Prospectus

SEED aspires to fulfil a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals.

Our purpose is neither to propagandize in the sense of promoting some fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events.

Our partisanship does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist: it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the entropic phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at the least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.
The Problem of Power

An early Christian Father, St. Ambrose, observed that "the Kingdom of God...does not consist in persuasive arguments but in a clear demonstration of power". In a specific sense the concern of SEED will be, as our prospectus asserts, not with "persuasive arguments", but with the discovery of "power", its conservation and realization.

And, while our approach to this question is not "religious" in the sense of "secular" or "partisan", it is religious in the literal sense of the word religion, "to bind together", or "to bind back". These two definitions suggest two criteria for our search: first, that our approach will be integrated and consistent; second, that it must be bound back to something. That "something" we will refer to as "reality", which (if we are even to begin to search) must be objective and at least partially discoverable. What we mean by reality is suggested in the Tao which C.S. Lewis describes as "the Way in which the universe goes", or in the words of Gregory Nazianzos: "Everything that exists has Logos [in the sense of 'reason' or 'law'] as its constitutive principle". This reality or logos is the final authority in any exploration of "the way things are".

This assertion of belief in a "reality" carries the implication that power (as Ambrose regards it) derives from reality. "Power" which disregards the underlying nature of things in effect opposes the law of its own being; it is self-annihilating. That is, power is subject to limitations, the limitations imposed by the authority of reality. In other words, power is conserved or realized or demonstrated only when it is fully integrated with authority.

In the terms of this distinction, we recognize two threats to the maximally efficient utilization of power, both of which are in glaring evidence today. One of these is the idea that authority may be distributed, that each individual is the creator of his own "reality". This facile subjectivism—in that it disregards genuine authority—results in the dissipation of energy, the disintegration of power. It is the precursor of chaos. In opposition to this belief is the idea that "power" is authority. Correctly viewed, this "power" is mere force; it derives its effect from the energy inherent in reality, but because it too disregards authority, it is temporary. Thus, we suggest as principles that authority cannot be distributed, and that power, while it may be concentrated or distributed, obeys the laws of its nature.

The two erroneous attitudes towards the expression of power mentioned above reveal themselves, then, as entropic phenomena: they consist in "power which renders itself powerless". As such, they are inimical to our objective, which is to discover means of conserving energy, of realizing power.

While the foregoing principles are applicable in the physical realm, our concern is more with their specifically human implications. In the sphere of human activity, we identify power with man's faculties of consciousness and intention. Maximum potential energy (and, therefore, potential power) is a function of the maximum possible play of consciousness and intention, the maximum exercise of mind and will. Again, the perverted use of these faculties, their use in defiance of the authority of reality, results in the dissipation of energy. And, just as surely, concentration of these faculties in a coercive monopoly, or 'elect', where initiative is centralized, results in social entropy.

At the same time, society—or, more accurately, association—affords the individual the possibility of cultural (that is, growth-related) expression and development: a man becomes what he potentially is through his discovery and correct application of the principles of association. Each of us is, at least potentially, an integrated or powerful (not 'over-powering' or 'dominating') personality. That potential for self-realization exists only where power is distributed to individuals (allowing them consciousness and intention); the realization of the potential can result only when that power is bound back to the authority of reality. 'Character is the policy of the individual': but where the individual is not permitted to express his policy, 'character' is meaningless. There is no such thing as moral self-expression if a person's policy is determined by external coercion.

Unfortunately, the associations which provide men with opportunity for expression and development at the same time offer temptations which militate against the release of personal power—the temptation to abdicate responsibility for the exercise of consciousness and intention in favour of cozy functionalism, or to impose (by force or docility) one's own policy on others.

