

Seed

'Dialectic'

One of the more amusing minor aspects of the development of British Socialism was the apprehension felt by some Marxist dramatists that the realization of their social ideal would involve the destruction of their vocation. As Wallace Martin, in his book *The New Age Under Orage*, notes, the philosophy of these worthies appeared to imply the annihilation of their craft.

Fundamental to both the Marxist interpretation of history and the drama is the idea of *dialectic* — the violent clash of opposites (or, apparent opposites), from which a new order ("synthesis") is supposed to emerge. However, the Marxist wedding of dialectic to materialism tends to make all conflicts purely economic in nature. The removal of economic contradictions implicit in the anticipated achievement of the socialist millennium ("communism") involves the eradication of the social tensions which are (presumably) the stuff of drama. Thus, economic contradictions having been resolved, the subject-matter of drama will have disappeared. Contemplation of this prospect left socialist dramatists impaled on the horns of a dilemma.

That they saw it as a dilemma at all tends to undermine their philosophical position: does their social objective involve an economic injustice to them, or is their concern of another order, an order having to do with self-expression? What is the nature of the discomfort with which their own ideal seems to threaten them?

The point is, of course, that what is essentially human about life is not economically determined — albeit the policy of some individuals and groups is to relegate as much human activity as possible to purely economic functions. In fact, economic conflict is of a decidedly lower order than moral conflict: while one is primarily concerned with the standard of living, the other involves the "soul" (which, incidentally, A. R. Orage himself regarded as the proper subject of literature, dramatic and other).

The tragedy (to use a dramatic term) of a person preoccupied with an economic struggle (e.g., "making a living") is not so much that he may be uncomfortable, but that he is prevented from even confronting issues which might permit him to become more properly "human". To the extent that his behaviour is merely a response to the stimuli of economic factors, he is determined by his environment: his actions are not in fact initiated or willed by him; more correctly, they are externally-induced reactions. Since he is functioning under constraint, his sphere of moral choice — his sphere of genuine spiritual conflict and potential spiritual resolution — is restricted.

Thus, the socialist dramatists were wide of the mark. The real human drama does not end with the removal of economic pressures; it only begins then. The man whose life consists in material survival organized around a system of wage-slavery finds it relatively easy to be "virtuous": he has no effective choice. It is when he is freed from economic necessity that his real internal drama begins, as, for example, L. P. Jacks has observed: "Leisure is that part of man's life where the struggle between white angels and black angels for the possession of his soul goes on with the greatest intensity". Economic freedom involves not only great opportunities but also great risks — perhaps the only risks worth taking.

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SEED aspires to fulfil a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals.

Our purpose is neither to propagandize in the sense of promoting some fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events.


Our partisanship does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist: it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and will which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the entropic phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at the least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.



Predictions

A seemingly minor deed by the new federal Minister of the Environment may prove to be beneficial in an unexpected way. Mme Sauvé has announced that, in future, the source of daily weather forecasts will be identified as Environment Canada. All of us have been disappointed by unreliable weather predictions, and the government's admission of responsibility in this domain should serve to place its statements generally in a more realistic perspective in the eyes of the public. That the confidence we should like to have in governmental pronouncements is not currently justified is a lesson well worth learning.

On the other hand, we hope that this decision does not presage an acceleration in meteorology of developments such as we have witnessed recently in regard to economics. As Bryan Monahan has observed: "theoretically sound, the 'laws' of economic 'science' are in practice worthless for the most part, and predictions based on them are less reliable than the notoriously unreliable forecasts of weather. Before the war, economists were for this reason becoming the laughing-stock of the public; and if their prestige has recovered to some extent, this is because governments have taken powers to make theories work as nearly as possible despite the facts. It is easy enough correctly to predict a shortage of wheat if for reasons of financial policy you take powers to restrict its production."

One cannot but wonder whether Mme Sauvé's declaration will emerge as the harbinger of an intensified effort to establish hegemony over the weather. After all, government credibility would be less compromised if some human agency were capable of actually delivering the results forecast; and public educational systems ensure a plenitude of energumens persuaded that nature generally makes things badly and that man's supreme achievement consists in reorganizing as many of them as possible. However, nature has independent ways incomprehensible to office-dwelling logicians and statisticians, and the ultimate results of the reorganization are never exactly what was intended.

