

# THE NEW AGE

INCORPORATING "CREDIT POWER."  
A WEEKLY REVIEW OF POLITICS, LITERATURE AND ART

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### NOTICE.

Owing to Bank Holiday THE NEW AGE will be printed a day later next week.

## NOTES OF THE WEEK.

### The Death of Dollfuss.

The death of Dollfuss must be recorded for reference. It took place on July 25. The attempted revolution did not succeed—which is all to the good, because its success would have caused a psychological tension much worse than that existing at the moment and being made visible in Italian mobilisation orders. (We write this on July 27.) In any affair where Hitler is involved the Jews naturally listen intently. The sentiment among them appears, from what we have overheard, to be: "England must not be dragged into another war; let them fight it out between themselves." Their emotional reaction is one of furious condemnation of the "Nazi assassins." On four separate occasions this sentiment and reaction have been voiced by different working-class Jews in our hearing and without our prompting—hold the ring and leave Hitler to take his punishment. It is probable that the whole rank and file of Jewry are talking like this. Whether so or not it is obvious that they are able to do so with less restraint and more effect than was the case when the Nazis were despoiling and maltreating members of their race in Germany. The connection of Dollfuss not being directly committed in for the lightning of repressed Jewish feeling against Hitler all over the world, and with greater danger to him because the storm-clouds out of which it proceeds are the product of Gentile as well as Jewish air-currents of mental reaction, intellectual or moral.

These clouds will undoubtedly put "political armies," uniforms and "shirts" into a shadow—a deep shadow where all colours are one and where all the political policies and plans associated with them will be indiscriminately confused in the popular mind, and invested with a sinister import. Whether there is any general moral to this is a matter for those who applaud or condemn the policy of uniforms to debate. In the meantime it is worth while pointing out that the military

form of government in Austria was an immediate factor in facilitating the plan of the Nazis. They obtained access to the room where Dollfuss was by disguising themselves in Heimwehr uniforms. The success of the ruse was due to the fact that the sight of such uniforms in, out and about the Chancery was a familiar one. The raiders were detected too late. A mere minute or so might have saved Dollfuss's life. One cannot easily imagine a similar coup being carried out in Downing Street in just that way. The polite gentleman who receives visitors at the door has not been trained to look upon any uniform as a passport inside and upstairs, and in all probability there dwells in his bones the long tradition of demarcation between civil and military prerogatives which characterises the British Constitution. Of course no Minister is safe against an implacable enemy intent on killing him, but he is likely to have a better chance of escape in this country than probably any other. The English Minister's home may be a castle, but his official residence is virtually a private dwelling-house. In Austria it is the other way round, as a glance at pictures of the Viennese Chancery show. As Mark Tapley would look at it, there is no credit in terms of heroism from the point of view of the would-be assassin in breaking into a homelike official residence to commit violence, but all the credit in the world in breaking into a veritable fortress. It would seem that a Minister is safest when he's least protected, and is least secluded when his privacy is most formidably guarded.

### The Death of Dillinger.

It is a far cry from Dollfuss to Dillinger, but there are some features in the story of the gunman that make it congruous with the above reflections. Dillinger, said one of his intimates, "hated everything in a uniform." When a youth he had to suffer a harsh sentence for his first offence. The result was that instead of enduring his imprisonment as a means of fitting him to return to society, he resentfully used it to qualify for another kind of society—the society of the criminal underworld. He outlawed the whole legal system, and set a price on everyone who wore a uniform symbolic of legalism. Another item in the story was published in the *Evening News* early last week, and was a sentiment attributed to Dillinger by another intimate; namely: "I rob banks because they rob other people." There is not much chance that Dillinger acquired this sentiment

