Synthesis

Ezra Pound, a poet notorious for his flamboyant championing of fledgling artists, once wrote — in exasperation — to a young poet who sought his advice: “You are wasting your time. Study economics.” Elsewhere, Pound argued that “finer and future critics of art” should be able to discern from the quality of line in a painting the degree to which “usury” was tolerated in the age that produced it.

The issue posed here is a serious one: it is the question of the relationship of a system of values to “art”; the question of the interdependence of ethical and esthetic principles. In short, it is the question of the integrity of culture.

The observations of A.R. Orage on this subject are worth resurrecting. He maintained that, far from “art” being an “autonomous discipline”, it does manifest or incarnate social, ethical, and philosophic values — whether it intends to or not. Thus, “autonomous” art, preoccupied with technique or “style”, is merely a species of idolatry, and a sign of cultural decadence. Decadence (a term comprehending both moral and esthetic phenomena) Orage says is characterized by “absence of a mission, of a purpose, of a co-ordination of powers”. In short, decadence is recognizable as a disintegration of policy and coherence; it is “the substitution of the part for the whole”.

One wonders if this is not the quandary of contemporary “culture” — that it has become particularized in artistic epiphenomena. Rather than suggesting the creative dynamic and metaphysical prototypes that inform human associations and activity, the word “culture” has come to connote the fine arts — music, ballet, painting, belles lettres. Connoisseurs of this type of “culture” (individuals of great refinement, no doubt) seem preoccupied with the mere replication of works of art from the past; practitioners in the arts tend to express only a disparate subjectivism, or craze for stylistic “novelty”. Together, they form a “cultural” elite, chary of sullying their rarified esthetic sensibilities with such mundane subjects as philosophy, economics, and social policy.

However, by isolating themselves from “the moral and intellectual order” upon which society rests, they in fact participate not in culture, but in decadence. Art which is not “sacramental”, not integrated with “truth”, becomes mere illusion or “magic”, and contributes to the erosion of the human faculty of discrimination between appearance and reality. Ultimately, of course, this dissociation of artistic expression from its dynamic (communication) and the restraints of a coherent idea issues in the disintegration of style itself. Chaos of substance incarnates in chaos of technique.

What is “the moral and intellectual order” upon which our culture rests? Or is it merely a beguiling, kaleidoscopic disorder?
Our Policy

SEED aspires to fulfill a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals. Our purpose is neither to propagandize in the sense of promoting some fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events. Our partisanship does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist; it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and will which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurist intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the entropic phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at the least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.

"Caesar"

At an Assembly held November 27-30, 1972, the Canadian Council of Churches adopted a resolution calling for the re-introduction of succession duties and gift taxes at the Federal level. The Council's rationale for this action provides a startling insight into some contemporary 'Christian' priorities.

(1) "Succession duties and gift taxes are widely accepted means of distributing part of the tax burden..." Whatever is "widely accepted" is conformable to Christian practice. This will not do account for the esteem in which we must hold the 'Democratic' decision of the mob who elected Christ (over Barabbas) to be crucified.

(2) "Succession duties and gift taxes slow down the concentration of power, wealth, and advantage, thereby providing a measure of protection to our democratic institutions..." Coercion is democratic, as long as the State is doing the coercing. Power, wealth, and advantage are undemocratic when in private hands. When they are concentrated in State monopoly, however, they become guarantees of freedom. This is no doubt why Christ was so avid an enthusiast for the centralist policies of the Roman Empire.

(3) "The shift of succession duties and gift taxes from federal to provincial legislation encourages individual provinces to become tax havens in an ill-founded attempt to attract capital." Decentralization of power is a great mischief, to be shunned at all costs, and encouragement of individual differences is of the devil. This is unquestionless why Jesus must have been speaking ironically when He said that "the kingdom of God is within you". Moreover, initiative is to be avoided at all times, and investment is the bane of virtue. The man with the five talents ought to have surrendered them at his earliest opportunity to the nearest taxgatherer, with instructions that they might be maladministered by incompetent functionaries in the service of the State.

(4) "The existence of such tax havens threatens the succession duties and gift taxes of all provinces". By no means allow any circumstances which might tend to disintegrate the consolidation of central power, or allow differentiation of opportunity. Christ submitted to Crucifixion, no doubt, to give a shining example of the merits attached to surrendering personal sovereignty to the temporal powers-that-be.

"Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's." With the Canadian Council of Churches, who needs Caesar? And whoever heard of "God"?

