

# THE NEW AGE

INCORPORATING "CREDIT POWER."

A WEEKLY REVIEW OF POLITICS LITERATURE AND ART

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## NOTES OF THE WEEK.

### Teaching the Teacher of the Teacher of the—

The first leader in *The Times* of January 4 is entitled "Teaching the Teacher." It is worth close study by Social Credit students, particularly those interested in the technique of education itself, and those interested in tracking down the financial influences behind educational policy. The article loses nothing—and in our judgment gains considerably—in value by being concerned rather with the education of our future rulers than with that of the mass of the ruled. We quote the concluding paragraph.

"Owing to their social and financial position public school boys are still a privileged class: but they are critically examined in a world which demands great adaptability, efficiency and quality in those who are to take a leading part in the management of affairs. Nothing but good can be done by an inquiry into the best type of training for their educators. Something has been attempted, but the experiment has not yet received from headmasters the interest which it deserves."

The article has been inspired by a Resolution of the recent Headmasters' Conference to propose to the Board of Education an inquiry into the training of teachers for secondary schools, including public schools. The writer begins his comments by asking:

"... it raises ... also the ... vexed and novel question of how long public school headmasters will continue to engage the newly fledged graduate of Oxford or Cambridge without guarantee of his ability to teach, persuade, and keep order." Later he refers to Professor Jacob, of Manchester University, as having pointed out

"the danger of the present system of selecting at school, between the ages of seventeen and eighteen,

the future teachers of the nation, to be given university education at the public expense. At such a time selection must be difficult: maturity and a sense of vocation will be rare. Above all is the danger that the students will change their minds while at the university, lose their enthusiasm for teaching, and adopt the profession only because they are morally and financially bound to do so."

Discussing the argument that if these unwilling students did not become teachers their education would be wasted, he refers to the Principal of Somerville College as having suggested that local services would benefit by an increase in university-trained officials.

The remedy indicated by the writer is that the selection of future teachers might be made while they are at the university, for this might guarantee that most of them would bring to their work "enthusiasm, capacity for leadership, and adaptable temperament."

"These are the qualities which are being demanded more and more from the State's teachers as their social and intellectual role in towns and suburbs grows in importance. Such qualities do not always reveal themselves early in the day school owing to the child's dependence on its parents."

Coming to the question of headmasters he says:

"There exists no adequate organisation through which public school masters who think about their work and methods may compare notes. . . . There is too much secrecy and too little inquisitiveness. . . . From many points of view it would be invaluable if young public school masters, having learnt in their first five years their own shortcomings and the mysterious ways of young intelligence and temperament, could seek refuge and refreshment in some kind of staff college which would be a training centre and a clearing house for methods and ideas."



## Alberta Notes.

The visit of Mr. H. B. Brougham to Alberta has excited a good deal of comment in the Canadian newspapers. The issue of *New Democracy* for December 15 contains an article covering one and a quarter pages consisting mainly of quotations from these newspapers' comments. One is taken from the *Ottawa Evening Citizen* of November 28 which published an interview between its London correspondent, Mr. A. C. Cummings, and Major Douglas. It appears therefrom that Mr. Brougham has no authority to speak in Douglas's name on Social Credit, and that Douglas would have advised him to keep away from Edmonton if he had been consulted. Further, Douglas said of the Brougham plan: "It is not mine and not purely Social Credit." Newspaper comment generally is not concerned with the authorship or nature of the plan, but with the mystery of who or what inspired Mr. Brougham's visit. Mr. Brougham declares that Mr. Aberhart invited him; Mr. Aberhart declares that he didn't invite him. There the matter rests at present. According to one report Mr. Brougham has announced his intention to write a history of Social Credit in Alberta. According to another, one of the features of Mr. Brougham's plan consists in the idea of

"private enterprise signing up thousands of adult Social Credit consumers to deal exclusively with producers, manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers who will contract to supply them with dividends derived from the creation of new trading credits based on the margin of unused capacity and at a discount on retail price."

