

THE NEW AGE

INCORPORATING "CREDIT POWER."
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NOTES OF THE WEEK.

The B.B.C. and Social Credit.

Following our remarks of December 13 and 20, we must record some more information received from the correspondent who reported on Mr. Hilton's talk to the Unemployed Clubs. He tells us that this talk (originally broadcast on November 30) was repeated by Mr. Hilton on the wireless about a week later, this time to an audience of schoolchildren. We do not know whether these would be scholars in elementary schools or not, nor whether the listeners would be all the scholars or only the elder scholars. At any rate, the talk got into the schools somehow and somewhere, which is what matters. In the course of it Mr. Hilton, according to our correspondent, was heard to say of Social Credit, words to this effect: "Talk about it by all means, but don't do anything about it." If this paraphrase does injustice, in Mr. Hilton's view, to the authentic statement (which we presume will be on record in his manuscript) we shall be pleased to print the statement on request. In the meantime our correspondent is quite clear in his mind that Social Credit was referred to by its name, and that the advice given drew a distinction between its significance as a subject of study and as an object of policy. Why schoolchildren should be warned against the subject as a policy seems a bit of a puzzle, unless the purport of it was, let us say: "Tell Dad I said so if he mentions the subject." But perhaps it was intended for the teachers who were listening in. Anyhow, there the matter stands; and if our account is accurate in essentials, and if it reflects the attitude of the authorities, it raises some interesting speculations about how the bankers are proposing to deal with Social Credit plans of campaign.

Social-Credit Political Policy.

There are, in theory, three modes of campaigning—education, agitation, and intimidation. The education enlightens people about a bad system, the agitation holds up to moral condemnation those who run the system, and the intimidation ranges through a series

of indictable offences (or near approximations thereto) such as libellous speech at one extreme to a *coup d'etat* at the other. Take as an illustration the rows about the franchise years ago. The campaign started with: "How useful a vote is," then: "How wicked the people who oppose our having a vote," and, lastly, the action of excited demonstrators pulling up the railings at Hyde Park, which (so some historians tell us) decided certain Parliamentary notabilities to withdraw their opposition—which, no doubt it did, although the lesson to be learned is qualified by our present knowledge that the bankers were sympathetic to the "people's cause," and that therefore the employment of force involving possible bloodshed would have been awkward for the anti-reformist leaders. No Minister or ex-Minister of the Crown cares to incur the odium of murder (as the people would call it) either directly or indirectly unless he is first assured of sanctuary inside the sacred portals and behind the stained-glass windows of the banking system. The late Mr. Asquith, though he was dubbed the "Featherstone Murderer," and was cordially hated for his part in the suppression of the riots there, lived an unscathed and honoured life, because in that episode the bankers approved the bloodshed—for the rioters were taking the law into their own hands to secure concrete results, whereas the reformers had been putting the law into the bankers' hands without so much as demanding any results whatever. This serves to emphasise something we should have said above, namely, that "agitation," involving moral condemnation, is not the same thing as "intimidation." They overlap, but they are essentially distinct. It is not intimidation, for instance, to attribute to Mr. Montagu Norman the responsibility for the suicides and bankruptcies of the deflation-period. This contains the seeds of intimidation, but only in the same sense that education contains the seeds of agitation. The distinction is paralleled in law, where, in a case of torts involving damage, the defendant is not responsible for damages (restitution of loss) other than those which "naturally and probably" arise from his act.

directly we say this we must qualify it, for this rule of law, which has been recognised by authoritative jurists for generations, was disregarded in one judgment in 1921. It appears that the charterers of a certain vessel had a man in their employ who, in the course of work on board, kicked down a plank. The plank fell down into the hold. In the hold was petrol vapour. A piece of iron (probably a nail) in the plank struck a spark. The spark set the vapour alight. The vapour set the vessel on fire. Question: Were the charterers liable for the whole of the resultant damage? Under the established rule of law the answer would be No, for who could affirm that the firing of the vessel was the "natural and probable" result of dislodging the plank? Nevertheless, the Court found against the charterers.* Their employee was guilty of negligence, for the plank might have fallen on someone's head; but the actual ultimate result, involving £200,000 damage, was another matter. The penalty would appear to have been an extravagant inflation of the measure of responsibility.

We give this case attention because, as a writer in *The Law Times* says with a reference to it, the judgment was "received with consternation" by jurists. That is, it re-interpreted the significance of the phrase "natural and probable" in a sense foreign to the naturally and probably accepted meaning of those adjectives. Very well, if such an unexpected interpretation can happen in a straightforward case like this, where the facts are precise, and where the issue between the parties is of no political or constitutional importance—of no concern outside the parties themselves, how is anyone to be sure of what will be found legal or not when more complicated issues arise embracing political considerations which have to be explored to the limits of that mighty frame of reference designated by that indefinable term "the safety of the State"?

Applied to the Social-Credit campaign, on a parity of reasoning with that which led to the judgment in question, an innocently-intended educational lecture on the technique of finance might be held to be the starting-point from which there "naturally and probably" proceeded some crime committed long afterwards and far away. Once accept the bankers' interpretation of the "safety of the State"—which we know to be *the integrity of the Money Monopoly*—as the overriding criterion of legality, then not only is education indistinguishable from intimidation, but the intentions of the offenders become irrelevant. For if the safety of the State is held to be jeopardised by any act, the question of whether that act was intended to produce that result or not becomes a trivial matter of pence off a big fine or days off a long sentence. The only thing left for Social Credit propagandists to do, then, would be to perform rites of adoration before the mystery of the economic paradox. And if they dared to go so far as to join the bankers to the mystery they would have to be careful to leave unchallenged the established idea that bankers permit poverty for the same inscrutable reason that Providence permits earthquakes and hurricanes. The Movement would resolve itself into a Church or other institution of worship, much to the joy

* *Polemia and another and Furness Withy and Co., Ltd.*, 1921. Court of Appeal—Lords Justices Bankes, Warrington, Scrutton. See history and comments in *The Law Times*, December 22, and onwards. Cited as the *Polemia*

of gatecrashers now flocking in through its ill-guarded entrances.

