

THE NEW AGE

INCORPORATING "CREDIT POWER."

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF POLITICS, LITERATURE AND ART

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NOTES OF THE WEEK.

Finance and the News-Monopoly.

In a lecture given to the Post Office Telephone and Telegraph Society last week at the Institute of Electrical Engineers, by Mr. C. Fleetwood-May, a chief official of Reuter's, it was stated that London became the news centre of the world in Victoria's reign, a position which it still holds, in spite of fierce competition. Mr. Fleetwood-May said:—

"The fact of being the world's news centre means a great deal. London could hardly have become the financial hub of the world if it was not also the news centre."

"News collecting on an internationally organised scale," he added, "was originally nothing to do with newspapers, but started as an essential part of international finance. It began with the Fuggers, financiers, who had correspondents all over Europe."

This piece of candour, straight from the mouth of an authoritative expert in the news-game, is worth careful preservation by Social-Credit exponents. It is all the more important because it occurred in the course of a semi-confidential address to Civil Servants. We have frequently made reference to Kipling's dictum (attributed to a character in one of his stories) that *power* resides in the *control of communications*, and on one occasion included the telephone-telegraph system in an enumeration of the different forms of "communication." So the idea in Mr. Fleetwood-May's disclosure will not be new to most of our readers; but what he says will afford them an excellent text on which to elaborate the idea and expound its implication to the public.

The saying that "time is money" can be as truly rendered: "news is money," with its corollary that the control of news is the control of money. The converse of this corollary is also true—namely that the control of money is the control of news. And the more centralised and exclusive the control of either the more self-

evident is the proposition that the two things controlled are indistinguishable for all practical purposes, which, summed up, mean the purpose of imposing and instrumenting high policy.

* * *

To give an illustration. If you were to possess this power, and wanted somebody to refrain from doing something or going somewhere, you would have the choice between two equally effective options; you could put a money-cost (or price) on the action, and withhold from him the money necessary to meet the cost, or you could frighten him off performing it by misinforming him of the consequences. You would get your own way as a despot, or as a liar; for he could not know that you were either. And that is the secret of the bankers' power. They can so use their control of money as to induce the popular belief that they do not control it. It is all the old game of passing the buck, with the new feature that the buck passes to and fro from *Money* to *News* and from *News* to *Money*—and with such velocity that it is doubtful whether even the Money-mongers and News-mongers can always be certain where it is.

* * *

Perhaps there is no better way of realising the essential identity between the money-system and the news-system than to watch the tape-machine at work. Letter by letter the hammers stamp out a message, and if you are in a contemplative mood you realise that what you see unfolding itself on the tape is a duplicate of a message being typed out at that very moment by an operator maybe hundreds of miles away. And then, if you have some knowledge of the Social Credit Analysis, you realise that you are watching a working model of the loan-costing system, where, as the operators of high finance type out the figures of created money on their instrument those figures simultaneously appear as a cost-message on the industrial-accounting machine under your eyes. Sometimes the tape-machine will tap out a "correction" a previous message, thus reminding you—if you

the right mood—that news messages are not invariably infallible: but you never see such reminders come through on the accounting-machine of industry. You never see, following such a message as “Bank-loan issued £100, creating cost £100,” some such correction come through as: “Bank-loan repaid £100, destroying cost £100.” Yet, as you know, the message, truly corrected, should read something along this line: “Bank-loan repaid, £100: Cost left unrecovered (and irrecoverable), £80.” What *might* be seen by the ordinary watcher would be a supplementary message running like this: “New Capital Issue £80,” which would give him the exactly opposite and false notion that a new item of revenue-earning wealth was being added to the industrial system.

