I hate haggling. I have always hated haggling. Why do I dislike it so? In the first place, haggling seems like a tremendous waste of time, energy, and resources that could have been better spent on other things. It seems horribly inefficient. Beyond that, and even more fundamentally, haggling tacitly presupposes as a distinct possibility (if not probability) that there is a threat of rapacious hostility on the part of the seller. To defend himself from this threat, the buyer is coerced into haggling himself as it is his only means of countering it. For me, the underlying antagonism robs the experience of shopping of whatever pleasure it might otherwise possess.

Clearly, not all people feel the way I do about haggling. In certain Middle-Eastern and Oriental countries, haggling is so much a part of the cultural software that it is generally expected that, whenever you go to make any kind of purchase, the seller will outrageously inflate his price at first, while you, as the buyer, are expected to counter him with an outrageously low ball offer. All of this is done with the tacit understanding that, eventually, through a lengthy process of going back and forth, a sensible price for both buyer and seller will be arrived at. The ‘wonders’ of haggling apply to everything, even to something as innocuous as a bunch of bananas. Is it any wonder that Westerners who find themselves in an Eastern bazaar, but who have not been duly forewarned, often end up like lambs led to the slaughter?

There is, of course, an alternative to haggling which is in operation to some significant but imperfect extent throughout the world, and which has its roots in Western culture: the notion of the ‘just price.’ To my mind, setting and ‘publishing’ (making public) a price that is, in some fundamental sense, ‘fair’, to both the seller and the buyer, so that neither one is taking advantage of the other, is infinitely preferable to having to haggle. This price could be arrived at through custom, through the operations of the free market (assuming the participation of virtuous actors), or through some form of government regulation and oversight. The difficulty with the ‘just price approach’ has usually to do with how do we determine what the objective basis for the ‘just price’ could or should be. As they say in French, “ce n’est pas évident”.

Whether because of the influence of Christianity and/or other cultural factors, C.H. Douglas noted that when it comes to the question of price, there is a basic bifurcation between the East and its love of haggling on the one hand, and the West and its desire (never completely fulfilled) to transcend haggling altogether through an application of some kind of rational principle on the other:

“Perhaps the cleavage in outlook between the East and West is most practically exemplified in the idea of ‘price’ as simply the haggling of the market, or as Sir Marcus Samuel put it, ‘the price of an article is what it will fetch,’ on the one hand, and the struggles of the Mediaeval Church (the foundation of Europeanism) with the concept of the Just Price. Whether St. Thomas Aquinas achieved any stable mechanism for this doctrine, I do not know—probably not. But the philosophy of it is basic. There is no part of the Social Credit thesis which has roused such rancour as the demonstration that the Just, or what we now prefer to call the Compensated Price, is at the root of economic democracy.”

My love for the clear, the linear, and the logical has always put me firmly in the Western camp where mentalities are concerned, and so my marked preference for the Western approach to price (and my disdain for haggling) now become self-explanatory. Similarly, since Douglas Social Credit is the only doctrine of which I am aware which finally provides, as Major Douglas intimates, a firm foundation for the concept of the previously elusive concept of the ‘just price’, my passionate interest in Douglas Social Credit follows inexorably.
Douglas established that as the true or natural cost of producing any good or service involves the consumption of all of the matter and energy involved in brining that good or service into being, the financial cost of any such item should never exceed the sum of the financial costs paid out to cover the raw materials and the process of their transformation into a finished piece of output. The global C/P or consumption/production ratio gives us the objective standard for regulating final prices so that they reflect the true or natural costs of production. Once applied, retail prices would be lowered by the price factor (the discount that needs to be granted to reduce financial prices so that they reflect natural costs) and the National Credit Authority would reimburse retailers with the difference via an issue of debt-free credit. Neither the seller nor the buyer would be able to take advantage of the other. In addition, the seller would have all of his costs met, while the buyer would have the price of items lowered so that they become more affordable to him (thereby indirectly increasing his purchasing power).