This is an admittedly extreme speculation, but we like to drive potential tendencies to their ultimate logical limits, because that is the shortest and clearest way of showing their significance. In any case the liberty of the day is sufficient for the day, and at the present moment members of the Movement enjoy the option of choosing between educational and agitational campaigning, or engaging in both. As for illegal intimidation, nobody is foolish enough to attempt to exercise it or procure others to do so. There is no power inside the Movement or visibly connected with it which could succeed by that method—and failure would put the intrepid experimenter where he would not be able to employ any method at all. That is to reject it on the ground of feasibility, not of principle. As regards the principle, it is true to say that if one cannot apply it there is no use in discussing it. In one sense that is so. But the logic of the Social Credit Analysis, combined with our knowledge of high-political super-Parliamentary wire-pulling, makes it certain that the principle is inherent in the inevitable development of the economic crisis itself. Impending events, while the authorities remain obdurate, must create reactions among men and women of all classes—not excluding what are called the criminal classes—which will have an intimidatory effect on those authorities. The intimidation need not be purposive, nor indeed need the agents of it be aware of its nature. To make our meaning clear, any event which makes the bankers go faster than they wish along the line of their policy, or obstructs their going so fast as they wish along that line, will have an intimidatory effect. It will cause a division of inner counsels about how to instrument the modified speed of advance enforced on them with appropriate orders and rules; and it will create in them all an uncertainty about what new event may supervene on the change.

The following are a few examples of events which have had an intimidatory effect.

The trial of Mr. Leopold Harris.

The trial of Mr. Hatry.

The trial of Lord Kylsant.

The action of the Bank of Portugal against Waterlow and Sons.

The Invergordon mutiny.

The public protest of judges re reduction of salaries.

Lord Hewart's attack on bureaucracy in *The New Despotism*.

We place them in order of their character, without reference to dates. The first four arose out of acts held to be criminal, the fifth constituted what would have been held as treason if the mutineers had been arraigned before a tribunal, the sixth and seventh were cases of agitation in high places. All these events in their various ways touched a nerve centre; they were the causes, or the expressions, of unprompted situations which forced the authorities (in the last analysis, the Money Monopoly) either to modify their policy or to take action in defence of that policy, with the result that they had to let a lot of matters come out in the newspapers on which critics of the financial system were able to extend and develop their indictment of it.

Not one of these events can be said to have been directly caused by Social-Credit education or agitation.

On the contrary it is true to say that they provided Social-Credit campaigners with mounts, turning them, if they wished, from infantry into cavalry, raising their educational efforts to the stature of agitation. Agitation is education on horseback. We rise to power not on our own plans, but on the miscarriage of the bankers' plans.

It should be observed, further, that what we define as *education* when absorbed by the ordinary citizen takes on the force of *agitation* when absorbed by the super-citizen—that is, the man of authority and influence. For example it was comparatively innocuous when we were getting ordinary citizens to "look into" our proposition that money was costless and that its creation by the banks gave them no property-rights in it—and things of that sort; but when M. Marang took it into his head to float "spurious" Bank-of-Portugal notes in that country he started something which culminated in setting the jurists of the world discussing those matters. He got about whether a note was worth its face value to the Social-Credit propagandists could not have produced such an effect with twenty-years' effort; but M. Marang, who had no notion of forwarding a Movement, did it in two or three, or, to put it more forcibly, made it inevitable by a few months' operations. It still remains a mystery why the directors of the Bank of Portugal were allowed by their Central-Bank associates in this country to enter the action, much more to persist in it, if the reason was not that the shock of the discovery caught them on the wrong foot. Anyhow, the fact is that the sending of the jurists to school on the money question is doing more to undermine the authority and to challenge the omniscience of the bankers than would thousands of resolutions passed by assemblies of ordinary citizens throughout the country. That is why we class it as intimidatory.

On parallel reasoning the same conclusion can be reached in respect of the other cases. For instance, when judges are stirred to pronounce salary-cutting unconstitutional without waiting for the question to be submitted to them in their juridical capacity—and when one judge publicly proposes to close his Court, downing the tools of legal administration, in order to obstruct some contemplated legislation, we are brought into something like an "Invergordon" atmosphere at once. We behold agitation imbued with the force of intimidation.

Summing up, the educational and agitational members of the Movement are able to say, like Falstaff, that though there be no intimidation in themselves they are the cause that intimidation is found in other men; or, to be exact, that their teaching is the cause that the actions of other men can be seen to take on the quality of intimidation—not to speak of the more profound truth that this element of intimidation can be justified in the Social-Credit frame of reference. Thus we come back to our earlier proposition that intimidation is not wrong in itself, but wrong only in those who are unable to practise it with impunity. "If it works, it's right."

Both the moderate and the militant elements in the Movement should subscribe to this formula. Take the authoritative dictum: "All taxation is robbery." If

the moderates wish to stop short at explaining *why* this is so, but the militants wish to go further and say to their hearers: "What about it?" there need be no clash; in fact, it is impossible to explain the *why* without inspiring in certain types of hearers the wish to do something about it. The problem is not one of principle, but of expediency. And since nobody is able to formulate in advance an intelligible criterion of expediency there is no basis for judgment against those who try to inculcate *tolerance of the idea* of intimidation. And that is as far as any militant in the Movement wishes to go. The questions Who?—What?—How?—Where?—and When? are outside the orbit of our calculations: they will be answered out of the complex of irreconcilable forces which the bankers' obduracy is keeping in motion. There has been going on an extrusion of the best wits and talents into the region of economic idleness; and the mischief that has come of it is but a working model of the mischief to come. It is for those who have best reason to fear it who have to get busy about it. The final moral is that the dynamic power of Social-Credit activities proceeds from their diversity.

