The Massacre of Money

Most of us are vaguely familiar (at least in practice) with Benjamin Franklin’s famous dictum concerning the fecundity of money: “Remember, that money is of the prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on... He that kills a breeding-sow, destroys all her offspring to the thousandth generation. He that murders a crown, destroys all that it might have produced, even scores of pounds”.

What Franklin is referring to, of course, is the investment of savings (one wonders how a crown may be murdered — by spending it?) What he fails to mention is that such investment, while it may lead to production of new wealth, at the same time creates costs relative to that new production, so that the “purchasing power” of money does not increase, although its quantity may. In short, no new money is “begotten” without a corresponding increase in costs.

Perhaps more interesting than the economic difficulties of Franklin’s assertion, however, are its metaphoric implications. Like all metaphors, it is liable to literalization by persons who cannot distinguish words from reality — and Franklin himself may be one of these.

Money, clearly, is not fecund; it is sterile; it cannot “breed”, even analogically. As Ezra Pound has noted, two pieces of gold (albeit they may be shaped like a rooster and a hen, respectively) when placed side by side will not reproduce even golden eggs. The point is, of course, that money (particularly paper money or credit, which has no intrinsic value) is no more than a numerical abstraction from reality, a mere image, or representation, which may or may not be bound back to reality. If it is, it is of value in communication; if not, it is a meaningless abstraction.

It is not money which produces, but “reality” (i.e., real wealth brought into correct relationship with other real wealth, and issuing in something “new”). To suggest (even metaphorically) that an increase in the quantity of money has necessarily something to do with natural increase is merely perverse.

In fact, to endow an abstraction with the qualities of reality is a dangerous species of idolatry — in the case of money, pecuniolatry. The notion of the fecundity of money is an example of the dissociation of the image from reality, or elevation of the image above the reality. The consequence is that financial manipulations, and not economic fact, determine our economic lives.

Once the abstraction becomes the object of veneration, the sense of reality, of coherence, is lost. Policy based upon unreality can lead only to disaster. “Money” dissociated from economic reality can only become progressively meaningless — as, for example, it does in inflation, the “proliferation” of money. The belief that money can breed leads to the conclusion that money can be murdered; money endowed with the qualities of life will be mourned when it appears to be afflicted with a “sickness unto death”. The psychological effects are those one would expect to accompany the destruction of a well-loved idol.
Unions and Men

The labour troubles we have been experiencing in Canada are probably but a foretaste of worse to come. Accelerating inflation and strikes are opposite sides of the same coin, as each group in society is automatically thrown into competition with every other group in order to keep income increasing at the same rate as the cost of living. Union policy assumes a critical role in such a situation, with union leaders threatening to paralyze economic functions unless their wage and other demands are met.

This being the case, it is instructive to consider some of the most conspicuous union activities. A partial list would include the following: (1) intimidation of non-trades unionists; (2) holding the community in general to ransom; (3) providing remunerative bureaucratic offices for politically ambitious persons; (4) submerging individual interests in groups enforcing their policies by means of externally imposed discipline; (5) restricting output to bolster the labour force. Evidently unions furnish much material for criticism; yet their "representatives" are notoriously impervious to it. Perhaps more than any other group, union leaders tend to be wrapped in an impenetrable self-righteousness. In their opinion, ultra populæ sunt ultra dei; and they define "the people" as "workers" or "workers who agree with us" as circumstances require. Of course, this assumption that the voice of the "workers" embodies all wisdom, truth, and justice instantly removes any basis for critical consideration of their own motives or actions.

Trade unions constantly attack the power of management and business, but union leaders are themselves devout worshippers at the shrine of coercion. They promote the concept of society as a continuous dialectical struggle, which they use to justify constant appeals for solidarity among the ranks. Consolidation of union affiliations has proceeded to the point that some organizations now claim to speak for millions of employees. The ordinary member has no more control over or influence upon 'his' spokesman than he has on the Lama of Tibet.