This passage is apparently the paragraph-writer's own synopsis, and its terms must not be attributed to Mr. Brougham. These are not too clear; but as they stand they appear to reflect a modified version of Major Douglas's plan of a dozen years ago whereby consumers in their respective localities would be organised in what one might call "shopping unions" corresponding to trade unions in structure, but directed to bargaining with retailers for price-discounts on purchases as distinct from Labour's policy of bargaining with employers for wage-advances on services rendered. Old readers will recall that the plan, if it could have been carried out thoroughly, would have resulted in all the shopping of a given community being done at a number of shops selected from the total number open in the area. The shops selected would have been those which offered the most generous discount (quality being equal) in return for the increase in custom and revenue offered them by the executives of the "shopping unions." The "fund," so to speak, out of which the selected shops would have provided the discount would have been created by savings in overhead charges. The amount of saving would have depended on what proportion of the total number of shops were able to handle the total business. For example, there might be twenty butchers' shops in a town whose inhabitants could be efficiently served by five, thus showing a redundant capacity of service which was imposing on the community four times the amount of overhead charges that would need to be imposed under the new plan.

Of course the plan was not suggested as a "Social Credit" plan in the sense that its universal adoption would, of itself, settle the economic problem. Nor did Major Douglas say that it was a feasible plan. He put it forward in reply to a question raised by Social Credit

followers at the time as to what action they could take as distinct from educational propaganda. The substance of Major Douglas's explanation why he suggested the plan was as follows: "You cannot hope to get hold of the system at the production-cost end, but you can try to get some hold on it at the consumption-price end." The plan might not be feasible; but it was the logical form of active resistance to the Money Power's confiscatory extortion at the shop counter. Even if feasible, it would only be a first step. On the other hand, if that first step could be taken, it would disclose the direction in which further steps were necessary, and would heighten the feasibility of taking them.

As is now history, nothing came of the suggestion. Only one person (a lady in Richmond, Surrey) took any action. She visited shops in that town and got prices for various commodities. These were tabulated for comparison and printed in *Public Welfare* (January, 1922). Nobody followed her example; and that's that. In any case there was a snag ahead. It was one thing to disclose the cheapest shops but another to get consumers to allow themselves to be organised. To the busy woman it matters little that a shop is dearer if it be nearer. Time is money. Nevertheless, as stated, the plan was theoretically quite sound and is so to-day.

If Mr. Brougham's plan includes proposals along the above lines the fact that he has not Douglas's authority to put it forward does not necessarily mean that it is wrong in principle. Nor has such an objection been raised against it. But the test is—feasibility. Can you get people to work the plan? The snag is a dual one: it lies in (a) the inertia of consumers and (b) the powerlessness of retailers to alter prices. Your shops offering tied commodities at tied prices. Your independent storekeeper is nearing extinction, particularly in the more "advanced" countries. The instituting of marketing boards for necessary articles of consumption interposes a barrier between consumers who would make bargains for discounts and suppliers who would enter into such bargains. Price is in the hands of the law; and since consumers cannot be expected to take the law into their own hands, they must continue to pay lawful prices as distinct from just prices.

According to one Press report an association is being formed in Alberta for the purpose of putting pressure on Mr. Aberhart's Government to deliver the dividend. (There is no indication, by the way, that this is connected with Mr. Brougham's visit or his proposals.) It will be interesting to see what effect it can produce, because the present situation in Alberta is precisely that which the Social Credit Secretariat hopes to bring about at the next general election. There has been a completely successful "electoral campaign" in Alberta. Practically every Member of the Alberta Parliament is pledged to "produce results"—that is, to pay out a dividend. Whether the amount of the dividend is to be £5 per month, £1, or any other amount does not matter: the test is whether any dividend at all can be exacted by the efforts of the new Association. If so, that can be counted as the "result" within the meaning of the pledge. Now, the Association's efforts must be something other than commencing on a new electoral campaign to take effect at the end of the Government's statutory term of office. For if campaign No. 1 (100 per cent. successful) needs campaign No. 2 to make it effective, there is no guarantee that No. 2 won't need a No. 3 and so on *ad infinitum*. The Association, as

such, can only try to do what Mr. Aberhart has challenged his critics to do, that is to turn the Government out in six months' time, when apparently an opportunity will be provided (according to the reported text of Mr. Aberhart's speech). But since nine-tenths of the membership of the House supports the Government, either the Government's supporters in the House must turn it out by an adverse vote, or some *coup d'état* on the model of Sir Philip Game's dismissal of the Lang Government in New South Wales must be invoked.