"The New Age" Dies Again!

THE NEW AGE lost its prestige and its most influential contributors and died a natural death when Orage retired from the ownership to join a forest school of philosophers in Fontainebleau. Some time afterwards he toured the United States of America to teach the Gurdgeff Gospel, and then returned to England as an apostle of the Douglas theory.—From an obituary notice upon the late A. R. Orage, published in *The Rhodesia Herald* of Friday, November 23, 1934. It is reported as having been communicated by their London Correspondent.

Forthcoming Meetings.

Green Shirt Movement For Social Credit.
National Headquarters: 44, Little Britain, London, E.C.1.
Wednesday, January 9, 8 p.m.—Lecture: "Social Credit and Fascism," by John Hargrave, Founder and Leader of the Green Shirts.
Wednesday, January 30, 8 p.m.—Lecture by Edgar J. Saxon, Editor of *Health and Life*, "Why I Stand for Social Credit."

Birmingham Douglas Social Credit Group.
January 9.—Economic Nationalism, True and False—Dr. J. E. Purves.
January 23.—The Common-sense of Social Credit.—L. D. Byrne, Esq.
February 13.—Resistances to Social Credit Propaganda.—P. R. Mason, Esq.
February 27.—Life or Money?—A. L. Gibson, Esq.
March 13.—World Affairs from the Social Credit standpoint.—E. H. Bill, Esq.

Cardiff Social Credit Association.
Until further notice, discussions and debates will be held every Tuesday, at 7.30 p.m., at the Angel Hotel, Cardiff. All are invited. Collection.

London Social Credit Club.
Blewcoat Room, Caxton-street, S.W.
January 4, 7.45 p.m.—"The Essence of Social Credit," by Mr. Arthur Bennett.
January 11, 7.45 p.m.—"The Political Expression of Social Credit," by Mr. Joseph W. Sault, Editor of the *Fleet Street Freeman*.
January 18, 7.45 p.m.—"The Shortage of Purchasing Power," by Mr. C. Marshall Hattersley, author of *This Age of Plenty*.
January 25, 7.45 p.m.—"Foreign Trade and Social Credit," by Mr. Ewart Purves.
Friday Nights, 6—11 p.m.—Social Credit Literature Stall and Library.

The New Age Club.
[Open to visitors on Wednesdays from 6 to 9 p.m. at Lincoln's Inn Restaurant (downstairs), 305, High Street, W.C. (south side), opposite the First Avenue Hotel, near to Chancery-lane and Holborn tube stations.]

Obituary.

JAMES ADAMSON.

To every veteran in the Social Credit Movement it will come as a personal shock to learn that James Adamson died on Christmas Day. Only a few days earlier he had manifested symptoms indicating an operation, which was performed, with the mournful result that his condition was discovered by the surgeon to be already hopeless. He was forty-five years of age. By profession a naval draughtsman, he possessed faculties and abilities peculiarly conducive to the grasp and exposition of the Social Credit Analysis in its technical aspect. Add to this his characteristic virtues of modesty, conscientiousness, patience and continuity of purpose, and you have a man whose service to the Social Credit Movement it is impossible to over-estimate.

In one way the setting of his departure recalls that of Orage's—for just as Orage passed away on the completion of his address on the wireless, so did Adamson within an hour or so of our decision to reprint his article on the A + B Theorem which appeared last week—a decision prompted by numerous appreciative comments and requests that we had recently received from students and teachers alike. The article originally appeared on December 28, 1933, which was exactly a year previously to its re-publication. Our decision to re-publish it had nothing to do with the idea of celebrating an anniversary—in fact our realisation of the time-lag has come since. No, it is one more example of the curious conjunctions of circumstance which have punctuated the records of Social Credit history during the last fifteen years, and which might seem to many of us almost to be metaphysical attestations of the consonance of our economic objective with the ultimate and unfolded high destiny of the human race. Little did we realise that when the operators in the composing-room were tapping out the letters of this man's contribution to the resolution of the economic paradox, they were engraving this man's epitaph. And "Jimmy's" intimate friends—for to them he was so known—may perhaps comfort themselves with the fancy that their old companion in the great campaign, through that supersensitive faculty imparted by the near approach of death, was able to hear the click of the linotype machine assuring him that, though he be dead, yet shall he go on speaking.

Yet it was not in the direction of publicity that he would have looked for appeasement in his lifetime—and his friends, in a whimsical mood, might feel inclined to say that it was just like Jimmy to disappear as soon as he began to win wider recognition. As a matter of fact he had written this, his last, contribution at the request of others, not on his own initiative. His heart was not in this work, valuable as it has been pronounced since, but it was in teaching the new way and the new life to the unemployed who suffered around him. And who better than one who shared their afflictions? For it has to be recorded that, for all his high attainments and capacities for economic service, the wanton infliction of idle impoverishment fell on him too. Do the financiers, we wonder, ever reflect that in driving the piles of capital reconstruction, as they call it, they have transixed men's souls? The Scriptural admonition: "Fear not them that can destroy the body" needs to be considered in another form. Those who are to be feared are they who can destroy the soul without destroying the body. Yet there are only too many publicists to-day who would unwittingly exchange the whips of mili-

tarism for the scorpions of finance. And Adamson, associated as he had been with the designing of war-vessels, doubtless often reflected in this wise when waves of pacifist oratory reached his ears.

But it is all one now. He has fought the good fight, he has finished the course, and in the hearts of all who knew him he already wears the garland of a courageous and unselfish achievement which shall be remembered and acclaimed on that day when men shall enter and dwell in the Promised Land of economic abundance.

A + B.

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ADAMSON DIAGRAM.

Readers who have occasion to discuss, or correspond about, the A + B Theorem with objectors will know that the crucial issue is always based on this fact: That every constituent in the price (at cost) of any finished article reflects the past payment of money to private individuals (as wages, salaries, dividends, and so on).