News can mislead without necessarily being untrue. News, like Money, is not a pool, but a flow, and there is such a thing as the short-circuiting of news corresponding with that of money. A particular piece of news may be true at the moment of announcement, and become untrue afterwards in the sense that the deduction one rightly draws from it at first may become a false deduction afterwards. The hypothetical examples of messages just given help to illustrate this truth. For instance, at the moment when a bank-loan is issued and announced (as we are supposing) the deduction that the cost initiated at the same time was recoverable would be correct. The bank-loan becomes Deposits which are additional to the previous amount of credit in public ownership; so that the equivalent cost linked to it is arithmetically and potentially recoverable. In short, the fact of the loan establishes the fact of the recoverability of the linked cost. But when the loan is called in, the natural deduction that the linkage holds and the cost disappears along with the repaid loan is wrong. On the token figures of our examples it is 80 per cent. wrong. Thus the lapse of time brings about a lapse of meaning—the earlier true news in the flow falsifies the significance of the later true news by misdirecting the interpretation that should be placed thereon. Deception is carried on a current of true news just as tendentious news is carried on a current of purposeless electricity or air-waves. To paraphrase the title of a famous book, we are all compassed about by *Lies from Nowhere*. . . . And now, having got ourselves entangled in the fringes of metaphysics, we will stop.

Pre-History.

According to Mr. Ezra Pound, “Empires decay because of rottenness at the centre, and in every known case that rottenness has been financial,” and he asserts that usury was the cause of the fall of the Roman Republic, the Roman Empire, the Venetian Republic, and so on.

Common sense tells us that no empire, any more than a living organism, would decay without some rottenness in some vital part, and Social Credit shows us that mere usury is not, at any rate in our own present case, the real fault. Under Social Credit the usurer would find his proper, insignificant place. But usury gets a good chance to grow when there is a faulty system of economics; and ideas have grown up round the practice of usury in the last two hundred and forty years which are helping to perpetuate an economic system long since rotten. (For instance, the idea that all money is debt—bankers' definition—or that in some way all credit goes by right not to the nation, but to the banks.) Bankers during that period, driven with increasing

frequency by their necessity of borrowing more money—this because of an increasing money shortage, not because of usury—have placed themselves, and us, more and more in the power of a particular gang of people, which, though it began as (and still is) a private gang of usurers, has had bartered to it now a far wider power: that of withholding and restricting the nation's credit.

It is true that the Roman and other great civilisations reached a point where their economic system went wrong, but the repetition of history only shows us the similarities of the past (always more obvious than the differences), and offers no guidance to us who are making history now, except, in a general way, to show us what *may* happen by the laws of probability and with the material of human nature. (But it may not; in any case the peculiarities need as much attention as the general, or rough, outlines.) Certainly there was never before the same problem as there is now of “a too productive earth and a too productive machinery” (to quote from the conference now going on between France and her colonies), never such a world-wide scramble for dumping-grounds. Come to that, never has the whole world been affected by one and the same problem before.

But we *have* reached a point at which it may be said all other civilisations went down—the point when a structure begins to totter, a system gets out of hand. This stage has always been marked by a dearth of good leaders in the governmental system and by a loss of morale in the nation as a whole—as at the present time. In our case, however, the remedy is known—the adjustment that would set conditions right for this civilisation to pick up again. If history is not to repeat itself this time, we must implement the remedy before the day of grace passes; for another point of similarity in the past seems to have been that all these systems had a longer or a shorter day of grace, a period of time before the fall, in which they could have averted it.

Hearing about them is like watching a procession of all the now extinct animals that have lived on the earth—huge monsters like giant rhinoceroses, or weird flying reptiles, or those enormous ones with the very long necks and tiny heads. One and all they perished (perhaps a few kinds were destroyed by a stroke of ill-luck) because they were unable to tackle some final problem, not always in themselves—their own particular problem, but always the same problem—failed to adjust themselves; or rather, circumstances in which they found themselves too completely perhaps, they had adjusted themselves too completely to one set of circumstances, and then were unable to change and fit in with another—like our “science” of economics, which was not designed for the present machine age.

Any “system that works,” such as a civilisation or a living organism, will carry on for a long time by the sheer force of its original impetus. That is the day of grace; but it is very definitely a “day” only. It will not last for ever.

Can we succeed where the others failed? The Social Credit movement may be a reviving influence in the veins of the “creature,” or a consciousness of the right thing in its mind, but we must make it a directing consciousness—must get the whole creature to move in the right direction. Can we, then, wake the community to the urgency of the situation—rouse them to action? Since we are the people in possession of the remedy, the whole responsibility for the survival, or otherwise, of this civilisation rests on us, now. We have to consider whether it is enough to convert a few others, or even a fairly large number, to Social Credit, or whether, since time is obviously short, we may not have to do something far more startling.