Moreover, it should be apparent that unions depend for their existence on the very situation which they condemn employers for exploiting, namely, the economic
The Encyclopedist Heresy

A significant feature of contemporary culture is a sense of disintegration, which (in various of its aspects) has been called "alienation", "dissociation of sensibility", and "the Encyclopedist heresy". The last of these is of particular interest in the field of knowledge, and raises the question of how we can apprehend reality. A trend in recent centuries has been the dissection of knowledge, the isolation of disciplines and persons in them. The following essay attempts to suggest principles upon which an integrated approach to reality might be founded.

In his essay, "On the Shortness of Life", Seneca arrives at the conclusion that the condition proper to man is "leisure" and that the activity proper to leisure is contemplation: "Of all men they alone are at leisure who take time for philosophy, they alone really live...". Elsewhere in the same essay, he derides those who indulge in "busy occupation" or "busy idleness", among them...

...those...laborious triflers who spend their time on useless literary problems, of whom even among the Romans there is now a great number. It was once a fable confined to the Greeks to inquire into what number of rowers Ulysses had, whether the Iliad or the Odyssey was written first, whether moreover they belong to the same author, and various other matters of this stamp, which, if you keep them to yourself, in no way pleasure your secret soul, and, if you publish them, make you seem more of a bore than a scholar (327-28).

The distinction which he makes between two kinds of intellectual activity is fundamental: one (philosophy) is the noblest of human ends; the other ("laborious trifling") is in the same category of activity as "the practice of baking [one's body] in the sun".

Intellectual Detail Function

One need only examine a list of thesis titles (or scholarly publications) at a modern university to realize that the tendency which Seneca so deplores is characteristic of the state of much contemporary "learning". As Sebastian de Grazia has pointed out, the rage is for "research" (as opposed to "simple study")

the sphere of knowledge is divided into disciplines, and sub-divided into specialities. As a result, we witness a situation in which masses of intellectual energy are expended in unearthing catalogues of disparate trivia, but no integrated approach to "truth" emerges.

This leads to the anomalous condition in which many academics—highly skilled and knowledgeable in one category of data—are often idiots when it comes to evaluating the philosophical and political implications of either their functions or their "knowledge". Thus, C.S. Lewis's observation that "The only people who are really dupes of their favourite newspapers are the intelligentsia" is close to the mark.

This syndrome—the dissociation of data-collection from "philosophy" (the "autonomy of technique")—has been noted by, among others, Dorothy Sayers, who regards it as an aspect of the general augmentation of knowledge: "as the volume of the world's knowledge increases, we tend more and more to confine ourselves, each to his special sphere of interest and to the specialized metaphor belonging to it". The quantitative element in this phenomenon is significant, and is implied in the standard criterion for doctoral theses that they "add to the stock of knowledge in a given discipline"; "reality" is additive. The value of the information collected, its quality, is secondary; what is crucial is its amount. One is reminded of the analogy of the hundred monkeys with typewriters who, given world enough and time, would (by pure chance) write War and Peace: of course, they would not know that they had written it. To them it would be a mere mass of peculiar symbols, like any other. They would be incapable of understanding the meaning of their functional achievement.

To facilitate this process, ever-increasing specialization is fostered, with two important results: (1) detail is pursued for the sake of detail, and is alienated from meaning; (2) specialists in different disciplines are isolated from each other, and policy is formulated on grounds of the conviction that reality is actually an agglomeration of non-interacting compartments and that "progress" arises from the further subdivision of those compartments. C.H. Douglas has identified this policy as "the Encyclopedist heresy", and has described it as "a Satanic application of the principle of divide and rule".
Douglas insists that we must "synthesize the situation away from the Encyclopedist heresy", and Miss Sayers similarly argues that a "synthesis of experience" is necessary. However, here we encounter the "quantitative fallacy": if fact is infinite and our minds are not, then this "synthesis" cannot proceed from comprehensive "knowledge". This is the rationale for the familiar objection raised against anyone who posits an interpretation of social phenomena on the basis of policy: "The question is too complex. There is no one simple answer. You don't have the technical know-how". The area of potential knowledge—of facts—is infinite; no one since Sir Francis Bacon has had the temerity to "take" all knowledge as his province. Anyone who tries finds only that any specialized study takes him deeper and deeper into esoteric (often hypnotic) detail. Laurence Sterne in [Tstitum Stany] has followed this phenomenon to its logical conclusion: he demonstrates that one cannot keep abreast even of the facts of his own experience.