"Modern man no longer knows what to do with the time and potentialities he has unleashed. We groan under the burden of this wealth. We are haunted by the fear of 'unemployment'. Sometimes we are tempted to trample this super-abundance back into the matter from which it sprang without stopping to think how impossible and monstrous such an act against nature would be."

— Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man, 276
The Monopoly of Scarcity

Perhaps the most pervasive and demoralizing myth dogging civilization today is the myth of scarcity. Thus, for example, there seems never to be enough "money" to go around, with the result that various segments of society are constantly at each others' throats, feverishly attempting to secure a share in insufficiency. Lately, moreover, we have become inured to the idea of a dearth of resources — particularly energy resources — and see about us a situation verging on panic. A third kind of "scarcity" appears to persist in the area of human association: this is the scarcity of freedom. Self-sovereignty is fine, we are told, but we must be prepared to share it for "the common good". My queries are these: is scarcity an inevitable aspect of reality, or is it a policy susceptible of reformation? Are financial and economic scarcities merely techniques in the policy of limiting freedom, the policy of monopoly?

In a previous issue of SEED, an analogy was drawn between the economic and the financial aspects of any productive enterprise. A factory, for example, can be regarded as having a dual economic function (the dissipation of energy, and the transformation of material) and a dual financial function (the generation of prices, and the distribution of incomes). Under existing financial arrangements, we notice a contradiction between the economic and financial functions of production: for example, the most effective distribution of incomes seems to coincide with the maximum economic (and human) wastage — as in time of war. It seems that we have to choose between a shortage of money and a shortage of energy. I should like in this essay to examine some further implications of this analogy.

The Cost of Production

The observation has been made that the true cost of production is consumption. That is, the real economic cost of any transformation of matter is the matter-energy consumed in that conversion: raw materials, fuel oil, electricity, plant depreciation, food eaten by workers, gasoline burned in their cars, and so on. If we recall the first law of thermodynamics — "matter-energy can be neither created nor destroyed" — we are reassured that consumption cannot exceed production. What we consume, in other words, is not lost, but only altered. Nevertheless, we are confronted with the so-called "exhaustion of resources" — the scarcity of raw materials. In fact, the problem of the exhaustion of resources is that they disappear, but that they are converted to other, non-usable forms (or, at least, forms that require further energy-consuming transformation before they become usable). Thus, as we have seen, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen postulates "the entropy law of economics": "matter-energy enters the economic process in a state of low entropy and comes out of it in a state of high entropy". This description is in accord with the second law of thermodynamics, which states that the entropy or bound energy of a closed system continuously increases.

The implications of this analysis are alarming, for it suggests that the running-down of resources is absolutely inevitable — regardless of how "conservative" we are in our resource management, or how frantically we fumble about in search of "optimum population". The economic process as we know it involves the exploitation of "scarce, irretrievable low entropy" and, ultimately, the outflow of valueless waste. Any attempt to recover or reconvert (re-cycle) waste involves a further expenditure of energy, or a further increase in entropy. A good example of this phenomenon is the anti-pollution device in the automobile: to render the oxidation of fuel less polluting, a lower efficiency of energy utilization is necessitated. If, in fact, our energy resources are limited, fixed, the outlook is indeed gloomy — regardless of how frugal we are, we must exhaust them in time.

In other words, our store of energy —our fixed stock of energy, particularly in the form of fossil fuels —represents our energy capital. Any investment of this energy capital in the economic process involves a dissipation of energy, an increase in entropy, for which no corresponding source of energy income seems forthcoming. Any effort to redeem this 'waste' requires a further expenditure of energy, a further depletion of
our energy capital. The truism holds that we cannot live indefinitely upon our capital, or continue to regard it as income. Our only hope is to discover some ongoing source of energy, a source of genuine energy income. What is required is an infusion of energy to compensate for the build-up of entropy in the "closed" economic system.

Energy Income

In fact, we do have an energy income. As Georgescu-Roegen observes, far from the earth being a "closed" system, it "floats, as it were, within the cosmic store of free energy, which may even be infinite". Thus, for example, photosynthesis—the fixation of energy by green plants, which is the ultimate source of our fossil fuels—is going on continuously. Indeed, if we were to replace tractors with oxen (which eat grass and excrete fertilizer), the energy-pollution complex should theoretically be righted. But the effect on our productive capacity of such a return to primitive methods would be devastating. However, there are other types of energy income which could, which must, be exploited—solar radiation, tides, winds; all kinds of flows in nature. Moreover, experiments in harnessing these alternate energy sources (the tide scheme at St. Malo, and solar furnaces in the Pyrenees, for example) suggest that the technical problems involved can be solved.

