Faith and Inevitability

Human beings, clever and frail as they are reputed to be, have perhaps nowhere exercised that cleverness more fantastically than in contriving extenuations of and justifications for that frailty. As a character in Joseph Heller's Catch-22 puts it, baldly, we deny "God" when times are good, yet blame "Him" for our problems. Unable to accept the responsibility for our own errors, we are constantly in search of (usually metaphysical) alibis.

Tudor Jones has compiled a list of common alibis: "God, Divine Will, Prophecy, Allah, Ideas ... Pain, Pleasure, Der Zeitgeist (Spirit of the Age), Die Gestalt (Form), The Mode of Production and Distribution, Sin, Inexorable Economic Law, Evolution, Historical Determinism, Predestination, Climate, Sun Spots ..." Some of these, he points out, are deserving of recognition, or of reverence. Too often, however, the determinism is resorted to as a means of placating a residual sense of personal responsibility, and is accompanied by a progressive paralysis of will. That is, the idea is an anticipation of the condition which it imagines: postulating determinism, we (as individuals) become increasingly susceptible to manipulation by "external forces".

One must not venture very deeply into contemporary mysticism to discover the operation of the alibi — often in forms sophisticated enough to confound even the most rarified intellects. Thus, for example, inflation has become an "Inexorable Economic Law", before which even those flamens of arithmetic abstraction — the economists — can only abase themselves. At the same time, the logic of scientific (historical?) materialism convinces us that we are, in Arthur Koestler's terms, puppets suspended from our chromosomes, or, in B.F. Skinner's, complexes of conditioned responses. For those who find neither of these sufficiently persuasive, there is always the pullulation of religious sects who advise us — in soul-searing particularity — of the evils into which we are precipitating, and then observe reassuringly that there is nothing to be done, except by some remote and disincarnate deity. The moral is always the same: surrender your wills to some politician, psychologist, or theological abstraction, and await the apocalyptic moment. This estimation of human nature is desperately pessimistic.

The point is that every moment — in so far as it is pregnant with possibility — is apocalyptic where the personality is concerned. Choice creates character, and each moment presents the personality with decisions that must be made, correctly or incorrectly. This is the terrible responsibility of soul-making: it requires that there be right and wrong, good and evil. Determinisms tend to obviate the sense of this disconcerting responsibility, allowing malleable man to comfort himself with the gentle delusion that morality consists in a preponderance of pleasurable over painful manipulation.

This is not to argue that there is no ultimate necessity, no "aspect of Reality with which man has to co-operate or die". There is. And the burden of man's relationship to that Reality is not to shrug his shoulders in despair, but to exercise his consciousness and intention in discovering and conforming to the law of that Reality. This exercise cannot be accomplished through the abdication of will and reason. Alternatively, of course, one can postulate that "Reality" is in fact evil, in which case the exercise of consciousness and intention against it, as defiance, will appear "noble". However, it implies violent, as opposed to passive, annihilation — but annihilation nevertheless. Ultimately, the conviction that the nature of things is evil is as starkly pessimistic as the conviction that man is merely a feather blowing in the wind of some awful caprice.
“Narcissus”

Most of us are familiar with the story of Narcissus, the youth of surpassing beauty for whom Echo pined away to a mere voice, and whom Nemesis punished by making him see and fall in love with his own image reflected in a fountain. So enamoured was he of his reflection that he himself wasted away in vain love of it. The gods, taking pity, turned him into a flower.

Fewer of us, perhaps, are familiar with Oscar Wilde’s postscript to this story, of which we offer a crude paraphrase:

The flowers of the field, after Narcissus’s death, went to the fountain in which he had seen his own fatal image and begged of it water that they might with tears crown his demise. The fountain replied that he could not supply the lacrimal fluid; he had none to spare for he had used it all for his own tears.

“'You must have loved him deeply, that you weep so for him,' said the flowers. ‘I did,’ replied the fountain. ‘He was so beautiful,’ the flowers observed. ‘Oh,’ sighed the fountain, ‘was he?’ ‘But you,’ explained the flowers, not a little taken aback, ‘must have known better than any creature how beautiful he was!’ ‘Frankly,’ said the fountain, ‘I never really noticed.’ But, queried the flowers, ‘if you did not know how beautiful he was, why did you love him so deeply, and why do you weep so profusely?’ ‘I weep,’ answered the fountain, ‘because I am no longer able to see myself reflected in his eyes.’