It is a strange desire, to seek power and lose liberty, or to seek power over others and to lose power over a man's self.

Sir Francis Bacon, "Of Great Place"

“From Nothing, Nothing Comes”

An issue much disputed at the time of the Reformation was the question of justification by works *versus* justification by faith and grace. While the argument probably involves a false antithesis (“grace” being a precondition of “works”), it did (and perhaps still does) give rise to the problem of what powers men, as men, really have. What, in fact, have men earned or merited, and what has come to them as a free gift or inheritance from outside the sphere of human endeavour? In *King Lear* (a play centrally concerned with the idea of “inheritance”), Shakespeare dramatizes one aspect of this question, implying, it seems, that the denial of “grace” (even at the secular level) can involve a man in tragedy.

The fact that “Shakespeare” is specifically excluded from the collectivist visions of such anti-Utopian novels as *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four* is vaguely registered and even more vaguely deplored by most readers of those works. The exact significance of his exclusion is, I think, seldom appreciated: it is usually thought to have something to do with the suppression of intellectual freedom, or freedom of the press--which it undoubtedly does. It also has something to do with the integrity of the “creative” process--an integrity expressing personality, and therefore antithetical to collectivism. However, even more important than these considerations, which have to do with the subjective freedom of the artist to express himself, or the reader-spectator to react, is another: that is, the truth about the objective order of things which great art incarnates. It is not subjectivism which totalitarian regimes fear¹; it is the revelation of objective reality which makes nonsense of collectivist theory. Thus, as Winston Smith reflects in *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, “Freedom is the freedom to say that two plus two make four. If that is granted, all else follows.”

Tragic Denial

Whatever else they may be, Shakespeare’s plays are dramatic explorations of aspects of reality--some less successful than others. Among the most successful are the “tragedies”, which raise questions about rifts or apparent contradictions in reality--contradictions which involve awful wastes of human energy. At the same time, however, they raise the question not whether reality itself is radically flawed, but whether man’s (or, a man’s) apprehension of and approach to reality is not radically flawed. If it is, then the entropic process of which “tragedy” is a dramatization might be reversed by a sufficiently moving portrayal of “tragic stupidity”

--that is, the disastrous denial of reality.

Such a portrayal can be seen in *King Lear*. Although one might argue (with Gloucester) that the tragedy results from “the gods” sporting with men, it is evident from the play that Lear’s tragedy is intimately linked to his denial of what are arguably two fundamental aspects of reality. These are the integration of substance and form (implied in the idea of “Incarnation”) and the question whether “something” can come of “nothing” (the issue raised by the idea of “Grace”). The price of denying reality is entropy, or waste--and it is the tragic wastefulness of Lear’s stupidity that Shakespeare dramatizes.

Lear’s tragedy is the result not of intentional “sin”, then, but of an inadequate approach to reality --which perhaps in its temporal consequences amounts to the same thing. To apply conventional moral categories to Lear’s situation is thus misleading: for example, his assertion that he is “a man/More sinn’d against than sinning” is a red herring. It is Lear’s attempt to justify himself in terms of the category “justice” which he had mistakenly tried to maintain at the outset of the play. The criterion against which Lear’s tragic error must be measured is not some preconception about the commensurability of rewards and deserts, but the nature of reality itself. The postulation of “justice”--at least in the quantitative terms in which Lear sees it--is itself perhaps “unrealistic”.

Form and Substance

It is a commonplace to observe that Lear’s abdication of effective power in favour of formal “authority” is a mistake: in terms of Renaissance political/religious theory, it is perhaps even a “sin”.² However, the point of his abdication is that it represents a form of abstractionism--a dissociation of the sign from the thing signified, a disintegration of “symbol”.

Foregoing his effective power, embodied in his property, for one thing, Lear believes that he can retain the tokens of power: "Only we shall retain/The name all th'addition to a king" (I, i, 135-6). The dissociation of form from substance is, of course, the ground of all idolatry, the worship of images of reality without regard to reality itself.

