.*, Part X, pp. 5082-83.
237. *Ibid.*, p. 5081.
238. *Ibid.*, pp. 4802-3.
239. *Ibid.*, p. 5081.
240. *Ibid.*, pp. 5082-83.
241. *Ibid.*, p. 5084.
242. *Ibid.*
243. *Ibid.*, p. 5087.
244. Beard, *op. cit.*, p. 539.
245. *Ibid.*, p. 541. The facts in reference to the Creighton message are ably summarized by Beard, *op. cit.*, pp. 537-41.
246. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XI, p. 5166.
247. *Ibid.*, pp. 5165-66.
248. *Ibid.*
249. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, pp. 1238-39.
250. *Ibid.*, p. 1202. (*Italics supplied.*)
251. Grew, *op. cit.*, p. 493; *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 786, footnote 72.
252. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 784-86.
253. *Ibid.*, II, 385.
254. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XII, p. 238.
255. *Ibid.*, Part IX, p. 4512.
256. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, pp. 1414-15.
257. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, unnumbered volume, p. 528; *ibid.*, Part VIII, p. 3568.
258. *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 443; Part XV, 1633.
259. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, p. 528. (*Italics supplied.*)
260. *Ibid.*, pp. 527-28.
261. *Ibid.*, Part VIII, p. 3443.
262. *Ibid.*, Report of the Joint Committee, unnumbered volume, pp. 212, 219; *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part III, pp. 1108, 1176, 1321, 1430.
263. *Ibid.*, Part XI, pp. 5543-44.
264. *Ibid.*, Part III, pp. 1110, 1327-29, 1430.
265. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 228-29, 139.
266. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
267. *Ibid.*, Part VIII, p. 3568.
268. *Ibid.*, Part X, pp. 4660-64.
269. *Ibid.*, p. 4663. (*Italics supplied.*)
270. *Ibid.*, Part XI, pp. 5543 ff.
271. *Ibid.*, p. 5545. (*Italics supplied.*)
272. *Ibid.*, Part VI, pp. 2835-36, 2886-89.
273. *Ibid.*, Part VII, p. 3360.
274. *Ibid.*, Part VIII, p. 3822.
275. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2338.

276. *Ibid.*, p. 2344.
277. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5549.
278. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1108. On May 7, 1951, Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin informed the Senate that he had established that General Marshall was at Bolling Field, the army air base at Washington, on the morning of December 7, 1941. Senator McCarthy said that General Marshall was there to welcome Maxim Litvinov upon his arrival as Soviet ambassador. Cf. *Congressional Record*, May 7, 1951, p. 5085.
279. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, p. 4525.
280. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2183.
281. *Ibid.*, Part XI, pp. 5427-28.
282. *New York Times*, December 7, 1941, 1:4.
283. Davis and Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
284. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, p. 3997.
285. *Ibid.*, Part XII, p. 248: Tokyo to Washington, No. 907.
286. *Ibid.*, Tokyo to Washington, No. 908.
287. *Ibid.*, Tokyo to Washington, No. 909.
288. *Ibid.*, p. 249: Tokyo to Washington, No. 910.
289. *Ibid.*, Part IX, p. 4006.
290. *Ibid.*, Part XII, p. 245: Tokyo to Washington, No. 902, Part XIV of fourteen parts.
291. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, unnumbered volume, p. 521.
292. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part IX, pp. 4033-34.
293. *Ibid.*, Part II, p. 812.
294. *Ibid.*, pp. 811-12.
295. *Ibid.*, Part VI, p. 2540.
296. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 318.
297. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
298. Cf., *ibid.*, p. 134 *et seq.*, "Responsibilities in Washington."
299. *Ibid.*, Part IX, pp. 4517, 4518, 4524, 4571; Part X, p. 4627.
300. *Ibid.*, Part VIII, pp. 3427-34.
301. *Ibid.*, pp. 3428-30. (*Italics supplied.*)
302. *Ibid.*, p. 3430.
303. *Ibid.*, pp. 3432-33.
304. *Ibid.*, pp. 3910-11.
305. *Ibid.*, pp. 3428, 3910; Part IX, p. 4110.
306. *Ibid.*, Part VIII, pp. 3436-37.
307. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5427.
308. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, unnumbered volume, p. 524.
309. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5437.
310. *Ibid.*, p. 5440.
311. *Ibid.*
312. *Ibid.*
313. *Ibid.*, p. 5191.
314. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, p. 223.
315. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1334, No. 529 7th.
316. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2184.
317. *Ibid.*, Part IX, p. 4519.

318. *Ibid.*, *Minority Views*, p. 225; Part XXXIX, p. 94.
319. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2184.
320. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 94-95.
321. *Ibid.*, p. 95.
322. *Ibid.*, p. 94; Part VII, p. 3116; Part XIV, pp. 1409-10.
323. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 3, 123.
324. *Ibid.*, Part I, pp. 46-48, 58-59.
325. Davis and Lindley, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
326. "1941: Pearl Harbor Sunday: The End of An Era," *The Aspirin Age, 1919-1941*: edited by Isabel Leighton (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1949), p. 490. (Italics supplied.)
327. Platform of the Democratic National Convention of 1940; cf., Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 291.
328. Speech by F. D. Roosevelt at Boston, October 30, 1940. *Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt*, IX, 517.
329. Roosevelt to Admiral J. O. Richardson, *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, p. 266.
330. Admiral Richmond K. Turner, *ibid.*, Part XXVI, p. 265.
331. *Ibid.*, Part XIV, p. 1328: War Department instruction to General Short in Hawai.
332. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1310.
333. Secretary of War Stimson, *ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5433.
334. General Marshall, *ibid.*, Part VII, p. 2935.
335. Jonathan Daniels. Cf. Note 326 above.
336. *New York Times Magazine*, October 8, 1944, pp. 40-41.
337. Perkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 379 f.
338. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XI, p. 5438. (Italics supplied.)
339. *Ibid.* (Italics supplied.)
340. *New Republic*, April 15, 1945. (Supplement, "Roosevelt: A First Appraisal by Those Who Knew Him.")
341. *Ibid.*
342. *Ibid.*
343. *Ibid.*
344. Cited by Perkins, *op. cit.*, pp. 379 f.
345. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XIX, p. 3505. (Italics supplied.)
346. *Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941*, II, 793-94.
347. *Peace and War*, p. 843.
348. Associated Press dispatch from London, June 21, 1944, published in the *Chicago Tribune*, same date, 1:2.
349. Churchill, *The Grand Alliance*, p. 593. (Italics supplied.)
350. *Ibid.*, p. 602.
351. *Ibid.*, pp. 606-8.
352. Jesse H. Jones, with Edward Angly, *Fifty Billion Dollars: My Thirteen Years with the RFC (1932-1945)*, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951), p. 260.

THE PEARL HARBOR INVESTIGATIONS

by

PERCY L. GREAVES, JR.

The most disgraceful feature of the whole tragic affair was the evident determination on the part of Washington to fasten the blame on the Hawaiian commanders. The incomplete and one-sided Roberts report, the circumstances of the retirements of Kimmel and Short, the attempts of the War and Navy Departments to deny access to the intercepted messages by the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Board of Investigation, the appointment of secret one-man boards to continue investigations, and finally, the inability of the Joint Congressional Committee to secure access to pertinent files, constitute a blot on our national history.

—ADMIRAL HARRY E. YARNELL, former Commander in Chief, United States Asiatic Fleet, and former Commandant, Pearl Harbor Naval Base.

I drafted the Pearl Harbor report. Two Republicans signed that report. I have no apologies to make concerning it, and no one as yet has come forth with a single fact to challenge one statement of mine in the report. If you have any such fact or facts, I would be glad to receive them.

No man ever more conscientiously or objectively plowed through a 10,000,000-word record than did I in drafting that report. What facts were not dug out and presented?

—EDWARD P. MORGAN to Senator Andrew F. Schoepfel, Congressional Record, January 15, 1952.

Percy L. Greaves, Jr., was born in Brooklyn, New York, on August 24, 1906. He received the degree of B.S., *magna cum laude*, from the Syracuse University School of Business Administration in 1929 and later carried on graduate study in economics at Columbia and New York Universities.

He served as financial editor and research economist of the *United States News* from 1934 to 1936. He resigned to accept an executive position in Paris. From here he travelled widely in Europe, especially in France, England, and Germany, observing economic conditions and diplomatic relations. He returned to the United States in 1938 to direct research and survey activities for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. Following this assignment, Mr. Greaves did extensive research work in the political field, particularly in regard to problems of the Executive Department of the Federal government and foreign affairs.

During the second World War he followed closely the diplomatic aspects of the era and the revelations which began to make their appearance, even during the great conflict. When the Joint Congressional Committee was created to investigate the attack on Pearl Harbor, Mr. Greaves was engaged as chief research expert for the Republican minority members. His alertness and industry in that post apparently annoyed Senator (later Vice-President) Alben W. Barkley, chairman of the committee, for Barkley remarked one day: "He [Greaves] has been sitting by the Senator from Michigan [Homer Ferguson] during these whole hearings and apparently prompting the Senator in the interrogatories he has addressed to the witnesses."

At any rate, no person knows more than Mr. Greaves about the facts of the Pearl Harbor attack, of the so-called investigations of that tragic event, and of the failure of these investigations to bring forth, honestly and clearly, all of the facts connected therewith.

I. INTRODUCTORY OBSERVATIONS

The investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack have been many and varied. The complete facts will never be known. Most of the so-called investigations have been attempts to suppress, mislead, or confuse those who seek the truth. From the beginning to the end, facts and files have been withheld so as to reveal only those items of information which benefit the administration under investigation. Those seeking the truth are told that other facts or documents cannot be revealed because they are intermingled in personal diaries, pertain to our relations with foreign countries, or are sworn to contain no information of value.

Nevertheless, many revealing facts have been brought forth and buried in a voluminous public record. Some of the most astounding are unknown to the general public and to many historians. Most of them are hidden away in the forty-five volumes of the Congressional investigation of 1945-46. The full story of the administration's attempt to cover up the facts would run into many volumes so only the high lights can be covered in this short review.

In order to understand the why and how of the whitewash, it is necessary to know a few of the basic facts. Under our form of government the President and the Secretary of State are responsible for the safe conduct of our foreign relations. In 1941 the Secretaries of War and Navy were responsible under the laws of Congress for the maintenance and supervision of our Army and Navy. The Chief of Staff was responsible for Army operations and the Chief of Naval Operations for Navy operations. Together, within the laws and appropriations of Congress, these six persons had primary responsibility for the defense of the United States and all of its possessions. The Pacific Fleet was subject to orders of the Chief of Naval Operations in Washington but, when it was in Pearl Harbor, the Army was charged with its protection. The Hawaiian Army

commander took orders directly from only the Chief of Staff, the Secretary of War, or the President of the United States.

In August, 1940, sixteen months prior to the Pearl Harbor attack, the Army Signal Corps had broken the top Japanese diplomatic code known as PURPLE. We were thus able to decipher and read all diplomatic messages sent between Tokyo and Japanese officials all over the world, including Washington. Copies of the most important of these and other intercepted messages were circulated to all key administration officials in Washington, including the President. These messages, known as MAGIC, revealed much important data to the recipients. Washington sent duplicate code machines to London, Singapore, and Cavite, Philippine Islands, to keep the British and our Far East forces informed. Hawaii did not get one. Therefore, Washington had a far greater than normal responsibility and opportunity to make certain that Hawaii was properly warned and alerted.

Early in 1941 administration officials reached a secret agreement with British and Dutch officials which committed us to go to war against Japan if Japanese forces crossed a certain line. Crossing this line would have indicated an attack on the possessions of one, two, or all three of the signing powers. This meant that we were pledged to go to war if British or Dutch Far East possessions were attacked. Since this agreement had not been submitted to, much less approved by, Congress, it was unconstitutional. The administration was, therefore, extremely anxious to conceal this fact from the American public. Accordingly, every effort was made to prevent its disclosure during the investigations.

For these reasons, it is perhaps only human that Washington officials have desired to conceal what they did or did not do with the information at hand.

II. THE KNOX REPORT

The first investigation was the shortest, as well as one of the most important. It was made by the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox. He flew out to Pearl Harbor immediately after the attack and made his report to the President about a week later. The administration never intended that this report be made public. However, it was located in the files of the Navy Department, through the diligence of Senator Homer Ferguson, long after the original date the administration had set for the closing of the Congressional investigation. It had never been seen by the Chief of Naval Operations and the committee's counsel had failed to bring it to the committee's attention.

It contains at least two interesting statements which the administration was anxious to withhold from publication. This report revealed that:

Neither Short nor Kimmel, at the time of the attack, had any knowledge of the plain intimations of some surprise move, made clear in Washington through the interception of Japanese instructions to Nomura, in which a surprise move of some kind was clearly indicated by the insistence upon the precise time of Nomura's reply to Hull, at one o'clock on Sunday. . . . Neither the Army nor the Navy Commander expected that an attack would be made by the Japanese while negotiations were still proceeding in Washington. Both felt that if any surprise attack was attempted, it would be made in the Far East.¹

Of course, the best means of defense against air attack consists of fighter planes. Lack of an adequate number of this

type of aircraft available to the Army for the defense of the Island is due to the diversion of this type before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians.

The next best weapon against air attack is adequate and well-disposed anti-aircraft artillery. There is a dangerous shortage of guns of this type on the Island. This is through no fault of the Army Commander who has pressed consistently for these guns.²

The significance of this report is that it revealed that Washington had vital information that was not passed on to the Pearl Harbor commanders and that Pearl Harbor was not adequately supplied with defense matériel because our available supply had been furnished to foreign powers. This report did not contain a single word of criticism of those in command at Pearl Harbor, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short, Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, U.S.A., and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet, U.S.N. Yet, with only this report as a basis, they were removed from command shortly afterward.

It might also be noted that the Congressional Investigating Committee Counsel did not consider this report "of interest generally."³ It was given to Senator Ferguson only in answer to his request, and was not distributed to other members of the Investigating Committee or to the press.

III. THE ROBERTS COMMISSION

The next investigation was conducted in secret for the purpose of preparing a report which could be made public. This report could contain no inkling that Washington had had any informa-

tion which was not available to those at Pearl Harbor. If the true circumstances had become known, the administration would have lost public confidence. The group making this report is known as the Roberts Commission and it was created by Executive Order on December 18, 1941.

President Roosevelt asked Secretaries Knox and Stimson for their "suggestions as to the investigating board."⁴ In making his suggestions, Stimson conferred with his Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and they united in making their suggestions to the President. They proposed that it should have a civilian head, and recommended Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts. Originally a Philadelphia lawyer and nominally a Republican, the Justice had been an active supporter of President Roosevelt's prewar foreign policy of aid to the Allies. Likewise recommended by Messrs. Stimson and Marshall was Major General Frank R. McCoy and Brigadier General Joseph T. McNarney. The latter had just returned from Europe where he had been negotiating with the British and Russians and was, therefore, well informed as to our agreements with these foreign powers. During the "session of the Commission" he was promoted to major general.⁵

On the Navy's side, the appointees were Admiral J. M. Reeves and Admiral W. H. Standley. The latter is described by Robert E. Sherwood in *Roosevelt and Hopkins* as "An old friend of Roosevelt's, Standley had been one of the President's most rugged supporters in the long battle for aid for the Allies before Pearl Harbor."⁶ Two weeks after the completion of this report, Admiral Standley became the President's ambassador to the Soviet Union.

These friends of the administration started by taking testimony from the Washington principals entirely *off the record*. No transcripts were kept, although they heard General Marshall, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stark, Navy Chief of War Plans Admiral Turner, Army Chief of War Plans General Gerow, as well as the heads of the Military and Naval Intelligence Services.

Justice Roberts spent a day with Secretary of State Cordell Hull. Apparently these conversations were all of a friendly, confidential nature. The Commission accepted without question all the information volunteered by these Washington authorities. It then

proceeded to Pearl Harbor, where it recorded testimony taken under oath from those at the scene of the disaster. The Commission was not well informed about the code breaking or "Magic" information, known in Washington but not in Pearl Harbor. They raised little or no question concerning the responsibilities and duties of those in Washington. In fact, there is every indication that the Commission felt that the commanders at Pearl Harbor were better informed than they actually were.

One of the most important things involved in the Pearl Harbor situation was the Winds Code message. This involved a code which Japan had set up to notify her representatives around the world when they would start the war. The implementing message would also indicate in three weather words which nations Japan would attack. Later testimony revealed that such information had been received in Washington indicating that war was going to be levied against the United States as well as other countries.

Later, during the Congressional investigation, Justice Roberts was asked if the Winds implementing message had come before his commission. The Justice testified: "I have no recollection of any such thing. And I think you will search the testimony in vain for any reference to it."

A few minutes later, Senator Ferguson, in questioning the Justice, quoted from the Justice's own words in the transcript of the Roberts Commission. Chairman Roberts was then questioning General Short's Intelligence Officer, Colonel Fielder:

CHAIRMAN ROBERTS: It has been reported to me that about 10 days before the attack a code was intercepted which could not be broken, but it was forwarded to Washington to the War Department to be broken, and the War Department found out it could be broken and did break it, and found it contained three important signal words which would direct the attack on Pearl Harbor, and that the War Department subsequently intercepted over the radio those three signal words and forwarded them to the military authorities here as an indication that the code had been followed and that the attack was planned.⁸

The Justice denied that this had reference to the Winds Code message, although he admitted it was very likely that it could describe that message.

In questioning another Intelligence officer, Colonel Bicknell, at Hawaii, Justice Roberts, as chairman, stated:

I refer to the fact that some ten days before December it is supposed that a Japanese code message was intercepted and was broken down by the Department in Washington, one of the military departments, which gave certain key words which would be flashed over the radio directing the attack on Pearl Harbor and that, having broken that down, one of the military establishments in Washington caught over the radio, the three key words and relayed them here to you. When I say "you," to the Islands.

COLONEL BICKNELL: I never heard of such a thing, no, sir.⁹

Another conflicting situation concerning the Roberts investigation, as reported by Justice Roberts to the Congressional Committee, is that they had asked the higher command of the Army and Navy to produce every document that could have a bearing on the situation at Pearl Harbor. He testified that he was furnished an outline "of the whole transaction" by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

Again, with Senator Brewster questioning:

It is my understanding that you were given more or less information about the magic, but all reference to that was very properly eliminated from both your investigation and your report?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Certainly . . . we knew the commanders weren't given what was taken off the breaking of the code; yes, indeed. . . . All that about the magic, and all that, was given us in confidence at the War Department when we were taking the statements and not put on the type-written record.¹⁰

A few minutes later, Senator Ferguson asked him if he got the "Magic."

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: No; we were never shown one of the magic messages.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Not one?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Not one.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Were you ever shown the substance of the magic messages?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON: So that when you made this report, you never had any information out of the magic messages?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: No, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Did you know there were such messages?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I knew that the Army or Navy or State Department had been cracking a super code of the Japanese for weeks or months and that they had been taking off all kinds of information. We asked the War Department and the Navy Department to tell us what they got from that and they told us. They did not show us the messages, any of them, and I didn't ask them to.

SENATOR FERGUSON: All right. Then we come to the next finding in your conclusions:

"The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy fulfilled their obligations by conferring frequently with the Secretary of State and with each other and by keeping the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations informed of the course of the negotiations with Japan and the significant implications thereof."

How, without having the intercepted magic messages, did you make this finding? I will put it that way.

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: Why, certainly. The Chief of Staff and Admiral Stark told us and the Secretary of War and the Secretary of Navy told us that every time Hull gave them a

warning they would go and repeat it to the Chief of Staff and to the Admiral. I did not need to look at any messages to find out whether Marshall and Stark had been sufficiently warned. That is all I was interested in.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Now, Justice, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War, the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Stark, the President and the Secretary of State were each being furnished this magic. Did you know that they were all being furnished the magic?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: I did not know it and I would not have been interested in it.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Well, then, Justice, if your Commission was not furnished all the data that we had here in Washington how could you make a finding on whether or not they were on their toes out in Hawaii and knew all the facts?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: We had the messages that were sent to them.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Well, did you know that there was more information that could have been sent to them?

MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose there never was a situation where there was not more information that could be sent to somebody.¹¹

As might be expected, the Roberts Commission Report condemned the actions of the Pearl Harbor commanders, claiming among other things that:

It was a dereliction of duty on the part of each of them . . . demonstrated on the part of each a lack of appreciation of the responsibilities invested in them and inherent in their positions . . . each failed properly to evaluate the seriousness of the situation. These errors of judgment were the effective causes for the success of the attack.¹²

Those in Washington got off scot free with one exception: "Failure of the War Department to reply to the message relating

to the antisabotage measures instituted by the commanding general, Hawaiian Department."¹³ This last statement mentioned no names, although the responsibility was definitely that of General Marshall. This report, made public on January 25, 1942, held that the Washington officials had sufficiently alerted the commanders at Pearl Harbor and that these commanders had failed to take the necessary steps to protect the fleet. No indication was given of the confidential information in the hands of Washington and mentioned in the report of Secretary Knox.

Although there is no record of the secret conversations Justice Roberts held with top Washington officials, he told the Congressional Committee that all information gathered by his commission had been given to the public. It was later revealed in a letter, which the administration tried to keep secret, that during the 1944 presidential campaign, General Marshall had written to candidate Governor Thomas E. Dewey:

The Roberts' Report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.¹⁴

Senator Ferguson had questioned the General very closely on this point, ending up with:

We are clear on that, that certain parts were taken out before it was made public.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is correct. I am quite certain, sir.

SENATOR FERGUSON: And you had that information in September of 1944, because you wrote the letter at that time?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Oh, yes; sir.¹⁵

Nevertheless, Justice Roberts maintained that nothing had been withheld, even though his report mentioned 1,887 pages and the Congressional Committee was furnished only 1,862 pages.

A close examination of all the testimony and papers made

public by this commission indicates that its purpose was to judge those in command at Pearl Harbor. The Commission seemed to feel it had no responsibility to investigate those in Washington. Their personal friends or superiors could do no wrong. So it was a pure and simple whitewash of those in Washington.

IV. THE HART INQUIRY

About two years after the Pearl Harbor attack, Admiral Kimmel, still subject to possible court-martial, became worried lest some of the important testimony be forgotten or lost. He asked the Navy Department if it could not make a record of the testimony. An inquiry was ordered on February 12, 1944, to take testimony and depositions from members of the naval forces who had knowledge of facts pertinent to the surprise attack. Admiral Thomas C. Hart, Retired, was chosen for this task. At the time of the attack he was Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet and the person to whom all the "war warning" messages were originally sent.

The precept for this inquiry left to the Admiral's discretion the persons whom he should interview and the questions which he should ask. He, of course, had no authority to question anybody from the White House, the State or War Departments. He concluded four months of taking testimony on June 15, 1944. He made no report as he had not been asked to make one.

Before the Congressional Committee, Hart admitted that he had not done a complete job. He had made no attempt to question Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, Captain Arthur McCollum, or Commander A. D. Kramer, all of whom were key Navy witnesses.

In a later inquiry,¹⁶ Admiral Hart became the counsel for Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations at the time of the attack. Hart was also one of the witnesses who had said that he had seen the Winds Execute message. Later, he changed his statement,

saying that what he had seen was a report about the Winds message and not the original.

While appearing before the Congressional Committee he was questioned at length concerning his knowledge of the situation in the southwest Pacific, his deployment of the Asiatic Fleet, and certain preattack messages sent to Washington relating to our agreements with the British. Embarrassed, at one time during his testimony, he stated: "I would like to do anything to get me out of this seat but I will continue."¹⁷ Although he could hardly be considered an impartial person to head such an inquiry, he did obtain some very valuable testimony which later investigations tried to destroy.

Perhaps the most important testimony taken by the Hart Inquiry was that of Captain L. F. Safford, in charge of the Communications Security Section of Naval Communications in Washington. This officer testified that in his official duties he had seen messages which gave definite information concerning the Japanese objectives as early as the spring of 1941. He said in part:

In October, 1941, the Japanese Consuls were directing and advising the evacuation of Japanese Nationalists from the Netherlands East Indies, Malaya, Philippines, Hawaii, America, and Europe. By October 28, this was in full progress. On November 4, we received important information that the internal situation in Japan, both political and economic, since the American embargo, had become so desperate that the Japanese Government had to distract popular attention by a foreign war or else by bloodless, diplomatic victory. On November 12, we received important information that the Japanese Government regarded November 25 as the deadline for negotiations then being conducted between Japanese and American Governments to end. November 17, we received information from a very reliable source that Japan had no intention of attacking Russia in Siberia or she had changed her plans, if such intention ever existed. . . . On November 24, 1941, we learned that November 29, 1941, Tokyo time, was definitely the governing date for offensive military operation of some nature. We interpreted this to mean that large-

scale movements for the conquest of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific would begin on that date, because, at that time, Hawaii was out of our minds. On November 26, we received specific evidence of Japan's intention to wage an offensive war against both Britain and the United States. On December 1, we had definite information from three independent sources that Japan was going to attack Britain and the United States, and, from two of them, that Japan would maintain peace with Russia. On December 4, 1941, we received definite information from two more independent sources that Japan would attack the United States and Britain but would maintain peace with Russia. At 9:00 p.m. (Washington time), December 6, 1941, we received positive information that Japan would declare war against the United States at a time to be specified thereafter. This information was positive and unmistakable and was made available to Military Intelligence at this same time. Finally at 10:15 a.m. (Washington time), December 7, 1941, we received positive information from the Signal Intelligence Service, War Department, that the Japanese declaration of war would be presented to the Secretary of State at 1:00 p.m. (Washington time), that date. 1:00 p.m. Washington time was sunrise in Hawaii and approximately midnight in the Philippines, and this indicated a surprise air raid on Pearl Harbor in about three hours. Kramer appended a note to this effect to the paper sent over from S.I.S. before presenting it to the Secretary of the Navy.¹⁸

Other valuable information was obtained from Vice Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner, who, at the time of the attack, was Chief War Plans Officer in Washington. He testified that the WPL-46 (Basic War Plan 46, also known as Rainbow No. 5), mentioned in the "war warning" message to Admiral Kimmel,

. . . had its basis in an international agreement with the British Army, Navy, and Air Force. The conversations with the British leading up to preparation of that plan were held

in February and March of 1941. It was a world-wide agreement, covering all areas, land, sea, and air, of the entire world, in which it was conceived that the British Commonwealth and the United States might be jointly engaged in action against any enemy. On the conclusion of that agreement with the British, the WPL-46 was prepared after a great many talks with the Army and was approved by the Joint Board, the Secretaries of War and Navy and by the President. The Navy issued their form of that War Plan in May of 1941, and it is my recollection that the Army form of it was issued about August.

It contemplated associated Powers, including the Netherlands East Indies, and such colonies of British Allies as were still in the war, for example, the Loyalist French Colonies.¹⁹

This admiral also testified that Admiral Kimmel's part in the plan was not defensive and that "it would be a grave error for anyone to get the idea that the war in the Central Pacific was to be purely defensive. Far from it."²⁰

He further testified, in reference to whether the plan could be put into partial execution, that a careful study of this plan shows that "its mechanism does not permit such a step to be taken . . . that document provides for a virtual unity of command between the British and our Army and Navy in certain cases."²¹

This admiral also confirmed information that Washington knew that an attack was to be made on the United States. He testified: "The enemy codes at Washington and Manila were to be destroyed, which definitely indicates war against the United States. Once the United States and Japan are at war or approaching war, then war-like actions may occur any place."²²

This had reference to a dispatch of December 3, sent to Admiral Hart as Commander in Chief of the Asiatic Fleet, with a copy to Admiral Kimmel for information. It stated that we knew that Tokyo had ordered the destruction of its top-secret code machines in London, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Manila; that the Batavia machine had already been returned to Tokyo; and that a day earlier Washington also was directed to destroy its machine. The British

had reported that London had already heard that the Japanese had destroyed their machine there.

V. CONGRESS TAKES A HAND

About this time, Senator Homer Ferguson, a close follower of these events, became concerned lest the public might never get the true story. So he introduced Senate Joint Resolution 133. This was approved on June 13, 1944. It provided for a further extension of all statutes affecting the prosecution of those connected with the Pearl Harbor catastrophe and further directed the Secretaries of War and Navy to proceed forthwith with an investigation into the facts surrounding it. As a result, each Secretary appointed an investigating group which immediately went to work. What happened after the intervention of Congress into the situation will be described in the remainder of this chapter.

VI. ARMY PEARL HARBOR BOARD (APHB)

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson appointed three Army officers to the Army Pearl Harbor Board in July, 1944. They started off by reviewing the record and exhibits of the Roberts Commission. They went on to gather forty-one volumes of testimony and seventy exhibits. A total of 151 witnesses appeared before them. The Board found that "There was a distinct lack of a war mind in the United States. . . . Public opinion in the early stages had to be allowed to develop; in the later stages it ran ahead of preparation for war."²³ Since then public opinion has never been allowed

to develop by itself. The administration has seen to it that public opinion was favorable before it announced any new plans to the nation.

The APHB went into the problem much more factually than either the Roberts Commission or the Hart Inquiry. It placed on the record damaging information obtained from the State Department concerning the November 26 ultimatum sent to Japan over the objections of Army and Navy officials and in contravention of an agreement previously reached at the White House. It revealed Marshall's awareness of the danger back in the early months of 1941, and many of the things he did to hide his responsibility for the fact that the Army was not prepared to defend the fleet on the morning of December 7, 1941.

The testimony taken also revealed that the messages sent to Short were written and designed primarily for MacArthur in the Philippines, with copies going to Short. There was also testimony that Secretary of War Stimson had himself weakened the so-called warning message. We also learn from APHB testimony, for the first time, that it was a Colonel Walter Bedell Smith who, as Secretary to the Chief of Staff, was responsible for getting important messages to General Marshall.

The final secret APHB Report placed the blame on Secretary Cordell Hull, General Marshall, and General Leonard T. Gerow, as well as on General Short.

In addition to this secret report, made public after V-J Day, and the testimony pertaining thereto, the Board had learned of the existence of "Magic" several months after it had started taking testimony. It also learned of the attempt made by General Marshall to suppress this information. Nevertheless, the APHB was not deterred and obtained considerable top-secret information concerning the Winds messages and other vital material. The Board pointed out that none of the vital information known by the War Department in Washington was passed on to General Short at Pearl Harbor. The top-secret report said, in part:

The messages actually sent to Hawaii by either the Army or Navy gave only a small fraction of this information . . .

the difference between altering those defenses in time by a directive from the War Department based upon this information and the failure to alert them is a difference for which the War Department is responsible, wholly aside from Short's responsibility in not himself having selected the right alert.²⁴

They found that Colonel Walter Bedell Smith did not get to General Marshall, on the night of December 6, an intercepted Japanese message which might have caused him to send further information or warning to General Short. The APHB top-secret report concluded with this paragraph:

Up to the morning of December 7, 1941, everything that the Japanese were planning to do was known to the United States except the final message instructing the Japanese Embassy to present the 14th part together with the preceding 13 parts of the long message at one o'clock on December 7, or the very hour and minute when bombs were falling on Pearl Harbor.²⁵

This is, perhaps, a slight exaggeration as Washington did not know, or at least no evidence has been adduced that Washington knew, precisely, that the attack would fall on Pearl Harbor although they had good reason to expect that it might.

The nation and our historians are greatly indebted to Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, the executive officer of the Board. It was largely due to his diligence that much of this information was obtained and he is to be thanked for compiling the final report which gives as true and unbiased account as has yet appeared. It was not complete, as it could not go into phases involving the White House and certain other diplomatic matters, but its conclusions are logical. For that very reason it did not satisfy the powers that be. Secretary Stimson, who had appointed the board, felt called upon to make a statement in his own defense and continue further investigations under his personal direction.

VII. THE NAVY COURT OF INQUIRY (NCI)

In accordance with the joint resolution passed by Congress, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal appointed three retired admirals to conduct an inquiry "into all circumstances connected with the attack made by the Japanese Armed Forces on Pearl Harbor."²⁶ This inquiry ran concurrently with the APHB, covering about the same dates—in this case from July 24, 1944, to October 19, 1944. Secretary Forrestal ruled that Rear Admiral Wilkinson and Captain McCollum could not appear before the Court "without interruption to or interference with the war effort."²⁷ Inasmuch as the admiral had been Director of Naval Intelligence and the captain had been Chief of the Far Eastern Section of the Office of Naval Intelligence on December 7, 1941, these key men could have furnished valuable information.

The APHB had questioned Ambassador Grew, but the NCI was the first to inquire of Washington State Department officials. The NCI examined Stanley K. Hornbeck and Maxwell M. Hamilton, both of whom had been concerned with Far Eastern affairs in the State Department. The inquiry was directed at finding out whether they passed on information to the Navy Department that it should have known and transmitted to the commanders at Pearl Harbor. NCI was not able to get any satisfaction from these gentlemen and undoubtedly did not feel that it was within the Court's province to call Under Secretary Welles or Secretary Hull.

The questioning was conducted with little evidence of bias, although the NCI did not feel that it had the right to make inquiry into Washington's higher levels. The Court members, being well informed on naval affairs, saw that the evidence indicated little reason for placing any blame on Admiral Kimmel. They knew that his assignment under the War Plan was principally an offensive

assignment and that he was carrying out the duties assigned to him when the attack occurred.

They found that:

. . . the Navy's condition of readiness in effect on the morning of 7 December, 1941, was that best suited to the circumstances then attending the vessels and patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet. A higher condition of readiness could have added little, if anything to their defense. . . . The task assigned the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, was to prepare his Fleet for war. War was known to be imminent—how imminent, he did not know. The Fleet planes were being constantly employed in patrolling the operating areas as the Fleet's preparations for war were being carried on. Diversion of these planes for reconnaissance or other purposes was not justified under existing circumstances and in the light of available information . . . all-around reconnaissance was not justified in the absence of information indicating that an attack was to be expected within narrow limits of time. It is a further fact that, even if justified, this was not possible with the inadequate number of Fleet planes available.²⁸

However, there were some attempts to defend the Navy's actions. One part of the report says: "The attack of 7 December, 1941, on Pearl Harbor, delivered under the circumstances then existing, was unpreventable. When it would take place was unpredictable."²⁹

Another section, partly whitewashing the Navy, was:

Up to the time that the Japanese demonstrated the feasibility of delivering an attack from torpedo planes in relatively shallow water and under conditions of restricted length of approach, the best professional opinion in the United States and Great Britain was to the effect that such an attack was not practicable.³⁰

The Court found that Admiral Kimmel "had no knowledge of the existence"³¹ of the ultimatum that was sent to the Japanese on

November 26, a copy of which was furnished the Navy Department. He also lacked other pertinent information available in Washington.

The Court also stated:

In view of the Chief of Naval Operations' approval of the precautions taken and the deployments made by Admiral Kimmel in accordance with the directive contained in the dispatch of 16 October, 1941, the Court is of the opinion that Admiral Kimmel's decision, made after receiving the dispatch of 24 November, to continue preparations of the Pacific Fleet for war, was sound in the light of the information then available to him.³²

The NCI had a full copy of War Plan 46 and knew the exact instructions that were given to Admiral Kimmel in the so-called "war warning" message. The Roberts Report, like other administration propaganda, had tried to mislead the public into thinking the instructions were to prepare for defending the Fleet, whereas, in fact, they were to prepare for an attack on the Japanese mandated islands.

The Court of Inquiry found

. . . that Admiral Harold R. Stark, U.S.N., Chief of Naval Operations and responsible for the operations of the Fleet, failed to display the sound judgment expected of him in that he did not transmit to Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet, during the very critical period 26 November to 7 December, important information which he had regarding the Japanese situation and, especially, in that, on the morning of 7 December 1941, he did not transmit immediately information which appeared to indicate that a break in diplomatic relations was imminent, and that an attack in the Hawaiian area might be expected soon.

The Court is further of the opinion that, had this important information been conveyed to Admiral Kimmel, it is a matter of conjecture as to what action he would have taken.

Finally, based upon the facts established, the Court is of the opinion that no offenses have been committed nor serious blame incurred on the part of any person or persons in the naval service.

The Court recommends that no further proceedings be had in the matter.³³

Like the APHB, the NCI took top-secret testimony and issued a separate top-secret report concerning "Magic," its decoding and circulation among the high command and the White House in Washington. From time to time the Navy's Judge Advocate objected to putting this material in the record. In most cases it was put in over his objection or after he had withdrawn his objection.

The top-secret material established beyond any question the fact that the Winds Code and Execute messages were received. This was acknowledged in testimony taken from several admirals and from most of the personnel involved. The only key person who did not recall it was Admiral Noyes, who, at the time of Pearl Harbor, was the rear admiral in charge of the Navy's Communications Division in Washington. Several hundred important dispatches were shown Admiral Noyes. He could not, or would not, say which ones he had previously seen, refusing to identify any except those which bore his initials. He refused to rely on his memory, explaining that, by the time of his testimony, over three years had elapsed since these dispatches would have officially come to his attention.

The NCI record also included many important messages indicating the seriousness of the situation and revealing to Washington the fact that Japan was preparing for some action against Great Britain and the United States.

On the whole the NCI reports were good and sufficient, so far as the Navy was concerned.

VIII. THE CLARKE INQUIRIES

During the summer of 1944 General Marshall learned that the existence of "Magic" had come to the attention of the APHB and NCI. He then ordered his Deputy Chief of the Military Intelligence Service, Colonel Carter W. Clarke, to conduct a top-secret inquiry. The interrogations were held September 14, 15, and 16, 1944. They were directed primarily at the handling of "Magic" in the War Department.

Testimony revealed that the United States had been reading some Japanese codes as early as 1936. It also revealed that Colonel Bratton, who testified before the APHB that he had delivered the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message to Colonel Walter Bedell Smith on the night of December 6, 1941, for delivery to General Marshall, had "a memorandum which I made at the time for the record."³⁴ Bratton also testified that top War Department officials "knew that some such message was coming"³⁵ as the message announcing it had been delivered to them by him at 3:00 P.M., December 6.

Another witness, General Marshall's Intelligence Officer, Major General Sherman Miles, testified concerning the delivery of the first thirteen parts of the fourteen-part Japanese reply. "I first knew that it was in that evening and of course we were watching for it very eagerly. We knew that that meant some very definite decision regarding the conference. It was being translated all night. I knew the first part of it was translated on the evening of the 6th but that did not give away the whole business."³⁶

Another bit of testimony, damaging to the administration's attempt to keep secret the prewar Anglo-Dutch-American agreement, was that of Lieutenant Robert O'Dell, our assistant military attaché at Melbourne at the time of the attack. He testified concerning a December 6, 1941, message from his superior to the War Depart-

ment via Hawaii. This message indicated that the Dutch were putting the Joint War Plan into effect and that this was to happen only in case of war. This message had been held up for seventeen hours by the Australian officials, and was not received in Washington until after the attack, but the information was that an attack was expected by the Dutch within sixty hours as early as December 3, our time. Before the cable was sent, the Netherlands Command reported that Japanese planes had reached Kopang. The plan that the Dutch were putting into effect called for United States participation, "in a naval manner."³⁷

Upon completion of the testimony, Colonel Clarke prepared a memorandum for Marshall's Assistant Chief of Staff, Major General Clayton Bissell. This was a seven-page memo which indicated the Army had been informed on December 5; that Admiral Noyes, Naval Communications Officer, had received the Japanese message using the Winds Code; and that it

. . . meant that Japanese-Great Britain relations were to be broken; that on 5 December 1941 Col. [Otis K.] Sadtler [Chief of Army Communication Service, Army Signal Corps, War Department, Washington, D.C.] so informed Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton, Gen. Gerow, Col. Gaily and Gen. Bedell Smith, then Secretary of the General Staff, but that Gen. Miles or Col. Bratton never informed Gen. Marshall personally of the Sadtler information.³⁸

The memo also indicated that those gathered in General Marshall's office on the morning of December 7 were primarily concerned with the Philippines, and not with Hawaii. When Colonel Bratton left with the fateful last-minute message, he was instructed: "That if there was any question of priority involved to give first priority to the Philippines."³⁹

General Bissell, in preparing a covering memo for General Marshall, dated September 20, 1944, summarized the findings in four paragraphs, two of which said that the Army and Navy Departments had been receiving and distributing "Magic." The third stated: "Prior to Pearl Harbor, neither the F.C.C. nor the Army

Signal Corps intercepted an implementing message,"⁴⁰ meaning the Winds Execute message. No mention at all was made of the fact that most of Washington's top Army officials knew of its receipt by the Navy.

The fourth paragraph dealt with the fourteen-part message from Tokyo and said that it was delivered in the War Department before 9 A.M. on December 7, 1941, and "as soon as possible thereafter [actually it was 11:20] Gen. Marshall, Gen. Gerow, Gen. Miles, Col. Bratton and Col. Bundy met in Gen. Marshall's office at the War Department and at the time Gen. Marshall decided to send a further warning to the commanders in the Pacific areas."⁴¹

The Clarke Investigation was reopened on July 13, 1945, upon the oral directive of General Marshall, as a result of the fact that the NCI had taken testimony indicating that General Marshall might have ordered the destruction of the Winds Execute message.

Testimony then taken revealed that the top Japanese diplomatic code, known as "Purple," had been solved in August, 1940, after twenty months' work, and that it was given to the British in January, 1941, along with all the technical co-operation necessary to read any Japanese message. Other testimony revealed that General Marshall was not satisfied with the work of the Army Signal Corps during the first half of December, 1941.

Brigadier General Isaac Spalding, who was purported to have said that General Marshall had ordered the destruction of certain messages, told Colonel Clarke that: "I wouldn't want anything I say to transgress the integrity of Mr. Stimson or George Marshall. They are two of the finest men in the world and they would hew to the line, I know."⁴² Needless to say, both were his superiors.

However, Spalding did testify that Colonel John T. Bissell had told him in 1943 that:

Certain messages had been received and were in the files of G-2 and he deemed it most necessary to destroy them. I got the impression that these messages were derogatory to the War Department and that he (Bissell) on his own responsibility destroyed them. I had the impression that they were secret information which it was most desirable that the Presi-

dent, Congress, the public, Mr. Stimson and Gen. Marshall not know about.⁴³

Colonel Bissell, who, since Pearl Harbor, had been raised to a brigadier generalship, was brought before the committee and furnished all previous testimony. Asked if he had ever made such a statement, he answered, "No, I did not."⁴⁴ And so a memorandum was prepared for the Chief of Staff on August 13, 1945, which said: "I find that no written message implementing the Winds Code message was ever received by G-2 and I find that no records pertaining to Pearl Harbor have been destroyed by G-2 or by anybody connected with G-2."⁴⁵ And that whitewash was complete.

IX. THE CLAUSEN INVESTIGATION

The APHB Report had pointed directly at General Marshall and indirectly at Secretaries Hull and Stimson. The administration could not allow these charges to stand. The report was reviewed officially on November 25, 1944, by the Judge Advocate General of the Army, Major General Myron C. Cramer. In a fifty-page report, he said, among other things:

It is my opinion that the Board's conclusion that General Marshall should have sent additional instructions to Short upon receipt of Short's reply, is not justified. . . . To sum up, I am of the opinion that none of the Board's conclusions as to General Marshall are justified. My views are confirmed by the Roberts Report.⁴⁶

On December 1, 1944, Secretary Stimson said in a statement that General Short had shown "errors of judgment of such a nature as to demand his relief from a command status. This was done on January 11, 1942."⁴⁷ Stimson said nothing about General Marshall

at that time, but added: "I have decided that my own investigation should be further continued until all the facts are made as clear as possible and until the testimony of every witness in possession of material facts can be obtained."⁴⁸

In a letter dated November 23, 1944, to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Stimson wrote:

In connection with the recent report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, a number of unexplored leads have suggested themselves which require investigation. I have directed that this investigation be undertaken by Major Henry C. Clausen, JAGD.

You are directed to give Major Clausen access to all records, documents, and information to your Division, whether of secret or top secret nature and to advise all officers of your Division to afford Major Clausen the fullest possible cooperation.⁴⁹

This investigation was primarily a matter of finding a scapegoat for the failures of General Marshall and Secretary Stimson. And so, promoted to a lieutenant colonelcy, Henry C. Clausen, formerly of the APHB staff, started off on what was probably the greatest whitewash junket in American history. Clausen later reported that: "In the course of this investigation, I traveled over 55,000 miles by air and interviewed 92 Army, Navy, and civilian personnel."⁵⁰ Statements of fifty of the ninety-two interviewed were included with his report. But there was no word as to what he learned from the other forty-two.

Before starting out, he received further instruction on "unexplored leads" from General Cramer. A few of the twenty-three leads dealt with very minor details, while most of them were aimed against the Hawaiian Command. Only one or two were concerned with the top brass in Washington. Clausen was free to interview whomever he pleased, but his findings or leads were limited to those relating to Army personnel.

It is interesting to note that these instructions asked him to find out "Whether General Miles, Admiral Noyes, Colonel Bratton, or

Captain Safford knew about the Anglo-Dutch-U.S. Joint Action Agreement, in which case they would have known that a 'War with Britain' message would necessarily have involved the United States in war."⁵¹ Most administration apologists still deny that such an agreement ever was in effect.

One of the first affidavits prepared by Colonel Clausen was signed by a Colonel Dusenbury. It stated that no part of the final Japanese message was delivered to top Army brass before December 7, 1941, because "the first half had been received while Colonel Bratton was on duty and he had seen this and had not had it delivered that night; furthermore it being late at night when the final part was received, I did not wish to disturb the usual recipients who were probably at home asleep."⁵² This contradicted previous testimony and denied the admitted fact that at least one set had been delivered by Colonel Bratton on December 6 to the State Department.

On June 15, 1945, Clausen obtained an affidavit from Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith. General Smith was the Colonel to whom Colonel Bratton said he delivered the message on December 6. Bedell Smith had since risen to Chief of Staff for General Eisenhower. General Smith said that to the best of his recollection he had left his office on December 6, 1941, at 7:00 P.M. and that he was quite certain he

. . . was not at his office after 10:00 P.M. If the intercepted radio message referred to by Colonel Bratton was delivered either to me or to the Night Duty Officer, it would have been delivered in the locked envelope. . . . Both I myself and the Assistant Secretaries understood that these pouches contained information of such value and importance that they should be shown to the Chief of Staff without delay.⁵³

The next affidavit was signed by General Leonard T. Gerow. It said:

General Short did not send at any time any notice to the War Department which would indicate that he was not fully

prepared for an attack of the kind which occurred, with the means available to him.⁵⁴

This contradicted the fact that General Short had wired back to Washington exactly what he had done, alerted his command for sabotage. According to General Marshall's own printed rules and regulations it was his, Marshall's, responsibility, as General Short's only Army superior, to notify Short if Short's reported action was unsatisfactory.

General Gerow denied receiving the first thirteen parts of the Japanese message on December 6, because, if he had received them, he said, "I would immediately have warned the overseas commanders and informed the Chief of Staff. Access to the Chief of Staff for such purposes was always open to me."⁵⁵

The next affidavit was obtained from Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, who furnished the names of three who might verify the reception of the Winds Execute message. These three were later interviewed but only one was questioned on this subject. Apparently Clausen had little interest in verifying receipt of the Winds Execute message.