In terms of certain assumptions, then, the position seems desperate. The "Encyclopedist heresy" is a dangerously disintegrative phenomenon; yet, given the finitude of the mind's ability to assimilate detail, it appears impossible to reverse this process of disintegration. However, just as we cannot "redeem" time by dividing it, or by trying to "catch" it, we cannot hope to "redeem" knowledge quantitatively. And, just as time becomes significant not as a segment of perpetuity but as a point of intersection with eternity, so perhaps knowledge becomes significant not on the basis of how much of it there is, but what it means. There may, in fact, be some sort of cross-sectional principle which obviates the artificial separation of disciplines, and brings coherence and relation to their contents. It was something of this sort that Bacon was advancing in his inductive method: he sought, not to encompass all knowledge, but to establish means of coherently approaching reality.

Knowledge and Understanding

An observation made by Ezra Pound will, perhaps, furnish a clue to the resolution of this quandary:

Knowledge is or may be necessary to understanding, but it weighs nothing against understanding, and there is not the least use or need of retaining it in the form of dead catalogues once you understand process.6

The distinction is an important one: knowledge—by which Pound means information or assimilable data—is potentially endless; there is another factor which qualifies information, which makes it meaningful (or not), namely, understanding. Most important, it is understanding that consciously relates knowledge to policy. (Those who adhere to the Encyclopedist approach to reality may not be aware that they are manifesting a policy, but the policy of disintegration is implicit in their very approach.)

Another way of regarding this integrative principle is suggested by Josef Pieper in his distinction between intellectus and ratio7. Intellectus, he observes, "is the name for the understanding in so far as it is the capacity of simplicem intellectus, of that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape to the eye". Ratio, on the other hand, "is the power of discursive, logical thought, of searching and of examination". Both faculties pertain to the understanding, and to the Middle Ages, were combined in the act of "knowing". Pieper notes that ratio is "purely human" intellectual activity; intellectus—intuitive receptivity to simple truth—is "superhuman". Intellectus, then, related to contemplation, implies the play of "reality" upon the mind; it suggests a kind of coherent, bird's-eye view of truth, and thus provides the principle which breaks down the barriers constructed by the habit of thought described in the "Encyclopedist heresy".

Note the two assumptions upon which the idea of intellectus is based: (1) there is a coherent, integrated reality; (2) this reality is knowable by intuition, by insight, which is not an aspect of intellectual effort. Pieper points out that, according to Emanuel Kant, on the contrary "the reason cannot intuit anything"(10); thus, Kantian epistemology admits only ratio—discursive thought, or intellectual work.

Faith and Works

The implications of this position are enormous, for it represents the alienation of intellectual effort from its objective, truth (except relative truth, or partial "truths"). The work of knowing is divorced from the ultimate object of knowing—the simple vision of truth. We have noticed elsewhere that the implication of religion—religious—is the binding back of policy to a conception of reality. Postulation of in-
In an important article entitled "The Consecration of Words," published in 1942, G.G. Dobbs analyzed a semantic device destructive of the use of language as a means of relating to reality. Since this device, which he dubbed "the Technique of the Essential Adjective," is almost certainly more widely employed (both intentionally and ignorantly) today than then, a reconsideration of Dr. Dobbs' argument seems to be in order.