Not only are the tragic consequences of Lear's abstractionism made clear in his ineffectual protests against his predatory daughters, but they are evident as well in his loss of contact with himself. What is a king? Shakespeare has, of course, posed this question before--notably in *Richard II* and *Henry V*. What is a king who has only "th'addition to a king"? Lear, in his loss of identity, discovers the frailty of names, of metaphors, of the images of things. "Dost thou call me fool, boy?" he asks his fool. "All other titles thou has given away; that thou wast born with," his facetious companion replies. Ironically, Lear, who has tried to separate form from substance, discovers that form follows substance. The vanishing substance leaves behind it an empty form. "Who is it that can tell me who I am?" queries the dethroned Lear. The answer--the core of the play--is that he is "a poor, bare, forked animal"--and, something more.

"All in All Sufficient"

If Lear's attempt to abstract form from substance, the stripping away of the externals which justify or identify a man, is a tragic misperception, so, no less, is his assertion of self-sufficiency. The ideological basis of his decision to divide his kingdom among his daughters is a belief that "merit" can somehow earn "bounty". Thus, to his daughters, he poses the problem of their buying his blessing: "Which of you shall we say doth love us most?/That we our largest bounty may extend/Where nature doth with merit challenge" (I, i, 51-3). Somehow, he fails to appreciate that the "shadowy forests", "champlains", "plenteous rivers", and "wide-skirted meads" are his in stewardship only; they are, in fact, a gift (by definition "free") which he by no manner of means could have merited, earned, or created himself. In asking his daughters to earn his blessing, he is guaranteeing that he will discover his own "worth".

Cordelia, of course, refuses to play the game according to Lear's rules. When he asks her to spend the

metal of her rhetoric to purchase his love ("what can you say to draw/A third more opulent than your sisters?"), she answers, quite rightly, "Nothing". In fact, she expresses her affection in terms of Lear's assumptions about the quantification of "love": "I love your Majesty according to my bond; no more nor less". Love, which must be free³, cannot be purchased; Cordelia refuses to express love in terms of money value. For Lear's offer of rewards, Cordelia pays not love, but, more appropriately, "duties". Duties imply obligations; love is love only when it is expressed independent of obligations.

Philosophical Nihilism

"Nothing?" Lear demands. "Nothing," Cordelia reiterates. Nothing can buy love; what is purchased is not love. "Nothing will come of nothing," Lear storms. His assertion is a denial of the reality that love (a value more important than human preconceptions about "just deserts") comes of nothing. Moreover, at a theological level, Lear's assertion is blasphemy: it is a denial of grace, which, like love, is by definition free; it cannot be earned, purchased, or merited.⁴ Lear's blasphemy, in the context of the play, begs the question of his own worth, his own value when he is stripped of the grace that has made him king and steward of a fecund land.

What he is, explicitly, is "nothing". Having denied "grace", "love", and "benison" to Cordelia, Lear is treated to an intimation of what he is without these gifts. At I, iv, 134ff., Kent calls the Fool's song "nothing", and the Fool asks Lear: "Can you make no use of nothing, Nuncle?" The old man answers: "Why, no, boy; nothing can be made of nothing"--a repetition of his earlier statement to Cordelia. Lear is beginning to discover, however, that nothing *can* come of something: the "something" (which Lear took for love) which earns Regan and Goneril their father's "grace" comes to nothing for Lear: "Prithee," says the Fool to Kent, "tell him, so much the rent of his land comes to".

The point is re-iterated. When Lear questions Goneril's frown, the Fool observes:

Thou wast a pretty fellow when thou hadst no need to care for her frowning; now thou art an O without a figure. I am better than thou art now; I am a Fool, thou art nothing (I, iv, 199-202).

(continued p. 8)

The Numbers of Man

The spectre of a population explosion leading to famines and wars on a world scale is being raised with increasing insistence at present. The novelty of the threat is exaggerated, as history bears witness to the frequency of predictions of the dire effects of both overpopulation and depopulation through the centuries. This continuation of an article begun last month considers the validity of the assumptions underlying such predictions and their claims to be scientifically, rather than politically, motivated.