This epilogue, cynical though it may be, is not without a tincture of truth: self-interest (here, unfortunately, presented in the extreme form of consumptive self-infatuation) is the legitimate concern of the ‘individual’. The fountain’s reply may appear ‘selfish’, but it is at least an effectual denial of this Narcissistic claim to a monopoly of grace.

The political moral of the story (if Wilde intended a political moral, which he probably did not) should provide a sharp pinprick to any infiltrated Narcissusse (politicians, cultural planners, and other promising young persons of all ages) among us who may feel that the world exists to titillate their egos. It is these ‘leaders’ who feel that their policy is the right policy, and that the massstruck multitudes live for the sole purpose of sending up obsequious and reverential applause to their efforts, on cue, of course. The thought seems never to occur to these planners—whose utopias are usually projections of their egotism—that each of us may have his proper genius.

Or ‘selfishness’. But, if we must be victims of Narcissism, let it at least be our own; an ‘Echo’ cannot claim even the distinction of being unique.

“A country is rich when it has—like the Midi—abundance of good cheeses, thick slices of pains de foie gras, veal soft to the tooth, luscious new peas in season, when it has good cloth in plenty, when it has abundance of good plumbing, baths well heated, comfortable railways, etc. and etc., and when these things are too cheap to squabble over.”

— Ezra Pound, The New Age, 1919
Beating Mules with Asphodels

The word "democracy" has assumed almost mythic power in its effect on the contemporary imagination, conjuring up the political ideal manifest in systems ostensibly so disparate as the U.S.A. and the various "People's Democratic Republics" of Eastern Europe. The mere application of the term to supposedly divergent phenomena suggests that it is often no more than a catch-all "pleasure-word", in rather loose currency. The following essay — which might be called "Basic Democracy" — attempts to define the components of free, orderly association, and to suggest principles that must be held in mind as the basis of action in any attempt to secure effective "democracy".

As long ago as 1919, P.D. Ouspensky drew attention to what he termed "the Law of Opposite Aims and Results": "everything leads to results that are contrary to what people intend to bring about and towards which they strive". Whether this failure to integrate means and ends is a "Law" or merely a result of propaganda is open to scrutiny. Certainly, the phenomenon is in glaring evidence today, and nowhere more immediately than in politics, where it manifests itself as a dis-integration between expressed ideology (who does not proclaim "democracy"?) and the techniques invoked to realize that ideal. My contention is that these techniques are the consequence of a kind of hypnotism (or, if you will, misapprehension) that could be corrected.

Executive Privilege

A couple of examples suggest themselves. Not too many years ago, a popular agitation on university campuses was for more "student representation" on administrative bodies, and great displays of energy were expended in the name of "power to the people". The upshot has generally been that the "people" have achieved the technique they demanded, but their objective — personal "power" or autonomy — has remained unrealized. In this, they exhibit themselves as dupes of a kind of Pavlovian conditioning: trained to insist upon a technique rather than a policy, they are "reinforced" when their technical demands are met, even though their real political position remains unaltered. All that they have in fact achieved is a change in administrative personnel: some students (those on the boards) have attained a forum from which to exercise their executive wills. They have merely been assimilated into the educational monopoly.

Again, one frequently hears the suggestion that to obviate industrial disputes, governments ought to enact legislation compelling the representation of employees in management. The logic here is satanic: in the name of procuring some negligible (as far as democracy is concerned) administrative alteration, all the compulsive force of the State is invoked. As for the "workers" (note the impersonality of the designation) who probably want only more purchasing power (effective demand), they are deceived into relinquishing real objectives (the right to contract out, and control—as consumers—over a program of production) for the sake of a (perhaps) marginally more beneficent oligarchy. Acquiescing in the "majority vote" rule of a board on which they may be represented, they in fact surrender their personal right to say "No."