As a condition of participating in the compensated price reimbursement system, Douglas proposed that profit margins on turnover would have to be negotiated and agreed to so that retailers could not arbitrarily raise or inflate their prices so as to negate the debt-free injections into the economy made possible via the discount.

Since price levels would be regulated by means of the c/p ratio in line with the rational principle that ‘the true cost of production is consumption’, the establishment of a full-fledged Douglas Social Credit financial system would effectively put a final end to haggling, at least as far as the flow of current production is concerned. It’s an interesting question whether haggling for second-hand goods would continue in a Douglas Social Credit Commonwealth. There would probably be no law or regulation prohibiting it. However, the fact that new goods (including houses) would be priced at the compensated price means that second hand goods would have to be similarly priced if they are to compete. This is likely to restrict the space and the possibility for haggling. As far as I am concerned, I would be none too pleased if we could get rid of haggling entirely.

As an interesting aside, the Western antipathy for haggling is so strong as a cultural undercurrent that, in the absence of a more perfect Douglas Social Credit ‘just price’ system, one wonders if the desire to avoid it must not seek out other ways to manifest itself in whatever way that it can … in whatever way is available to it. In this regard, I do wonder whether the Australian attitude towards tipping might be a case in point. Perhaps a historian might answer.

One of the things that, in my estimation, Australia does right is the elimination of any expectation of tipping in restaurants, cafés, bars and so forth. While not formally embodying the practice of haggling, tipping is, quite often, just another manifestation of the same or similar dynamic. Unsurprisingly, I don’t like tipping either.

Wherever there is, in the world, this expectation of tipping a waiter or waitress, immediately one has to decide how much should they be tipped, i.e., what percentage of the final bill? While a certain percentage may be customary as the default, it is understood that the tip can be more or less depending on the quality of the service. If the service exceeds expectations it should be more (as much as 20% or higher). If the service fails to meet expectations it should be less. As a result, it can happen that the wait staff and the customers enter into an elaborate dance: the wait staff are trying to suss out how much effort a customer may be worth in attempting to induce the highest possible tips from him before committing themselves fully to extra-special service (a sort of cost-benefit analysis) and the customers are testing and observing the wait staff to see whether they are worth more than the customary percentage. In the bad old days, before electronic transfers were possible or common, the decision-making was further complicated by whether one had enough notes and coins to make up the appropriate sum.

Sometimes this ritual, almost ‘courtship-like’ behaviour, takes on strange hues. I remember once, after I had recently relocated to Arkansas, being told by a waitress that she earned a measly $2.15 USD per hour as a wage and was therefore mostly dependent on tips in order to survive. I was sure to tip her very generously indeed.

In any case, tipping, like haggling, seems inefficient and fraught with the possibility of insult, injury, misunderstandings, and so forth. While it is, perhaps, not so demanding as to ruin a dinner or one’s appetite, it does have the potential to provoke a disagreeable turn to an otherwise pleasant experience. It’s far better to do what is done in Australia: pay wait staff decent wages so that everything is already included in the final tally. ***

References:

(continued from page 3)

Overall, the point is that it’s not just about following the money, but also following the ideas that now seem to be catching up with the Trudeau Liberals. ***

Article Source:

New Times Survey
Page 2
April 2022
Uprising a sign of new voter awareness

In a short 2017 video clip circulating on YouTube, Klaus Schwab, head of the World Economic Forum and the global promoter of corporatist stakeholder capitalism, outlines how his subversive WEF movement has, to use his word, “infiltrated” governments all over the world. He makes special note of Canada. “I have to say, when I mention now names, like Mrs. (Angela) Merkel and even Vladimir Putin, and so on, they all have been Young Global Leaders of the World Economic Forum. But what we are very proud of now is the young generation like Prime Minister (Justin) Trudeau … We penetrate the cabinet. So yesterday I was at a reception for Prime Minister Trudeau and I know that half of his cabinet, or even more than half of his cabinet, are actually Young Global Leaders.”