On July 27, 1945, Clausen obtained Colonel Bratton's affidavit in Paris, France. Colonel Bratton was then serving under General Bedell Smith, General Eisenhower's successor as Commander in Chief in Europe. In his affidavit, Colonel Bratton, after being shown the other affidavits, changed his former testimony to state that, on December 6, he had given thirteen parts of the fatal message to Colonel Dusenbury for delivery to General Marshall, inasmuch as Colonel Dusenbury lived at Fort Myer where General Marshall had his home. In closing his affidavit, he said: "Any prior statements or testimony of mine, which may be contrary to my statements here . . . should be modified and considered changed."⁵⁶ His earlier testimony had been almost a year nearer the event and was given when he had before him a memo written right after the attack.

The affidavit of Major General Miles, signed in Boston, was revealing. It stated that in his earlier testimony before the APHB:

I avoided any statement concerning details of information and intelligence which I had derived from Top Secret sources then called "Magic," or any intimation that such sources existed. The reason I so limited my testimony was because prior to my appearance before the Board, Brigadier General Russell A. Osmun and then Colonel Carter W. Clarke of G-2, transmitted to me instructions from the Chief of Staff that I was not to disclose to the Army Pearl Harbor Board any facts concerning the radio intelligence mentioned, or the existence of that form of information or intelligence in the period preceding 7 December 1941. Accordingly, I obeyed.⁵⁷

General Marshall confirmed in his affidavit that he had ordered these facts withheld. In effect, he had ordered his subordinates to commit perjury in their sworn testimony.

In an interim report, Clausen stated that Colonel Bratton's memory "was more refreshed" and that other affidavits "tend to support the revised testimony of Colonel Bratton."⁵⁸ The new affidavits to which he referred were made by men who were not on duty or who could not remember what happened. Apparently Clausen thought that they supported revised evidence. Clausen asked that his witnesses be required to destroy their copies of affidavits they had signed for him.

In one report, Clausen wrote: "General MacArthur, who received information similar to that received by Short, stated in his affidavit, after reviewing the intercepts, that the War Department warnings were ample and complete for the purpose of alerting his Command for war."⁵⁹ However, Clausen neglected to mention that the Philippines were reading the intercepts from Japan while Hawaii was not, and that MacArthur had much more information than did General Short.

Concerning Short's defense that he had been ordered not to alarm the public, Clausen reported that affidavits from two persons "confirm the lack of ground for Short to fear any such alarm, in view of the experience of the all-out Herron alert of 1940."⁶⁰ Apparently Clausen thought that previously announced peacetime

maneuvers were similar to sudden alert maneuvers when tension was mounting and headlines said that war might break at any time.

The exhibits of this investigation included a cable picked up from the British Secret Intelligence Service at Manila, dated December 3, 1941. It said: "Our considered opinion concludes that Japan envisages early hostilities with Britain and U.S. Japan does not repeat not intend to attack Russia at present but will act in South."⁶¹

Upon the completion of Clausen's junkets, Secretary Stimson issued his official report on the Pearl Harbor disaster. He said "the primary and immediate responsibility for the protection of" Pearl Harbor "rested upon" General Short.⁶² His report neglected to mention that Short was not supplied reconnaissance planes and other vital matériel that Knox, Stimson, and Marshall knew were needed at Pearl Harbor when they diverted such supplies "before the outbreak of the war, to the British, the Chinese, the Dutch and the Russians."⁶³

Stimson placed whatever blame might lie in Washington on a beribboned pro-administration sycophant, General Leonard T. Gerow. This was part of the whitewash, as Gerow officially had borne no responsibility. Gerow had been in charge of the War Plans Division. It did not become an operating division until after war began. He had had no authority in his own name to issue any instructions whatsoever to General Short. The only man in the Army who could have given such orders was General Marshall.

Stimson found that there was "no dispute, however, that General Marshall did not get this information [the Japanese message] until the morning of December 7 . . . the witness corrected his testimony and testified that the only message he delivered on the night of December 6 was to the duty officer for the Secretary of State."⁶⁴ As to General Marshall, Stimson found that "criticism is entirely unjustified. . . . It is not the function of the Chief of Staff specifically to direct and personally supervise the execution in detail of the duties of the various sections of the General Staff."⁶⁵

He completely ignored the fact that Marshall, and Marshall alone, had the responsibility of supervising General Short. Stimson concluded that "on the contrary, throughout this matter I believe

that he [Marshall] acted with his usual great skill, energy, and efficiency."⁶⁶

And so Marshall and top administration officials overruled the APHB and declared themselves guiltless.

X. THE HEWITT INQUIRY

Although the NCI had recommended that no further proceedings be held, the administration was not satisfied with the results of this inquiry; so the Navy, like the War Department, ordered an additional inquiry.

On May 2, 1945, the Secretary found "that the previous investigations have not exhausted all possible evidence."⁶⁷ And so Admiral H. Kent Hewitt was detailed to make a study of all previous Navy investigations and then to conduct such further investigations as may appear to be necessary.

Complete files on previous Navy investigations were turned over to John F. Sonnett, special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, and Lieutenant John Ford Baecher. The Sonnett-Baecher team held the administration viewpoint and played much the same role that Colonel Clausen did for the Army. Their first task was to prepare a lengthy two-volume "Narrative Statement of Evidence at Navy Pearl Harbor Investigations." Then they determined that there were certain things that should be further investigated. Practically all of these pointed to whitewashing the administration while blaming those in authority at Pearl Harbor. They also sought to negate the well-substantiated testimony that a Winds Execute message had been received.

Testimony taken revealed, among many other things, that Admiral Stark had called the White House before nine o'clock (Washington time) Sunday morning, December 7, when he had in his possession the message indicating that diplomatic relations

would probably be broken by Japan at 1:00 P.M. (Washington time).

Captain Kramer, who had previously testified that he had received the Winds Execute message, went over his thinking and stated:

I do recall definitely being shown such a message by the GY watch officer and walking down with him to Captain Safford's office and being present while the GY watch officer turned it over to him. A brief conversation ensued and Captain Safford then took it, I assumed, to Admiral Noyes, since that message was the one we had all been on the *qui vive* about for a week or ten days. That is the last I saw of such a message.⁶⁸

Admiral Hewitt asked Kramer if this message was in "a collection of intercepted traffic bearing on Pearl Harbor" that Kramer had assembled and discussed with Mr. Forrestal "during the latter part of December 1941."⁶⁹ Kramer could not recall, but this indicated the early interest the administration had in gathering all such messages.

Kramer gave this testimony on May 22, 1945. The group went on to other testimony, but it was still not satisfied with Kramer's testimony. He was called back again toward the end of this investigation, on July 6, 1945, at which time he stated that he had "a positive recollection of having accompanied the GY watch officer with a 'winds' message to Commander Safford's office, at which point he carried the ball, taking it, as I understood, directly to Admiral Noyes, who was handling it by special setup that he had for that type of message."⁷⁰

Mr. Sonnett did the questioning on this second occasion and tried to get Kramer to say there was "no translator on duty in the Navy Department during such times as you could not be present."⁷¹ Kramer answered that there was, in effect, a translator on duty in the Navy Department as he had indicated.

It is interesting to note the quibble about the absence of certain minor personnel when the top command, knowing an important

message was coming in, was nowhere in evidence that week end. The Hewitt investigators ignored previous testimony from admirals who knew that the Winds Execute message was in and contented themselves with sending for underlings who could say they hadn't seen it.

Instead of calling Admiral Noyes, Admiral Hewitt stated for the record:

There is yet no other evidence to the effect that a "winds" code message relating to the United States was received. Upon review of the sworn testimony of Admiral Noyes, given before the Naval Court of Inquiry, it appears that he recalled no such message and that he did not believe that any such message relating to the United States had ever been received by the Navy, although he had some recollection of a "false alarm." Accordingly, I find that no useful purpose would be served by calling Admiral Noyes as a witness in this investigation, and direct that the portions of his previous testimony relating to this subject be incorporated in this record.⁷²

Earlier evidence clearly indicated that the message disappeared after it reached Admiral Noyes. Noyes could not discuss it on the phone the day it was received because he had to hurry to Admiral Stark's office, presumably with this message. The previous failures of Admiral Noyes to recall, and his refusal to identify, any pre-Pearl Harbor documents without his initials was considered sufficient, and he was not questioned; whereas Kramer, who remembered it clearly, was called twice in attempts to "refresh" his memory.

So, those whose testimony was satisfactory to the administration were not called back, while those whose testimony was unsatisfactory were twice grilled in an attempt to shake them.

Admiral Hewitt made 101 findings. His first one was that: "The basic assumption of the Rainbow Five War Plan was that the United States and her Allies would be at war with the Axis Powers, either including or excluding Japan."⁷³ The second one was that:

"The Navy Basic War Plan (Rainbow Five) assigned various offensive tasks to the Pacific Fleet. . . ."74

This verified the fact that our war plans were based on a secret joint agreement with foreign powers and that the so-called "warning" message to Admiral Kimmel to prepare to carry out the Navy War Plan was, in fact, an order to prepare for offensive rather than defensive operations.

Admiral Hewitt did find that Admiral Stark failed to transmit to Kimmel, on December 7, the "highly significant information [received] several hours before the attack" although he could have reached him immediately with a "scrambler" telephone maintained by the Army.⁷⁵

Hewitt also found that three officers, who had previously been said to have seen and read the Winds message, testified that they had never seen such a message.

His eighty-third finding was that: "The Navy Basic War Plan assigned to the Pacific Fleet the task of protecting the territory of the Associated Powers in the Pacific area by destroying hostile expeditions and by supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that hemisphere."⁷⁶

The ninety-eighth finding was to the effect that on December 7, 1941, the battleships were in Pearl Harbor "as a result of adherence to Fleet schedules."⁷⁷

Admiral Hewitt came to twenty-nine conclusions, including:

No message was intercepted prior to the attack which used the code words relating to the United States. . . .

The Chief of Naval Operations did not communicate to him (Kimmel) important information which would have aided him materially in fully evaluating the seriousness of the situation. . . .

Admiral Kimmel, nevertheless did have sufficient information in his possession to indicate that the situation was unusually serious. . . .

Prior warning of an impending air attack, even as little as one half hour, would have served considerably to reduce the effectiveness of the attack.⁷⁸

His final conclusion was that "Unity of Command" should be established.

The Secretary of the Navy then found that both Admirals Kimmel and Stark "failed to demonstrate the superior judgment necessary for exercising command commensurate with their rank and their assigned duties." Orders were also issued that these gentlemen should never hold any position in the United States Navy which requires the exercise of "superior judgment."⁷⁹

And so, the blame for Pearl Harbor continued to lie in part on Admiral Kimmel, and the blame for all the Navy laxities in Washington was placed on Admiral Stark—although there is good reason to believe that his actions, or lack of actions, were undoubtedly the result of orders from above.

XI. THE CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION

Congress was still not satisfied with the information which had been made public. Much of it was confusing. The reports of top administration officials were in conflict with those of the APHB and the NCI. Rumors of various sorts became widespread.

Finally, after V-J Day, John T. Flynn published his revealing pamphlet, *The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor*. It disclosed for the first time that our Washington officials had read all the diplomatic messages going in and out of Tokyo for months preceding the Pearl Harbor attack, and that—for them—the attack was no surprise at all.

Senator Ferguson introduced a resolution in the Senate providing for a full investigation, while Representative Forest Harness introduced another in the House. The House Naval Affairs Committee backed an investigation and the administration was finally forced to come forth with its own resolution. This was presented by Senator, later Vice-President, Alben Barkley. A Joint Congressional

Committee was appointed, composed of five Senators and five Representatives, three of each being Democrats and two Republicans. This gave the administration under investigation a majority vote of six to four.

The majority members picked for committee counsel a nominal Republican, William D. Mitchell, who had served with Secretary Stimson in the Hoover cabinet. He was a gentleman of the old school who believed that all officers of the United States Army and Navy were gentlemen who never lied. His sympathies were definitely with the administration as he could not, apparently, conceive that anyone could commit such crimes of concealment as were evident to the more discerning. For chief assistant counsel, the majority selected Gerhard A. Gesell, a young retired New Dealer who was then a \$35,000-a-year partner in Dean Acheson's law firm. Acheson, himself, was then Under Secretary of State and, as such, censored all information supplied by the State Department. The Navy liaison was Lieutenant Baecher, who had helped pilot the Hewitt attempts to discount the NCI findings.

The minority was not officially allowed any assistance (but the author of this review was employed by Senator Brewster, personally, to assist him as the ranking Republican Senator and the other minority members in their efforts to ferret out the facts).

The first difficulty the committee faced was the fact that, before it was appointed, President Truman had issued an order

. . . to prevent release to the public, except with the specific approval of the President in each case, of—

Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the United States Government.⁸⁰

It was obvious to all that such an order would effectively prevent any real investigation. So, President Truman was persuaded to modify it on October 23, 1945, to permit public testimony on the subject before the entire committee. This still prohibited Army and Navy officers from talking with the committee members in-

dividually and furnishing any possible leads. It also gave the War and Navy Departments power to determine what they would release or keep secret. A majority vote of the committee could likewise foreclose any testimony it did not care to hear.

The President was requested to modify his order further. He then permitted employees of the government to volunteer information to the "committee or its counsel, to come forward voluntarily and disclose to the committee or its counsel any information they may have on the subject of the inquiry." This still did not satisfy the minority, and the President was forced to amend the order still further to permit prospective witnesses "to disclose orally to any of the members of the Joint Congressional Committee" any information they had. He qualified this, however, by adding: "This does not include any files or written material."⁸¹

Individual committee members were thereby stopped from receiving any files or written information from any employee or ex-employee of the Federal government. The full committee determined by majority vote what was or was not material to the investigation without members of the committee ever seeing rejected material. So the stage was carefully set for whitewashing.

On November 1, 1945, the members of the committee were handed a tentative order of proof covering committee procedure. This provided for a Navy and an Army officer to present a story of the actual attack, summarizing all available data, and then for the committee to hear about forty-eight witnesses whose names had been selected by Counsel Mitchell. It was his expectation that all testimony could be taken in a month of open hearings and, allowing two weeks for writing the report, the entire matter would be closed by the end of the year.

A committee staff, friendly to the administration, decided what papers and evidence were to be presented before the committee. Minority members were not satisfied with this situation and asked for a great deal of material which they desired to analyze for their own use. As there were only one or two typed copies available of the previous investigations and the committee staff generally required one of them, this presented serious difficulties. Another one thousand pages of unindexed exhibits were also furnished com-

mittee members in the forty-eight hours preceding the opening day. Minority members sought postponement of the hearings so they could first digest this vital background material. The majority would not permit a delay, and so the hearings opened on schedule, November 15, although no one was adequately prepared.

The tactic of constantly deluging committee members with more material than they could possibly read was continued throughout the investigation. The exhibits alone, when finally printed eleven months later, totaled thirty-four volumes, several of which ran well over eight hundred pages. Other material placed in the record without exhibit numbers and occasionally without even enough copies to go around ran the total number of volumes up to forty-five. To this day, many important facts have never been adequately presented to the public and remain buried in the ten-million-word record.

Exhibit No. 1 contained 253 pages of intercepted Japanese diplomatic messages sent during the period from July 1, 1941, to December 7, 1941—all selected by a member of the committee staff. Senator Brewster immediately requested in writing that he be provided with all of the intercepts instead of the staff-selected ones and that he be permitted to see those going back to January 1, 1941. No attention was paid to this request and no committee member was ever permitted to look at the complete file. It seemed evident that some vital messages were missing.

Senator Brewster also tried to get a copy of former Ambassador Grew's diary on which his book, *Ten Years in Japan*, had been based. The counsel wrote Mr. Grew and received in reply a letter saying:

As to the diary itself, this is in no respect an official document. It is a private work headed "Daily Personal Notes" containing my own personal records and prepared for my own guidance in analyzing and assessing day to day developments. The diary is in the nature of a private sketchbook in which the main lines of my eventual official reports to the Secretary of State were traced, and it contains many inaccurate and sometimes misleading statements, hurriedly jotted

down from day to day, which had to be ironed out and, so far as possible, corrected or confirmed before taking shape in my official reports. Only the official reports should therefore govern. Private matters of interest only to my family and myself, are, as in any diary, contained in it, and it includes furthermore frank comments on individuals, comments which can only be regarded as of a strictly personal and private character and which I am honor bound not to reveal.

It is my belief that all of the material in my diary which would be helpful to the investigation of the Joint Committee has been published in my book, "Ten Years in Japan." To make assurance doubly sure, however, I have carefully examined these daily personal notes covering the months immediately preceding the attack on Pearl Harbor, and I have found no comment or material, other than that already published, which would, in my opinion, be helpful to any phase of the Committee's investigation. It is my belief that all of the main facts on this subject, so far as my own observations and reports from Tokyo are concerned, have been published in the four volumes mentioned.⁸²

And so, on the opinion of this gentleman, himself, the committee was prevented from finding out what his true thoughts were concerning the development of our diplomatic relations with Japan before the attack. Minority members had been informed by Grew's assistant, Eugene H. Dooman, that the ambassador had vigorously opposed the policies of Secretary Hull which led to the breach in relations and the attack.

The first Navy Department witness, Admiral Inglis, in charge of Naval Intelligence, told the committee he thought that Congress and the American people were largely to blame for Pearl Harbor. This bias colored his presentation, although the facts were that Congress, the representatives of the people, had always given the Army and the Navy more funds than the administration had requested in the years preceding the Pearl Harbor attack. It was the administration, and not the people or the Congress, who had the facts.

Early in the investigation two Democratic members of the committee tried to intimidate persons suggesting leads to members of the committee by asking that the committee be publicly furnished with the name of any individual who furnished any committee member any leads or information. Upon insistence of the minority that they would keep their sources confidential, the Chair ruled that it had "no desire to regulate the attitude of any member on that subject."⁸³

The desire of the minority committee members to get facts not proffered by the witnesses or the questioning of the committee counsel upset the carefully planned schedule of the majority. And so new tactics were evolved.

President Truman ordered General Marshall to the Far East to assist in the program that ultimately led to the communization of China. The committee counsel then decided to call Marshall out of sequence so that he could be hurried out of the country. But, before presenting Marshall, the counsel called General Gerow, the 1941 Chief of War Plans, and had him assume responsibilities which had belonged solely to Marshall. This also reduced the time available for Marshall's testimony, inasmuch as Truman wanted to get him off to China that week.

Marshall had been involved in almost every step leading to the Pearl Harbor attack from the ordering of the fleet to Hawaii up to the very moment it was struck. He was responsible for its protection while in Pearl Harbor and for providing the fleet with the matériel needed for its defense. He was also consulted on most diplomatic maneuvers and received copies of all Japanese messages. In addition he was in charge of many of our prewar conversations and agreements with the British and Dutch and could have vetoed the sending to foreign powers of matériel needed at Pearl Harbor. He was also responsible for asking Governor Thomas E. Dewey, the 1944 Republican presidential candidate, not to mention facts relating to Pearl Harbor which were damaging to President Roosevelt, then running for his fourth term.

General Marshall's appearance was very dramatic. An atmosphere of urgency for speed was created. He first appeared on Thursday morning, December 6. The committee counsel and majority mem-

bers questioned him through Thursday and Friday. On Saturday morning minority members were permitted to question him. Senator Brewster was absent because of the sudden death of his father. Representative Gearhart questioned the General for a short time. Then Senator Ferguson began.

In the meantime the committee chairman, Senator Barkley, stated on the record that he had hoped to conclude with the General that day. Marshall had told the vice-chairman, Representative Cooper, that "his plane was waiting, ready to take him to his duties in China."⁸⁴ It later developed that Marshall had not even seen the President for instructions since accepting his appointment over the telephone.

Senator Ferguson questioned him all through Saturday and the following Monday and Tuesday, and still further during the second round of questioning on Thursday.

There was an attempt made to deride and discredit Ferguson's pointed questioning. Some majority members claimed the questions were not pertinent. Senator Lucas spent the week end with the President. Following this, Marshall was ordered to the White House. Lucas took this opportunity to launch an attack on the author of this chapter for his assistance to the minority members.

Despite all these attempts to head him off, Senator Ferguson was hitting home. On his first day alone, he forced Marshall to admit, among other things, the following damaging facts:

1. That General Gerow was in charge of war plans. He had no authority over General Short. In fact, Gerow had nothing to do with operations until we were actually engaged in war;
2. That under Army Regulations, Gerow had no responsibility for sending or not sending a proper alert to Short;
3. That Marshall, as Chief of Staff, was the only Army officer with authority over Short and, therefore, Marshall was the only person responsible for not properly alerting Short;
4. That there was no responsible Army officer on duty Saturday evening, December 6, or Sunday morning, De-

ember 7, who could take action before Marshall's belated arrival at 11:20 Sunday morning and, therefore, it could not be said that Washington was on a full alert, even though they knew the situation was critical;

5. That Marshall had appointed as head of Army Intelligence a man he knew was short of the required qualifications;
6. That although the head of Army Intelligence "should have had access to all intelligence" he did not have such access and, therefore, his confidential bulletins were not the best information available;
7. That lack of manpower in deciphering Japanese codes was not due to lack of Congressional appropriations;
8. That Marshall knew Great Britain was informed of what we read in the Japanese codes before Pearl Harbor, and that "we have been trying to keep that quiet as much as we could";
9. That Marshall knew no reason why Admiral Kimmel had been cut off from the group receiving information obtained from reading Japanese codes;
10. That Marshall denied knowledge that the Japanese once knew we were reading their codes. (A later witness revealed that Washington had such knowledge and this message was circulated to Marshall in the regular distribution of other intercepts.)
11. That before the Roberts Report "was made public there were certain things withdrawn and the complete Roberts Report went to the President before portions were withdrawn."
12. That the United States initiated the Anglo-Dutch-American Agreements;
13. That Marshall had approved these agreements, as had the Secretaries of War and Navy, and that the agreements went into general effect before the attack;
14. That officers of the United States were furnished to China for combat duty against Japan before December 7, 1941.⁸⁵

All this and more was brought out solely by Senator Ferguson's questioning after the committee counsel and the majority members of the committee were fully satisfied that they had placed in the record all of the significant information that Marshall could furnish. If the record had been closed before Senator Ferguson's questioning, Gerow would have been left the Washington scapegoat, responsible for the failure to alert Short properly, whereas Marshall and Stimson bore this responsibility. The fact that Senator Ferguson was dominating the investigation, and bringing forth so much vital material that the general counsel had not covered, angered the general counsel.

The general counsel was further infuriated when, on December 18, Senator Brewster asked Admiral Wilkinson:

Did you have any reason to suspect, during the period between October and December 7, 1941, when you were functioning as Director of Naval Intelligence, that the Japs suspected that we were breaking any of their codes?

ADMIRAL WILKINSON: Yes. I do not know specifically in that period, but there had been a message which I recall somewhere around October, I think, that the Germans had informed the Japs that there were indications that we were breaking some of their codes. Several messages that were sent from Japan indicated that they wished their agents to be particularly careful in their reports to protect their codes.

SENATOR BREWSTER: Have you located the messages which contained these references to the German warning?

ADMIRAL WILKINSON: I think I can find one, sir.

SENATOR BREWSTER: I would like to ask counsel whether they have located those.

MR. GESELL: No; we have not, the ones I believe the Senator refers to.

SENATOR BREWSTER: What steps have you taken?

SENATOR FERGUSON: Mr. Chairman, may I refresh Mr. Gesell's memory? I had a request in for such information and I am sure that my letter states definitely that there were no

such codes—I mean no such messages. Do you recall that, Mr. Gesell?

MR. GESELL: No; I do not.

SENATOR BREWSTER: Well, I have a letter from Mr. Mitchell saying that there was no evidence that the Japanese had any knowledge that we were breaking their codes or suspected it, and that the evidence was all to the contrary. Do you recall that letter, Mr. Mitchell?

MR. MITCHELL: Yes. That is based on a report from the Department of whom we made inquiry.⁸⁶

The next day Mr. Mitchell opened the hearing by saying:

Yesterday, I made the mistake, without checking up on the fact, of saying or thinking that I had submitted that request to the Navy or the Army, and they had reported and it was on the basis of their report that I made that statement, and as the result of that there were some imputations made on the good faith of the Army and Navy in not producing what we asked for.

I want to say that imputation is not justified because I now find I never did ask for that material, and that this answer that I made was based on my own impression of what they were asking, and what the evidence was at that time. I am quite willing to be open to criticism for not having followed it up, although at that time we were pretty busy just getting started, and possibly I might be forgiven for that.

THE VICE CHAIRMAN: I am sure we all recognize that.

MR. MITCHELL: At any rate, we had the inquiry made. Bear in mind that this inquiry, as I interpret it, I am quite sure referred to what the Japs knew about our breaking the code prior to Pearl Harbor. . . .

SENATOR FERGUSON: That is all I was referring to, Mr. Mitchell. There is no misunderstanding about that.

MR. MITCHELL: There is no misunderstanding about that. At that time, this was in the singular, and I was thinking of the diplomatic code, the magic or the purple stuff, so I wrote

and told him I did not know of any evidence of that kind. I should have asked the Departments for it, but I am glad to make it clear or to get straightened out on it. . . .⁸⁷

A number of intercepted messages were then placed in the record revealing that the Japanese had been warned by Berlin that we were reading their codes in early 1941. Marshall and several other top officers had previously testified to the contrary.

This apparently was close to the last straw for the general counsel. He was a pitiful sight. Mrs. Mitchell approached Mrs. Brewster on the side asking if the minority senators might be a little easier on him because of his health. It was quite apparent that it was a shock to him that Army officers had testified that these messages had not existed, whereas they did. He resigned a short while later, as did his assistant counsel.

The new general counsel was Seth Richardson, who more recently served the administration as chairman of the Loyalty Review Board and also as chairman of the Subversive Activities Control Board. The new associate general counsel, replacing Mr. Gesell, was none other than Samuel H. Kaufman, who was later rewarded with a Federal judgeship. He presided at the spectacular first trial of Alger Hiss.

Before leaving, Mr. Mitchell prepared a "Revised Order of Proof and List of Witnesses, and Explanatory Memoranda" for the use of the new counsel and committee members. This document, prepared prior to Kimmel's testimony, contained a section critical of him. Another section dealt with the White House papers of President Roosevelt. Mr. Mitchell had:

. . . requested Miss Tully to extract from the files for the year 1941 all papers relating to Japan, the imminence of war in the Pacific, or general Far Eastern developments. . . . Counsel has not had nor requested physical access to the files, but has relied upon Miss Tully's extraction of documents coming under the broad headings noted above . . . not all of the Roosevelt files have been read, but, of course, those

considered likely to contain material relevant to the inquiry have been read.⁸⁸

Another long section was devoted to his (Mitchell's) belief that the Winds Execute message was never received. All in all, it was a judgment of the evidence before it was all in.

For a while things ran a little more smoothly. During the testimony of Admiral Kimmel, Senator Brewster brought out the fact that the committee had only been told of the defensive duties ("f," "g," and "h") of the Pacific Fleet and subsequently he obtained the omitted offensive tasks specified in WPL-46:

a. Support the forces of the Associated Powers⁸⁹ in the Far East by diverting enemy strength away from the Malay Barrier through the denial and capture of positions in the Marshalls, and through raids on enemy sea communications and positions.

b. Destroy Axis sea communications by capturing or destroying vessels trading directly or indirectly with the enemy.

c. Protect the sea communications of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area.

d. Support British naval forces in the area south of the equator, as far west as Longitude 155° East.

e. Protect the territory of the Associated Powers within the Pacific Area, and prevent the extension of enemy military power into the Western Hemisphere, by destroying hostile expeditions and supporting land and air forces in denying the enemy the use of land positions in that Hemisphere.

SENATOR BREWSTER: Now, those are rather large orders, are they not?

ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Yes, sir; and in that connection I might say that prior to the commencement of these hearings we found out what they were submitting to counsel and my counsel went to Mr. Mitchell and pointed out to him that these defensive measures divorced from the others did not give a true picture of my responsibilities, of the problems that faced me; that it was necessary to have these additional things

brought to the attention of the committee. After that and when it was distributed to the committee my counsel again went to Mr. Gesell and informed him that we felt this was not a full presentation of the picture which was necessary to be drawn if they were to find out what my responsibilities were in the premises, and beyond that we went no further.

SENATOR BREWSTER: Do you know what reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you regarding that matter?

ADMIRAL KIMMEL: What, sir?

SENATOR BREWSTER: What reply Mr. Gesell made to your counsel as reported to you, regarding that request?

ADMIRAL KIMMEL: I do not know as he made any reply, but he did not do anything about it.

MR. MURPHY: Will the Senator yield?

SENATOR BREWSTER: Well, I am quite interested because I raised this very question early in the hearing as it impressed me that we would be utterly unable to form a balanced judgment on whether or not you had made a wise decision unless we knew what your responsibilities were and if your primary responsibilities were to carry out aggressive warfare all over the Pacific Ocean, out as far as the Malay Peninsula, the Philippines, and all that, I assume that must be taken into account. I was unable to secure recognition of that by the counsel at the time and I am very much interested to know that you apparently had presented a similar and what seems to me a well-warranted request and I think that it will be in order to find out, if possible, why it was that this information was not made available to us initially by whoever was responsible.

MR. MURPHY: Will the Senator yield?

SENATOR BREWSTER: Yes.

ADMIRAL KIMMEL: Well, I don't know anything about it.

SENATOR BREWSTER: No; I know you do not.

MR. MURPHY: Mr. Mitchell made a statement to the committee that the reason it was not was he thought the committee was primarily concerned with defense obligations made

as to Pearl Harbor. Then he was pressed by the committee and he and Mr. Gesell then made available to the committee the complete war plans of the Pacific and the complete plans covering the entire situation and we have that.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Were you through?

MR. MURPHY: Yes.

SENATOR FERGUSON: Then do I understand counsel had this entire matter before them and only furnished us this deleted version, or did they have to go back to the Navy and get the entire matter? And I would like to know whether they requested the entire record at first.

MR. MURPHY: I am sure I cannot answer that. I can only say that Mr. Mitchell said at first all they wanted to present was the defense of Hawaii.⁹⁰

Although this voluminous WPL-46 had been shown to the committee, only one copy was available. It was a bulky thing that no one had time to read and the former counsel had kept it out of the record. The new counsel let it go in. It contained the first public inkling of what Admiral Kimmel had been ordered to do in the so-called "war warning" message, first mentioned in the Roberts Report. Unfortunately, no copies were given or shown to the press until the entire proceedings were printed many months later.

The high light of the hearings was probably the testimony of Commander Lester R. Schulz. He had never appeared in any of the previous investigations and was not scheduled to appear at this one. His appearance resulted from Senator Ferguson's request for the names of all those who were on duty at the War, Navy, and State Departments, as well as the White House, during the important days preceding the attack. Many of the records were lost, but one was located by the sheer persistence of the Senator, showing that Commander Schulz, then a Navy lieutenant, was on duty during the late afternoon and evening of December 6, 1941. This witness was flown in from somewhere in the Pacific and came directly into the committee room before the Navy liaison man, Baecher, had time to talk with him or suggest anything in the way of testimony.

Schulz testified that he gave a locked pouch to President Roose-

velt at 9:00 P.M. on December 6. The President opened the pouch and read the message. Then, in Schulz's presence, he turned toward Harry Hopkins and said, in substance, "This means war." Mr. Hopkins agreed and expressed his opinion, according to Schulz, that:

. . . it was too bad that we could not strike the first blow and prevent any sort of surprise. The President nodded and then said in effect, "No, we can't do that. We are a democracy and a peaceful people." Then he raised his voice, and this much I remember definitely. He said, "But we have a good record." The impression that I got was that we would have to stand on that record, we could not make the first overt move. We would have to wait until it came.⁹¹

He also revealed that the President tried to get in touch with Admiral Stark at his home. When told Stark was at the theater, the President decided not to risk alarming the public by calling him out of his box, and so the President let the matter rest.

Such valuable information was obtained only as a result of the minority's perseverance and in the face of the majority's efforts to direct testimony along other lines. Schulz was such a clean-cut youngster that no one dared to challenge his word. It was accepted without question by the stunned and silent majority.

Another glum period for the majority came during the appearance of Colonel Bratton, who had been persuaded by Colonel Clausen to change his earlier testimony.

MR. KAUFMAN: And do we have it now that no delivery was made to any of those persons other than to the Secretary of State and excepting General Miles who had already seen it at Admiral Wilkinson's house?

COLONEL BRATTON: This is the point at which my memory begins to go bad on me. I cannot state positively whether there was any delivery made that night or not at this time.

I testified before the Grunert Board (APHB) that I had made delivery to the Secretary of the General Staff, to the night duty officer, or to General Gerow and to General Miles.

That was my normal procedure. I tried to make simultaneous delivery to all of these people.

Since making that statement before the Grunert Board—I withdraw that statement.

At the time when I made the statement to the Grunert Board I had not remembered, or I did not remember, that Colonel Dusenbury was working with me in the office that night. Now, since making this statement to the Grunert Board I have been shown a number of affidavits by various officers, General Smith, Bedell Smith, General Ralph Smith, General Gailey, General Gerow, and others, to the effect that they did not receive the 13 parts of this message from me or from anybody else Saturday night.

Now, I know all these men. I do not doubt the honesty and integrity of any one of them, and if they say that I did not deliver these pouches to them that night, then my memory must have been at fault.⁹²

Apparently not wanting to contradict his superiors—those who should have acted before the attack—he was persuaded to alter his original testimony, based on notes made at the time, and to say that his once-clear memory was at fault.

As time wore on it became evident that a thorough investigation was not to be permitted. Secretary Hull's statement was read to the committee and he appeared a few times for one hour at a time for questioning by Mr. Mitchell and by five majority members. When Marshall was brought in out of sequence, Hull was shunted aside so that no member of the minority was ever able to cross-examine the man who was officially responsible for the disastrous negotiations leading to the attack. The minority was permitted to submit some written questions to Hull, but the answers were largely evasive and there was no chance to cross-examine him.

Among the other key witnesses who were never brought before the committee were the State Department's Far East advisors, Stanley Hornbeck and Maxwell Hamilton. Stanley Hornbeck had been suddenly sent to Europe as ambassador to Holland. He is the gentleman who, Admiral Richardson testified, had more to say about

the Pacific Fleet than the Navy itself. He was apparently very confident that Japan would be a pushover and took a very aggressive stand in the negotiations.

Another State Department witness never called was Ambassador Grew's former assistant, Eugene Dooman. Dooman had indicated privately that Hull had threatened Ambassador Grew on his return to this country if Grew did not immediately destroy all copies of certain papers.

Secretary Stimson had a heart attack the day it was announced that he would be summoned as a witness. He did not recover until after the hearings had been closed. Written questions were submitted to him and he answered only those he chose. He submitted part of his diary, largely those parts which had previously been revealed in the APHB proceedings made available to this committee. He claimed that all other sections of his diary would reveal nothing further about Pearl Harbor. These brief quotes indicate that, during the last week in November, President Roosevelt had told the cabinet we could expect an attack as early as the following Monday. A November 25, 1941, entry, discussing a White House meeting, stated: "The question was how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves."⁹³

The hearings ended when the majority shut off all further investigation and testimony over the objections of the minority. No opportunity was granted to obtain testimony from almost two score of important witnesses including Bedell Smith, James Forrestal, top Far East State Department officials, and the Judge Advocates of the Army and Navy who had instigated the Clausen and Hewitt "investigations." Smith, as Marshall's top secretary, was especially vital as it was his duty to see that the key messages of late December 6, and early December 7, were delivered to the General promptly. Another important witness would have been the orderly assigned to General Marshall on the evening of December 6. He could certainly have told the committee whether or not Marshall was at home up to ten o'clock when the orderly normally went off duty.

The committee had no opportunity to question the code experts

as to the truth of Marshall's statement to Dewey that the Japanese were using the same codes in 1944 as in 1941. Several witnesses had indicated that this was not so. It was a rather technical subject but experts should have been examined to determine if Marshall had been attempting to keep this issue from embarrassing his chief during the 1944 presidential campaign.

Time was not allowed to go into many situations thoroughly, particularly the attempts of many in this country and Japan to obtain a peaceful settlement of our differences. The information on the record seems to indicate that those in high power in this country rejected all peaceful solutions and refused to co-operate with peace groups in Japan. The failure of these peace groups to obtain a hearing put the Japanese war party in power and made "Pearl Harbor" inevitable.

The new counsel, Seth Richardson, began to worry about the report shortly after coming on the job the second week in January. On February 21, 1946, he submitted a confidential memorandum to the members of the committee which indicated quite clearly that he still lacked an understanding of the case. He expressed his opinion on a number of issues. He felt that the duty of the Pacific Fleet was "purely defensive." He also agreed that "the President was supported by a majority of his military advisors" in sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor. The facts were the very opposite. Every top Navy man testifying on the subject indicated that the fleet should not have been stationed there. Richardson compared the Philippines with Hawaii, ignoring the fact that the Philippines had "Magic" while Hawaii did not. Perhaps the clearest indication of his confusion was his statement that: "The insistence of General Short that he was entitled to assume approval at Washington of his sabotage alert report seems unconvincing to me." Later in the memorandum Richardson stated that: "General Marshall and General Gerow admitted, specifically, responsibility for neglecting a proper consideration of this report."

After the hearings were closed, four memoranda were prepared and distributed to every member of the committee. One, dwelling on the diplomatic phase, was prepared by John Masten, an assistant counsel for the committee. It was wholly an administration

interpretation of the material which the administration had permitted the committee to see. This memorandum was printed later as part of the Majority Report.⁹⁴ It indicated that the majority had been successful in keeping many important parts from the public.

The memorandum by the general counsel, Seth Richardson, indicated he had learned some things between February, when his first statement appeared, and June. He placed some blame on Washington for sending the fleet to Pearl Harbor without adequate protection and priority on matériel. He found that the warning messages were primarily intended for Admiral Hart in the Philippines and not Admiral Kimmel in Hawaii, and that the Navy at Washington should have required more comprehensive reports from Kimmel as to his action, since they had known for weeks that Pearl Harbor was being mapped and plotted by Japanese agents. He also assumed that Washington should have acted more promptly in connection with the last-minute messages inasmuch as their importance was confirmed by Commander Schulz's testimony that President Roosevelt thought they meant war. He also blamed the White House obliquely for not insisting on unity of command at Hawaii. On the whole, his recommendations were of the middle-of-the-road type.

A third memorandum was prepared by the associate general counsel, Samuel H. Kaufman, who had acted as the administration's agent and who later revealed his pro-administration sympathies more flagrantly during the first Hiss trial. In his opinion the messages to Hawaii "adequately and fully reflected the information in Washington." He ignored the Schulz testimony concerning Roosevelt, stating that only Marshall thought the last-minute messages were important and, therefore, there was some excuse for the others not to consider them important. He also thought that Admiral Kimmel had been instructed to take defensive measures. Mr. Kaufman was very kind to Secretary Hull. He implied, as did the Roberts Report, that Admiral Kimmel had received a December 6 message announcing the destruction of some Japanese code machines, although this message did not arrive until after the attack. He found the Hawaiian commanders "derelict," but did not accept the administration viewpoint that General Gerow was partly to

blame for not sending a further message to General Short after receipt of Short's sabotage alert message. He agreed with the general counsel that "the failure to reach a timely decision was due to the inability of the two services to agree upon a basis for unified command and the failure of superior authority to impose it." The only superior authority was Franklin D. Roosevelt.

The most important memorandum was that prepared by one Edward P. Morgan. It was 308 pages long and was done in the best Morgan manner. He is now better known as the author of the more recent Tydings Committee whitewash of the State Department. The Morgan Pearl Harbor Report represented the administration's point of view and, after important modifications, became the final Majority Report. It was too biased for even the majority to swallow in toto. Mr. Morgan's boastful and protracted brazenness is well revealed in the quotation from his answer to Senator Schoeppel, printed at the beginning of this chapter.

The major changes made in the original Morgan Report follow:

Where the Morgan Report had stated: "Indeed, had the keen awareness of Japanese deceit and bestiality voiced by the Secretary of State characterized thinking elsewhere, the disaster of Pearl Harbor as we know it might never have occurred," the Majority Report read: "The President, the Secretary of State, and high Government officials made every possible effort, without sacrificing our national honor and endangering our security, to avert war with Japan."⁹⁵

Where Morgan had suggested: "The disaster was the failure, with attendant increase in personnel and matériel losses, of the Army and Navy in Hawaii to institute measures designed to detect an approaching enemy force, to effect a state of readiness commensurate with the realization that war was at hand, and to employ every facility at their command in repelling the Japanese," the Majority Report removed the two words, "in Hawaii."⁹⁶

Mr. Morgan had suggested: "The attack came as an astounding, bewildering, and catastrophic surprise to the commanders in Hawaii. Yet they were fully conscious of the danger from air attack." Here the Majority Report says: "Officers, both in Washington and Hawaii, were fully conscious of the danger from air attack."

Mr. Morgan did place some responsibility on the War Plans Division of the War Department in Washington for failure to discharge its responsibility. The Majority Report made this a "direct responsibility."⁹⁷

Mr. Morgan found that Army and Navy officials in Washington thought that those in Hawaii had been "adequately and properly alerted on the basis of the November 27 warnings. This belief was justified." The Majority Report found that "The Intelligence and War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments failed" in this respect.⁹⁸

This addition was obtained by the minority House committee members, as well as the final conclusion of the Majority Report that: "Under all of the evidence the War and Navy Departments were not sufficiently alerted on December 6 and 7, 1941, in view of the imminence of war."⁹⁹

Neither Mr. Morgan nor the Majority Report mentioned the responsibilities of the State Department.

When the committee came to consider the report, Senator Ferguson was ignored completely because, as Senator Lucas said, Ferguson would not agree with anything the majority wrote and would write his own report anyway. For these reasons, minority Senators Brewster and Ferguson did not attend all closed sessions dealing with the Majority Report.

Minority Representatives Gearhart and Keefe caused considerable consternation by signing the Majority Report. They felt they had improved the Majority Report by obtaining certain changes in, and additions to, the Morgan Report. It is undoubtedly true that the Majority made extensive concessions in return for these two signatures, but the unfortunate result was to give the whitewash a more or less respectable veneer. There was some gain for the cause of truth in that, if the majority had not sought to lure Gearhart and Keefe, they might have submitted the far more misleading Morgan Report as the official Majority Report.

Representative Gearhart had always been a thorn in the administration's side. He represented the Ninth California District—a district with more registered Democrats than Republicans. Under California's peculiar election system, candidates for political office

enter the primaries of both major parties. Gearhart, a Republican, had replaced a Democrat in 1934, when he won both the Democratic and Republican nominations. He held them both through 1944. During the early Pearl Harbor hearings he had been a vigilant searcher for the truth. The administration, knowing he represented a strong anti-Japanese West Coast district, tried to embarrass him by charging, flippantly, that he wore a kimono. On March 23, 1946, the House majority leader, Representative John W. McCormack, accused Gearhart and the Republican Senators of being "willing to prove the Japs innocent of the sneak attack if they could prove President Roosevelt guilty."¹⁰⁰ These attacks had their effect, and in June (1946) Gearhart lost the Democratic primary. Thus intimidated by "pro-Jap" charges, Gearhart was scared into signing the July 20 Majority Report in order to save his seat in the November elections.

The case of Representative Keefe was different. He had asked many incisive questions and shown a keen interest in the proceedings. His questioning had dispelled the administration's charges that Congress was responsible for our unpreparedness. He produced the figures which showed that, in the eight years preceding Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt had cut Army and Navy requests by \$2,800,000,000, while Congress had restored \$1,300,000,000 of the budget cut. He was relentless in his questioning of Marshall and other administration apologists. He was handicapped, however, by committee rules which permitted every other member prior opportunity to question each witness. Many of the questions he had worked up were exhausted by Senator Ferguson before Keefe's turn. Time after time, Keefe saw the Senator getting credit for uncovering many important points he, himself, had been prepared to reveal. Piqued by this fact, he was determined not to sign a report sponsored by the Senator. Two days before the Majority Report was issued, "he told the House he could not agree with the report as a whole, so he signed it 'with reservations.' The reservations, he added, will be listed in a separate statement filed with the report."¹⁰¹ His twenty-four-page "Additional Views" statement was an intelligent condemnation, not only of Marshall and the administration, but also of the way the Majority Report was slanted,

saying, "The committee report, I feel, does not with exactitude apply the same yardstick in measuring responsibilities at Washington as has been applied to the Hawaiian commanders. I cannot suppress the feeling that the committee report endeavors to throw as soft a light as possible on the Washington scene."¹⁰²

Lest anyone is still inclined to believe that Keefe was in essential agreement with the Majority Report, it is well to cite the opinion of Charles Austin Beard in his *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (pp. 346-47):

. . . his [Keefe's] Additional Views constitute an arraignment of the Roosevelt Administration's management of affairs during the months before December 7, 1941, which is, in many ways, sharper in tone than the "Propositions" filed by the two Republican Senators, Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Brewster. Indeed, in phrasing, Mr. Keefe's statement is even more like an indictment than the essentially historical Conclusions advanced by the minority. . . .

The press ignored the content of Keefe's "Additional Views" and heralded his signature on the Majority Report. He was alarmed at this interpretation and asked that his "reservations" be printed as a minority report. The majority refused this request on the basis that it was too late.

Senators Brewster and Ferguson found the Majority Report:

. . . illogical, and unsupported by the preponderance of the evidence before the Committee . . . permission to search files and other records was denied by majority vote to individual members *even when accompanied by Committee counsel*. Rightly or wrongly it was inferred from this that there was a deliberate design to block the search for the truth. . . . When all the testimony, papers, documents, exhibits, and other evidence duly laid before the Committee are reviewed, it becomes apparent that the record is far from complete.¹⁰³

These two senators prepared and signed a minority report which was fully documented. Yet it was not nearly as strong as it might have been because they were overcautious lest they state something which could not be 100 per cent verified from the incomplete record.

XII. THE ADMINISTRATION PAID OFF

Subsequent events have revealed that those who testified in the various hearings as to facts that were damaging to the administration and their superiors had few promotions. Those who maintained secrecy, failed to remember, or testified on behalf of the administration, rose very quickly to high places.

General Marshall was made a permanent five-star general entitled to a lifetime fifteen-thousand-dollar-a-year pension, and was later moved up to the cabinet. Colonel W. Bedell Smith soon became a three-star general, succeeded General Eisenhower as commander in chief of the American Forces in Europe, and later was appointed our ambassador to Russia. Secretaries Hull and Stimson recovered their health soon after the hearings closed. The committee chairman, Alben Barkley, became our Vice-President. One majority committee member, Senator Lucas, became the Senate majority leader until he was retired by the Illinois voters in 1950. Another majority member, John W. Murphy, and the associate general counsel, Samuel H. Kaufman, were appointed to lifetime Federal judgeships. On the other hand, virtually no one who tried to spread the alarm during the twenty-four hours preceding the attack, or later to reveal facts damaging to the administration, has ever been promoted or rewarded.