If the second, then the Association would undoubtedly be strengthened by the cordial co-operation of the banking interests of Canada, whether it desired to have that co-operation or not. This fact lends colour to Mr. Aberhart's insinuation that enemies of Social Credit are fomenting and exploiting the present protests against the late arrival of the dividend. If this is not true now, it can become true at any time. If it does not become true, then what pressure can the Association bring to bear to remove the Government before its time? Resolutions? Deputations? and gestures of that sort? Or is it contemplated that the temper of the citizens of Alberta will rise to the point of disorder on a scale sufficient to paralyse the administration of government altogether?

Then again; supposing that the Government is turned out prematurely; what happens next? Another election and another Social Credit Government? Well; and next—?

## Credit Cancellation and Profits.

Recent articles in this journal on the subject of credit cancellation raise the associated question of profit regulation.

Whether consumer credit is issued in the form of Dividend or Discount, it is the consumer who gets it in the first place. He gets it directly as dividend and indirectly as discount, but it is he who gets it.

If we assume, as we may without hesitation, that he will spend it and not hoard it, then these credits cannot pile up in consumers' bank accounts. If it is possible for them to pile up anywhere, it must be, as recent articles show, with the various producers who receive the money in payment for their goods and services.

Now the payments which a producer receives for his goods—his revenue—are used to make good the costs incurred during their production. Anything remaining over, after these have been met, is profit. His profit will depend on his costs; we cannot define the one without defining the other.

So we come to the question of what are legitimate costs under a Social Credit régime. I suggest these may be grouped under five headings: (1) Wages and salaries paid to staff. (2) Direct payments to other organisations for goods or services received. (3) Allocations for depreciation. (4) Rents and royalties. (5) Interest and sinking fund on debentures, if any. The provision of reserve funds, other than those required for depreciation of plant and for repayment of debentures, will not be regarded as a legitimate cost. Profit will then be any revenue, whether arising from sales of product or from interest on investments, remaining at the end of a given accounting period after the foregoing costs for that period have been met.

Let it be assumed that, under a Social Credit régime, profits at every stage of the production chains will be

limited to an agreed percentage of the legitimate costs, and that all rents will be limited to an agreed percentage of the value of the land or buildings at which that property stands assessed for rating purposes.

Now an issue of consumer credit will call for an increase in the rate of issue of producer credit in order to finance the increased production demanded. This will result in an increasing volume of costs, and increasing total profits. How will the profits be used? We may expect that the "strong financial position" arising from the building up of large reserves will cease to hypnotise shareholders, and there will be increasing pressure upon directorates to distribute profits as dividends—a procedure which will restore (at a later date) the purchasing power absorbed by the collection of the profits. But there may well be a tendency to use a portion of the profits to pay off short term bank advances, so that the day-to-day "working capital" of industry will gradually become the absolute property of business firms. To that extent there will be an increase in deposits not offset by corresponding loans.

But the increase in working capital, necessitated by the increase in trade, can hardly be regarded as a piling up of money. It is money which is, for the most part, in rapid transfer between various producers, accompanying the rapid exchange of goods and services between the various links in the numerous chains of production; and while the capital is "working" in this way it cannot be used for any other purpose, no matter what its volume may be.

The only place where money can be said to pile up will be in the reserve funds for depreciation, etc., in so far as these funds are not invested. Where they are invested in existing securities they will set free money to the same amount in the hands of the individuals who previously owned the shares; while if they are invested in new ventures they will be used to repay the costs of the plant-constructors for the new business. In this case, the plant-constructors will use the money either to repay a bank loan or to restore their depleted working capital; neither of which operations will involve any piling up.

Issues of producer credit (whether the producer's own capital, or borrowed from a bank) can be divided—vide H. M. M.'s pamphlet on the A + B Theorem—into two sorts, (1) New credits, and (2) Replacement credits. The former create new costs; the latter transfer existing costs. Omitting profits, a replacement credit simply cancels an earlier credit, whether of the "new" or "replacement" variety or a mixture of both. The only producer credits which concern this problem are (a) the final replacement credits which finance the goods into the shops, and (b) the temporary new credits which appear in consumers' hands, as income, on the other side of the counter. When, and as often as, they meet, they cancel one another. Both go out of existence.

When, as now, owing to "allocated" charges and other causes, (a) is in excess of (b), it is necessary to augment (b) with consumer-credits. These, however, will be cancelled as fast as they make contact with final replacement producer-credits in the shops. If, from any cause, (b) plus consumer-credits should be in excess of (a), the situation would be rapidly self-correcting. Producers would at once smell out the surplus effective demand; but, being unable to collect it, as they normally would, in the form of excess profits, they would at once increase production. That is,

they would issue new producer credits to meet and cancel the temporary excess in consumers' hands.