Schwab and the WEF had help in setting up their Canadian infiltration mission, including from Trudeau’s former chief of staff, Gerald Butts, a participant in the WEF’s Davos conferences and a leading backroom organizer of the Trudeau government’s ideological gambits. When it comes to subversive plans to overthrow the free-world economy, few are larger in scope than the WEF’s global scheme to remake the world and install a new form of “capitalism” based on the recruitment of corporate leaders into the role of government.

The WEF infiltration of Ottawa has never been a secret, nor has Butts’ involvement. But it is far from being common knowledge among voters that the ideological model behind the Liberal policy machine, the steering mechanism that guides decisions and policies, is subversive and authoritarian. It also covers a massive policy territory, from climate to COVID-19.

Klaus Schwab was maybe the first global personality to jump on the pandemic as a vehicle for the imposition of his new world order. As a result of the COVID-19 crisis, he saw major opportunity. “The possibilities for change and the resulting new order are now unlimited and only bound by our imagination.”

The Trudeau government jumped at the opportunity, imposing sweeping social and economic controls that have cost Canadians and their economy hundreds of billions of dollars in losses, in addition to unmeasurable personal and emotional turmoil — turmoil that has helped fuel the protests and convoys that have now shattered the surface of Canadian stability.

In short, the subversive ideas that have infiltrated the Trudeau Liberal government have come around to fire up a popular resistance to the WEF ideology the prime minister and his cabinet have adopted.

That possibility may explain why Justin Trudeau has now turned to extreme rhetoric and unprecedented constitutional action against the trucking convoy and its multi-faceted supporters. His reaction is an attempt to divert attention away from the flaws in policy and the failure of the WEF-shaped model he adopted to guide policy. He saw COVID-19 as an opportunity for greater government intervention. Many Canadians now see the government pandemic policies as oppressive overkill.

Rather than face potential ideological breakdown, Trudeau is now attacking his critics on other grounds, claiming they are racists, subversives, yahoos and Trumpian jobs funded by foreign agents. The prime minister may be taking advice from his old friend, Gerald Butts. In an interview with The New York Times earlier this week, Butts blamed Fox News and foreign influences.

For the past two years, Butts told the Times, Canadians have been largely locked down at home, forced to spend more time in front of their television screens. As they did, they absorbed the American culture war being played out from Fox News to Breitbart. As a result, Trumpian ideas took root in Canada. At the same time, foreign and “dark” money arrived. “One of the most concerning things about this movement,” Butts said, “is it’s shown how easy it is to pour millions of dollars of dark money into Canadian politics.

When it comes to foreign money, Butts should know how that system works. As the former head of the Canadian branch of the World Wildlife Fund, he was part of an international community of activists and funding organizations that received hundreds of millions of dollars over more than two decades. Vancouver writer Vivian Krause investigated and found more than $600 million in foreign funding of environmental groups, from the David Suzuki Foundation to Dogwood and Tides. Over the years, these groups — through demonstrations, blockades and other means — have managed to shut down Canada’s Keystone XL, Northern Gateway, Trans Mountain and Energy East pipelines. The losses are in the billions.

Some organizations — including the political activist anti-Conservative Leadnow — use the same crowdfunding techniques now probed under Ottawa’s convoy law.

Krause has also just posted another funding investigation outlining how the ‘WE Charities’ secured tens of millions of dollars from a major insurance company, Allstate, to support WE’s campaign to promote political voting among Canadian youth. She has asked Elections Canada to investigate. https://www.we.org/en-US/

The scale of these funding activities — largely from U.S. charitable foundations (Rockefeller, for example) — dwarfs to insignificance the piddling foreign funds allegedly flowing to the truckers’ convoy.

(continued bottom of page 2)
THE TORY INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY by Michael J. Connolly

In 1931, the young English historian Herbert Butterfield published a small book entitled The Whig Interpretation of History. While modest in size, it left an outsized impact on historical scholarship, considerations on the nature and practice of history, and the way historians think about presentations of the past. Too many English historians, particularly those of the nineteenth century like Thomas Babington Macaulay and Lord Acton, portrayed history as the “struggle for liberty” over authority and the inevitable triumph of progress, usually defined as the mores of contemporary liberalism and the prerogatives of the British Whig and later Liberal Party. The story of history becomes one of ascent, a sort of neo-Marxist progressive liberation from constraint and oppression, thereby glorifying the present as the culmination of past battles against evil. None of this settles well with our knowledge of the world since 1789, or 1776, or 1688, or 1649, or 1537, however, nor did it settle with Butterfield.