through studying credit-reform literature; but an alternative hypothesis is significant in a parallel sense, namely, that he found out by experience that the honest citizens in the various localities where he operated were more disposed to look the other way when he held up financial institutions than when he interfered with private property. And, in fact, the writer of the report affirms this, expressly saying that people were not simply indifferent to his bank-raids, but in a lot of cases helped him to escape detection. All over the mid-West, explains the writer, the people had suffered at the hands of the banks, so that Dillinger, in their eyes, was not the destroying devil which the Government (but say, banks!) called him; he was rather an avenging angel. The police are stated to attribute his long immunity to this circumstance; and we do not doubt that some readers of these "Notes" will also attribute to it the peculiarly atrocious manner in which Dillinger was polished off when the police found him. Have we not heard, even in this country, suggestions for giving the "cat" to those who commit the crime of "violence to property"? It is as if the sentiment of honest citizens among whom Dillinger did his deeds was: "Who robs the bankers robs trash"—and it only wants altering by two words to be a sound technical statement, i.e., Who robs the banks steals trash. That was the basis of Mr. Gavin Simons' defence of Messrs. Waterlow & Sons in the Bank of Portugal's action. A bank note is "printed stationery" asserted that brilliant advocate. Such then is the background against which Dillinger's crimes can be most fairly judged.

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Now let us hear what the *Times* has to say about it. A short leading article appeared therein on July 24, two days after Dillinger's death. There is a board-room air about the opening of it:

"The intrepid men of the Chicago Department of Justice . . . earned the world's (*sic*) congratulations on the completion of their grim task.

"This sordid and dangerous hooligan had held four States (*sic*) in terror for the whole of the present year.

" . . . it is impossible to estimate how much relief from fear, misery and loss is summed up in the news that he is dead.

"To dispose of him in the way chosen was clearly necessary."

But you must not suppose that the writer is an indiscriminate admirer of summary execution in the streets. He sees a "disturbing feature" in the present case. It shows that gunmen have it in their power to "force their own methods upon the police," for the "final ambushing" of Dillinger was "indistinguishable from a similar manoeuvre of two rival gangs." He complacently remarks that Washington is not going to be squeamish, whatever may be the objection in other countries to the principle of arrest and trial before punishment. Then he descends to a graver note. American statesmen have to deal with the deeper problem of "the social soil in which the gangster thrives." It is the social soil in which the bankster thrives; but the writer does not explore the problem from that angle. What he does not like is the episode where souvenir-hunters dipped their handkerchiefs in the blood of the slain man.

"This is the reverence that has been done in the past to the bodies of kings and martyrs.

"The popular delusion that has surrounded the obscene Dillinger with a like romanticism is the supreme evil that the United States has to overcome."

On a minor point first, we are afraid that we must puncture this inflated disquietude; the newspapers reported that the souvenir-hunters cut up the bloodstained handkerchiefs and sold them in pieces measuring a square inch at something like half a dollar each. So at least there was business as well as sentiment in their motivation, and who shall say which prevailed? Of course

there will, in the end, be some ultimate buyer, some "consumer," of the tiny scrap of material, and he would come under the writer's condemnation. Yet surely, the crime of merely buying was nothing to the crime of the dipping, which showed what you might tactfully call a nasty presence of mind. The moral is diffused, probably having to do with the comparative cheapness of human life in the States, and perhaps even more with the cheap sensationalism of the Press. We will risk the guess, by the way, that one of the blood-stained relics has found its way into a banker's keeping. That ought to be so; for at the beginning it was bankster vampirism which has drawn the gangster's blood.

\* \* \*

And arising from this reflection, it might be that some twinge of conscience lies behind the ghoulish rhapsodies of this writer about the killing of this man. Or they may simply reflect the sudden relief of psychological tension among the stewards of financial law and practice. For instance, why call Dillinger "obscene"? The epithet would pass near enough if it had reference to Dillinger's sentiments about banks. Perhaps it does. Anyhow, the dangerous uniform-hunter is gone at last, and the custodians of the "bankers' property" can don their striped trousers again—if those garments happen to be the mark of their high calling in the United States.