It is necessary to bear in mind the action and reaction upon one another of producer and consumer credits. An excess of one will call forth an increase of the other. They are rather like positive and negative charges of electricity. And when they meet they neutralise; both charges vanish.

Under these conditions, and apart from a general expansion of working capital necessitated by the increased volume of trade, it would appear impossible to get any considerable piling up of either consumer or producer credits. What we should see would be a ding-dong race between two mutually destructive competitors, neither of which could ever win.

A. W. COLEMAN.

## Movement Notes.

Arrangements are being made for a meeting between Messrs. Townend, Kennedy and Bell for the purpose of interchanging experiences in the recent election, and discussing future policy.

It is stated (unofficially) that the total sum sent in to *Social Credit* on the invitation of Mr. J. E. Tuke, the Treasurer of the Secretariat, in support of the election funds in Bradford (North) and Birmingham (Erdington) was approximately £16. Accordingly £8 has been remitted to each fund. No supplementary grants have been made out of the general fund of the Secretariat. So practically all the expense of the candidatures has fallen on the candidates, their local guarantors and subscribers.

Opinion among the chief organisers and workers in all three contests is unanimous that the electoral campaign has been of no perceptible value as a method of influencing votes in the elections.

In one constituency, when the organisers looked up signatories to the pledges a disconcertingly large proportion of these signatories professed to have forgotten that they had signed.

Pledges to perform acts in an indefinite future are much like post-dated cheques. When a person signs a post-dated cheque and forgets that he has done so, it is highly probable that there will be "no effects" to cover it on presentation. On the date of the signing there may be Ardour, but on the date of maturity—R/D.

The same results would happen in the case of commercial canvassing but for one vital difference, namely that when a person signs on the dotted line for, say, an encyclopaedia he incurs a legal obligation enforceable under penalty. Even so there is plenty of default.

The moral is not necessarily to abandon the electoral campaign. It obviously serves uses other than that of directly turning elections. What seems to be necessary is that rush tactics should be abandoned. It sounds impressive no doubt to hear that Mr. or Mrs. So-and-so has collected  $x$  signatures in  $y$  man/woman-hours, but it should be clear on reflection that the higher the numerical value of  $x$ -over- $y$  the lower the fulfilment value of  $x$ .

Certain opinion, hitherto indiscriminately enthusiastic for the campaign, is inclining towards the policy of spending more time on giving the "prospect" reasons why he should sign the pledge (so that the fact of signing should remain in his mind) and even then, keeping in periodical touch with him, and (ideally) enrolling him in the local group or branch of Party as the case may be. This follow-up system involves more effort per signa-

ture, but raises the value of that signature out of all proportion to one obtained on a pledge-form pushed through the letter box and fished from under the doormat in the space of half an hour.

Another consideration arises. Now that the policy of the electoral campaign is known, the conduct of it can be left to run under its own steam so far as a national centre body is concerned. It can be de-centralised. Take a locality such as Richmond, Surrey. The capitation fees now going to London could be used instead for getting Richmond pledge-forms printed in Richmond. True, the smaller quantity printed would increase the expense, but on the other hand printers' charges in Richmond are considerably lower than those in the London area. Further, the Richmond group would get its forms at the printers' price and would cut out middlemen's profits, or levies, now going to London. On balance the cost should be much the same as it is now.

But a far more important consideration comes into the matter. The pledge-forms now in use carry advertising matter. But the advertising is controlled by a centralised censorship. So, too, is that on all the literature provided for canvassers by the Secretariat (which suggests that this literature also should be printed locally). The present writer knows nothing of the opinions of the members of the Richmond group (Richmond is only instanced in this context because it lies nearest to his place of residence) and if they all agree with the principle on which the above advertising is censored these remarks will not apply. But speaking of groups generally it is reasonable to suppose that a proportion of members in each group would like to see the advertising on the literature distributed widened to include all journals and organisations which advocate authentic Social Credit views. If the production of such literature were controlled locally the views of these members would doubtless be reflected in the advertising. What happens at present is that the person canvassed gets to know of the existence of the Secretariat, then of that of its official organ, *Social Credit*. If he buys *Social Credit* he gets to know what literature is available for his instruction. But he does not know that this list of literature is incomplete. He does not know that the two "biggest sellers" among Social Credit pamphlets produced in this country are not listed. Notwithstanding that these two pamphlets, together with H. M. M.'s *Outline of Social Credit*, almost solely constituted the text books of the Australian Movement for some years and were reprinted there, they are ignored by the Secretariat.

