The Press and the Law.*

"Curse these damned newspapers: for every criminal they help us to capture they enable twenty to escape." Thus one detective told another in a sixpenny thriller that we read recently. Some scribe had reported a clue which the police were trying to keep secret in order to lull the suspected criminal into a sense of security and confidence.

Well, the events of last week brought this heated claim back to our minds. For it epitomises the problem of how the journalist is to exercise freedom of comment without defeating the ends of justice. We had to resolve this problem as best we could when we wrote the comments on the charges against Mr. Powell which appeared in our last issue. When writing them we anticipated that before they were in print the case would have been finally disposed of, and Mr. Powell would have been irrevocably convicted or acquitted. On the day when we made up the paper for press (this was a Monday, November 14) no news had come through.

In the meantime there were rumours that the case might be adjourned for a week. So, with this in mind we consulted with our printers, and arranged to suspend two paragraphs of our third column on page 10 of our issue dated November 14th. This caused the news that an Appeal had been heard the day before, and that the Appeal had been fixed for January. So our beautiful precautions were of no avail. What may be called journalistic imprudence was retrospectively defeated. Note this, however we are not making apologies, but inviting sympathy or hurry to deliver your views." Well, the reply that we can make is that on every occasion we publish we have waited until it was absolutely safe to speak. We have wished we had not. There may be a thing in racing, as studying the form of a horse for so long that he has won the event before you even have your money on him. And in such a case, did I not follow your fancy?"

A further reply can be derived from the outburst of the detective cited above, for he did admit that the intrusion of the Press sometimes assisted the ends of justice. In the case of our comments it would puzzle any lawyer to show how they could have made it more difficult for Mr. Powell to form a true judgment on the evidence available, even if they had been circulated the day after the trial had begun. On the other hand it would not have helped any of our readers, if our reporters, to show how they had not used their skill to help direct the Press in their help to the ends of justice. For they pointed out things which seemed to need elucidation or certain matters which were left for the reader to verify; so at the worst they were merely superfluous, and at best helpful.

This consideration affords a basis for a third reply, which is this: That the indiscriminate imposition of absolute silence on independent reporters and commentators apropos of legal cases pending or pending is a menace to the public interest. We believe that when it is not in the public interest the rule of silence should be relaxed, and that the ethical responsibilities of the Press towards the ends of justice should be made more stringent than otherwise. But there is a need for a trained judicial expert in the field to place the Press in the position of a technical impropriety. At the present moment, however, there is nothing for us to say except to speak out about Mr. Powell's conviction and sentence, and to see the reports of the proceedings and the grounds of appeal. We shall have the opportunity to read the arguments and to hear the evidence. The public interest lies in the disclosure of the evidence and the grounds of appeal.
importance of the issue raised (or the large amount of money at stake) to him personally. His letter was written before he knew that an Appeal to the Supreme Court had been lodged, but what he says is nevertheless useful.

From a political point of view the option to appeal in this case is as much a liability as an asset to those who would like the, achievements of Social Credit movements at heart. For although the probability of a final judgment counts for a great deal, the time that might be saved by reaching a final judgment might count just as much and in the present state of Social Credit it is a step in the right direction without vastly increasing a disability on the strategy of the movement. Those who can stand are said to lose by Social Credit leaders mark.

In strict logic, having regard to the unique political frame of reference in which the offending leafflet came to be composed and printed, the Privy Council, as a quasi-judicial authority, would be the tribunal best fitted to review the case. The Privy Council could advise the government further to charge them and, if for the appellate tribunal. For the Privy Council to set a precedent with its handling of the and the exercise of its discretion in this respect would be the greater logic.

Further, as with virtually any other government, this could be made to suit such a discussion of the constitutional consequences of the situation. In those cases, the Privy Council is the ultimate court of appeal.

As with any other government, this too is a creative act of the Privy Council. It could not be said to be of such a character as to impede the proper functioning of the government, and in this respect it is of the utmost importance.

The idea that the Privy Council is a political body is an illusion. It is clear that the Privy Council is the ultimate court of appeal in such matters. It is clear that the Privy Council is the ultimate court of appeal in such matters.


**LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.**

**PRICE-INCOME SHORTAGE.**

Mr. Hiset’s method of proving his theorem is difficult of understanding. On the one hand, the idea is that the low price of goods is a consequence of the income earned, and on the other, it is that the low price of goods is a consequence of the income earned.

His theorem states that the price of a commodity is equal to the income earned by the producer of that commodity.

The price of a commodity is equal to the income earned by the producer of that commodity.

Let us consider a simple example. Suppose we have a tree that produces apples. The price of an apple is equal to the income earned by the producer of that apple. If the apple is to be sold, the producer of the apple will sell the apple at a price equal to the income earned by the producer of the apple.

Now let us consider a more complex example. Suppose we have a factory that produces a commodity. The price of the commodity is equal to the income earned by the producer of the commodity. If the commodity is to be sold, the producer of the commodity will sell the commodity at a price equal to the income earned by the producer of the commodity.

In both cases, the price of the commodity is equal to the income earned by the producer of the commodity.

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Social Credit and the Law.

Diary of Events with Dates of Comments in The New Age.

November 5, 1939. Critique of Mr. Harold J. Laski’s attack on lawyers.


April 2, 1931. Comment on the conflict of judgments between Lord Justice Scrutton and Lords Justices (lower court). The Waterlow Appeal on a question of new obligations to reduce the £250,000 in the Times Law Reports of April 9 and 21, 1931, respectively.

June 12, 1931. Legal education in the public schools and the Commonwealth’s legal system.

November 5, 1939. A comment on the legal system of the Commonwealth, with particular reference to the conflict of judgments between Lord Justice Scrutton and Lords Justices (lower court). The Waterlow Appeal on a question of new obligations to reduce the £250,000 in the Times Law Reports of April 9 and 21, 1931, respectively.

Forthcoming Meetings.

LONDON SOCIAL CREDIT LTD.
Blewcoat Room, Caxton-street, S.W.

November 5, 1939. The Afternoon of Sound Finance.

Housing Scheme.

Social Credit P.S.W. N.H.Q. 42, Liverpool, E.C.

Wednesday, November 21, 8 p.m.

“A Social Creditor on the Housing Problem.”