Monster Inflation

The dictionary defines “monster” as “any animal or human grotesquely deviating from the normal”; usually, what makes monsters so grotesque and horrifying is their display of incongruous combinations of features from other beasts. Thus, for example, the mythical Manticora has “a threefold row of teeth meeting alternately; the face of a man, with gleaming, blood-red eyes; a lion's body” and “a tail like the sting of a scorpion”. Other “monsters” include harpies, minotaurs, centaurs, and aptyraxes.

Judging from the metaphors applied to it, inflation must be some kind of monster. Recently, Prime Minister Trudeau told us that he plans to “knock the wind out of inflation”. We have all heard of galloping inflation, mushrooming inflation, burgeoning inflation, even exploding inflation. We are advised not to add fuel to the fire of inflation; at the same time, we are in a “race” against inflation, we are “wrestling” with inflation, and we are told that we must “freeze” inflation.

Now, it is obvious that any enemy: at once a boxer, a wrestler, a sprinter, a horse, a fungus, a toboggan, a tree (ME burjon = bud), a roller-coaster, a rocket, a bomb, a blaze, and a flood must be a formidable opponent. In fact, how to tackle, bring to its knees, overtake, kill, stem, emasculate, deracinate, defuse, quench, quell, corral, or dam such an adversary is no mean challenge. If one is not sure what form the antagonist might take, one is in danger of using the wrong weapon at any given time.

Take, for example, the Food Prices' Review Board, chaired by Beryl Plumptre: it seems to be a watchdog headed by a kind of combination semi-precious stone and slightly overweight fruit tree barking at, trying to charm, or crush, or shade a balloon, Sumo wrestler, or express train. Now, a new “body” has been established to monitor increases in wages and prices; it, apparently, will be a policeman, safety valve, or stopcock trying to conceal a conflagration, forestall a flatulence, unwind a spiral, or deflane a dragon. One wonders if our champions in the battle to bridle inflation will in fact be able to harness so portentous and protean a peril.

One wonders, indeed, whether the maze of metaphors used to describe inflation and our response to it is not itself an apt metaphor for economists' and politicians' 'comprehension' of the problem. Are they any more clear about the price-gouging, loan-sharking, wage-claiming, bureaucratic fumbling, and corporate ripping-off than they are about the fires, pupillists, mushrooms, cataracts, fulminates, and runaway stallions? Perhaps the snarled similes suggest that our public servants really do not know what inflation is or what to do about it.

Or do they? And if they do, is the war in words, the onslaught in oratory, and the retrenchment in rhetoric perhaps only a trumpery in tropes, a masquerade in metaphor? The one reassuring thing about monsters is that, usually, they are fabricated versions of something else. Is 'inflation' a made-up or merely a misconstrued monster?
Our Policy

SEED aspires to fulfill a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals. Our purpose is neither to propagandize in the sense of promoting some fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events.

Our purpose is neither to propagandize in the sense of promoting some fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events. Our participation does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist: it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and will which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the erasing phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.

---

‘Leisure’, Past and Present

George Cutten comments in The Threat of Leisure that, "It would be interesting to trace the evolution of the meaning of the word 'leisure' from 'an opportunity to do something' to 'a chance to do nothing'". The Shorter Oxford Dictionary does list the former definition; but for purposes of illustrating its usage, this lexicon resorts to Shakespearean drama. It should hardly be necessary to point out that Shakespeare's writings precede the Puritan Revolution in which a man's whole purpose and worth became identified with his work and leisure was connoted with laziness, idleness and a host of other vices.

Concordances to Shakespeare's writings leave no doubt that he himself valued leisure, for, although his characters are doing the speaking, the consistency of their comments on the use of leisure must indicate his own views on the subject. In Shakespeare's plays, leisure "serves" as an opportunity for different things: there is "leisure for these rites of love" and "leisure to repent". People 'stay upon' leisure to be able to do what they want. "Leisure" is coupled with such adjectives as "good", "patient", "sovereign" and "spiritual". And in Sonnet 120 it is "I, a tyrant" who "have no leisure taken".

