

"All that is necessary  
for the triumph of  
evil is that good  
men do nothing . . ."  
— EDMUND BURKE.



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### **C.H. Douglas' Proposal of the "Electoral Campaign" and its Application in the Province of Québec By M. Oliver Heydorn (text of a presentation given at the AMI conference Sept 26th, 2026)**

#### **Introduction**

During the inter-war years, many industrialized nations were faced with an inveterate problem: the paradox of poverty amidst plenty. This paradox reached its apogee during the years of the Great Depression and did not properly abate until the advent of the 2<sup>nd</sup> World War. Partially on account of this crisis, the Anglo-Scots engineer, Major C.H. Douglas, was able to propagate a highly sophisticated diagnosis and set of remedial proposals centred on the financial system that became known as Social Credit (not to be confused with the much more recent Chinese 'social credit').

On Douglas' view, the core problem was this: under the reigning financial system, costs and prices are generated faster in the course of production than incomes are simultaneously being distributed. The current system compensates for this chronic, underlying gap in the main by relying on constantly increasing government, business, and consumer debt: additional money borrowed into existence from the banking system. Douglas proposed that this gap should be filled instead *via* the creation of debt-free credit by an organ of the state, a National Credit Office, and that it should be distributed directly *via* a National Dividend and indirectly *via* a National Discount for the benefit of the common citizens. By ensuring that there is always enough consumer buying power in the form of income to offset prices in the aggregate and that this compensatory credit can be widely and equitably distributed to everyone, Douglas proposed that the artificial paradox of poverty amidst plenty in an industrial society could be readily resolved, alongside a long list of other financial, economic, social, environmental, and political ills.

While C.H. Douglas is best known in connection with his financial and economic ideas, he had also developed an elaborate political theory, complete with its own diagnosis and remedial proposals. The evolution of Douglas' political thinking was spurred by his repeated attempts in the early 1920's to interest the political class in his discoveries and in his proposals for reforming the financial system. The fact that these attempts were constantly being rebuffed revealed to Douglas that the problem he was facing was not primarily an intellectual problem, but rather a political problem. Vested interests were perfectly content with tolerating the system's dishonesty, injustice, and dysfunctionality so long as they could continue to use the system to centralize wealth, power, and privilege in their own hands. In fact, the illegitimate centralization was precisely dependent on the system operating in a dishonest, unjust, and hence dysfunctional manner. To overcome this inertia of the vested interests, a political strategy was needed. The debate had to be taken outside of the halls of academia, bank parlours, and government offices and brought to the people and to the democratic arena. Mass education involving the dissemination of books, articles, speeches, interviews, study circles, radio programmes and so on were some of the tactics used to advance this strategy. The other major tool had to do with the adoption of various methods for direct political action.

One of Douglas' proposals on the plane of political action was called "The Electoral Campaign". Contrary to the received wisdom of his time and of ours, Douglas was not in favour of the establishment of a political party as the appropriate vehicle for implementing the Social Credit monetary reform. In fact, he was dead-set against it. In contradistinction to a traditional political party, the Electoral Campaign was to be an organized, non-partisan union of electors.

This ideal, that of the Electoral Campaign or Electors' Demand, was later transplanted, with mixed fidelity, into the distinctive cultural and political soil of the Canadian province of Québec. There, beginning in 1939, Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier had founded "L'Union des Électeurs" — "The Electors' Union" as an explicit attempt to apply Douglas' proposal. The trajectory of this movement—from educational pressure group to temporary electoral coalition, through a dramatic peak in 1948, and finally to a deliberate withdrawal from the political scene altogether—illuminates both the strengths and the vulnerabilities of the original Douglas proposal within the context of Canadian politics. It also supplies practical lessons for any contemporary effort to revive similar approaches under modern conditions.

The following presentation will reconstruct the history of these attempts at Social Credit political action in chronological sequence, beginning with Douglas' own conception of the Electoral Campaign, then tracing the Québec experiment in detail, and finally concluding with the various strategic implications that these

lessons hold for a non-partisan civic league today.

## **I. Clifford Hugh Douglas' Political Theory and the Logic of the Electoral Campaign**

As was just mentioned, Douglas was completely opposed to the formation of a Social Credit political party which would compete with other political parties for power within an alternate-party 'democratic' system. Indeed, the suggestion that the Social Credit movement should seek to achieve success through party politics is diametrically opposed to Social Credit philosophical and political principles.