Policy and Administration

The "dissociation of intention from means" which emerges from these examples is the result of an inability to distinguish policy from administration. Thus, one sees the phenomenon of people fighting over executive privileges (and combining in antagonistic groups to do it) rather than seeking confirmation of their political rights. Sebastian de Grazia has simultaneously indicated the nature of the problem and (apparently unconsciously) pointed to the differentiation fundamental to its resolution:

Evidently, freedom and equality are fine for what the people may want to vote for in politics or to buy for their free time. They are not fine in industry, however, where thorough democrats have sometimes proposed to act out the dogma that one man is as good as another by giving each worker, employer, and manager—that is, each man it—one vote apiece as the way to govern the factory or office. The worlds of industry and government have become too technical for the ordinary man, it seems. Precisely. The government of a factory or office in an administrative matter; it has to do with technique, with mechanism, and therefore requires special expertise and hierarchical organization. You cannot determine how best to construct a nuclear reactor by a show of hands at a public meeting. Administration—how to do something—cannot be established by popular ballot.
On the other hand, the area where democracy should and can be effective is that of policy—what is to be done. Do we want to build a nuclear reactor? Will we, as individuals, indicate that this is our policy by subscribing the necessary funds? Or will we let the project die by withholding our subscription? Policy provides the dynamics of any program; it requires effective subscription by an exercise of individual will. The worker does not maintain the freedom to express his policy by electing a representative to an administrative body; at the very best, and fortuitously, he may get bits and pieces of his objectives. He does, however, maintain his intentional power (and freedom) as a consumer who may or may not "order" the products of a particular enterprise, and, as a member of the technical hierarchy who may opt out of that hierarchy—provided he has a viable alternative, which he certainly does not where that technical hierarchy is in effect a political monopoly (whether private or state-administered is immaterial). It has been well said that genuine democracy consists in the right to atrophy a function by contracting out. If economic democracy—and, by extension, political democracy—are to be maintained, this power to contract out must be guaranteed, and alternatives must be available.

There are thus two fundamental objections to the strategy of jockeying for executive or administrative privilege as a means of establishing "democracy". In the first place, it results in the anomalous spectacle of amateurs trying to tell experts how to do things: the consequence is chaos. At the same time, this procedure maintains the fiction that political power ought to reside in administration: when administration arrogates to itself the control of policy, and the consumer—citizen has no power to contract out, the result is tyranny. A corollary of each of these circumstances is a quantum-jump of the antagonism factor in social relationships—an illusory quantum-jump, however, in that the energy generated is dissipated as "hot air".

Sanctions

The political question that we should be asking, then, is not "How can we stack some executive committee with 'our men'?", but, "How can we ensure that we may retain the individual power to indicate our policy so such administrative experts as we choose to enact our policy?" The maintenance of this democratic power depends upon our possession of effective sanctions against administrative tyranny. It is on this issue of sanctions that our political freedom rests, and it is on this question that our attention should be fixed.

The underlying philosophical importance of this issue has been suggested by C.S. Lewis:

...there are two opposite reasons for being a democrat. You may think all men so good that they deserve a share in the government of the commonwealth, and so wise that the commonwealth needs their advice. That is, in my opinion, the false romantic doctrine of democracy. On the other hand, you may believe fallen man to be so wicked that not one of them can be trusted with any irresponsible power over his fellows.

The first of these conceptions gives rise to the belief that the "common will" (expressed as a statistic) is a sufficient index of rectitude, and to the failure to discriminate between administration and policy. The latter view (here stated in its extreme form) requires that the individual retain sanctions against the incursion of the irresponsible exercise of executive power. These sanctions alone can make administration "responsible": it must "respond" to the effective expression of policy by the contracting individual.

Thus, unless one adopts the view that human nature is essentially prone neither to envy, greed, nor the will-to-dominate, the political sanctions which must be maintained will have to be more than fine-sounding abstractions or even psychological (ethical) pressures. John Locke, for example, realized this and sought a substantial basis for freedom: he "united property and liberty indissolubly". And, before they embraced the relatively meaningless phrase that man's inalienable rights include "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness", the framers of the American Declaration of Independence seem to have had a more solidly realistic appreciation of where these sanctions lie. Both the declaration of the First Continental Congress and the Virginia Declaration of Rights contain the assertion that among the natural rights (sanctions prior to any privileges a state may choose to allow) of men are included "the means of acquiring, and preserving, property". Like it or not, in a world of not-quite-perfect people, property is perhaps the most effective sanction (short of perpetual revolution; in brief, self-destruction) that the individual has. Psychological sanctions—protests and propaganda, even the mys-