The Technique Explained

He began with the following observation:

"[Nouns] are pegged down firmly to reality in the form of the things meant, and as long as people are in touch with that reality and keeping their eyes and their minds on it, it is next to impossible to prize the meaning away from the noun. But adjectives appear to be more vulnerable than nouns, and hence we find that the Technique of the Essential Adjective is made use of to corrupt the meaning of an otherwise invulnerable noun.

He used an example to illustrate this point.

"Take, for instance, the word 'property,' meaning one's own, proper to oneself. Our experience of property, unless, indeed, we are without any, is quite sufficient to keep the meaning firmly stuck to the world of reality. It is useless anyone saying that property ought to be abolished, for we all know that it is the basis of our freedom, and that we should be reduced to the condition of slaves without it. So the suggestion is made, not that 'property' itself is harmful, no! no! of course not! but that private, personal or individual property is the source of all our troubles and should be done away with, it being, of course, of the very essence of all property that it is private, personal or proper to an individual. If this is swallowed by the unthinking, the meaning of the word is successfully removed from anything in experience, and the 'meaningless blanks,' 'collective property,' can be attached to something completely remote from the original meaning of 'property,' such as the control of the whole of the resources of a dispossessed people by a few individuals who are added to administer them on the people's behalf. This technique is verbally as crude and as absurd as it would be to say that, while dogs can be tolerated, all canine dogs should be done away with.

A further example pertained to an inversion of the meaning of 'love.'

"The word 'love' is related to 'lief,' gladly, willingly, and to 'leave,' permission. The word 'free' is from the Old English, to love, and it relates to 'friend.' Here then is our essential adjective! ... by whatever means, only during the last half-century of the Christian Era, the phrase 'free love' has been made to mean something immoral to the vast majority of those who come across it. Deadly damage is done by those who associate these two words, when they are brought together, toan immoral meaning, for they are involved in a denial of the nature of the thing meant by the symbol 'love,' which is once again prized away from reality so that it can be used to mean something different. Thus 'God is Love'; but 'Free Love is immoral.' "God is Free Love," is therefore blasphemy, and the suggestion is inescapable that the nature of 'love' must be that it is not free. The essential reason of the New Testament, as against the Old [i.e., 'the substitution of the voluntary, or free, principle of love, for the compulsory principle of Law'] is thus confused and lost, and the meaningless symbol, 'love,' deprived of its essential quality, can be applied to the old Law of Duty and compulsion.

Reasoning Paralyzed

Dr. Dobbs' detection and analysis of this situation are most useful, for they furnish a counter-technique which instantly cuts through the confusion generated by such phrases and protects our language from the assault being made upon it. The examples cited above enable us to comprehend that there are actually two different ways in which the Essential Adjective may operate to destroy a concept. One way is by direct contradiction between the adjective and the noun, so that in combination they effectively cancel each other's meaning. The second is more subtle: the adjective virtually duplicates the meaning of the noun, thereby implying the existence of other categories of the noun consistent with antonyms of the adjective. Of course, whichever version of the Technique is used, the effect on the unsuspecting victim is the paralysis of his ability to formulate realistic conceptions. Try as he may, he cannot make sense of an impossible dichotomy.

We can observe this effect among, for instance, adherents to the cause of international socialist revolution. The wonderland of Marxist terminology abounds in examples of the Technique of the Essential Adjective. Consider—the 'working class' (implying that nobody apart from proletarians does any work), 'democratic centralism' (used to describe a situation in which all members of the movement are bound to accept the dictates of a central committee), 'industrial action' (a synonym for a strike, i.e., the cessation of industry). Communists also utilize the Technique in their everyday organizational tactics: witness the recent establishment of a 'defense tribunal' for a Montreal abortionist. It is of the essence of the meaning of 'tribunal' that it should render judgment as to guilt on the basis of the evidence submitted to it—not defend the accused. The
frequency of such phrases in the Marxist vocabulary goes a long way toward explaining the iron control that the communist doctrine exerts over its supporters. The fact that they reason in terms that are divorced from reality insulates them from the encroachment of other concepts. Living intellectually in an almost impenetrable theoretical realm, they offer a frightening demonstration of the condition to which the Technique of the Essential Adjective, skillfully applied, can reduce us.