To begin with, the introduction of a Social Credit party violates several key axioms of Social Credit political theory. You see, Douglas did not only reject the idea of a Social Credit party, he also rejected the party system itself as being incompatible with effective democracy. On Douglas' view, there should be a sharp distinction in the governmental structure between representative functions (which are to deal strictly with policy and results) and the hierarchical civil service bureaucracies (which are to deal strictly with administration). The representatives are to be held responsible by the electorate for accurately and effectively communicating the broad and specific policy-objectives that the electorate wish the government to pursue. The administrators are to be held responsible by the electorate for delivering the desired results effectively, efficiently, and fairly. The following is a pertinent quote from Douglas' speech "The Approach to Reality":

"There is at the present time an idea that we should have a Social Credit party in this country. I can quite understand and sympathise with that idea, but it is a profound misconception. It assumes that the government of the country should be a government of experts. Let me show you that it does assume that. If you elect a Social Credit party, supposing you could, I may say that I regard the election of a Social Credit party in this country as one of the greatest catastrophes that could happen. By such an election you proceed to elect, by the nature of it, a number of people who are supposed to know enough about finance to say what should be done about it. Now it is an axiom of experience that no layman can possibly direct the expert in details, and in normal things no layman is fool enough to try to do it.

If you had a Social Credit government, it would proceed to direct a set of very competent experts – the existing financial authorities, for example – how to do their jobs. The essential thing about the situation would be the responsibility for what was done. Now no set of 500 or 600 men whom you could elect in this country could possibly know as much about finance as the people they would presume to direct. You know, in all that I have said about financiers, I have never

at any time said that they were incompetent, nor are they, within the limits of their own philosophy. But to elect a Social Credit party in this country would be to elect a set of amateurs to direct a set of very competent professionals. The professionals, I may tell you, would see that the amateurs got the blame for everything that was done.”<sup>1</sup>

Establishing a Social Credit party, or any political party, is also incompatible with the reality that there are, in fact, common objectives, which each and every individual would support if he were asked, behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, which type of association is the type in which he would prefer to live, i.e., one which effectively serves its fundamental purpose for being, or one which fails to achieve this end. In the case of economic associations, everyone could agree that the true purpose of the economy is to deliver the goods and services individuals desire with the least amount of trouble to all. Likewise, with respect to political associations, everyone could agree that the government’s fundamental and most authentic task is to maximize the effective sovereignty of individuals over their own affairs as efficiently as possible within the context of the natural law. This desire of each and every person to live in democratically structured associations which function effectively constitutes what Douglas termed “the common will”.

Accordingly, Social Credit is rightly seen as the movement of every man, woman, and child precisely because it stands for this common will, this common policy. A common will cannot be adequately represented or communicated by a political party in a system which is supposedly designed to ‘balance competing interests’; it is excluded *ab initio*. The minute you label one party ‘Social Credit’, you tend to set all the members of other political parties against Social Credit. This, to Douglas’ mind, was a self-defeating dynamic in which much time, energy, and indeed money would be wasted. Since the Social Credit monetary reform was ultimately for the benefit of everyone, it should be supported by everyone, regardless of any political party affiliation. That means that, taking the existing political system as a given and as our starting point, any and all political parties should be supportive of Social Credit.

Finally, Douglas disapproved of the vehicle of party politics because when you establish a party, you also tend to link the fate of Social Credit in the minds of the public with the electoral fate of the party. Combine this with the reality that the inner logic of party politics invariably leads party members to abandon principle in attempting to acquire power and it should be easy to see that the introduction of a Social Credit party would only lend itself to the ‘divide and conquer’ strategy of those who were opposed to Social Credit. Once genuine reformers entered the party system they would be compelled to accept the disciplines of party loyalty, electoral compromise, and the necessity of appealing

to secondary issues in order to win seats. The integrity of purpose which would be necessary to actually reform the money system would be lost in the process. The history of Social Credit parties in Canada, both at the federal and provincial levels, shows that Douglas was also correct on this particular point.