The point is that these sources of energy income are (1) ongoing, allowing a "pay-as-you-go" method of energy expenditure, and (2) potentially less "polluting", which means that their expenditure does not involve to the same extent as the chemical change of fossil fuels the formation of pollutants whose effects must be dealt with by a further expenditure of energy, and so on ad infinitum. That is, we require sources of energy whose use does not compel us to expend further energy just dealing with the recovery of wastes. Rather than throwing away our energy capital, which befoils the environment, trying to keep the environment livable, we should be investing that capital (while it lasts) in the development of sources of energy income.

Correctly viewed, then, there is no "scarcity of energy"; there is a misadministration of the utilization of energy, and a failure to recognize the energy income in the cosmic flows intercepted by the earth.

The Financial Treadmill

An analogous situation obtains with regard to the financial cost of production—a question related to the "scarcity of money" syndrome. If energy represents a real investment in any economic process, then credit represents the financial investment. That is, most of the financial capital of any productive program takes the form of credit, loaned into existence by financial institutions. In short, "money" comes into the economy as a debt. During the process of production, a portion of this money is distributed as wages, salaries, dividends, etc.—as incomes. However, another portion is allocated for payments to other institutions, for raw materials, bank charges, etc. That is, the money created in respect of that productive program is partly allocated to the meeting of costs of previous production; the money distributed in respect of that productive program is less than the costs incurred in the production. In order to meet these costs (expressed, with profit, in prices), future "money" must be loaned into existence in respect of future production.

In short, the meeting of costs generated during the economic process can be accomplished only by the creation of new costs. Or, in order to liquidate the debt to the financial institutions, further borrowing is necessary. This borrowing may take the form of loans for further capital investment, or various types of "consumer credit". The consequences are burgeoning national debts, artificial stimulation of capital production, and consumer indebtedness-aggravated by the charging of interest on all this debt-created money. Thus, as a build-up of entropy is inevitable in the economic system, so a build-up of debt is inevitable in the financial system. And, just as it is impossible to redeem the pollution "debt" by ongoing expenditure of our energy capital, so it is impossible to redeem financial debt by everlasting borrowing, which always involves the creation of new costs. Again, investment of financial capital merely perpetuates the process of cost-creation, and cannot ameliorate the problem of the "scarcity of money". Again, what is required is a fund of financial income that is not accompanied by the creation of new costs. To compensate for the inherent inability of financial incomes to liquidate financial

(continued p. 8)
Thoughts Beyond Thinking

B.F. Skinner's treatise, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity,* purports to make an original contribution to human thought. In this lies the fatal flaw of the work, for Skinner's attempt to uphold a rigorously deterministic view of human evolution necessarily entails a denial of the validity of thought itself. Considering that, at bottom, he has merely restated in a somewhat novel context arguments whose self-contradictory nature has been demonstrated repeatedly, the widespread attention that his study has aroused hardly seems to be warranted.

The Behaviourist Position

Skinner's basic thesis runs as follows. In the past, ignorance about the causes of human behaviour resulted in its being attributed to "indwelling agents" such as intentions, feelings, purposes, character traits, human nature, personal philosophy, and so on. However, progress in scientific understanding has consistently tended to reduce the domain in which "autonomous action" is possible. We are therefore justified in discarding the "pre-scientific" concept and concluding that all human behaviour derives from environmental conditioning. At this point, the significance of the title of his book becomes clear: freedom cannot exist when men can do nothing except what they are conditioned to do, and dignity dissolves into meaninglessness when men can be neither credited nor blamed for their actions.

Recognition of the absolute nature of environmental control over human actions has been made possible by the supercession of the "false scent" offered by the Cartesian concept of control consisting of stimuli evoking direct responses. "The environment not only prods or lashes, it selects"—along the lines that natural selection occurs in the standard theory of evolution. This process of selection is brought about by the effect which positive and aversive reinforcements have in programming responses into the individual. Skinner wants to develop a "technology of behaviour" which will redesign the environment. All negative reinforcers ("the only bad things") would be eliminated, and all positive reinforcers ("the only good things") would be retained. Thus, "our task ... to make life less punishing" would be accomplished and culture would evolve more rapidly towards good results.