## The Social Credit Smoke Room.

Plus ça change plus c'est la même chose.

If philosophies differ but actions remain the same, the difference between the philosophies is of no more than academic interest. (*The Times*.)

"Now within such a social structure the individual ceaselessly strives to escape manipulation, and to assert his or her individuality. To rise superior to the Conglomerate Mass—to receive recognition as an individual—to acquire Privilege—is the natural reaction of the thwarted individual. The various organisations in which individuals are grouped together provide a field for the most forceful personalities to pursue this struggle for recognition. Within any such grouping there are those who, by accident or design, attain recognition from the group as possessing qualities fitting them for positions of authority within the group.

"Within the orthodox form of organisation these persons who have acquired this recognition within the group are

elected to the executive committee or whatever the executive body of the organisation is termed. The fact that they are elected to this position to manage the group's affairs confers upon them recognition as Superior Persons. The forceful personality desiring to acquire Privilege within the group soon learns the art of manipulation to secure this recognition for himself. If by chance he finds himself in this privileged position without conscious manipulation of the group, the subsequent Tendency will be to acquire the art. For, remember, he is not elected to perform a specific function and assume responsibility for the results of his administration; he is elected jointly with others as being fitted to manage the entire affairs of the group. The executive committee or council is a perfect device for escaping personal responsibility. The individual members do not take decisions. The entire executive takes decisions. Therefore, all persons on the executive are collectively responsible for the results of those decisions. Which means that nobody is responsible, for the group hesitates to sack an entire committee, but cannot pin responsibility on one individual, although the artificial device of the 'scapegoat' is sometimes used to conceal the fact."—[Extract from a discourse entitled "Principles of Organisation" appearing over the signature of Denis L. Byrne and published as a supplement to a recent issue of *Social Credit*.]

\* \* \*

C.—I say; have you seen Byrne's analysis of the principles of organisation in *Social Credit*?

R.—The special supplement? Yes. Most impressive, I thought.

L.—And enlightening?

C.—Well, I have not gone into it very closely, but I have the feeling that when I do—

L.—What do you say, R.?

R.—Oh; I am already familiar with the general trend of the analysis and—

L.—But have you read it?

R.—Well, not connectedly.

L.—Then you haven't read it. I have.

R.—Ah. I hope it did you good. You're rather addicted to excessive analysis, and need an example of constructive reasoning to—

C.—Excuse me interrupting a moment, but I can never remember which is the side that the Secretariat take—is it collective responsibility for personal action, or personal—?

R.—I've told you ever so many times, it is personal responsibility for collective action.

C.—Ah, thank you. I like to know which is the right answer. I find it assists one in weighing arguments for and against, don't you? I'm sorry to have troubled you, but our talk about "body odour" the other day left me rather confused. In fact I'll confess that I didn't follow Byrne's discourse very far because of that. I got mixed up about whether it was a privilege to be a responsible person or a responsibility to be a privileged person.

L.—I'm not surprised. The thing is an exercise in metaphysics.

R.—I think you go too far in—

L.—Well, I'll come back a bit. I'll say that it is wrongly titled for a start. There is nothing in it about "principles of organisation": it is all about the psychology of would-be organisers.

R.—But psychology is involved in organisational problems, surely.

L.—It is; but the psychology discussed in this article is not brought into relation with any concrete problems—it is an amorphous abstraction such as Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler might have discoursed on at a Lotus Club banquet.

C.—Anyhow, there is a purpose behind the discourse, for I notice that Mr. Byrne tells us to beware of the "cloven hoof."

L.—Oh, yes; but there was a purpose in the warning: "Beware the Jabberwock, my son." We would understand the discourse if we knew what a jabberwock looked like or how it behaved.

R.—There you go again with your eternal hair-splitting—

L.—But am I not obliged to? Can you point to a single passage that enables one to detect and verify the danger vaguely described as the "cloven hoof"? No: I insist on seeing a jabberwock in the flesh, or a picture of it; or a description of its habits—even its pedigree—anything so that when I meet it I can greet it in the words of the song: "There you are, then—there you are!"

R.—Now, stow all that innocence. You know very well that Byrne is trying to safeguard the Movement against falling for power-maniacs.