### ***The Social Credit Electoral Campaign***

In contradistinction to party politics and petitions as methods for implementing Social Credit, Douglas came up with his own original proposal (within the context of a British parliamentary system) of the 'Electoral Campaign' or union of electors. The path to the establishment of an effective democracy requires that individuals make a proper use of the rough machinery of political democracy which is already available to them in order to ensure that their policies will prevail. To this end, the Electoral Campaign is "... an assertion of sovereignty – of power."<sup>2</sup>

The first and most general plank of the original Electoral Campaign was that voters would publicly pledge themselves to only vote for those parliamentary candidates who would agree to forward the objectives proposed by the majority of their constituents:

"We of the official Social Credit Movement are concentrating upon this problem of devising a mechanism, to enable the individuals who comprise the public to impose their policy on the organisations which have no sound reason for existence other than the will of the people. We have organised a device known as the Electoral Campaign, to obtain a demand, backed by a sufficient number of votes, that every member of Parliament shall regard himself as the spokesman of the policy of his constituents, rather than as an expert elected for the purpose of managing the business of the country."<sup>3</sup>

In other words, the Electoral Campaign was designed to make use of the existing democratic mechanism so that it would actually fulfill a democratic purpose:

"Your ancestors and mine fought a series of bloody battles in various parts of this island for the purpose of obtaining political democracy. They set in operation a mechanism. Now, I am perfectly confident that the working of that mechanism at the present time is perverted, but I am also perfectly confident that it is not necessarily ineffective for our purpose, and it seems to me to abandon without endeavouring to rectify the working of the mechanism which has been obtained by us amid blood and tears, is a very dangerous thing to do."<sup>4</sup>

This particular mechanism can only function effectively, however, if a sufficient number of individuals are willing to do the hard work necessary to make it work. The establishment of an authentically democratic association requires the exertion of constant initiative on the part of the individuals who

compose it:

“Once having got it into your minds that yours is the real power if you would only exercise it, the mechanism existing at the present time, with very slight modifications, is easily sufficient to make your power effective if you will bear certain fundamental considerations in mind. Don’t imagine that a question of democracy has anything to do with leadership. Democracy and leadership are a contradiction in terms. There is more room for leadership in the world than ever there was, but your leaders should be your servants and not your masters. Don’t waste your time looking round for someone who is going to do the job for you, you won’t find him. If you won’t do it yourselves, it is not going to be done. Take your present Members of Parliament just as you find them and disabuse them of the ideas that they are heaven-sent geniuses, whom you have elected to run the country for you. They don’t run the country anyway, but you let them think they do. Your Members of Parliament are elected to represent the common will, not the uncommon intelligence. The proper place for intelligence is in the ranks of the technicians who should be the servants of the common will. With the common will goes the common power, that is to say, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the police, and the other sanctions of the Crown. It isn’t necessary and it is obviously utterly impracticable for you to organize an army, navy and air force to fight the State. The State has them already, and the State is your State. Make it perfectly clear that you are going to have it used for your purposes and not for the purposes of the oligarchy.”<sup>5</sup>

From an historical perspective, it must be admitted that the lack of initiative exhibited by the British public prevented the Electoral Campaign, insofar as it was actually attempted, from being as effective as it otherwise could have been and Douglas often complained about this himself:

*“You the individuals whose interests are always at stake in matters of policy, who are killed, wounded, maimed, poisoned in every war, who are starved and broken in every industrial depression, who work long hours under, in some cases, unpleasant conditions for objects from which you do not benefit – you are the people who never apply any effective and continuous pressure to the Government.”*<sup>6</sup>

Insofar as it was to be applied specifically to the implementation of Social Credit, the Electoral Campaign involved organizing groups of electors in each constituency so that they could demand that their representatives, their Members of Parliament, would openly support appropriate monetary reform legislation. The demand would be presented to the sitting member regardless of party affiliation. If the member refused or equivocated, the organised electors, voting as a bloc, would simply vote against him or her at the next election. They would publicise that the sitting member was recalcitrant and that the campaign would be voting against him or her in the next election. The campaign did not

seek to replace one set of politicians with another; it sought rather to make the existing parliamentary machine responsive to a single, non-negotiable economic demand. Douglas repeatedly insisted that the strength of the method lay precisely in its refusal to become a party.