#### The Labour Programme of Action.

The Labour Party's programme of action is discussed by *The Times* of July 25 in the first leading article. Some illuminating things are said about the nature of the programme and the relations between the Socialist League and the Labour Party. The League are the inspirers of the design of the Socialist State, and the Party are the executive whose function it will be to carry it out. There are many snags between the projection of a thing and its achievement; and the leader-writer sets himself to indicate some of them. They can be compressed in the general statement that if the League's programme is (a) indivisible and (b) to be pushed through in the lifetime of a single Parliament, then the Party would be obliged to tamper with the procedure of the two Houses. To keep to an urgent and rigid timetable there must be dictatorship of some sort, says the writer. That is true enough, and readers will remember that we went fully into the reasons when we discussed Lord Hewart's book, "The New Despotism," particularly with regard to the handicap of course delays" on the bureaucrat. In this context, of course the procedure in Parliament is the same thing as procedure in Court, and to get a move on with legislation is to cut motions out and cut debates short. And the same restriction on discussion is imposed by insistence on the indivisibility of a programme. The process is often seen in the passage of a single Bill, when the attention of each clause limits the scope of discussion on the later ones. In this case, however, the House can least keep in mind a picture of the whole Bill all the time, and can therefore proceed to debate the earlier clauses with more or less clear comprehension of the implications in relation to the general purpose of the Measure. But suppose the House to pass a long sequence of interlocking Measures including such things as the ownership and control of all their debatable investments, the net effect of all their debatable clauses would be nothing much more than handing a cheque to the Labour Government. The ordinary Socialist may be inclined to think that this would be a good thing; it would certainly make for speed in setting the law in motion; but at the cost of setting the community in commotion. Though the Socialist League may have a coherent picture of the object of its programme, and even of the administrative machinery necessary for its success, the Socialist Party have to take into account the consequences of this "success," which are always successful. Even the farseeing bankers, who all the brains at their command, were unable to

an enactment which would hold the balance between "stern economy" and "wise spending"—they had to ask the people to be so good as to show them in practice what they were unable to show them how to do in law. "Tell us our opinion, old gal!"

The Labour Party, knowing something of executive problems, have been astute enough on the one hand to incorporate in their programme everything that the Socialist League advocates, but, on the other, to make this programme divisible and to omit the time-table. So while the Socialist agitator or canvasser can go full steam ahead to get a popular mandate for "Socialism in Our Time," the Socialist Minister-to-be reserves the freedom to dispense pieces of Socialism in his own time.

The writer notes, however, that the Labour Party, though steering clear of committing itself to the slogan "Socialism in one Parliament," does intend to speed up Parliamentary procedure. Though there will not be a large time-table for the complete programme, there will be little time-tables for selected parts of it. After second reading all Bills would be sent to Standing Committees, which, of course, could sit simultaneously. As for the House of Lords, the gaining of an electoral majority for the Programme is to be "interpreted" as a mandate to abolish that House, particularly "if the House of Lords seeks to wreck essential measures." In a general comment the writer says: "Reform of procedure should be the agreed arrangement of the House of Commons of all parties, and not of Socialists intent upon great changes in a great hurry"—any alteration should be in the interest of all parties, not of one. This excellent doctrine presents difficulties, because it is impossible to get the House to consider alterations in procedure without referring to the next Measures likely to be presented under the new rules; and it is more than probable that not all interests will be equally pleased when they consider them from that point of view. Only an all-in National Government with disciplined supporters could hope to succeed; but that is another way of saying that only the banking interests can shape procedure. They do not need to do it, however, because the absentmindedness of the general body of legislators guarantees a smooth passage to anything they want.

#### The Electricity Breakdown.

The breakdown of the electricity supply reported in the Press on Monday last points the moral against centralisation which has so often been emphasised in these pages. When we were shown the Battersea power station in process of construction it was explained to us that not even the worst lightning could put the plant out of action. Duplicated equipment and heaps of smaller devices had been provided against such acts of God. Well, in the event, the whole affair has gone wrong without God's help. There is a record in the Bible of God "winking" in times of ignorance; and that is what appears to be the case now. As Allen Upward noticed in his famous book (to the discerning, of course) when mariners lost their ships and blame had to be apportioned—not to speak of insurance interests protected—the Courts had to decide how far God was responsible and how far the captain. And in course of time it became a working rule of law that God sent only the big waves; and so, if the ship went down among little waves it was the captain's fault. Well, there were no "big waves" over Sunday night; the weather was behaving normally. Yet, without warning, a dislocation of the grid system affected Twickenham in the west, and Brighton in the south. The Barking station failed at the same time, and Ilford was almost entirely without electricity for fifteen minutes. The interruptions in all directions varied from half an hour to fifty minutes.