The concept of population outstripping its means of nourishment is widely believed to have originated with the publication in 1798 of Rev. Thomas Malthus's *Essay on Population*. This is an erroneous notion. As early as 1589 Giovanni Botero had written:—

The powers of generation are the same now as one thousand years ago, and, if they had no impediment, the propagation of men would grow without limit and the growth of cities would never stop. For the same reason the human race, grown to a certain multitude, has not passed beyond it; and for three thousand years or more the world has been just as full of men as now, for the fruits of the earth and the supply of food do not allow a greater number of people.⁶

Botero himself undoubtedly had precursors.

Malthusian Theory

What Malthus did was dress the concept in scientific terminology. His theory held that, since population increases as a geometrical progression, doubling every 25 years unless constrained from doing so, while food production increases only as an arithmetical progression, the size of the population must ultimately be determined by economic limitations. However, if anything, his attempt to give precision to the theory of the existence of a natural tendency towards overpopulation made it less realistic than the more general opinions of his predecessors. Neither of his basic propositions were more than assumptions, and neither can be successfully defended. Considering that, in comparison with most earthly flora and fauna, men are unprolific, there is no ground for asserting that food production can increase at no better than an arithmetical rate. Nor, as we shall see later, is the belief that the numbers of men increase geometrically anything but an airy speculation.

The implication of Malthus's thesis is that population is always pressuring food supply. A corollary

would be the impossibility of improving the diet of the people—and, indeed, the probability that this diet would deteriorate. Yet nations have extended food production far beyond local requirements, yielding surpluses which cannot be consumed internally and must be either exported or destroyed. The governments of both the United States and Canada have contended with the 'menace' of glut by actually paying producers of food-stuffs not to produce.

It may, of course, be objected that this situation is not true of all nations. However, in the instances where it is not true, cultural factors (such as adherence to inefficient methods or exaggerated abhorrence of material advantages) and political sabotage can be shown to play roles as important as that of any alleged exhaustion of the potential to satisfy the needs of the populations involved.

What Malthus's doctrine meant to him will be better understood if we realize that he propounded it in the context of an opposition to the extension of the Poor Laws in England. His logic was worthy of a modern economist. Thus, he argued that no more houses should be built, because this would enable the poor to increase their numbers, which in turn would create a superfluity of labourers, driving wages down and spreading economic hardship.⁷ Since circumstances would keep the people poor in any case, there was no point in having larger numbers of them suffering economic duress.

Reaction to Malthus

Perhaps because it served well the inheritors of the Puritan tradition who sought justification for maintaining a callous attitude towards the condition of the poor, Malthus's thesis was propagated widely. However, its philosophical implications horrified persons having

⁶ Quoted in James Bonar, *Theories of Population from Raleigh to Arthur Young* (London, 1929), 17.

⁷ See J.M. Keynes, "Robert Malthus," *Essays in Biography* (London, 1933), 107.

different religious conceptions. Thus, one Thomas Sadler wrote:—

In the plain apprehension of the many [this theory] lowers the character of the Deity in that attribute which, as Rousseau has well observed, is the most essential to him, his goodness, or otherwise impugns his wisdom; as it disturbs our dependence upon Divine Providence, and weakens those feelings of complacency with which man ought to regard his fellow man, teaching human beings to regard each other as rivals for an insufficient share in the bounties of nature, rather than as co-partners in an overflowing abundance, which still increases their multiplication; and, above all, as it distinctly aims at destroying the sacred and long-established rights of poverty and distress,—it commits a deliberate outrage on the settled feelings and principles of mankind.⁸

Unfortunately, the arguments in the tomes published to refute Malthus usually manifested more emotionalism and inappropriate dogma than true science. Yet the ferment generated by the dissemination of Malthus's theories did produce, occasionally, a seeming glimmer of light in the prevailing fog. People genuinely concerned to get at the truth began testing the theory against actual experience, and any correspondence between the two seemed to become more and more fortuitous.

The part of the Malthusian theory which could not sustain critical investigation was, moreover, its most plausible part—namely, the statement that human population tends to increase geometrically. Innumerable variations in population patterns could not be reconciled with this model. In fact, the further the new research was carried, the more compelling became the evidence that neither the propensity nor the ability for human reproduction is constant.