## **II. The Founding of the Electoral Union – L'Union des Électeurs (1939)**

The Great Depression of the 1930s had struck Québec with particular force. Rural communities and urban working-class neighbourhoods alike suffered from prolonged unemployment, deflationary pricing, and a pervasive sense that the productive capacity of the province far exceeded the purchasing power in the hands of its citizens. In other words, they were coming face to face with the paradox of poverty in the midst of plenty or at least potential plenty. This was the dire set of circumstances which spurred Louis Even (1885–1974) to search for an answer to the crisis. Louis Even, a former member of the Brothers of Christian Instruction who had to leave his religious order after he had become deaf, was working as a printer and journalist in Montréal. On one fateful day in 1934, he had encountered Douglas' ideas through J. Crate Larkin, an American who had written an introductory book based on Douglas' writings. That book was called "From Debt to Prosperity". Even became convinced that Douglas' A + B analysis went right to the heart of the paradox of poverty amidst abundance. He then began to translate Douglas' ideas into French and to popularise them throughout Canada, declaring that Social Credit was a light on his path and that everyone should know about it.

In September 1939, Even launched the monthly newspaper *Vers Demain* ("Toward Tomorrow"). A few weeks later, in the autumn of the same year, he joined forces with Gilberte Côté (1905–2002), a dynamic young organiser who would later marry Gérard Mercier and become known as Gilberte Côté-Mercier. Together, they founded "L'Union des Électeurs" — The Union of Electors. The choice of name was itself deliberate. Following Douglas' suggestion of an Electoral Campaign, this Electoral Union was to be a union of electors, not a political party. Just as workers in a factory or in any workplace could form a union to advocate for their common interests, the citizens, the voters in a liberal democratic system, could form a union, independent of any and all political parties, in order to advocate for their common interests. The founding documents and early issues of *Vers Demain* presented the movement as a civic league whose purpose was twofold: to educate the population in the principles of Social Credit, and to organise citizens so that they could bring effective pressure to bear on the elected representatives of every party.

The economic message remained faithful to Douglas and could be

summarized as follows: private banks created the bulk of the money supply as debt; this monopoly forced society to fill the structural, recurring price-income gap with even more interest-bearing debt. The correct remedy for the problem of the gap was the issuance of debt-free money by the community, distributed directly through a National Dividend and indirectly through a compensated reduction in retail prices (the National Discount). In the Québécois context of the late 1930s, this message was frequently framed in the language of Catholic social teaching, as the Catholic religion was dominant in the province. The founders argued, in effect, that the existing financial system was incompatible with the dignity of the human person and the common good, to say nothing of the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity (the four key principles of Catholic social teaching). Social Credit, by contrast, by restoring adequate purchasing power to families, would give practical embodiment to those principles.

From the outset, the Union emphasised education over electoral ambition. Local study circles, public lectures, and the steady distribution of *Vers Demain* were the primary activities. Even so, the Electoral Campaign method—demanding specific legislative action from sitting members and threatening to withdraw support if refused—was presented as the authentic Douglas strategy that should be employed on the political plane.

### **III. Early Electoral Experiments and the Limits of Pure Pressure (1940–1944)**

Unfortunately, the Canadian parliamentary system of the early 1940s proved to be far less permeable to pure pressure tactics than Douglas' proposal (which had been specifically designed for a British context) would have anticipated. Party discipline was strict; members who broke ranks risked expulsion or loss of nomination. When Union representatives approached Liberal and Conservative deputies with formal demands for monetary reform, the responses were polite but non-committal. The legislative agenda remained under the control of party leaders and the Ministry of Finance.

Faced with this type of institutional resistance, the Union decided to adapt Douglas' proposal to their own less-than-ideal circumstances. It decided, as a temporary educational measure, to place its own candidates on the ballot under Social Credit or allied labels. The purpose was not primarily to win seats, but to use the election campaign itself as a platform for public instruction and to demonstrate the existence of a body of electors who were prepared to make the monetary issue the deciding issue.