(continued p. 6)
Power in Society

A popular contemporary song advances the proposition that, "Everything is beautiful in its own way." That such lyrics find uncritical, if not unconscious, acceptance in the minds of thousands of individuals indicates a radical departure from the viewpoint prevalent when European civilization was marking its greatest achievements. The quotation constitutes a denial of the existence of evil. The practical implications of such a denial are, of course, both pervasive and profound; and there is good reason for attributing to it the general deterioration of standards in our society. A person devoid of the concept that deviation from a "good" or "correct" course is possible can hardly be expected to entertain objectives with reference to some criterion of excellence.

Since, if evil does exist, men probably never stand in greater peril of its operations than when they are blind to it, ascertaining what validity the "everything is beautiful" ("everything" presumably includes a range of items from backbiting to plague) school possesses is a matter of fundamental importance. Forewarned is forearmed: an individual lacking the ability to discriminate between good and evil moves through life continuously menaced by influences the harmful effects of which he has no chance of anticipating.

Centuries ago, when European culture was intentionally Christian, the existence of evil—potentially and actually—in all aspects of human activity was seen as very real, having repercussions on personal behaviour and societal institutions. From this perspective, the definition of the correct place that power should occupy in the associations among men was accorded considerable attention and elaboration.

Power per se was not looked upon as being objectionable. In fact, any personality or extension of human purpose which lacks power may be regarded as a failure. Christianity traditionally taught that our goal should be to maximize power (that is, to maximize the capacity to get things done).

At its best moments, the Church promulgated the tenet that the Christian objective of promoting the efflorescence and perfecting of individual personality could not occur in the absence of free choice. A corollary of this concept was the belief that power has exceeded its proper bounds when it is exercised by one man over another; no one should be forced to function as a robot responding to someone else's dictates. Consequently, while hierarchies might be necessary in certain circumstances, the power within them should be limited as much as possible and bestowed preferably upon persons not desiring it. This perspective was reflected in the ceremony used to elevate a man to the episcopacy during which the candidate was required to profess: "Kolo Episkopari" — "I do not want to be a bishop."

The inspiration of this approach can be easily traced. The New Testament abounds with evidence that stressing the maintenance of personal sovereignty is genuinely Christian. For example, Jesus continually denounced the political and priestly power structures in First Century Palestine. He warned that possession of great financial wealth renders entry into "the Kingdom of Heaven" virtually impossible. During the temptation in the desert, Satan attached no conditions to the challenge that He demonstrate his power over a stone; however, power over the lives of men was only promised providing that Jesus fall down and worship Him.

If these passages do not present the idea with sufficient certainty, the implications of the incident involving the healing of the centurion's servant are unmistakable. In asking Jesus to intervene, the centurion admitted his unworthiness as follows: "I am a man set under authority, having under me soldiers, and I say unto one, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh, and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it." Jesus responded by marveling and declaring that He had never witnessed a greater display of faith. The message is clear, surely: power wielded by one man over another is so extreme a deviation from the Good that the effects can be overcome only by a wholly exceptional kind of faith. Note that the centurion was under authority, as well as in it.

This conception of the desirability of subordinating the distribution of power in human relations to the protection of personal sovereignty is hardly in evidence at all in our contemporary society—and we are paying a high price for having abandoned it. While on one hand the sway of political and industrial hierarchies is being rapidly extended and consolidated, on the other frustration and discontent are tearing up the foundation of social harmony. Nations everywhere confront such a succession of crises and threatened crises that governments spend most of their time trying to demonstrate that, although domestic problems are on the rampage, certain conditions, at least, are worse in other countries. All of which may be taken as a vindication of the importance that Christianity traditionally attributed to the matter of confining power to its proper place.

If the old view was realistic, we can expect nothing but total disaster from continuing to formulate policy to its exclusion. In future, any proposal which entails reducing one man to an extension of the will of another should be regarded as partaking more of perversion than of progress. Personal satisfaction (and what other justification could society possibly have for existing?) could only be enhanced by a reorientation of policy designed to establish every individual as his own master, free to make his own decisions about his destiny.