Apparently the duplicate plants, intended to assist in an emergency, have got a kink which makes them go out on a sympathetic strike instead. What would

happen, then, in an intensive air raid must be a question that many people will be asking. Only a week ago there was newspaper gossip about removing the factories and equipment of Woolwich Arsenal down west to be out of the danger zone. And for the same reason there should be no key generating stations within easy flying distance of our coasts, particularly those fronting on the Continent. But they are put there for technical reasons, which means in the last analysis in most cases of engineering problems, reasons of cost. Nobody is to blame. Constructors, administrators, and organisers are forced to compromise, to tamper with their principles of physical efficiency in order to fulfil the law of "sound finance."

\* \* \*

Like the credit-system is said to be by its defenders, the grille-system is a "delicate" one. But if so, the claims made on behalf of either, that it should spread out for long distances from its "delicate" centre are logically wrong. But logic does not count here, because, besides the technical and strategic problems referred to, there is the over-riding financial policy of centralisation in economic enterprise for the sake of the monopolisation of political power. The individual, who can, to some extent, haggle about the price of candles, paraffin, coal, and what not is powerless to do so as regards gas or electricity. The bills sent out by the Combines are virtually demand-notes, and their accountancy departments extensions of Somerset House. So the electricity breakdown is one more reminder of the price we have to pay, and might yet have to pay, for the maintenance of the present financial system.

#### Damage or Waste?

The youth who was sentenced to two months' imprisonment for smashing a window at 11, Downing-street, and invoked Social Credit in mitigation of the offence, has in one way caused embarrassment to the Movement, no section of which advises methods of violence. But his outbreak was spontaneous, and because of that, it is useful as a peg on which to hang a sound moral. It is this: that whereas the damage done by him was no more than 11s. the cost of goods destroyed all over the world, goods of which he and his fellows stand in need, has reached astronomic figures. The damage has been done deliberately; in some cases credit has been advanced to assist it; yet nobody has gone to prison. Here are some items on the charge-sheet; all of them taken from newspaper reports during 1933.

\* \* \*

The U.S.A. destroyed 2,000,000 pigs that could have been used for food.

British farmers were forced to kill cattle too soon.

The U.S.A. destroyed 6,000,000 dairy cattle.

New Zealand drove 5,000 lambs into the sea—drowned them.

The U.S.A. was forced to plough in every third row of cotton.

France fines farmers for increasing wheat-growing acreage.

Russian failure of crops "brings better prospects."

40,000,000 gallon "glut" of milk in Great Britain.

British farmers feed new milk to pigs.

Brazil destroyed over 26,000,000 bags of coffee.

British herring glut "threatens starvation."

Irish Free State reported as destroying 200,000 calves at the rate of 25,000 per week. Owing to the "need for economy" the calves had to be slaughtered with hammers and stones.

The more extensively the community realise that all this sort of thing is unnecessary as well as unconscionable, the more prone will some of them be to adopt undesirable methods of protest. Suppression of uniforms is said to be contemplated by the Government. Yet to the desperate man it matters nothing what colours he wears, but everything what thoughts he thinks.



money which has been created by the banks. When a loan is repaid by the customer to the bank which made the loan, the deposit created by the loan is wiped out, and the aggregate of all bank deposits is thereby reduced by the sum so paid.