Our intention, then, is to investigate social policy with regard to the foregoing considerations. Our apprehension is that many policies pullulating today are doing so in the direction of the dead-level of absolute entropy. Our hope is to identify such policies, and against the radical basis of our philosophy, to suggest non-entropic alternatives. And, always, we admonish those who mistake force for power or power for authority that they are pursuing a policy of self-annihilation. It has been truly said that a man who leaps from a precipice does not violate the law of gravity, he illustrates it. We feel that it would be tragic if the "Kingdom of God", the "clear demonstration of power", asserted itself only in our destruction.

численное значение
Watergate and Constitutionalism

Since the American President was sworn into office a year ago, the government of the United States has been in a condition of distraction occasionally verging on paralysis. That country now faces the prospect of having for the next three years an administration which is widely distrusted and regarded as being unworthy of public confidence.

Strange Aspects

The so-called "Watergate scandal" which is said to have brought about this state of affairs has a number of strange aspects, perhaps the most mysterious of which is why such a sustained barrage of innuendo and accusation has been unleashed by the news media against Mr. Nixon and his associates. This is not to imply that the charges that have been made are untrue, but only that they have been pressed with extraordinary vigour. The experienced reporters who brought the scandal to the boiling point and kept it there certainly realize this. Even a political tyro knows that contemporary electoral processes constitute a breeding-ground for corruption, which can be expected to vary in degree directly in accordance with the size of the stakes involved. Nothing could be more ridiculous than to assume that these processes automatically tend to thrust virtue to the summit of political hierarchies. On the contrary, large-scale elections virtually ensure the ascendancy of clever maneuverers motivated by overweening ambition. The silly postureing that these men adopt in the course of every campaign are in themselves proof of the petty dishonesty of the typical politician.

Mr. Nixon and his supporters may be guilty of manifold misdeeds, but would anyone seriously deny that the Kennedy and Johnson electoral machines were similarly pragmatic?

The point is that the allegations that we have heard in connection with the Watergate affair merely expose the stuff of modern political practices. Consequently, the potential for whipping up scandals may be said to exist at all times. However, "old hands" at the games of politics and journalism--recognizing that treachery in bottomless bags is futile, if not dangerous--have an understanding that certain matters are not to be probed too deeply. Yet all the conventional stops have suddenly been pulled out regarding the Watergate affair. Why? Apparently the scandal represents a continuation of the assault on the confidence of the people of the United States in their native superiority—a confidence so exaggerated in recent decades that the disorientation that must accompany its disintegration could generate a revolutionary situation within the country.

Media Derelict in Duty

Whatever the case, the belief that this episode has any connection with the purification of American politics is puerile. The manner in which the news media have guided public interest in Watergate has been totally destructive. Proposals for remedying the electoral or administrative deficiencies which have been revealed are conspicuously lacking. Rather, the media have exploited the public appetite for suspense by perpetuating the whole affair at the level of such questions as, "Who will be implicated, or toppled, next?"

Disappointingly (if not unexpectedly), our domestic press has acquiesced in this superficial approach, disregarding a clear responsibility to analyze the constitutional considerations underlying the crisis in the United States. The kind of shenanigans involved in the Watergate espionage and cover-up are out of keeping with their repercussions; and one of the major lessons of the Watergate scandal, to which less than due attention has been drawn, is that the constitutional system of the United States has not only failed to meet the situation satisfactorily, but has tremendously exacerbated its worst features.

Roots of the Crisis

From this perspective, the nature of the recent scandal may be seen to derive largely from the philosophical attitudes prevalent among the authors of the American Constitution. As history has shown, their assumption that a small group of men could, working over a short period of time, draft a document which would satisfy forever the requirements of a large and variegated nation was pregnant with unforeseen difficulties.