That fact was recognised by economic students long before Social Credit was heard of, and was particularly emphasised by Communist propagandists in their statement that all wealth was created by the "workers," who got a small fraction of the money expressing the total value—the rest of the money being taken by the "Capitalist." In the Communist idiom—the whole of the final price was divided up and distributed among "workers" on the one hand and "idlers" on the other. That the "idlers" are investors makes no difference, for a personal investment has to come out of a personal income. In the final analysis all costs have been personal incomes.

This truth has been put into diagrammatic form by Mr. Gaitskell (who denies the truth of the A + B Theorem) and by Mr. Adamson (who affirms it). We re-printed Mr. Adamson's article (embodying both diagrams) last week, and suggest that in future the illustration of processes and costs adopted by both these protagonists be made the standard for discussion. In that illustration the cumulative costing proceeds from the farmer (rearing sheep) to the retailer (say, the tailor) through three intermediaries, the weaver, spinner, and wholesaler. Each of the five lays out £200 on his operation, and at the end of the fifth process (or service) the cumulative cost of each parcel of chain-made product is £1,000.

Now the orthodox objection to the A + B Theorem can be stated by reference to the diagram in the following terms: That as against the retailer's cost (price) of £1,000 for clothes the consumers hold five times £200 paid out by the five producers.

This statement can be made good in one of two ways—(1) that the £1,000 has accumulated in the hands of consumers during the five successive stages producing the identical clothes now on sale, or (2) that the £1,000 is being paid out by the producers simultaneously with the offering of the clothes. The case 1 consumers hold £800 hoarded money and £200 earnings, all belonging to, let us call it, "stock No. 1" of clothes. In case 2 they hold current earnings £1,000, of which £200 belongs to stock No. 1, and £200 each belonging to stocks Nos. 2 to 5 which are to come forward successively later on.

Deducting the £200 current earnings (i.e., in the fifth period) common to both cases, the objector has the option of saying (case 1) that £800 worth of clothes are purchasable by hoarded incomes stretching back four stages, and now replacing past costs, or (case 2) purchasable by

current earnings which will now be recorded as new costs stretching forward over four future stages.

But there is this difficulty about case 1 (apart from its remoteness from actual experience) which is that if pre-consumption incomes are hoarded, the size of the hoard at the opening of the fifth period is not £800, but £2,000, and is increased by another £1,000 in the fifth period. (Mr. Adamson's diagram.) So if the retailer does not raise his price the consumers have a surplus of £2,000 after buying the clothes—and will continue to hold it perpetually afterwards. They are in the same position as if the five producers collectively had advanced them a loan in perpetuity, free of interest, in respect of the initial pre-consumption stages of production.

Case 2 fits in with actual experience. Here the consumers are assumed to depend on their earnings in the fifth period for the £1,000 necessary to buy the clothes. That is to say, they have no hoard of £2,000 extra, although, as in case 1, it is self-evident that they did receive the £2,000 during the pre-consumption period. We are left to suppose that they collectively bought the unfinished products during the first four stages, £200 worth in period "a," £400 worth in period "b," £600 worth in period "c," and £800 worth in period "d." If so they are in the same position as if they had lent the producers £2,000 in perpetuity, free of interest, getting their return in the shape of the assured delivery of £1,000 worth of clothes henceforth for their current earnings of £1,000 period by period.

This item of £2,000 is seen to be common to both cases. In case 1 the consumers hold the unspent money and the producers own the unfinished goods; and in case 2 the producers hold the money and the consumers own the goods. And of these alternative theories readers will be tempted to exclaim: "How happy we could be with either." In both cases the unfinished goods and the unspent money exist side by side, and no financial obstacle stands in the way of their conversion and distribution—such an obstacle could only be physical (e.g., inability to continue producing) or psychological (e.g., loss of desire to produce or consume), and can be ruled out of calculation.

It may be noted parenthetically that the analysis of the pre-consumption costing is not affected by the way in which the five producers deal with their accounts. If it be assumed that each of them waits until the fifth period before recovering any money at all the farmer will be out of pocket at the end of the fourth period £200, the spinner twice £200, the weaver three times total £2,000. If it be assumed that the first sells to second, the second to the third, and so on, period by period, the position will be reversed at the end of the fourth period—the farmer will be out of pocket to the retailer is not yet in the picture) £800, with the weaver and spinner £400 and £600 respectively—total £2,000 just the same.

So the argument revolves round this £2,000 and what it signifies and involves. The illustration does not include reference to the bankers and their loan-system, so one is obliged to assume that the five producers had, between them, a pool of £2,000 + £1,000—the first being permanently sunk in production, and the second being expended and recovered period by period when the consumers begin buying. On that assumption by whatever sum the producers are out of pocket at any time the consumers must be in pocket; or alternatively, to the extent to which they might recover costs from con-

sumers in the pre-consumption period, to that extent the unfinished goods of that period are the property of the consumers.

This leads to a consideration of the investment system. Fundamentally, invested money is a prepayment by consumers for unfinished goods to be delivered to them as and when finished. If one likes to call it a consumers' loan, it is a loan not returnable, nor required, in money, but in things. In this fundamental sense it will be seen that the producers in the illustration chosen could wind up their respective businesses by the same gradual steps as in the initial building up, and yet go on delivering clothes to consumers until nothing remained to deliver.

If, for example, at the end of period "e" in the diagram (the period when consumption is possible) the farmer ceased operations and paid out no money, like-farmer ceased operations in the next period, and so on there would be a diminishing sequence of distributed money payments, namely, £800, £600, £400, £200, during the winding-up period of four stages. At each stage clothes bearing a cost of £1,000 would appear, totalling £4,000. But all these clothes could be bought, either because the consumers held their hoard (as in case 1) and could pay the balance with it, or because, having already prepaid the balance by investment in the unfinished goods (as in case 2), they would get all the clothes for their £2,000 earnings.