Several Problems

A number of questions immediately arise with respect to Skinner's analysis and proposals. For instance, the manner in which he associates the term "scientific" with his thesis is dubious in the extreme. Although, on his own admission, that human behaviour is environmentally, rather than autonomously, determined cannot be proven, he treats his theory as a fact and even insists on its being accepted as a basis for the reconstruction of society. Formulating conclusions before the evidence is in hardly exemplifies a scientific approach. Moreover, Skinner's irresponsibility in this regard inevitably reflects on the research he has done on behaviourism. Since he considers environmental determinism to be a foregone conclusion, one cannot help suspecting that, whatever his findings, he would devise some way of fitting them to his thesis.

Also, of course, there is the problem of the method whereby the behaviourist-controllers of his new society would be selected. Skinner alludes glancingly to this question at various points in his argument; however, when he finally endeavours to answer it, his comments are less than illuminating. The identity of those who will control everyone's behaviour is unimportant, he says, because their control would be subject to contingencies. Their power would not offer unlimited opportunity for exploitation and abuse, since control automatically implies countercontrol. Controllers who stray off track could be corrected.

Skinner is obviously getting into difficulty at this point. We have been waiting for him to explain how the angels required to operate his system of planned environmental inputs would be produced, and he suddenly admits the possibility that the controllers would be liable to error. How, we may wonder, can they be effective as controllers if their subjects can reject their decisions? Moreover, if untutored countercontrol automatically interacts with control to keep behavioural programming directed towards good results, why does this not happen in the context of the present system of allegedly all-pervasive environmental controls? We simply have no reason whatever for believing that the type of control which Skinner advocates would not botch the
job as badly as, apparently, it is being botched now.

The Radical Flaw

Thus, to save his tottering argument, Skinner is driven to conclusions that seem directly to contradict his initial assumptions about the determinants of human behaviour. "Man is indeed controlled by his environment, but we must remember that it is largely an environment of his own making," he says. "We have not yet seen what man can make of man." He cannot have it both ways: men cannot be controlled absolutely by environmental factors if they have the ability to choose to modify the environment to obtain different results; on the other hand, if the possibility of choice regarding this matter does not exist, any talk of "man making something of man" is plain nonsense.

If he is to remain consistent, Skinner cannot claim anything more for his controllers than that they could transmit environmental influences on themselves onto other persons. However, this position is completely untenable, because the proposition that human action is, absolutely, an outcropping of responses to environmental influences leaves no justification for believing that certain forms of behaviour are more valid or desirable than any others.

We can clarify this consideration by showing how it applies to Skinner himself. Since he does not claim to be personally independent of the system of environmental controls, he must accept that everything he does derives exclusively from conditioning and therefore has no grounds for believing any of his pronouncements to be objectively true. Even if he were to think himself capable of objective analysis, what (on his assumptions) would such a thought except a reflection of some combination of environmental influences? He might entertain the thought—just as he might have become a behaviourist—because he ate too many avocados in his youth or because his nurse dropped him on his head on a concrete sidewalk. If his theory of conditioning were correct, Skinner would have no means of knowing its correctness. Nothing he, or anyone else, does would differ qualitatively from a belch. He would deserve no more attention for his notion that life should be made less punishing than he would if he were to profess that he is a poached egg. In other words, we would have no reason for trusting anything he does or says—and neither would he.

In fact, the instant that he penned the first word of his book, he refuted his own theory. He should, at least, have prefaced the work by some such warning as "Since my mind moves only whither its conditioning dictates, I am not responsible for any of the views expressed herein." The reader would then have realized the spirit in which Skinner's concepts should be approached, and laid the tome aside—never to be taken up again. That he never explains his own situation in these terms betokens either that he is intellectually dishonest or that he is enthralled by a pathetically elementary error in logic. If the latter, he can be categorized among a large number of confused and confusing writers who have pontificated that our destiny is totally predetermined by factors over which we have no control—and then proceeded to spend most of their lives advancing schemes for the betterment of the human condition. In this sense—like Marxism and Freudianism—Skinnerian behaviourism cannot avoid being self-contradictory.

Boon to Power-mongers

Nevertheless, we may be sure that Skinner's writings will receive even more attention in the years ahead than they have to date. Already, his positive- and negative-reinforcement precepts are being used to justify the administration of electrical shocks and drugs which induce violent fits of vomiting to inmates of prisons in the United States. Other, more general, applications of the principles of behaviourism will certainly be devised as persons in positions of power, who are convinced of their superiority over their fellow men, come to appreciate the unlimited scope the theory offers for meddling in the lives of other members of the community.

R.E.K.