If history is the record of progress, then the progressive road to a brighter future is marked by potholes that call into the question the legitimacy of the interpretation itself. Butterfield proposed to substitute a radical empiricism for Whiggery, so radical in fact that his replacement looked bloodless, a “just-the-facts, ma’am” Dragnet-style history without meaning or morality. A more effective counter to Whig history, one that fights upon the same ground as the Whigs, is a Tory interpretation that emerged from the same point of contention – the Glorious Revolution of 1688 (Tories would prefer to call it the Inglorious Revolution) and its fallout.

Whig history embraced a method of analysis, definitions of key terms, and a narrative of the past reflecting Whig prerogatives. Butterfield famously defined Whig history as interpreting the past in light of present ideas and moral priorities:

*It is part and parcel of the whig interpretation of history that it studies the past with reference to the present; and though there may be a sense in which this is unobjectionable if its implications are carefully considered, and there may be a sense in which it is inescapable, it has often been an obstruction to historical understanding because it has been taken to mean the study of the past with direct and perpetual reference to the present. Through this system of immediate reference to the present-day, historical personages can easily and irresistibly be classed into men who furthered progress and the men who tried to hinder it.*

Having settled upon a method, Whig historians then created a convenient definition of progress that affirmed the class from which they emerged. Progress represented the Protestant European principles of individualism and liberty (often defined as “doing as one likes,” in Matthew Arnold’s formulation) and, by extension the Whiggery and liberalism which emerged to defend it. Enemies of progress were Catholics and Tories who “perpetually formed obstruction” and were, to use a common Whig/liberal phrase “on the wrong side of history.” “It is astonishing to what an extent the historian has been Protestant, progressive, and whig, and the very model of the 19th century gentleman,” Butterfield observed.

“[T]he historian tends in the first place to adopt the whig or Protestant view of the subject, and very quickly busies himself with dividing the world into the friends and enemies of progress.” The resulting historical narrative based on “progress” drew straight lines to the present-day and was, in the words of historian Wilfred McClay, “simplistic and one-sided, reducible to white hats and black hats.”

Whig historiography serves several purposes. First, Whig history has an inevitability to it, that history runs in one direction – toward liberation of the individual from constraint – and to oppose that movement is futile delay. Jacobitism, Thermidorean reaction, and the Spanish Inquisition are painful but fleeting and their extinction gives evidence of history’s meaning, the victory of good over bad. Whig histories almost always have a happy ending. Second, Whig history validates liberal policies and ideas, and delegitimizes opposing narratives. If the present is brighter than the past and the future brighter still, roadblocks and delays are inhumane. Opposition to Whiggish conceptions of liberty are not just contrary to the direction of history, but also cruel. Thus, Whig historians practiced a kind of Victorian cancel culture, delegitimizing contrary narratives as a kind of perverse humanitarianism.

Third, Whig history deletes details that complicate the progressive narrative and in its resulting simplicity takes on the air of propaganda. The historian Roger Schmidt writes,

*The [Whig] historian elevates the factual into literature, creating a narrative that entertains, enriches, and captivates. The historian is not an archivist but a rhetorician, the reading of history not a study but a means of achieving a polite education ... A superficial commitment to the past is thus catered to and encouraged in the name of polite learning. As a result, masses of historical actualities sink below the surface, leaving only a configuration of significant events, the Whig archipelago ...*
interpretations are better than others. There will always be interpretive differences, but some and works hard to make intellectually convincing cases. evidence that complicates our understanding of the past, that studies the sources, considers all the inconvenient objectivity, we can at least practice an honest empiricism world, and if we fall short of Butterfield's standards of contemporary moral concerns: ideal historian as aloof, detached, and floating above recitation of facts. McClay describes Butterfield's has any meaning or moral content whatsoever and if the forgiven for wondering if in Butterfield's view history Readers of the Whig Interpretation of History can be for wondering if in Butterfield’s view history has any meaning or moral content whatsoever and if the only possible response to Whig history is a bloodless recitation of facts. McClay describes Butterfield’s ideal historian as aloof, detached, and floating above contemporary moral concerns:

The historian should, in short, aspire to a God’s-eye view, one in which a deliberate attempt is made to set aside the dominant moral claims and sympathies of one’s own era – not out of a misplaced relativism but out of a carefully thought-out set of judgments about the limits of what historians can accomplish, and the peculiar set of virtues to which they should aspire.

But we cannot secede from the moral realities of the world, and if we fall short of Butterfield’s standards of objectivity, we can at least practice an honest empiricism that studies the sources, considers all the inconvenient evidence that complicates our understanding of the past, and works hard to make intellectually convincing cases. There will always be interpretive differences, but some interpretations are better than others. Even Butterfield missed his empirical ideal, when during World War II he back-peddled from his earlier paean to objectivity with ringing defenses of England’s endangered heritage of liberty. History had moral content after all. So, if Butterfield’s antidote to Whiggery falls short, another historical method is needed. It is no use combating Whig history with a kind of historical neutrality of “just the facts,” as it cedes the field to liberals who will rightly claim that objectivity is impossible anyway and continue the triumphant narrative. The Whigs must be met on the historiographical battlefield with opposing interpretive methods. The contrasting force is not the impossible dream of radical objective empiricism, but the Tory interpretation of history with its own values, perceptions, categories, and subsequent narrative.

The Tory interpretation is not an invention of today, but a genuine school of history that fought against Whig history in the interpretive battles after the “Glorious Revolution” of 1688. Tory historians like the Restoration lawyer Roger North, whose 1706 Examen: Or, An Enquiry Into The Credit And Veracity Of A Pretended Complete History, Showing The Perverse And Wicked Design Of It worked to refute Bishop White Kennett’s Whiggish A Complete History of England, were equally combative as the Whigs and equally full of confident moral judgments based on observations of change over time. The Tory values expressed in their histories contrasted starkly with Whigs and were founded in an alternative vision of how the world works. As historian Mark Knights relates:

The Tory interpretation prized order over revolution and continuity over change. Mistaken definitions of liberty and notions of popular sovereignty and rights, in particular, received sustained attention as profoundly dangerous for church and state. Tory historians tended to write in terms of duty rather than rights and on the side of the monarchy and the established church, condemning challenges to either institution. Tory interpretation rested on the belief that there had been a prolonged and coordinated attempt to undermine the two institutions of order, church and state. It was an interpretation rooted in the persistence, utility, and order of a church-state that was challenged by forces of sedition. As a result, rather than progress, the Tory interpretation stressed the prevalence of decay and corruption.

The Whig ideology of rights and liberty cloaked “selfish motives,” Tories asserted, and they hid behind insincere religious expression to reach their goals. For Tories, “Whig religion was so lukewarm that it barely concealed their pursuit of self-interest.”

Whereas Whigs saw humanity’s prospects getting brighter every year, Tories saw little progress at all.
Our material world may be improving, but spiritually and morally we were regressing. Whig history spoke of how the forces of darkness were being defeated and things were getting better. Tory history spoke of how the forces of darkness were winning and things were getting worse. Knights continues:

The Whig interpretation stressed the progress of liberty: liberty of speech, of the press, and freedom from tyranny. The Tory interpretation, by contrast, told a story about the perversion of liberty, a narrative in which the language of liberty had been manipulated by unscrupulous men who sought to enslave others. Hostility to license, not to liberty, was the Tory rallying cry: licentiousness in speech, in worship, in morality, and in civil affairs.