L.—Quite so. But I know it only because of my antecedent knowledge of his point of view. The language in which he wraps his warning is utterly useless for the enlightenment of the conglomerate mass to whom it is addressed. I am entitled to place myself in the position of a new reader of *Social Credit* and to ask myself what such a reader would make of it.

C.—Still, I think that even Henry Dubb would get a notion of the general drift—

R.—Yes; what's necessary is that he should not follow any leader in the Movement not accredited by the Secretariat. He'll get that all right.

L.—Excellent. "Stick to Codfin, not Short. Short may be all right—we've nothing against him; but Codlin is all right." But why not say so as plainly as you put it? Why all these allusions to "Privileged Ones"? Sounds like the "Elders of Zion," and conveys the impression that the author (who is personally responsible) or the authors (collectively responsible) for the article (personal/collective action) is/are suffering from paranoids.

R.—I'm afraid you've got this "responsibility" problem confused in your mind.

L.—No. I've a clear grasp of what the formula ought to be if it were relevant to principles of organisation—which it is not. It is this: *Personal responsibility for personal action*. Applied to leadership it means that the director of any branch of an organisation is personally responsible to the group for the quality or consequences of his action, irrespective of whether his co-directors approve the action. If, when challenged, he relies on their approval as his justification, he is invoking that very principle of *collective responsibility for personal action* which Byrne (is it really Byrne?) is attributing to diabolical influences.

C.—Ah, perhaps that is why I was confused when I looked at his article. He cites two formulae whereas there is a third.

L.—Yes, and if you reflect a little you will see that the third reduces the other two to nonsense. P.R. for C.A. is the same thing as C.R. for P.A. and any dictatorship of "Privileged Ones" could be happy with either. P.R. for P.A. is their stumbling block—granted that lip service to any formula at all is a guarantee of straight dealing. For, when all the talk is finished, the antecedent truth stands clear, that the success of an organised movement depends on the character of its organisers. Collective responsibility when all the talk is finished, the antecedent truth stands clear, that the success of an organised movement depends on the character of its organisers. Collective responsibility on the character of its organisers. Collective responsibility can work well when the right people undertake it. In the insurance world risks are often underwritten collectively—but behind the collectivity stands the individual responsibilities of each underwriter to pay his quota when a claim matures. But suppose each underwriter said: "Oh, you must see Mr. So-and-so . . ." well, that would put a finish to the whole business. So what we want at the top are men whose credentials, qualifications, integrity and purpose have survived scrutiny—men who are prepared to say: "I stood for this, and I accept the responsibility (and penalty) for failure to satisfy you." Have we got them?

## Notice.

All communications concerning THE NEW AGE should be addressed directly to the Editor:

Mr. Arthur Brenton,  
20, Rectory Road,  
Barnes, S.W.13.

## Points From Inquiries.

### 7.

#### CAN SOCIAL CREDIT BE POPULARISED?

Sir,—In 1930 I issued a pamphlet setting forth my cure for unemployment. I called it "The Dole for All."

I had not then heard of Major Douglas or his Social Credit System. When my attention was called to it I read some of Major Douglas's books and found that the principle underlying his proposals was the same as that on which my "Dole for All" was based. But a fundamental difference lies in the fact that I proposed to raise the money for my scheme by taxation, and on this all Social Credit experts turn me down.

I cannot in turn criticise the Major Douglas method of financing, because I cannot understand it.

What I cannot understand the average voter cannot understand, and in its present form of presentation to the democracy Social Credit will remain an abstract theory, appealing perhaps to the intelligentsia but getting no votes from the man in the street, and Social Credit candidates will go on forfeiting their deposits.

What I am able to criticise in the Social Credit scheme is its ignoring of the fact that unemployment is of two kinds, compulsory and voluntary. Granted that to-day most unemployed people are genuinely looking for work, there are tens of thousands who prefer to live on the dole than to accept the class of work open to them. The most obvious example is the army of unemployed young women who refuse domestic service.

Then, again, to-day's unemployed have mostly at some time of their lives been industrious workers, but a generation is now growing up that has never worked, that does not see why it should work, and that cannot work even if it would.

The prospect is, therefore, that voluntary unemployment will be rapidly on the increase.

If this is so under the present miserable dole payments, what will it be under Social Credit with its 30s. per head per week?

A man would be a fool who would go to sea and suffer the miseries and dangers of a seafaring life if he can get 30s. per week by doing nothing on land.