Nothing would be more foolish than to assume that the Technique does not contact our own lives. Several instances of its use even emerged in the course of the recent federal election campaign—the most blatant being the Progressive Conservatives' 'flexible freeze' on wages and prices (but then, the very name of this party proves that its leaders have long been aware of the Technique). Against this, we can mention Mr. Trudeau's 'participatory democracy'—a conjunction of words which puts us in the dilemma of having to conceive of a form of democracy that excludes participation. Little wonder if the quality of political thinking is declining: the linguistic tools essential to this thinking are being systematically subverted.

Awareness Needed

Indeed, Dr. Dobbs' essay opens up a vast field for semantic exploration. As we consider the matter he has raised, it becomes evident that adjective-noun combinations promoted by professional liars and cheats are not the only ones susceptible to exposure as inherently false and deceptive. Many of the expressions we use without question in day-to-day conversation should be reassessed in light of his analysis. Take, as only one instance, a phrase such as 'leisure time'. We are not likely to see any danger in this combination of terms. However, our word 'leisure' derives from the Latin lex, meaning 'to be allowed'. Hence, our use of the phrase automatically implies the existence of another category of time when we are 'not allowed'—when there is an arbitrary limitation of our freedom. If we are to employ such terminology, how can we possibly promote the concept that all of our activities should be matters of choice, which we do because we are attracted to them?

Considering that no effective heed was paid to the original work that Dr. Dobbs did on this subject, so that we have lost ground to the Technique of the Essential Adjective in the intervening years, a repetition of his concluding admonition seems apposite:

("Heresy", continued from p. 4)

*Intellektus* implies a conception of reality in which the principles of truth are knowable; the denial of *intellektus* suggests a conception of reality that allows only the objects of discursive logic to be known.

In terms of this distinction, and from the point of view of one whose "religion" posits coherence in reality, the use of the description "heresy" for the Encyclopedist phenomenon is accurate. The denial of the operation of *intellektus* constitutes a denial of faith, leaving man without any "supernatural" insight into truth, but only the power of discursive, logical thinking with which to gather and classify data. Mental effort is no longer integrated with simple apprehension of truth.

That is, man is condemned to intellectual work without the insight that gives that work ultimate meaning. *Ratio* is pursued for its own sake, not for truth's; the function of reasoning becomes an end in itself. This leads, as has been noted, to great expenditure of intellectual energy in the examination of incoherent trivialities. The means (reason) has been elevated to the status of an end; this process Thomas Aquinas has called "the essence of sin". The practical consequences are those which we might expect of sin: feverish activity directed towards no end but progressive disintegration: the "Encyclopedist heresy". If faith without works is death, what must works without faith be?

Policy and Function

Still another way of regarding this question is to take the example of the computer, which represents the refinement of works, or functionalism. A computer performs the functions of *ratio*—logical "thought", analysis, classification—with a high degree of efficiency; it can even relate to "meaning" within the context for which it is programmed. That is, a computer is an example of technical excellence which is incompetent to formulate policy.

(continued p. 6)

I do not know what further use will be made of this devillish technique against us, but I suggest that we can be on our guard, and warn others against it, and it would be of interest to note particularly those who make use of it, and more especially those who revive it in any new form.

R.E.K.
"Unions", continued from p. 2)
defenselessness of the average person. After all, union dues are merely a kind of protection money—and no mob ever prospered in the protection racket unless clients were convinced of the reality of the menace against which protection was being sold. If the employment system did not furnish a continuous menace of the required type, unions would have to invent one of their own in order to stay in business. In other words, the advantages that a union offers its members are relatively superficial: it is inimical to their interests in so far as these involve genuine economic independence.