"... the banks now have an almost complete monopoly of the credit facilities of the country. They may restrict or extend credit at will within the limitations which I have mentioned; and the question has arisen whether the control of credit should continue to be exercised in the sole discretion of the directors and officials of the banks."—(Hon. C. H. Cahan, Secretary of State for Canada, in an address to the Canadian Club of Toronto on November 13, 1933.)

#### [Conclusion of references.]

We table for convenience the main ideas in the Bank of Nova Scotia's article in their sequential order.

1. Handling credits well and wisely.
2. Sound and successful dealings in credit.
3. Banker blamed for using something which is not his but everyone's.
4. Credit as a mystical substance.
5. Mysterious something called credit.
6. Other people's money.
7. Note taken from depositor an asset of the bank.
8. Not a mythical substance, but a sum of money.
9. Money a substance passing over a counter.
10. Banker thinks in realistic terms about his obligations.
11. Otherwise his assets would be frozen.
12. Bankers must think about money realistically.

The theme is Social-Credit "Mysticism" and Orthodox "Realism." In the course of his criticism Mr. Wilson quotes a definition of a mystic as follows:

"One who seeks by contemplation and self-surrender to obtain union with or absorption into the Deity, or who believes in a spiritual apprehension of truths beyond the understanding (term often used in contempt).

Mystic truth, then is truth that cannot be verified by reason. Naturally enough it suits the bankers to designate Social Credit a branch of mysticism, connoting the "visionary" nature of the A + B Theorem, and the dream-state in which it was revealed to its discoverer; or, to change the image, to talk as if he had been caught up into the seventh heaven where he beheld unutterable truths which it were, if not unlawful to utter, at least impossible to explain.

Yet, to put the position as briefly as possible, the whole bother arises because orthodoxy will insist on regarding money as a *token of money* whereas Social Credit insists on regarding it as a *token of things*. The orthodox "realist" forgets *things*, which are realities, while the Douglas Mystic, in common with every one of his fellow creatures, is concerned with things first, and only in the tokens of them as a means of getting them. The logical consequence is that the orthodox banker is not technically, that is, primarily concerned with costing. He may become so politically and secondarily, as in cases where anomalies in costing and the consequences thereof to his customers spoil his game of pairing up debit-money-tokens with credit-money-tokens in his counting-house. Basically he is only concerned with money as a "substance passing over a counter," and if that substance has a "cost," the "cost" is the "substance." A pound out—a pound back—and something attempted, something done, has earned his night's repose notwithstanding that millions may lie awake at night in anxiety over the consequences of it. It is as if he had received the revelation from on high that money came into the world to punish sinners, not to enable sinners to save themselves. For the difference between salvation or damnation is the difference between correct and incorrect methods of relating money

to things. Our lapse into rhetoric can be related to the third point in the above enumeration where Social Credit advocates are reproached for "blaming the banker" for "using something which is not his" but which belongs to the whole community. Even allowing, for the sake of argument, that we were unable to rationalise the theory of the public ownership of money, we can rationalise to everybody the theory of the public ownership of things produced by the public, money or no money. The crux of our charge does not lie in the question of *what or whose the money is* which the banker uses but in the question of *how he uses it*. We say that things are happening in the presence of money as now administered which would not happen in its absence. "We've got all we want but can't have it" is a statement which could not be true of an island of savages, but is true of this island of civilised beings. If ten savages picked up 100 coconuts and consumed 20 on one day, they would still own the other 80 on the next, and would enjoy unconditional access to this balance. And even if you suppose them to improvise tokens representing their suspended consumption of coconuts, could you imagine them handicapped by that fact? Only by making the assumption that the advent of the token-system marked the advent of the tabu-system—in short that they thenceforth administered their token-system under mystic direction. Then it would be simple. They would construct palm-battering-rams to speed up the wind-falls, and would lay by the wind-falls to pay for the rams while refraining from eating the ram-falls because the nuts were not hand-picked! Here would be the truths of mysticism made manifest in "sound finance," and there is no doubt that the savages would soon be "absorbed into the Deity" or depart from this life in another direction.