Now we come to the question of how far this analysis approximates to experience. It will have been noticed that it takes no account of the permanent assets of industry. Every producer in the illustration passes on the whole of the product. Note that this takes place on the assumption and for the reason that consumers use the whole of their incomes (as described) for private consumption. Note also that they are able to do this because the producers collectively are assumed to start with and expend a fund of £2,000—that is to say none of them spends his £200 instalment twice (or more times) over. They either do not get any money back before the consumption period, or if they do it accumulates in their hands. The £2,000 is in visible existence and somebody or other—whether they or the consumers—has a property right in that sum.

Against this background we must consider a new factor. It is that in modern industry a large part of the operations consists in the manufacture, and the maintenance, of instruments of production (usually called capital assets). To illustrate this let us take the same diagram as before and let it represent the costing of these instruments. Instead of the farmer and so on let us imagine a miner, a smelter, a metal-roller, and so on leading up to a machine-merchant. Leaving the figures undisturbed we get a machine ready for sale in the fifth period costing £1,000, and unfinished machines behind the market costing £2,000. And in the hypothetical circumstances governing the previous analysis a new machine can come on the market at the same regular intervals as did the clothes. We can now combine the two diagrams and say that in the fifth period there are clothes and this machine ready for sale with a cost of £2,000, and unfinished clothes and machines behind the market costing £4,000. But whereas the clothes can usually be marketed at £1,000 in every successive period there is no call for a new machine to be marketed at anything like the same frequency. The machine is very slowly replaced—or, to put it in other words, it requires only maintenance. Therefore period 5 is the peak point in the distribution of incomes. After that period there is a diminution measured by the difference between the cost of manufacturing the machine and the cost of maintaining it. Let us suppose that maintenance costs £100 in every period. Thenceforward there will be costs amounting to £1,100 to be recovered in respect of clothes and maintenance, but behind these there will be £2,000 costs of unfinished machines which, by the thesis, won't need to be finished—at least for a considerable time.

Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought.

By Chapman Cohen.

[The following article is the introductory chapter of Mr. Chapman Cohen's new book, *Primitive Survivals in Modern Thought*. We print it, with acknowledgments to the author, as it not only furnishes all the information about the scope and purpose of the book that one would look for in an independent review, but outlines ideas whose value is applicable over a much wider field than that in which the Freethought movement operates. The difficulty of everyone who takes part in the exposition of new ideas is to get others to understand what he means in despite of his handicap in having perforce to express himself in terminology connoting obsolete ideas. Whatever may be one's opinion of Mr. Cohen's views as a Free-thinker, there is no one better qualified to teach the would-be controversialist how to attain clarity of thought and exactitude in expression. Those readers of these pages who are able to realise what a weapon in the bankers' defence lies even in the common vocabulary from which both sides build up their arguments, will appreciate the timeliness of this publication.—ED.]

It was, I think, Matthew Arnold who said that if we are doomed to perish it is because of our want of patience with ideas. The statement is solidly true, for even though our habitual contempt for ideas may not result in complete disaster, we shall yet on that account live the less joyously and the less profitably. Impatience with ideas is still a very marked feature of the general life. Take haphazardly any given number of people and all but a very small proportion will treat ideas, if not as things to be suppressed, at least as things to be kept out of sight as much as possible. Sport and personalities, a royal marriage or a film-star's divorce, a murder or a political scandal—all these may serve as permissible topics of general conversation, but the man who tries to introduce a discussion of ideas soon finds himself treated as a crank. Even when the discussion does not threaten to impose a too severe strain upon listeners or probable participants, there is an uneasy feeling that new ideas may lead to all sorts of unpleasant consequences. In polite society—whether in Mayfair or suburbia—a bomb would probably arouse less active resistance than a genuinely revolutionary idea. The thrower of the one would just be handed over to the police, the other would stand a good chance of being torn to pieces by the outraged worshippers of the customary and the commonplace.

The situation in the intellectual world is somewhat analogous to that which exists in the world of economics. The application of new ideas to industry has resulted in giving the world more utilities in the shape of food and clothing than it can, in existing circumstances, use. This has produced the curious result that a considerable part of the world is threatened with partial or complete starvation. And, again, in existing circumstances, the shortage of food and clothing promises to increase with our capacity to produce more of both. We will not bother with ideas, so ideas bother with us. One might almost paraphrase a well known saying, "He that does not think neither shall he eat," as descriptive of the situation.

In the world of intellect, we have, with slight variation of terms, a similar situation. Let knowledge stand for production, and understanding for distribution, and the positions become identical. Knowledge has in-

creased as rapidly as our capacity for production—indeed, it is knowledge applied to industry that has made this increased production possible. But the need for a re-understanding of the world has lagged almost as much as a revision of our methods of distribution. It thus happens that neither in the economic nor in the intellectual sphere have we made the best use of the increased power that has been attained. A consequence of this is the existence of much unnecessary want in the one direction and a great deal of remediable confusion in the other.

Man's understanding of the world and of the experience he undergoes, is embodied in his customs, his institutions and his inventions; but his understanding is necessarily expressed in language written or oral. Yet his language is strictly relative to the social state (meaning by that term the physical, intellectual and institutional forces that environ him) in which is created the terminology that forms part of his social heritage. It thus happens that in order to express ideas that reach into the future he is compelled to use language that has coercive associations with the past. To-day we are using thought-forms belonging to the earliest stages of culture to express an understanding of the world of to-day. We fail to realise that with every substantial expansion of our knowledge of nature there is required a revision of our knowledge as a whole.