Tories believed Whigs advanced toward their goals by subterranean methods, deceit, misdirection, and the sowing the confusion. Post-1688 Tory historians were “highly sensitive to the ways in which people could be misled, either through the manipulation of their fears or through slogans deployed by those who sought to use the power of the people to undermine church and state.” Whig subterfuge too often succeeded because of human frailties. Again, the contrast is sharp. Whigs pictured the advance of liberty as evidence of innate human goodness, while Tories “ascribed historical causation to vices inherent in man, such as ambition and self-interest.”

Whig history reflected the rising Enlightenment, with historical events proceeding rationally and systematically toward the desired progressive end. “It seems designed to demonstrate that God does not play dice,” historian Roger Schmidt wrote. “[T]he more seemingly pre-ordained one’s history, the more beautiful … If God is the wonderous Clockmaker, and the earth His divine work of mystical engineering, then History ought to unfold in some semblance of order, a reflection of the Divine hand of Providence at work.” In other words, God was a Whig. In contrast, Tories saw not God, but His nemesis at work in history. The Tory interpretation of history “inverted the providential view of history … offering instead a view of human agency in association with the Devil, in which religion was used as a veneer to hide self-interest.” If Whigs had a providential view of history, the Tories had a Mephistophelian one.

The Tory interpretation of history encompassed three basic principles: elaboration, etymology, and empathy. In their rationality and progressive optimism, Whigs simplified history down to a monomaniacal narrative of progress, “seeing progress not as the product of contention between two sides but as the domination of one side over another.” Contrary evidence was ignored, inconveniences discounted, and contradictions explained away all for the sake of the good story. Yet where Whigs saw simplicity, Tories observed complexity and the diverse experiences of individuals.

Countering the Whig narrative style, Tories like Roger North preferred biography, “the most legitimate and least distorted form of history.” Schmidt explains that “North challenges the validity of that style of historiography which concentrates on the dramatic and public event, neglecting individual lives and the surface of everyday life. Such neglect allows, if not encourages, historians to speak of large historical forces abstracted from human agents, and to divorce ‘events’ from the context in which they occurred.” Tories wrote instead of “the ungovernable richness of the individual life” against “the overarching dynamic put forth by Whig historians.” Sweeping Whig abstractions like liberty, equality, or rights were swept aside by the “the intricate undertow of human affairs, the erosion of ideology in the face of practical, personal, or immediate demands, and the ceaseless incoming of the haphazard and miscalculated.” By focusing on individuals, Tory history “seeks out such complexities as particular accounts and private lies afford, in order to construct a more intimate knowledge of the past, and a history that seeks to rise above them in order to construct large scale models of change or evolution.” In Whig histories, everything works out in the end. For Tories, life is complex, chaotic, often contrary, sometimes ends badly, and demands elaboration by the historian.

The principle of elaboration means Tory history is hard, “even unnaturally hard,” the historian of science Michael D. Gordin suggests. “This is not because of political ideology, but because treating the past on its own terms as much as possible, and not simply as a runaway aimed at the present, goes against our instincts of placing ourselves and our times at the center of the world-picture.” You must train yourself to be a Tory historian. Toryism offers a higher liberty to historians by limiting their presence (and their own times) in the narrative and liberates them to a deeper understanding of the past. It is liberation through drawing boundaries, while Whiggery is surrendering to self-regard.

Frankly, the elaborations of Tory history are more interesting. Didactic Whig histories teach readers a lesson on how to think “correctly” about the past, like a minister instructing a sinful congregation. But as Schmidt writes, the Tory preference for “biography was ideally suited to describing life beyond the Whigs interpretation … That is to say, biography offered a history freed from the necessity of chronicling significant events: minor figures swim into focus, incidental circumstances are given a solidity … Biography could ennoble those who supported the lost cause.”

(continued next page)
Thus, Roger North’s Examen and its defense of King Charles II, for example, is “irksonely inconvenient: a vast slow process of which one can never quite keep track … a chaotic motion in a dissipative structure.” By focusing on individuals, North believed that “a knowledge of character equals historical understanding” and that character is not easily predictable: “lightning may be divine in origin, but it never travels in a straight line … A history poised on such a foundation as only volatile, unstable individuals can offer, cannot be charted with certainty, nor its trajectory predicted. ‘What they did’ is an unreliable index to ‘what they were.’” Mapping the decisions, character, and quirks of historical actors, Tory historical contingency countered Whig determinism.