K. M. MILNES.

Scrapping Social Credit.

A short paragraph in THE NEW AGE recently advanced the proposition that it would be as easy to scrap Social Credit as it is to adopt it, provided that it turned out a failure.

Is this true? If so, is it wise to emphasise the fact in propaganda?

Firstly, as to its truth. It goes without saying that the problem of overcoming the resistance of people opposed to Social Credit, and so placed as to be able to prevent its adoption, is stupendous—at least to all appearance as seen by Social-Credit advocates. But this is irrelevant to the real issue, which can be stated thus: Could those people—let us call them the Bank-Statesmen—*supposing them to approve* of the experiment being tried, design a pattern for it and secure wide and willing co-operation in working it out? If so: Would they, by launching the experiment, incur the risk that, in the event of its failure, the co-operating interests would wish for, and be able to enforce, its continuance?

The answers to these questions can be derived from an examination of such an exemplary scheme as that worked out for Scotland; and readers familiar with its provisions will have no difficulty in seeing that the launching of that scheme would present no difficulties to speak of. *Ex hypothesi* the Press of the country would be explaining its principles and provisions honestly; and when that was done most of the initial hostility of the interests required to co-operate would be removed, and what remained would consist mostly of subdivided hostilities proceeding from mutually irreconcilable demands, the obstructionist sponsors of which would cancel each other out. Self-interested calculation would triumph over doctrinal agitation. A prize in the hand is worth two in the bush—and be that bush called by the name of Justice, Equity, Fraternity, Equality, or Liberty, the vast majority of practical people will take the view that even should there be higher prizes to be won by raiding the bush, well, a prize in the hand will help to finance the raid! They could at least buy the salt to catch the bird.

Now we come to the second question. There is much plausibility in the proposition that the easier a thing is to start the harder it is to stop. And in any case it is self-evident that the starting of anything must produce an alteration of the conditions in which the option to start or not to start is open. During the Protectionist controversy leading up to the General Election of 1906 a Unionist newspaper argued that, after all, if this country found by experiment that Chamberlain's scheme of Protection plus Imperial Preferences failed to fulfil expectations it could be abandoned. Whereupon a Liberal newspaper immediately retorted that the policy of abandonment would need years of organised agitation costing hundreds of thousands of pounds in order to overcome the vested interests which would have crystallised round the faulty policy and would be insistent on its perpetuation. That was a convincing reply—although, if the Unionists had known what we all know to-day about the technique and policy of our bankers-statesmen, they could at least have pointed out that the vested interests of High Finance at the back of the anti-Protectionist agitation would be able to put up all the money necessary for its conduct. However, the issue was never put to the test, for the Liberal Free-traders won a smashing electoral victory over the Protectionists; and we may not doubt that our friends the

bankers had more to do with the winning of it than history has recorded. They doubtless acted on the principle that prevention was cheaper than cure, and that the proper time to stop an undesirable policy was before it started!

The history of this conflict will repay further examination, (a) because it illustrates how changes in orthodox policies, or agitations for such, play into the hands of the bankers, or are bent by them to their own purposes, and (b) because by doing so it enables us to appreciate the difference between the problems created by such changes and the problem likely to be created by the fundamental change involved in the adoption of Social Credit.

During the seven years leading up to the General Election of 1906 the Boer War had been fought and the gold mines annexed; Mr. Balfour's Education Act had infuriated Nonconformity by “putting the Church schools on the rates;” the Government had stirred British Trade-Unionism into violent hostility by permitting the South African mine-owners to import Chinese labour into the Rand; and lastly Mr. Chamberlain's fiscal policy, on which he proposed to fight the Election had alarmed a large section of British industrialists who stood to be injured by tariffs. Incidentally, the Australian Commonwealth Act had been passed—an event which would have facilitated the negotiation of Imperial Preferences had Mr. Chamberlain won his mandate (although that may not have been the only reason for it). Now, reviewing this picture of armies of agitators converging on the ballot-box against their common enemy, the result of the election could have been pretty surely anticipated. The bankers were in the happy position of being neutral on all but one of the questions agitated, and of being able to secure a large body of popular support for the retention of Free-Trade policy—the question in which they were interested. They were able to appeal to consumer-interests under the slogan of the “Big Loaf” (Free Trade) versus the “Little Loaf” (Protection)—pictures and models of these loaves being displayed throughout the constituencies.