Every department of life bears witness to this defect, and of the ill consequences that result. In politics statesmen are found attempting to regulate affairs under the dominance of ideas that had their natural habitat in conditions prevailing two or three centuries ago. Whole peoples are carried away with a conception of nationalism that is as much out of place as dromedaries in Oxford Street. Military men think of national conflicts with the intellectual outlook of the Tudors, and each new war shows with sickening regularity how much out-of-date is their understanding of the situation. They have a knowledge of the application of the weapons of destruction they wield, but for any understanding of the medium in which these weapons must function, they might as well be armed with clubs belonging to the Stone Age. Theologians are naturally expected to be completely committed to the perpetuation of old ideas, and obsessed by the ideas of a bygone age. They are completely committed to the perpetuation of their existence, must resist new ones as a condition of their existence. Even among scientists there are a large number of men who, with an immense knowledge of what has been done and what can be done, are so far from a complete understanding of what their knowledge implies, and are so far from showing a sense of the need for re-understanding it, that they may be found reading into modern science what are fundamentally the conceptions of a pre-scientific period. So there is no wonder that we have old questions perpetually asked, and the old answers pontifically given, when there is lacking the recognition that these questions have little relevance to the life of to-day.

The following pages represent an attempt to restate a number of old, but still pertinent questions, in the light of what I take to be the modern understanding. Were it not that I might be thought to be challenging comparison with a very famous historical essay, I might have called this a "Discourse on Method," for I do imply a certain method of approach to the questions dealt with. But I make no claim to be even a miniature Descartes, and am content to consider that I am making a very humble contribution to a warfare that is always in

being—the war of words and phrases. Neither am I vain enough to think that this essay will bring about an end to that warfare. To assume that would be to misunderstand my own position. For I believe that the process of re-understanding is one that must always be necessary so long as knowledge goes on increasing. However careful we may be, and however great the intellectual advance made, language must always lag behind exact thought, and will always carry over into the world of greater and more accurate knowledge implications and ideas that belong to the past. Constant watchfulness and care will, therefore, be necessary, and that will involve a continuation of the warfare of words unless human thought reaches that machine-like stage of unquestioning submission to authoritative instruction which appears to be the ideal of many people to-day. But so long as the human intellect remains a free-moving instrument of investigation and criticism this particular warfare will continue, and with profit to everybody concerned.

The origin of this essay is to be found in a series of questions put to me by readers of the *Freethinker*. Some of my questioners were religious folk, some otherwise, but the answers given were primarily intended for Free-thinkers. I do not mean by this that there is not much in what follows that cannot be of great use to religious people. I believe it can be and will be useful to them, even though it goes no further than helping to get a clearer idea of the Freethought point of view. Whether discussion leads to agreement or continued disagreement the service of clarifying thought may yet be rendered. Nothing is more unsatisfactory than to find that, when the controversy has ceased, the man with whom one is discussing is quite blind to the meaning of what one is saying. There is a world of difference between an opponent knowing what one says and understanding what one means.

Above all, I have in mind that great number of people who nowadays have got rid of a conscious attachment to religious ideas, but who are still, unconsciously perhaps, carrying round with them the ghosts of their dead superstitions. This class has a very strong attachment to religious phrases, and often remains fundamentally religious in its outlook. They delight in non-committal terms, vague thoughts and twilight phrases; they show a pathetic desire to join in the cries of the crowd while evincing an aspiration to be taken for daring experimenters along a new path. They belong to that class satirised by George Eliot, who if they were asked to decide whether twice two were four or five would suggest four-and-a-half in the hope of pleasing both parties. Often it will be found that this type of person has given up the slavery of dogma only to take on with the slavery of phrases. While without the substance of "truly" religious, and are far more anxious to stand well with their natural enemies than they are to stand by those who are their friends. These people are usually impartial on the wrong side, and guard the pass with their backs to the enemy. My desire is to get them to turn their faces to the foe.

Finally, I should like to utter a word of warning to the impatient reader who may be inclined to brush on one side some part of what follows—particularly towards the close—with the remark that he has neither time nor patience for metaphysics. To such I would say, gently, but quite firmly, that the remark does little credit to their intelligence, and I can only hope for their

enlightenment. But in any case no one can escape consciously holding, or unconsciously implying, some metaphysic. This can no more be escaped than one can put on one side the law of gravitation by drawing up a legally worded form of renunciation. When Aristotle used the word "metaphysics"—he coined it, I think—he intended it to cover all that had not been dealt with under the head of physics. And although it has a rather different connotation to-day, it still carries its original significance. For there is a science of the sciences, a science which takes the findings of every science, and all that each science teaches and implies, and frames a generalisation that will cover the whole of this field. This science to-day constitutes what is legitimately meant by metaphysics. A much better word is one suggested by G. H. Lewes, "metempirics," as comprising a more inclusive sphere than any of those covered by any one branch of science, but that term does not appear to have caught on, so we must still use the old one.

Largely, metaphysics comes more and more to depend upon a theory of knowledge, and indeed to mean a theory of knowledge, for after we have done with our science of physics, or chemistry, or biology, or psychology, each one with its special "laws," there remain the questions of how we get our knowledge, and how far are the instruments by which we get knowledge dependable.

Thus it happens that no one can escape some metaphysic, whether he is conscious of it or not. It may be a sound or unsound metaphysic that is held or implied, and, when it is only implied, a man may be as ignorant of it as a child is of the functions of the secretory glands; but it is there, and it is illustrated every time he walks upstairs, even though he may, with the imperturbable ignorance of a Dr. Johnson, stamp the earth and imagine that thereby he has banished a particularly knotty philosophical problem. This type of man who cries "a fig for metaphysics, I believe that things exist as I see them," has often not the slightest idea that in saying this he is pledging himself to one of the most metaphysical of propositions, and one which a conscious metaphysician would put forward with hesitation. Like the religious Atheist who is a nuisance to almost everyone but the believer in deity, the avowed anti-metaphysician is generally a nuisance, because he is too promiscuous in his appetite for metaphysics.