While the administration has been anxious to keep certain facts from the public, it has done everything it could to have its own side publicized. Perhaps the worst example of this was the appointment

of Samuel Eliot Morison as the Navy historian. This "historian" from Harvard, President Roosevelt's alma mater, had all records made available to him, yet he tried to confuse the American public by absolute misstatements in his criticism of the late Dr. Beard, saying:

Part II, "Unveiling Realities," affords Beard a marvelous opportunity, by quoting all manner of gossip, slander, Congressional snipings, and the like, to build up in the reader's mind an impression of frightful iniquity on the part of the Administration. For instance, David Lawrence is quoted on pages 289-90 as asking a number of rhetorical questions, such as: "Why were all our battleships in harbor in Hawaii on December 7, 1941, instead of out at sea, and who in Washington gave the orders to keep them there?" But Beard never gives the answer: That they were there by Admiral Kimmel's order, in accordance with normal peacetime routine, after he had received the "war warning" message of November 27.¹⁰⁴

As shown in this chapter, the fleet was there in accordance with Washington orders. The "war warning" message ordered Kimmel to prepare for the offensive movements shown in the war plans which were available to Dr. Morison, but which the administration tried to keep from the public. Dr. Morison would have us believe that Kimmel was disobeying wise Washington orders and following "normal peacetime routine," whereas, in fact, he was obeying orders, as Dr. Morison must have known.

History bought and paid for by politicians in power is seldom worth the paper on which it is imprinted. Unfortunately, Dr. Morison's thirteen volumes will have to be discounted as biased, incomplete, and unreliable. The taxpayers' money has once more gone down the drain.

A recent example of the whitewash technique was revealed in the book, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, by Herbert Feis. This State Department employee took two years off from his administration duties to write his apologia at the Princeton Institute of Advanced

Study. Unlike the great historian, Charles Beard, he was permitted "full access to all pertinent records"¹⁰⁵ of the State Department, all American official military records, the help of Miss Grace Tully in obtaining access to the collection of papers at the home of President Roosevelt at Hyde Park, "the full private diaries of Stimson, Morgenthau, and Grew; the file of the intercepted 'magic' cables; and equivalent collections of official and private Japanese records."¹⁰⁶ For him, Colonel Carter Clarke "was good enough to assemble the whole of the file of intercepted Japanese messages known as magic."¹⁰⁷ Despite this, his book fails to mention most of the damaging facts presented in this cursory review.

XIII. OFFICIAL ARMY HISTORY REVEALS PREWAR ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR PLANS

An even later whitewash attempt is perhaps the most pitiful. This shameful effort to hide the administration's unconstitutional prewar agreements with Great Britain is contained in a 551-page volume of the official "History of the War Department" entitled *Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations*, by Mark S. Watson (Washington, D.C., 1951).

Pages 103 and 104 describe the preparation of Army and Navy Joint War Plans. In conclusion:

This grand composite was the basic plan in readiness when war actually came in December 1941, the program having been continuously restudied and amplified in the light of co-ordination with British plans.

On page 125, the author states:

On 29 January 1941, with the British Staff on hand, there were initiated the two nations' Staff Conversations, ABC-1

and ABC-2, which lasted until 27 March, riveted Army and Navy firmly to Rainbow 5, and established an understanding of what British and American elements alike would regard as their respective missions in the event of war.

Then on pages 369 and 370, the reader is cautioned that:

The discussion could not avoid some degree of joint planning of U.S.-British strategy, contingent though it would be by advance stipulation, and negative though it would be, for the same reason, in political commitment of the United States to any war agreement whatever. . . . The conferring Staff members were to be of high level, but not the highest in the case of either nation, and this supported the polite assurance that the conference decisions would not be actually binding upon anyone. Constitutionally of course they could not be.

Emphasis is added to this caution on page 375:

The conversations ended with a detailed report of agreement on basic policies, primary objectives, and the plans for attaining them—all on a contingent basis as scheduled. The agreements were “subject to confirmation by the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff Committee of the War Cabinet in the United Kingdom,” and by “the Governments of the United States and . . . United Kingdom.” The governmental confirmation, which could come only from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill, was not given, either for the ABC report or for the later Joint Rainbow Plan 5 that was based upon the unconfirmed ABC compact. . . . The Staff Conversations served to put into written form the views which already were held and on which there was general agreement. . . .

The plot gets more interesting on page 379:

The responsibility for strategic direction of the Associated Powers' [see Footnote 89] naval forces in the Far East (except those which were retained by the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Asiatic Fleet for Philippines defense) was without argument assigned to the British.

This official document of the Army Department's Historical Division reports on page 384:

As to the ABC-1 agreement, its final approval at the Cabinet level came some weeks after the end of the conversations. The report itself was signed only by the delegates, but upon the cover of a copy that was introduced in evidence at the Congressional Pearl Harbor Inquiry in 1946 is a penciled notation, itself unsigned and undated, reading: "Approved by Sec. Navy 28 May 1941. Approved by Sec. War 3 June 1941. Not approved by President." To that extent it was made clear by the Chief of State in the United States (and this was true of Great Britain as well) that the conversations were not those of the highest civil authority. The test specifically mentioned that agreements were subject to confirmation by the military chiefs (which was given) and also by the governments. These last confirmatory signatures were never affixed.

The author, having explained to his own satisfaction that the agreements were not agreements, neglects to explain that all priorities and war plans were issued and carried out in accordance with these agreements, regardless of who did, or who did not, sign them. But as the pages pass, the truth rears its embarrassing head. On page 394 it is stated:

On 2 April 1941 . . . General Marshall sent to the commanding general of the Philippines Department, then Maj. Gen. George Grunert, a full copy of ABC-1 plus five of its annexes. He informed General Grunert that he had not yet formally approved the report and that its provisions would not become directives until such approval was given.

This plainly states the "agreements" became directives upon Marshall's signature.

An alarming admission is quoted on page 408, from a Joint Board memorandum of September 25, 1941:

The major strategic concept, and the principal military operations set forth . . . (in ABC-1) are still sound, and should form the general guide for the conduct of a war against the Axis Powers, in which the United States is associated with the British Commonwealth.

The sentence following this quotation states:

This "Final Action" of Army and Navy, signed by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff, was dispatched to London on 25 September for transmission to the British Chiefs.

On page 446, the Army Department quotes from an October 18, 1941, memorandum from Marshall for MacArthur, that one of "the enlarged Army missions now would be":

(d) Co-operate with the Associated Powers in defense of the territories of these powers in accordance with approved policies and agreements.

Four pages later the author reports a conference of November 26, 1941, when

General Gerow said the Japanese probably would not go into Siberia, but most likely into Thailand, raising a question of American action after the Japanese had passed the agreed-upon limit of $100^{\circ}\text{E}-10^{\circ}\text{N}$.

A glance at the map shows that passing this "agreed-upon limit of $100^{\circ}\text{E}-10^{\circ}\text{N}$ " would represent a Japanese by-pass of the American-held Philippines to attack either British Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, or both. The author thus unconsciously admits the truth of

the statement that administration officials had agreed that the United States would go to the aid of the other "Associated Powers" in such an eventuality—that we would join Britain in war, even though there were no attack on American territory or ships.

A further admission appears on page 476:

After the Secretary of War had given formal approval (2 June 1941) to Rainbow War Plan 5, largely based upon the ABC agreements, the Army pushed ahead with its detailed implementation of that plan in all its commands.

It should be noted that the Joint War Plans stated that they were based on these agreements. The so-called "war warning" messages sent to MacArthur, Short, Hart, and Kimmel asked them to take action in accordance with these agreements. To maintain that these agreements were not in force is to make a farce of every major Army and Navy action in the last six months of 1941.

The copy of the agreements actually signed by Messrs. Stimson, Knox, Marshall, Stark, et al., was never produced. Could it be that President Roosevelt approved it? That was Admiral Stark's opinion up to the day before he testified in 1946. His prepared statement read in part as follows:

21. . . . we held extensive staff conversations with the British and Canadians early in 1941 and the report of these conversations was embodied in a document known as ABC-1, dated March 27, 1941.

22. Based on the understandings arrived at in ABC-1, the Army and the Navy developed a Joint Basic War Plan, known as Rainbow No. 5, which was approved by the Secretaries of War and the Navy, ~~and by the President.~~"

In reading this aloud to the committee, Admiral Stark interpolated: "You will note that I have crossed out the words 'and by the President.' That is the only change made in this statement."¹⁰⁸

Later the Admiral was interrogated on this point:

SENATOR FERGUSON: I want to know, when you put that in there, whether you were of the opinion personally that that had been approved by the President?

ADMIRAL STARK: I was. . . . I took that out because I had no documentary proof of it. I do know the President, except officially, approved of it, although it shows he was not willing to do it officially until we got into the war. Nevertheless, I sent that plan out on April 3. This is also from the record. . . . I told Kimmel and told Tommy—Admiral Hart—that I had read to the President my official letter of April 3 and that the President had approved it and knew I was sending it out. Therefore, I think it is safe to say that the President certainly approved of it. He approved my sending it out, although he had not officially approved it.¹⁰⁹

SENATOR FERGUSON: Now, on April 4 you said this in your letter: "I spent over 3 hours with him (the President) day before yesterday and another hour yesterday. My official letter on the staff conversations had some flaws in it as the result of that conference. I may tell you and Hart and King in the strictest confidence—and I mean by that nobody but you and Hart and King—that I read to the President the official secret letter which I mailed you three yesterday and received his general assent to it. . . . I am also enclosing a memorandum which I regard as vitally secret and which I trust you will burn as soon as you have read it covering the President's talk with Ghormley—"

ADMIRAL STARK: Yes; that is Vice Admiral Ghormley—

SENATOR FERGUSON: "—and me yesterday." Now, what was in that memorandum that was ordered to be burned?

ADMIRAL STARK: I do not specifically recall what was in that memorandum.¹¹⁰

Admiral Stark, as Chief of Naval Operations, issued and approved all top Navy orders and directives in 1941. He did so with the understanding that Roosevelt had approved these agreements and that they were in full effect. The record seems to substantiate his statements, and not those of the "official" historian.

The record is full of references to missing papers, forgetful memories, and direct contradictions. Approvals are not approvals. Agreements are not agreements. If you search for the truth, be you great historian or chosen representative of the people in the Congress of the United States, the doors are locked against you. If you are friendly to the administration, you may see any papers you want. Such is the whitewash of those responsible for the death of our boys at Pearl Harbor, for our participation in World War II, and for the resulting world-wide chaotic conditions—conditions which seem to be leading us into World War III.

Those who have participated in this great conspiracy against the American people undoubtedly believe that the end justifies the means. They probably all join the Editors of *Life*, who tell us in their *Picture History of World War II* that "In retrospect Pearl Harbor seemed clearly the best thing that could have happened to the U.S."¹¹¹

POSTSCRIPT

This chapter was prepared principally from original sources available to the Joint Congressional Committee at the time of the 1945-46 investigation. Later, in checking the documents furnished committee members with those finally published as a "complete" record, an interesting discrepancy was noticed. It indicates quite clearly the extent to which the administration went to keep the public in the dark, particularly with reference to concealing that we were secretly at war while publicly at peace.

The following transcript is given as it appeared in the original Clarke records. The words in brackets were omitted from the printed record made public.

GEN. CLARKE: In our discussions here we have referred a number of times, and so have you, to the so-called Japanese

Purple system. Will you state approximately when that was solved and by whom it was solved?

MR. FRIEDMAN: To the best of my recollection, the first complete translation was handed in some time in August [of 1940], it might have been the early part of August or the middle part of August [1940]. We had been working on the Japanese Purple system [for approximately 20 months]. . . .

GEN. CLARKE: On approximately what date did we give the Purple machine to the British?

MR. FRIEDMAN: I recall that very clearly. A joint U.S. Navy-U.S. Army cryptanalytic mission consisting of four officers, two from each service, went to London [in January 1941] for the purpose of establishing technical cooperation with the British cryptanalytic service. It was at that time that the Army furnished a Purple machine and the technical data to the British.¹¹²

EDITOR'S POSTSCRIPT

Mr. Cabell Phillips' attempt to whitewash General Marshall for his delinquency in failing to alert General Short after he knew of the impending attack on Pearl Harbor has been dealt with at the close of the preceding chapter by Mr. Morgenstern. The situation is further illuminated by the following letter which the writer of this chapter sent to the *New York Times*. It hardly needs to be stated that the *Times* did not publish the letter.

January 22, 1952

The Editor
New York Times Magazine
229 West 43rd Street
New York City

Dear Sir:

On December 2nd you ran an article by Cabell Phillips, "Ten Years Ago This Friday." This article, in accordance with your established policy, had the normal Pro-Administra-

tion left-wing slant New York Times readers have come to accept as "All The News That's Fit To Print."

When some of the errors were called to your attention you made the situation worse by printing a so-called correction along with a defensive reply by Mr. Phillips. Now, in the issue of January 20th, Phillips, in trying to meet his critics, has passed the bounds of even his prejudiced writings. I hope that you have sufficient respect for your readers to correct his amazing misstatements.

First, let's dispose of your December 16th correction that Marshall was not among the conferees with President Roosevelt on the night of December 6, 1941. On the record, Marshall pleads he doesn't remember where he was that night. Off the record, he has told at least one Senator that he could not say where he was because it might injure his superior. In the recent MacArthur hearings, Marshall told the world that he considered loyalty to his Chief superior to loyalty to his country. On the record, he was asked by the Pearl Harbor Congressional Committee's counsel:

MR. MITCHELL: You are sure you were not at the White House that evening?

GENERAL MARSHALL: No, Sir; not at all.

Technically, that would indicate he wasn't sure whether or not he was at the White House. His other official answers are just as evasive so it cannot be said definitely whether or not he was at the White House.

As for Mr. Phillips' December 16th reply:

"The Army had no direct telephone communication with Pearl Harbor—scrambler or otherwise—in December, 1941. Naval communications were not available to General Marshall on that Sunday."

Of course, any phone in the United States could have been connected with Pearl Harbor.

In your January 20th issue, Phillips goes further in contradicting your correspondents. He states that there was no such device as a scrambler phone in existence in December, 1941. He also states that the existence of such an instrument "is

not conclusively shown by the printed testimony of the Pearl Harbor investigation." Then, referring solely to the whitewash, in the best Morgan manner (Morgan also wrote the Tydings Committee whitewash), he "found no reference in the report to an offer by Admiral Stark of the use of Navy communications facilities." He then says that it is not unreasonable to conjecture that "Marshall did not feel free to ask the use of Navy communications for a message to Army commanders exclusively"—previously he had admitted it was also "to inform the Naval officers."

Now, let's look at the record. In Vol. 29, page 2313, we find:

GENERAL FRANK: Was the telephone considered as a means?

GENERAL MARSHALL: No, it was not considered, or it may have been considered but it would not have been used. I am quite certain, certainly not to Hawaii first, because all our information at the moment was out at the other theater, out in the other thing. If I had thought I could put telephone calls through at those hours, which meant we had to get the fellow out of bed and do a number of things, and all the time-consuming element on the business, I would certainly have called MacArthur first, and then I would have called the Panama Canal second, because we had had very peculiar things there, and of course they could chop into us very badly there. We were open in a more vulnerable way in the Panama Canal than we were in Hawaii.

Vol. 3, page 1109:

GENERAL MARSHALL: The information then came in in fuller detail, and telephone communication was established and I talked to General Short's Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips. You could hear the explosions at the time. He was endeavoring to tell me what was actually happening.

Vol. 3, page 1432:

MR. KEEFE: Now, as a matter of fact, what sort of telephone service did you have to Hawaii at that time?

GENERAL MARSHALL: We had no special lines, but I think

we had a scrambler. I know I had a scrambler on mine, and I think we had a scrambler on the phone.

MR. KEEFE: Did you have to use the ordinary commercial telephone service?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think so, yes.

MR. KEEFE: Put in a call and ask to get somebody out there?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Well, as far as I recall, that was the situation at that particular time.

MR. KEEFE: You got a call that morning from somebody out there, and they got you out there right when the bombs were dropping.

GENERAL MARSHALL: I think I put in that call.

MR. KEEFE: You may have put in the call later on that morning?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, sir.

MR. KEEFE: Whom did you call?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I called General Short, and I got his Chief of Staff, Colonel Phillips.

MR. KEEFE: How long did it take you to get it?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I do not recall.

MR. KEEFE: You got it right when the raid was in progress?

GENERAL MARSHALL: Yes, when the bombs fell.

Vol. 3, page 1212:

GENERAL MARSHALL: My only recollection regarding the security aspect—and it is difficult for me to state this with any assurance that I am being accurate because I am confused in back sights—was we must be sufficiently secure to prevent some claim of overt act on our part, and, therefore, the telephone was ruled out. Now, I am not at all certain that that did rule out the telephone. That might have been an afterthought after the event; I do not know.

On the following page he mentions that the scrambler then in vogue was not as elaborate as the later model which is now felt to be secret.

Vol. 3, page 1214:

SENATOR FERGUSON: You had a scramble telephone to Hawaii and the Philippines at that time?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I don't know about the Philippines but I know we had it in to Hawaii.

Now, as to the Navy's offer of its radio (Vol. 3, page 1431):

GENERAL MARSHALL: He (Stark) asked me if I wanted to use the Navy radio. I first spoke to him about sending the message. I do not think he spoke in that first telephone conversation about the Navy radio. I think it is probable that that came in the second message, the second conversation 10 minutes later.

MR. KEEFE: At any event, in one of the conversations before the message was sent to your message center, you talked to Stark and he wanted to know if you wanted to use the Navy radio.

GENERAL MARSHALL: That is correct, sir.

MR. KEEFE: And you did not accept it?

GENERAL MARSHALL: I did not accept it.

I have quoted Marshall because I presume you believe him, although Mr. Phillips could claim that Marshall's word is worthless because of his many misstatements during the investigation.

The sworn affidavit of General Miles, Vol. 35, page 101, states that he (Miles) was ordered to commit perjury by Marshall. Marshall admits this on page 104. If Phillips will not accept Marshall's statements, other testimony can be provided.

The Navy Court of Inquiry found:

"Had the telephone and plain language been used, this information could have been received in Hawaii about two hours before the attack began."

The endorsement by James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, said:

"An acute sensitivity to the tautness of the situation would have dictated at least a plain language telephone communication."

I hope that the *New York Times* has enough integrity left to print this communication.

Very truly yours,
(Signed)
Percy L. Greaves, Jr.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 7

1. *Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack*, 79 Cong., 2 sess. (39 parts, with exhibits; Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), Part V, p. 2338. (The *Hearings* will hereinafter be designated *Pearl Harbor Attack*.)
2. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2342.
3. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2350.
4. *Ibid.*, Part VII, p. 3260.
5. Adjutant General's file on General McNarney.
6. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 496.
7. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part VII, p. 3272.
8. *Ibid.*, Part VII, p. 3276.
9. *Ibid.*, Part VII, p. 3277.
10. *Ibid.*, Part VII, pp. 3271-72.
11. *Ibid.*, Part VII, pp. 3278-80.
12. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 21.
13. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 21.
14. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1129.
15. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1205.
16. Navy Court of Inquiry (NCI).
17. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part X, p. 4815.
18. *Ibid.*, Part XXVI, p. 390.
19. *Ibid.*, Part XXVI, p. 264.
20. *Ibid.*, Part XXVI, p. 265.
21. *Ibid.*, Part XXVI, pp. 284, 286.
22. *Ibid.*, Part XXVI, p. 283.
23. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 29.
24. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 221.
25. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 230.
26. *Ibid.*, Part XXXII, p. 5.
27. *Ibid.*, Part XXXII, p. 7.
28. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 307, 309.

29. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 308.
30. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 311.
31. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 316.
32. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 321.
33. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, p. 321.
34. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 19.
35. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 21.
36. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 58.
37. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 63.
38. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 5.
39. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 7.
40. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 1.
41. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 2. (*Italics and insert supplied.*)
42. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, pp. 92-93.
43. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, pp. 91-92.
44. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 101.
45. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIV, p. 76.
46. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 267-64.
47. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 4.
48. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 5.
49. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 5.
50. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 1.
51. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 6.
52. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 26.
53. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 91.
54. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 93.
55. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 93.
56. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 98.
57. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 101.
58. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 116.
59. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 120.
60. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 120.
61. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 592.
62. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 14.
63. *Ibid.*, Part V, p. 2342.
64. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 17.
65. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 18.
66. *Ibid.*, Part XXXV, p. 19.
67. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 359.
68. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 81.
69. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 83.
70. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 340.
71. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 349.
72. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 93.
73. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 578.
74. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 578.
75. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 581.
76. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 586.
77. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, p. 587.

78. *Ibid.*, Part XXXVI, pp. 575-76.
79. *Ibid.*, Part XXXIX, pp. 382-83.
80. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, p. 285.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 287.
82. Grew refers to his book and to three State Department volumes.
83. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part I, p. 229.
84. *Ibid.*, Part III, p. 1234.
85. *Ibid.*, Part III, pp. 1184-1229 incl.
86. *Ibid.*, Part IV, p. 1815.
87. *Ibid.*, Part IV, pp. 1859-60.
88. "Revised Order of Proof," by Mitchell, Sec. 3, p. 2.
89. "The term 'Associated Powers' means the United States and the British Commonwealth, and, when appropriate, includes the Associates and Allies of either Power." *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XVIII, p. 2909.
90. *Ibid.*, Part VI, pp. 2838-40.
91. *Ibid.*, Part X, p. 4663.
92. *Ibid.*, Part IX, p. 4515.
93. *Ibid.*, Part XI, p. 5433.
94. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, pp. 291-465.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
100. *Congressional Record*, March 27, 1946, p. 2680.
101. *New York Herald Tribune*, July 19, 1946.
102. Report of the Joint Congressional Committee, p. 266-A.
103. *Ibid.*, pp. 493, 497, and 499.
104. *The Atlantic Monthly*, August, 1948, p. 95. Morison has since been appointed to the rank of admiral.
105. Herbert Feis, *The Road to Pearl Harbor*, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. vi.
106. *Ibid.*, see on the jacket for the book.
107. *Ibid.*, p. vii.
108. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, p. 2102.
109. For other testimony to the effect that the President had approved the Joint Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5—WPL-46—see Admiral Turner's testimony on pp. 421-22, above.
110. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part V, pp. 2391-92.
111. *Life* (periodical), *Picture History of World War II* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950), p. 86.
112. *Pearl Harbor Attack*, Part XXXIV, pp. 84-85.

8

THE BANKRUPTCY OF A POLICY

by

WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN

America has lost the greatest of her presidents. The world has lost its greatest leader. In the face of so overwhelming a calamity, what is the use of words? . . .

Do we do well to sink under the flood of sorrow, unmindful of the Providence that gave us this man in our hour of greatest need and permitted him to remain with us until victory had become inevitable? What would the world be like today if we had not had Roosevelt? Under a less resolute president, America might not have entered the war or might have entered it too late. . . .

Few men have ever left behind them so much of themselves, so many forces that live on. . . .

Roosevelt's figure in history will be one of unexampled splendor. He died at the zenith of his greatness, secure against the anticlimax of postwar confusions and negations.

—ALVIN JOHNSON, "In Memory of Roosevelt," *The Clock of History*, pp. 241-42.

Wherever men gather to honor the architects of their happiness, they will gratefully remember the work of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

—BASIL RAUCH, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, p. 496.

William Henry Chamberlin was born in Brooklyn, New York, on February 17, 1897. He was educated at the Penn Charter School and Haverford College, where he was elected to membership in Phi Beta Kappa.

Mr. Chamberlin has been a lifelong student of foreign affairs and international relations, giving special attention to Soviet Russia and the Far East. No contemporary journalist surpasses him for wide and precise knowledge of world affairs or ability to marshal his materials in lucid and effective fashion. Few equal him for courage and integrity in setting forth the facts as he understands them. He was Moscow correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor*, 1922-34, and Far Eastern correspondent for the *Monitor*, 1939-40. He has contributed important reports and articles to many of the leading newspapers and periodicals, and now writes a regular column for the *Wall Street Journal*. He has lectured on world affairs at Haverford College, Yale University, and Harvard University.

The most important books written by Mr. Chamberlin are: *Soviet Russia* (1930), *Russia's Iron Age* (1934), *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (2 vols.; 1935), *Japan Over Asia* (1939), *The European Cockpit* (1947), and *America's Second Crusade* (1950). The last of these is the ablest revisionist study of the background, causes, course, and results of the second World War. It will long remain the best survey of the subject for the general reader. Mr. Chamberlin's long and close contact with world conditions all over the civilized globe gives him special competence to assess the effects of the Roosevelt foreign policy upon the state of the world in our time.

I. LYING US INTO WAR

According to his own official statements, repeated on many occasions, and with special emphasis when the presidential election of 1940 was at stake, Franklin D. Roosevelt's policy after the outbreak of the war in Europe in 1939 was dominated by one overriding thought: how to keep the United States at peace. One of the President's first actions after the beginning of hostilities was to call Congress into special session and ask for the repeal of the embargo on the sales of arms to belligerent powers, which was part of the existing neutrality legislation. He based his appeal on the argument that this move would help to keep the United States at peace. His words on the subject were:

Let no group assume the exclusive label of the "peace bloc." We all belong to it. . . . I give you my deep and unalterable conviction, based on years of experience as a worker in the field of international peace, that by the repeal of the embargo the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today. . . . Our acts must be guided by one single, hardheaded thought—keeping America out of the war.

This statement was made after the President had opened up a secret correspondence with Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and later Prime Minister in the British government. What has been revealed of this correspondence, even in Churchill's own memoirs, inspires considerable doubt as to whether its main purpose was keeping America out of the war.

Roosevelt kept up his pose as the devoted champion of peace even after the fall of France, when Great Britain was committed to a war which, given the balance of power in manpower and in-

dustrial resources, it could not hope to win without the involvement of other great powers, such as the United States and the Soviet Union. The President's pledges of pursuing a policy designed to keep the United States at peace reached a shrill crescendo during the last days of the 1940 campaign.

Mr. Roosevelt said at Boston on October 30: "I have said this before, but I shall say it again and again and again: Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

The same thought was expressed in a speech at Brooklyn on November 1: "I am fighting to keep our people out of foreign wars. And I will keep on fighting."

The President told his audience at Rochester, New York, on November 2: "Your national government . . . is equally a government of peace—a government that intends to retain peace for the American people."

On the same day the voters of Buffalo were assured: "Your President says this country is not going to war."

And he declared at Cleveland on November 3: "The first purpose of our foreign policy is to keep our country out of war."

So much for presidential words. What about presidential actions? American involvement in war with Germany was preceded by a long series of steps, not one of which could reasonably be represented as conducive to the achievement of the President's professed ideal of keeping the United States out of foreign wars. The more important of these steps may be briefly listed as follows:

1. The exchange of American destroyers for British bases in the Caribbean and in Newfoundland in September, 1940.

This was a clear departure from the requirements of neutrality and was also a violation of some specific American laws. Indeed, a conference of top government lawyers at the time decided that the destroyer deal put this country into the war, legally and morally.

2. The enactment of the Lend-Lease Act in March, 1941.

In complete contradiction of the wording and intent of the Neutrality Act, which remained on the statute books, this made the United States an unlimited partner in the economic war against the Axis Powers all over the world.

3. The secret American-British staff talks in Washington in January-March, 1941.

Extraordinary care was taken to conceal not only the contents of these talks but the very fact that they were taking place from the knowledge of Congress. At the time when administration spokesmen were offering assurances that there were no warlike implications in the Lend-Lease Act, this staff conference used the revealing phrase, "when the United States becomes involved in war with Germany."

4. The inauguration of so-called naval patrols, the purpose of which was to report the presence of German submarines to British warships, in the Atlantic in April, 1941.

5. The dispatch of American laborers to Northern Ireland to build a naval base, obviously with the needs of an American expeditionary force in mind.

6. The occupation of Iceland by American troops in July, 1941.

This was going rather far afield for a government which professed as its main concern the keeping of the United States out of foreign wars.

7. The Atlantic Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill, August 9-12, 1941.

Besides committing America as a partner in a virtual declaration of war aims, this conference considered the presentation of an ultimatum to Japan and the occupation of the Cape Verde Islands, a Portuguese possession, by United States troops.

8. The orders to American warships to shoot at sight at German submarines, formally announced on September 11.

The beginning of actual hostilities may be dated from this time rather than from the German declaration of war, which followed Pearl Harbor.

9. The authorization for the arming of merchant ships and the sending of these ships into war zones in November, 1941.

10. The freezing of Japanese assets in the United States on July 25, 1941.

This step, which was followed by similar action on the part of Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, amounted to a commercial blockade of Japan. The warmaking potentialities of this

decision had been recognized by Roosevelt himself shortly before it was taken. Addressing a delegation and explaining why oil exports to Japan had not been stopped previously, he said:

It was very essential, from our own selfish point of view of defense, to prevent a war from starting in the South Pacific. So our foreign policy was trying to stop a war from breaking out down there. . . . Now, if we cut the oil off, they [the Japanese] probably would have gone down to the Netherlands East Indies a year ago, and we would have had war.¹

11. When the Japanese Prime Minister, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, appealed for a personal meeting with Roosevelt to discuss an amicable settlement in the Pacific, this appeal was rejected, despite the strong favorable recommendations of the American ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew.

12. Final step on the road to war in the Pacific was Secretary of State Hull's note to the Japanese government of November 26. Before sending this communication Hull had considered proposing a compromise formula which would have relaxed the blockade of Japan in return for Japanese withdrawal from southern Indochina and a limitation of Japanese forces in northern Indochina.

However, Hull dropped this idea under pressure from British and Chinese sources. He dispatched a veritable ultimatum on November 26, which demanded unconditional Japanese withdrawal from China and from Indochina and insisted that there should be "no support of any government in China other than the National Government [Chiang Kai-shek]." Hull admitted that this note took Japanese-American relations out of the realm of diplomacy and placed them in the hands of the military authorities. The negative Japanese reply to this note was delivered almost simultaneously with the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was a strange and as yet unexplained failure to prepare for this attack by giving General Short and Admiral Kimmel, commanders on the spot, a clear picture of the imminent danger. As Secretary of War Stimson explained the American policy, it was to maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot, and it may have been feared that openly pre-

cautionary and defensive moves on the part of Kimmel and Short would scare off the impending attack by the Japanese task force which was known to be on its way to some American outpost.

Here is the factual record of the presidential words and the presidential deeds. No convinced believer in American nonintervention in wars outside this hemisphere could have given the American people more specific promises than Roosevelt gave during the campaign of 1940. And it is hard to see how any President, given the constitutional limitations of the office, could have done more to precipitate the United States into war with Germany and Japan than Roosevelt accomplished during the fifteen months between the destroyer-for-bases deal and the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Former Congresswoman Clare Boothe Luce found the right expression when she charged Roosevelt with having lied us into war. Even a sympathizer with Roosevelt's policies, Professor Thomas A. Bailey, in his book, *The Man in the Street*, admits the charge of deception, but tries to justify it on the following grounds:

Franklin Roosevelt repeatedly deceived the American people during the period before Pearl Harbor. . . . He was like the physician who must tell the patient lies for the patient's own good. . . . The country was overwhelmingly noninterventionist to the very day of Pearl Harbor, and an overt attempt to lead the people into war would have resulted in certain failure and an almost certain ousting of Roosevelt in 1940, with a complete defeat of his ultimate aims.²

Professor Bailey continues his apologetics with the following argument, which leaves very little indeed of the historical American conception of a government responsible to the people and morally obligated to abide by the popular will:

A president who cannot entrust the people with the truth betrays a certain lack of faith in the basic tenets of democracy. But because the masses are notoriously shortsighted and generally cannot see danger until it is at their throats, our states-

men are forced to deceive them into an awareness of their own long-run interests. This is clearly what Roosevelt had to do, and who shall say that posterity will not thank him for it?³

Presidential pledges to "keep our country out of war," with which Roosevelt was so profuse in the summer and autumn of 1940, could reasonably be regarded as canceled by some new development in the international situation involving a real and urgent threat to the security of the United States and the Western Hemisphere.

But there was no such new development to justify Roosevelt's moves along the road to war in 1941. The British Isles were not invaded in 1940, at the height of Hitler's military success on the Continent. They were much more secure against invasion in 1941. Contrast the scare predictions of Secretary Stimson, Secretary Knox, and General Marshall, about the impending invasion of Britain in the first months of 1941, with the testimony of Winston Churchill, as set down in his memoirs: "I did not regard invasion as a serious danger in April, 1941, since proper preparations had been made against it."

Moreover, both the American and British governments knew at this time that Hitler was contemplating an early attack upon the Soviet Union. Such an attack was bound to swallow up much the greater part of Germany's military resources.

It is with this background that one must judge the sincerity and realism of Roosevelt's alarmist speech of May 27, 1941, with its assertion: "The war is approaching the brink of the western hemisphere itself. It is coming very close to home." The President spoke of the Nazi "book of world conquest" and declared there was a Nazi plan to treat the Latin American countries as they had treated the Balkans. Then Canada and the United States would be strangled.

Not a single serious bit of evidence in proof of these sensational allegations has ever been found, not even when the archives of the Nazi government were at the disposal of the victorious powers. The threat to the security of Great Britain was less serious in 1941 than it was in 1940. There is no concrete evidence of Nazi inten-

tion to invade the American hemisphere in either year, or at any predictable period.

One is left, therefore, with the inescapable conclusion that the promises to "keep America out of foreign wars" were a deliberate hoax on the American people, perpetrated for the purpose of insuring Roosevelt's re-election and thereby enabling him to proceed with his plan of gradually edging the United States into war. What aim was this involvement in global war supposed to achieve?

II. THE WAR AIMS PROCLAIMED BY ROOSEVELT

1. *Atlantic Charter and Four Freedoms.* The most detailed statement of United States war aims, the equivalent of the Fourteen Points pronounced by Woodrow Wilson during the first World War, may be found in the Atlantic Charter. This is a joint statement by Roosevelt and Churchill, issued after their meeting off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941. It was described as a "common program of purposes and principles" in the United Nations Declaration, issued in Washington on January 1, 1942. The Atlantic Charter is composed of the following eight points:

FIRST, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

SECOND, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

THIRD, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

FOURTH, they will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States,

great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

FIFTH, they desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

SIXTH, after the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

SEVENTH, such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

EIGHTH, they believe that all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

So, under the terms of the Atlantic Charter, the victors of World War II were pledged to respect the right of every people to self-determination and to observe, as between nations, the principle of economic equality of opportunity. The argument, subsequently advanced by Churchill, that the Atlantic Charter did not apply to Germany, is in contradiction to two expressions used in that document. These are the references to "all states, great or small, victor or vanquished" and to "all men in all the lands."

One can find in the Atlantic Charter the germ of the United Nations idea, "pending the establishment of a wider and perma-

ment system of general security" and also of the belief that nations could be divided into peace-loving sheep and aggressor goats.

There is also an implied gesture of compliment to President Roosevelt in the happy vision of "all men in all the lands [living] out their lives in freedom from fear and want." The President, in his inaugural address of January, 1941, after his election to a third term, had dramatically emphasized the universal realization of the Four Freedoms as essential to world peace. These were freedom of speech and religion and freedom from want and fear. This became the outstanding "glittering generality" in Roosevelt's war aims.

A fair test of the success and effectiveness of America's participation in the war would be the degree to which the postwar world has been characterized by freedom from want and freedom from fear, freedom of speech and religion, the right of peoples to choose their own forms of government and their own national allegiances, and of the advancement toward world-wide conditions of free commercial intercourse and reduction and limitation of armaments.

2. *Unconditional Surrender.* This became an official American and British war aim after Roosevelt tossed off the phrase at the Casablanca conference in January, 1943. It was apparently inspired by a confusion, in Roosevelt's mind, between two episodes in the American Civil War.

The demand for immediate and unconditional surrender was put forward by Grant at the siege of Fort Donelson. Roosevelt seems to have mixed this up with the capitulation of Lee's Confederate Army at Appomattox, where the expression, "unconditional surrender," was not used. Despite repeated pleas from specialists in psychological warfare and commanders in the field, Roosevelt refused to modify or even to clarify this demand as long as he lived.

3. *Co-operation with the Soviet Union.* To charm and appease Stalin into becoming a co-operative do-gooder on the international scene was one of Roosevelt's primary war objectives. According to William C. Bullitt, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union and to France, who was at one time a favored counsellor of Roosevelt and who enjoyed opportunities to discuss Russian policy with the President during the war, Roosevelt's Russian policy was based on four principles:

(a) To give Stalin without stint or limit everything he asked for the prosecution of the war and to refrain from asking Stalin for anything in return.

(b) To persuade Stalin to adhere to statements of general aims, like the Atlantic Charter.

(c) To let Stalin know that the influence of the White House was being used to encourage American public opinion to take a favorable view of the Soviet Union.

(d) To meet Stalin face to face and persuade him into an acceptance of Christian ways and democratic principles.

Bullitt, whose own impressions of the Soviet regime had changed very much in a negative direction as a result of his experience as ambassador, presented a memorandum outlining the reasons why such a policy would fail. Roosevelt's reaction, according to Bullitt's testimony, was as follows:

Bill, I don't dispute your facts; they are accurate. I don't dispute the logic of your reasoning. I just have a hunch that Stalin is not that kind of a man. Harry [Hopkins] says he's not, and that he doesn't want anything but security for his country. And I think that if I give him everything I possibly can and ask for nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will work with me for a world of democracy and peace.

A similar interpretation of Roosevelt's policy, written by Forrest Davis and published, with the President's knowledge and approval, in *The Saturday Evening Post* in May, 1944, contains the following statements:

The core of his [Roosevelt's] policy has been the reassurance of Stalin. That was so, as we have seen, at Teheran. It has been so throughout the difficult diplomacy since Stalin-grad. . . .

Suppose that Stalin, in spite of all concessions, should prove unappeasable. . . .

Roosevelt, gambling for stakes as enormous as any statesman ever played for, has been betting that the Soviet Union needs peace and is willing to pay for it by collaborating with the West.

This eagerness to appease the Soviet dictator, at whatever cost to the professed war aims embodied in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, is a thread to the understanding of the two main wartime conferences of the "Big Three" (Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill) at Teheran and Yalta.

Indeed, the destruction of Germany and Japan as great powers, implicit in the "unconditional surrender" slogan, and the appeasement of the Soviet dictatorship, were opposite sides of the same coin. In setting as a goal the political destruction, economic crippling and total disarmament of Germany and Japan (and, as the first phase of occupation in Germany and Japan showed, these were the fruits of unconditional surrender), the balance of power in Europe and Asia was completely upset.

Tremendous power vacuums were created on the frontiers of the Soviet Union. What this portended was pointed out toward the end of 1943 in words of singularly prophetic quality by the late Jan Christiaan Smuts, Prime Minister of South Africa and one of the most experienced and thoughtful senior statesmen of the British Empire:

Russia is the new colossus on the European continent. What the after-effects of that will be, nobody can say. We can but recognize that this is a new fact to reckon with, and we must reckon with it coldly and objectively. With the others [the reference was to Germany, France, and Italy] down and out and herself the mistress of the continent, her power will not only be great on that account, but will be still greater because the Japanese Empire will also have gone the way of all flesh. Therefore, any check or balance that might have arisen in the East will have disappeared. You will have Russia in a position which no country has ever occupied in the history of Europe.

4. *Far Eastern War Aims*. Two war aims in the Orient were spelled out in Hull's note of November 26, 1941. These were the withdrawal of Japan from China and support only for the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. Others, as set forth by the Cairo Declaration, issued by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek on December 1, 1943, were as follows:

That Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the First World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

5. *Platitudes and Beatitudes*. We here reproduce characteristic excerpts from a long statement of American war aims, covering seventeen points, issued by Secretary Hull on March 21, 1944:

In determining our foreign policy we must first see clearly what our true national interests are. . . .

Co-operation between nations in the spirit of good neighbors, founded on the principles of liberty, equality, justice, morality and law, is the most effective method of safeguarding and promoting the political, the economic, the social, and the cultural well-being of our nation and of all nations.

International co-operative action must include eventual adjustment of national armaments in such a manner that the rule of law cannot be successfully challenged and that the burden of armaments may be reduced to a minimum.

As the provisions of the four-nation declaration (of Moscow) are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the un-

happy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or to promote their interests. . . .

The pledge of the Atlantic Charter is of a system which will give every nation, large or small, a greater assurance of stable peace, greater opportunity for the realization of its aspirations to freedom, and greater facilities for material advancement. But that pledge implies an obligation for each nation to demonstrate its capacity for stable and progressive government, to fulfill scrupulously its established duties to other nations, to settle its international differences and disputes by none but peaceful methods, and to make its full contribution to the maintenance of enduring peace.

Each sovereign nation, large or small, is in law and under law the equal of every other nation.

The principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security will be the foundation stone upon which the future international organization will be created.

Each nation should be free to decide for itself the forms and details of its governmental organization—so long as it conducts its affairs in such a way as not to menace the peace and security of other nations.

All nations, large and small, which respect the rights of others are entitled to freedom from outside interference in their internal affairs.

This is, perhaps, the most conspicuous official example of the vapid, unrealistic moralizing which enveloped America's war aims in a haze of utopian crusading fervor. Hull was not alone in this tendency to phrase American foreign policy in terms of beatitudes and platitudes, uttered in complete isolation from the hard fact that a war, fought with most barbarous methods, was leading with relentless logic to one of the most unjust and unworkable peace settlements in history.

Wendell Willkie, whose subsequent declarations showed that in the 1940 campaign he faithfully imitated Roosevelt's technique of talking peace to get votes while contemplating measures which

could only lead to involvement in war, rivalled Hull in his ability to turn out meaningless platitudes. What specific recommendations can be read into the following typically vapid musings in Willkie's hastily written book, *One World*?

To win the peace three things seem to me necessary. First, we must plan for peace now on a world basis; second, the world must be free, politically and economically, for nations and men, that peace may exist in it; third, America must play an active, constructive part in freeing it and keeping its peace. . . . When I say that peace must be planned on a world basis, I mean quite literally that it must embrace the earth. Continents and oceans are plainly only parts of a whole, seen, as I have seen them, from the air. England and America are parts. Russia and China, Egypt, Syria and Turkey, Iraq and Iran are also parts and it is inescapable that there can be no peace for any part of the world unless the foundations of peace are made secure through all parts of the world.

Perhaps the most original formulation of war aims came from Vice-President Henry A. Wallace. The war, according to Wallace, was "a fight between a free world and a slave world." "The peoples," he confidently predicted, "are on the march toward even fuller freedom than the most fortunate peoples of the world have hitherto enjoyed."

"The object of this war," Wallace declared in an unequalled flight of fancy, "is to make sure that everybody in the world has the privilege of drinking a quart of milk a day." There was a secondary object: to beat Satan. To quote further from the speech which earned Wallace the reputation of a wartime inspirational prophet:

Satan is turned loose upon the world. . . . Through the leaders of the Nazi revolution Satan now is trying to lead the common man of the whole world back into slavery and darkness. . . . Satan has turned loose upon us the insane. . . . The *Götterdämmerung* has come for Odin and his crew.

. . . We shall cleanse the plague spot of Europe, which is Hitler's Germany, and with it the hellhole of Asia-Japan. No compromise with Satan is possible.

6. *The establishment, in place of the League of Nations, of a new international organization, to be called the United Nations.* The United Nations, as its Charter clearly proves, was based on the assumption that the wartime alliance of the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, and China would be permanent. Walter Lippmann expounded this theory when he wrote in the year 1944:

It is easy to say, but it is not true, that the Allies of today may be the enemies of tomorrow. . . . Our present alliance against Germany is no temporary contraption. It is an alignment of nations which, despite many disputes, much suspicion, and even short and local wars, like the Crimean, have for more than a century been natural allies.

It is not a coincidence that Britain and Russia have found themselves allied ever since the rise of German imperial aggression; that the United States and Russia, under the czars and under the Soviets, have always in vital matters been on the same side. . . .

Anyone with a reasonable knowledge of history could see the flaws in this argument. There have been a great many occasions during the last century when the nations that were the principal allies of World War II felt and acted toward each other very differently from "natural allies."

However, the belief in the permanence of a wartime alliance was the very cornerstone of the United Nations, as that organization was conceived at Dumbarton Oaks, perfected at San Francisco, and inaugurated at London. The Charter of the United Nations vested executive power in the Security Council, a body with five permanent and six rotating members. The five permanent members were the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and China.

Except on minor matters of procedure, the Security Council,

under the Charter, is empowered to act only with the affirmative votes of the five permanent members. A single veto can paralyze action under the Charter. This veto can not only block decisions of great moment, like the use of armed force against an aggressor, but it can also prevent much less important decisions, such as the admission of new members to the United Nations.

The Charter makes no effective provision for growth and change. It may be amended only with the consent of all the permanent members. When the constitution of the United Nations was framed, everything was staked on the assumption that the wartime co-operation of the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, a co-operation made possible by Roosevelt's philosophy of giving Stalin everything he wanted, would continue permanently.

7. *American National Security.* Participation in the second World War, as in the first, was advocated on the ground that American security would be vitally endangered if the Axis Powers were not crushed. There were cruder and more sophisticated versions of this argument.

A cruder version was the scare picture, often repeated in the interventionist literature of 1939-41, of a Nazi invasion and occupation of the American continent—the notorious myth of “Hitler's timetable” to invade Iowa via Dakar and Brazil. Americans were supposed to shiver at the thought of storm troopers swaggering through the streets of American cities and manhandling peaceful citizens. One interventionist poster showed American children being forced to repeat their prayers: “Adolf Hitler, hallowed be thy name.”

For those who found such suggestions merely ridiculous or, at least, extremely improbable, there was another line of psychological approach. It was argued that, even if no physical attack on the Western Hemisphere took place, the American way of life would be profoundly affected for the worse by an Axis victory. The American economy, so ran this argument, would be regimented; the atmosphere of an armed camp would become permanent; Americans would never know real peace and security.

One prominent advocate of intervention inquired, in the years before Pearl Harbor, whether America could resign itself to spend-

ing as much as three billion dollars a year on armaments. This, he calculated, would be the cost of not "stopping" Hitler. Having stopped Hitler, the military authorities are now proposing that we spend sixty billion dollars a year to stop Stalin, and their proposals have been accepted and adopted into our Federal budget.

It was widely assumed, explicitly or implicitly, that war was the road to permanent peace, that defeat of the Axis would be followed by an era of international good will and security.

So, American war aims may be briefly summarized as follows: (1) the realization of the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms; (2) the unconditional surrender of the Axis Powers and the obliteration of these powers from the scheme of world politics; (3) peaceful co-operation with the Soviet Union on a long-term basis; (4) the dismemberment of the Japanese Empire and the support of the Nationalist government of China; (5) a miscellaneous list of desirable moral ideals, including the regulation of international conduct by rules of unimpeachable morality, the procurement for every human being in the world of a quart of milk a day, and the vanquishing of Satan; (6) the establishment of the United Nations on the basis of close co-operation with the Soviet Union; (7) the assurance of American national security and the promotion of an atmosphere of international peace and good will in which Americans and other "peace-loving" peoples could go about their affairs free from the burden of excessive armaments and of want and fear.

These were the aspirations. What about the achievements, eight years after the end of hostilities? Let us consider the realization of Roosevelt's war aims, point by point.

III. HOW FAR WERE ROOSEVELT'S AIMS REALIZED?

1. *Pledges of the Atlantic Charter.* The first three clauses of the Atlantic Charter assert, in very clear, unambiguous language, the right of every people to choose the form of government under which they desire to live. These clauses repudiate, on behalf of all the signatories, territorial aggrandizement. And territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned are denounced.

Before he signed the Atlantic Charter Stalin had voluntarily renounced territorial aggrandizement in a speech which he delivered in the Soviet Union and which was widely quoted as a definition of Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet leader declared: "We shall not yield an inch of our own soil. We do not covet a foot of foreign soil."