1 New York: Alfred Knopf, 1971
2 In drawing this comparison, Skinner seems to take for granted that "natural selection" adequately explains biological evolution. However, the mathematics of probability cast an overwhelming doubt on the validity of this belief.
3 As he puts it: "In what may be called a pre-scientific view (and the word is not necessarily pejorative), a person's behaviour is at least to some extent his own.

(Continued, p. 7)
Lemmings

The story is told of a naturalist on a field trip to the tundra who was suddenly accosted by the sound of a thin, high-pitched voice saying, "Hi!" Thinking himself alone, he cast his eyes about to see whence the unexpected greeting came, but could discern no living thing but a diminutive brownish rodent.

"Hi!" the lemming reiterated. "Don't humans answer when somebody speaks to them?"

Mildly taken aback, the scientist replied, "Quite frankly, I didn't realize that lemmings could talk."

"Well," said the rodent, with self-righteous reproof in his tone, "now you know."

By this time having regained his scientific composure, the naturalist spoke: "There is one thing that I have always been curious to know," he said. "Tell me, why do lemmings leap from precipices into the sea?"

"Funny you should ask that," said the lemming, "because there is something that I have always wanted to know about humans."

"What is that?" queried the naturalist.

"Why they don't," answered the lemming.

With all due respect to the perspicacity of the lemming, one yet wonders if he was asking an accurate question. There are many kinds of precipices, and many varieties of "sea". And it is a not unheard-of phenomenon to witness blind human mobs (warmed by the most blissful kind of fellow-feeling, no doubt) precipitating to dark oblivion.

And, without wishing to impugn the significance of the philosophical point that the lemming so poignantly makes, this human abandon is rarely a matter of conscious decision.

("Thinking", continued from p. 6)
The Policy of Monopoly

These, then, are the sources of two aspects of the myth of scarcity—scarcity of energy, and scarcity of money. What is remarkable about both is that they appear to be the results not of natural laws, but of policies. One wonders if the policy of the Monopoly of Energy and the policy of the Monopoly of Credit are not concentric. Is it, for example, a mere coincidence that the Rockefeller family has "interests" in both Standard Oil and the Chase-Manhattan Bank? Is it coincidental that Soviet technological development was largely financed by "Western" bankers, and that the U.S.S.R. exerts "some" influence over the Middle East oil states? Is it a coincidence that both the scarcity of energy and the scarcity of money are proposed as excuses for the policy of limiting freedom by governments (I think of inflation, taxation, rationing, and the formation of government oil corporations)?

Policies can generally be traced to philosophies—to what one believes about the nature of the universe. The policy of monopoly rests (approximately) upon two ideas: (1) that it is in the interest of a world plan that a few individuals or groups should control and apportion the "scarcity" with which we are endowed; (2) that no one is entitled to "something-for-nothing" if they could, they would bottle and sell air, and enshroud the earth in a black umbrella—renting windows to people at a price). The monopoly of energy and the monopoly of credit are forceful (though ultimately self-destructive) expressions of these convictions. They distort and interrupt the potential free flow of abundance. They incarnate the belief that scarcity is the lot of man, and that deprivation is good for the soul. They are also a technique for satisfying the will-to-power of certain persons.

The conception of an ongoing, external infusion of energy into the "closed system" of the world, or the idea of an infusion of financial credit related to that "free" source of energy and not tied to the creation of debt, are radical qualifications of the religion of scarcity. In this regard, "religion" is perhaps not an inappropriate word. For, although they may be no more than material analogies, external, "free", sources of energy and credit raise the theological question of "unearned Grace". A condition for receiving grace is the willingness to acknowledge it.

D.R.K.

2Strictly speaking, the application of the word "debt" to a physical situation is not accurate, insofar as a natural process pays for itself in physical terms. A financial debt, on the other hand, implies a legal obligation that may have no relationship to physical fact.
3See Anthony C. Sutton, Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development 1817 to 1930 (Stanford: Hoover Institute on War, Revolution and Peace, 1968). It is doubtless significant that, according to a recent report by Ronald L. Soble of The Los Angeles Times, the Chase Manhattan Bank is "known to be the Arabs' leading U.S. banking partner".

"The State exists simply to promote and to protect the ordinary happiness of human beings in this life, a husband and wife chatting over a fire, a couple of friends having a game of darts in a pub, a man reading a book in his own room or digging in his own garden—that is what the State is there for. And unless they are helping to increase and prolong and protect such moments, all the laws, parliaments, armies, courts, police, economics, etc., are simply a waste of time."

— C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, 166