R.E.K.

tical ballot-box—are consistently exposed as ineffectual safety-valves for the letting-off of political steam. As a former governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, observed—without irony—"The dogs bark, but the caravan moves on". Belligerent barking is energy wasted on the wind; meanwhile, by our tacit acquiescence in the alienation of our sanctions, we only grease the axles of the wagons of tyranny.

The Money Vote

Thus, personal freedom is inseparably bound to economic autonomy; the individual is free when he has—in his hand or in his hip pocket—the means of effective demand. This means of effective demand is the mechanism of his power to choose, and in many ways the economic (or money-) vote makes the political vote as we now know it seem a pathetic charade. Each hour of each day, we vote economically—we buy a pound of steak instead of a pound of tripe; we buy a ticket to the opera or to a roller-derby; we subscribe to Harper's or to Penthouse. The political vote, on the other hand, is neither so flexible nor so specific: we are asked to choose, not one program at a time, but a package deal—a group of programs (a political platform), some of which may be abhorrent. At the same time, we are asked to choose not policies (since most political football teams are playing the same game) but administrators (who is the best place-kicker—when the fact is that we would prefer to be at a lacrosse match or a jousting tournament). Then, we do not even get the lesser-of-all-evils—that we despairingly choose: we are at the tender mercies of the tyrannous (and irresponsible) majority (who probably don't know anything about place-kickers, anyway). The logical extension of this political philosophy is a consumer election in which 51% of the voters can force us all to eat tripe.

Perhaps the foregoing will appear a somewhat hysterical digression, but it does seek to establish a point: genuine democracy consists not in perpetual balking on administrative details, but in the guaranteeing of individual power over individual policy—the "power to choose or refuse one thing at a time". This power depends upon our possession of effective sanctions, and economic sanctions are perhaps the most versatile means by which the individual may express his policy. If we are concerned about "democracy", then, we have to learn to keep our eye on the ball. The "ball" at the moment consists in our economic sanctions. These are being eroded faster than one likes to ponder—except that the autonomous survival of the individual depends upon our pondering it—and doing something about it. As the poet Ezra Pound once remarked, “[economic] as the reality under political camouflage, are interesting as a gun muzzle aimed at one’s own head is ‘interesting’, when one can hardly see the face of the gun holder and is wholly uncertain as to his temperament and intentions.”

Administrative Monopoly of Sanctions

We do not accept that economic is the “reality” under political camouflage; rather, the reality is the political intention underlying the economic camouflage, which is the technique of the policy. (Nevertheless, Pound’s point is well-taken.) If our objective is economic/political democracy, then we are almost constrained to adopt the view that someone else—with the opposite political objective, namely, the centralization of initiative; in short, monopoly—is pursuing that policy with considerable elan and alarming success at the moment. The successful incursions of that antiethical policy are in no small measure the result of the technique of attacking and destroying the individual’s economic sanctions. Witness, for example, the inflation/scarcity/austerity complex that confronts us at the present time. Our economic vote is losing its effective power through inflation; we are told that there are “scarities”—which means that our choice is limited; the government is urging (and may enforce, through taxation, regulation, and policing) upon us little “austerities”—we are being told how much—and what—we may choose. At the same time, of course, there is no talk of abolishing the secret ballot or public demonstrations. While losing our real sanctions, we are permitted to retain our token sanctions.

And while our real sanctions disappear, the forces which tend towards monopoly are consolidating their own. The usual refrain of monopolists in justification of their actions is: ‘All this autonomy is causing dissatisfaction and conflict; therefore, let us centralize power to eliminate social tensions’. They never reveal that the cause of the tension is the pursuit of the lie which suggests that administrative privileges (as opposed to political power) can be distri-
Erickieransaurus

Mr. Eric Kierans' professional career has had as many facets as the proverbial cat has lives. Having been president of the Montreal Stock Exchange and held portfolios in the Cabinets at Quebec and Ottawa, he is now professing "the dismal science" at McGill University. Of late, he has publicly championed the economic policies of the New Democratic Party. His has been a chequered past, indeed; but perhaps the madness contains more method than is superficially apparent.