Had the authors of the Constitution needed the lesson afforded by the first American experiment along these lines—namely, the Articles of Confederation a-
adopted by the Continental Congress in November 1777—they would have realized the hazards entailed by such an approach to the constitutional problem. Although these Articles served well enough during the tensions of the Revolutionary War, they proved ruinously ineffective in time of peace. In 1786 George Washington described the situation engendered by this first constitution as follows: "... no day was ever more clouded than the present. ... Without an alteration in our political creed, the superstructure we have been seven years in raising, at the expense of so much treasure and blood, must fall. We are fast verging to anarchy and confusion." He found the position acutely frustrating: "I am told that even respectable characters speak of the monarchical form of government without horror. ... What a triumph for our enemies to verify their predictions! What a triumph for the advocates of despotism to find that we are incapable of governing ourselves, and that systems founded on the basis of equal liberty are merely ideal and fallacious." 1

However, in endeavouring to deal with the situation, the authors of the American Constitution merely repeated the procedure that had already failed so signally. Yielding to the temptation that has always been the bane of makers of revolutions, they assumed their competence to set matters right by simply rewriting the rules of government and called a convention for this purpose. Fifty-odd individuals deliberating for a few weeks worked out the specifications of the constitution to be effective in their country in perpetuity. These persons, who spoke habitually of "building temples to liberty," and the like, displayed scant comprehension of the gulf usually separating realism from words and emotions. Drawing up a formula for societal functions is easier than living with such a formula. The French provided as vivid a demonstration of the truth of this proposition as could ever be found during their Great Revolution which began two years after the promulgation of the American Constitution, and for falling to rid itself of abstractionist approaches to politics France has paid the price of two centuries of endemic political instability.

The American constitutional experiment has been generally successful in comparison with those in France. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of the American Constitution have always been lurking in the wings, ready to occupy centre stage. The performance is now under way, although the attention of the audience seems still to be focused on the bit players rather than the main actor.

Unique Constitutional Experiment

Most modern constitutions resemble the American Constitution in the sense of being formalistic. The famous exception is, of course, the unwritten British Constitution, which not only is unique in both its origins and development, but also relates directly back to a period preceding the present era of institutionalized materialism and collectivism. The significance of these considerations to Canada is obvious, since our Constitution derives many of its fundamental attributes from the British model.

It has been said that, rather than devising a constitution, the British people grew one. "A Constitution is either an organism or an organisation. ... The real British Constitution is an organism." 2

Ridiculing this Constitution— as has frequently been done—on the grounds that it is complex, unsystematic, and constrained by senseless traditions is about as intelligent as protesting that a giraffe would be a better giraffe if it resembled something else. A giraffe functions and adapts with its giraffe faculties as a giraffe ought; and, in the same way, the defects that have been imputed to the British Constitution are actually characteristics of all life.

This scattered Constitution ... need not fear critics anxious to point out an omission, or theorists ready to denounce an anomaly.... By this means only can you preserve the happy incongruities, the useful incongruities, the protecting contradictions which have such good reason for existing in institutions, viz. that they exist in the nature of things, and which, while they allow free play to all social forces, never allow any one of these forces room to work out of its allotted line, or to shake the foundations and walls of the whole fabric. This is the result which the English flatter themselves they have arrived at by the extraordinary dispersion of their constitutional texts, and they have always taken good care not to compromise the result in any way by attempting to form a code. 3

The "card-index" mentality readily imagines that events should conform to some arbitrarily defined pattern or set of categories. For example, one can assume that men are nothing but chance agglomerations of protoplasm and impose some system upon them based on this assumption. However, if it happens that the nature of man includes factors that the system ignores, it al-

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Inflation: The Price of Entropy

Classical legend tells us that these twin hazards to noviciés (and not-so-noviciés) navigators, Scylla, the rocky promontory of Southern Italy, and Charybdis, a whirlpool opposite the harbour of Messina in Sicily. The feeling was that, if your ship was not dashed to atoms by the one, it would be engulfed by the other. The Scylla and Charybdis of modern economics are industrial stagnation, associated with restricted financial credit, and inflation, associated with free credit and "prosperity". These two evils have usually been regarded as dichotomous. Thus, economists have typically rationalized depression in terms of "stable prices" and inflation in terms of a "thriving" economy. At the moment, however, we have the unheralded spectacle of the synchronous occurrence of inflation and industrial slowdown: Scylla and Charybdis have united to torment us simultaneously.