New theories were accordingly developed to account for discrepancies. The following, propounded by Thomas Doubleday in 1847, was typical:—

The GREAT GENERAL LAW then, which, as it seems, really regulates the increase or decrease both of vegetable and animal life, is this, that whenever a *species* or *genus* is *endangered*, a corresponding effort is invariably made by nature for its preservation and continuance, by an increase of fecundity or fertility; and that this especially takes place whenever such danger arises from a diminution of proper nourishment or food, so that consequently the state of depletion, or the deplethoric state, is favourable to fertility, and that, on the other hand, the plethoric state, or state of repletion, is unfavourable to fertility.

⁸*The Law of Population: a disproof of the Superfecundity of human beings and developing of the real principle of their increase* (London, 1830), I, 6.

⁹*The True Law of Population Shewn as Connected with the food of the People* (London), 5-6.

Incidentally, this theme (and variations upon it) has had its modern defenders, among whom the most prominent is probably J. de Castro, who has argued in regard to contemporary population trends that hunger, stimulating the built-in defense mechanisms of the body, is the cause, rather than the effect, of mounting population pressure.

Can of Worms

Of course, the suggestion that nature might be interceding in such a way to influence population growth opens up a dreadful 'can of worms' in so far as the proponents of the theory of overpopulation are concerned. It makes for such a messy situation in comparison with their neat theories. As a result, they have developed a standard response for persons who endeavour to point out exceptions to the 'rule' of accelerating population growth: such exceptions are attributed to variations in the practice of contraceptive techniques. This line of argument has been carried to ludicrous lengths. For example, one study, after stating that, "beginning about 1875, fertility rates in Western Europe began a decline that continued through the late 1930's," proceeds to explain the phenomenon as follows: "There is substantial evidence that *coitus interruptus* began to be widely practiced in Europe when birth rates began to fall."¹⁰ This is, surely, an instance of grasping at the flimsiest straw in preference to admitting the possibility of a breach in the case that without conscious intervention man's numbers will tend to increase beyond his means of sustenance.

Despite such apologetics, however, natural variation is the only factor that can explain many of the anomalies in population patterns. The decline of birth rates in the absence of conscious contraception has been established as regards various primitive peoples. Within the borders of many countries fertility rates have been found to vary radically from region to region with, in places such as Portugal, no economic or other reason for the situation being apparent.¹¹ Different races

¹⁰F. Notestein, D. Kirk, S. Segal, "The Problem of Population Control," *The Population Dilemma*, ed. by Philip Hauser (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 142.

¹¹Massimo Bacci, *A Century of Portuguese Fertility* (Princeton University Press, 1971), 125.

probably have inherently different fertility rates.¹² In a given population group the number of male babies born over a period of years exceeds the number of girl babies by a fairly stable ratio; but the ratio is consistently about 2% lower for American Negroes than for American Whites. Moreover, the ratio tends to increase in wartime and, apparently, to decrease in respect of illegitimate births. So-called 'primitive breeding seasons' have been observed in different population groups:—

In Great Britain at the present time there is a clear seasonal fluctuation in the number of births. The peak occurs in the early spring . . . and the lowest number occurs in the autumn. The difference between the high and low numbers is about 15 percent. The same periodicity seems to have existed a century ago when such fluctuation was not likely to have been the result of family planning.¹³

Studies of fertility patterns among women in India have shown that 80% of them can become pregnant within five months after a neonatal death, but if the baby survives 50% cannot become pregnant for a year.¹⁴ Two proximate cultural groups, one of which practices contraception while the other does not, have been shown to have essentially the same fertility patterns over extended periods.¹⁵

Other possible influences on human birth patterns may be surmised from research involving animals. For example, studies of wild mice have indicated that their fertility automatically diminishes as their population density increases. Changes in diet and environmental noise can significantly alter the fertility (though not necessarily the sexual activity) of rats.

¹²On the Measurement of Human Fertility: Selected Writings of Louis Henry, trans. M.C. Sheps (New York, 1972), 142.

¹³A.S. Parkes, "The Biology of Fertility," *Human Fertility and Population Problems*, ed. Roy O. Greep (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), 26.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 39.