I have, therefore, very little hope that the impatient type of mind which is not in the habit of indulging in careful analytic thinking, or the painstaking analysis of mental positions, the man who habitually mistakes words for things, and who imagines that he can understand a philosophical proposition with the same ease with which he can follow the forecast of a sporting tipster, will care for a deal of what he will find in these pages. He will cry out for what he calls "facts," in complete ignorance that he is throwing on one side just the class of facts that gives reality to all the other facts, and which enables him to understand them. There is, I am afraid, no royal road to understanding, but there are very many easy paths that lead one back to the starting point. And in the world of mental exploration round trips seem to have a very curious fascination for intellectual "trippers."

NOTICE.

All communications requiring the Editor's attention should be addressed directly to him as follows:
Mr. Arthur Brenton, 20, Rectory Road, Barnes, S.W.13.

What Will Remain?

By R. Laugier.

VII.

Schopenhauer exalted the "unconscious" of Leibniz into the "will"—that is a blind force working through us, and this idea of the "unconscious" being a more powerful factor in human existence than the "conscious," plays, I think, a most important part in modern culture.

Schopenhauer derived from Spinoza, who wrote: *To seek only enough money or anything else, as is necessary for the upkeep of our health and life, and to comply to such customs as are not opposed to what we seek.* That "god-bedrunken man" was excommunicated by his Church for independent thought, and he would have faced the angry mob who had just killed a patriot. Nevertheless Spinoza kept himself by polishing lenses, believed in austerity of taste, and "despised" money. Later that Puritan, pantheist, and transcendentalist, Thoreau, greatly influenced by Spinoza, taught the same social and economic creed, whilst behaving fearlessly against authority. Schopenhauer himself wrote: *"A poet or philosopher should have no fault to find with his age, if it only permits him to do his work undisturbed in his own corner."* But he had every fault to find with his own age; and this stoical, puritanical type will always contradict their theories in their actual life, and will be continually battling with themselves.

As Finance and Business reign, the philosopher and artist is more and more at war with himself and society, until his work becomes one long scream of pain, as in the poetry of T. S. Eliot. Artists now, can scarcely become artists, unless they have private means. The aristocratic patron is replaced by the *Daily Mail* and Book of the Month Club; and it will be a grave mistake to think that Democracy can ever come into her own without the leadership of a true aristocracy.

Naturally, mediocrity and worse now come to the fore; not only because the "wrong people" have power, together with the money that provides such power; but also because under a Business régime, only Business "ideas" are comprehended. If a miracle happens, and an artist can so shake clear of environment as to attack Finance directly, this can be dealt with easily enough. The best way is to explain what the artist really means. (Cf., the rise of newspaper reviewing, with the inevitable degradation of criticism, an event foreseen by Henry James.)

So we have such utterly different racial types as Schopenhauer, Spinoza, Thoreau, Tolstoi, all teaching the virtues of Spartan simplicity, and all preferring the "despising" of money, which is easy, to the comprehending of it, which is difficult. But the scientists, with their motto, "Neither to love, nor hate, but to understand," should not have fallen into the same error as these philosophers, all of whom are primarily poets (as their style plainly shows), rather than unemotional analysts. But, as a fact, emotion leads the human spirit nearer to Truth than the dehumanised rejection of emotion.

Spinoza begat Schopenhauer; Schopenhauer begat Nietzsche; Nietzsche begat Reny de Gourmont—among others. (Shaw's *Man And Superman* is based upon Schopenhauer's *Metaphysics Of Love*.)

I think that an unconscious sympathy exists between the Puritan Mind, the German Mind, and the Jewish Mind, and I have suggested that these three intellects

when they "overlap" are opposed to the ancient Greek Mind, as we know it in its culture. To put this another way, the Puritan and average German, whatever may be their ostensible opinions regarding the Jews, will get on with the Israelites far better than with the Frenchman, Spaniard, or Italian. Compare, for example, the importance of ancient Hebrew literature in its effects upon English and German literature, and the comparative unimportance of the Old Testament in French literature. The French translation of the Bible is artistically poor. The French mind cannot adapt the savage, and mystical imagery of early Jewish poetry; and, in fact, the French produce no great mystical poets at all. But Jew, German, and Puritan are at home in the transcendental, which at its best is beautiful, and at its second-rate becomes at once merely vague nonsense. In England, even a hedonistic "Pagan" like Wilde, has his style enormously influenced by the Authorised Version. As for the influence of German transcendental metaphysics, look at their effect on Coleridge, Carlyle, etc.

Schopenhauer was very like the Puritan, inasmuch as the German would strip life of all its little amenities and the German would strip life of all its little amenities and urbanities, in the name of Truth. *Rien n'est beau que le vrai; le vrai seul est aimable.* But supposing one misses Truth? The results are then not very aimable. The strong man, the superman, the prophet—he must be right; otherwise so far from being a civilising influence, he is reactionary and barbaric. Where lesser men—the gay poet, the urbane essayist—may err, and no harm done; your god-like Teacher cannot slip without producing a landslide. And, alas! he does slip! He is human, and fallible, and must fail somewhere. Said Goethe: *greater he is, the greater may be his error. Said Goethe: When a great man has a dark corner in him it is terribly dark. . . . If a clever man commits a folly it is no small one.* And the modern, superman's god, Napoleon said, *How many superior men are children more than once in a day.* Perhaps it is wiser, then, to remain children, as the artists do?

About 1885, Nietzsche, wrote as follows: *The Jews, however, are beyond all doubt the strongest, toughest, and purest race at present living in Europe; they know how to succeed even under the worst conditions (in fact better than under favourable ones), by means of virtues of some sort, which one would like nowadays to label as vices. . . .*

I should like to examine this passage, though, for lack of space, I must do so cursorily. I think Nietzsche's statements and their implications are fundamentally erroneous, and the errors arise through false conceptions attached to such words as "toughest," "strongest," "succeed," "worst conditions," "favourable conditions," "virtues," "vices"—in short the cultural values underlying the passage quoted appear to me false.