But, for the very reason that grounds of hostility to the Unionist Government were so mixed, the question of interpreting the electoral mandate, if given to the Liberal Party (as it was in the event) was likely to be difficult. As we all know to-day, the function of interpretation is reserved by the bankers as is their power to impose their interpretation on the Government. And so it was then, although not so tightly as now. So it is not surprising to find that the smashing Liberal victory of 1906 was hailed as a mandate for Free Trade. Neither the Nonconformists nor the Trade Unionists got what they agitated for—the Church remained “on the rates,” and, although the Chinese were subsequently cleared out of the Rand, their places were filled, not by white labour (as the Trade Unionists had expected) but by black.

Next to the question of credit policy that of fiscal policy involves the most far-reaching consequences to the industrial interests of a country as regards both their domestic and their international relationships. It can alter the balance of power between various industries within the country, and between them all considered collectively and similar national groups in other countries. Now, if we bear in mind that in 1906 the bankers of Britain were not nearly so tied up with foreign affiliations as they are to-day, we shall realise the

hostility to a fundamental fiscal change could be reconciled with the general interest of the country on the grounds that (a) it would be a leap in the dark so far as its ultimate results to our overseas trade was concerned, and (b) it would enable the protected industries to enrich themselves at the expense of the non-protected inside the country, and by so doing divert political power to them which they would use to defeat attempts to abolish the tariffs. They would build up political fighting funds with profits extracted from the rest of the community. That was why the Liberal newspaper previously mentioned was able to point out that the repeal of tariffs, once granted, would be a long and expensive job. Not, be it noted, because of the attitude of other countries, for they would naturally be in favour of the repeal; but solely because of the attitude of particular interests in this country. It was all a matter of the domestic balance of power—how to alter it back if the changed policy did not fulfil the expectations of its sponsors.

Now we come to the main question. Would the adoption of Social Credit be followed by similar consequences? Assuming for the sake of argument that Social Credit were to disappoint expectations, or (to go to extremes) were to prove injurious to the majority of citizens, would there be any influences preventing or delaying the rejection of the policy? Readers will be disposed to laugh at the very idea, and rightly so. Nevertheless, it is implicit in the warnings which the bankers utter against trying out the experiment. We shall all be "ruined by inflation"—"look at Germany"—and things of that sort. Yes, but the ruin won't descend upon us the next morning. So long as the principle of the new policy were applied, the experimental discount and dividend could be as modest as the Government chose to make it; and in any likely case there would be plenty of time to watch results and tendencies before "irretrievable disaster" could possibly overtake us. Look at Roosevelt—he's still a long distance from such disaster, in spite of his omission to adopt any safeguards against inflation.

Very well. The next point is that if undesirable results and tendencies arise, and if, when experienced or detected, they are permitted to continue and develop, the influences keeping the policy in being must reside in some grouping of people. Who would they be? Bankers?—industrialists?—wage-earners?—or, shall we say, consumers, that is, the whole people?

Again: what would be the nature of these undesirable results? It would have to be the disappearance of the benefits initially conferred. Now, the scheme starts by giving more purchasing power to every citizen and providing a monetary incentive to producers to deliver more goods. If the scheme is fundamentally unsound, as the bankers say, then, since it is a coherent co-ordinated scheme based on the alleged unsound principle, it will fail in all directions together, and not in any one by itself. In that case there will be no section of the community wanting to go on with it against the wishes of the rest. The consumer who cannot buy more goods implies a retailer who cannot sell more goods, and cannot order more goods from the manufacturer. The disappointment of any one is the disappointment of all. Rich and poor alike would cease to work the scheme—producers because it wasn't worth while, and the consumers because they couldn't help themselves. There would be no need for an election to stop it: it would stop itself.