The point is, of course, that whereas previous depres-sions (for example, that of the 1830's) have been financial phenomena, it is alleged that the present incipient slump is the result of real economic conditions: there is an "energy crisis", which means that transportation costs are rising, the petrochemical industry has restricted access to raw materials, the automotive industry can acquire neither the plastics necessary for our manufacture nor customers for vehicles that will cost a small fortune to run. Perhaps the most distressing manifestation of this situation is the slowing-down of British industry to roughly 60% of its previous output. The results will be mass unemployment, decrease in export income, and an aggravation of a continuing balance-of-payments crisis. In the existing psychology of economics, these consequences will appear to be disastrous. More important, they will in fact be disastrous—if the propaganda about "scarcity" is in fact true, which it very well may be.

What we are confronted with, then, is the grim realization that "inflation" is not, and never has been, a sign of health in the economy. In other words, the financial symptom (inflation) appears by hindsight to have been an index of a real and deplorable condition. The dilution of purchasing-power seems to have been a mirror of the dilution of industrial efficiency and power. Moreover, the inescapable corollary of all this is that inflation and industrial ill-health, rather than being alternating incompatibles, are in fact two sides of the same coin. As Bryan Monahan has observed, "Wasted effort dilutes the value of useful effort; this is the reality underlying the financial phenomenon of inflation." 

Entropy Economics

In a valuable article entitled "Economics and Entropy", Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen has proposed a useful way of regarding economic processes in relation to natural resources. He points out that, since according to the first law of thermodynamics matter-energy can be neither created nor destroyed, the problem of the exhaustion of resources is not that they disappear, but that they are ultimately converted to other, non-useable forms, to "waste". This is hardly an innovative observation, for it is implicit in thermodynamics that in the conversion of matter from one form to another, energy is "lost," or "dissipated". This phenomenon leads Professor Georgescu-Roegen to postulate "the entropy law of economics". While matter-energy can be neither created nor destroyed, it does exist in two states—"free or available energy, and as bound or unavailable energy". The measure of the bound energy in a thermodynamic system is its entropy. Now, Georgescu-Roegen is able to describe the economic processes in terms of thermodynamics: "matter-energy enters an economic system in a state of low entropy and comes out of it in a state of high entropy". This assertion has a number of profound implications. Beyond the scope of the present essay, suffice it to say, however, that the economic system has a dual function: it produces goods and waste.

The Financial Aspect

Curiously, Georgescu-Roegen's formulation appears to have been anticipated by roughly fifty years by C.B. Douglas, who similarly pointed to the entropic factor in economic production: "the breakdown of energy is financially represented as increased value by being charged as indirect cost and so appearing as increased price." This reminds us of another twin-function of the productive system: it is at once a manufacture of goods (which represent the build-up of over-all plant profit) and the distributor of purchasing-power (as salaries, wages, dividends). Thus, a factory can be said to manufacture goods and waste, prices and incomes. Under present financial arrangements, these functions reveal themselves to be not always complementary.

Thus, symptoms that have always been regarded as signs of a financially-flourishing economy have suddenly been exposed as signs of a self-exhausting economy. Among orthodox economic desiderata there have always been such conditions as full employment and a booming export trade. Employment, we know, distributes real incomes. At the same time, the distribution of these incomes entails a high level of industrial activity—or, in Georgescu-Roegen's terms, a high rate of conversion of low entropy into high entropy, an accelerated production of waste. Thus, the apparently-desirable financial effect of distribution of incomes is counterbalanced by the wholly undesirable real effect of efficient output of waste.