By the end of the war, however, the Soviet Union had acquired, not a foot, but 273,947 square miles of foreign soil, inhabited by 24,355,000 people. The Soviet acquisitions were as follows:

	Area in square miles	Population
Eastern Poland	68,290	10,150,000
Finnish Karelia	16,173	470,000
Lithuania	24,058	3,029,000
Latvia	20,056	1,950,000
Estonia	18,353	1,120,000
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina	19,360	3,748,000
Moldavia	13,124	2,200,000
Petsamo	4,087	4,000
Koenigsberg area	3,500	400,000

Carpatho-Ukraine (Eastern Czechoslovakia)	4,922	800,000
South Sakhalin	14,075	415,000
Kurile Islands	3,949	4,500
Tannu Tuva	64,000	65,000

In no case was there any convincing pretense of consulting "the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned" or of respecting "the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." In most cases there is the strongest evidence that these Soviet annexations were intensely distasteful to the peoples affected.

For example, the Finns who live in Karelia were permitted to choose between remaining in their homes and going penniless into Finland. The option was almost unanimously for Finland. A very high proportion of Lithuanians, Letts, and Estonians preferred the bleak existence of the DP camps to the prospect of being repatriated to homelands which had fallen under Soviet rule.

The enthusiasm of the people in eastern Poland for Soviet annexation may be measured by the fact that about a million and a quarter of them were deported to the Soviet Union under circumstances of such barbarous cruelty that about three hundred thousand perished. All Germans who survived the occupation were driven out of the Koenigsberg area. The outrage to the principle of national self-determination involved in the annexation of eastern Poland by the Soviet Union was accompanied by an even greater outrage, the arbitrary transfer to Poland of all German territory east of the line represented by the Oder and the Neisse rivers. This meant the dispossession of at least nine million Germans of the homes which they had occupied in territory which had been solidly German for centuries.

The Soviet annexations at the expense of Poland were specifically authorized by the Yalta Conference of Roosevelt, Stalin, and Churchill in February, 1945. This same conference recognized that "Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West." In other words, it sanctioned the brutal uprooting from their homes of many millions of people and extensive

transfers of population in complete disregard of the desires of the peoples concerned. No more complete repudiation of the self-determination clause of the Atlantic Charter could be imagined.

Yet, with a rare mixture of cynicism and hypocrisy, the Yalta Declaration includes the following passage, affirming the Atlantic Charter in the very document which specifically authorizes the disregard of the principle of self-determination:

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter—the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live—the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

If the self-determination clauses of the Atlantic Charter were soon proved a fraud and a hoax by the actions and decisions of the victorious powers, the other promises of that document fared no better. Points four and five are sweeping pledges of equality of economic opportunity for all nations “great or small, victor or vanquished.”

Equality of economic opportunity would mean maximum elimination of trade barriers, freely convertible currencies, and no discrimination against the economy of any nation. But, eight years after the end of the war, bureaucratic regulation of international trade, inconvertible currencies, barter and semi-barter deals between nations are still the rule, not the exception.

And the promise of these points in the Charter was further nullified by the many discriminatory restrictions which were imposed on the postwar economic development of Germany and Japan. Under the Morgenthau Plan it was seriously proposed to turn densely populated, highly industrialized western Germany into a predominantly agricultural and pastoral country and to seal up and permanently destroy the German coal mines—an indis-

pensable source of energy not only for German, but for European industry.

The full political ferocity and economic idiocy of the Morgenthau Plan, which would have involved the death by starvation of millions of Germans, was never put into practice. But under the Potsdam Agreement of the "Big Three," concluded in August, 1945, and amplified by a subsequent "level of industry" agreement, the German economy was placed in a strait-jacket of innumerable discriminatory restrictions.

Germany was denied the right to manufacture or operate ocean-going vessels. A top limit of 5,800,000 tons, ridiculously low in view of German industrial capacity and needs, was set for the German steel industry. Output of machine tools was set at 11.4 per cent of the 1938 figure. German capacity to earn its national livelihood was impaired by these and scores of other arbitrary interferences with normal economic activity. All German property abroad was confiscated, making the revival of German foreign trade extremely difficult. For years after the war a ruthless program of dismantling German plants continued, on the ground that they might be used to rehabilitate German militarism. But many plants were dismantled which had little relation to armament, such as soap factories, optical plants, and the like. The English were especially conscienceless in their dismantling, concentrating on plants that might provide some competition with British industry. That all this was entirely inconsistent with what might be called the welfare clauses of the Atlantic Charter was clearly pointed out by the well-known British economist, Sir William Beveridge, who said, after a visit to Germany in 1946:

In a black moment of anger and confusion at Potsdam in July, 1945, we abandoned the Atlantic Charter of 1941, which had named our goals: For all nations improved living standards, economic advancement and social security, for all states, victor and vanquished, access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity. From Potsdam instead we set out on a program of lowering the standard of life in Germany, of de-

stroying industry, of depriving her of trade. The actions of the Allies for the past fifteen months in Germany make the Atlantic Charter an hypocrisy.

Clauses 6 and 7 of the Atlantic Charter were of a somewhat vague inspirational character. They called for a peace which would afford assurance "that all men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want" and that all men should "traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance." With barbed wire immigration restrictions all over the world and with feverish preparations under way for the ultimate horror of a war fought with atomic bombs, it obviously has not been that kind of a peace.

The eighth and last point of the Charter, proposing that all nations "must come to the abandonment of the use of force" is ironical to the point of travesty in 1953, when far the greatest and most expensive armaments race in history moves steadily into higher gear.

2. *The Four Freedoms.* In short, the score of the Atlantic Charter as a forecast and assurance of the shape of things to come is precisely zero. The same may be said of its companion, the Four Freedoms. One of the most unmistakable results of the second World War was an immense expansion of the power of Soviet Communism and totalitarianism.

Direct annexation added some twenty-five million new subjects to Stalin's empire. The indirect method of setting up satellite states in Eastern Europe made the lives of almost one hundred million East and Central Europeans (Poles, Rumanians, Czechs, and Hungarians, Bulgarians and Albanians, Germans and Austrians in the Soviet zones) completely dependent on the will of Moscow. Almost five hundred million Chinese are also subject to Communist, if not Russian, domination.

Communism is not conducive to freedom of speech, or freedom of religion, or to freedom from want and fear. Indeed, when one considers the wholesale uprooting of tens of millions of people from their homes, the starvation of tens of thousands and the impoverishment of tens of millions, the savage civil wars in Greece

and Korea, the retention of German and Japanese war prisoners as slave laborers long after the end of hostilities, it seems doubtful whether there was ever such widespread acute "want and fear" as one could find as a direct consequence of the war fought to eliminate these evils.

The failure to realize or effectively promote the Four Freedoms can be made more apparent if we consider each of them in order. It is obvious that there has been no advancement of freedom of speech in the Soviet Union as a result of the war. In all the vast areas and large populations taken over or dominated by the Soviet Union—the Baltic area, Poland, eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and the satellite Balkan states—there is no freedom of speech for those who oppose the Soviet regime. Though Tito may battle against the Kremlin, there is no freedom to criticize his regime in Yugoslavia. Freedom of speech was sharply curtailed for years in western Germany by the occupation forces, and it has not yet been restored to anything like the degree which existed under the Weimar Republic. In Italy, there may be rather more freedom than existed under Mussolini, but conditions remain the same in Falangist Spain. The situation remains about the same as before the war in France and Britain. Free speech is limited in the many totalitarian or quasi-totalitarian states of Latin America. And the conquest of China by the Communists has ended freedom of speech among the five hundred million Chinese. It may, therefore, be said with considerable restraint that freedom of speech has been retarded rather than promoted by the war.

The same is true of freedom of religion. There has been no relaxation of the rigor of the Soviet opposition to Christianity. In Czechoslovakia and Hungary there has been ruthless persecution of the Catholic hierarchy, and repressive measures have also been applied in satellite countries. The Communist conquest of China means that Christian missionaries in that great country are in greater jeopardy than at any time since the Boxer revolt. The same is true of other areas in southwestern Asia which are dominated by Communists. There has been an effort to suppress the national religion of Japan on the ground that it has been closely associated with Japanese militarism. Protestantism is curtailed in Falangist

Spain. Elsewhere in the world the religious situation remains much the same as before the war.

Fear of economic and physical dangers has been greatly increased by the war. In totalitarian countries, death, exile, and forced labor are ever to be feared by the whole population, save for the ruling hierarchy. As is pointed out elsewhere, economic security is threatened even in the "free countries" by increasing armament costs, higher taxes, debt, inflation, and the like. The mounting tension in the cold war threatens the peoples of the entire globe with the horrors of a third world war which may break out at any time, as well as the atrocities in the peripheral wars such as those in Korea and Indochina. The introduction of atomic warfare threatens the very existence of every civilian throughout the world and especially in the civilized nations that will bear the brunt of the third world war. The situation which atomic warfare has brought to the world may be illustrated by the following "six survival secrets" set forth recently in an official booklet, *Survival Under Atomic Attack*, issued by the National Security Resources Board:

1. Try to get shielded. If you have time, get in a basement or subway. If caught outdoors, seek shelter alongside a building or fall in any handy ditch or gutter.
2. Drop flat on the ground or floor. To avoid being tossed, flatten out at the base of a wall or bottom of a bank.
3. Bury your face in your arms. This will protect your face from flash burns, prevent temporary blindness and keep flying objects out of your eyes.
4. Do not rush outside right after bombing.
5. Stick to canned and bottled foods and beverages. Unprotected food and water may have radio-active poison.
6. Do not start rumors. In the confusion that follows bombing, a single rumor might touch off a panic that would cost you your life.

That the fear of want has been vastly increased by the war is evident everywhere and is emphasized at other places in this sec-

tion of the book. In the Soviet Union, a majority of the population live below standards of decency and comfort with respect to food, clothing, and shelter. In the forced labor camps, life is truly bestial. Millions were transported from the Baltic and other areas to die of starvation in brutal slave labor camps. Prisoners of war have starved by the thousands or have met a fate worse than death in forced labor. Many displaced persons who escaped to western Germany still live on a mere subsistence level. Millions of Germans expelled from Central and Eastern Europe starved during the process of expulsion or now live at the margin of subsistence in an overcrowded land which has lost its food-producing areas. Many Germans starved to death after the surrender, and all of them lived below a decent subsistence level for three years or more after the war. Until restrictions are lifted from western German production, it will be necessary to provide food for the Germans of that area and most of this food will have to be furnished by the United States. Few of the millions of Germans living in the cities obliterated by bombing have been able to secure decent housing. Many German prisoners lived in acute deprivation in France for a time after the war. Living conditions for the masses in France, Italy, and Spain remain harsh and depressed.

England has existed in a state of "austerity" in which consumer goods and food are as restricted as in wartime. Many believe that Britain can escape from austerity only through wholesale emigration of Englishmen to Commonwealth countries, if this is possible. The overcrowding of Japan by millions returned there from the mainland, together with the disruption of the Japanese economy by war, have made it necessary to send in vast quantities of food to preserve the existence of the Japanese. Civil war in China after the war brought increased want and famines which led to the starvation of millions, a condition which has persisted after the Communist conquest. The mass of the people in India and south-western Asia live on a mere subsistence level tempered by frequent famines.

Even in the United States a third of the population live at or below the poverty line. Half of the population dwell in substandard housing. All classes are menaced by inflation and rising living costs

—the dollar being worth only fifty-two cents today in terms of 1940 purchasing power. Inflation is a special menace to those who live on fixed incomes derived from interest on bonds, bank savings, annuities and the like. Increasing armament costs mean higher taxes and the raising of our already astronomical public debt. Nowhere in Latin America has the “good life,” as measured by freedom from want, been realized. And the threat of a third world war points up the danger of the universal destruction of property and resources beyond precedent in human experience.

3. *Unconditional Surrender.* This is the only war aim which was realized. But its effect is now generally conceded to have been devastatingly disastrous. There is abundant proof that it stiffened the German will to resist long after the war was clearly lost. It probably prolonged the war by about two years. There was, therefore, an immense increase in the bombing and other destruction which made the economic restoration of Germany, an essential part of the recovery of Europe, far more difficult and expensive for the American taxpayer. An altogether convincing indictment of the “unconditional surrender” slogan and its logical sequel, the so-called war crime trials, in which every principle of impartial justice was disregarded, is presented by an experienced British elder statesman, Lord Hankey:

It embittered the war, rendered inevitable a fight to the finish, banged the door to any possibility of either side offering terms or opening up negotiations, gave the Germans and the Japanese the courage of despair, strengthened Hitler's position as Germany's “only hope,” aided Goebbels's propaganda, and made inevitable the Normandy landing and the subsequent terribly exhausting and destructive advance through North France, Belgium, Luxemburg, Holland, and Germany. The lengthening of the war enabled Stalin to occupy the whole of eastern Europe, to ring down the iron curtain and to realize at one swoop a large instalment of his avowed aims against so-called capitalism, in which he includes social democracy. By disposing of all the more competent administrators in Germany and Japan this policy rendered

treaty-making impossible after the war and retarded recovery and reconstruction, not only in Germany and Japan, but everywhere else. It may also prove to have poisoned our future relations with ex-enemy countries. Not only the enemy countries, but nearly all countries were bled white by this policy, which has left us all, except the United States of America, impoverished and in dire straits. Unfortunately also, these policies, so contrary to the spirit of the Sermon on the Mount, did nothing to strengthen the moral position of the Allies.⁴

Under the exigencies of the cold war between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers the political implications of unconditional surrender tended increasingly to fade out of the picture. There was a growing tendency to adjust relations with Germany, Japan, and Italy, not by one-sided dictation but by the more reasonable method of discussion and negotiation.

A curious aftermath of the unconditional surrender slogan has been the large, unprecedented outlay of American funds to restore and sustain the economies of the defeated Axis Powers. Subsidies for the benefit of Germany, Japan, and Italy have now run to a figure of many billions of dollars, about twentyfold greater than the indemnity which was exacted from France after the Franco-Prussian War. Much better results might have been achieved with a much smaller expenditure of American money if the war had not been prolonged, with the vastly increased destruction, by the unconditional surrender demand and if the Germans and Japanese had not been subjected to so many hampering restrictions in managing their own economic affairs.

4. *Co-operation with the Soviet Union.* This has been perhaps the most dismal fiasco among all the objectives so confidently proclaimed by Roosevelt during the war. In the hope of appeasing Stalin and winning Soviet co-operation after the war, Roosevelt and Churchill did not hesitate to renounce the principles for which they were ostensibly fighting the war, demanding great sacrifices from the American and British people, and inflicting irreparable damage on the economy and the cultural monuments of Europe.

If there was a country that was clearly entitled to benefit from the general Atlantic Charter assurances of independence and self-determination for all nations, that country was Poland. Hitler's attack on Poland was the excuse for the British and French declarations of war. The Poles were fighting against Nazi Germany at the time when Stalin, Molotov, and Ribbentrop were exchanging friendly toasts and arranging the partition of Poland and of all Eastern Europe between their respective governments.

Yet a prominent feature of the diplomatic history of the war is the gradual abandonment by America and Great Britain, first of Poland's territorial integrity, then of Poland's independence. By the time of the Teheran Conference (November 26 to December 1, 1943), Roosevelt and Churchill had reached the point of willingness to acquiesce in Stalin's demand for the annexation of almost one half of Poland's territory, lying east of the so-called Curzon Line, inhabited by about one third of Poland's population.

By the time of the Yalta Conference (February 2-11, 1945), they were willing not only to authorize by their signatures this mutilation of Polish territory but also to throw over the government, representative of the principal Polish political parties, with which they had co-operated in London during the war. In place of this government they accepted, with a few face-saving and, as events were soon to prove, quite empty reservations, a regime that had been built up in Moscow around a nucleus of veteran Polish Communists.

The Polish Communist party represented a negligibly small minority of the Polish people. It had been dissolved before the war by the Communist International on grounds of excessive factionalism, Trotskyism, and other heresies. The very name Communist was so unpopular that, even after the Red Army had occupied Poland and installed the Communist-dominated government desired by Moscow, the Communists called themselves the Workers party.

But with the acquiescence of the Western Powers, this small and unrepresentative minority group fastened its grip firmly on Poland and furnished a model for similar regimes in other countries behind the Iron Curtain. Appeasement of the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period went to the extreme of handing

over to the Soviet authorities General Vlasov and other political refugees from Soviet rule. There were pitiful scenes of suicide and attempted suicide among DP groups threatened with repatriation to Russia against their will.

The Soviet Union was also handed the keys to the Far East at the Yalta Conference. In a fatuous attempt to buy completely unneeded Soviet participation in a war against Japan, which Stalin was certain in any case to enter in its last stages, Roosevelt offered Outer Mongolia to the Soviet dictator, the barren but strategically valuable Kurile Islands, South Sakhalin, and, most important of all, political and economic concessions which assured the Soviet Union a dominant position in Manchuria.

Manchuria, because it was intensively developed by the Japanese during their period of supremacy, and because it is rich in natural resources, is, industrially, the most valuable part of China. Roosevelt signed away China's right to full restitution of Manchuria (as promised in the Cairo Declaration) without consulting or even informing the Chinese government. It was no accident that the Chinese Communists were subsequently able to use Manchuria as a base from which to overrun the whole of continental China.

The appeasement of Stalin at the expense of weaker nations completely compromised the moral goals of the war. But it did not achieve its purpose: a friendly and co-operative Soviet Union after the war. On the contrary, Soviet-Western relations rapidly deteriorated.

It became commonplace for Soviet and Western representatives to exchange language which, in a more restrained age, would have foreshadowed war, or at least a breach of diplomatic relations. Militant Communist propaganda, aimed at overthrowing non-Communist governments, had been held in abeyance during the war, except in East European and Asian countries which the Soviet Union hoped to take over quickly. It was vigorously resumed after the end of the war. A number of Communist espionage rings, operating under Soviet orders, were revealed, the best organized being in Canada.

The conclusion of peace treaties with Germany and Japan was indefinitely stalled because repeated conferences between the

Soviet Union, the United States, and Great Britain led to no results. There was no physical frontier between the United States and the Soviet Union. But a long, hostile, political frontier developed between the two countries, stretching from Germany to Korea.

Germany, already crippled by the assignment to Poland of some sixty thousand square miles of ethnic German territory east of the Oder and Neisse rivers, was sundered by an unnatural line of partition between the Soviet and western zones of occupation. East Germany was turned into a totalitarian state along familiar Soviet lines of political dictatorship and economic collectivism. West Germany remained an area where private property was respected (apart from acts of organized and unorganized Allied pillage which occurred during the first phase of occupation policy) and where elections were as free as is possible under foreign occupation.

From time to time the cold war was heated up. A momentous departure from America's traditional foreign policy occurred in March, 1947, when President Truman announced that the United States was bolstering Greece and Turkey with arms and subsidies against Communist attack from without and from within. At that time a Communist guerrilla revolt was in progress in the northern provinces of Greece and was receiving considerable aid from the three bordering Soviet satellite countries, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania. The revolt was finally suppressed, the secession of Tito's Yugoslavia from allegiance to Moscow contributing to this end.

A still more serious crisis in American-Soviet relations occurred in the summer of 1948 when the Soviet authorities in Berlin inaugurated a rail and road blockade of the western sectors of the city. The purpose of this blockade was to force the Western Powers to quit Berlin or, as the price of remaining, to give up the formation of a West German government. The blockade was successfully counteracted by a very expensive, large-scale, airlift system of supplying food to the city. It was abandoned in the summer of 1949 and has been succeeded by minor harassments and pinpricks.

The Soviet Union concluded alliances with its East European satellite states and with China which were clearly directed against

the United States. The United States took the lead in organizing a coalition of the states of western and northern Europe under the North Atlantic Pact, which was clearly directed against the Soviet Union.

At the mid-century the United States was still paying the price of the cold war (large subsidies for economic and later for military aid to non-Communist Europe, and high defense expenditures) in billions of dollars, in high taxes, and a higher cost of living for Americans. With the attack of the Soviet satellite state of North Korea on South Korea and the American intervention, which was sanctioned by the United Nations, an additional price in many thousand human lives, intense suffering, and vast destruction was also exacted. American casualties in the Korean war up to the end of November, 1952, exceeded 127,000, among whom were about 23,000 dead and 12,000 missing. Even as of that date it was the third most costly war in American history. And a gigantic expanded armament program, calculated to strain the resources of the American economy to the utmost, was well under way.

Roosevelt, in a Christmas Eve broadcast of December 24, 1943, declared to the American people: "To use an American and ungrammatical colloquialism, I say that I got along fine with Marshal Stalin . . . I believe that we are going to get on well with him and the Russian people, very well indeed." This statement belongs in a category with the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms as a prediction of the shape of things to come that went very wide of the mark.

5. *Our Disastrous Far Eastern Policy.* It is in the Far East, where the United States became overtly involved in the war, that the bankruptcy of all the hopes and objectives which were linked with the war is most clear and indisputable. Europe, outside the Iron Curtain, is still in the American camp, although the economic and military price of nursing and rehabilitating an organism that has been greatly enfeebled by the war is very heavy and constantly increasing.

But America has been virtually shoved off the mainland of East Asia, apart from the precarious beachhead in Korea which has been held, for the time being, by a considerable outpouring of

American blood. United States prewar and war policy in the Orient was based on two assumptions: that China would become a strong, dependable, friendly power, and that Soviet designs in the Far East were pacific and amicable. Both these assumptions have been demolished by the course of events.

There is the highest authority for affirming with assurance that there would have been no war in the Pacific, no Pearl Harbor, no savage, heartbreaking struggles for Guadalcanal and Iwo Jima and Okinawa, if it had not been for the American policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek's regime to the limit in its struggle with Japan. President Roosevelt asserted at a dinner of the Foreign Policy Association in 1944: "We could have compromised with Japan and bargained for a place in a Japanese-dominated Asia by selling out the heart's blood of the Chinese people. And we rejected that!"

The late Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War in Roosevelt's cabinet and an ardent advocate of a bellicose policy both in the Pacific and in Europe, confirms this viewpoint with the statement: "If at any time the United States had been willing to concede to Japan a free hand in China there would have been no war in the Pacific."

This argument, of course, loses most of its force when we face the fact that peace could have been maintained with Japan without seriously sacrificing the interests of China. In the year before Pearl Harbor the Japanese were willing to abandon their expansionist program if they could be provided with some face-saving formula, but this the United States persistently refused to grant.

American partiality for China found expression in the attitude of favoring, in contrast to the more lukewarm attitudes of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, the acceptance of China as one of the five permanent members of the United Nations, with the right of veto. But all these American diplomatic calculations of finding in China a friendly ally were wiped out when the Chinese Communists, with direct and indirect aid from the Soviet Union, swept over China and, by the end of 1949, were in control of the whole vast country, with its population of nearly five hundred million people.

The Chinese Communists made no secret of their antagonism

to the United States. They staged "hate America" days and weeks. They subjected American diplomatic representatives to calculated insults unprecedented since the Boxer uprising. They shut off all independent reporting from China. They devised a series of harassing regulations, designed to make business in China difficult, if not impossible, and to pillage foreign firms thoroughly before they were even allowed to close down. They made travel to and from China and in China almost impossible by imposing a vexatious system of permits. They lost no opportunity to proclaim their solidarity with the Soviet Union. They kept up a flow of munitions and supplies into Korea, thereby prolonging the fighting and the cost in American lives.

In view of the vehement anti-Communist official declarations which became standard after the cold war got under way, it is supreme irony that the principal result of American involvement in war in the Far East was the establishment of a Communist regime in China, the very country it was proposed to "save." After the conquest of China by the Communists the United States became involved in a diplomatic dilemma that was both ridiculous and humiliating.

We continue to recognize formally a government, the rump Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek, which, at the same time, the State Department did everything in its power to disparage, discourage, and defame. Typical of the attitude of the State Department was the following passage in Secretary Acheson's letter of transmittal of the State Department *White Paper* on China:

The decay which our observers had detected in Chungking early in the war had fatally sapped the powers of resistance of the Kuomintang. Its leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them, its troops had lost the will to fight and its government had lost popular support. . . . The nationalist armies did not have to be defeated; they disintegrated. History has proved again and again that a regime without faith in itself and an army without morale cannot survive the test of battle.

The Chiang Kai-shek regime of postwar days was not appreciably different from the Chiang Kai-shek regime of 1940. If, therefore, Mr. Acheson's analysis is correct, what is to be the verdict on the judgment of Roosevelt, Stimson, and Hull, who pushed America into war as a champion of this corrupt, inefficient, and unpopular regime?

The absurdity of the situation is enhanced because Mr. Acheson, up to the last months of 1950, found it impossible to do diplomatic business with the Communist government which ousted the Nationalist government from control of China. In this same letter of transmittal one finds the following sentences:

The communist leaders have forsworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last fifty years, under tsars and communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East. . . . Should the communist regime lend itself to the aims of Soviet Russian imperialism and attempt to engage in aggression against China's neighbors, we and the other members of the United Nations would be confronted by a situation violative of the principles of the United Nations Charter and threatening international peace and security.

In other words, if the Chinese Communists act as their philosophy and their alignment with Russia would seemingly impel them to act, we shall be right back where we came in at Pearl Harbor, forced to go on another crusade against aggression, but with a different act of villains. Is it not a reasonable deduction from what has happened in the Far East that we would have been just as well off, and would have saved the lives and health of tens of thousands of Americans who perished or who were permanently maimed and wounded in the Pacific theater, if we had left the Japanese, the Chinese Nationalists, the Chinese Communists, and the Russians to settle their own affairs and arrive at a reasonable balance of power among themselves?

6. *Platitudes and Beatitudes.* The idea that the savage war was

being fought for high and noble purposes and would bring some kind of moral regeneration to the world has proved a ghastly fallacy. It was absurd to believe that barbarous means would lead to civilized ends.

"Liberty, equality, justice, morality and law," to quote words which the venerable Hull liked to enunciate as a statement of American policy, are not characteristic of a world in which "saturation bombing," with its indiscriminate extermination of men, women, and children, is considered a legitimate means of carrying on war, and the ultimate arbiter is the atomic bomb.

The orgies of mass rape and looting and general destruction which marked the irruption of Soviet troops into Europe (the "bringing of Asia to the Elbe," in Churchill's belatedly regretful phrase) were unparalleled in modern European history. One would search the records of previous settlements after war among European powers without finding anything remotely comparable with the Morgenthau Plan, the deliberate stunting of a nation's economic recovery prescribed by the Potsdam Declaration and the subsequent level of industry agreement, or the mockery of justice perpetrated under the so-called war crimes trials.

Hull's confident prediction that "there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power" has been conspicuously falsified by events during the eight years after the end of the war. The Soviet Union has concluded a network of treaties with its East European and Chinese satellite regimes. The North Atlantic Pact is the most ambitious alliance into which the United States has ever entered.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union are trying to win and use the defeated Germans and Japanese in their competitive alliances. If there is any clear purpose in American foreign policy it is to build up at tremendous expense a new balance of power in place of the one which was recklessly destroyed by pressing the war against Germany and Japan to the total destruction of the political and military power of these nations and thereby making the Soviet Union the leading power in the vast land mass of Eurasia.

Wendell Willkie's "One World" has gone the way of many

other wartime illusions. What Willkie and his disciples overlooked is that, while science has made possible the technical possibility of much swifter communication between various parts of the world, political barriers against normal human contacts have more than offset this development. It is doubtful whether there has been another time in modern history when so large a part of the world was so effectively closed to normal travel as today.

What about Henry Wallace's slogan: A quart of milk a day for every human being? When I was in Hamburg in 1946 the ration was a little over a pint of skimmed milk every week, not every day. Even this pitiful allotment was often not available to the Germans and people of German ethnic origin, some fourteen million in all, who were driven from their homes in the German territory east of the Oder-Neisse line, in the Sudetenland where their ancestors had lived for centuries, and in other countries of eastern and southeastern Europe.

The discrepancy between the figure of persons liable to deportation and the refugees later accounted for in Germany suggests that a very large number of deportees, perhaps as many as three million, perished either as a result of outright massacre or from cold, hunger, and disease. This vast human tragedy has been almost ignored outside of Germany. But occasionally a little corner of the veil that hides it has been lifted. The following is an extract from a cultivated German woman who was expelled from East Prussia by the Poles late in 1945.

We received notice from the Poles of our evacuation from East Prussia on October 30, 1945. On November 10, the expulsion of hundreds of people started; this number later grew to thousands. To the sound of ringing church bells, we left our homeland at seven in the morning. But even before, at 6:00, young Poles with rubber clubs were upon us, shouting: "Get out! Get out!"

Then began an unspeakable journey. We were robbed even before we left Maldeuten. They took our food, and, as I lost my coat, I had to travel four weeks in open coal cars clad only

in a thin summer jacket. At times, we rode on the roofs of coaches. It was so icy, one person fell off the train in his sleep. One stretch—from East Prussia to Stargard (Pomerania)—accounted for 65 deaths. Cars were littered with corpses. One old man lay near us and no one bothered about him; the train had no attendants. The first food we received was near Sangerhausen and Freudenstadt in Thuringia.

In Danzig, the car was stopped for three days; again, we had nothing to eat. In Stargard, a Russian transport stood across the track loaded with goods for the Soviet Union. At night, the Russians slipped across to our train to rob us of our last possessions. They had lots of time, and they did a thorough job. There was a regulation against plundering, however, and one man advised us all to shout "Help" whenever the Russians came. The next time they paid us a visit there was a deafening roar from hundreds of throats. Many Russians were frightened away, but some became angry, and began to shoot into the coaches.

After three days, we were told the Polish engineer had left and had taken the locomotive along. If anyone wanted to go further he could go on foot. At the central station, a train took us to Schuene, near Stettin, where we found a refugee camp teeming with thousands. We lay close to one another in an ice-cold wind. There was no shelter or cover of any kind. We no longer possessed anything.⁵

What these miserable expellees met when they finally reached Germany is well described in the following dispatch from the Berlin correspondent of the London *Daily Herald* in 1945:

I saw at the Stettiner Station miserable remnants of humanity, with death already shining out of their eyes—with that awful, wide-eyed stare. Four were dead already, another five or six were lying alongside them given up as hopeless by the doctor, and just being allowed to die. The rest sat or lay about, whimpering, crying, or just waiting.

Such scenes as these, which were only representative of thousands of similar cases, were the result of Roosevelt's concessions to Stalin at Yalta, confirmed at the Potsdam Conference of the summer of 1945.

Mr. Wallace's apocalyptic dream of a quart of milk per day had not come true for these victims of uprooting, who could be counted in millions, or, indeed, for any large part of the human race. And one could scarcely be sure whether Wallace's other war aim, the vanquishing of Satan, had been achieved, in view of the unprecedented inhumanity of many aspects of the postwar settlement. We simply have supplanted one Satan by another.

7. *The United Nations.* By 1950 the United Nations had become, for all practical purposes, the Divided Nations. The Security Council, under the terms of the Charter, is only empowered to act with the affirmative agreement of the five great powers in its membership, the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, China, and France. So long as this principle was observed, the capacity for action of the organization was paralyzed by the cold war. Soviet proposals were voted down regularly by the non-Communist majority in the Security Council and in the Assembly. American and other Western proposals were just as regularly vetoed by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet boycott of the Security Council and other UN agencies, designed to bring pressure for the admission of Communist China, made it possible for the Security Council to lend UN sanction to military action in Korea.

But the validity of this action was contested by regimes in control of about one third of the population of the earth. It was not United Nations action as contemplated under the Charter. The affirmative vote of the Soviet Union was lacking. And China's vote was cast by the representative of a discredited and powerless government which was no longer in effective control of any part of the Chinese mainland, of a government which had, indeed, been repeatedly rebuffed and repudiated by the American State Department.

The United Nations majority has assumed more and more the character of an anti-Communist coalition. This development may

have been inevitable. But it was not in conformity with the original design of the United Nations, based on five-power unanimity.

Not only has the United Nations become a travesty and farce as a unified system of political world government, but its meetings and operations have contributed greatly to international disunity, hostility, and bellicosity. Its meetings provide an unprecedented platform and sounding board for denunciation, vituperation, and bitter accusations. Its operations have already launched upon the world a costly, bloody, and seemingly interminable war in Korea which may wind up in a third world war.

8. *American National Security*. Does the average American have any reason to feel more secure in 1953 than in 1940? If he is a young man, the shadow of the draft hangs over his plans for education and life work. If he has savings or investments in bonds or life insurance, they are threatened by inflation. Whatever his occupation, he faces the prospect of a tremendous and ever growing load of taxation, unprecedented in time of peace and legally unlimited.

Most important of all, perhaps, he is not given much chance to feel secure, in the most elementary physical sense. Day in and day out he is warned of the perils of atomic attack. If he looks across the Pacific he sees a solidly hostile East Asia. If he looks across the Atlantic he sees as his first line of defense in Western Europe a papier-mâché coalition of powers which, when they were far stronger than they are today, went down under the first shock of attack by the German armored columns that were far inferior in numbers and armament to Stalin's armed horde.

A favorite argument of interventionists from 1939 until 1941 was that, even if the American continent was in no danger of direct attack, a Nazi Germany predominant in Europe and a Japan predominant in East Asia would be uncomfortable neighbors. This point may be conceded. But what kind of a neighbor is Stalin's Russia? "Uncomfortable" would be a weak descriptive adjective.

The concentration of totalitarian striking power in a single center, Moscow, is more disadvantageous and menacing from the standpoint of American security than the distribution of this power among several centers, in Berlin, Tokyo, Moscow, and Rome. Moreover, Communism is more dangerous than National

Socialism, Fascism, or Japanese authoritarianism because of its far more attractive and well developed international propaganda and network.

A sober and realistic survey of the international scene would indicate that, despite the complete military victory in World War II, American military security is more precarious today than it was before we entered the conflict. This is equally true whether one considers security from the military, the political, the economic, or the moral angle.

IV. THE COSTS OF THE WAR

1. *Material Costs.* The second World War was far and away the most destructive conflict ever waged by the human race. Our chief authority, C. Hartley Grattan, in his article, "What the War Cost" (*Harper's Magazine*, April, 1949) estimates the cost of the war at four trillion dollars.⁶ This astronomical figure is difficult to grasp; it would be almost incomprehensible if stated as four thousand thousand million dollars. The direct and immediate cost of four trillion dollars is staggering enough. But Secretary of the Army Gordon Gray estimated in 1950 that the ultimate cost of modern wars is about four times the direct and immediate cost. Therefore, we may estimate the ultimate cost of the second World War as some sixteen trillion dollars, granted that we escape a third world war as a result of the second.

Direct war expenditures in national budgets amounted to \$1,117,000,000. Destruction, according to Mr. Grattan's computation, was double this figure. And he adds \$650,000,000,000 as part of the indirect losses which may be set down to the account of the war. These include looted stocks of raw materials, manufactured goods and foodstuffs carried off by invaders, the value of kidnapped labor power, losses from reckless use of natural resources, rundown

equipment, diversion of facilities from civilian to military use, and liquidated investments. As Mr. Grattan says:

Of the material costs the largest by all odds came from that most appalling innovation in ruthless destruction, air bombardment—especially area raids which were indiscriminate in that no specific target was aimed at. . . . The assault on dwellings ranks as one of the great horrors of the war. . . . Terror and obliteration air raids were considered successful almost in proportion to the number of people who lost their homes; for homeless people cannot work well, and production falls almost toward zero.

About twenty out of every one hundred residences in Germany were destroyed. Two and a quarter million homes were destroyed in Japan and 460,000 in Great Britain. Every fifth Greek was left homeless and 28,000 houses in Rotterdam were obliterated. Over half of the huge total tonnage of destructive bombs fell on Germany, about one fifth on France, and one eighth on Italy. Ironically, the French suffered more from bombing by their American and British "liberators" than from the air attacks from their German invaders.

The vast property losses associated with the violent uprooting of tens of millions of war refugees, Poles, Letts, Lithuanians, Estonians, Ukrainians, even Russians fleeing from Soviet rule, Germans expelled from their homes in eastern Germany and other European countries, can hardly be computed. In contrast to movements of this kind in the past, these uprooted people, as a rule, were unable to salvage any part of their property.

One of the many indirect losses of the war was the disruption of established patterns of trade and investment. This bore especially hard on Great Britain, and on continental Europe generally. Loss of investments and normal trade contacts furnish much of the explanation for the so-called "dollar gap," the inability of the European countries to balance their commercial account with the United States without huge American subsidies under the Marshall Plan.

2. *Increased Financial Burdens in the United States.* The financial costs of the second World War to the United States were astronomical—around \$350,000,000,000. Lend-lease amounted to \$50,000,000,000. Our public debt has risen from around \$40,000,000,000 to about \$260,000,000,000. Unprecedented public spending has continued since the war. Our Federal budget before the Korean war ran around forty billion dollars a year—ten times the budget in Hoover days. It is doubling as we move closer to the hot war. Lavish grants have been made to foreign nations. A Congressional Committee on Expenditures, headed by Senator Harry F. Byrd, reported that during the period from August 1, 1945, through the fiscal year 1951, the United States appropriated some forty-five billion dollars for foreign-aid projects. This is 285 dollars for every man, woman, and child in the United States. The sum equals the complete cost of operating the United States government for six years before the second World War.

Much higher spending was, of course, in prospect as a result of armament increases and the extension of Marshall Plan aid beyond the date originally contemplated. No less than ninety billion dollars were available for armament expenditures in the year 1952. This amount was three times the total cost of the first World War to the United States. During the period from April, 1945, to January, 1953, President Truman spent approximately twice as much as had all the Presidents of the United States combined down to 1940. It is hard to see how a drastic cheapening of the dollar, with disastrous social and financial consequences, can be avoided. At the beginning of the year 1953, the dollar was worth fifty-two cents in terms of 1939 purchasing power. This means inflation, indeed, it is serious inflation.

To a far more dangerous extent than is generally realized the American economy is being propped on two stilts—tremendous arms expenditures and subsidies to foreign countries. The danger of creating strong vested interests in vast armament projects, quite apart from the immediate political necessity of this step, is obvious.

The great increase in public expenditures has inevitably resulted in taxation on a scale that would have seemed fantastic before the first World War and even impossibly high in New Deal days. But

it is now taken for granted in our country. The fact that President Truman, in a period of formal peace, has levied more taxes since 1945 than all the previous Presidents of the United States combined has set off no popular revolt. Indeed, the fact has passed almost unnoticed. Increased local government expenses have raised property taxes. The number subjected to income taxes has greatly increased, along with the taxes which must be paid. Those who are compelled to pay income taxes rose from about 4,000,000 in 1939 to 53,000,000 in 1952. In 1929 a man with a personal income of \$250,000 retained 80 per cent of his income after taxes. In 1945 he had only 17 per cent of his income after taxes. In the very highest income brackets the income tax is over 90 per cent.

Inheritance taxes are becoming confiscatory. In 1948 the estate of Mrs. Henry White was assessed at \$9,750,000 and the inheritance taxes were in excess of \$7,000,000. The inheritance taxes on the \$35,000,000 estate of William K. Vanderbilt were \$30,000,000. As expenditures and the Federal budget shoot skyward, increased taxation is unavoidable.

Excise and other hidden taxes are added to income and property taxes. Liquor taxes amount to about \$2,500,000,000 annually; tobacco taxes to \$1,125,000,000; taxes on common carrier services to some \$525,000,000; gasoline taxes to \$435,000,000; telephone and telegraph taxes to \$250,000,000; and jewelry taxes to \$235,000,000.

Supreme Court decisions have removed all normal legal limits on taxation. No tax can be regarded as illegal merely because it is too high or is a duplication of the taxation of the same income. Moreover, devices have been found to remove most objections to excessive taxation. The masses are subject to the withholding tax. After some protesting and grumbling for a few months, the residue, after the deduction of the withholding tax, comes to be regarded as the salary or wage payment received, and the taxation is all but forgotten. The objections of the rich to excessive taxation are largely nullified by raising "Red scares" and war scares and by assuring large corporate incomes through armament production or foreign relief. Hence, there is no substantial group in the country to battle against the ever-rising tide of taxation.

The enormous increase of public expenditures and the crushing

burden of taxation, which we have just described above in relation to the United States, are not limited to our own country. The condition is universal in the postwar world. In some countries, like England, the tax is even more appalling than in the United States.

Astronomical public debts, vastly greater public expenditures, and even more formidable tax burdens have been the result, almost exclusively, of the second World War. If the war had brought great benefits in the way of increased human happiness, greater freedom, assurance of peace, lessening of armaments, and the like, even the staggering financial costs, direct and indirect, might not have been too great a price to pay. But, when we find ourselves and the world further from peace and well-being than in 1939, this increasingly menacing financial picture is shocking indeed.

3. *Loss of Life.* The second World War was not only the most destructive conflict of which there is any historical record; it was also the most costly in human lives and the most inhuman in methods of warfare. Mr. Grattan estimates that about forty million human beings lost their lives during the war, and that of this enormous number only ten million were soldiers. Such a slaughter of noncombatant civilians is without any precedent, and it shows how completely the so-called rules of civilized warfare were cast aside by both sides. One thinks with envy of the infinitely more humane spirit of the eighteenth century when Gibbon could observe, in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*:

The laws and manners of modern nations protect the safety and freedom of the vanquished soldier; and the peaceful citizen has seldom reason to complain that his life or even his fortune is exposed to the rage of war.

The rest of the country and community (apart from professional soldiers) enjoys in the midst of war the tranquility of peace, and is only made sensible of the change by the aggravation or decrease of the public taxes.

There were four main causes that led to this appalling toll of noncombatant victims, which include many women and children.

First, there was the indiscriminate use of air bombing against

large city areas. As it became possible to pour down greater loads of ever more destructive explosives and incendiary bombs, these air raids were accompanied by increasingly heavy loss of life. Particularly terrible were the "suffocation bombings" of Hamburg, where fires kindled by phosphorus bombs sucked out the air and led many people to drown themselves in canals; the slaughter of several hundred thousand persons, including many refugees, in Dresden, a nonmilitary objective, in February, 1945; the tremendous fire raids on Tokyo; and the mass extermination inflicted by the needless dropping of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

It is popularly supposed that the foremost horrors of bombing in the second World War were those brought about by the atom bombing of the two Japanese cities. But far more persons were killed in the bombing of Dresden on February 13, 1945. It is estimated that the total casualties in this bombing during a single night were in excess of two hundred thousand. The following is an authentic, firsthand description of the horrors of that night:

On that evening about one million people may have lived within the walls of this town. Besides its more than 600,000 inhabitants there were some hundreds of thousands of raid victims and evacuees, as well as refugees from the Silesian districts.

Many human beings died a quick death through suffocation in a raging hurricane of fire, while conflagration spread relentlessly through narrow streets which showed no gap before this disaster. Tens of thousands who escaped, they do not know how, made their way to the wide park area outside the inner city, mainly to the great garden in the east and the area on the left bank of the Elbe.

About midnight, a second British air fleet appeared in the fiery red skies over the Elbe Valley and massacred those in the garden by attacking the crowds with high explosive bombs and guns, a massacre which perhaps the imagination of an Ilya Ehrenburg (Russian war correspondent) might have conceived.

Twelve hours later—the siren failed to work—a third attack laid a new wreath of perdition around the town, following the belt in which the bulk of the homeless people who had fled to the periphery and its surroundings was supposed to be.⁷

About three hundred people lost their lives in the bombing of the second World War for every one who perished by the same means in the first. Contrary to the war propaganda version of responsibility for this peculiarly terrible type of warfare, as indiscriminating in its selection of victims as a raid by primitive savages, it was a British decision that led to this type of slaughter and destruction. This is made clear by Mr. J. M. Spaight, Principal Secretary of the Air Ministry, who affirms:

Because we were doubtful about the psychological effect of propagandist distortion of the truth that it was we who started the strategic bombing offensive, we have shrunk from giving our great decision of May 1940, the publicity which it deserved. That, surely was a mistake. It was a splendid decision. It was as heroic, as self-sacrificing, as Russia's decision to adopt her policy of "scorched earth."⁸

What was this "great decision?" It was an attack by British bombers on railway installations in western Germany on May 11, 1940. This was a departure from previous practice, when both sides had restricted the use of airplanes to areas of military operations or to specifically military targets, such as airdromes and naval bases.

According to Mr. Spaight, the decision "to bomb Germany should she be our enemy" was taken in 1936, when the Bomber Command was organized. Among his surprisingly candid revelations, which have attracted much less attention than they deserve in this country and in Great Britain, is the statement that Hitler's first bombing of civilian targets in Britain followed three months after the British air force was bombing indiscriminately in Germany, and that "Hitler assuredly did not want the mutual bombing to go on."

It is often suggested that the tremendous American and British raids on German cities were a justified reprisal for German bombings of Warsaw and Rotterdam. Both Mr. Spaight and the well-known British military expert, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, reject this view. Captain Hart writes: "Bombing did not take place until the German troops were fighting their way into these cities and thus conformed to the old rules of siege bombardment."⁹ In an article in *Harper's Magazine*, March, 1946, Hart clearly proved that Hitler had tried to induce the British to agree to bomb only military objectives and that the British decisively rebuffed this proposal.

In the British decision to ignore the distinction between military and civilian targets may be found the seeds of the destruction of many continental cities, and also of the devastation which overtook London, Coventry, and Bristol. Winston Churchill told the House of Commons on September 21, 1943: "To achieve this [the extirpation of Nazi tyranny] there are no lengths of violence to which we will not go."

The indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets not only produced unprecedented human mortality, but it also destroyed precious historical monuments, wonderful old cathedrals, and art museums and treasures whose loss cannot be computed in terms of money. A conspicuous example was the devastation of the historic monastery of Monte Cassino after it was known that the Germans were not using it for any military purpose.

This destruction of historic monuments and art treasures exceeded anything known in previous history. The devastation wrought by such invading barbarians as the Vandals, or Attila and his Huns in the later Roman Empire, was as nothing compared to the destruction caused by bombing in the second World War. That historians have not since risen to condemn it is evidence of the moral deterioration and cowardice of our era. Even the unlettered historians of the early Middle Ages bitterly criticized the devastation wrought by the barbarians of their era and the preceding generations.

Second among the causes of the tremendous civilian mortality was the totalitarian ruthlessness in "liquidating" or exterminating

whole categories of human beings on racial or class grounds. Millions of Jews perished at the hands of Nazi extermination squads. There was a systematic liquidation, by executions, prisons, and concentration camps, of all suspected anti-Communists in countries occupied by the Red Army. The number who perished in this way also probably ran into the millions.

More than ten thousand Polish officers, taken to the Soviet Union as war prisoners in 1939, disappeared without a trace until the Germans announced the discovery of several thousand bodies of these men, with bullets in the backs of their heads, in the Katyn Forest, near Smolensk, in 1943. The Soviet government, which had hitherto claimed to know nothing about the fate of these prisoners, hastily improvised the story that the prison camps in which they had been held had been seized by the Germans. However, the circumstantial evidence is overwhelming that the Polish officers were slaughtered by the Russians. The attempt to include this item as a German "war crime" in the Nuremberg indictment ended in a fiasco. The Tribunal failed to find the Germans guilty, but cautiously refused to listen to the evidence of witnesses like the Polish General Anders and the Swiss Professor Naville, whose testimony would have been unfavorable to the Soviet version of this dark incident and would have convicted Soviet officials of war crimes.