Very well, and that is the situation in economic life to-day. Our tokens of money are used as tokens of tokens of money—as tokens of tokens of tokens of things—money—as tokens of anything rather than things. Our monetary system is attended by all the experiences of a tabu-system, by results exactly the opposite of those which we expect the monetary system to get for us. So if the bankers, under whose authority these things happen, like to call themselves realists, it is up to them to rationalise their realism. They can attempt to do this in two alternative ways. They can argue that these things happen because of the people's effective (a) disobedience, or (b) obedience to financial laws and rules. Either we are all carelessly putting a perfect goods-getting mechanism out of order, or else we are innocently using one designed to prevent our getting the goods. Whatever mystery invests the subject of money here; for in any system where the directors and the directed are pursuing opposite policies, and either party is unaware of the fact, the result is bound to be "mystic reality" or "realistic mystery" or whatever other jargon you like to import into the inquiry. You will have bankers "handling credit well and wisely" (point 1) or entering into "sound and successful dealings in credit" (point 2), and you will have would-be consumers feeling "unwell" and acting "unwisely," and producers entering into "unsound or unwise" "ful" dealings with goods. Wisdom or unwisdom, soundness or unsoundness, are meaningless terms, and will remain so until related to a single common intention.

The argument should now be narrowed a little. It is not necessary to impute malign intentions to bankers. And that is fortunate, for who can prove motivation in a case like this? But you can presume them. In everyone is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act. The Social-Credit advocate is able to explain the bankers' act, i.e., the design of the bankers'

system, and to show that the economic evils spoken of are the natural consequence of it. The advocate's aim is primarily to get these consequences altered by changing the system. He proposes a technical reform. If the present generation of bankers were the best-intentioned people alive, that would not impair the validity of his case, for the natural consequences of their technique would be just the same as if they all meant them to happen. With the exception of a comparatively few financiers whose names are rarely heard of one might say that, strictly speaking, the bankers have no intentions, the so-called motivation behind their policy is something like what is termed a "conditioned reflex"—an impulse or habit of action generated by association with the mechanism of finance and traditional ways of working it. Just as a dog can be got so used to associating his meal with the sound of a whistle, so that whenever the whistle blows his mouth becomes salivated, so the banker has got so that he comes over all gooseflesh whenever the red light or tinkling bell attached to a ledger-posting machine announces a debit-balance in the account of an optimistic depositor, and the passing out of more money or "substance"—precious "substance over the counter"—than had come in over the counter. He can't help it; it's his way. And the difficulty about arguing Social Credit with him is not so much his potential inability to understand the analysis as his psychological resistance to the idea that new principles and methods are called for in his line of business. And so, generally, the authoritative opinions expressed in all such bank circulars as the one we are discussing, reflect a reflex and do not communicate a conviction. This makes the problem of change so difficult; for in the banking fraternity generally, the masterminds of the Credit Monopoly control a body of officials imbued with feelings analogous to those of martyrs. Events during the last year or two, it is true, have forced them to abandon some of their beliefs, but not so far as to make them distrust the axioms which Social Credit is challenging, and which the Credit Monopoly is intent on preserving inviolate.

The bankers' readiness to enter into public argument, as indicated in many other quarters than Canada, is not to be interpreted as necessarily a symptom of readiness to give way. According to what we are able to piece together for ourselves by deductions from events the balance of probability is that the enemy forces are retreating to stronger positions according to plan and are using these dialectical skirmishes simply to cover their retirement. They have been, or know that they will be, out-argued on the technical phases of the issue. But it is a far cry from their conceding the Social Credit case to their sanctioning the Social Credit system. You do not disarm opposing forces by explaining how they came to possess arms and you not. They need only say: Very interesting; what are you going to do about it?—and that is a conundrum for the leaders of the un-armed forces. In warfare the enemy's retirement from certain positions leaves you with the option of occupying them, and in certain conditions, of attempting to cut off the retreat. But the enemy foresees that, and if they decide to retreat they take precautions; for example, mining the ground you would have to pass over in order to harass them or cut their communications. Again, a retirement in one place may be the prelude to an attack elsewhere. In the case of the bankers, this hypothesis of an attack elsewhere may be reasonably entertained. "Elsewhere," in this context, signifies other-Trade Unionists would call victimisation. Now, imagining some sector of a military line on which an attack was to be delivered, the fortuitous circumstances conducive to success would be that (a) the sector was weakly supported, and (b) that its signalling system was defective or out of action. In one word—the sector was isolated from the rest of the troops. The enemy would have to find this out as best they could, and by such means as they had at their dis-