In the federal election of 1940 the Union tested this approach on a small scale. Two candidates ran under the "New Democracy" banner, a short-lived coalition that included Social Credit elements. Louis Even contested Lac-

Saint-Jean–Roberval and obtained approximately 17 percent of the vote—an encouraging result for a first outing. Armand Turpin contested Hull and received 31.8 percent. Neither was elected. Québec's federal representation remained overwhelmingly Liberal under Prime Minister Mackenzie King. The exercise nevertheless confirmed that a message centred on monetary reform could attract measurable support in certain ridings.

The provincial election of the 8th of August 1944 provided another opportunity and a larger stage. Maurice Duplessis' L'Union Nationale was returned to power after a five-year long Liberal interlude. The Electoral Union used the campaign to expand its network of local organisers and paper sellers across the province. It was not yet able to field a full slate of candidates and won no seats, but the organisational infrastructure for a more ambitious effort had been established in the process. Throughout this period, the movement continued to insist that it was not a conventional party; electoral participation was presented as a means of education and pressure, not as an end in itself.

#### **IV. Post-War Expansion, the 1945 Election, and the 1946 Breakthrough**

The end of the Second World War brought both opportunity as well as frustration. The federal election of 1945 saw a more energetic campaign by Social Credit forces in Québec, largely organised through the Union's networks. The popular vote for Social Credit candidates in the province reached approximately 4 percent. Under Canada's first-past-the-post system, however, this support was not yet sufficient to procure seats in Québec. All Social Credit members elected that year came from Western Canada, principally from the province of Alberta. The Québec wing of the movement remained locked out of Parliament.

A breakthrough occurred in the following year. In a 1946 federal by-election, Réal Caouette was elected in the riding of Pontiac (a constituency later associated with the Abitibi region). Caouette became the first Québécois Social Crediter to sit in the House of Commons. His victory introduced a more pragmatic, electorally-oriented current into the broader movement. While Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier continued to emphasize education and non-partisan pressure, Caouette and those around him saw value in sustained party organisation and the pursuit of seats. The tension between these two approaches would eventually produce a split.

#### **V. The 1948 Campaign: Peak Effort and a Double Rebuff**

The provincial general election of the 28th of July, 1948, marked the high point of the Electors' Union direct political activity. The movement fielded 92 candidates—an unprecedented effort that made the Electors' Union the third force in Québec provincial politics. The campaign style was intense. Door-to-

door canvassing was relentless. *Vers Demain* appeared regularly with detailed economic explanations and calls to action. Formal “summons” letters were sent to sitting members demanding written commitments to support Social Credit legislation; refusal was to be followed by public identification of the member as an opponent of the people’s interests.

In the cultural climate of mid-century Québec, the economic message was frequently interwoven with religious language. Speakers and writers presented Social Credit as the practical application of the Gospel to the monetary system. Rejection of the reform was sometimes portrayed as resistance to Christian social principles. Religious symbols and practices began to appear at meetings. These methods, combined with aggressive pressure on both those elected officials and local clergy who remained, for whatever reason, unsympathetic to Social Credit, kindled a growing unease within the Catholic hierarchy.

In May 1948, weeks before polling day, the bishops of Québec issued a collective pastoral letter. They carefully distinguished between Social Credit theory, which they treated as an open question of economics on which the faithful were free to form their own judgements, and the concrete methods employed by the Union. The letter condemned the appropriation of sacred language and symbols for political purposes, the harassment of deputies and parish priests, the quasi-religious discipline demanded of young militants, and the claim that Social Credit alone embodied an authentic Christian social order. In a province where the institutional Church still exercised decisive moral authority, especially in rural areas, the condemnation inflicted severe damage on the Union’s standing among its natural constituency.

On election day, the Union managed to obtain 9.2 percent of the popular vote—still a respectable third-party performance. Under the first-past-the-post electoral system, however, it elected no members. Duplessis’ L’Union Nationale secured a dominant majority. The combination of electoral exclusion and episcopal censure produced a profound reassessment within the leadership.

## **VI. Withdrawal from the Electoral Arena and the Reassertion of the Douglas Method**

Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier interpreted the 1948 result as confirmation of Douglas’ original warning. Participation in the party system had consumed resources, exposed the movement to the Church’s hierarchical discipline, and still failed to produce legislative influence. The pure Electoral Campaign—education of the public in conjunction with organised and constant but civil pressure on the already sitting representatives without the

formation of any kind of party—appeared, in retrospect, to be the wiser course.