¹⁵J.L. Brownell, "The Significance of a Decreasing Birth Rate," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia), V (July 1894), 89.

R.E.K.

(To be concluded next month)

Brethren, think of the kingdom of heaven as just this, the genuine contemplation of realities.

Basil of Caesarea

To Those Who Share Our Concern

The publication of SEED is an enterprise which we feel is of cardinal importance to the revitalization of our culture. This endeavour represents the concern of a few individuals sensible of their responsibility to reverse, where possible, what they perceive to be the deterioration of the ideological and practical bases of this culture, and prepared to make personal sacrifices in the accomplishment of this objective.

However, our success can only be in proportion to our resources, which — particularly in their financial aspect — are quite limited. We are determined to proceed, even within those limitations. But we would like to do more.

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"From Nothing", continued from p. 4)

1. is constitutes a qualification even of the Fool's earlier characterization of Lear as a "fool"; now, the old king is a cipher. As Kent later observes, Lear has come out of "heaven's benediction" into "the warm sun" --an image of his exposure to tragedy.

The Gift of Grace

Lear eventually comes to contradict his claim that "nothing will come of nothing": he recognizes, but does not appreciate, the fact that what is valuable in life consists of superfluity--what is beyond necessity. When Goneril and Regan attempt to reckon how many sustainers Lear *needs*--a variation on Lear's attempt to measure love at the outset of the play--and Regan asks, "What need one?", Lear cries:

O! reason not the need; our basest beggars
Are in the poorest thing superfluous:
Allow not nature more than nature needs,
Man's life is cheap as beast's

(II, iv, 265-9).

Mere "nature", mere quantifying reason, are not enough. It is superfluity that raises man's life above that of the beasts: but what is the source of this superfluity?

The very "nothing" (that is, nothing that man can do) which Lear has so deprecated.

Lear's insight is but a prelude to his tragic acquaintance with reality: toward the end of his speech, a storm is heard in the distance. It is in this storm --the external circumstance which accentuates Lear's nakedness and the figure of his internal tempest--that Lear learns, with tragic humility, what he, "unaccommodated man", is. Without the superfluous, without that which is not necessary, which cannot be measured, which cannot be bought, man is no more than a "forked animal". It is the "something" that comes of nothing --the uncoerced loyalty of Kent, the unpurchasable love of Cordelia, and her "forgiveness"--that "saves" Lear, that restores his spiritual eyesight. The impressive irony of *King Lear* is that "nothing"--the valueless, as Lear sees it--becomes the only thing worth having, and that only what is "free" is valuable. That, in fact, grace--the grace of wisdom, of love, of tragic lucidity --can only be purchased with "nothing".

D.R.K.

¹In fact, the fostering of simple subjectivism ("reality" as something manufactured by each person for himself) is a technique of social demoralization. As an aspect of relativism, it undermines the notion of value--the criterion of rectitude, the basis for esthetic and ethical judgement.

²Malcolm M. Ross in *Poetry and Dogma* (Rutgers University Press, 1954) points out that "In the poetry of the English Renaissance, the Crown is a dominant culture symbol" (113). The degradation of the Crown from symbol to mere metaphor is implicit in Lear's rejection of the "reality" underlying the sign.

³C.G. Dobbs in an article entitled "On the Corruption of Words" (*The Social Creditor*, August 29, 1942) observes that "The word 'free' is from the Old English *freon*, to love, and is related to 'friend.'"

⁴Thus, for example, C.S. Lewis: "God did not die for man because of some value He perceived in him. The value of each human soul, considered simply in itself, out of relation to God, is zero" (*Transposition and Other Addresses*, Chapter 3). As we shall see, Shakespeare seems to make precisely this point in regard to Lear.

...there is nothing in psychological theories that seriously modifies our conviction that psychology is not yet a science. Other studies, such as sociology, economics, and so on, also have from the scientific point of view, something unsatisfactory about them. Science is at its strongest in dealing with the material universe. Its pronouncements on other matters are relatively weak and hesitating.

J.W.N. Sullivan, *The Limitations of Science*, 125-6

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