posal. Bankers, however, know everything all the time, and no circumstances are fortuitous in any real sense. They can know who is who, and what he's up to, in respect of any person in whose activities they become interested. It follows that if any sector of the Social-Credit line were to become isolated in the way above described, the bankers would know they could smash it whenever they chose. And so would anyone conversant with Social Credit politics. Whether such circumstances transpire remains to be seen, but should be noted as a possibility. In view of the wide dissemination of knowledge on finance, the bankers could not very well take any drastic action against their critics without first having at least made a show of answering their case. Though opinion may be flouted or suppressed in fact the forms of democracy have to be preserved as far as possible; and it would not do for people known to be associated with a given political policy, especially one attracting an increasing amount of sympathetic attention, to be "put through it" while the bankers were observing strict silence about the merits of the policy.

Coming to another angle of the subject, the insinuations made in banker propaganda that bankers are poor bewildered innocents being attacked in their characters by fanatics on mystical grounds, tend to prepare the public mind to condone reprisals visited on Social Credit advocates who press their campaign "intemperately" and, particularly, "unconstitutionally." There is the suggestion of a gentlemen's agreement being hinted at, under which the bankers for the one part would condescend to criticise the case, in return for which sponsors of the case would mould their methods of advocacy to traditional forms of leisurely persuasion. Nothing to be hastily pressed for, at any rate among the general public. There would be much to be said for such an agreement provided that guarantees were forthcoming that Social Credit was, so to speak, sub judice in the sense that it was down for hearing in some High Court of impartial authorities within a short time. We once heard a ruling given, which has been a cardinal point in our policy, that it might be our duty in certain circumstances to write with restraint on particular issues in case we unwittingly said something to embarrass negotiators in matters of State policy which were really important for this country; but the ruling contained this proviso, that in such a case the duty lay on the authorities concerned to take at least one responsible leader of the Movement into their confidence. If they neglected to do so it was not to be our concern to roar softly in case we frightened the ladies.

## The Point of the Pen.

By R. Laugier.

### No. 6.—WIT, HUMOUR, AND WISECRACKS.

Eighteenth-century writers differentiated between wit and humour: humorists laughed *with* a man, wit laughed *at* him. Wit has always been essentially aristocratic, by which I mean nothing to do with class.

The aristocratic intelligence is, I believe, always realistic. It faces up to what it believes to be truth. It falls neither into the pit of sentimentality, nor of cynicism. Realism is largely a matter of unmasking human vanities: the artist-realist begins, of course, with himself. "Look into your heart, and write."

Humour, then, may be sentimental, and usually is so; true wit is real, and is not afraid of being "malicious," if intellectual integrity is at stake. Wit rubs Attic salt into the wounds it inflicts upon human vanity—which is one way of curing!

Recently there has arisen a new form of humour, known as "wisecracking." It consists, apparently, of both humour and wit, but it is the wit of the crowd, not of the aristocrat. Like all humour, "wisecracking" consists of exposing unexpected likenesses or hitherto unseen similarities. The lowest form is the pun, and





ACADEMY CINEMA, Oxford Street.  
GER. 2981.

ROBERT LYNE in  
"POIL DE CAROTTE"  
and Rene Clair's  
"AN ITALIAN STRAW HAT" (U)

## Social Credit Reading Course

SET A.

Comprising:—

Social Credit in Summary (1d.).  
The Key to World Politics (1d.).  
Through Consumption to Prosperity (2d.).  
Social Credit Principles (1d.).

Post free 6d. the set.

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