A third cause of human butchery was the savage guerrilla war which raged in many occupied countries. This led to an endless series of "atrocities" on both sides, in which would-be innocent bystanders were often the victims of the guerrillas and of the occupation troops.

Fourth, as a cause of great loss of life, we may place the vast uprooting of people in Eastern Europe and the maltreatment of war prisoners, by both Germans and Russians, on the Eastern Front. Many war prisoners starved to death. It has been reasonably estimated that at least five million Baltic and Germanic peoples perished as a result of murder, exposure, and starvation when they were expelled from their homes during and after the war. There was a tremendous discrepancy between the number of German soldiers reported as being captured in Russia and the number who were repatriated up to the time when the Soviet government announced

that all war prisoners had been released. Perhaps a million of these prisoners perished in Russia. Of about 60,000 Italians captured in Russia, only about 12,000 ever returned to Italy.

4. *Moral Losses.* Perhaps the greatest moral loss caused by the war is the immense amount of conscious and unconscious hypocrisy which it has generated. The growth of unconscious hypocrisy is perhaps even more dangerous than the practice of the conscious moralistic deception that has always been the stock-in-trade of politicians and demagogues.

The prevalence of public hypocrisy reveals a most dangerous mood of susceptibility to totalitarianism, of conditioning for the kind of society which George Orwell depicted in his mordant and far-sighted satire, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, where the War Department is called the "Ministry of Peace," the agencies for public lying and propaganda, the "Ministry of Truth," and the torture chambers, the "Ministry of Love." Two of the principal slogans of that society, "War is Peace" and "Ignorance is Strength," are receiving an ominous amount of acceptance in the Western world today.

A good example of hypocrisy, conscious or unconscious, is the very general refusal to face up to the implications of the complete failure to apply the principles of the Atlantic Charter in the peace settlement. It is seriously suggested that it was a major achievement for Roosevelt to enunciate such noble principles as one finds in the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms. That he made no visible effort to translate these principles into practice is passed over as a matter of little or no consequence.

Another illustration of this kind of warped thinking is the argument of the late ex-Secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, and others, that Yalta was really a success for American diplomacy because Stalin signed his name to some nice-sounding promises about "free unfettered elections," "democratic institutions of their own choice," etc. This would seem to be on a par with praising the financial genius of a man who would accept at face value a large assortment of worthless checks.

International hypocrisy probably reached its highest point in the trials of thousands of Germans and Japanese for alleged war crimes. That some German and Japanese actions, and some actions

of the victorious powers as well, went far beyond the somewhat elastic conception of the rules of civilized warfare cannot be denied. There would be a case for the impartial trial of all persons charged with such actions before a neutral tribunal.

But the International Tribunal, composed of American, British, French, and Soviet judges, which sat in judgment at Nuremberg and Tokyo, and the subsequent tribunals set up by the occupying powers in their respective zones, lacked the most elementary sanctions of a court of law. The prosecutors were also both judge and jury. There was no semblance of impartiality in these trials of the vanquished by the victors. Nor was there any pretense of punishment being meted out evenhandedly for all infractions of law and humanity. Only Germans and Japanese were brought to trial.

Most of the major offenses against the Nazis—plotting and waging aggressive war, forcible seizure of alien territory, impressment for slave labor, looting and undernourishment of the population in occupied countries, and mass murder of both soldiers and civilians—could be charged just as convincingly against one or all of the victorious powers. For example, it was a matter of common knowledge at the time, and has since been proved by documentary evidence, that the Soviet invasion of Poland and the later occupation of the Baltic States were acts of premeditated aggression, concerted between Stalin and Hitler before they were put into effect. As Montgomery Belgium says:

Altogether, it is clear that the “war crimes” of “murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilians of occupied territory” is a “war crime” with which the victors may be reproached. The international military tribunal at Nuremberg pronounced sixteen of the former German leaders guilty of a “war crime” of which the victorious powers—by whom the tribunal was set up and whom the judges represented—might likewise have been pronounced guilty.

American judges and publicists who participated in the postwar trials reluctantly revealed the fact that American officials and agents, in trying to force Germans to confess or pro-

duce damaging evidence, were guilty of all manner of ruthless brutalities which matched the worst of which the Nazis were accused.¹⁰

The hypocrisy of the war-crimes trials is well illustrated by the case of the German, Admiral Erich Raeder, who was given a life sentence for plotting aggressive war, namely, helping to plan the Nazi invasion of Norway. Lord Hankey revealed some years back that the British were making identical plans at the same time. Winston Churchill admitted this to be a fact in his book, *The Gathering Storm*. Final confirmation has recently been offered by the publication of the first volume of the British *Official History of the Second World War*. This sets forth in detail the plan approved by the British War Council as early as February 6, 1940. It embraced the seizure of Narvik and the occupation by force of northern Norway and Sweden, even including the Swedish port of Lulea on the Baltic. Yet, despite the fact that the official British version admits that, on this matter, the British war leaders were as "guilty" as the Nazis', no one has raised his voice publicly in Britain or the United States to demand that Admiral Raeder be released. He continues to languish in the grim Spandau fortress prison, subjected one week out of every four to at least minor tortures and brutalities at the hands of Russian guards.

Justice Robert Jackson and others associated with the Nuremberg trial have tried to present it as a high point in the development of international law and justice. But it was actually an all-time low point in the prostitution of the forms of law to purposes of political revenge.

Aside from the affront to equity, in that the accusers were guilty of the same war crimes as the accused, the legal aspects of the postwar trials constituted an affront to the basic principles of jurisprudence and accepted legal practice. They were based on *ex post facto* law, a procedure which challenged the most sacred legal principles. Just as bad was the policy allowing the accusing nations also to provide the judges and juries. Hence, the trials were legal travesties. There were additional absurdities. Officers were punished for the deeds of soldiers, though they had no knowledge or

responsibility for their actions. The reverse of this was also true—soldiers were punished merely for obeying orders. Especially preposterous was the trial and punishment of industrialists who were merely serving their government in a period of intense national emergency. This ridiculous extension of guilt and responsibility was recently protested in the United Nations meetings. Its dire implications for the future were tardily discerned.

Even more important than the travesties with respect to law and equity was the assurance that these trials make wars far more brutal and ruthless in the future. In all wars to come the losers will be regarded as the aggressors, no matter what the facts, and will be punished accordingly. Hence, no methods of wartime destruction, however horrible, can be spared to produce victory, at whatever human and material cost. The trials will, therefore, produce exactly the reverse of the results which were represented as their main justification.¹¹

International hypocrisy is surely serious enough. But what even more directly concerns the American public is the ever-increasing growth of political hypocrisy in the control of our own public affairs. This can be fairly attributed to the disastrous impact of the second World War upon our public morality.

It is obvious that hypocrisy in politics is nothing new, but it has developed to an alarming degree since 1933. The recent trend began with Mr. Roosevelt's vigorous denunciation of excessive spending on the part of the Hoover administration and his promise of greater economy if he were elected President. There was plenty of comparable hypocrisy in many of his statements in regard to the New Deal program, but far more shocking were his statements on public policy from 1937 to Pearl Harbor, during which he "lied us into war." The hypocrisy connected with the promises made to us during the war regarding the aims of the second crusade have already been pointed out. Wendell Willkie also enthroned public hypocrisy by his confession during the Lend-Lease hearings that his earnest statements against our involvement in war during the preceding presidential campaign were only "campaign oratory." This trend toward hypocrisy as the more or less universal procedure of politicians, even in the highest branches of our government, has

grown apace since the second World War. It is forcefully disclosed by Fulton Oursler in an article on "The Twilight of Honor" in *The Reader's Digest*, July, 1950:

Today's curse upon political life is not so much what is unlawful as what is unscrupulous. At the root of our decay is a sickness of conscience. Moral obtuseness is a plague over free government. This decline in national character is a serious danger because, if we lose our standards, all our liberties may also be lost through abuses, corruption and chaos. A people can be only as strong as their resistance to breaches of public and private morality.

The American people are finding it increasingly difficult to be shocked, no matter what happens. Instead of resisting breaches of public morality, we tend more and more to condone them, and dishonesty along with them.

"That's politics," we say. As if politics need always to be a sink-hole. Without a vision, the people are perishing; they are even finding something to admire in the slickness, the tricky deceitfulness, by which the taxpayers are bilked. They smile at scoundrels in office as if they were amusing scalawags.

Moral lassitude seems constantly to deepen in a world situation of the greatest seriousness. One has only to watch the headlines to realize the Democrats and Republicans alike have led us into a twilight of honor. We shall be lucky if it is not also the doom-time of democracy.

When special excise levies, from theater tickets to babies' talcum powder, were imposed during the war, magniloquent speeches were made in which Congress was pledged to remove those expensive nuisances when the emergency was over. The emergency has long since passed, but we still pay.

Broken promises, of course, are not illegal; they are simply faithless and dishonorable. But even lip service to a code of honor now excites open derision.

Some months ago the President of the United States delivered in person his annual advice to Congress. Once during his message he mentioned the need for saving money. From

all over the Capitol chamber came the sound of laughter. Startled at the guffaws, the President looked around him with a smile. In this mockery of economy, this assumption that the President himself had tongue in cheek when he spoke of saving, there was nothing illicit. But the incident was brutally cynical; it was symptomatic and frightening.

Never before in America has official conscience fallen so low, or official impudence grown so brash; and never before has public apathy seemed more profound. Unlawful acts can be punished by the courts. But only public opinion can deal with dishonor.

The Government of the United States was formed on the concept that honor was a holy thing. In the Declaration of Independence, the signers finished up their revolutionary document with the declaration: ". . . we pledge our lives, our fortunes, and"—most important of all—"our sacred honor."

A child can grasp the simple fact that men who hold their honor as something sacred will not betray the trust of voters who put them in positions of authority. When, however, we elect men whose honor weighs only lightly on their conscience, and when their dishonorable behavior seems of no moment to the citizens, democracy comes to a sorry pass.

Similar in implications is the following editorial by Raymond Moley in *Newsweek*, November 6, 1950, commenting on the frequency of hypocrisy in campaign methods and promises:

Little Joe Ferguson, the negative token figure used by the political arms of the unions to beat Taft, quite naively said when I asked him how he stood on the Brannan plan: "I am for what the farmers want." On labor he is for what labor wants. On civil rights he is for what Negroes want. On everything he is for what everyone wants.

A serious moral issue is raised by this kind of appeal. Joe Ferguson is merely aping a strategy that has become more and more characteristic of our American politics. It won for

Truman two years ago. It will win for many of his candidates this year. And if it wins for the enemies of Taft in Ohio, it will be a grim and bitter reminder of the deterioration of a once self-reliant and self-respecting people.

It is, among other things, an appeal which is completely false. We can't all have all we want. No government, especially one which is manned by Joe Fergusons, can make such promises. The tricky people who make them do not expect to make them good. They will as always cover their failure by blaming someone else.

The Truman promises of 1948 have not been realized. They stand out like the bare branches of a tree in winter. But his people who are running for re-election are saying that bad people in Congress frustrated their efforts. Send us back and we will make good next year, they say. Always next year the pie will come down from the sky. And so on, year after year.

The wind of public hypocrisy and political cynicism, sown in the Roosevelt era, has reaped the whirlwind of political corruption in the Truman administration, which far exceeds in extent and venality anything known in the days of President Harding.

5. *Inroads on Liberty and Freedom.* The first World War was supposed to make the world safe for democracy. Actually, it was the main cause of the two leading threats to the democratic way of life, the totalitarianism of Communism and Fascism. The second World War was supposed to vindicate the rights of man against the threat of extinction at the hands of the totalitarian state. Its real effects, however, have been immensely to extend the scope of the oldest and most perfected form of totalitarianism, Communism, and constantly to extend the power of the state over the individual in Western countries.

Both the Americans and Britons, for instance, have lost their freedom from military conscription in peacetime. Under a socialistic administration in Great Britain many administrative agencies can set aside the right of habeas corpus. The individual Briton has lost many rights which he could have taken for granted in prewar days: the right to build, or even, in some cases, to repair his own

house; the right to travel abroad freely (due to foreign-exchange control); and the right, or possibility, to save adequately for his old age.

The inroads upon civil liberties in the United States since 1945, and especially since 1947, have been without precedent in our history. The right of freedom from search without warrant, supposedly guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, has been destroyed by two Supreme Court decisions—in 1947 and 1950. There has been an epidemic of loyalty-oath demands. Excessive concern with security has led to extensive thought-policing. Public servants with good records have been turned out of their positions on completely unsupported anonymous evidence. Leading Federal judges with a previous stalwart liberal record have succumbed to the prevalent hysteria. The McCarran Internal Security Act was vetoed by President Truman on the ground that it made a travesty of our Bill of Rights.

Only an alarmist would anticipate the speedy development in the United States of the full-fledged brutality of Nazi or Soviet totalitarianism. But when the executive department of the government assumes unprecedented and enormous power and is far and away the greatest spending agency in the country, the political party in control of that branch possesses tremendous power in the way of maintaining itself in power without violating the formal rules of democracy.

The emergence from the war of a tremendous Eurasian-Soviet empire, committed by the philosophy of its rulers to the goal of world conquest through world revolution, was a most disastrous by-product of Roosevelt's foreign policy. This development posed real and difficult problems for American security.

Many of the methods which have been employed in the name of anti-Communism are not only futile and even absurd in themselves; they have set dangerous totalitarian precedents. There has been an epidemic of special oath requirements, of which the one at the University of California has attracted most attention. Passports for foreign travel have been withheld from prominent Americans or cancelled on the ground that the trip was "not in the national interest."

Now freedom of travel is, or should be, one of the favorable distinctions between free and totalitarian societies. If foreign travel is treated as a privilege, not a right, a precedent has been set that in the future may be used against all critics of the administration that may be in power.

The immigration provisions of the McCarran Act for "control of subversives" have led to most undesirable results. No actual Communists seem to have been inconvenienced by the act, just as no spies were detected by the so-called Espionage Act of World War I, which led to very grave infringements of civil liberties. But hundreds, if not thousands of Europeans, the great majority certainly vigorous anti-Communists, have been held up and subjected to a long inquisition at Ellis Island on the suspicion that they might at some time have belonged to Nazi or Fascist youth or student organizations, membership in which was almost compulsory. The bad will that has been aroused for the United States in potentially friendly European countries by this stupid and high-handed procedure can scarcely be overestimated.

V. THE STARK BANKRUPTCY OF ROOSEVELTIAN FOREIGN POLICY

The legacy of the second World War for America has been not peace but an ever hotter cold war. As a sequel to the destruction of the balance of power throughout the world we find ourselves committed to interventionist enterprises in the most remote marches of the world. Instead of the philosophy of regional commitments which served America well for more than a century, we are now embracing the doctrine of global collective security, which has been aptly and wittily, if ominously, described as "perpetual war for perpetual peace."

There would seem to be only one sound historical verdict for a

policy that promised peace and led to war, that promised justice and liberty and enthroned injustice and tyranny, that professed to assure friendship among nations and an atmosphere of international security and "freedom from want and fear" and brought as its consequence the chill blasts of the cold war, that set out to destroy Germany and Japan and led to the necessity, under very difficult conditions, of trying to reconstruct these countries as effective allies. This verdict is intellectual, moral, political, and economic bankruptcy, complete and irretrievable.

POSTSCRIPT

SOME NOTES FOR FUTURE HISTORIANS ON THE TRUMAN FOREIGN POLICIES

by
WILLIAM L. NEUMANN

[EDITOR'S NOTE.—The immediate results of the Roosevelt foreign policy can already be rather fully and fairly assessed, and they are competently analyzed in the preceding pages by Mr. Chamberlin. The foreign policies of President Truman, who took over the Roosevelt heritage and continued in much the same pattern, are still in the crucible. But the nature and results of some of the most important of them, along with the methods followed, can now be appraised. This is done in the following pages by Dr. Neumann, whose observations constitute an appropriate postscript to Mr. Chamberlin's trenchant chapter.]

The promises of politicians nearly always exceed their ability to perform. Similarly, their threats are usually more dire than circum-

stances warrant. But, during the past fifteen years, this technique of threat and promise has become an almost stereotyped political formula in the United States. According to the basic precept of the Machiavelli of George Orwell's world of "1984": "If one is to rule and to continue ruling, one must be able to dislocate the sense of reality." By creating a world of illusion, based on the statements of high officials, reality is obscured while the voter and legislator are moved to actions deemed desirable by the creators of the illusions.

The use of this technique in the passage of foreign policy legislation in the post World War II years offers an interesting field of study for both the observer of today and the historian of the future. The raw data which follow are presented as examples of the now popular promise-and-threat device for obscuring reality. As a reminder of the actualities of the present situation, supplementary data is offered from sources less suspect of special pleading. The contrast between the picture of Europe and its future as it is presented by official American sources and as it is revealed by other sources strikingly illustrates the confusion which has been created by politically useful illusion.

TO PASS THE BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENT (1945)

The Promise

. . . this means real peacetime employment for those who will be returning from the war and for those at home whose wartime work has ended. It also means orders and profits to our industries and fair prices to our farmers.

—FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
February 12, 1945.

The Threat

In a nutshell the Fund agreement spells the difference between a world caught again in the maelstrom of panic and economic warfare culminating in war—as in the 1930's—or a world in which the members strive for a better life through mutual trust, co-operation and assistance.

—FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT,
February 12, 1945.

They involve jobs and profits. They help determine the fate of both new and old enterprises. They govern the amount of food on the family table, the money for a new radio, schoolbooks for the children.

—HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.,
March 7, 1945.

. . . they present a very simple issue—stability and order instead of insecurity and chaos.

—HENRY MORGENTHAU, JR.,
March 7, 1945.

. . . this fund is the greatest chance that you have in the world to preserve free enterprise.

—DEAN ACHESON,
March 8, 1945.

The Bretton Woods proposals present us with a chance to avoid this disaster. . . . If we do nothing . . . we will find a disintegration of the world system into a state of economic warfare.

—DEAN ACHESON,
March 8, 1945.

THE REALITY

The threatened disasters arising from a failure to bring into being the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were premised on the possible restoration of the devices of prewar trade competition: exchange restrictions, blocked currencies, and other nationalistic economic techniques. Similarly, the promises were premised on the efficacy of the Bretton Woods agreements in removing the impediments to international trade and solving the problems of balance of payments. Yet, after six years of operation, the economic situation of the world appears as follows:

. . . there has been little secure or sustained progress toward the [International Monetary] Fund objectives of unimpeded multilateral trade and the general convertibility of currencies.

During the last seven years, balance of payments difficulties have been continuous or recurrent, and most countries have either been unable to make substantial progress toward freer international trade, or have had to reverse from time to time some of the steps taken in that direction.

* * *

It is a melancholy fact that seven years after the end of the war the fund has to report that international payments are still far from having attained a state of balance and that exchange difficulties and exchange restrictions are again, over large parts of the trading world, the order of the day.

—INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, *Annual Report*, 1952

Alongside this official statement must be placed the reaction of the European nations meeting in the European Consultative Assembly in September of 1952:

The Assembly adopted by a show of hands a report of its Economic Affairs Committee which expressed grave doubt that the Bretton Woods agreement "any longer can be applied." . . . Delegates said it now seemed unlikely that the world would see multilateral trade and free convertibility of currencies "in our lifetimes" and therefore some alternative arrangement should be adopted.

—NEW YORK TIMES, September 25, 1952

TO PASS THE BRITISH LOAN (1946)

The Promise

. . . it will have a decisive influence on the international trade of the whole world . . . it will keep open a market for those surpluses of the United States which are customarily

The Threat

. . . failure to approve the loan will result in continued limitation of business between this country and those countries who are forced to sell for blocked sterling.

exported to the United Kingdom.

—HARRY S. TRUMAN,
January 30, 1946.

There is no doubt that our export of commodities like cotton and tobacco would suffer.

—HENRY A. WALLACE,
March 12, 1946.

. . . this agreement is in the interest of this country, of Great Britain and of the entire world. It is not charity. . . . The loan will make possible expanded world trade and thus is to our interest.

—HENRY A. WALLACE,
March 12, 1946.

. . . failure to approve the loan will reduce our exports below the prewar level with far-reaching consequences for our economy as a whole, and in particular for those fields of production like cotton and tobacco where large numbers of people gain their employment by producing for export.

—HENRY A. WALLACE,
May 27, 1946.

I regard it as essential to the whole future of the free world, the world that engaged freely in international trade.

—DEAN ACHESON,
March 13, 1946.

. . . new apple orchards established in Australia and Canada, the British taste in tobacco shifted to Empire types, Brazil's cotton fields extended over some of her vast territories, the Empire cotton growths improved and expanded.

—DEAN ACHESON,
March 13, 1946.

THE REALITY

Great Britain received an American loan of \$3,750,000,000 in 1946. A year later, Britain's economy was unable to carry the finan-

cial burden of the maintenance of troops and economic aid in Greece, and the United States assumed that responsibility. Another year later, 1948, and new appeals were made for American financial aid. Thus the Marshall Plan program began. Almost half of the contributions made under that program went to Britain. And yet, in the fall of 1952, the English economic situation was in the most precarious position since the war:

The British government is planning to make what is described as an entirely new approach to the United States. . . . such measures as . . . large American investment, government and private, in underdeveloped areas of the British Commonwealth. . . . Monetary help, possibly from the International Monetary Fund or possibly directly from the American and Canadian governments.

—WASHINGTON (D.C.) POST, August 25, 1952

TO PASS THE GREEK-TURKISH AID PROGRAM (1947)

The Promise

This [World War II] is an investment in world freedom and world peace. . . . The assistance that I am recommending . . . should safeguard this investment and make sure that it was not in vain.

—HARRY S. TRUMAN,
March 12, 1947.

The Threat

The foreign policy and national security of this country are involved . . . assistance is imperative if Greece is to survive as a free nation. . . . Turkey now needs our support . . . for the maintenance of its national integrity. . . . Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.

—HARRY S. TRUMAN,
March 12, 1947.

. . . the United States, in undertaking aid to Greece and Turkey, is not assuming

. . . the economic stakes are enormous. If these countries and other countries should

British obligations or underwriting British policy there or elsewhere. We propose, rather, a program designed by this government to promote stability in Greece, Turkey, and the Middle East generally, and thereby to pave the way for peaceful and democratic development.

—DEAN ACHESON,
March 24, 1947.

adopt closed economies, you can just imagine the effect that it would have on our foreign trade, and I think that [effect] should not be lost sight of in considering this matter.

—WILLIAM L. CLAYTON,
March 25, 1947.

THE REALITY

The Truman spokesmen gave the impression that the problem of Greece was one of temporary relief to avoid any suspicions that the United States was taking on a permanent public charge. Actually, the United States, through the Export-Import Bank, had already loaned Greece \$25,000,000 in January, 1946, without any substantial results for the Greek economy. At the end of a year of aid, and the expenditure of over \$150,000,000, Greece was still unable to secure a loan from the International Bank. To keep Greece relatively solvent the United States, to date, has been forced to send more than an additional billion dollars of aid. Greece in 1952 was still unable to operate without assistance from America.

Another major argument for Greek aid was the problem of Communist guerrillas. In March of 1947, before American money began to reach Greece, the State Department estimated the number of guerrillas at 13,000. But by March of 1948, after almost a year of American aid, the guerrillas were officially reported at 26,000. The decrease in guerrilla activity came, finally, not from American aid, but as a result of the Titoist break between Moscow and Yugoslavia. This break meant the closing of the Yugoslav and Albanian borders to Communist volunteers and supplies. The control of the Communist problem in Greece was a product of Yugoslav action

rather than of the Truman program. Politically, Greece still remains a highly unstable country.

TO PASS THE MARSHALL PLAN (1948)

The Promise

Our decision will determine in large part the future of the people of that continent [Europe]. It will also determine in large part whether the free nations of the world can look forward with hope to a peaceful and prosperous future as independent states or whether they must live in poverty and in fear of selfish totalitarian aggression.

—HARRY S. TRUMAN,
December 19, 1947.

It will require sacrifices today in order that we may enjoy security and peace tomorrow . . . the establishment of enduring peace and the maintenance of true freedom for the individual . . . I ask that the European recovery program be judged in these terms and on this basis. . . . The program is not one of a series of piecemeal relief measures.

—GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
January 8, 1948.

The Threat

Considered in terms of our own economy, European recovery is essential . . . no economy, not even one so strong as our own, can remain healthy and prosperous in a world of poverty and want.

—HARRY S. TRUMAN,
December 19, 1947.

Left to their own [European] resources there will be, I believe, no escape from economic distress so intense, social discontents so violent, political confusion so widespread, and hopes of the future so shattered that the historic base of western civilization . . . will take on a new form in the image of the tyranny we fought to destroy in Germany.

. . . Our national security will be seriously threatened.

We shall in effect live in an armed camp, regulated and controlled.

—GEORGE C. MARSHALL,
January 8, 1948.

. . . a recovery program for Europe of the size and nature proposed by the President will serve the cause of peace.

. . . I feel that this is an opportunity for the first time in history to get real economic co-operation in Europe through peaceful means.

. . . this program is one of the most far-reaching undertakings for peace and for human progress ever undertaken by this or any other country.

—W. AVERELL HARRIMAN,
January 12, 1948.

. . . we must face the reality that dire consequences are almost certain if we fail to move decisively at this critical juncture in world affairs.

. . . The decline of Europe would require far-reaching readjustments of agricultural and industrial production and distribution in this country and in other areas. It might well affect our ability to obtain needed imports and, particularly, essential raw materials.

—W. AVERELL HARRIMAN,
January 12, 1948.

After a year of operation, the Marshall Plan again came before Congress for new appropriations. New promises were not only made for the future but the achievements of the program were presented in heartening terms:

Events have proved that the hopes reposed in this program, both here and abroad, have not been misplaced. . . . There has been no advance in totalitarianism on the continent of Europe . . . the free community of Europe has not only held its own, but it has, during this period, made great strides forward. . . . There have been definite advances made in Europe in the field of collective security. . . . The results of the first year of its operation definitely establish

that the measure was sound. There have . . . been significant steps toward the eventual development of a closer political union.

—DEAN ACHESON,
February 8, 1949.

. . . we are winning this struggle for freedom and peace. In my opinion, the pressures in Europe are beginning to reverse. They had been strongly from the east to the west. With economic recovery gaining momentum, with new hope and growing confidence in the hearts of men in western Europe, pressures are beginning to move from west to east.

—W. AVERELL HARRIMAN,
February 8, 1949.

THE REALITY

Four years after the inception of the Marshall Plan, some estimate can be made of its success in solving the economic problems of Europe. It was not intended, as General Marshall pointed out in 1948, to be one of a series of piecemeal relief measures. The serious limitations of the Marshall Plan's accomplishments are pointed out by the able economists of the Economic Commission for Europe:

The first quarter of 1952 was in all too many countries a fairly close replica of its predecessor. Industrial employment and production as a whole stagnated or fell, even after allowance for the normal seasonal drop, in all the big western European industrial countries except France. . . .

* * *

Exports marked time and these countries—the United Kingdom and France—which were already in balance-of-payments difficulties continued to experience an alarming drain on their reserves of foreign exchange.

* * *

In transactions with the United States, western Europe as a whole lost gold and dollars to the tune of \$800 million in the second half of 1951 and the drain continued unabated during the first quarter of 1952.

* * *

The first quarter of 1952, like its two predecessors, was a period of stagnation in nearly all branches of retail trade and of actual depression in some. In spite of attempts by traders to work up a mood of optimism in the press, there seems to have been little improvement since.

—ECONOMIC BULLETIN FOR EUROPE, IV (August, 1952), 1.

The history of our times abounds in further examples of this relatively novel technique of our government in its foreign policy. The North Atlantic Pact, the Military Assistance Program, the renewal of Selective Service, and the Mutual Security Program were all presented to the public and to Congress with a wealth of promises and threats. Amidst this whirl of words the future historian of the Truman administration must pursue his search for reality, slashing through the illusions of our time.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER VIII

1. Forrest Davis and Ernest K. Lindley, *How War Came* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942), p. 258.
2. Thomas A. Bailey, *The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), p. 13.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Maurice P. A. Hankey, *Politics, Trials and Errors* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1950), pp. 126-27.
5. Roger N. Baldwin (and others), *The Land of the Dead* (New York: Committee Against Mass Expulsion, 1946), pp. 23-24. See also Juergen Thorwald, *Flight in the Winter*, London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd., 1953.

6. Now confirmed by an official government estimate.
7. *Peace Action* (March, 1945), pp. 2-3.
8. J. M. Spaight, *Bombing Vindicated* (London: Geoffrey Bles, Ltd., 1944), p. 74.
9. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Revolution in Warfare* (London: Faber & Faber, Ltd., 1946), p. 72.
10. Montgomery Beligion, *Victor's Justice* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1949), p. 61.
11. For a devastating exposure of the moral sham, legal fantasies, and disastrous results of these war-crime trials, see F. J. P. Veale, *Advance to Barbarism* (London: Thompson and Smith, 1948). A greatly expanded American edition of this book has been published (1953) by the C. C. Nelson Publishing Company of Appleton, Wisconsin.

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9

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF NATIONAL INTEREST AT THE MID-CENTURY

by

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By following the policy we have adhered to since the days of Washington we have prospered beyond precedent; we have done more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect; we have shown to other nations the way to greatness and happiness. . . .

But if we should involve ourselves in the web of European politics, in a war which could effect nothing, . . . where, then, would be the last hope of the friends of freedom throughout the world? Far better it is . . . that, adhering to our wise pacific system, and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our own lamp burning brightly on this western shore, as a light to all nations, than to hazard its utter extinction amidst the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe.

—HENRY CLAY, 1852

We went into the fight [the Korean war] to save the Republic of Korea, a free country established by the United Nations. . . .

Meanwhile, we must continue to strengthen the forces of freedom throughout the world. . . .

That means military aid, especially to those places like Indo-China which might be hardest hit by some new Communist attack. . . .

In Europe we must go on helping our friends and allies to build up their military forces. . . .

—HARRY S. TRUMAN, address to Congress, 1952

George Andrew Lundberg was born in Fairdale, North Dakota, October 3, 1895. He received his A.B. degree at the University of North Dakota in 1920, his M.A. at the University of Wisconsin in 1922, and his Ph.D. degree at the University of Minnesota in 1925. He was also a Fellow in Sociology at Columbia University and he studied at the University of London. He has taught sociology at the University of Washington, the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Minnesota, Columbia University, and at Bennington College. Since 1945 he has been head of the Sociology Department at the University of Washington. He has filled a number of governmental posts, including research supervisor, F.E.R.A., and consultant of the National Resources Planning Board. He was president of the American Sociological Society in 1943 and he has also served as president of the Sociological Research Association and of the Conference on Methods in Science and Philosophy. He was in France with the American Expeditionary Force during the first World War. In 1952 he served as Research Consultant to the Air Force in Japan with the rank of colonel. He received the Distinguished Achievement Medal from the University of Minnesota in 1951.

Professor Lundberg's chief books are: *Social Research* (1929); *Leisure: A Suburban Study* (1934); *Foundations of Sociology* (1939); *Can Science Save Us?* (1947). He is nationally recognized as a leading protagonist of rigorous scientific method in social science.

He has been one of the few sociologists who has, from the first, recognized the paramount importance of foreign policy for both social science and public welfare. He has applied to this subject the same unflinching scientific method that he has so ably utilized in the study of domestic social problems. He has not fled for succor or cover to our "Ministry of Truth." His insight, candor, and courage in dealing with the bearing of foreign policy on sociology and social science are reflected in his presidential address before the American Sociological Society on "Sociologists and the Peace" (*American Sociological Review*, February, 1944), which thoroughly aroused the traditionalists in the society; his article on "Scientists in Wartime" in the *Scientific Monthly*, February, 1944; Chapter VI in his book, *Can Science Save Us?*; his article on "Semantics in International Relations" in *American Perspective*, June, 1948; and his article on "Conflicting Concepts of National Interest" in *American Perspective*, Fall, 1950. No man living is better equipped than Professor Lundberg to examine and assess contemporary American foreign policy in terms of social and political science.

I. THE MEANING OF NATIONAL INTEREST

The only realistic way of defining national interest from the standpoint of policy is in terms of (1) the values cherished by the people of a nation, or by their *de facto* spokesmen, in relation to (2) the costs, and (3) the resources available. If these values are security, liberty, equality, and fraternity, as defined by the people in question, the national interest is served by whatever policies conduce to these ends. If these values are expansion, domination, conquest, or the evangelization of an ideology, whether of Christianity, Communism, or Democracy, then the national interest is served by all measures that contribute to these goals.

Questions of national interest begin, therefore, with an inquiry into the values of the people of a nation (or of their *de facto* spokesmen), always in view of the sacrifices entailed in realization. In countries where the consensus of the adult population is supposed to determine national values and policies, extensive and intensive polling is one method of determining existing values and, therefore, the definition of the national interest. For countries and populations professing or practicing no democratic doctrines, the same basic information can presumably be secured with much less trouble from the dictator, the king, or the pope currently in power. With such a statement of the values before us, social scientists should be able reliably (1) to construct policies in accordance with these values, (2) to determine their feasibility in the light of available resources and the sacrifice-potential of the population, and (3) to measure the degree to which the policies adopted do or do not actually contribute to the national interest as defined.

Informally, and perhaps to some degree unconsciously, the above is approximately the natural process by which national interests and national policies are, in fact, determined. The imperfections of in-

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formal and unconscious methods in large societies, however, become very great because of the breakdown of the kind of intimate communication and communion which operates in primary groups. Hence, formal methods of determining the existing consensus have appeared, such as elections and polling. The cultural compulsion to invoke the plebiscite, at least in form, appears to be very great throughout the Western world. The plebiscite is solemnly maintained even in times and places where everyone recognizes its completely farcical nature. In fact, elections and mass voting seem to take their place among the vast superstructure of folkways, customs, and ceremonials which survive long after the population has forgotten the original purpose of the ritual.

Up to the present time the direct empirical investigation of the values of men in different cultures has somehow seemed beyond the proper province of scientific inquiry. It has been felt that this is a subject rather for religious and philosophical speculation, intuition, or for the judgment of politicians and "writers."¹ Even social scientists have generally been under this misapprehension. The development of the technique of public opinion polling within the last fifteen years, however, now definitely has made possible the reliable determination of values of all kinds among different groups.

Foreign policy is usually conducted by a few persons. The wise or unwise decisions of these few, from the standpoint of their own definition of national interest, is actually what is operative in concrete situations. This state of affairs makes all the more important, from the democratic point of view, the application of new methods of more reliably determining the wider basis of national values and conceptions of national interest in the underlying population. In addition to the desirability of correctly gauging national interest according to the values of the people in one's own country, it is necessary for the administrators of national policy to have a keen appreciation of how these values and policies appear to the minds of the governing classes and masses of other countries. In the future this basic information can be determined much more reliably through the application of the technique of public-opinion polling.

The extent to which there exists in a nation any single goal or goals that are held in common to a high degree is itself a question

of fact. To the extent that the goals and ideals actually cherished by groups within a nation are different, the definition of national interest will be correspondingly obscure. Inquiry into this subject is likely to reveal that, while there is high agreement about the ends, there is sharp disagreement about means. Accordingly, the first task in the determination of policy is to determine how the values of different economic or religious classes, regions, or other classifications of men, agree or differ (1) with respect to goals and (2) with respect to permissible or desirable means of pursuing the desired ends.

This essay is not concerned with the question of whether national interest is a desirable or defensible goal of policy. There are those who, like certain adolescent "world citizens," have loftily dismissed nationalism as a primitive and parochial ethnocentrism and have started for themselves to live, perhaps a bit prematurely, but with some attempt at consistency, in realms transcending national self-consciousness. They would, presumably, argue that national interest and world interest are identical or, in any event, that the national interest must be subordinate to world interest. In this connection would doubtless arise, also, the question as to whether national interest should not be liquidated in a general pool from which all humanity should share equally. We confine ourselves here to a very much less romantic but more practical problem, namely: What is the relation of certain specific policies now under discussion to the national interest of the United States.²

II. CONTINENTALISM VERSUS THE NEW INTERNATIONALISM

If we accept the proposition that a desirable definition of national interest should be based on a consensus of the values of the population as a whole, then a very much more adequate and relia-

ble inquiry into the nature of these values than has hitherto been undertaken would be necessary. In the absence of such data, however, it is possible to discuss the subject in frankly hypothetical and approximate terms. That is, we may accept certain current statements of the national interest and follow through with a consideration of whether and to what degree actual policies now pursued serve the proclaimed end. This essay will consider and evaluate from this point of view the two principal conceptions of the national interest which are at present before the country.

The policy of continentalism affirmed a concentration of interest on the continental domain and the development in this area of a civilization in many respects peculiar to itself and to the potentials of its own heritage. Concretely, the policy meant nonintervention in the controversies and wars of Europe and Asia and resistance to the intrusion of European or Asiatic power systems and imperial ambitions into the Western Hemisphere. At the same time the policy reserved complete freedom of action as to the concrete acts which the national interest might dictate. Washington urged, for example, all necessary preparation so that the United States could "choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." It should be obvious that this policy, both in its origin and in its subsequent affirmation and implementation in instruments like the Monroe Doctrine, was in no sense "isolationism," as those opposed to the policy have ignorantly or fraudulently attempted to maintain.³ It was a positive program permitting the making of whatever temporary arrangement with other governments seemed desirable, for choosing war or peace as the national interest seemed to dictate without any permanent commitment to one or another European combination, either under the guise of "world government" or otherwise. The policy did, in fact, contemplate and encourage active commerce and trade with other nations and there was no hesitation to apply force anywhere in the world when the national interest seemed to justify it as, for example, in the case of the Barbary pirates. For a hundred years or more this policy was reaffirmed and applied with remarkable consistency and with the overwhelming support of the people.

The phrase "isolationism" implies a policy of nonintercourse of

any kind with other countries, a situation which probably cannot exist under modern conditions and which, in any event, has not existed in the Western world for centuries. A highly developed system of diplomatic, trade, and other relations has, of course, existed ever since the appearance of national states. No one, perhaps, is opposed to such relations, although there may be some question about particular proposals. Very few people are opposed to more adequate world organization for the same reason that very few are opposed to good weather, health, peace, prosperity, or happiness. Extremely proper and crucial questions may, however, be asked about types and methods of organization. To designate all who question a particular proposal as "isolationist" is merely using the word as an epithet. This use of the word enables its user to digress from the issues and eloquently to attack a position which nobody holds.

The isolationist-internationalist issue can, therefore, be regarded only as a device which has distracted attention from sober consideration of the real issues and problems of international organization. Some of these have to do with fundamental questions of physical and cultural regions, resources and technology, and with our knowledge of organizational techniques, rather than with questions of the survival of defunct empires, the designation of good men and bad men, the superiority of "our way of life," and the whole traditional moralistic-legalistic attitude. These are not questions of internationalism versus isolationism. In short, the whole frame of reference within which current discussion of international policy is carried on is at best based on ignorance of the real issue and at worst on intellectual fraud.

The conception of national interest which departed from continentalism supported overseas expansion and the playing of a major role in world affairs. This conception took various forms, usually referred to as the policy of imperialism, "the new internationalism," or by various names given to idealistic aspirations for world government. In its original form, as expounded by Captain Alfred T. Mahan, it was frankly imperialistic and was supported only by certain business interests, a small group of intellectuals, and a well-financed, extremely articulate, and influential group of

professional "peace" agitators. Generally, the policy has been defended on the ground that it would pay rich dividends to the nations engaging in it and also because it would become the instrumentality of extending the blessings of industrial society and its culture to the "backward" peoples of the earth. As to the alleged economic profitableness of imperialism, a more adequate accounting soon revealed that, while it did pay well for certain individuals and corporations, its profitableness to the nation, after expenditures for the resulting armaments and wars were considered, was nil. By 1917 the economic argument, except for a continuing delusion about the importance of foreign trade, had been largely supplanted, at least in the propaganda, by idealistic and humanitarian appeals for Wilson's policy. Since that time this conception of national interest has been maintained chiefly in the name of world peace, notwithstanding the fact that, under it, the United States has become involved in two world wars within twenty-five years. A third war is, at this writing, in progress in the name of an international organization representing chiefly the United States and her allies.

The policy here under appraisal represents a *departure*, under the stress of international crises and war, from the traditional policy, with a vigorous return to the latter between the two wars. At no time has there been evidence of widespread public support of the new internationalism. Only under the impact of concentrated propaganda from the highest official sources regarding the alleged imminent peril, including invasion, of the nation has the necessary support been secured for the wars under cover of which the two ventures into the new internationalism has been achieved.

Wilson became president in 1916 and Roosevelt in 1940 on the most outspoken pledges of nonparticipation in European and Asiatic wars. Wilson's departure from this policy was overwhelmingly repudiated in 1920 and his internationalist program was subsequently dropped from the Democratic platforms of 1924 and 1928. Franklin D. Roosevelt himself explicitly declared, in 1932, his opposition to our joining the League of Nations. The neutrality legislation of the 1930's represented a return to our traditional foreign policy, and only as a result of the provoked attack upon Pearl Harbor was it possible again to secure a declaration of war in 1941.

Since the country has been, in reality, on a war basis ever since (the period from 1945 to date is politely called a "cold" war), it is too soon to report on the reaction to commitments again entered into during the second World War. Also, it appears that during this period we made sufficient progress toward a one-party government (much deplored when practiced in other countries) under the name of a "bipartisan" foreign policy, so that no choice on the subject of foreign policy was afforded by the major parties in the elections of 1944 and 1948. It is true that the commitments entered into have been ratified by Congress and that vigorous official participation in the so-called United Nations is underway, although at this writing small progress is evident in the solution of the principal international impasse that has existed since the war.

As for the world government idea, the fact seems to be that there is negligible public support for the organized movement, despite tremendous publicity and agitation. While the public-opinion polls show a variety of results regarding more or less romantic questions about international relations in general and the United Nations in particular, the crucial issue is whether and to what extent people would be willing to relinquish national sovereignty in the interest of international organization. On this point there appears to be always less than a majority and usually from 17 to 20 per cent who favor the idea when the question is put to them in realistic terms.⁴ A poll in 1949 in Norway, and one in the state of Washington,⁵ showed 13.2 per cent and 12.1 per cent, respectively, returning affirmative answers to the question, "Would you favor a world government even if it meant giving up our national independence?" The fact that a country in Norway's position still values her national sovereignty so highly is a pretty good indication of the slender amount of sentiment for world government at present, except that the Norwegian figure represents perhaps the maximum. Among the active propagators of the new internationalism, the largest of the various world-government organizations has a membership of only about 40,000, and the total membership in all such organizations is perhaps considerably under 100,000. In view of this slight foundation of actual support, it is not surprising that international organizations find themselves in difficulty when-

ever they confront serious crises. Incidentally, Woodrow Wilson himself conceded before his death in 1924 that, in view of the lack of public support in the United States for the League of Nations, it was better that the United States abstained from entering into that commitment,⁶ although he had previously contended that our failure to join the League was due to a few "evil" senators.

Even among those who accept the notion of world government with a concomitant loss of national sovereignty, it could perhaps be shown that no considerable number of Americans are contemplating anything but an American world organization. To nearly all Americans who favor the program world organization means *American* ideals, *American* democracy, and *American* ideology benevolently foisted on the rest of the world. Unfortunately, this raises the practical question of how appealing this system is to people of other nations. In the absence of comprehensive international public-opinion polls, we may cite the estimates by French and British students who have recently reported on the subject. One of them says, "For the most important and most dynamic masses all over the world, the American ideology is either repugnant or devoid of meaning. Consequently, American power is not on the side of people's hopes."⁷ Another says, "The American way of life, as a model and as propaganda, is meaningless to the European, with his denser population and more acute problems."⁸ These are the estimates of competent and responsible French and British spokesmen. Is it necessary to ask what the attitude of Asiatic peoples is?

III. SECURITY AND PROSPERITY

Each of the policies outlined above is supported by its respective followers as the most effective means toward the national interest. Scientific inquiry would doubtless show numerous factors in a

nation's conception of its interest. For the sake of brevity we shall here consider only the two objectives which are most commonly advanced as goals of national policy, namely, (1) security and (2) prosperity.

The term security is perhaps the most general and inclusive of the goals usually mentioned as a primary objective of national policy. Security, to any person, usually means the absence of a felt threat of deprivation of any of the conditions which he highly values. It follows that the notion of security probably includes "freedom"⁹ and most of the other values frequently specified as goals of national policy. Accordingly, it also often happens that he who has most to lose is oppressed with the greatest feeling of insecurity. For this and other reasons it is possible that American leaders, and through them the people of the United States, have developed definitely paranoid¹⁰ attitudes with respect to security as measured by objective standards and by the standards of other peoples.

While attitude on foreign policy is determined largely by leaders who are supposed to be in a position to judge these matters, an unwarranted tendency to hysteria on the part of the masses is evident. A nation in which millions of people can be frightened by a radio broadcast into accepting as authentic a wholly fanciful news broadcast about an invasion from Mars, betrays a state of nerves that must be considered pathological. Especially is this true if one considers that it was not principally the illiterate part of the population who were the chief victims of the panic, but rather definitely middle-class people with considerable "education."¹¹ Or, consider the ease with which vast numbers of Americans have accepted the notion that we have, on two separate occasions in the last thirty-five years, been in imminent danger from invasion by Germany and by Japan. No logistics have ever shown that such events were within a range of probability requiring concern. Subsequent investigations have shown that such operations have, in fact, never been contemplated by the countries in question. Yet it is perhaps correct to say that a considerable public in the United States lives in more or less constant fear of such eventualities.

It is true that, when pressed, the propagators of this fear admit

that they have in mind rather a future development after our present enemies have consolidated extensive intermediate conquests. This is always on the assumption that enemy nations are motivated by insatiable desires for world conquest as an end in itself, instead of as a means to their own security. Even if such programs of conquest could be shown to have existed as enemy projects for the more or less remote future, they surely would undergo modification in the process of attainment. In any event, the only nation that has ever come into power of such proportions as actually to constitute a possible world conqueror is the United States and, even in its case, there is no reasonable probability that it could make good such a conquest. As for the alleged plans of Germany and Japan, and more recently of Russia, to conquer the world, even if such plans could be shown to have existed or to exist, there is every reason to believe that the same forces that have made nations like the United States and Britain greatly interested in promoting world peace would be likely also to overtake other nations. That is, when a nation has completed its own conquests and would be very happy if it could be guaranteed their permanent retention, it usually becomes greatly interested in promoting programs of world government to maintain the *status quo*, to prevent "aggression," and to establish permanent peace.

The impasse which an unreasonable or paranoid definition of national security may produce is illustrated currently in the case of the United States. According to current policy, our national security demands military bases around the world and elaborate military establishments off the shores or on the frontier of other nations. Perhaps no one will question the purely military advantage of such a program. However, its implications must be considered from the viewpoint of other nations. It is solemnly affirmed that these provisions are for defense only, and any person, party, or foreign nation that fails to take our word for this intent is roundly abused and is accused of aggressive designs upon us. Now I am personally satisfied that no considerable element in the population, and probably few important leaders in the United States, are consciously intent on aggression or the conquest of other nations. It is impossible to see, however, why foreign nations should take this

view of the matter and accept our word as an adequate assurance of our intent. The failure of some foreign nations to take our word at its face value in this respect is regarded with pained surprise. The feeling seems to be that our pacific intentions are self-evident or that, in any event, our past record and present reputation should be sufficient guarantee of the purely defensive nature of our policies.