Accordingly, the electoral apparatus of the Union des Électeurs was dismantled. The movement redirected its energies into popular education and non-partisan civic action. This reorientation led, in the early 1950s, to the creation of structures that emphasised study, the publication and dissemination of Social Credit materials, and moral suasion rather than candidacies. Over time these efforts coalesced into the establishment of the Institute of Political Action and, later, the Pilgrims of St. Michael, popularly known as the White Bérêts (Les Bérêts Blancs). The White Berets retained the Social Credit economic doctrine and continued to advocate for the National Dividend and related measures, but they did so outside the electoral arena, combining monetary reform with a distinctive religious spirituality, aesthetic, and pilgrimage tradition.

The more overtly political and pragmatic movement associated with Réal Caouette continued its electoral activity. It eventually crystallised into “Le Ralliement Créditiste” and achieved significant success during the federal election of 1962, when 26 Social Credit members were elected from Québec. By that time, Réal Caouette had split with Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier because of their differences in opinion concerning the proper political strategy.

## **VII. Maurice Duplessis and the Political Context**

Maurice Duplessis, the main figure (some might say omnipresent figure) in Québec politics from the mid-1930s until his death in 1959, regarded Social Credit with a mixture of doctrinal disdain and strategic vigilance. Economically conservative, he viewed proposals for debt-free state credit as utopian and potentially disruptive to the order of private enterprise that he defended. Politically, he recognised that the Union’s natural base—rural, Catholic, nationalist, and sceptical of both federal power and big finance—overlapped substantially with the electorate that sustained Duplessis’ party, the National Union. A strong Cr ditiste vote risked splitting the anti-Liberal forces and thereby assisting his opponents.

There is no evidence of any type of alliance, secret negotiation, or personal collaboration between Duplessis and the Electors’ Union: they were sworn enemies. Official memoranda from the Union of Electors and militant delegations demanding provincial credit legislation were sometimes received at the Premier’s office; they were met with formal courtesy and firm rejection. Duplessis’ network of local informants monitored the Social Credit movement’s meetings and publications. When the bishops issued their 1948

letter, the Premier publicly welcomed the clarification and used the language of fanaticism and social discord to further isolate the Electors' Union in the final weeks of the campaign. In short, Duplessis treated the Union as he treated other potential threats to his hegemony: with close surveillance, electoral combat, and opportunistic exploitation of its vulnerabilities.

### **VIII. Lessons and a Contemporary Application: The Canadian Union**

The historical record of the Electors' Union offers a clear set of lessons for any attempt to revive some version of Douglas' suggested methodology under present conditions. Firstly, the pure Electoral Campaign—non-partisan, focused on a single monetary demand, and exercised through organised voting pressure—avoids the diluting and corrupting effects of party organisation. Secondly, electoral participation, even when undertaken for educational purposes, tends to generate its own institutional momentum and internal divisions. Thirdly, the interweaving of monetary reform with contested religious orientations can provoke authoritative backlash that undermines the economic message itself. Fourthly, measurable, geographically concentrated electoral leverage can serve as an effective means of compelling attention from sitting representatives.

A contemporary non-partisan civic league, provisionally named the Canadian Union / L'Union Canadienne, could incorporate these lessons. Its general objective would be to break the monopoly on credit creation currently exercised by the private banking system by closing the structural accounting gap between prices and incomes via the issuance of debt-free national credit. That credit is to be distributed to consumers directly through a National Dividend paid to every citizen and indirectly through a Compensated Discount that reduces retail prices. The bank-created debt-money thereby eliminated is exclusively the portion currently used to fill the gap; ordinary commercial lending for productive purposes would continue.

To achieve the implementation of the DSC monetary reform, external pressure could then be exercised by building a verified bloc of electors in strategically chosen ridings. Citizens would register by postal code through a simple digital platform, publicly committing to vote against any incumbent who refuses to support the required monetary legislation. The threat becomes credible when the numbers are transparent and the demand remains single and non-negotiable. The Canadian Union thus remains formally outside the party system. It does not endorse parties as such; it demands specific legislative action from individual Members of Parliament. Candidates who accept the demand receive the organised support of the bloc; those who refuse it, lose it. Parallel to the pressure work, an educational

arm would continue to inform the population about the DSC monetary reform model without interruption. Short, clear explanations of the A + B gap, the National Dividend, and the Compensated Discount could be prepared for digital platforms, always concluding with a concrete invitation to join the verified electoral bloc.