From this understanding of complexity comes an appreciation for language and the importance of etymology to historical understanding. Schmidt emphasizes that North placed heavy importance on etymology to avoid anachronism, “one of the chief sins of the Whig interpretation and one which a thorough knowledge of etymology would seemingly prevent.” When diverse figures like Pope Paul III, King Henry XIII, Oliver Cromwell, John Adams, Daniel Webster, Vladimir Lenin, and Barry Goldwater use terms like “liberty,” “freedom,” “equality,” “right,” “justice,” or “authority,” each is using the definitions and understandings of their day and context. Bringing present-day definitions to centuries-old words bends meaning to the contemporary desire for historic justification.

It is great comfort to have Mary Wollstonecraft or Robert Dale Owen on “your side” in debates over equality. But the shared meaning of words changes over time. Dictionarium Anglo-Britannicum of 1737 defines “equal” only as a geometric and mathematical category, and “equality” as “a being equal, or like, Agreeableness, Likeness: in Mathematicks, the exact Agreement of two Things, in respect to Quantity.” The 1775 Universal Etymological English Dictionary defines it as synonymous with “equalness”: “a being equal or like, Agreeableness, Likeness.” Samuel Johnson in his 1792 Dictionary of the English Language shows the multiple understandings of “equality” by drawing from prominent authors and how they used it: Shakespeare as “Likeness with regard to any quantities compared,” Milton as “The same degree of dignity,” and Thomas Browne as “Evenness; uniformity; equability.” By 1828, in American Noah Webster’s dictionary, equality was now “An agreement of things in dimensions, quantity or quality, “the same degree of dignity or claims… and equality of rights,” “Evenness, uniformity,” and “Evenness, plainness, uniformity; as in equality of surface.”

Compare these, at which time a host of Anglo-American writers composed seminal political works in the Western Tradition, with today’s Cambridge University online dictionary of “equality”: “the right of different groups of people to have a similar social position and receive the same treatment” and “a situation in which men and women, people of different races, religions, etc. are all treated fairly and have the same opportunities.” Contemporary cultural and social pressures are clearly directing this definition. Eighteenth and nineteenth century dictionary editors would not have recognized or understood this meaning. If you want to understand David Hume, Adam Smith, or Edmund Burke, read their language in light of their understanding. Roger North believed that “etymology was an essential foundation not only for the study of the laws, but for historical understanding in general; the terminology of the past must be read within a specific historical context.” Whigs, reading backwards in the light of their own understanding, project meaning onto the past and misread history for the benefit of their ideology. Tories saw this misreading as deliberate, as a way for Whiggery to trick and manipulate people by deceptive historical narratives. Without sufficient research and knowledge of context, “history can neither be precise nor reliable.”

Finally, by explicating complexity and the contingency of language, Tory preference for biography errs toward an empathetic presentation of the past. Tories believed that with empathy and a vicarious rendering of human lives, readers could better understand actors and situations. Butterfield believed a primary qualification for historians was seeing the past on its own terms: The primary assumption of all attempts to understand the men of the past must be the belief that we can in some degree enter into minds that are unlike our own. If this belief were unfounded it would seem that men must be forever locked away from one another; and all generations must be regarded as a world and a law unto themselves … Real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own.

Empathy underlay the Tory use of biography and “describing life beyond the Whigs’ interpretation.” Schmidt offers that Tory history comes closer to communion with the past: “That is to say, biography offered a history freed from the necessity of chronicling significant events: minor figures swim into focus, incidental circumstances are given a solidity…. Biography could ennable those who supported a lost cause.” None of this meant biographers universally approved of their subjects, only that the best renderings of human life begin with empathy rather than antipathy.
How better to refute Whiggery than to have a deeply empathetic understanding of their many personalities, even ones you detest?