Unfortunately, the historical record and the reputation support precisely the contrary thesis—a fact that may be regrettable but which must, nevertheless, be conceded by anyone not hopelessly in the toils of ethnocentric delusions. Professor Sibley recently summarized in briefest outline the record of the United States with respect to war and conquest, as follows:

It is difficult to know just what the United Nations Charter means when it speaks of its constituent members as “peace-loving”; but if it means by the term a relative absence of war in the history and traditions of the nations involved, it is not speaking of the United States. First the long and costly American Revolution; then the undeclared war with France; then the war against Tripoli; the fatuous War of 1812; miscellaneous and costly Indian wars between 1800 and 1860, many of them arising because of treaties broken by the United States; the frankly imperialist war against Mexico; the long and bloody Civil War; an extensive series of wars against so-called “uncivilized” Indian tribes beginning shortly after the conclusion of the Civil War; the Spanish-American War; the cruel and costly suppression of the Filipino insurrection; undeclared wars in the Caribbean area during the administration of the “anti-imperialist” Woodrow Wilson; the First World War; undeclared war against Nicaragua during the twenties; and finally the enormously costly Second World War. That is the record—one year in four, conservatively estimated, a war year.¹²

For the same period of national existence there are perhaps few, if any, countries, except Great Britain, that could equal the record.

At the very least, foreign nations cannot help but note that twice within the last thirty-five years the United States has invaded both Europe and Asia with military expeditions that could not, except by the wildest stretch of the imagination, be termed defensive. The invasion of Russia in 1919 is not even known to many Americans. It is these objective facts, not our pious and perhaps sincere pretensions regarding them, that must weigh in the opinion of foreign countries.

Nor does it help to contend that, in recent years, we have not kept, and do not intend permanently to retain, any of the territory conquered. The regimes we have protected, established, or bolstered in the invaded areas are, from the standpoint of our enemies, merely so many Quisling regimes openly supported financially and with military supplies for the purpose of strengthening our military, economic, and political position for whatever program we see fit to adopt. Possibly the point can best be summarized by asking what would be the attitude of the United States if Germany should have declared, in 1917 or in 1940, and Russia today should insist, that they need to occupy Cuba and make extensive military installations in Mexico purely as a defensive measure against the most powerful and dangerous military power the world has ever known?

At this point, in attempting to determine whether United States' policy in the two world wars and after has been in the national interest, it will be useful to consider the probable consequences of alternative policies. It is significant that doubts regarding American intervention in the two world wars tend to grow as time permits increasing perspective for the appraisal of its effects. The unwisdom of our participation in World War I and the relative tolerableness of the probable consequences of our nonparticipation are now considered everywhere as at least debatable, with a large body of expert and informed, as well as popular, opinion leaning in the direction that the whole undertaking was definitely contrary to the national interest. Even the possible domination of Europe, at least as a sphere of influence, by the Germany of 1914 is now regarded as highly tolerable compared with such developments as the Nazi regime and the second World War. As an in-

strument toward the unification of Europe, which is generally regarded as desirable, the possibility in question would seem greatly preferable to any development now in prospect. Any eventuality which would have resulted in the rationalization of the economy of Europe, avoidance of the war debts and reparations tangle, and other results which would almost certainly have softened or avoided the economic consequences of the first World War as they actually transpired, would certainly, to a great extent, have served the national interest of the United States as well as that of the world. (See Section VIII, below.)

Granting that it is not possible to specify in detail all the consequences which the traditional policy of the United States would have involved, it is nevertheless significant to note the increasing consensus with the passing of time that neither the national interest of the United States nor the interest of the world was served by our policy in 1917. With respect to World War II, the Gallup poll showed the following results in 1946 and 1947:

Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter World War II?

	1946 (April)	1947 (October)
Yes	15%	24%
No	77%	66%
No opinion	8%	10%

It will be noticed that affirmative answers increased from 15 to 24 per cent in one and one-half years. For some reason the question has not, to my knowledge, been asked since 1947.

There are those, of course, who contend that the people's view of these matters, under the influence of mass hysteria, are actually more sound, reliable, and in accordance with the facts than their appraisal of the same situation in periods between wars and in the perspective of years and decades of considered judgment when they have the relevant facts at hand. Thus it has been contended recently that it was the "revisionists'" appraisal of the first World War that was erroneous, that the war propaganda was true, and that in the future we must protect ourselves against revisionism.

Perhaps we are entering upon an era of permanent war during which the distortion of the facts, which we now regard with such horror in other lands, is about to become also our settled and permanent policy. In the meantime it is impossible to prevent "revisionism," for it is merely the report and appraisal of events as seen in the light of fuller information, perspective, and undisputed consequences.

Any discussion of alternate policies is, of course, faced with the difficulty that while the results of the policy adopted are known, the effects of those that were not adopted can only be surmised. This is a difficulty which all social appraisal must face, except within that limited domain where actual experimentation with different policies is possible. Still, in view of the results that have in fact ensued under the policy adopted in 1917 and in 1941, it is at least possible, within wide limits of probability, to appraise alternate policies. That is, it is possible to marshal logical evidence that will satisfy most men of the probability that an alternative policy would have been preferable, even conceding a wide margin of imponderables.

There can be no final determination of the legitimacy of a nation's definition of its own security. There is no absolute security and there is no certain method of appraising the degree of security that exists. This essay merely raises three questions which Americans need to ponder seriously in their quest for security: (1) What would be the situation if all nations should adopt our own view as to what their national security demands? (2) Has our security increased as a result of the last war and the policies of which it was the result? (3) Is our national security likely to be increased even under the most optimistic probable outcome of present policies?

Next to the security argument for the new internationalism, the most important consideration urged is its alleged benefits to foreign trade. Hereby hangs one of the most amazing delusions to be found in the confused annals of economic and political discussion. The advantages of trade have been appreciated throughout all historic times and need neither explanation nor defense. A simple semantic confusion regarding the meaning of the word

trade has, however, resulted in a delusion which is only the more mischievous and astonishing because of the extent of its diffusion among the very people who need to be, and might be expected to be, immune to it. Thus, millions of people, including economists and, of course, politicians and "statesmen," are unable to appreciate the crucially important difference between (1) exchanging commodities and services between nations and (2) the process by which one party sends commodities and services to the other and at the same time provides the purchaser with money with which to "pay for" the things received. As a result it is actually believed that "prosperity" is served by the second as well as by the first of these transactions. It is insisted that we must "get rid of" seven billion dollars a year of our export surplus as "insurance against depression."

It is difficult to imagine a more colossal confusion of means and ends. "Full employment" would be just as certainly guaranteed by dumping the seven billion dollars' worth of goods into the ocean. We are not here concerned with the propriety or desirability of charity or loans from which the lender expects a return (economic or political) or which, in any case, may build up the bona fide purchasing power of the recipient. We are concerned only with the infatuation with economic processes and symbols to the point where it is actually believed that the national interest is served by exporting our national resources in return for I.O.U.'s worth only the paper on which they are written.

The self-sufficiency of different nations will obviously vary according to their location, resources, technology, etc., and these conditions are the logical ones which should, and usually do, determine the extent and type of a nation's international trade commitments. The position of the United States and her satellites in the Western Hemisphere in this respect is known to be very fortunate. The problem of strategic commodities is being increasingly met by new synthetic products or by stock-piling. In any event, a nation or an area which produces a surplus of food is always, in the present world, in a strategic position to dictate the conditions of her foreign trade.

While particular business concerns may profit from the spurious

kind of "trade" mentioned above, nothing could be farther from the truth than the allegation that the nation as a whole is "dependent" on foreign markets for "full employment" and "prosperity." Our foreign trade is always less than 10 per cent of our total trade. The most we could lose would be all of it. Granting the temporary dislocations¹³ in the national economy from a sudden termination of this trade, even if every person who became unemployed or destitute were put on full relief to the extent of his customary income (because of the failure of the foreign market), still the taxpayer would be much less burdened than by providing the larger sums for the "purchase" of our surplus product by foreign nations. Commodities or services sent abroad, *when not repaid by other commodities or services*, reduce by so much the natural resources of the nation. This injury to the national interest is multiplied manifold when the commodities in question are war materials which not only contribute nothing to building up the bona fide purchasing power of the recipients but presently fall into the hands of prospective enemy nations to be used against us, as in the case of China, for example. Our present "aid" to Europe is largely of this character. It is a policy based on thinly veiled bribery on our part (for recipient nations to stay non-Communist), and blackmail on their part ("give us a billion or we will go Communist").

Incidentally, a curious dilemma suggests itself for those who are at once devoted to the "one-world" idea and equally convinced that no peaceful world is possible without *foreign* trade. Under the various "one-world" schemes there would, of course, be no *foreign* nations to trade with. To say that domestic trade will then fulfill the present necessities of foreign trade obviously will not do because it suggests that the United States, for example, might substitute trading between the states for its foreign trade which, as everyone is quick to note, is national autarchy and "isolationism," if not Fascism. Planetary autarchy would, I take it, be an even greater evil than national autarchy, for it must not be forgotten that the essential virtue of foreign trade seems to be that it must be *foreign*. Perhaps the apparent postponement of the "one world" is a blessing in disguise in that, until trade with the other planets

is developed, we might find ourselves with a perfectly good "one world" hopelessly crippled because of its lack of *foreign trade*. We shall return to this subject later.

So much for the contribution in theory and in practice of the new internationalism to security and economic prosperity. The true romantic internationalist, however, is more or less bored with these material details. After all, is not the whole program in the interest of freedom and the brotherhood of man, and what difference do other considerations make? There is no doubt but that the whole internationalist enthusiasm rests to a large extent on unbridled idealism of this sort, unchecked by realistic consideration of the program's actual effects. To this type of mind, the objectives are inherent in the program, and no one needs to be concerned too much with questions of the adaptation of the means to the end. Even the rude awakening which the course of events periodically thrusts on his notice fails greatly to shake the faith of the crusader in his obsession. The disastrous results are regarded not as the consequence of any fault of the policy, but merely as evidence that its application was "too little and too late." Whether the nation is physically capable of applying the policy in the required amount and at the appropriate time is one of these material details which seems irrelevant to the true believer.

IV. ECOLOGY AND FOREIGN POLICY

In view of what has been suggested in the preceding sections regarding the history, theory, and characteristics of the new internationalism, the reader must be left to decide whether this policy has served or is likely to serve the national interest. It may be helpful in this connection for each person to ask himself to what extent, for example, the "Four Freedoms" have been advanced as a result of the recent war for these alleged objectives. (For a

summary, see pp. 506 ff. and 597 ff.) In the long run, the masses of people will judge. Furthermore, the considerable increments that are daily being added to the debit side of the ledger would render any account as of the time of this writing largely out of date by the time this is printed.

Nor does space permit a discussion of the more fundamental reasons why the approach embodied in the new internationalism must always fail. Most briefly stated, it must fail because it ignores and violates natural laws which govern human society just as surely as the laws of physics and physiology govern their respective fields. On this main point, there is, curiously, agreement among all factions. They all justify their policies in the name of principles and laws drawn from various sources—from the Bible, from the other Great Books, from direct revelation or “hunches,” from astrology, and whatnot. The argument is over *which* principles should govern.

Unfortunately, the social sciences have not yet advanced to a point where they are prepared to take a naturalistic view of their task. They proceed, instead, from radically different premises, namely, philosophical, theological, and legalistic lore which basically seems to assume that man's traditional systems of verbalizations about society are more fundamental guides than the actual empirical events that have transpired. In short, the reason for the miscarriage of the national and international programs discussed above is their violation of all principles of human ecology and sociology, which in fact govern the lives of nations, regions, and peoples.

This is not the place to discuss in detail what these principles are. It is conceded that the stage of development of the social sciences does not permit, at present, as definitive a statement of principles as could be desired. Nevertheless, a simple illustration may indicate the *nature* and the *direction* of these principles, as well as the reason why neglect of them must result in disaster. A prominent ecologist reports the following case:

It so happened that in the Kaibab Forest in Arizona man had “altruistic regard” for the deer because he wished to do the killing of the deer himself. He therefore “saved” the deer

by eliminating the pumas. The result was that the deer increased in numbers, could not survive on the limited winter food supply, and died by the thousands. Consequently, there was a smaller population of deer than there would have been had man left the puma alone.¹⁴

Consider how one might reason about the above incident if one elected to adopt the frame of reference in which the current international situation is usually discussed. The pumas were unquestionably aggressive and immoral, and they were clearly planning for world conquest. They therefore deserved the fate visited upon them by the hunters for preying on the peace-loving deer. The hunters of Arizona were very noble in their campaign to establish freedom from fear in the deer world. It is unnecessary further to labor the illustration. It will probably be agreed that neither the interests of the hunters nor those of the deer were served by the policy adopted. It is probable, also, that had the deer been consulted and had the consequences of the hunters' campaign on their behalf been made clear, they would have preferred to put up with the pumas, although they would have been roundly denounced as "appeasers" by their would-be saviours.

It may be unfortunate, but it remains a fact, nevertheless, that there are principles of limits and balance operative in human society, based on location and distribution of resources as well as on the technological development and literacy of population, to which realistic, political, and economic programs must conform if they are to achieve their objectives. To ignore these principles, both in theory and in practice, and to launch instead on programs like the Four Freedoms "for all men everywhere in our time" represents an ignorant or fraudulent disposition to secure under false pretenses a pathetic kind of support from the unfortunate of the earth. At present we apply a legalistic-moralistic method of analysis to these problems, which, when we act upon it, demonstrably aggravates, to an appalling degree, want, oppression, cruelty, and fear.

It will promptly be asked if I am taking a fatalistic view of social events and if I am advocating the law of tooth and claw. In

answer it might be asked whether we have any more striking examples of the operation of the law of tooth and claw than those provided by the two world wars, both of them crusades carried forward in legalistic-moralistic terms, ostensibly to eliminate the law of tooth and claw. The question is what theory of human relations—local, national, and international—corresponds most nearly with the facts. Professor Emerson has said that, “When man upsets the balance of nature, it is often necessary for him to re-establish the balance,”¹⁵ and he has given illustrations of the operation of the principle in ecology. Are not the predicaments in which the United States found itself at the close of the two world wars examples of essentially this character? That is, the Young Plan, the Dawes Plan, and others were somewhat desperate and only partially successful efforts to restore a destroyed balance in a large and important ecological area, the imbalance of which, under current organization of communication and trade, also has serious repercussions on outlying areas. Indeed, the attempt on our part to establish an equilibrium continued, by various absurd means, until about 1937, by which time Germany had recovered sufficiently to seek to complete, by the traditional methods of local boundary disputes and wars, the readjustments of essentially the same imbalance that had resulted in the first World War. On both occasions we saw fit to attempt to prevent this readjustment by the traditional methods, although at the outbreak of World War II, twenty years of other methods, League of Nations and all, had failed.

In the absence of any scientific data as to what might constitute the economic and sociological balance in question, or at least in the absence of any disposition to consider such data as might exist, it was instead discovered, about 1937, that the problem was a moral rather than a scientific one. In the former framework, consisting mainly of a Messianic complex of ancient vintage, it became our duty to repeat our previous performances in World War I; this time, however, at much greater cost and with much more serious destruction of the balance which, in intervals between wars, we soberly seem to recognize as necessary and do our best to restore. The current designation of the program is called the

Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, the NATO, and the various measures to be undertaken, including the rearming of Germany in order to restore the balance of a non-Communist Europe as against a Communist Russia, which was before the war and still is, the state of affairs most favorable to our national interest. For as long as that balance existed, neither Russia nor Germany could venture far from its own frontiers in any program of expansion. That we now recognize this fact is clearly indicated by our present frantic efforts to rearm Europe. As for the objectionable regimes in both countries, we were, in 1939, in an ideal position to encourage their mutual destruction through material support without permitting either to destroy the balance by conquering the other, which was probably out of the question anyway.

Any realistic suggestion of this kind, however, causes the romantic idealists to cry out against "balance of power" as a self-evident immorality. The fact that they are at the same moment engaged in restoring precisely such a balance by every means at their disposal, including war, does not occur to this large and frequently sincere and idealistic, albeit schizoid, public. The phrase "balance of power" has become a stereotype to which they have become negatively conditioned emotionally to such a degree that they are unable to recognize that the very solutions they advocate in the direction of world organization, including the various world government schemes, are only more formally organized and controlled systems of *balanced* power, as are the various national governments existing today for that matter, especially in democracies. What the idealists should crusade against is not balance of power but *imbalance*. (See pp. 610-12, below.)

And so our foreign policy, vitiated by its own internal schizoid contradictions, continues to upset the world and to defeat that stability, balance, and peacefulness which is the desire of the overwhelming majority of people everywhere. On the one hand is a small group influenced by natural scientific, rational considerations of what is possible and what the costs and the consequences will be. On the other hand is a more vocal group deriving their programs from revealed principles of justice and right received from higher authority than man's experience. Unfortunately, these

revealed principles are not considered as subject to validation by any such miserable criteria as mere practicability, relative peace, and prosperity. On the contrary, the accepted approach leads to territorial, demographic, and ecological settlements which create new nations for purely political reasons, although these new nations admittedly cannot survive without foreign subsidy.

One of the principal obsessions which a democratic people will have to get over, if they wish to make a transition to a scientifically oriented approach in human social policy, is the notion that fact and the validity of generalization about the human social order are determined by the noisiness of minorities, majority votes, and the opinion of radio commentators, journalists, preachers, lawyers, and novelists. To be quite specific, the idea will have to be faced that perhaps the views of Charles A. Beard and John Bassett Moore on the consequences of our foreign policy are worth more than the more congenial ideas of ten thousand radio commentators with the whole galaxy of Nobel Prize winners in chemistry, physics, journalism, and literature thrown in. I mention Beard and Moore because they do not even claim to be scientists, but merely sober students of the social scene who believe that under certain conditions it is possible to predict with some accuracy the social results of given foreign policies. Among illustrations might be mentioned John Maynard Keynes' work on the *Economic Consequences of the Peace* after the first World War. Warren S. Thompson also showed in his book, *Danger Spots in World Population*, published in 1929, the probable consequences of foreign imperialist policies in the Far East as these events actually transpired in the ensuing decade. More far-reaching in its implications is, perhaps, the work of John Quincy Stewart and George K. Zipf on the distribution and equilibrium of population.¹⁶

I cite these instances in order to emphasize not only the need for scientific knowledge but the need to apply that knowledge in our approach to social problems. I am not here criticizing journalists and radio commentators for doing rather efficiently what they have been trained to do and what they are paid to do. I am rather commenting on a confusion in people's minds which causes them to look to such sources for guidance in public policy, and to be in-

fluenced by the labels which are applied to one or another program. It is of no importance whether a proposed policy is labeled isolationist or internationalist. The important thing is what will be its consequences. The isolationist-internationalist dichotomy was obviously a fraud from the beginning and everyone who continues to use it in any literal sense is a party to the fraud.¹⁷ We have not been, and we are not, confronted with any such issue. The only question that has been before us for at least one hundred years is the *kind* and *degree* of international organization and participation that will be productive of certain desired results. That is a scientific question, not a question to be settled by Gallup polls, journalists, or third-rate politicians mistaking themselves for statesmen.

In view of current differences of opinion, however, and in view of the present undeveloped state of the social sciences, it is more important that this essay should formulate certain questions rather sharply and not become involved in arguments about details. To all scientists, philosophers, formulators of public policy, and thoughtful people everywhere, I, therefore, suggest as a common starting point, these questions: (1) Is it not warranted to assume, in view of the known facts on which we agree, that there are discoverable demographic, ecological, and cultural principles to which successful social organization must, within limits, conform? (2) Are not these principles governing human relations fully as important as, for example, those known to govern the construction of bridges? (3) If so, had we not better make more adequate provision in the future for the reliable formulation and application of these principles on the ground that, without such knowledge and application, all the good will, exhortation, and international organization in the world will not avail?

In summary: We have taken the view that contemporary national problems may be regarded as the result of an inadequate degree of organic integration in the larger social units which today attempt to function as independent societies. That is to say, present societies are inadequately integrated and organized for the environment in which they have to live. One of the essentials for a society's successful functioning in the social world today is an adequate

technique of delayed response, i.e., the capacity to take into consideration aspects of the environment relatively remote in time and space. The possession of such technique is precisely the difference between what is commonly regarded as "high" and "low" forms of organic life, as well as the criterion of high and low intelligence.

The organism which has no adequate mechanism of this sort and which, therefore, does not predict and take into account the relatively remote consequences of its behavior, will behave in an inconsistent, contradictory, and disastrous manner as regards its adjustment over longer periods of time. Thus we find in this country the same administration vigorously supporting neutrality legislation to avoid becoming involved in war one year, and the next year urging the repeal of such legislation in order to participate in war. Great Britain engages in a policy of noninterference with, if not actual encouragement of, German expansion into the Ruhr and elsewhere during a period of seven years, up to and including Munich, and then suddenly declares war on behalf of Poland, an action which even sober scholars who approve of the war regard as an utterly irrational, emotional outburst.¹⁸ In the short space of three or four years we change our postwar policy almost diametrically from the Morgenthau to the Marshall Plan. We destroy productive machinery in Germany at the very time that relief plans to replace such machinery are underway, and so forth. Any of these plans might have been relatively defensible if consistently pursued. To pursue all of them simultaneously is not only frightfully costly in lives and in material wealth but such contradictory action imposes on the body politic all the strains and liabilities that afflict the schizophrenic individual.

The criticism leveled in this essay at current policy rests, then, not on any opposition to international organization as such. On the contrary, it rather recognizes that an organization of people of the earth into groupings based on natural areas and principles of ecology and sociology would almost certainly call for a drastic reorganization of the nations, regions, and empires as now combined in national alliances of various sorts, and the establishment of flexible machinery for change in these relations according to

changing conditions. Sound principles of international organization would arrive at the boundaries of different units on more fundamental grounds than is the case at present. A current news item reports the present method as follows:

“The 38th parallel was picked up by a tired meeting on a hot night in Potsdam,” said a State Department official last week. “It’s a line that makes no political, geographical, economic, or military sense. But the Russians and Americans at the meeting simply couldn’t agree on who should occupy what. Finally, a general suggested the 38th parallel. And that was that.”¹⁹

The cavalier fashion in which “statesmen” revise boundaries, abolish existing nations, and establish new ones without the slightest regard for the organic conditions relevant to the situation, provides unlimited illustrative material of the same kind. The demarcations thus arrived at thereupon become sacred boundaries, the violation of which constitutes “aggression,” an infringement on people’s “freedom.” The only sound basis for social organization of any kind is organic unity and relative self-sufficiency. In the end, a given population must in any case come to terms with the problem of living in a finite area on finite resources, whether such area embrace a region, a continent, or a planet. What is, at present, the optimum area, population, and necessary amount and variety of resources is a question for scientific determination. The answer will be determined largely by the existing state of knowledge of social and political as well as other kinds of technology. These basic considerations have never been given adequate attention under the legalistic-moralistic approach to international affairs.

They have been further obscured in recent times by the excited trumpeting of politicians, newspapermen, preachers, and “social scientists” who have made the startling discovery that the airplane and the radio have radically reduced the time for travel and communication between distant places. This fact is supposed to prove, by some *non sequitur* that has never been explored, that organic relationships and groupings of the territories and peoples of the

earth have somehow been abolished. Yet this improvement in the technique of communication, important as it is, has in no way changed the fact that the boundaries of some countries adjoin each other as they always have. Some countries and areas constitute physical, cultural, economic, and religious units, the organic unity of which has been in no way modified by the increasing speed of travel. "Writers" are fascinated with the thought that New York is now no further, in time, from London than London was formerly from Paris. The implication seems to be that this change in the speed of travel has somehow abolished all pre-existing principles having to do with the importance of *relative* distances. The basic fact remains that the *ratios* of comparative time-distances between places remains exactly as they were, regardless of any increase in speed of travel.

The policy of continentalism recognized to a relatively high degree the basic principles of ecology in human affairs. The new internationalism violates these principles in the most flagrant manner by abolishing and creating new nations and political areas in the name of morality and justice, and with complete disregard for the presence or absence of natural organic foundations for such organization. Such political monstrosities can, of course, survive only as long as they are supported by outside military might and natural resources, chiefly of the United States of America. On the one hand we pretend to promote unity and larger administrative units; on the other hand we increase the fragments. By making the claims of any cultural group which happens to possess sufficient political bargaining power into so-called independent nations, we create the impression that they are, in fact, independent, whereas actually they are like so many patients in oxygen tents.

Another matter which is usually overlooked in the creation of world states on paper is the fact that, in the growth and development of social organization, certain natural processes and principles are involved just as they are in the growth of any individual organism. This suggestion has been seized upon by one anthropologist as representing a lapse into a naïve theory of evolution long since exploded. He refers to the theory that societies evolved from the hunting and fishing stage, through the pastoral and agricultural, to

the industrial stage. Having made the startling discovery that, for example, a society inhabiting an area where there are no fish or animals to hunt, needs not pass through the hunting and fishing stage, it is thereupon assumed, apparently, that there are no principles governing the evolution of social and political organization. What needs to be shown, in order to refute theories of orderly growth and development in human society, is that nations sometimes spring into being without a prior development of clans, tribes, kinship groups, and families. In the same way, present-day internationalists seem to be under the impression that there is no reason why a world state cannot be established without regard for the prior development of its constituent parts. In short, the theory seems to be that, if we only project all the problems of human relations which we are unable to solve in a city, a state, or a nation upon a world stage, they will somehow solve themselves, or at least will be easier to solve.

The current definition of the issue, therefore, in terms of internationalism versus isolation is a thoroughly erroneous and mischievous categorization designed to obscure the real problem and to prevent our coming to grips with it. It is not at all a question of nationalism versus internationalism but purely a question of the type and extent of international organization and the definition of the units to be organized. Clichés about the interdependence of nations overlook this fact. The Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization are also forms of international organizations. Doctrinaire internationalism, on the other hand, is based on the assumption of a divinely ordained or philosophically deduced end to which the whole creation is destined to move. There is a fondness for the unwarranted projection of "trends" which points out that since the size of political units has been growing for many centuries, therefore they must continue to grow to include at least the whole planet. By the same reasoning, trees should reach the clouds, men should become giants, and elephants should become mountainous in size. Biologists find, on the contrary, that these matters are governed by principles of optimum limits and *balance*.²⁰ Similar principles govern the life of human groups.

While much work remains to be done toward the more perfect understanding of these principles, we at present ignore even the considerable knowledge on the subject that exists. Instead, we hold fondly to a theological-legalistic deduction that the ultimate destiny of mankind calls for the simple extension of the Federal system of the United States, including its Bill of Rights, business organization, and an unlimited number of irrelevant folkways to the whole world, preferably at once. The net result of the policy thus far, as John Bassett Moore once remarked, has been to insure that every boundary dispute will result in a world war.

V. PRESSURES INFLUENCING POLICY

If, as has been contended above, the foreign policy of the United States, pursued since 1917, has been contrary to the national interest, it is pertinent to inquire why this policy is still in force. We have already considered the economic arguments for that policy which have to do chiefly with the alleged necessity of foreign trade. The argument for the necessity of foreign trade and the influence of business groups were reviewed in detail by Charles A. Beard in 1934.²¹ His facts and his analysis of this subject have never been successfully challenged and further elaboration is therefore unnecessary. The influence of naval officers and politicians has also been reviewed at some length by Dr. Beard.²² These groups were, in turn, apparently influenced by what they considered the success of a similar policy in Great Britain.

In considering other reasons for our pursuit of the present foreign policy, it must be remembered that foreign policy is notably the responsibility of a comparatively small number of people and that their background and outlook largely determine policy. In the first place these people are humanly subject to simple errors of judgment resulting in many cases from sheer idealism unchecked by

adequate knowledge of the underlying sociological processes of which politico-legal aspects are merely a superficial expression. Our political leadership and our foreign policy have always been dominated by legalistic rather than scientific viewpoints. Ethnocentric idealism, unfortunately, has been exploited frequently by seasoned diplomats and politicians at the expense of the idealist. More frequently the diplomats are themselves in the grip of chauvinism.

American public opinion on such matters appears to be especially romantic. While we have seen fit to restrain advertisers, stock salesmen, and patent medicine venders from making extravagant claims for their goods, we take a tolerant attitude toward almost any formulation of large-scale social remedies, provided they present themselves in the guise of idealism. Yet, unbridled social idealism, unbalanced by realistic criteria as to the possibilities and costs, is a social liability and, in effect, a serious type of fraud on the body politic. Quick and comprehensive programs for the abolition of fear, hunger, and the attainment of freedom of speech and freedom of worship "for all men everywhere in our time," is clearly of this order. Contemporary programs of this kind appear to have had, if not their origin, at least their principal support in the United States. Under the aura of this type of idealism it is easy to lose sight of the national interest.

The most articulate influence supporting the new internationalism in the name of idealism has been a small but extremely influential group of prominent citizens constituting the so-called "peace movement." The late Charles A. Beard characterized this movement as follows:

With the opening of the twentieth century came the great flowering of projects for a peaceful world order. A second conference at The Hague in 1907, again on a call from the Tsar, though even more disappointing in results than the first, again put the idea of world peace into newspapers everywhere. Aided by powerful recruits, once neglected groups of "impractical dreamers" found themselves swept up into high places. Added force was given to the movement in 1910 when Andrew Carnegie donated \$10,000,000 to establish an

institution for the promotion of international peace. With the endowment were associated some of the most impressive names in American public life: for example, Elihu Root, George W. Perkins, Joseph H. Choate, Cleveland H. Dodge, John Sharp Williams, Nicholas Murray Butler, and Andrew D. White.

Sinews of war were now available for the war against war, and high sanction was given to propaganda for the pacific settlement of international disputes. Great conferences were held annually; local societies sprang up all over the country; college presidents, clergymen, professors, teachers, club women, and community leaders by the hundreds were drawn into the sweep of the agitation. Voluntary workers were now supplemented by paid workers. The meagre treasuries of the old societies were enriched by subventions, as Mr. Carnegie's magnificent gesture encouraged other men of wealth to make substantial donations. Wide publicity was sought and won. A meeting presided over by Elihu Root was bound to receive a large spread in the press. An address by Nicholas Murray Butler could command columns in the metropolitan papers. A rub-a-dub agitation once carried on in holes-in-walls became a national sensation which the most scornful politicians, even Theodore Roosevelt, could scarcely ignore.²³

At the present time this influential factor in our foreign policy is represented chiefly by the various world government organizations mentioned above (pp. 561 ff.). They have not been noticeably deterred in their agitation by the brilliant analysis of their program by N. A. Pelcovitz²⁴ or even by the warning of Warren Austin,²⁵ who, after pointing out the impossibilities in the proposals of the world government advocates, makes the following statement: "The defeatist attitude of the world government advocates toward the United Nations can be as obstructive as the defeatism of the isolationists." The so-called isolationists will, I trust, be duly thankful for being thus suddenly elevated by the distinguished Mr. Austin to the company of the aristocracy of the new internationalism.

As has been pointed out above, the influence of these groups in

support of the present foreign policy is out of all proportion to their numbers (see p. 563). Their skillful manipulation of the symbols of international idealism has operated to confuse a very large public which is thoroughly and justifiably frightened at the prospect of another war, and who have been misled to believe that the program agitated by the world-government organizations represents a way of avoiding the disaster. This is a perfect example of what unbridled idealism, unchecked by facts and possibilities, can produce in the way of frustration, disappointment, and misfortune. It is interesting, also, that Ambassador Austin, who presumably will not be accused of being either isolationist or opposed to world peace, should be the one to point out to the world-government advocates that their program is incompatible with the facts as they exist. In short, the fact that a proposed program is *intended* to achieve certain ends is not sufficient to justify the adoption of that program. If a policy aimed to achieve world peace and the national interest can be shown to be impossible in operation, it must be repudiated on that count alone, even if it could be shown that in theory and under other conditions it might achieve the millennium. There is no argument about the desirability of world peace or of an organization to achieve that end. The argument is about practical organization in the present world and the fact that the policy in question has so far achieved precisely the opposite of its avowed end.

Finally, among the influences that have been responsible for the conspicuous departure from our traditional foreign policy since 1917, a prominent place must be accorded to the brilliant statesmanship and diplomacy of Great Britain. This is no new discovery and certainly not a startling one in circles at all informed. The influence brought to bear, and the machinations of W. H. Page to get us into the first World War, are well known. The greater part of that story, with reference to the second World War, is denied us as yet through the withholding of certain official documents. In the meantime, a few straws in the wind are indicative of the richness of the full story which awaits some future historian.

As has been mentioned above, the foreign policy of a country, even under democratic government, is likely to be determined

largely by a comparatively small group of men. An analysis of the personal backgrounds, education, and general outlook of the personnel of the State Department during the past fifty years would, from this point of view, be extremely illuminating. Such an analysis of personnel during the Roosevelt administration would be especially revealing. Even Franklin D. Roosevelt, who will hardly be accused of being an Anglophobe, was apparently irritated occasionally by the fact that his subordinates were already so imbued by the spirit of the "one world" that they forgot for whom they were supposed to be working.

Elliot Roosevelt reports as follows on the second Cairo conference:

"You know," Father was saying, "any number of times the men in the State Department have tried to conceal messages to me, delay them, hold them up somehow, just because some of those career diplomats aren't in accord with what they know I think. They should be working for Winston. As a matter of fact, a lot of the time, they are. Stop to think of 'em: any number of 'em are convinced that the way for America to conduct its foreign policy is to find out what the British are doing and then copy that. It isn't a question of whether they're Democrats or Republicans. . . ." "I was told," Father said, "six years ago, to clean out that State Department. It's like the British Foreign Office. They have a man there, his title is Permanent Under-Secretary. He's Permanent Under-Secretary if the Government is Tory, or if it's Labor, or if it's Liberal. Makes no difference. There he is: Permanent. That's our State Department."²⁶

It must be emphasized that this is not a report from the *Chicago Tribune*. It is Franklin D. Roosevelt speaking, as reported by his son. It is regrettable that Mr. Roosevelt's perspicacity on this subject did not extend to the recognition of the fact that, at the very time he was speaking, his State Department was harboring Russian spies, and that he had one of them with him in the capacity of a trusted adviser. Also, he did nothing to remedy the situation of

which he complained. His negotiations with Churchill, the Lend-Lease program, the base-destroyer deal, conveying military supplies, etc., were of a character that might well confuse his subordinates as to whom they—and their chief—were working for. Nor is the confusion confined to our State Department, according to the following news item: "In London, the Colonial Office launched a 'know the Empire' campaign, explained that 3% of Britons believe that the United States is still a British colony."²⁷

In view of the events of the last thirty years, the error is understandable. The fact that the figure is only 3 per cent is further evidence of British genius for fine technical and academic distinctions in matters political. The per cent of the population in the United States who are under the same impression must be much larger. It was quite common before and during the second World War for high government officials to declare that our national existence was dependent on the survival of Britain in its traditional position—an amazing claim in view of the actual facts. A continuance of this delusion, also, in view of the impending fate of the British Empire, could have highly disastrous consequences to our national interest. For it appears that our present foreign policy contemplates nothing less than underwriting the bankrupt and tottering remains of that empire.

Professor Beard's attempt to trace the origin of the Lend-Lease policy constitutes another revealing detail. Congress itself was unable to unravel this mystery until Henry Morgenthau finally published, in *Collier's* (October 18, 1947), an extract from a letter from Churchill to Roosevelt dated December 7, 1940, which contained the original proposal.²⁸ Under the circumstances it is not surprising if quite a few citizens, both in the British Empire and in the United States, are in doubt as to the boundaries of the empire.

In the meantime, the Oxford Union Debating Society passes a resolution lamenting "United States domination of the democratic world."²⁹ The report continues: "The members cheered and stamped when philosopher C. E. M. Joad said that 'Britain is tied to the wheels of the American chariot—a chariot leading to Hell.'" The indignant professor's appraisal of the situation is, perhaps,

correct, chiefly as regards the destination of the chariot. He is a bit confused as to the position of his country in the picture. A realistic examination of the facts would reveal, I think, that far from being tied to the chariot's wheel, Britain is comfortably on board with both feet and, while not actually holding the reins, at least advises the driver with such compelling skill as to determine the main course. That course is designed primarily to keep the remnants of a defunct empire alive by artificial respiration. Whatever else may be said for the project, the national interest of the United States is definitely not the main consequence. In short, if we accept the learned professor's figure of speech, I should suggest that those who are allegedly tied to the chariot wheels are, paradoxically, very definitely taking the ostensible drivers of the chariot for a ride.

The natives of southeast Asia, it appears, also do not agree with Professor Joad's view, as seen from the cloisters of Oxford. The following exchange between War Minister Bo Ne Win of Burma and a British "observer" is revealing:

"We don't want a mechanized army," said Bo Ne Win. "What Burma needs is plenty of soldiers with a gun and a handful of rice, who can walk anywhere."

"That's all very well for tracking down *dacoits* (bandits) and to keep internal order," said the Briton. "But how would that kind of army stand up to invasion?"

"You mean from China?" said Bo Ne Win without prompting. "We couldn't hold out long against the Chinese Communists. But if they invaded, you British would be right back to fight for us."

"Not so fast," said the Briton. "We aren't prepared to come."

"Well then," said Bo Ne Win, "you're still clever enough to make the Americans come."³⁰

That the faith of the Burmese in Britain's ability to enlist our services on behalf of the British Empire is not without foundation is indicated by the following description of a recent British diplo-

matic *démarche* in Washington. Again, it should be noted that the account is not from the *Chicago Tribune* but from a long and laudatory article in *Time*, which is not, I believe, suspected of Anglophobia:

This is how he [the Ambassador] goes about it. Not long ago in his paneled office at the British Embassy on Washington's broad Massachusetts Avenue, Sir Oliver scanned the top-priority, top-secret cable. Hurriedly typed on the familiar "Incoming" pink sheet, it had just been rushed to his desk from the code machines in the cipher room above. It was an urgent call from the London Foreign Office to speed a new Anglo-U.S. attack on Britain's desperate dollar shortage.

Sir Oliver summoned his key aides: his Minister, his Treasury expert, his second- and third-level liaison officers with ECA and all U.S. fiscal agencies concerned. In less than 60 minutes, the task force had mapped its program: the Ambassador had phoned Dean Acheson's office for the earliest possible appointment, each aide had scheduled his meeting with his opposite U.S. number and knew precisely what he was going to tell him.

Early next morning, the Embassy swung into action with the gusto and "blanket coverage" of a tabloid covering the hottest gangland killing. Through the Embassy gates streamed the line of official cars, led by the Ambassador's gleaming Rolls-Royce, each carrying a British diplomat to charge a key citadel of U.S. officialdom. By noontime, every U.S. official from Acheson down who had any concern with the problem had been fully briefed. U.S. decisions could be taken before dinnertime. A third-level State Department official reflected admiringly: "When I was called into Secretary Acheson's office to consult on the matter, I had already had an hour to look over the documents. I was ready with some answers. Naturally, I lean over backwards to do something for an Embassy like that."

The Embassy is doing things like that every day. Its twelve code clerks this year have handled 13,100 cable messages; six

switchboard operators daily handle more than 2,600 calls; it takes 700 typewriters to keep letters and dispatches rolling (last year they chewed up more than five million sheets of paper); three photostat machines grind out more than 10,000 pages of documents a month; the Embassy's 90-odd cars, buses, trucks, and station wagons fill a four-story garage; there are 72 messengers alone on the staff of 1,012 making up Washington's biggest diplomatic delegation.³¹

To these statistics must be added a network of consuls general, consuls, vice-consuls and "information" services throughout the United States, plus the hordes of lecturers, Rhodes Scholars, and professors amiably assuring us that as long as Britain endures we have nothing to fear. Here, truly, is a fifth column (perfectly legal and considerate of the amenities, unlike the crude and subversive methods of Russia, for example) which in elaborateness, efficiency, and results has never before been equaled.

This analysis of the situation implies, of course, no criticism of British policy. It is rather an expression of admiration and envy for skill and singleness of purpose in policy devoted to the national interest. In an era of nationalism any other course would, in fact, be indefensible. At the same time, any consideration of national interest and the pressures that determine foreign policy which neglected to take into consideration the influences of the type that have been reviewed above, would surely be incomplete. The full story can be recounted only by some future historian to whom at least the official records will be available. The personal relations and understandings among statesmen can, of course, never be fully revealed.

VI. DEEDS AND CONSEQUENCES

We turn in conclusion to a brief appraisal of the actual course of events of the past decade that represents the fruits of current foreign policy in operation. It was not before 1924 that a reasonably complete review of the conditions leading to our participation in World War I became generally available. The "revised" view of Germany's guilt, of Allied secret treaties and many other matters, caused considerable shock and disillusionment to those who had swallowed the war propaganda without salt. One learned Harvard professor of history, in fact, declared that while he could find nothing wrong with the facts as assembled by various scholars to the effect that Germany was not alone responsible for the war, the subject was too complex "to make any review of printed testimony a safe basis for changing an opinion forged by the fires of war." Many others are taking the same cavalier attitude toward the meticulous and devastating analysis which Charles A. Beard assembled in his last book.³² For the Roosevelt myth, cultivated and inculcated by subsidized propaganda over a period of fifteen years, seems to many people to be a higher reality than the cold record of historical fact.

Fortunately, a review of the facts can no longer be dismissed as merely a personal attack because all the leading personalities concerned, with one exception, are already physically or politically dead. The significance of the era, however, from the standpoint of immediate and future foreign policy, and, indeed, from the point of view of the whole future of constitutional government, makes Beard's book the most important study that has yet appeared about the political aspects of our participation in the war. The volume under consideration is a sequel to the same author's *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940*. Together, the two books

constitute a monumental work that every American citizen needs to ponder. Both books will receive increasing attention as the debacle of our foreign policy continues to unfold.

Many of the facts and documents here assembled by the expert hand of Dr. Beard are already more or less familiar, in fragmentary form at least. Publishers and editors of scholarly as well as of literary journals have managed hitherto to suppress or ignore critical examination of the subject on the ground of the dubious qualifications of the authors in historiography and on account of the polemic and *ex parte* character of the presentation.³³ They will not be able to ignore Dr. Beard's work on these grounds, as his demonstrated competence for his task will probably be admitted even by his worst enemies. The journalists, poets, and playwrights, not to mention the bandwagon professors and politicians, who have in the last decade enjoyed a field day of rhetoric and malfeasance in statecraft, are now called to account in a manner that can no longer be ignored. To be sure, the record is not yet complete, as Dr. Beard points out. He quotes his correspondence with both the State Department and with the Director of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park regarding the "unavailability" of the President's papers, including both the official minutes of his press conferences and his correspondence with Churchill before the latter became Prime Minister. It seems quite certain that the documents at present withheld, both from Dr. Beard and from the Pearl Harbor investigating committees, will not improve the picture of deception and folly already available.

The subtitle, "A Study in Appearances and Realities," gives a general idea of the plan of Dr. Beard's book. Part I deals with Appearances. Parts II and III deal, in careful detail, and with copious citations of the source for every fact, with the Realities as garnered from a variety of sources, but mainly from the various official reports on the Pearl Harbor disaster. Dr. Beard begins with the iron-clad commitments of the Democratic party in the campaign of 1940 against *foreign wars, except in case of attack*, and especially with Roosevelt's most emphatic declarations on that subject. The italicized words turned out to be the joker in the case, for when the time came, since America's frontier was declared to be the Rhine,

Europe was, of course, no longer "foreign," and, as the record clearly shows, most of 1941 was devoted to provoking, in the most flagrant manner, the "attack" which, with Jesuitic casuistry, was considered by Roosevelt as an abrogation of his pledges. For sheer deceit, I know of nothing in our history comparable to the maneuvers of the administration up to December 7, 1941, to produce an attack while protesting solemnly to the public regarding the efforts to maintain peace. It would be interesting to see how this record would fare even before the Nuremberg tribunal, not to mention an impartial court. The reluctance, for obvious reasons, of both Germany and Japan to attack us even under the most extreme provocation became, in fact, a major problem for the administration. As the Secretary of War soberly reports in his diary covering the meeting of the President and his "War Cabinet" on November 25, 1941: "The question was how we should maneuver them [Japan] into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." The State Department's belligerent note of November 26 to Japan was correctly calculated to achieve the desired end. Japan replied on December 7, 1941, with a final note and the Pearl Harbor attack.³⁴

Space forbids even the briefest summary of the overwhelming and amazing details incidental to the result mentioned. Whether one approves or disapproves of the facts set forth, perhaps no one will fail to admire Dr. Beard's scholarly competence in his craft in assembling and sifting the relevant data. Chapter III recounts the amazing details of our undertaking to patrol the Atlantic sea lanes and finally to convoy war material for the British in flagrant violation of what at least used to be international law. Here, also (Chapters IV and XV) are recounted the commitments of the Atlantic Conference. Other "Secret War Decisions and Plans" are reviewed in Chapter XIV and, finally, the mysterious commitment to go to war under certain conditions on behalf of the British and Dutch interests in Asia is described in Chapter XVII. Many other interesting facts and details of American foreign policy during the years when peace was declared to be our great objective are here recounted. It is sober and highly relevant reading for any American citizen.

As a source book regarding our entry into World War II, Beard's volume is doubtless destined to become a standard reference. The real climax of the work comes in the final chapter, the Epilogue, in which Dr. Beard devotes himself to the various interpretations that are possible of the essentially indisputable facts he has assembled. For, after all, what attitude one takes toward the facts reviewed depends on one's taste in such matters. To those who have a low opinion of constitutional government and common morality in public affairs, the record as reviewed is, of course, in no way derogatory but, on the contrary, a record of strong and enlightened leadership. Accordingly, Dr. Beard here considers the case of those defenders of the Roosevelt administration who, while admitting the essential facts as reviewed, contend that the action in question was a noble and foresighted program in the national interest. This argument runs approximately as follows:

. . . The great end which President Roosevelt discerned and chose justified the means which he employed. As a far-sighted statesman he early discovered that unless the United States entered the war raging in Europe, Hitler would be victorious; and the United States, facing alone this monstrous totalitarian power, would become a victim of its merciless ideology and its despotic militarism. According to this interpretation, it was a question of democracy, the Four Freedoms, the noble principles of the Atlantic Charter, and world security on the one side; of totalitarianism, consummate despotism, and military subjugation on the other side. Since the American people were so smug in their conceit, so ignorant of foreign affairs, and so isolationist in sentiment that they could not themselves see the reality of this terrible threat to their own safety and a necessity to meet it by a resort to war, President Roosevelt had to dissemble in order to be reelected in 1940 as against Wendell Willkie, then the antiwar candidate of the Republicans on an antiwar platform. Furthermore, as members of Congress, Democrats and Republicans alike, continued throughout the year, until December 7, their vigorous opposition to involvement in war, President Roose-

velt, in conducting foreign affairs, had to maintain the appearance of a defensive policy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. But the means which President Roosevelt actually employed in the conduct of foreign affairs were justified by the great end which he, with peculiar clairvoyance, had early discerned and chosen for himself and his country.³⁵

Accepting provisionally the doctrine that the end justifies the means, and Sumner Welles' dictum that "the wisdom of any foreign policy can generally be determined only by its results," Dr. Beard proceeds with devastating thoroughness to appraise the Roosevelt foreign policy by the criteria proposed by the supporters of that policy:

When did the end that justified the means actually come? With the surrender of Italy, Germany, and Japan? If not, when did it come or is it to come—in what span of time, short or long? By whom and according to what criteria is the question of time to be answered beyond all reasonable doubt?