Moreover, this waste is not only the energy dissipated in the conversion process, but extends even to the kinds of materials that are produced. (Not to mention, for the moment, various forms of psychological waste.) If the expenditure of energy is inevitable in any kind of economic undertaking, then that expense must be justified in terms of the value of the product. Today, however, we witness the phenomenon of the production of goods that are themselves waste: gadgets, gimmicks and tinsel; war materials, cars, washing machines, and refrigerators that are designed to fall apart within eighteen months. Indeed, it may be said that our economy rests upon the doctrine of built-in
obsolescence. And those who complain about the dangers of a "growth economy" should be complaining instead about the boimous spectacle of a "waste economy". Anomalous though it may appear, existing arrangements require that the distribution of financial incomes be accompanied by the wild proliferation of entropy.

This, then, accounts largely for the economic scarcity with which we are at the moment confronted. Certain of our energy resources (our energy capital, i.e., the store of fossil fuels) are quite obviously limited, and we nevertheless acquire in spurious financial demands which require us to waste the few resources that we do have as frenetically as possible.

At the same time, however, our financial gains are revealed to have been mere chimera, for, if we recall, the productive system is a manufactory not only of incomes, but of prices as well. Each step in the productive process requires the conversion of matter from one form to another; what we gain in facility we lose in entropy. But the energy used enters the accounting system of the industry as a cost, which must ultimately be incorporated in prices. Thus, the real cost of entropy is recorded in the financial cost—as inflation. We pay for our economic prodigality in terms not only of deplorable waste, but also of diluted purchasing power. We pay for waste in scarcity, and in higher prices.

Thorny Questions

Scylla and Charybdis? Or merely the Prince of Confusion whispering in our ears (as C. S. Lewis claims he is wont to do) that we must choose between these twin evils? The antithesis has already revealed itself as a unity; perhaps we are merely steering our course through the black channel of delusion which leads only to the edge of the world—whence to fall off.

What can be done? "Slow down our expenditure of energy," says one. "But that," cries another, "would inevitably lead to unemployment, and that means no money." Scylla and Charybdis. As long as the question is posed in terms of the present assumptions, the answers will always be the same—wrong. What is required is a change in the questions themselves.

Recall the factory, with its dual twin-functions, one economic (the production of goods and services), the other financial (the manufacture of prices and incomes). Why is an increase in waste financially desirable? Why is an increase in goods not so desirable? Does the distribution of existing production depend upon financial incomes distributed in respect of wasteful future production? Is employment the only means of distributing income? Why do we have to produce things that we do not want (exports, war materials) before we can purchase what we do want?

These are questions fundamental to a change in orientation in economic thinking. The scope of the present essay does not allow me to deal with them analytically. But, empirically, these are the questions that must be asked. In terms of the existing economic system, which has perhaps wasted itself in pursuit of the financial whirlwind, it may be too late to ask these questions. But, as long as creativity and entropy persist, they are queries that, in the economic realm, reflect the root of things.

D.R.K. ("Watergate", continued from p. 4)

most certainly will prove incapable of dealing with them. The complexities of the interrelations of dynamical processes (of which life processes are among the most complex) reduce to nonsense the claims of persons who believe that they can arrange these processes to some arbitrary scheme. The unrealistic system will either crumble as a result of erosion caused by "leaks" or explode because of accumulated internal pressures.

While the British Constitution does not conform to any easily discernible pattern, its structure embodies the wisdom and experience of thousands of men who have contended over prolonged periods with a tremendous variety of strains and tests. During more than 1500 consecutive years, the English never reacted to difficulties discovered in their Constitution by deciding to wipe the slate clean and begin (to repeat the same old mistakes) all over again. Instead—because of some uncommon temperamental trait—they adjusted and modified the Constitution to meet requirements as these arose. It is only natural that the product of such a process, persevered in through the centuries, should contain many virtues. Moreover, some of these are apt to remain hidden until problems emerge to disclose them.