Evidently, Shakespeare was heir to an attitude towards leisure conforming to Aristotle's teachings on the matter:

...we choose...work for the sake of leisure...one must be able to work and fight, but even more to be at peace and lead a life of cultivated leisure, to do the necessary and useful things, but still more those of intrinsic worth.

Compare this same view with that we hear bruited all about us to the effect that work under direction is the noblest of human activities and the chief purpose of any time away from work is to refresh us for the next stint of toil. Leisure has become 'spare' ('thin' or 'dispensable') time, "idleness", "vacant moments" and time "to kill" (Roget's Thesaurus). This deplorable conceptual retrogression is the fruit of a philosophy that does not recognize that the actions of intrinsic worth are free actions and that leisure is the opportunity to express ourselves on the highest planes we are capable of attaining.

1. New Haven; Yale University Press, 1926, p. 5.

The ‘Tragic’ Delusion

Perhaps the most popular excuse for the inaction of people confronted with various kinds of “evil” is expressed as some version of “the tragic sense of life”. This sense is an intuition (often reinforced by appearances) that the human condition is essentially disastrous, that our expectations, though frequently admirable, are futile. This “tragic sense” tends to lead to demoralization— to the conviction that there is ‘nothing to be done’, except perhaps to cultivate tragic sensibilities. The following essay investigates some of the implications of this view.

At one point in his remarkable and important study *Christianity and Classical Culture*, Charles Norris Cochrane recalls the words which Herodotus "puts into the mouth of a Persian grandee at the Theban dinner party given on the eve of Plataea": "Of all the sorrows which afflict mankind, the bitterest is this, that one should have consciousness of much, but control over nothing" (468). This statement epitomizes the supposed "tragic condition of man": it implies both the terror in the face of the unknown cause and the pity for the human sufferer described in Aristotle's psychology of tragedy. The view is a compelling one even today: thus, for example, C.P. Snow, seeking evidence for the "deep feeling" of scientists of his acquaintance, finds it in their perception "that the individual condition of each of us is tragic". His implication is that any sensitive person will acknowledge man to be the victim of un-avoidable antagonistic forces (whether conscious or unconscious, internal or external). In Hans Jonas' words, the picture is one of "the not-knowing of things human on the part of that within which all things human have preposterously to be enacted—which constitutes the utter loneliness of man in the sum of things".

**Dualism**

Note that each of these definitions or descriptions involves a "dualism" of some kind. In Herodotus, the dualism lies in the disparity between human consciousness and power; in Aristotle, between the "value" of the victim and the "justice" of the unknown cause; in Jonas, between human intention and cosmic indifference. Even Snow, who presumably subscribes to something like these views, sees human existence as essentially contradictory: while (he maintains) man's destiny is finally tragic, he can strive to ameliorate the physical conditions of life through "science". Paradoxically, the knowledge that teaches despair in one area can lead to "social betterment" elsewhere.

In fact, "the tragic vision" is essentially "dualis-
the appearances”; its anti-empiricism renders experience (from which some of its conclusions are drawn) invalid. The point is, as Cochrane suggests, that the “One” which it postulates is in fact “suppositional”. From another point of view, “transcendentalism” is defective because it portrays reality as discontinuous; it perpetuates what Cochrane calls “the most vicious of heresies, the heresy of two worlds” (515). Practically and morally, because it denies the validity of mundane associations, abstractionism leads us nowhere: it issues in a version of nihilism.

Jonas has elaborated this point: “A transcendence withdrawn from any normative relation to the world is equal to a transcendence which has lost its effective force”:

In other words, for all purposes of man’s relation to the reality that surrounds him this hidden God is a nihilstic conception: no norm emanates from him, no law for nature and thus none for human action as a part of the natural order (332).

The implications of this are enormous. If the created world (man included) is discontinuous from the “unknown god”, if, that is, the principle of “good” is not incarnate in the created order, then where do the criteria of value come from? Not from the created order, because it (by definition) is the device of an evil god. (Thus, for example, in Manicheism, ‘normal’ sexual morality is inverted: on the one hand, sexual perversions are allowable or irrelevant, since they concern only the contemptible world of matter; on the other, sexual relations directed towards reproduction—creativity—are condemned because their consequence is the imprisonment of more “light substance” in matter.) Presumably, the criteria of value can be “witnessed” by the ologos, or the illuminati, the “enlightened ones”, but for the rest of us they remain merely “suppositional”. The “Law” is not evident in the world; the “law” that is is antithetical to “what is truly human”. The creator-god has cut us off from our real destiny; therefore (the argument is), we are justified in defying the created order, even if this involves our destruction.