This approach restores the sequence Douglas originally prescribed: rigorous economic diagnosis, precise monetary remedy, and non-partisan electoral pressure concentrates resources on the two instruments—public education and measurable voting leverage—that alone can compel existing institutions to act.

## Conclusion

The history that began with Clifford Hugh Douglas' analysis of the price-income gap and his prescription of an Electoral Campaign found a determined but imperfect expression in the Québec of Louis Even and Gilberte Côté-Mercier. The Electors' Union demonstrated both the resonance of the Social Credit message among ordinary citizens and the practical difficulties of translating non-partisan pressure into legislative results within a disciplined party system.

A contemporary Canadian Union that begins again from Douglas's first principles—debt-free credit to close the accounting gap, distributed by National Dividend and Compensated Discount, advanced through organised electoral demand rather than party formation—possesses the opportunity to avoid the earlier pitfalls. Whether that opportunity is realised will depend on the discipline with which the method is applied: the demand kept single and clear, the organisation kept non-partisan, the pressure kept measurable, and the educational work kept continuous. In the disciplined recovery of the original Electoral Campaign lies the most coherent continuation of the intellectual and civic project that Douglas inaugurated and that the Electors' Union, for a critical decade, attempted to carry forward in Québec. \*\*\*

## References:

- 1 C.H. Douglas, *The Approach to Reality* (London: K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 1936), 12-13.
- 2 C.H. Douglas, *The Tragedy of Human Effort* (Vancouver: The Institute of Economic Democracy, 1978), 13.
- 3 C.H. Douglas, *The Tragedy of Human Effort* (Vancouver: The Institute of Economic Democracy, 1978), 10. Cf. C.H. Douglas, *The Approach to Reality* (London: K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 1936), 21. "It seems very difficult to make this, to me, rather simple point. The essence of it is whether or not you regard the Member of Parliament as an expert. If you assume that he is an expert then you are electing a second-rate expert to control a first rate-expert. If you agree that the Member of Parliament should not be an

expert, then why tie a label on him? The proper attitude of the people is, “We don’t care what your alleged name is – the essential thing is that you should do as you are told. ... There is nothing repugnant, nothing novel about asking people to insist that their Member of Parliament shall do as they tell him, more particularly if it is pointed out to them that in this way they can get an amelioration of their conditions. What they are, *in fact*, being asked to do is to assume the functions of real democracy.” Cf. also C.H. Douglas, *Security Institutional and Personal* (Liverpool: K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 1945), 12: “... we have devised a mechanism which, if we could induce you to carry it out, would impose your policy upon your Member of Parliament quite infallibly, and if you imposed the same policy upon a majority of Members of Parliament, that policy would come into existence.”

4 C.H. Douglas, *The Approach to Reality* (London: K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 1936), 23. It makes far greater sense to find a way to force the existing democratic mechanisms to serve their proper ends as a method of introducing the Social Credit reforms than to try to invent an entirely new mechanism for this particular purpose: “To carry out any big operations, such as the realisation of Social Credit, a mechanism is necessary, and our choice lies between using the existing mechanism or inventing a new one. I think that it is true to say, that for any practical policy, at least the embryo of a suitable mechanism exists, even though it may be in distorted form, and to suppose that you can invent a new mechanism in the face of custom and habit and use it for introducing a new system of society is just plain, bald nonsense.” C. H. Douglas, *The Nature of Democracy* (Vancouver: The Institute of Economic Democracy, 1934), 3.

5 C.H. Douglas, *Dictatorship by Taxation* (Vancouver: The Institute of Economic Democracy, 1978), 11-12. Cf. *Ibid.*, 13-14: “We have in Belfast, and, in fact, all over the world, a mechanism known as the Electoral Campaign which, with the proper spirit behind it, can make the Government your servants. We have provided you with the mechanism, you must supply the spirit.”

6 C.H. Douglas, *Dictatorship by Taxation* (Vancouver: The Institute of Economic Democracy, 1978), 13-14.

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