If the time for the achievement of the end be postponed to some point in the indefinite future, the confirmation of the thesis must likewise be postponed indefinitely. In that case an effort to confirm it now becomes a matter of calculating probabilities, ponderable and imponderable. If, however, the results of the war—foreign and domestic—thus far known be taken into the reckoning, a question both logical and historical may be asked: Does it now appear probable that President Roosevelt did in fact so clearly discern the end—the consequences to flow from his actions in 1941—that he was in truth justified in his choice of means?

With regard to consequences in foreign affairs, the noble principles of the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter were, for practical purposes, discarded in the settlements which accompanied the progress, and followed the conclusion, of the war. To the validity of this statement the treatment of peoples in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, Italy, Germany,

and other places of the earth bears witness. More significant still for the fortunes of the American Republic, out of the war came the triumph of another totalitarian regime no less despotic and ruthless than Hitler's system, namely, Russia, possessing more than twice the population of prewar Germany, endowed with immense natural resources, astride Europe and Asia, employing bands of Quislings as terroristic in methods as any Hitler ever assembled, and insistently effectuating a political and economic ideology equally inimical to the democracy, liberties, and institutions of the United States—Russia, one of the most ruthless Leviathans in the long history of military empires.

Since, as a consequence of the war called "necessary" to overthrow Hitler's despotism, another despotism was raised to a higher pitch of power, how can it be argued conclusively with reference to inescapable facts that the "end" justified the means employed to involve the United States in that war? If the very idea of neutrality with regard to Hitler was shameful in 1941, what is to be said of commitments made in the name of peace and international amity at Teheran and Yalta, where the avowed and endorsed principles of the Atlantic Charter for world affairs were shattered—in commitments which were subsequently misrepresented by President Roosevelt, publicly and privately?³⁶

This was the "result" in the spring of 1947. The reader can supply his own amplification of the picture since that time, for the details are on the front page of every newspaper. Among the items that may be pondered in this connection are the following: (1) More than 135,000 casualties in the Korean war to date (June, 1953). (2) Federal expenditures at the annual rate of about \$70,000,000,000. From April, 1945, to January, 1953, President Truman spent approximately twice as much as all the other Presidents of the United States combined down to 1940. (3) The administrations of all Presidents from George Washington through Franklin D. Roosevelt, including two World Wars, the Civil War, the War of 1812, collected \$248,000,000,000 of taxes. President Truman's

administration in a few years has levied \$12,000,000,000 more, the fantastic total of \$260,000,000,000. (4) For the fiscal year beginning July, 1953, Truman's budget estimate was \$78,600,000,000, of which 73 per cent, or over \$57,000,000,000 was for "national security." The defense expenditure proposed would amount to \$380 for every man, woman, and child in the United States versus only \$8.00 in 1938. These are indeed some of the results by which our foreign policy should be measured.

Finally, Dr. Beard interprets his data in terms of their significance to the American constitutional system. In twelve brief paragraphs (pp. 582-84) are set forth the consequences to our constitutional system "if the precedent[s] set by President Roosevelt in conducting foreign affairs . . . are to stand unimpeached and be accepted henceforth as valid in law and morals" (p. 582). These twelve points deserve the attention of every American. If he approves of them he is, of course, at liberty to abandon the system under which he has been governed hitherto and to relinquish to the executive most of the powers of the legislature. Before he makes this choice, however, he should soberly face the issue as set forth by Beard so that whatever is done may be done deliberately instead of by subterfuge under some declared emergency or other emotional guise. As a brief summary of the conclusions that are warranted from this thorough study by a man of undisputed qualifications, the twelve points should be quoted in full. If the record as it stands is to govern in the future, then:

The President of the United States in a campaign for reelection may publicly promise the people to keep the country out of war and, after victory at the polls, may set out secretly on a course designed or practically certain to bring war upon the country.

He may, to secure legislation in furtherance of his secret designs, misrepresent to Congress and the people both its purport and the policy he intends to pursue under its terms if and when such legislation is enacted.

He may, by employing legal casuists, secretly frame and, using the powers and patronage of his office, obtain from

Congress a law conferring upon him in elusive language authority which Congress has no constitutional power to delegate to him.

He may, after securing such legislation, publicly announce that he will pursue, as previously professed, a policy contrary to war and yet at the same time secretly prepare plans for waging an undeclared "shooting war" that are in flat contradiction to his public professions.

He may hold secret conferences with the Premier of a foreign government and publicly declare that no new commitments have been made when, in fact, he has committed the United States to occupying, by the use of American armed forces, the territory of a third country and joining the Premier in parallel threats to another government.

He may make a secret agreement with a foreign power far more fateful in consequences to the United States than any alliance ever incorporated in a treaty to be submitted to the Senate for approval.

He may demand, and Congress may pliantly confer upon him, the power to designate at his discretion foreign governments as enemies of the United States and to commit hostile acts against them, at his pleasure, in violation of national statutes and the principles of international law hitherto accepted and insisted upon by the United States.

He may publicly represent to Congress and the people that acts of war have been committed against the United States, when in reality the said acts were secretly invited and even initiated by the armed forces of the United States under his secret direction.

He may, on the mere ground that Congress has made provisions for national defense, secretly determine any form of military and naval strategy and order the armed forces to engage in any acts of war which he deems appropriate to achieve the ends which he personally chooses.

He may, by employing his own subordinates as broadcasters and entering into secret relations with private agencies of propaganda, stir up a popular demand for some drastic

action on his part which is not authorized by law, and then take that action, thus substituting the sanction of an unofficial plebiscite for the sanction of the Constitution and the laws enacted under it.

He may, after publicly announcing one foreign policy, secretly pursue the opposite and so conduct foreign and military affairs as to maneuver a designated foreign power into firing the first shot in an attack upon the United States and thus avoid the necessity of calling upon Congress in advance to exercise its constitutional power to deliberate upon a declaration of war.

He may, as a crowning act in the arrogation of authority to himself, without the consent of the Senate, make a commitment to the head of a foreign government which binds the United States to "police the world," at least for a given time, that is, in the eyes of other governments and peoples policed, to dominate the world; and the American people are thereby in honor bound to provide the military, naval, and economic forces necessary to pursue with no assurance of success, this exacting business.³⁷

Let the citizen read and ponder this analysis of our departure during the last fifteen years from the policies that made us a great nation. Let him then survey the consequences thus far, both on our own national interest and that of the rest of the world, of these departures. He will then be in a position to decide whether he wishes to continue in foreign affairs the kind of policies reviewed in Beard's book, or return, as far as possible, to the tested methods of constitutional government.

The citizen also needs to decide whether he believes men like Charles Beard are more competent analysts and advisers on foreign policy than are the whole ghastly roster of newspaper columnists, radio commentators, and politicians who have guided it during the past decade. That the Executive will play an increasingly prominent role in public administration, is perhaps inevitable. But is there any reason why competent specialists should not be called upon to lay before Congress and the people the different possible

alternate courses of action, with an estimate of the probable cost and the consequences of each? Let each candidate for office publicly declare how he stands on each of Dr. Beard's twelve points relating to the powers and privileges of the Executive. The issue may then safely be left to the decision of the people.

In bringing thus to the attention of the American people the crossroads at which they stand, Dr. Beard rendered one more outstanding service in his long, distinguished, and courageous career. It is refreshing, in an age of sycophancy and subservience, of fawning and fear among scholars, to find one who ruthlessly hews to the line, heedless of the periodic calumny of lesser men, and who is also indisposed to veer his course for the cheap applause of the multitude. A man of lesser mould would, perhaps, long ago have wearied of the apparently thankless task and said, with Milton,

I did but prompt the age to quit their clogs
 By the known rules of ancient liberty,
 When straight a barbarous noise environs me
 Of owls and cuckoos, asses, apes, and dogs;

* * *

But this is got by casting pearl to hogs,
 That bawl for freedom in their senseless mood,
 And still revolt when truth would set them free.

VII. WHITEWASHING THE WRECKAGE

Beard's book, together with George Morgenstern's *Pearl Harbor*, deserves a place with Machiavelli's *The Prince* as concrete case studies of the principles developed in that classic. Morgenstern's book does in a detailed manner for the Pearl Harbor incident what Beard's volume does for the broader series of events leading up to

the war. As examples of the complete misapprehension of the facts which it is possible to foist upon the public by officials who care to do so, these books are notable contributions. They establish beyond question the falseness of the notions current in this country regarding the events leading up to the second World War. Here is set forth, in meticulously documented and incontrovertible detail, the process by which a small group of politicians circumvented all legal and constitutional provisions in bringing a great nation into a war to participation in which the people and the Congress were admittedly overwhelmingly opposed. Here, also, are brought together the full details of how the President, in recognition of the state of public opinion, loudly declared his own opposition to war at the very time that he was actively engaged in secret participation in the war and in arranging for formal and public participation in it.³⁸ For bland fraudulence on the part of high public officials there is perhaps nothing comparable to it in our history.

The Morgenstern volume, which appeared first, was for the most part ignored by the press and the agencies of mass communication; at most it was grudgingly and unfavorably reviewed. A single illustration will suffice. A Princeton professor, reviewing Morgenstern's book in the *American Political Science Review* (October, 1947), said, "This may be true, but most of us will want something more substantial than Mr. Morgenstern's blind anger before believing it." Yet the author of this remark had earlier quite soberly pointed out that 80 per cent of Morgenstern's text consists of quotations from official documents, and the reviewer admits that Morgenstern has "adhered closely" to this evidence in drawing his conclusions. There may be differences of opinion as to what is the proper emotion that the facts under review should evoke. But that hardly alters the facts themselves.

It usually takes some time after a war for even students of public affairs to revise their judgment, which has been influenced by war hysteria and propaganda. This recovery period is likely to be long and difficult in proportion as the exposure to the propaganda has been long and vigorous. Since the Roosevelt regime lasted longer than any other single administration in our history and hence exerted an unprecedented influence upon the media of mass com-

munication, it was to be expected that Revisionism following the second World War would encounter more persistent and serious resistance than was the case following the first World War.³⁹ Even in the latter case, however, it must be remembered that it was not until 1924, or six years after the Armistice, that serious challenges to the official war explanations began to appear in any number.

It was to be expected that the apologists for the Roosevelt regime would feel especially compelled to challenge, in some way, the devastating indictment of Beard's book. In view of the facts and the reputation of the author, the refutation of his indictment was naturally not an easy assignment and one which most historians of repute would hesitate to undertake. For one thing, most of them were on record at one time or another with expressions of high regard and respect for Dr. Beard's scholarship. Also, his work had been received over a long period of time with almost universal respect and acclaim. In the second place, most scholars had their own reservations about the Roosevelt administration and especially regarding the foreign policy since 1937. Accordingly, the task of attempting to whitewash the record, as exhibited and analyzed by Beard and Morgenstern, fell to a comparatively unknown young New Dealer, Basil Rauch,⁴⁰ who had been brought up in the days of the Roosevelt bureaucracy and who made up in enthusiasm for the task what he lacked as qualifications in other ways.

The best brief characterization of Rauch's book, both as regards the undertaking and the alleged results, is perhaps contained in one of the publisher's claims on the jacket: "Here is a spellbinding narrative on two levels: First, an exposé of the distortions of the Root and Beard faction; second, a survey of the Roosevelt record which restores F.D.R. as a middle-of-the-road president—neither radical nor reactionary—and *an unparalleled architect of world peace*" [italics mine]. In view of the events of the past ten years, down to and including the present, Rauch must be congratulated at the outset on being able to discern among the rubble and the strife of Europe and Asia notable architecture of world peace. Even more remarkable is his capacity to see such architecture in Roosevelt's moves from Munich to Pearl Harbor. Since the chief challenge to this view is to be found in Beard's volume, which we have reviewed

above, Rauch undertakes the modest task of refuting Beard's position and, incidentally, of teaching that distinguished scholar the elements of historical research. It is not surprising that he falls rather pathetically short in his undertaking.

Rauch concedes that "Beard has Roosevelt's advocacy of collective security and United States participation in the second World War as his chief facts in evidence that the isolationists were right. It is the thesis of this book that his fallacy is the ancient one, *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*, and that he has maintained it by distorting and excising the record."⁴¹ Now, if the fine phrase "advocacy of collective security" means anything, it must mean the concrete actions, indisputably performed during the period in question, including speeches, directives, and diplomatic correspondence. Yet Rauch declares it to be his intention to show that there was no important connection between these actions and our entry into the war. How this is to be reconciled with another major contention of Roosevelt's admirers, namely, that he saved civilization by means of our participation in the war, is one of these logical difficulties to which our author is not sensitive. In any event, he promptly forgets his announced thesis and devotes himself for some five hundred pages to a very different subject, namely, that Roosevelt did not *intend* his actions to have the consequences which they did, in fact, have.

As a further example of the general flavor of this "dispassionate" analysis (the estimate is by Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.), a single instance from the first chapter must suffice. We there learn that the actual policy and propaganda of "isolationists" (of the type of Charles Beard and the group organized under General Wood) was "America First and Last—Other Nations and Peoples Nowhere."⁴² Rauch is indignant that this group should have adopted the name America First, thus implying that the Roosevelt brand of "internationalists" do not place their own country first. He makes no note of the parallel fact that these same "internationalists," by branding all opponents as "isolationists," fraudulently implied that the latter did not believe in any relations whatever with other countries, a state of affairs which, of course, has neither existed nor been advocated by any informed group in

modern times. The author admits the absurdity of the term "isolationist" and correctly refers⁴³ to the elaborate international, economic, cultural, and political relations that have existed throughout this country's history. Beard was, of course, thoroughly familiar with these facts and approved of them long before Rauch was born. Rauch also admits in various places throughout his book that representatives of the America First Committee merely advocated *different* international measures from those of the Roosevelt administration. It is obviously this latter offense which is unpardonable and equivalent to "Other Nations and Peoples Nowhere."

With the ground thus cleared, the author proceeds with his task. The now familiar sources are resurveyed and the "right" interpretation is supplied. The record is, of course, far from complete as yet, thus leaving historians of diverse viewpoints the opportunity to speculate and surmise according to their prejudices, an opportunity of which Rauch takes full advantage. He simply does not feel, for example, that Stimson's statement about "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot" means what it says. After the author's display of logic in his first chapter, one is not surprised at what follows throughout the book. To give only one example, Rauch apparently feels that he has scored a tremendous refutation of Beard's interpretation of Hull's note to the Japanese, dated November 26, as of "pertinence" in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Rauch appears to be under the impression that the fact that the Japanese expedition to Pearl Harbor had been planned and set in motion before the date of Hull's note destroys the significance of the latter as a consideration influencing the Japanese action. It would appear to require no great logistic sophistication to appreciate the obvious fact that a military expedition of such proportions is not organized and set in motion to reach a destination thousands of miles away in the short time between November 26 and December 7. Yet Rauch feels he has made an important discovery from the archives of what most men would know from common sense. "It is now possible," says Rauch ostentatiously, "to state certain facts of the situation which were not available to Beard."⁴⁴ The fact is that the full story of Japanese purposes and plans, including the orders to Japanese commanders, was carried in

Associated Press dispatches from Tokyo in October, 1945, and was published in full by Morgenstern in 1947.⁴⁵ We know that Beard was familiar with Morgenstern's manuscript and, most likely, with the original press notices. What Rauch neglects to stress, and this happens to be the only relevant point, is that the Japanese commander of the Pearl Harbor expedition had specific instructions that if the Japanese-American negotiations then underway (of which Hull's note was certainly an important part) should reach an amicable settlement prior to December 7, all the forces of the combined fleet were to return to their bases. What is more, this order was further confirmed as late as December 2. In short, Beard's reference to the Hull note as one of "pertinence" to the Pearl Harbor attack is surely a conservative statement and is in no way refuted by Rauch's "discovery" that Japan, like other nations, prepares military expeditions *in the event that* pending disputes are not settled by other means. Indeed, Rauch's own report from his newly discovered Japanese archives makes it quite clear that the attack was to be carried out only in the event that negotiations failed. That the note of November 26 was a vital part in these negotiations is simply an indisputable fact, and Beard's position on the matter has been in no way shaken. Yet Rauch is evidently under the impression that the Japanese preparation of the expedition before the receipt of the note proves that the contents of the note were of no significance in explaining the action which followed, which is obviously false in view of the instructions admittedly in the hands of the Japanese commanders. All of these facts were known to Rauch. He simply fails to grasp their significance and uses them, instead, in an absurd and illogical attempt to refute Beard.

In view of the elementary confusions of this kind which characterize the book, it is hardly warranted to devote further space to the enumeration of additional individual cases. Yet, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., finds the book "entirely devastating in its exposure of the omissions and distortions of the Charles A. Beard school of historical revisionism." If the work of Rauch and Schlesinger on the subject is a fair sample, Beard and his "school" would appear to have very little to fear.

Some of Schlesinger's own tributes to his hero are, in fact, among

the most damaging statements that have been made. In an article ostensibly defending Mr. Roosevelt, Schlesinger says: "Roosevelt was always a pragmatist, playing by ear, as he liked to say, his improvisations controlled, not by logical analysis nor by an explicit moral code so much as by a consistency of emotion and instinct."⁴⁶ The characterization is, unfortunately, probably correct. This is, in my opinion, a more devastating criticism than any of those which Schlesinger seeks to refute. For the responsible leader of a great country to fail to be guided in his policies and decisions by the most expert judgment and logical analysis available, as well as by an explicit moral code and the experience and insight of people incomparably better qualified than himself in international politics, constitutes the most serious criticism possible.

Entirely aside from personalities, a President who elects to "play it by ear" is somewhat in the position of an airplane pilot with a hundred and fifty million people on board who prefers to ignore weather charts and instrument board and to rely on his emotions and instincts. It can hardly be contended that there are in international affairs *no* lessons of experience or guides of a logical character. Professor Schlesinger seems to reach a high point as a "detractor" when he explained that Roosevelt was actually under the impression that unconditional surrender meant "magnanimity to a helpless enemy." Was he also under the impression that the Morgenthau Plan was magnanimous? I suspect Mr. Roosevelt would be greatly disturbed by the type of defense that is being offered on his behalf by Messrs. Schlesinger and Rauch.

There are a great many questions having to do with our entry into World War II which historians will doubtless continue to argue about for some centuries. The records will be further squeezed to show the "motives," the "intentions," the "ideals" that animated the actors. Very frequently the most that can result from these debates is a change in one's estimate of the probability that a historical character was merely a fool rather than a scoundrel. It may well be that a merciful posterity will be inclined, on the whole, to take the former rather than the latter view regarding the principals in events from Munich to Pearl Harbor, and regarding the conditions of the peace.

Aside from all these arguments about the meaning of words and records, the fact will remain that some certain action indubitably was taken which can be shown to have been importantly related to the events that ensued. The desirability of these results will be the primary concern and the basis on which men will judge the characters of history—whether the actions taken were, in fact, in the national or world interest or not. As the years pass, the consequences will continue to multiply. In the larger perspective of history it will be these consequences, not the alleged motives, malice, or idealism of historical characters, which will determine men's estimate of the wisdom of the course pursued.

In view of the impossibility of reconciling the policy followed since 1937 with the national interest, the Roosevelt apologists are more and more inclined to retreat to that ancient refuge in such cases, namely, a transcendent international morality which supercedes the national interest and established constitutional methods. Thus Rauch grudgingly admits that the war with Japan could have been avoided⁴⁷ but finds that it would have been "immoral" to do so and that "the great majority of the American people long since had given up indifference to immorality in international relations."⁴⁸ He does not tell us by what authority he projects his own moral judgment of the events in question on the American people, about 80 per cent of whom indicated at the time that they were opposed to the war, however immoral that appears to Mr. Rauch. We can do no better in conclusion than to repeat the remarks of Hans Morgenthau on the relative defensibility in foreign policy of moral principles, as proclaimed by self-appointed spokesmen, versus national interest for both ourselves and other nations, as understood by the people and verified by the course of events:

Lacking in that intellectual discipline and political self-restraint which are the beneficial by-products of the power calculations of a foreign policy based upon national interest, the policy of moral principles chooses the whole world as its object to transform in the image of its own conception of morality. The fanaticism of the moral crusader enters into unholy wedlock with these potentially unlimited power

drives which are latent in all men. Inevitably, then, a foreign policy which starts out as a crusade for universal liberty and democracy will end in a war to conquer the world. If it succeeds, it will build a world empire upon the radioactive ruins of civilization, among which liberty and democracy may survive, at best, as words. If it fails, it will carry to destruction not only the moral values for the sake of which it had been undertaken, but also the nation pursuing such a course.⁴⁹

VIII. CONCLUSION

To the reader who is weary of details and personalities and who lacks time, equipment, and interest to evaluate what may appear to be largely partisan and academic controversy, it may be of interest to conclude with the considered judgment of a person who presumably has himself been one of the architects of the policy in question and who appears to be singularly free from rancor toward the personalities and the regime under criticism. George F. Kennan was, until 1950, counselor of the State Department and director of its Policy Planning Staff. He served the State Department as a career diplomat in various capacities for almost twenty-five years, "the most learned of our officials, the most experienced of our scholars." On the basis of this background, and in a spirit truly with malice toward none and with charity for all, what is Mr. Kennan's conclusion on the subject of American foreign policy and the national interest? We shall limit ourselves to three quotations:

I would like first [says Mr. Kennan] to say a word about the total result of these two world wars in Europe. These wars were fought at the price of some tens of millions of lives, of untold physical destruction, of the destruction of the balance of forces on the Continent—at the price of rendering

western Europe dangerously, perhaps fatefully, vulnerable to Soviet power. Both wars were fought, really, with a view to changing Germany: to correcting her behavior, to making the Germans something different from what they were. Yet, today, if one were offered the chance of having back again the Germany of 1913—a Germany run by conservative but relatively moderate people, no Nazis and no Communists, a vigorous Germany, united and unoccupied, full of energy and confidence, able to play a part again in the balancing-off of Russian power in Europe—well, there would be objections to it from many quarters, and it wouldn't make everybody happy; but in many ways it wouldn't sound so bad, in comparison with our problems of today. *Now, think what this means. When you tally up the total score of two wars, in terms of their ostensible objective, you find that if there has been any gain at all, it is pretty hard to discern* [Italics mine].

Does this not mean something is terribly wrong here? Can it really be that all this bloodshed and sacrifice was just the price of sheer survival for the Western democracies in the 20th Century? If we were to accept that conclusion, things would look pretty black; for we would have to ask ourselves: Where does all this end? If this was the price of survival in the first half of the 20th Century, what is survival going to cost us in the second half? But plainly this immense output of effort and sacrifice should have brought us something more than just survival. And then, we can only assume, some great miscalculations must have been made somewhere? But where? Were they ours? Were they our Allies?⁵⁰

Perhaps all will agree that both the world wars, as world wars, would have been impossible without the participation of the United States. That is, the wars that began in 1914 and in 1939 would have been, without our participation, European (and perhaps Asiatic) wars of essentially the balance-of-power kind that have occurred periodically throughout the centuries. American interests and American opinion have been greatly concerned for at

least a century with these traditional wars. Provocation and temptation to participate have been present in each case. But until approximately the turn of the last century, American policy has been to abstain from participation on the realistic ground that, much as we should desire to see one outcome rather than another, *our participation would jeopardize the national and the world's interest, as well as fail to achieve our objective, far more than could possibly result from our nonparticipation.*

The validity of this judgment, all personal questions and motives aside, has been the principal subject of the present essay. Our conclusion is the same as that of Mr. Kennan, quoted above. Nor is there any doubt as to what has been the attitude of the American people on this question throughout our history. Both the polls and the public protestations of the candidates for the Presidency in 1940 indicate an overwhelming sentiment against our participation. Wilson's election in 1916 under the slogan "He kept us out of war," as well as all other evidence, indicates a similar public opinion at the time of World War I. In both cases the foreign policy resulting in our participation was conducted with flagrant disregard of public sentiment and opinion. Speaking of the need for some parliamentary system "in which there is opportunity to consult the people on the great issues and at the crucial moments and to adjust governmental responsibilities in accordance with the people's decision," Mr. Kennan says:

I must say that if I had any doubts before as to whether it is this that our country requires, those doubts have been pretty well resolved in my mind by the events of the past weeks and months. I find it hard to see how we can live up to our responsibilities as a great power unless we are able to resolve in a manner better than we have done recently, the great challenges to the soundness of government policy and to *the claim of an administration to speak for the mass of people in foreign affairs* [italics mine].⁵¹

Such reform may be achieved by constitutional changes, by requiring consultation of Congress by the Executive in the manner

intended by the Constitution, or by official institutionalization of the technique of scientific public-opinion polling. More sensitive machinery than that in use at present for permitting public opinion to assert its influence in the formulation and execution of foreign policy is clearly indicated, unless we are prepared to abandon our pretenses at democratic government. The people of the United States are not yet prepared, I think, to embrace the "Führer principle" and to concede that, in foreign affairs at least, "the Führer knows best," although the doctrine has been vigorously propagated during the last two decades by the very factions ostensibly engaged in fighting it elsewhere. Indeed, the alacrity with which the states ratified the constitutional amendment limiting the President's tenure to two terms is not without significance as an indication that the American people do not believe themselves dependent upon the special insights of charismatic leaders for the conduct of their affairs, and that, in retrospect, they gladly would have been protected against Roosevelt's third and fourth terms.

Nor can it be contended that the conclusions here set forth are the results merely of the hindsight, in the light of which all men's errors can be made to appear ludicrous or culpable. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the disastrous consequences of the foreign policy reviewed in this chapter were clearly *foretold* by our most mature and most competent scholars as well as by statesmen, diplomats, and military men of highest repute. Many of them have been cited in the course of this essay and the full roster may easily be compiled from the public records of the years immediately preceding each of the World Wars. They and their views were simply shouted down by a rabble of poets, playwrights, journalists, social workers, preachers, professors, and political adventurers who, whatever their qualifications in their respective fields, were certainly not entitled to influence in high councils of foreign policy. Mr. Kennan has paid his respects to them in the following words:

. . . But I also suspect that what purports to be public opinion in most countries that consider themselves to have popular government is often not really the consensus of the feel-

ings of the mass of the people at all but rather the expression of the interests of special highly vocal minorities—politicians, commentators, and publicity-seekers of all sorts; people who live by their ability to draw attention to themselves and die, like fish out of water, if they are compelled to remain silent. These people take refuge in the pat and chauvinistic slogans because they are incapable of understanding any others, because these slogans are safer from the standpoint of short-term gain, because the truth is sometimes a poor competitor in the market place of ideas—complicated, unsatisfying, full of dilemmas, always vulnerable to misinterpretation and abuse. . . . And so the chauvinists of all times and places go their appointed way: plucking the easy fruits, reaping the little triumphs of the day at the expense of someone else tomorrow, deluging in noise and filth anyone who gets in their way, dancing their reckless dance on the prospects for human progress, drawing the shadow of a great doubt over the validity of democratic institutions.⁵²

Finally, there will be those who will contend that while non-participation in the two world wars was the only defensible attitude from the standpoint of the *national* interest, the interests of humanity, for which they are the self-appointed spokesmen, demand a contrary policy, namely, that decided upon by the small group of officials and agitators who chose the policy adopted in 1917 and in 1941. Let them reconsider their alleged concern for the interests of humanity as against the national interest, in the light of the two world wars as reviewed by Mr. Kennan above. Let them further consider, against the background of a devastated Europe and a bleeding and starving Asia, the competent and considered further judgment of Mr. Kennan:

If we are to get away from it [the basic faults in our approach to international affairs] . . . it will mean we will have the modesty to admit that our national interest is all that we are really capable of knowing and understanding—and the courage to recognize that if our own purposes and

undertakings here at home are decent ones, unsullied by arrogance or hostility toward other people or delusions of superiority, then the pursuit of our national interest can never fail to be conducive to a better world. This concept is less ambitious and less inviting in its immediate prospects than those to which we have so often inclined, and less pleasing to our image of ourselves. To many it may seem to smack of cynicism and reaction. I can not share these doubts. Whatever is realistic in concept, and founded in an endeavor to see both ourselves and others as we really are, cannot be illiberal.⁵³

EXHIBIT I

The following memorandum is submitted to reveal the almost incredible extent of our military commitments throughout the world. It will stagger even most of those who are already alarmed at the trend.

THE MILITARY COMMITMENTS OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION

Within four years the Truman Administration directly committed the United States to the defense of forty-one countries. With a total population of 155 million people, the United States is bound by treaty or by military occupation to defend a foreign population of over 560 millions. American armed forces must not only plan for the defense of the United States and its territorial possessions, but also for the defense of more than 45 per cent of the inhabited area of the world outside of the United States.

The United States has also been involved indirectly, through military missions, military bases or the extension of military aid in the defense of nine additional countries with

a population of over 170 million. Military technicians are scattered throughout the world in twenty-four countries including five nations not as yet included in formal treaty arrangements: Iran, Indonesia, Indochina, Thailand, and Liberia.

Outside of NATO and Pacific treaty states, nine nations, including one Communist nation, Yugoslavia, are receiving military supplies from the United States. Over a hundred American air bases are scattered throughout the world in ten different sovereign nations or their colonies including two nations not otherwise covered, Saudi Arabia and Libya.

In total, some fifty nations or 730 million people, almost one-third of the world's total population, look to the United States for their military defense. No nation in the history of the world, not even Britain at the height of its empire, ever entered upon such far-reaching commitments. As a result, the 1952 disposition of the U.S. armed forces involved two-thirds or more of the combat division strength of the U. S. Army in overseas combat or occupation. Military garrisons were also stationed in ten additional nations in connection with air base operations.

U.S. MILITARY COMMITMENTS AND DISPERSAL OF FORCES, 1952

TREATY COMMITMENTS

20 nations Rio Pact, signed September 2, 1947.
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

- 11 nations N.A.T.O., signed April 4, 1949.
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.
- 2 nations Greek-Turkey Protocol, signed October 1, 1951.
- 4 nations Pacific Area Security Pacts, signed August, September, and October, 1951.
Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Philippines.

OCCUPATION AND NAVAL PATROL

- 4 nations Austria, Formosa, Germany, and Korea.

MILITARY MISSIONS

- 30 nations Latin America: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, El Salvador, and Venezuela.
- Europe: Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, and Portugal.
- Africa: Liberia.
- Near East: Iran and Turkey.
- Far East: Formosa, Indonesia, Indochina, Korea, and Thailand.

AIR BASES

- 10 nations Azores (Portugal), Greenland (Denmark), Iceland, Great Britain, France, Germany, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, and Japan.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE (Outside NATO)

8 nations Burma, Formosa, Indochina, Iran, Philippines,
Thailand, Indonesia, and Yugoslavia.

EXHIBIT II

INITIAL FINANCIAL COSTS OF INTERVENTIONIST
TACTICS TO THE UNITED STATES

Below are two groups of figures. One gives the amount spent by each of our thirty-two presidents from George Washington to the end of Franklin D. Roosevelt's second administration. The other gives the amount spent by President Truman in peacetime, from his inauguration to September 30, 1949.

SPENT BY 32 PRESIDENTS FROM WASHINGTON
TO ROOSEVELT'S SECOND TERM, INCLUSIVE

Washington	\$	34,088,486
Adams		34,262,668
Jefferson		72,424,289
Madison		176,473,964
Monroe		147,237,899
Adams		65,427,017
Jackson		152,069,968
Van Buren		122,325,242
Harrison & Tyler		108,004,678
Polk		173,477,220
Taylor & Fillmore		179,631,529
Pierce		255,154,244
Buchanan		272,933,490
Lincoln		3,252,380,410

Johnson	1,578,557,645
Grant	2,253,386,743
Hayes	1,032,268,037
Garfield & Arthur	1,027,742,757
Cleveland	1,077,629,089
Harrison	1,412,315,899
Cleveland	1,441,674,174
McKinley	2,093,918,514
T. Roosevelt	4,655,450,505
Taft	2,799,211,854
Wilson	46,938,260,143
Harding	6,667,235,429
Coolidge	18,585,549,115
Hoover	15,490,476,636
Roosevelt (8 years)	67,518,746,001
	<hr/>
	\$179,620,113,645

SPENT BY PRESIDENT TRUMAN FROM FISCAL
YEAR 1946 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1949

Truman	\$191,081,394,191
32 presidents in 156 years spent	\$179,620,113,645
1 president in less than five years spent	\$191,081,394,191

In order to get any true picture of the relative cost of our interventionist foreign policy since 1940, one would have to set down the approximately \$350,000,000,000 that Roosevelt spent on the second World War, and then add what Truman spent from September, 1949, to January, 1953. If this were done, it would be evident that Roosevelt and Truman each spent twice as much as all the previous presidential administrations combined, which operated for 150 years according to the principles of continentalism and neutrality. The figures would be even more impressive if one eliminated from the pre-1940 expenditures the approximately \$47,000,000,000 spent by the first interventionist President, Woodrow Wilson.

FOOTNOTES—CHAPTER 9

1. For an elaboration of this subject see my paper, "Human Values—A Research Program," *Research Studies of the State College of Washington* (Pullman, Wash., September, 1950).
2. For a comprehensive discussion of the subject, see two volumes by C. A. Beard, undertaken on a grant of the Carnegie Corporation through the Social Science Research Council: *The Idea of National Interest*; and *The Open Door at Home*. (Both volumes published by The Macmillan Company, 1934). For a briefer summary by the same author, see *A Foreign Policy for America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1940). See also G. F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).
3. See, for example, the radio address of Franklin D. Roosevelt on December 9, 1941, in which he refers to "the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves from the rest of humanity" [italics supplied]. For a detailed review of the events leading up to the collapse of the New Deal in 1937 and its effect on our foreign policy, see F. R. Sanborn, *Design for War; A Study of Secret Power Politics, 1937-1941* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1951), Chap. III.
4. According to the *Fortune* polls of March, 1947, and February, 1948.
5. K. Svalastoga, "Observations, Measurements, and Correlations Relative to Internationalism" (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Washington Library, 1950).
6. According to a statement given to the press in May, 1945, by his daughter, Mrs. Eleanor Wilson McAdoo (*New York World-Telegram*, May 8, 1945). "It was right that the United States did not join the League of Nations. . . . I've been thinking about this for a long time. If we had joined the League when I asked for it, it would have been a great personal victory. But it would not have worked, because deep down in their hearts the American people didn't really believe in it." Cited in C. A. Beard, *American Foreign Policy in the Making, 1932-1940* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1946), p. 19.
7. Jean-Marie Domenach, *American Perspective*, Winter, 1950, p. 21.
8. George Catlin, *ibid.*, p. 25.
9. Freedom usually means any state of affairs which least contravenes the habits of the speaker. That is, we are free when we *feel* free. We feel free when our habitual inclinations are not interfered with. It follows, of course, that people can be free under a large variety of conditions

depending on their habits and their culture. This is usually overlooked in crusades to export our particular kind of freedom to peoples who would prefer their own way of life.


10. For example, it is reported that the late Secretary Forrestal suffered from delusions that Russia had already invaded the United States (A. D. Mebane, "The Strategy of World War III," *American Perspective*, Summer, 1950, p. 268). Consider also the case of General J. L. DeWitt, in command on the Pacific Coast in 1942, who recommended the incarceration in concentration camps of all persons "of Japanese descent" because, up to that time, there had been no evidence of sabotage by persons of Japanese descent either in Hawaii or on the West Coast. This absence of sabotage was cited by General DeWitt as a "disturbing and confirming indication that such action will be taken." *Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943).
11. Hadley Cantril, Hazel Gaudet, and Herta Hertzog, *The Invasion from Mars; a Study in the Psychology of Panic; with the complete script of the Orson Welles broadcast* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1940).
12. Mulford Q. Sibley, *American Perspective*, Winter, 1950, p. 12.
13. Only temporary dislocations of highly doubtful severity need be granted. For a full review of the subject see C. A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934).
14. A. E. Emerson, "The Biological Basis of Social Cooperation," *Illinois Academy of Science Transactions*, XXXIX (1946), pp. 9-18.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
16. John Quincy Stewart, "Empirical Mathematical Rules Concerning the Distribution and Equilibrium of Population," *The Geographical Review*, XXXII (1947), 461-85; George K. Zipf, *Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort* (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Press, 1949).
17. See G. A. Lundberg, "Some Views on Semantics in International Relations," *American Perspective*, June, 1948, pp. 127-32.
18. See N. J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, Inc., 1942), p. 115. See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 65.
19. *Time*, July 3, 1950, p. 15. Courtesy of *Time*; copyright *Time*, Inc., 1950. See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52, 98-99, 140-41.
20. For elaboration of this subject, see my paper, "Human Social Problems as a Type of Disequilibrium in a Biological Integration," *American Sociological Review*, December, 1948.
21. Charles A. Beard, *The Open Door at Home*. For the benefit of the Marxians, it may be noted that the *Wall Street Journal* is bitterly opposed to the current foreign policy.
22. *A Foreign Policy for America*, pp. 68-74.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-92.
24. N. A. Pelcovitz, "World Government Now?" *Harper's Magazine*, November, 1946, pp. 396-403.
25. Warren Austin, "A Warning on World Government," *Harper's*

- Magazine, May, 1949, pp. 93-97. See also Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-103; and Section VIII of this chapter.
26. Elliott Roosevelt, *As He Saw It* (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, Inc., 1946), pp. 204-5.
 27. *Time*, December 13, 1948.
 28. C. A. Beard, *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1948), pp. 24-30.
 29. "Personal and Otherwise," *Harper's Magazine*, August, 1950, p. 6.
 30. *Time*, November 7, 1949. Courtesy of *Time*; copyright Time, Inc., 1949.
 31. *Ibid.*, September 26, 1949. Courtesy of *Time*; copyright Time, Inc., 1949.
 32. *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*. Parts of this review appeared in *The Progressive*, May, 1948. See also C. C. Tansill, *Back Door to War* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952); and Kennan, *op. cit.*
 33. This was the treatment accorded the able analysis by George Morgenstern in his *Pearl Harbor: The Story of the Secret War* (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947). See above, Chap. I.
 34. See below (pp. 606-7) for an attempt to explain away this part of the record by an apologist for the Roosevelt administration.
 35. *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941*, p. 574.
 36. *Ibid.*, pp. 575-77.
 37. *Ibid.*, pp. 582-84.
 38. Four months before the Pearl Harbor attack, Roosevelt told Churchill, "I may never declare war; I may make war. If I were to ask Congress to declare war they might argue about it for three months." Winston Churchill, *The Grand Alliance* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1950), p. 593. Cf. Basil Rauch's contemptuous reference to "the ancient Constitutional arrangements by which Congress and the Executive are encouraged to quarrel their way to a policy, *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, (New York: Creative Age Press, 1950), p. 225. Winston Churchill is more reserved in his comments upon these matters. "I do not intend in these pages to pronounce judgment upon this tremendous episode in American history," *The Grand Alliance*, p. 602.
 39. For a full account of the attempt to suppress Revisionism regarding the second World War, see Harry Elmer Barnes's *The Struggle Against the Historical Blackout*, Ninth edition, 1952. Pamphlet available from the author. See also above, Chap. 1.
 40. *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*. See p. 45. Subsequently, there has appeared the more elegant defense by W. L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The Challenge of Isolation, 1937-1940* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), which has been considered in Chapter 1 of the present volume. For more detail on the Langer-Gleason book, see H. E. Barnes, *The Court Historians versus Revisionism* (second edition; privately printed, 1952).
 41. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
 42. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 468.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 19-20.
46. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Roosevelt and His Detractors," *Harper's Magazine*, June, 1950, pp. 62-68.
47. *Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor*, p. 453.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 454.
49. Hans J. Morgenthau, "National Interest and Moral Principles in Foreign Policy," *The American Scholar*, Spring, 1949, p. 212. Cf. Kennan, *op. cit.*, p. 95: ". . . I see the most serious fault of our past policy formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international problems." ". . . There might be [!] a state, or perhaps more than one state, which all the rest of the world community together could not successfully coerce into following a line of action to which it was violently averse. And if this is true, where are we? It seems to me that we are right back in the realm of the forgotten art of diplomacy from which we have spent 50 years trying to escape" (p. 100. The exclamation point is mine).
50. *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, pp. 55-56.
51. *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95; see also Sanborn, *op. cit.*, pp. 546-47.
52. Kennan, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-3.

Where U. S. Sends Men, Money

 Economic Aid





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U.S. Military Arms Around the World

Military Aid
(Weapons, Missions, etc.)

 U.S. Base



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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

by

HARRY ELMER BARNES

I charge that the articulate publicists of our country, by their semi-hysterical words in print and speech in which they champion extremes of diplomatic and military policy, are driving us rapidly into a war of unlimited and unattainable objectives which will bring on a gigantic catastrophe of ruin and revolution at home and abroad. . . .

By articulate publicists I mean those speakers and writers ranging from editors, novelists, magazine writers, columnists, dramatists, radio writers, lecturers, college professors, and educators, to senators and other elected officials, cabinet members, political leaders and presidents. When what they write and talk about becomes a united theme of agreement, action follows as certainly as butter follows the churning of sour cream. . . .

After fighting two world wars within a generation to defend democracy and freedom, with no result other than to see those ideals recede throughout the world, we shall be blind if we do not understand that a third such war, fought for equally unlimited and unattainable objectives, will end in one of the great catastrophes of history. For us to imagine that we can fight such a war without exhausting ourselves and destroying much of the good faith required for the functioning of democracy is to indulge in the same wishful thinking that twice has proved our political undoing.

—WILLIAM R. MATHEWS, *Editor,* Arizona Daily Star



With profit we may now briefly review the main facts and conclusions to which we are led by the material in the preceding chapters.

The first chapter, by the editor, indicates how two world wars, and especially the needless American entry therein, have converted the libertarian American dream of pre-1914 days into a nightmare of fear, regimentation, destruction, insecurity, inflation, and ultimate insolvency.

Revisionism, which means no more than the establishment of historical truth, when applied to the first World War, revealed the mistakes in our earlier interpretation of the causes and merits of that conflict, the folly of our entering it, and the disastrous results which followed. Revisionism helped us to return to national sanity, to the continentalism and peace of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover administrations, and to the neutrality legislation of the first administration of Roosevelt.

There is now a far more determined and ruthless resistance to Revisionism, as applied to the second World War, than there was in the 1920's when revisionists dealt with the conflict which began in 1914. This is due to the fact that the United States was much more directly involved in the diplomacy which led to the second World War. The intense hostility to Revisionism is prompted by the dictates of political expediency; by the hostility of special pressure groups interested in the promotion of war hysteria; by our indoctrination, for a decade and a half, with globaloney; and by the attitude of those with a vested professional and personal interest in upholding the official mythology expounded by the historians and social scientists who participated in great numbers in the propaganda and allied activities of the government during the war epoch.

The methods followed by the opponents of Revisionism fall mainly into these modes of operation: (1) denying revisionist his-

torians access to public documents; (2) intimidating publishers who might otherwise be willing to print revisionist materials; (3) ignoring or smearing revisionist books and articles; and (4) smearing and otherwise seeking to intimidate revisionist authors.

To counter the progress of Revisionism still further, many free and private historians voluntarily perpetuate the popular fictions relative to the second World War. They have either succumbed to globaloney or have a vested interest in sustaining the fictions. Then we have a considerable number of "court historians," who operate in a quasi-official manner and who are given full access to official documents on the tacit understanding that their books will defend the official version of events. Finally, we have an ever-growing body of official historians connected with the military establishment and executive departments who are paid to write history as their employers prescribe. This is a long step toward the official falsification of documents portrayed by George Orwell in his classic work, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*.

This antirevisionist historical bias has destroyed all semblance of accuracy in recent world history, and it gravely distorts the history of a more remote past by drawing false analogies with a fictitious recent past and present and by pointing up strained and mistaken causal relationships. In this way the antirevisionist historians are hurrying us along the path to the conditions of the "Nineteen Eighty-Four" system in which even the very concept of history is taboo and outlawed, because there must be no knowledge of the past against which existing mistakes and miseries can be tested and condemned.

The second chapter, by Dr. Tansill, provides a comprehensive survey of European diplomacy and international relations between the two World Wars and of the extent and results of American participation in international affairs during this era.

It is made clear how the Allied betrayal of President Wilson's Fourteen Points and the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, laid the basis for the second World War. This became ever more likely when the League of Nations failed to use its power to rectify the fatal terms of the vindictive postwar treaties. These

treaties created and nourished German and Austrian resentment and contributed crucially to the ultimate insolvency of these countries and to the resulting rise of totalitarianism. There were no substantial efforts made to revise the injustices done to Germany and Austria through negotiation with the peaceful—and actually peace-loving—republican leaders of these countries. The result was the rise of Hitler to power and the revision of the treaties by Nazi craftiness, bluff, and force. What Hitler actually did in the way of remedying the situation was not especially blameworthy; it was the methods he employed which, understandably, were shocking to many. But Hitler and his methods were, together, the penalty paid for fifteen years of Allied vindictiveness and folly. Professor Tansill lists and describes in sufficient detail the outstanding errors and injustices of the Treaty of Versailles and what came as its aftermath.

Aside from the action of the United States, which did sink or scuttle a number of serviceable ships (or others in construction) and cut down its army to a skeleton force, dishonesty, quibbling, delay, and reluctance characterized the whole fraudulent disarmament movement from 1920 to the mid-1930's. German rearmament was sharply restricted by the postwar settlement, but the European Allies failed to disarm in accordance with their agreement. Indeed, they proceeded to build up their armament above the 1914 level. Ultimately Hitler challenged the whole farce, announced the rearmament of Germany in defiance of Versailles, and the armament race took on new and enlarged proportions. But the relative extent of Nazi rearmament before 1939 was greatly exaggerated in the anti-Nazi propaganda. It did not exceed that of Britain and France.

The fumbling and stupidity of most Allied diplomats, but predominantly of Anthony Eden, broke down the system of collective security, for what it was worth, and opened the door to the unilateral moves of Hitler and Mussolini which hastened the second World War. Baldwin and Chamberlain, in England, acquiesced in Hitler's violations of the Treaty of Versailles because they relied on Hitler to act as a checkmate to the menace of Soviet Russia to the British Empire. On the eve of attaining striking success with this program, British diplomacy made a sudden and rather in-

explicable about-face in the winter and spring of 1939. After accepting, without serious objection, Hitler's more drastic moves and aggressions for some four years, Britain and France made war on Germany in protest against the most restrained and justifiable demand of Hitler's prewar career. That they did so was the result of pressure by Churchill and the Tory war group in England, by the British Labor party, and by President Roosevelt.

While the diplomacy of the Harding-Coolidge-Hoover administrations was opposed to the harsh postwar treaties, it did little to force any modification of them. Any attempt to do so was rendered the more difficult because the United States remained out of the League of Nations and made a separate treaty with Germany. The Dawes and Young plans served only to postpone the ultimate collapse of the reparations travesty; the impasse was finally recognized and terminated by President Hoover. American diplomacy under President Roosevelt failed to exercise a moderating influence on either Europe or Hitler.