Subjectivism

The notion that the created order is evil or antagonistic to human “dignity” leaves man (except for the ologos) without an objective moral reference point. Again, Jonas explains: “A universe without an intrinsic hierarchy of being...leaves values ontologically unsupported, and the self is thrown back entirely upon itself in its quest for meaning and value. Meaning is no longer found but is ‘conferred’. Values are no longer beheld in the vision of objective reality, but are posited as feats of valuation” (323). This means, of course, that values are to be conceived as purely subjective: the knowable universe is antagonistic or evil, and therefore what we know from it cannot be trusted; if there is a ‘good god’, he is unknown, and therefore offers no laws of value—only an ostensibly warrant to flaunt the laws of the phenomenal world. Thus, man is left to generate or formulate his own values.

Again, we have our tragic opposition: man asserts his own valuations against a world that (apparently) has no regard for them and that itself lacks coherence.

Tragic Justification

This brings us to the other reaction to the supposed tragic antinomy—immersion in a world conceived as purely quantitative”. For those who cannot accomplish unity with the “One”, this is the only response left. This response, which admits that the agnostes theos is unknown, tends (as Cochrane notices) to fall back upon the Protagorean maxim “man is the measure of all things”; he observes that this is a “mandate” for “subjectivism”. Jonas elaborates this question by referring to existentialism, which he regards as a development of Gnostic dualism which emphasizes the “silence” of the unknown god:

Since the transcendent is silent, Sartre argues, since “there is no sign in the world, man, the “abandoned” and left-to-himself, claims his freedom, or rather, cannot help taking it upon himself: he “is” that freedom, man being “nothing but his own project,” and “all is permitted to him” (332).

Existentialist man, like the pneumatikos or illuminatus of Gnosticism, is “beyond good and evil, and a law unto himself in the power of his ‘knowledge’” (334).

In this, man is morally free; in fact, he can create his own moral form. In this view, ‘tragedy’ ensues when the inferior law destroys the person who wants to create a superior form: the man who believes that he can fly becomes tragic when the inferior (but unavoidable) law of gravity causes him to plunge streetward when he steps off the Empire State Building. (Of course, another view maintains that he is merely a fool.) He is “justified” not by the rectitude but by the intensity of his self-assertion; that he is wrong is less important, because he is wrong “only” in terms of natural law.
As Cochrane points out, then, in this view "the intensity or duration of an experience" becomes "the sole gauge of its value" (380). This—because it is individual and subjective—can lead anywhere: what is important is not that an experience is "good" but that it is "extreme". At its cruelest level, this attitude reinforces the most futile kind of activity: how much titillation of how many types can one experience? At another, of course, it can support the "classical virtues"—the assertion of personal or subjective dignity in spite even of objective disaster. More often, though, it leads not only to the intensity, but also to the stupidity of various kinds of "romanticism"—including the "will to power". Presumably, if the sphere of action is objectively incoherent, this is the most that we can expect: the self-assertion of the forceful or defiant personality who claims to be free of the "law"—Lucifer, Prometheus, Heathcliff. Since this in turn involves violence (when that personality encounters the world against which it maintains its "freedom" and which, in the nature of things, must destroy it), tragedy reduces itself to the spectacle of "admirable" or "pitiable" dissipation of energy.

**Tragedy and Entropy**

This point is crucial. The tragic view implies a contradiction at the centre of human experience; this contradiction issues in violence when opposing forces meet; one force (that is linked with 'man') is always overcome. Cochrane, speaking of Prometheus, says:

> Based as it is on a distorted or partial apprehension of ultimate reality, its character is necessarily felt as oppressive; and the sense of oppression bears its inevitable fruits in defiance and revolt to be followed by confusion, defeat, and despair (412).