There is one more point. Granted that the scheme stops by general consent, it might conceivably be argued that the stoppage would be dangerous. The argument has some antecedent hypothetical plausibility because of the fact that wrong policies in the past have created circumstances inimical to their reversal. But when those circumstances are analysed they are found to be related to just such changes in *balances of interest* as we have discussed in respect of the Protectionist issue. Justly or unjustly, with universal consent or without, the reversal inflicted hardships and losses to certain sections of the community.

Social Credit does not come within the category of such cases. It does not start by disturbing the existing balance of interests; and therefore its cessation would not involve any re-balancing. It reinforces every one of them and reconciles them with each other. That is the claim made for it. If it fails to justify that claim, then the reinforcements and the reconciliation disappear (or do not occur), and the economic system is, so to speak, handed back without damage for the bankers to resume their own policy of managing it.

The conclusion is that Social Credit cannot continue in operation unless consumers are satisfied with it. If they are; then it ought to continue. And it will continue, because the satisfaction is felt by a whole community, who, by reason of the extra margin of purchasing power in their possession have an extra margin of economic power with which to back up their voting power in case of necessity.

But why waste time arguing about the possible failure of Social Credit—even hypothetically? Does it not suggest lack of confidence in our case? It can, of course. But judiciously used the arguments do serve to expose the hollowness and insincerity of bankers' warnings that the new policy is too risky to embark on. The fact that they are now graciously certifying the subject fit for popular discussion must not be construed as any weakening of their determination to prevent its adoption. Indeed, evidences are appearing that they are going to appeal to the public under the slogan: "Talk about it; but don't try it."

Gaitskell on "A + B."

[Reprinted, by request, from our issue of December 28, 1933.—ED.]

"It is evident that the 'rate of flow of prices,' or the sums which have to be charged to cover costs, do not include all payments made in respect of the production of the article."

So says H. T. N. Gaitskell, writing on "Four Monetary Heretics," Chapter VIII., in the work, *Everybody Wants to Know About Money.*


Mr. Gaitskell goes on to say that "The costs which have to be met by the outlay of the consumer are in fact only the costs of the final producer or retailer, and his costs are simply his A payments—wages, salaries, dividends, etc., and his B payments—the cost of services and goods brought from other organisations, of which the most important item will, of course, be his stock." "Providing that the retailer recovers these costs, there is no reason why he should not sell his goods and continue to carry on business. The other producers, who do not sell direct to the consumer, must recover their costs too, but naturally they do not rely upon nor deal with the consumer. They sell to 'other organisations,' and receive from them a 'B' payment."—"Since these persons do not sell direct to the consumer, it is obviously an error to suppose that the consumer must pay their costs as well. What he must

pay and what therefore the total A payments distributed throughout the system must equal are just a single A + B payment of the final producer or retailer."

Mr. Gaitskell claims that because the consumer does not deal direct with the producers and wholesalers, he does not defray their costs but, since he deals only with the retailer, he defrays only his costs. Mr. Gaitskell gives no clue as to who he imagines does defray the producers' and wholesaler's costs, or with what money they are financed.

Included in the retailer's cost is a B payment which consists of the wholesaler's costs, an A + B payment. The wholesaler's B payment consists of the producers' costs, also A + B payments. The retailer's B payment therefore consists of the producers' and wholesaler's costs and, since the consumer defrays both the retailer's A and B costs, I cannot see that it matters whether he deals with producers and wholesaler direct or not, he defrays their costs just the same through his dealings with the retailer.

To illustrate his argument Mr. Gaitskell uses a simple diagram suggested by Mr. E. F. M. Durbin's "Purchasing Power and Trade Depression":—



It shows (Fig. 1) that costs are made up of A payments, the A payments of the first producer becoming the B payments of the second and the A + B payments of the second and succeeding producers and wholesaler ultimately becoming the B payment of the retailer, whose cost consists of his A + B payments.

If the diagram actually represents facts, there would be no need for the Social Credit proposals, because total wages, salaries, and dividends, A payments, would exactly equal total cost of production, A + B payments. In fact the price factor ———— would

always be unity and with one or two minor exceptions Mr. Gaitskell thinks that it is always unity.