Mr. Kierans' views are treated by the news media with a respect often verging on obsequiousness—a fact which justifies an analysis of the real quality of his thinking. For instance, during a recent television broadcast (entitled "Canada at the Crossroads"), he deplored at length the effects of tax deferrals open to corporations for their capital expenditures. Suppose he said, that a company plans to make a $500,000 addition to its plant which would generate 40 new permanent jobs. Considering the provisions of the present tax laws, the company will be tempted to make an $800,000 addition creating only 20 jobs. In Mr. Kierans' opinion, it is shameful that the company should install more highly automated (and expensive) equipment and cause 11 jobs to be lost.

Without wanting to defend either the current tax racket or the means by which many large corporations now come by investment capital, I feel that it is important for the implications of Mr. Kierans' position to be made clear. The change of policy on the part of his hypothetical company would not diminish the productive capacity of its plant expansion: that is, the potential increase in the real wealth of the community would be as great, if not greater, in the second case as in the first. However, in the second case, 11 men will have been freed from the necessity of serving as extensions of the operations of machines for 7 or 8 hours a day.

Mr. Kierans apparently believes that the interest of man is advanced by making him a cog in some mechanical process. Perhaps his idea has a certain interest—but so have prehistoric fossils. A museum for antediluvian curiosities would seem to be a more appropriate setting than national television for Mr. Kierans' ruminations on matters economic and philosophical.

R.E.K.
("Asphodels", continued from p. 6)

buted "democratically". They cannot; and the attempt
to distribute them leads only to conditions ripe for
the usurpation of political control by either the exis-
ting or a revolutionary executive.

An administration which has unrestricted ("irres-
ponsible") prerogatives of taxation, legislation, and
"enforcement" has all the sanctions which make the myth
of personal sovereignty a cruel mockery. Thus, for ex-
ample, when Mao Tse-Tung observes that "political power
grows out of the barrel of a gun", he indicates that
he has a clear grasp of the importance of sanctions—
and a terrifying (to us) appreciation of the sanctions
to which tyranny inevitably will resort. (His assen-
tion suggests moreover that the significance of Pound's
analogy extends beyond mere metaphor.) The only al-
ternative to the centralization of power and the expres-
sion of that power by violent means is the distribution
of power—the distribution of sanctions. What this
effects practically is the distribution of effective
demand. All programs that tend to inhibit this distri-
bution are antithetical to realistic democracy.

In short, then, such economic democracy as we have
experienced is falling prey to the consolidation of ad-
ministrative tyranny; the monopoly is securing itself.
Meanwhile, we in effect support this policy of monopoly,
of centralization, of tyranny, as long as we play by
its rules by accepting the proposition that genuine
democracy consists in competing for executive privi-
leges. These, when the mist clears (if it does) will
prove a sorry substitute for political freedom. If we
choose to acquiesce in being assimilated to the admin-
istrative function, if we opt to become wheels within
wheels, then we have consciously expressed our policy
and can be said to be consciously responsible for the
consequences. I should not, however, like to think
that we are to surrender our sovereignty of personality
by default, for want of the capacity to distinguish
political choice from executive coercion.

D.R.K.

1 "Letters from Russia", The New Age, XXV:19 (Sept. 14,
1919). It is perhaps significant to Dasepomy's frustra-
tion that he is writing from immediately post-
revolutionary Russia.

2 Of Time, Work, and Leisure (Garden City: Anchor Books,
1964), 278.

3 "Rationalization without decentralized control of po-
licy will quite effectively install the trust magnate
of the next generation in the chair of the bureaucrat,
with the added advantage to him that he will have no
shareholders' meeting." (C.H. Douglas, Economic Demo-
cracy, fifth ed., 1907.)

tions, 1942), 39.

5 Quoted in A Mind Awake: An Anthology of C.S. Lewis,

6 de Grazi, 370, referring to Locke's Second Treatise
of Civil Government, 1690.

7 "Credit-Power and Democracy" (a review), Contact (Sum-
mer, 1921), 1.

"The analytic bias of the last three centuries has
immensely encouraged this tendency ['to confine our-
ourselves, each to a special sphere of interest'], and
it is now very difficult for the artist to speak the
language of the theologian, or the scientist the lan-
guage of either. But the attempt must be made: and
there are signs everywhere that the human mind is
once more beginning to move toward a synthesis of
experience."