Two Constitutions Contrasted

The unique way in which their Constitution evolved gave Englishmen a peculiar sensitivity to the weight and subtleties of constitutional issues. For instance, a person reading Walter Bagehot's classic study, THE ENGLISH CONSTITUTION, first published in 1863, today will instantly recognize the relevance of its analysis to the recent governmental crisis in the United States. (continued p. 7)
Nationalization

It cannot be pretended that the present wage-dispute in the mining industry is in any sense constructive. It is a mere return in desperation to the most primitive methods of Trade Unionism. It follows that there must be continued chaos in the mining industry or the Government's Bill will somehow be put into operation. In both cases alike the consumers and the workers will be called upon to pay.

Sound familiar?

The above quotation appeared in the British weekly The New Age for April 1, 1930. At that time the Miners' Federation of Great Britain was agitating for nationalization of the industry: the ostensible objective was the eradication of industrial disputes.

Since then, as we know, the British mining industry has been nationalized. Strange, is it not, that this has resulted in no perceptible amelioration of the situation?

One day, perhaps, the realization will dawn that the political and economic problems of society cannot be solved by a change in administrative arrangements, and particularly not by increased centralization of executive control. A commissar is merely a trust magnate with his face on backwards.

("Watergate", continued from p. 6)

Bagehot regarded America as "the greatest and best of presidential countries," whose people's "genius for politics" was exceptional. Yet he commented as follows on the weaknesses inherent in their rigid Constitution:

You have got a Congress elected for one fixed period, going out perhaps by fixed installments, which cannot be accelerated or retarded—you have got a President chosen for a fixed period, and immovable during that period: all the arrangements are for stated times, there is no elastic element, everything is rigid, specified, dated. Come what may, you can quicken nothing and retard nothing.  

With reference to this situation, "the difficulty of quiet times is nothing as compared with the difficulty of unquiet times" because of the "total absence of revolutionary reserve" in the Constitution. The nature of the political impasse which developed in the United States during the past year fully vindicates Bagehot's observations.

Unlike the British and Canadian Constitutions, which would have made possible either a change of government

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or a general election in the face of such a scandal, the American Constitution does not provide procedures to allow relatively smooth replacement of a discredited administration. The ability of the president to resist pressure to the point that government is paralyzed encourages the magnification and intensification of even minor constitutional problems. Moreover, such "revolutionary reserve" as the American Constitution does possess is of dubious efficacy in practice. For example, the vice-president is the successor of a deposed president; however, not only are vice-presidents seldom selected for qualities suiting them for the office of the presidency, but—as Watergate has shown—the vice-president is liable to be uprooted by the same storm that assails the president.

In addition, such storms constitute an ever-present threat as long as the highest dignity of the political system is bound up with an individual who rises to power through a popular election in which deception and string-pulling are the most potent instruments making for success. Because nominal sovereignty in Britain resides outside of the arena of mass politics, the people of that country who desire to respect their government are not forced to suspend their critical faculties and make a hero of the national champion politician.

Advantage Seldom Appreciated

In our time, tradition has been universally downgraded. However, tradition is merely a component of inheritance, and without inheritance mankind today would be grunting and grubbing roots from the ground by hand for food. This indisputable truth is not gainsaid by the obvious fact that tradition has sometimes worked for ill rather than for good. The Canadian heritage in terms of political institutions, whose most salient features are derived from the British model, has an enormous actual value—and an even greater potential one.

That the occasion afforded by the Watergate affair to demonstrate the advantages of a constitutional system combining dignity, flexibility and efficiency in the protection of human rights was hardly recognized, much less exploited, indicates the low level of contemporary political thinking in our country.

R.E.K.

1 Letters written to James Madison and John Jay on November 1, 1886, and August 1, 1886, respectively. See Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1923), 18, 34-5.


5 Ibid., 32.

"So long as cosmology remained divorced from physical causation in the mind, the right question could not occur in that mind. Again a parallel to the present situation imposes itself: there is, one suspects, a fragmentation in the twentieth-century mind which prevents it from asking the right questions... a one-sided philosophy—whether it be scholasticism or nineteenth-century mechanism, creates sick problems, of the sort 'What is the sex of the angels?' or 'Is man a machine?'"

Arthur Koestler, The Sleepwalkers, 400-1