The nineteenth-century American Tory poet Richard Henry Dana, Sr. observed the present-mindedness of Jacksonian Americans – what later generations would call “presentism” – and accused his fellow countrymen of lack of imagination and materialism. Americans were “besotted with the spirit of the age,” he wrote in 1833. “Present time constitutes, in a peculiar degree, a state of sense. He who is interested singly in the present lives mainly in a material world. He perceives only things and he cares only for things.” An unhealthy submersion in the present distorts the work of history:

> In the rush of things, stability of character is swept away, and the man gets overheated by the friction of close, grinding circumstances, and giddy in their whirl. Shut out from the calm past by the thronging of the exciting and urgent present, and standing too near to objects to take in their outline, they grow gigantic to him; then the spirit of exaggeration possesses him, disproportion follows, and the end is monstrous deformity.

Much like today, the Jacksonians’ attitude betrayed an impatience to imprint instantaneous meaning on all things, thereby bending them in ways flattering to the present, and a persistent narcissism where all things were understood by simply looking in the mirror. The art of history then becomes therapy, telling readers of Whig narratives that they are good, everything will work out, God is on their side, and all moral and material progress leads to them. Tory history, however, tells a different story. With the “three Es” of elaboration, etymology, and empathy, their histories inform readers the day is later than you think. ***

**Article Source:**
https://theimaginativeconservative.org/2021/10/tory-interpretation-history-michael-j-connolly.html

---

**IF YOU REALLY HAVE HAD ENOUGH**

If you are properly fed up with our politicians, what can you do about it?

Firstly, electing a decent one is an enormous job, and involves organising thousands of people. For now, that has to be put in the too hard basket. So what now?

There is a way in which 10 to 20% of voters can **defeat all sitting members**. Yes, this small number can easily defeat all sitting members of parliament. How?

Well, while it takes 51% to elect a politician, their winning margins are low. Many have margins of less than 5%, and few have more than 8%. If we put sitting members last, they can’t get any preference votes, and they lose.

**If most present politicians lose their seats, what will this do to future ones?**

Firstly, they will notice. None will feel safe, and they will at last start to listen. This would bring the biggest “boil over” in political history, and whoever is elected will know it. It will be burned into their brains. They will know at last, that they must change.

**But what if the new ones are no good either?**

We will try something not very different. **We put them all last too,** in the next election. We must send politicians to school. If we pull their snouts out of the trough, expel them from the House, and throw them into the street where they will soon be forgotten, eventually budding politicians will get the message.

**But why has it come to this?**

Because the Politicians, Parties and Media have been training us in bad habits. We have been mesmerised mostly by two large Party groups. We are in the habit of asking ourselves which of these is the worst?

Then we vote for the least worst. We always get the worst, but hopefully, we try to get the least worst. We’re given a habit where only the worst will do.

**But what about exceptions?**

If your politician has done his best to defend your freedoms and represent you, of course we make an exception. But any exception MUST be based on their record during their term in office, and NOT on their promises made at election time. If you haven’t noticed their exemplary service, put them last.

**Will this solve everything?**

Of course not. It will take time for the politicians to learn. One brutal non-violent lesson may not always be enough. What we have to do is give them as many lessons as it takes, but something tells me it won’t be many. The simple principle from which we need to start is ::

> “Put Every Sitting Member Last” ***

---

**Subscription to On Target $45.00 p.a.**

NewTimes Survey $30.00 p.a.

**and Donations can be performed by bank transfer:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A/c Title</th>
<th>Australian League of Rights (SA Branch)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BSB</td>
<td>105-044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A/c No.</td>
<td>188-040-840</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**or cheques to: ‘Australian League of Rights (SA Branch)’**

Postal Address: PO Box 27, Happy Valley, SA 5159.

Telephone: 08 8322 8923  eMail: heritagebooks@alor.org

Online Bookstore: https://veritasbooks.com.au

NewTimes Survey is printed and authorised by AJ Luks, 13 Carsten Court, Happy Valley, SA.