Mr. Gaitskell quotes, with one minor error, Major Douglas's statement of the A + B theorem from the Macmillan Committee Minutes of Evidence, Vol. 1, page 298, and imputes ambiguity to it. To business people who practise cost accountancy it has only one meaning, and that is the one which Douglas states quite clearly, viz.: "The rate of flow of purchasing power is represented by A, but since all payments go into prices, the rate of flow of prices cannot be less than A + B. Since A will not purchase A + B, a proportion of the product at least equivalent to B must be distributed by a form of purchasing power which is not comprised in the description grouped under A."

At the outset Mr. Gaitskell confuses the cost of production, which must be recovered, with "the rate of flow of prices." He does not visualise production and costing as dynamic, and because of this he nowhere imparts the true meaning to the problem which must be treated essentially as a flow.

Although I would not agree that the diagram is a correct representation of facts, since farming, spinning, weaving, wholesale and retail have "on-cost" and "establishment charges," which would be added to their production costs, and to be fair to Mr. Gaitskell he also recognises this, I am prepared to demonstrate that this diagram used dynamically instead of statically can show that the rate of flow of prices and incidentally the prices which the retailer would be compelled to charge for the products in order to cover all costs would be 3,000 instead of 1,000 imputed to the retailer by Mr. Gaitskell.

Since cost is a flow, as soon as farming pays out 200 A payments, it immediately proceeds to pay out another 200 A payments, and so on *ad infinitum*. Likewise, spinning, weaving, wholesale, and retail.

To develop the diagram correctly we must look upon it as being the product of a state of society which, as I believe Pigou puts it, "is in a perfectly steady state of self-repeating movement." The diagram will therefore be as shown in Fig. 2.



Production is divided into five periods, consisting of farming, spinning, weaving, wholesale, and retail. Each period is assumed to be of equal duration and cost, and A payments are made at the end of each stage to those engaged in industry either as workers or investors. It is understood that these A payments form consumers' purchasing power.

In such a state there will be five parallel lines of production proceeding simultaneously, each of them at a different stage at any one time. Each stage in any one of the five lines of production ends coincidentally with the end of a stage in each of the other four.

The A payments paid out at the end of each stage are assumed to be completely absorbed in the prices charged for the commodities which they buy so that no money is saved.

Let T1, T2, and T3 be three successive accounting periods during which woollen cloth is completed and made available for sale at the end of each of these periods, and that simultaneously woollen cloth

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The Social Credit Movement.

Supporters of the Social Credit Movement contend that under present conditions the purchasing power in the hands of the community is chronically insufficient to buy the whole product of industry. This is because the money required to finance capital production, and created by the banks for that purpose, is regarded as borrowed from them, and, therefore, in order that it may be repaid, is charged into the price of consumers' goods. It is a vital fallacy to treat new money thus created by the banks as a repayable loan, without crediting the community, on the strength of whose resources the money was created, with the value of the resulting new capital resources. This has given rise to a defective system of national loan accountancy, resulting in the reduction of the community to a condition of perpetual scarcity, and bringing them face to face with the alternatives of widespread unemployment of men and machines, as at present, or of international complications arising from the struggle for foreign markets.

The Douglas Social Credit Proposals would remedy this defect by increasing the purchasing power in the hands of the community to an amount sufficient to provide effective demand for the whole product of industry. This, of course, cannot be done by the orthodox method of creating new money, prevalent during the war, which necessarily gives rise to the "vicious spiral" of increased currency, higher prices, higher wages, higher costs, still higher prices, and so on. The essentials of the scheme are the simultaneous creation of new money and the regulation of the price of consumers' goods at their real cost of production (as distinct from their apparent financial cost under the present system). The technique for effecting this is fully described in Major Douglas's books.

*In Course of Preparation.***THE SOCIAL CREDIT WHO'S WHO,
DIRECTORY AND YEAR BOOK.**

Editor pro tem, ARTHUR BRENTON.

Editorial Committee in process of formation.

Collaboration invited.

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2. Names and addresses for the Directory section.
3. Suggestions as to what material (speeches, statistics, historical data, etc.) is best worth placing on permanent record in the Year Book section.
4. Information as to societies and organisations advocating Social Credit or other principles of financial reform. Date of formation: objects: officers: structure: fees, etc., etc.

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