It is not necessary to dwell upon the Jews' "genius for money," and say that the money-men will naturally "succeed" under the "worst condition," these conditions being for money, the most favourable, and those created by money itself. I do not dwell upon this aspect because I do not admit that men who have made a lot of money have succeeded: on the contrary, I think they have failed in life, or, to be more accurate, they have simply avoided life. This is seen very clearly in the grotesque articles, which appear from time to time in newspapers and magazines (particularly the American), and which claim to describe how Mr. X, bank president, or big bond-holder, "succeeded." Obviously he came

to the top—like the great soldier, only less honourably—by evading normal human life. Essentially the article will tell how Mr. X concentrated exclusively upon a business career, and ruthlessly shunned all knowledge that would not help him in Business. In other words this poor fish had not the guts, imagination, feeling, or horse-sense to be interested as a youth in philosophy, history, science, poetry, painting, music, the drama, women, good food, wine, foreign travel, sport, etc., etc. And such a man rules! In these same magazine articles they will ask him whether his "career" was assisted by a study of the "classics," or by a more "modern" and "scientific" training. To which Mr. X replies that he had no education, and made good (i.e., money) by natural genius! Actually the type makes money because the world is mad enough to let them work a three-card trick, the success of which is automatic.

The truth about success in Business is shown by the younger business-man's dream that he may one day "retire." No artist, no good warrior in the battle of life, ever retires. As for the business-man, by the time he has become an automaton, he cannot retire: if he quits he dies for want of natural interests. He is not, properly speaking, a man at all. Notoriously he is tired. One sees him crawling about Paris, trying to "get a kick out of life"!

So I do not admit that the big bond-holders have succeeded: they are merely the type most prone to survive in an environment that has become sub-human. They are the crustaceans who have grown the thickest carapace; they can live in slime, and yet breathe; you may lop a limb from them and they grow another. The secret of their "success," and of their survival lies in insensitiveness, the negation of vigour, stupidity, and a lot of luck, which they deny, or do not recognise. The bond-holder who "cleans up" on the market is often a man who survived a "slump," or "boom" (which he does not understand), much as a soldier might survive an unexpected gas-attack through accidentally finding a hidden mask.

The Jew in trade (as distinct from Finance), in England especially, owes much of his advantages to the pure accident of his Oriental precocity. In commercial life it is of the utmost importance that the child realises what he wants to do, and does this early. Boys are made or marred, under present conditions, between the ages of fourteen to twenty-one. The parents ask what the boy would "like to be." The Jew knows at ten, twelve, fourteen: the Anglo-Saxon type may not find out until he is sixteen, twenty, twenty-five. The Englishman, then, goes into the wrong job—for life, or for a few vitally important years. The Englishman drifts, helplessly, into a relation's office—anywhere—and his Jewish rival has seven years' start. The Englishman is regarded as a failure: perhaps he becomes a precocious Jew.

Even in the arts it is very common for distinguished English authors to spend years as ineffectual painters, architects, etc. Also if you glance at a biographical dictionary of English literature, you will discover that the English imaginative prose artist—a man with a vocation—usually writes his first distinguished novel at some age between forty-two and forty-five.

The arts test a man and search his soul, which Business does not. The Jews are not particularly "suc-

cessful" in practising the arts, though they succeed as middlemen. The less creative the form of art the more Jews you will discover in that field: and so the music-hall holds more Jewish artistes than the legitimate stage; there are more Jewish journalists, reviewers, and critics, than original prose writers. In music the Jew is a singer or an instrumentalist rather than a composer; and in music the Jew's precocity does not give him great advantages: the Gentile musician is also precocious.

Of course, the Jews have also the advantages that come from being a persecuted and, theoretically, despised sect. They combine and assist one another, where the English "cut each other dead." (Unless they are homosexuals, in which case we have the unique picture of Englishmen combining and assisting one another. For some time in our history homosexuality, or its reputation, has been of great assistance in "getting on," especially in the arts. Again, a theoretically despised sect.)

So, I am not anti-Semitic, but merely a searcher of truth, when I suggest that we English need not necessarily be over-awed by the superiority of the Jew. Undoubtedly the most intelligent people to be met in any gathering or concourse in modern England are the Jews; but this only means that the Jews like to get about more—in the theatre, restaurants, cafés, art-galleries, etc. The most intelligent type of Englishman is inclined to be rather a recluse; and if he is an artist he needs solitude. In the arts then the Jews do not manifest signs of superior strength or "toughness." Among my friends are many Jewish artists, some with world-wide reputations. They are not "tough"; they are good fellows, easy-going, charming, amusing. This type succeeds or does not succeed—much like the poor despised Gentile. I know several brilliant Jewish musicians who have not made financial success. Mr. Leonard Merrick, a cousin of Lord Reading, cannot be called "successful" as a popular story-writer; and yet it would be so easy for him slightly to alter some of his novels and make them "best-sellers." The artist, whether Jew or Gentile, does not work, primarily, for "success." He knows that to succeed in business is to fail in life.

(To be continued.)

Communications.

COMMUNISM AND SOCIAL CREDIT.

Sir,—With reference to your comment on Mr. Ockham's letter in the issue of December 13, may I point out that the U.S.S.R. does propose "to distribute production by some other method than via the money system."

After the wiping out of classes, which is being achieved in the present second Five Year Plan, the declared purpose of the U.S.S.R. is to raise production to such abundance and quality on the one hand, and the cultural level of the people to such a height on the other, as to render possible the transition from Socialism to Communism.

One of the characteristic features of this change is to be the abandonment of distribution by the money system and its replacement by the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his need." This means that the paying out of money as wages and its subsequent collection as payment for goods

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4. Information as to societies and organisations advocating Social Credit or other principles of financial reform. Date of formation: objects: officers: structure: fees, etc., etc.

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