American hostility toward Germany increased apace when Hitler came to power. This was a result of his crushing of liberalism and parliamentary government and of his persecution of the Jews. Hostility was reflected in our diplomacy which, in time, abandoned even the pretense of ordinary diplomatic courtesy and intercourse. Whatever William E. Dodd's great merits as an historian and teacher, he was an incredibly bad choice as ambassador to Nazi Germany—not unlike what it would have been if Hitler had appointed an ardent National Socialist ideologist as Nazi ambassador to the United States. The appointment of Dodd made German-American diplomatic relations all the more difficult and strained and Dodd's successors did little to improve the situation.

At the time of the Munich episode in 1938, President Roosevelt ostensibly favored the British policy of appeasing Hitler. Indeed, his communications to the European leaders involved may well have been the deciding factor in inducing Britain and France to decline to meet Hitler's threat by test of arms in 1938. But, from his discussions with American officials, especially General Henry H. Arnold, it is evident that Roosevelt regarded Munich as the prelude to war rather than assuring, as Chamberlain appears to

have hoped, "peace in our time." Yet Roosevelt was not in favor of war in 1938, for the situation then might well have been such that Hitler would have been defeated too rapidly to have permitted American entry into the conflict. The Czechs had a large and well-equipped army, and Russia was eager to collaborate in a war to check Hitler. By the summer of 1939 the situation had vastly changed. The Czech army was no more and Russia had signed a treaty with Nazi Germany. If war broke out under these conditions, it was likely to be a long one which would afford Mr. Roosevelt plenty of time to maneuver the United States into the fighting.

There seems little doubt that Mr. Roosevelt had decided to enter a European war, if possible, even before war broke out at the beginning of September, 1939. The *German White Paper* (captured Polish documents) and even the censored *Forrestal Diaries* confirm this conviction. What more definite assurances he may have given to Anthony Eden, in December, 1938, and to King George VI in June, 1939, remain a secret to this day.

The third chapter, by Dr. Sanborn, tells the story of President Roosevelt's unneutral conduct relative to the European War and of his unsuccessful efforts to enter the war directly through the European front door.

Dr. Sanborn reviews briefly the record of our anti-German diplomacy, especially from the date of the Chicago Bridge speech of October 5, 1937, urging the quarantine of aggressors. He shows that Roosevelt's pressure for peace at the time of Munich, in the autumn of 1938, was a decisive factor in preventing the checking of Hitler when this might have been accomplished by force because of the overwhelming odds against the Nazi leader. On April 14, 1939, Roosevelt made a speech calculated to enrage Hitler and Mussolini by comparing their methods to those of the Huns and Vandals. Through Ambassadors William C. Bullitt, Joseph P. Kennedy, and others, he put pressure on the Poles to stand firm against any German demands and on the British and French vigorously to support such a Polish policy. Such pacific communications as Roosevelt sent to Europe on the eve of war in August,

1939, were obviously only for the record, similar to his telegram to the Japanese Emperor on December 7, 1941.

Once war broke out in September, 1939, President Roosevelt dropped all semblance of neutrality, his policy thus standing in sharp contrast to that of President Wilson in 1914. Wilson, at the outset of the first World War, made a sincere effort to maintain neutrality and urged the nation to be neutral in both thought and action. Roosevelt moved for abrogation of our neutrality legislation even before the outbreak of war. He devoted himself to aid for Britain and France and opposed any movements designed to bring peace after the end of the Polish war. The full extent of his commitments to Britain will not be known until the nearly two thousand secret communications between him and Prime Minister Churchill are revealed to scholars. Mr. Churchill has told us that most of the important diplomatic business between the two countries from 1939 to Pearl Harbor was carried on in these secret messages (the so-called "Kent Documents"). But an impressive record of unneutrality can be assembled without these documents.

This unneutrality was stepped up after the fall of France and the British retreat from Dunkirk. Mr. Roosevelt's attitude was then well expressed in his famous "dagger in the back" address at the University of Virginia in June, 1940. Unneutral action amounting to acts of war began with the shipment of vast quantities of munitions to Britain after Dunkirk. By October, 1940, some 970,000 Enfield rifles, 200,000 revolvers, 87,500 machine guns, and over 1,200 pieces of artillery had been sent to Britain. President Roosevelt also began that stripping of our air defenses, for the benefit of Britain, which led to the resignation of Secretary of War Harry H. Woodring. New planes were to be allocated at the ratio of nineteen for the United States to fourteen for Britain. The famous destroyer deal was put through in September, 1940, an action which government lawyers admitted put us into the war both legally and morally. The peacetime Selective Service Act, the first in our history, was also passed in September, 1940.

That President Roosevelt had decided to fight out the war at the side of Britain by the end of 1940 was fully revealed by Harry Hopkins to Churchill at a luncheon on January 11, 1941, when

Hopkins told Churchill: "The President is determined that we shall win the war together. Make no mistake about it." To facilitate further plans for this joint conflict, top Army and Navy experts of the United States and Britain met in highly secret conferences in Washington from January to March, 1941. At the end of these sessions, Admiral Harold R. Stark wrote to his fleet commanders that "The question of our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*." At a supplementary conference in Singapore in April, 1941, it was agreed that our forces would attack the Japanese if the latter passed a certain designated point in the Pacific, even if they did not attack American ships or territory. This was a flagrant defiance of President Roosevelt's promise to the American people that we would not enter any war *unless* we were attacked.

Despite all this, President Roosevelt assured the American populace that all aid given to Britain was "short of war" and was designed to keep war from our shores. It was under this assumption that the Lend-Lease Act was pushed through Congress. But no sooner had the act been passed than President Roosevelt set in action the convoying policy which was a thinly veiled effort to lure Germany into a much desired act of war. The basis for the convoying program had been laid as early as January, 1941, and it actively began in April, 1941, though there were public denials by President Roosevelt, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox, and others. In spite of such grossly misinterpreted episodes on the Atlantic in connection with convoying as those of the *Robin Moor*, the *Greer*, the *Kearny* and the *Reuben James*, neither Germany nor Italy picked up the gage of battle. Not even President Roosevelt's war speech of September 11, 1941, denouncing "Nazi rattlesnakes" and announcing the policy of "shooting on sight" in the Atlantic, could lure Germany into war.

By the late summer of 1941 Messrs. Roosevelt and Churchill had decided that it might be impossible for the United States to enter the war by the European front door, and in August, 1941, they met off the coast of Newfoundland to devise a way whereby Roosevelt could force America into war through the back door of the Far East by a manipulation of Japanese-American relations. By

that time it was only a question of when and how. It was well known that war with Japan had been assured by the embargo and by the "freezing" orders of July, 1941—unless the United States was willing to lift these restrictions, which was something neither Roosevelt nor Hull ever remotely considered doing.

The fourth chapter, by Dr. Neumann, offers a broad survey of American policy toward Japan in the decade preceding Pearl Harbor. Essentially it was the same hostile policy developed by Stimson during the latter part of the Hoover administration. It was rejected by President Hoover but was adopted and continued by Roosevelt.

Japanese conduct in Asiatic affairs was dictated by two main objectives: (1) expansion to gain living room for the growing population of a small and scantily endowed island empire, to secure raw materials, and to obtain needed markets; and (2) the aspiration to attain the status and rights of a major power, without which Japan would be unable successfully to compete with Western imperialism. The resulting policy, increasingly sharpened by a growing recognition of Russian ambitions and advances in the Far East, was conducted as in other countries, at times by wise and moderate statesmen and at others by bellicose chauvinists. But the United States rarely made any effort to encourage and aid the Japanese moderates. Instead, American leaders usually rejected all friendly overtures.

The policy of the Roosevelt administration was based upon the idea that the maintenance of the "Open Door" in China and of Chinese territorial integrity was more important to us than friendship with Japan. The Open Door and Chinese integrity were regarded as a vital national interest of the United States. In addition to this, the Roosevelt policy held that our material interest in China was of crucial importance to this country. This policy was maintained despite the fact that our economic stake in Japan—investments and markets—was vastly greater than that in China and might be lost entirely as the result of an active anti-Japanese policy.

Roosevelt quickly scrapped the Hoover policy toward the Far

East and discussed war with Japan in his earliest cabinet meetings. But he was rebuffed by his cabinet and by the neutrality sentiment in Congress and throughout the country. So, as an enthusiastic disciple of Admiral Alfred T. Mahan, he contented himself for the time being with an unprecedented peacetime expansion of our naval forces, beginning with the allocation of N.R.A. funds for that purpose in June, 1933. He chose, as Secretary of the Navy, Claude A. Swanson, another ardent navalist.

The Japanese were, naturally and justifiably, alarmed because they correctly discerned that the Roosevelt naval expansion was aimed directly and deliberately at them. The United States, with British support, refused to modify the 5-5-3 naval ratio laid down at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1920-21. Thereupon Japan withdrew from the London Naval Disarmament Conference of 1935-36, but not before she had proposed a drastic cut in all naval tonnage which would have made impossible any naval war in the Pacific.

President Roosevelt laid plans for a naval blockade of Japan in 1937, but the adverse popular reaction to his quarantine speech of October 5 led to the abandonment of the project for the moment. In 1938 a new plan for naval war against Japan was formulated in a preliminary way, and was gradually expanded until the joint staff conferences in Washington in January-March, 1941, which, together with the Singapore agreement in April, committed us to make war upon Japan if she passed a given point in the Pacific, even though there was no attack on American ships or territory. Roosevelt was personally responsible for the location of our Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, in which move he disregarded the advice of Admirals Richardson and Stark. The State Department backed Roosevelt and Richardson was relieved of his command.

It was generally recognized by Washington authorities that the program for the economic strangulation of Japan, culminating in the sweeping embargo of July, 1941, would bring on war. The naval authorities were especially conscious of this and advised against it because they did not feel that we were prepared, as yet, for a naval war. Japan, given the alternative of economic starvation

or war, chose to fight, just as Roosevelt and Hull expected and hoped she would do.

Judged by the definitive test of results, the Japanese policy pursued by Roosevelt, Stimson, and Hull has proved a tragic and costly mistake. Russia, a far stronger power, has taken over Japan's Far Eastern hegemony. The Open Door is now closed tight, and for an indefinite period. The Far East is controlled by forces and powers which are determined, finally, to eject all Westerners. Japan has been removed as a checkmate to Russian expansion and has become a costly dependent of the United States. China is in the hands of Communists, and war rather than peace afflicts Asia.

In the fifth chapter Dr. Tansill gives us a succinct and frank account of the manner in which President Roosevelt, even before his inauguration, adopted the bellicose Stimson doctrine concerning the Far East and Japan, consistently rejected all Japanese peace overtures from 1933 to the end of 1941, and ultimately succeeded in needling the Japanese into the decision to attack our forces at Pearl Harbor, their only alternative to economic strangulation.

Mr. Stimson, when Secretary of State under President Hoover, had been much annoyed by Japanese operations on the mainland of Asia while remaining singularly unmoved by Soviet aggression and expansion from another direction. He had sought to apply sanctions against Japanese movements in Manchuria, but had been checked in this drastic move by President Hoover. Through the intermediary efforts of Felix Frankfurter, an old associate of Stimson, the latter had no difficulty in selling his Far Eastern and Japanese policy to President-elect Roosevelt at a conference at Hyde Park on January 9, 1933. Neither Stimson nor Roosevelt reckoned seriously with the menace of Russian advances in the Far East, which were almost solely restrained by Japan. Our Japanese policy under President Roosevelt, from this time until the attack on Pearl Harbor, was based upon a curious compound of anti-Japanese and unrealistic diplomatic policies and principles.

President Roosevelt's personal attitude toward Japan had no realistic basis in historical or economic knowledge. It was purely sentimental and mystical, founded primarily on the fact that some

of his ancestors had made money trading with China and also on the fantastic stories about aggressive Japanese programs for the future which had been told to him by a "Japanese schoolboy" who had been a fellow student at Harvard shortly after the turn of the century. Secretary Hull was equally innocent of the history of the Far East—indeed, of most history of any kind—and his hostile attitude toward Japan was framed against the background of his pharisaical international idealism which bore little or no relationship to the actual history of public affairs and the relations between nations. The remaining item in the compound was the violent prejudice against Japan held by Mr. Stimson, who became Secretary of War in the summer of 1940, and by Stanley K. Hornbeck, the State Department adviser on Far Eastern affairs. Against this amalgam of anti-Japanese feelings the conciliatory and statesmanlike efforts of Messrs. Joseph C. Grew and Eugene H. Dooman in the American Embassy at Tokyo could make little headway. This anti-Japanese and pro-Chinese policy had little or no relation to the economic realities of the situation, though the administration frequently appealed to an alleged economic interest to justify its anti-Japanese policy. Our economic interests in Japan vastly outweighed those in China.

Dr. Tansill gives us a realistic account of the Japanese movements on the mainland of Asia from 1931 to 1941. This contrasts markedly with the biased pro-Chinese and anti-Japanese interpretation which has commonly been accepted and which ignores the Soviet threats and advances in the Far East during this decade. He shows how Roosevelt and Hull rejected the pacific overtures by the Japanese liberals and moderates, even to the extent of proposed conferences between Japanese and American leaders. After 1937, the generally hostile attitude toward Japan was sharpened and hardened by President Roosevelt's decision to turn to armament and war as the most successful manner of prolonging his political tenure.

In spite of persistent American diplomatic hostility, the Japanese leaders, from considerations of sheer self-interest, had decided by the end of the year 1940 to seek a peaceful *modus vivendi* with the United States, even being willing to retire from the Asian mainland outside of Manchuria if they were given some face-saving

formula. Messrs. Grew and Dooman, in Tokyo, warmly urged Roosevelt and Hull to collaborate in this effort to promote general Far Eastern peace. But the proposals of both the Japanese and of our Tokyo diplomats were rejected at every turn by Roosevelt and Hull. Rather, the Stimson doctrine was revived and applied even more thoroughly and relentlessly.

The embargo on Japanese trade and the freezing of Japanese assets in July, 1941, were recognized by Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers as acts which would inevitably lead to war. The most feasible manner of arranging for the coming of such a war was discussed by Roosevelt and Churchill at their meeting off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941. As soon as he returned from this conference, Roosevelt sent for Admiral Nomura, the Japanese ambassador in Washington, and gave him what Stimson and top Army and Navy officials later described as amounting to an ultimatum, which was bound to strengthen the Japanese military chauvinists. Despite this, Premier Fumimaro Konoye of Japan made repeated overtures for a personal meeting with President Roosevelt with the aim of arriving at a definitive settlement of Japanese-American problems, even going so far as to make the unprecedented concession of offering to come to American shores for such a meeting. But Konoye's pleas were unceremoniously rejected.

Even this did not completely discourage the Japanese. As late as November, 1941, even the militaristic government of Admiral Tojo made a final offer to the United States which would have adequately protected our interests in the Far East and which would have afforded Japan the opportunity to retire honorably to Manchuria. This was rejected by Secretary Hull, under pressure from pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet personages in China and Washington. On November 26, 1941, Hull handed the Japanese an ultimatum so sharp and severe that, after he had transmitted it, Hull frankly admitted that his action had taken Japanese-American relations out of the realm of diplomacy and handed them over to the military authorities.

Accordingly, Washington awaited the inevitable Japanese attack. There was much worry for a time lest this be made on British or Dutch territory, which would have involved the Roosevelt ad-

ministration in serious political difficulties, in the light of Roosevelt's promise that we would not enter the war unless attacked. There was great relief, if no great surprise, when the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor.

The sixth chapter, by Mr. Morgenstern, provides the most reliable and up-to-date account of the immediate antecedents of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor which has yet been published. Incidentally, it disposes for all time of the whitewashings set forth in many newspapers and periodicals on the tenth anniversary of that tragic event.

When President Roosevelt finally got ready actively to foment war with Japan, he appropriately summoned Stimson as Secretary of War in June, 1940. Roosevelt laid his plan for an economic blockade of Japan in 1937 and continued it until the final and decisive move in the July, 1941, embargo. All responsible authorities in Washington knew this meant inevitable war with Japan unless it was relaxed, which Roosevelt, Hull, and Stimson were determined would never happen. Stimson was the father of the "sanctions" plan of economic pressure, and, once he was in the cabinet, the program proceeded apace. Roosevelt signed the Export Control Act on July 2, 1940. The expansion of this program effectively blocked Ambassador Grew's hopes and plans for a diplomatic understanding between Japan and the United States. The adoption of a war policy was not affected by our cracking Japanese coded messages which made it certain that Japan wished to avoid war with the United States at any cost short of national humiliation and complete retirement from the Asiatic mainland—which was what Roosevelt and Hull actually demanded of Japan.

Military and diplomatic plans for war on Japan paralleled the tightening of economic pressure. Highly secret joint staff conferences between the United States and Great Britain were held in Washington from January to March, 1941. At their close, Admiral Stark wrote to his fleet commanders that "The question as to our entry into the war now seems to be *when*, and not *whether*." This entry would take place, not only in the event that Japan attacked American forces or territory, but, also, under the

terms of a supplementary plan drafted at Singapore in late April, if Japan attacked the forces or territory of British Commonwealth nations or the Netherlands East Indies or moved her own forces beyond a line marked by 100 degrees East longitude and 10 degrees North latitude. Thus, despite President Roosevelt's assurances that our soldiers would not be sent into any foreign war, and regardless of the Democratic campaign pledge of 1940 that we would not go to war unless we were attacked, Roosevelt and his associates had pledged us to go to war if British or Dutch territory were attacked or if Japanese armed forces crossed an arbitrarily determined line.

Having failed to provoke Germany or Italy to declare war by our unneutral conduct in the Atlantic and in Europe, Roosevelt and Churchill met off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941, in an effort to devise some means for getting America into the war through the back door of the Pacific. Roosevelt insisted on "babying" the Japanese along for three months until we were better prepared for a Pacific war. But it was also agreed that Roosevelt would give a harsh warning to the Japanese ambassador in Washington, Admiral Nomura, which would stiffen the chauvinist groups in Tokyo. Accordingly, after Roosevelt returned from Newfoundland, he summoned Nomura on August 17 and gave him what Secretary Stimson and Army and Navy officials correctly described as virtually an ultimatum to Japan.

Despite this, Japan veritably crawled on its diplomatic belly from the end of August, 1941, until after the middle of November of that year in an attempt to reach some workable understanding with the United States. The effort met with cold and hostile rebuffs. The rejection of the earnest pleas of Prime Minister Konoye for a meeting with Roosevelt is well known. Not so well known is the fact that the United States had rejected two previous proposals of the Japanese to meet with high American officials at some designated spot, the last previous one being in 1939, at the crucial moment when Germany was seeking to force Japan into a military alliance. Numerous decoded Japanese messages, as well as the Japanese diplomatic proposals themselves, amply proved that the Japanese naval plans and movements in the autumn of 1941 were contingent on the failure to reach a reasonable diplomatic solution

of relations with the United States. Japanese diplomacy was not, as Herbert Feis has contended, a smoke screen for naval movements designed to provoke war.

The final Japanese diplomatic terms, offered in early November, 1941, as Proposals A and B—especially the latter—would have amply protected all legitimate American interests in the Far East. If they had been accepted, the outcome would have been infinitely more favorable to the United States than the results of the war with Japan, to say nothing of the costs and losses sustained by the United States in the war. The Japanese proposals were bluntly rejected. By November 25 the United States had decided upon war, with no intention of reaching a diplomatic settlement. On that day, at a meeting of Secretaries Hull, Knox, and Stimson, the latter noted in his diary that the only remaining question was how to maneuver Japan into the position of firing the first shot with the least possible loss to the United States. On the same day the Japanese task fleet left the Kuriles for Pearl Harbor, with instructions to “fire the first shot” if no diplomatic settlement was reached, but to return to its base if diplomacy succeeded.

Secretary Hull dispatched an ultimatum to Japan on November 26 which, he fully recognized, decisively closed the door to peace. He himself said that it took the Japanese situation out of diplomacy and handed it over to the Army and Navy. From this time onward it was only a question of when and where the Japanese would attack. Stimson, himself, opposed waiting for the Japanese to attack, and urged that American planes in the Philippines attack the Japanese fleet without warning or any declaration of war, thus executing a Pearl Harbor in reverse.

The decoded Japanese messages between November 26 and December 7 indicated, with relative certainty, when the attack would be made, and they also revealed the strong probability that it would be aimed at Pearl Harbor.

In January, 1941, Ambassador Grew had warned Washington that, if the Japanese ever did try to make a surprise attack on the United States, it would probably take place at Pearl Harbor. Top Washington authorities agreed with this. Japanese messages intercepted by Naval Intelligence in Washington between November

26 and December 7 gave convincing evidence that Grew had been right. Especially significant was the fact that Tokyo authorities repeatedly demanded information from their spies at Hawaii as to the situation of the fleet and all other relevant facts as to the Army and Navy deployment there, but asked for no similar information about other possible places of attack.

Basil Rauch and others have contended that Roosevelt and his military entourage expected the attack to take place in Thailand. They were, indeed, worried about the Thailand possibility, not because they regarded it as anywhere nearly as probable as an attack at Pearl Harbor, but because, if the Japanese attack was made in Thailand, they would have had to go to war without the benefit of an attack on American ships or territory. This would have been a violation of Roosevelt's vehement and repeated promises that Americans would not be sent into foreign wars and also of the statement in the Democratic platform of 1940 which said that we would not go to war *unless attacked*. Roosevelt's problem of carrying the country with him in war would have been greatly intensified. This was the reason for the immense relief felt by American civil and military leaders when the attack was finally made on Pearl Harbor.

Well in advance, the time of the anticipated attack was made even more certain. The "East Wind, Rain" message, indicating that diplomacy had ended and that Japan would make war on Britain and the United States, was intercepted by Naval Intelligence on December 4, three days before the attack. It became known early on the afternoon of the sixth that the Japanese reply to Hull's ultimatum, which all informed persons knew would mean war, would be received on the evening of that day. It was intercepted, and the first thirteen sections were carried to President Roosevelt early that night. He and Harry Hopkins agreed that this meant war. Roosevelt inquired where Admiral Stark was, and, finding that he was at the theater, ordered that he not be disturbed, lest public excitement and curiosity be aroused. The fourteenth section, making it certain, in the light of all past experience as to the way in which Japan began its wars, that the Japanese were going to attack, was ready for distribution in decoded form by 8:00 A.M.

on the morning of the seventh. The decoded Japanese message revealed that the full reply would be formally presented to Secretary Hull by the Japanese at 1:00 P.M. on the seventh—7:30 A.M. Pearl Harbor time. It was recognized that this would probably be the precise time of the Japanese attack.

Nevertheless, nothing was done to warn General Short or Admiral Kimmel at Pearl Harbor. General Marshall disappeared on the afternoon of the sixth and, despite his phenomenal memory, he has persistently declared that he cannot remember where he was on the night of the sixth. Admiral Stark was relaxing at the theater. Stark, although reached by telephone by Roosevelt later that night, did nothing to warn Kimmel during the morning of the seventh. Marshall went for a leisurely horseback ride. When he finally showed up at headquarters, at 11:25 A.M. on the morning of the seventh, instead of immediately sending General Short a warning message by scrambler telephone, which would have reached Short safely in a matter of minutes, he not only failed to do so, but even declined Stark's offer of the use of the speedy naval transmitter. Instead, Marshall leisurely sent Short the message by ordinary commercial radio, not even marking it urgent, just as he might have sent a birthday message to his grandmother. It reached Short seven hours and three minutes after the Japanese attack began and long after the Japanese planes had returned to their carriers.

Just why Marshall and Stark failed to warn Short and Kimmel has never been satisfactorily explained. Marshall has said that he failed to telephone a warning message for fear that the Japanese might intercept it and embarrass the State Department. If they had intercepted such a message the only immediate conceivable result would have been that the Japanese might have called off the attack, since it could not then have been a surprise, or that our forces would have been better prepared to resist the onslaught.

President Roosevelt expressed himself as greatly "surprised" at both the time and place of the attack, and his apologists have accepted these words at their face value. Neither the President nor his apologists have ever given any satisfactory explanation of why he could have been surprised. One thing is certain: he and his entourage were vastly relieved that the attack did take place at

Pearl Harbor rather than at Thailand. If they had any reason at all to be surprised, it was only over the extent of the damage inflicted by the Japanese. But there was little reason even for this, in the light of Roosevelt's personal order to keep the fleet bottled up like a flock of wooden ducks, of the order that no decoding machine should be sent to Pearl Harbor, and of the fact that Washington had deliberately failed to pass on to Short and Kimmel any of the alarming information intercepted during the three days before the attack. December 7 may have been a "day of infamy," but the infamy was not all that of Japan.

The seventh chapter, by Percy L. Greaves, Jr., is the only thorough and searching account of the various investigations of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster, though much of the ground had already been covered in a different manner in Charles Austin Beard's *President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941* (Part II). Even the literate American public, if it knows about any investigations of Pearl Harbor, is likely to believe that there were only two of them: the Roberts Commission Report, soon after the attack, and the Congressional Joint Committee investigation of 1945-46. As a matter of fact, there have been some nine investigations, of one sort or another, although none of them uncovered all of the cogent evidence. These investigations are of the utmost importance, not only politically but historically. From them we have learned most of what we know about the scandalous circumstances surrounding the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the responsibility of Roosevelt and his Washington entourage for this personal and public tragedy.

The first investigation of the Pearl Harbor incident was made by Secretary of the Navy William Franklin (Frank) Knox, who flew to Hawaii immediately after the disaster and reported to the President about a week later. Knox stated that General Short and Admiral Kimmel could not be held responsible for the tragedy since they had not been supplied with the secret information about the impending Japanese attack which had been intercepted in Washington. Further, he held that, even if they had been informed, they would not have been able to make an efficient defense, due to the

diversion of American fighter planes to the English, Chinese, Dutch, and Russians. Naturally, the administration suppressed this report. It was not discovered until it was dug out of the files by Senator Homer Ferguson at the time of the Congressional Joint Committee investigation in 1945-46.

Next came the Commission of Inquiry headed by Supreme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts, which did its work between December 18, 1941, and January 23, 1942. This was deliberately created to whitewash the Roosevelt administration and the Army and Navy officials in Washington. The Roberts Commission performed its task perfectly. It held that Washington had adequately alerted the commanders at Pearl Harbor as to the danger of an impending Japanese attack and that Short and Kimmel had been delinquent in their duty in failing to take adequate steps to repel the attack.

Justice Roberts stated that he had given *all* of his report to the public. Earlier, General Marshall had sworn that the sections revealing the secret knowledge intercepted by Washington before Pearl Harbor concerning the probable attack had been withheld from the report as given out by Roberts on January 25, 1942. We now know that Marshall was correct in this matter.

This edited and censored Roberts Report was given wide publicity and many Americans still believe that it represents the last word on the responsibility for Pearl Harbor. They have had further reason for this belief in that most of the books which have endeavored to whitewash the Roosevelt administration relative to Pearl Harbor essentially duplicate the Roberts conclusions.

Early in 1944 Admiral Kimmel requested the Navy Department to make a record of all testimony given relative to Pearl Harbor. On February 12, 1944, the Navy Department appointed Admiral Thomas C. Hart to make the investigation and collect the testimony. Though Hart had no authority to question the White House, or the State or War Departments, and did not question Admiral Stark, Admiral Kimmel, Captain Arthur McCollum, or Commander Alvin D. Kramer, the key Navy witnesses, he did obtain conclusive evidence, especially from Captain Laurence F. Safford, that the Washington authorities had comprehensive secret information, well in advance of December 7, 1941, of an impending

Japanese attack. Admiral Richmond K. Turner also revealed the fact that, as early as May, 1941, the Navy was laying its war plans for co-operation with the British and Dutch in the Pacific, even though the Japanese did not attack American forces or territory. Naturally, none of this information was given to the public.

Even more damaging was the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, which started work in July, 1944, and collected some forty-one volumes of testimony and seventy exhibits. It examined over 150 witnesses. Due to the integrity and courage of Colonel Harry A. Toulmin, executive officer of the board, the report gave an honest and accurate account of the Pearl Harbor situation, so far as the board could obtain evidence. It had no authority to question the White House or State Department. The report placed the blame on Secretary of State Hull, General Marshall, and General Leonard T. Gerow, as well as on General Short. The APHB also dug up much additional data as to the nature and extent of the secret information possessed by the Washington authorities in advance of December 7, 1941, concerning the impending Japanese attack. The APHB Report was not given to the public until after V-J Day, but it greatly upset Secretary of War Stimson, and he sought to undo the damage by the Clausen Investigation, which will be described shortly.

The investigation conducted by the Navy Court of Inquiry from July 24, 1944, to October 19, 1944, did an equally good piece of work in investigating the responsibility of naval officials for Pearl Harbor. The court essentially exonerated Admiral Kimmel of neglect of duty and severely criticized Admiral Stark for not passing on to Kimmel the secret information about the prospective Japanese attack which Stark possessed before Pearl Harbor. One of the most important things accomplished by the NCI Report was to establish beyond any possibility of doubt that the crucial "Winds Code Execute" messages ("East Wind, Rain") had actually been received, decoded, and discussed by top Washington officials of the Army and Navy, and possibly at the White House. This message, intercepted and decoded on December 4, 1941, revealed that Japan had abandoned diplomatic efforts and was about to make war on the United States and Britain. General Marshall was said to have

ordered the destruction of the copy of the "Winds" messages in the Army files, and whitewashing historians like Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison have tried to make us believe that no such code message was ever received. The NCI Report was not given out until after the close of the war.

The so-called Clarke Inquiries, conducted by Colonel Carter W. Clarke, deputy chief of the Military Intelligence Service, in September, 1944, and July, 1945, were mainly concerned with the handling of "Magic," the decoded Japanese messages, by the War Department. While designed to be a whitewash, the inquiry did establish the fact that the "Winds" message was well known to Army officials before Pearl Harbor, and revealed the secret Anglo-American-Dutch naval plans for war that so worried Roosevelt and his associates when they learned that there might be a "long shot" chance that the Japanese would attack Thailand instead of Pearl Harbor.

Since the APHB Report had criticized top Army officials, including General Marshall and General Gerow, Secretary Stimson set about to undermine the report. On November 23, 1944, Stimson announced the appointment of Colonel Henry C. Clausen of the Judge Advocate General's Department and a former member of the staff of the APHB to travel anywhere necessary, interview persons who had given damaging testimony during the APHB inquiry, and to get them, if possible, to modify their testimony. Clausen travelled 55,000 miles and interviewed ninety-two persons. He included statements from only fifty in his report. As might be expected, the Clausen "investigation" whitewashed Marshall and condemned Short, finding its main Washington scapegoat in General Gerow, though, at the time of Pearl Harbor, Gerow had no authority whatever to issue instructions to General Short. Only General Marshall could have done that.

The Navy Department was also disturbed over the NCI Report, so, on May 2, 1945, Admiral H. Kent Hewitt was instructed to make a study of all previous Navy investigations of Pearl Harbor and conduct all needed further investigation. The Hewitt Inquiry failed to whitewash Admiral Stark as the Clausen investigation had whitewashed General Marshall, though it is relatively certain that

any delinquencies on the part of Stark in December, 1941, were due to restraints imposed on him by the White House. The blame for Pearl Harbor, as far as the Navy was concerned, was still placed primarily on Admiral Kimmel, though Admiral Hewitt specifically admitted that Stark did not send Kimmel the alarming secret information about the coming Japanese attack which Stark possessed.

The most formidable investigation of the responsibility for the Pearl Harbor disaster was that conducted by a Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack, which carried on its work from September, 1945, to May, 1946. This was produced mainly by the demands of Senator Homer Ferguson and other congressional critics of administration conduct relative to Pearl Harbor and the earlier investigations thereof. Though this congressional inquiry occupied much time, examined many witnesses, and collected a vast body of evidence, the Democratic majority members had no wish or intention to get at the real facts about the actual responsibility for Pearl Harbor. They desired as much of a whitewash as would be possible at a public hearing that was under the eye of the press and public, though both the press and public had been conditioned to accept administration innocence. The Republican minority was eager to get at facts damaging to the Roosevelt administration, but was prevented from obtaining all the evidence it desired—even all of that which the executive department would divulge—and it was limited in its examination of witnesses. The committee was buried under an avalanche of alleged evidence which it did not request and which it did not have time to examine—and much of it was irrelevant. The inquiry was stopped short over the protests of the minority, though Secretaries Hull and Stimson did not appear for detailed examination, nor were the orderlies who covered General Marshall on December 6, 1941, brought to the stand. Only they could have revealed the mysterious location of Marshall on the crucial night of December 6, 1941.

The Majority Report would have been a complete whitewash had it not been for the successful effort made to lure the Republican Congressmen, Gearhart and Keefe, into signing the Majority Report. To bring about this result, the majority had to concede the

introduction of much damaging material relative to the Roosevelt administration, and to the Army and Navy Departments. It is instructive to note that even this majority effort at whitewashing presents a far more damaging case against the Washington authorities than the whitewashing volumes of Walter Millis, Basil Rauch, Samuel Eliot Morison, and Herbert Feis, to all of whom the full congressional report was available. Even though Gearhart and Keefe made a tactical error in signing the Majority Report, Keefe, at least, did not agree with much of it. His long statement, in his "Additional Views," was in some ways a sharper indictment of the Washington authorities than the Minority Report. The latter was very restrained, due to the effort to state nothing not overwhelmingly supported by what evidence the minority could obtain. It placed the responsibility for the disaster at Pearl Harbor squarely on the shoulders of the authorities at Washington, where it belonged.

Despite the mass of damaging information brought forth by the APHB and the NCI, and by the Congressional Joint Committee, considerable evidence awaits further investigation, and it is unfortunate that, when the Republicans were in a majority in Congress in 1947-49, they did not clean up the matter.

Mr. Greaves concludes his survey with material from the recently published official Army history on *Prewar Plans and Preparations*, which thoroughly establishes the fact that Roosevelt had committed us to war in the Pacific even if American forces and territory were not attacked—a violation of his sacred 1940 promises to "American fathers and mothers," and the reason for the great agitation of the administration authorities lest the Japanese might possibly attack at Thailand.

The net result of revisionist scholarship applied to Pearl Harbor boils down essentially to this: In order to promote Roosevelt's political ambitions and his mendacious foreign policy some three thousand American boys were quite needlessly butchered at Pearl Harbor. Of course, they were only a drop in the bucket compared to those who were ultimately slain in the war that resulted, which was as needless, in terms of vital American interests, as the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor.

The eighth chapter, by Mr. Chamberlin, goes to the crux of the Roosevelt foreign policy. It has been well established that Roosevelt lied this country into the second World War against the wishes of at least 80 per cent of the American people. This war cost the United States about a million casualties—227,131 were killed in action, 26,705 died of wounds, 38,891 died of other causes, 12,780 were missing, and 672,483 were wounded. Its direct monetary cost to the United States was about \$350,000,000,000—the ultimate cost will be at least one and a half trillion dollars, not counting military costs after 1945 which resulted directly from President Roosevelt's war and which are increasing fantastically today. There were other great cultural and moral costs which Mr. Chamberlin enumerates in his chapter.

The wisdom of Roosevelt and his associates in provoking and waging this war can only be fairly tested by weighing the results against the costs. Enormous advantages would have to be proved to justify such astronomical costs and appalling tragedies. Mr. Chamberlin proves with a wealth of evidence that virtually no benefits to humanity at large or to the citizens and national interest of the United States were reaped as a result of our entry into the war. For the most part, the situation is far worse than it would have been if we had remained aloof.

Many adulators of the foreign policy of President Roosevelt have now been forced, by the mounting evidence, to admit that he did lie us into war. But they take refuge in the allegation that this was all more than justified by the great services he rendered to the United States and to the world. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has contended that such a policy and actions were the traits of the good public servant and faithful official. Mr. Chamberlin's chapter answers such cynical casuistry for all time.

At the outset of the chapter, Mr. Chamberlin recounts the manner in which Roosevelt lied us into war, from the destroyer-base deal of September, 1940, to Secretary Hull's ultimatum of November 26, 1941. Public assurances of peaceful intent were paralleled throughout by policies and actions deliberately and effectively designed to bring us into war. Chamberlin exposes the bogus scare campaign which was based on the allegation that Hitler planned

to conquer and occupy the United States as soon as he had disposed of Britain and Russia.

The main announced aims of Franklin D. Roosevelt in waging the war were: (1) applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter of August, 1941; (2) fostering the Four Freedoms; (3) securing the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan as a prerequisite of peace; (4) co-operating with Soviet Russia for the purpose of promoting freedom, democracy, justice and peace throughout the world; (5) defending and perpetuating the regime of Chiang Kai-shek in the Far East; (6) promoting throughout the world our high moral ideals as expressed in Roosevelt's fictitious promises and Secretary Hull's pharisaical banalities; (7) creating a new world organization—the United Nations—which would curb war and assure permanent world peace; and (8) increasing American national security and obtaining assurance of protection from menacing forces both within and without our country.

Mr. Chamberlin relentlessly, but fairly, goes down the line of these alleged war aims and shows that only one was realized in practice. The Atlantic Charter has been violated as completely as were the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson after 1918. Russia took the lead in the violation of the Charter, but the United States and Britain were not without guilt and they stood aside in the face of wholesale Russian violations. None of the Four Freedoms was made more effective by the war and, in most respects, they are further from realization in 1953 than in 1940. Unconditional surrender prolonged the war by nearly two years; led to colossal and needless losses in lives, money, property, historic monuments, and art treasures; helped to put Russia in a dominant position in the Old World; disrupted the economic life of Central Europe; and cost the United States in excess of twenty-five billion dollars in the effort to restore the damaged areas. It also created in the devastated areas undying resentment which may produce the germs of a third world war.

Russia repudiated all concern with democracy and liberty after the war was over and was interested in peace only if it was assured in terms of Russian interests. As a result of Roosevelt's collaboration with Russia, the latter attained greater power than Germany

and Japan combined had possessed in 1940, and the Soviets were far less interested in amicable relations with the United States than Germany and Japan were before Pearl Harbor. The balance of power was destroyed in Europe, and the United States is now spending untold billions in the futile effort to restore it. In the Far East Russia has superseded Japan as the dominant power, and Japan has been rendered helpless as a checkmate against Russian advances. Chiang Kai-shek has been driven in impotent disgrace to a precarious haven in Formosa and the Chinese Communists have taken over China. Our inept policy in China has forced the Chinese Communists into the arms of the Kremlin instead of turning Chinese national ambitions against Russia. A new world war is raging in Korea, far more menacing to world peace than the Chinese-Japanese war of 1937-41.

Roosevelt's benign moral promises and Hull's pious beatitudes have gone with the wind, leaving behind the horrors of mass murder, appalling physical devastation, wholesale deportations, vindictive massacres, legalized lynchings of defeated war leaders, a world in chaos, and international integrity only a memory. The United Nations is split right down the middle, has failed to promote peace, and its rump is being used to promote war rather than to assure peace. Public morality has been debased by a generation of public lying, and cynicism about the gravest offenses against political ethics is growing with alarming rapidity. The corruption of the Truman administration vastly exceeded that of the Harding era.

American national security has not been assured; rather, it is much more precarious than in 1941. Russian power is far greater than that of Germany and Japan combined, and Russia is less desirous of peace with the United States. Our economic security is menaced by debt, unparalleled inflation, near-confiscatory taxes, and the prospect of astronomical future expenditures in a probably futile effort to regain the international security we already enjoyed at the time of Pearl Harbor. Individual security is menaced by our unstable economy, by unprecedented inroads upon our civil liberties and personal rights and by the specter of universal military training and interminable war hazards.

Such is the balance sheet of Roosevelt foreign policy, as Mr.

Chamberlin accurately concludes: "intellectual, moral, political, and economic bankruptcy, complete and irretrievable."

In a short postscript to Mr. Chamberlin's chapter, Dr. Neumann shows that the Truman administration followed the same interventionist policy as did the Roosevelt regime, using similar tactics and with comparably disastrous results.

In the ninth chapter Dr. Lundberg investigates the bearing and effects of the Roosevelt-Truman global foreign policy on the national interest of the United States. He examines the problem in the light of social science rather than the romantic, ethnocentric idealism of the global enthusiasts.

Our conception of national interest and security down to about 1914, and very completely down to 1898, was founded upon the framework of what has been called continentalism. This rejected American intervention in the controversies of the Old World and warned against Old World interference in our own affairs. It reserved complete freedom of action in defending our interests and rights in all parts of the world. It embraced neutrality as our basic policy in world affairs, designed to limit, so far as possible, such wars as did flare forth. Isolationism was no part of this outlook or policy. Those who upheld the principle of continentalism were not opposed to any reasonable degree or volume of peaceful international relationships and they were as congenial to all practicable world organization as they were to pleasant weather, a salubrious climate, or human happiness. In the era during which continentalism was dominant we grew to be a great and prosperous nation, remained aloof from world wars for a century, were free from heavy public debt and more than nominal Federal taxes, and enjoyed greater personal liberty than any other important nation in the world.

To counter this traditional policy of continentalism, which made the United States secure and prosperous, there has appeared, since 1914 and especially since 1940, a movement based on internationalism and interventionism which repudiates nearly all of our traditional principles and practices. It was born out of the following pressures: (1) the myth of the indispensable value of a large foreign

trade to the prosperity of the country; (2) uninformed, unbridled, and undisciplined ethnocentric idealism; (3) the lavishly subsidized peace movement, with easy access to and great power over the leading agencies of communication and propaganda, now the leading nonpolitical pressure group for global war; and (4) British diplomacy, which has cleverly won American support during terminal stages of British imperial disintegration.

The best way to assess the relative advantages of these two contesting conceptions of national interest is to examine their past and probable future contributions to American security and prosperity. It was once assumed that we could be safe within our own boundaries, but now we are told that we must have many military bases widely scattered throughout the globe. Yet this is not likely to promote our own security or world peace. The more we extend our bases the more we expose ourselves to attack and the more we arouse the hostility of other nations which are not likely to take at their face value our protestations of peace and good will. Our peace record on our own continent is not too impressive. It is generally agreed that our entry into the first World War did not increase our security, and there is a growing conviction that the same is true of our entry into the second.

The new internationalism has introduced a legalistic-moralistic approach to world problems that ignores "the principles of limits and balance operative in human society, based on the location and distribution of resources as well as on technological development and literacy of populations, to which realistic political and economic programs must conform if they are to achieve their objectives." It is fantastic to imagine that we can extend all the blessings of advanced cultures to all peoples of the globe immediately and without reference to these principles. World prosperity and peace must be developed in harmony with ecological and sociological principles rather than in accord with the rhetoric of radio commentators, journalists, preachers, playwrights, novelists, and sculptors. The folly of the legalistic-moralistic-emotional approach to world problems can be well illustrated by such recent and costly absurdities as Britain's encouragement of German policies from 1933 to 1939—and then suddenly declaring war on Germany for

continuing the same policies. Then came the Allied destruction of German and Japanese military power, soon to be followed by a costly and probably vain effort to rebuild it. Britain tolerated or encouraged, for several years, the American imposition of a modified Morgenthau Plan on Germany in 1945—and then approved replacing it with a Marshall Plan to repair the damage done.

Security may well be promoted by larger organizations than the national state, but such larger political entities must be based on geographical, ecological, technological, and cultural realities. Fantastic political boundaries are set up carelessly and arbitrarily, but once they are established, however casually and lightheartedly, they take on some mysterious sanctity; to violate them “breaks the heart of the world.” Every border war becomes a world war, and world peace disappears from the scene. By this absurd policy, internationalism and interventionism invite and insure “perpetual war for perpetual peace,” since any move which threatens petty nations and these mystical boundaries becomes an “aggressive war” which must not be tolerated, even though to oppose it may break the back of the world.

So far as prosperity is concerned, the new internationalism makes no better showing than it does with respect to peace and security. Foreign trade has never constituted more than 10 per cent of the total trade of the United States, and domestic trade could easily be increased by much more than 10 per cent through wise economic reforms. The cost of wars and armaments to the United States since 1917 exceeds the income that would result from a favorable balance in our foreign trade for a thousand years. The illogicality of the attitude of the “one worlders” in regard to the foreign trade which they venerate is easily exposed by pointing out that, if we actually produced the world state they so ardently demand, there would be no foreign trade whatever.

Before 1914 our national debt was virtually nonexistent; now it is approaching three hundred billions. Taxes are becoming confiscatory. President Truman collected more Federal taxes from April, 1945, to January, 1953, than all other American Presidents combined. Inflation is whittling away with alarming speed the purchasing power of the dollar.

The dolorous record of global meddling is becoming so impressive that it is at last beginning to stimulate apostasy among the formerly devout in the Roosevelt-Truman circle. The best example is provided by the recent book by George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*, in which the author assails the logic and alleged benefits of the legalistic-moralistic approach of the internationalists with as much vigor as Beard, though he discreetly, if illogically, withholds most criticism on events since 1939. It is easy, however, for the reader to carry Kennan's argument down through the mid-century.

Despite the overwhelming domination of the internationalists over public policy today, their defeat is not impossible. The movement is supported actively by only a microscopic fraction of the populace, though we all suffer from its depredations. The internationalists constitute only a sort of "Inner Party" in our incipient "Nineteen Eighty-Four" regime—not unlike the select Communist group or elite in Soviet Russia. The total claimed membership of all the world government organizations combined is under one hundred thousand. This presents what is probably the most extreme example of minority control in modern history, though its exponents pretend to be battling for world democracy. Their strength lies in their command over the agencies of communication and the support given them by powerful minority pressure groups, the world's richest foundations, and powerful oil and other international financial interests. If the public could get access to the facts, the return to continentalism and to sanity in world affairs would be quickly accomplished, to the vast benefit of the national interest and security of the United States.

There is little doubt that this book will be smeared by the "blackout" and "whitewashing" contingents as "a return to prewar isolationism," "the revival of America First," and the like. The epithet of "isolationism" is one of the conspicuous examples of the provision of "Newspeak" by the American advance guard of "Nineteen Eighty-Four" semantics. It is a smear term with no realistic meaning. Few of those who opposed American entry into the second World War were isolationists in any sense

whatever and many of the leaders, like the late Professor Beard, were lifelong advocates of rational international relations and good will. Indeed, there has been little or no literal isolationism in our traditional American foreign policy. Even Jefferson and the Founding Fathers were vigorous advocates of international intercourse and understanding. The only isolation that any of them, or their successors, ever advocated was isolation from selfish foreign quarrels, and this policy is as wise and vital today as it was in 1800. Indeed, it is even more essential to our national salvation and security today than it was a century and a half ago.

The authors of this book are educated and realistic persons who recognize the need and advantage of the widest possible degree of international contacts and relationships on a peaceful plane. Many of them were actively working toward such a goal when some of the most vocal advocates of global meddling today were babes in their cradles and swaddling clothes. They welcome the vision of world government at some distant date when it becomes feasible, after the nations of the world have been gradually prepared for such a momentous achievement through a better understanding of their mutual traits and interests and an increasing willingness to subordinate selfish national interests to international good will and cooperation. But the authors fail to discern any promising prospect of achieving better world understanding and collaboration as a result of power politics and military forays directed by great opposing coalitions of powers. A system which transforms every border war into a potential world war, seeks to thwart fundamental historic trends, and makes war scares and armament hysteria the basis of domestic political strategy and economic "prosperity" can hardly be regarded as an effective means to achieve world peace.

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