As much as (if not more than) employers, union leaders are dedicated to the preservation of an economic system whose fundamental principle is coercion of the individual.

Many ordinary union members recognize these facts, and the decent ones do not enjoy blackmail being exerted "on their behalf" any more than against them. However, they are caught in the middle of the contest for power. They have no effective means to opt out—especially when real buying power is dwindling daily as a result of inflation. Immediate economic pressures upon them make negotiation as individuals impractical.

There is only one way of shattering the stranglehold of present conditions and placing the individual in the position of being able to contract without duress. This way must involve the provision to him by right of an income sufficient to meet his fundamental economic needs. This concept is being given more serious consideration today than it has been in years past. Anyone who rejects it not only upholds coercion as a desirable motive for human action, but also denies the existence of a communal cultural inheritance in which every person is entitled to share. It would seem to require a certain blindness to contend that the fruits of the economic achievements of men since their emergence on earth belong exclusively to the comparatively small number of men who happen to manage the plant which embodies these achievements.

In any case, the alternative to a policy aimed at promoting personal freedom and security in the economic domain cannot be other than what we have sampled of late, namely, ever larger and more intransigent groups taking reckless blows at each other—heedless of the hardship wrought as a result on the other members of society.

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("Heresy", continued from p. 6)

The "Encyclopedist heresy" has the same implications for the human mind—its rational faculty overwhelms its intentional faculty; it becomes all "brain". That is, by disintegrating the sphere of knowledge and making the "mechanism" of thinking pre-eminent, encyclopedism leads to technical excellence, to the refinement of means, at the expense of policy-determining incompetence. Again, it must be noted that even the mind operates within the context of reality, and therefore cannot overstep ultimate "metaphysical" restraints. But, again, this brings us to the fundamental "religious" question: do the limitations of mind permit what Piéper calls "a simple vision of truth", or do they allow only "brain-work"? And this depends upon one's conception of reality; it is at base "religious", and thus will justify the use of terms such as "heresy".

The observation has been made that one's convictions about the nature of reality will be expressed in policy. Further, policy is manifested in appropriate administration, or "works". Thus, observation of "works" will provide insight into the policy and philosophy underlying those techniques: "By their fruits shall ye know them". The "Encyclopedist heresy" is manifest in the drive for the perfection of means, of function, of intellectual detail-work. Alternatively stated, the technique of encyclopedism represents the policy of intellectual disintegration, based upon the belief that "reality" is relative, compartmental, and quantitative. But, as we have seen, this view is hopeless—quantitatively, a computer is a better "brain" than man's mind. The conclusion which is forced is this: either man is an inferior machine, or he is "something else".

If man is only an inferior machine, then we ought logically (where do we get the premises upon which we exercise logic?) to give up. If man is "something else", we ought to concentrate on that "something". What distinguishes man is his intentional faculty: a computer cannot "choose" to co-operate or not with its programmer; a man (presumably) can choose to co-operate or not with "reality". If he does choose, or will to co-operate with reality (physical and otherwise), his ability to apprehend reality becomes the primary function of mind: this function of mind (technique) must be integrated with his choice (policy). But the "Encyclopedist heresy" assumes that the perfection of technique is itself the policy and the reality. The implicit policy of functionalism causes the atrophy of the policy-identifying and determining faculty. The "Encyclopedist heresy" postulates the "autonomy of technique". Technique is autonomous only where a man has abandoned his intentional power; even then, the technique is an expression of the policy of an external will. The horror of the "Encyclopedist heresy" is that it destroys man's integrative faculty—his will. He becomes a mere functional extension of someone else's policy.

D.R.K.

5 Quoted by Tudor Jones, "Modern Science", The Social Creditor, XXXVI (1957), 41.