The essential difference between Social Credit policy and mine is this:—

Social Credit will create by a payment of 30s. per head per week a growing army of non-working consumers whose needs must be satisfied by a decreasing army of sweated workers.

My plan would be to half starve the unemployed to force them to lend a hand in the work and to bribe the workers to do a bit less work and let the idle man help.

With all these differences the National Dividend of Major Douglas and the Dole for All of your humble servant have the same fundamental principle at the foundation.

E. A. CLEEVES.

Glan Gyrach, Penmaenmawr, N. Wales.

[The above is selected from a long letter which Mr. Cleeves devotes chiefly to discussing a pamphlet of his own called *The Dole For All*, published in 1930. If any reader cares to write to him, well and good. But it seems that he has derived his ideas about Social Credit from hearsay. Almost any pamphlet on the subject should put him right. Major Douglas's *Scheme for Scotland* contains provisions for compelling people to work when their services are necessary. On the other hand, advocates of Social Credit do not mistake involuntary idleness for voluntary laziness. The Dividend will enable people whom industry cannot employ to employ themselves. At present, creative abilities which are denied scope in the economic field are paralysed by impoverishment; whereas Social Credit opens the way for their diversion into the field of socially valuable service. It is almost a truism to say that the types of temperament and ability least necessary to industry are most necessary to society—and *vice versa*. At present only the one type is potentiated by income, leaving the other type to "waste its sweetness on the desert air." Since the instinct for survival animates both types, they both seek jobs in industry, irrespective of competence. You get poets in power-houses, musicians in munition factories, playwrights in provident societies, and hosts of other examples of creative potentialities needing free initiative for their expression imprisoned within a system of conditioned initiative. They need money in order to exercise their talents, but have to earn it under conditions which blunt their talents. The time is at hand when industry will be able so to economise in labour that all these misfits will be thrown out. Where? On to stony ground, to wither and dry up, or on to good soil to germinate and blossom?—ED.]

## The Social Credit Movement.

Supporters of the Social Credit Movement contend that under present conditions the purchasing power in the hands of the community is chronically insufficient to buy the whole product of industry. This is because the money required to finance capital production, and created by the banks for that purpose, is regarded as borrowed from them, and, therefore, in order that it may be repaid, is charged into the price of consumers' goods. It is a vital fallacy to treat new money thus created by the banks as a repayable loan, without crediting the community, on the strength of whose resources the money was created, with the value of the resulting new capital resources. This has given rise to a defective system of national loan accountancy, resulting in the reduction of the community to a condition of perpetual scarcity, and bringing them face to face with the alternatives of widespread unemployment of men and machines, as at present, or of international complications arising from the struggle for foreign markets.

The Douglas Social Credit Proposals would remedy this defect by increasing the purchasing power in the hands of the community to an amount sufficient to provide effective demand for the whole product of industry. This, of course, cannot be done by the orthodox method of creating new money, prevalent during the war, which necessarily gives rise to the "vicious spiral" of increased currency, higher prices, higher wages, higher costs, still higher prices, and so on. The essentials of the scheme are the simultaneous creation of new money and the regulation of the price of consumers' goods at their real cost of production (as distinct from their apparent financial cost under the present system). The technique for effecting this is fully described in Major Douglas's books.

### Forthcoming Meetings.

The Social Credit Party of Great Britain.  
(THE GREEN SHIRTS.)

National Headquarters: 44, Little Britain, E.C.1. 8 p.m.  
Wednesday, January 22.—Speakers' Class. Subject for discussion: Draft Parliamentary Bill to Equate Consumption to Production in Great Britain.

Manchester Social Credit Club.

Meetings on the first and third Tuesdays of each month at the Grosvenor Hotel, Deansgate, Manchester. 7 p.m. onwards. Visitors welcome.

Birmingham Douglas Social Credit Group.

A public meeting will be held in the Library, Queen's College, Paradise Street, on Wednesday, January 8, at 6.30 p.m. Speaker: J. G. Milne on "The Power of the Bank of England." Mr. Milne is an acknowledged authority on the technique of Social Credit and the money system, and this address will be helpful to all who wish to have a clear understanding of these important subjects. Visitors are very welcome.

The New Age Club.

[Open to visitors on Wednesdays from 6 to 9 p.m. at the Lincoln's Inn Restaurant (downstairs), 305, High Holborn, W.C. (south side), opposite the First Avenue Hotel and near to Chancery-lane and Holborn tube stations.]

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