The pattern is that which we have already seen: the "apprehension of ultimate reality" is dualistic (man, or man's champion, must defy the gods); the action which elevates man involves revolt, and issues in suffering (if not "despair"). Similarly, Tudor Jones has noticed that "tragedy" tends to involve "titanic struggles": "Annihilation is the only possible end to 'titanic struggles'". The extraordinary person tries to assert subjective values (that others share then, making them a part of the 'climate of opinion', does not make them any more objective) against the way things are, and, for his pains, is destroyed. The tragic view, then, seems ultimately to involve what A.C. Bradley has called "waste".

Let us briefly recapitulate. The tragic vision, which seems to be the most convincing interpretation of reality among many "sophisticated" persons, is essentially a dualistic conception, involving the postulation of two worlds, two gods, or two antagonistic orders or laws—two realms of "value". The response to this condition can be either renunciation of the tragic world, or cynical or defiant immersion in it. Of these, defiant confrontation with the world is the only strictly tragic response: the others avoid the tragic contradiction by acquiescence in one world or the other. This specifically tragic response, which speaks to us because it encounters the experiential world while asserting its own moral autonomy, nevertheless involves the waste or dissipation of energy. Tragedy, therefore, is essentially an entropic phenomenon.

**"Tragic Pleasure"**

Curiously, this issue is crystallized in Augustine's reflections upon "tragedy" in a more specific sense—namely, dramatic representations of the tragic cynosure in human experience. In one sense, of course, tragedy is necessary: it raises the question of "powerful opposites" and displays the destructiveness of the dualistic vision. However, this is apparently as far as tragedy can go: as Karl Jaspers has observed, the only atonement for tragic "guilt" is "destruction". Tragedy, therefore, seems to preclude principles of reconciliation: if, for example, Lear and Cordelia are reconciled by 'love', they are nevertheless subject to forces over which they have no control, and which finally destroy them. While they are justified in terms of human values, they are not spared. If this sort of thing, which certainly seems validated by much of our experience, is in fact the truth of the human condition, then (as Snow seems to suspect), tragedy is the final word on that condition. If, on the other hand, a resolution of the apparent duality at the center of things is possible, then preoccupation with "the tragic sense of life" is, ultimately, a futile and unnecessary policy—an involvement with delusion.

Augustine makes this point by referring to the notion of ἀθάνατος in Aristotle's psychology of tragedy. We will recall that theatrical tragedy is the imitation of an action which arouses pity and terror in the beholders; by arousing these emotions, tragedy is supposed
to purge the spectators of them. Emotion is, of course, a form of energy; the purgation of emotion is, therefore, a dissipation of energy. As Augustine points out, the objective of tragedy is to arouse intensity of emotion: "Whether this human agony is based on fact or is simply imaginary, if it is acted so badly that the audience is not moved to sorrow, they leave the theatre in a disgruntled and critical mood, whereas, if they are made to feel pain, they stay to the end watching happily". Tragedy is judged to be 'good' on the basis of the intensity of emotion it arouses — or, in other words, on the quantity of energy it causes to be dissipated. This is a notable paradox.

Tragedy and Sensation

It does, however, fit into the pattern of response to the dualistic universe which we have already seen, namely, immersion in a world "conceived as purely quantitative". In this response, which acquires philosophical in the tragic vision, intensity of experience becomes itself the criterion of value. Thus, persons see "justification" in their responsiveness to the dramatization of a kind of waste. "Why do you weep for your son," the skeptic asked Solon, "when it avails nothing?" "I weep," replied Solon, "precisely because it avails nothing". Given the final validity of the dualistic/tragic vision, there is nothing to do but weep. Thus, as Cochrane notes, "the Athenian playwrights... were destined to wrestle valiantly with the insoluble problem of man at grips with necessity... until with Euripides, tragedy dissolved into a flood of tears" (421).

This type of response is unsatisfactory for reasons that have already been given: as Cochrane says, the pursuit of the intensity of experience, irrespective of its integration with "an intelligible and worthy goal", "involves the utter waste of precious human energy" (390). Speaking of Augustine, he elaborates:

In the gladiatoria, the element of tragedy was too real; but, with respect to the stage-play, what Augustine deplores is its inherent falsity. This falsity depends upon its character as mimesis or imitation. The basis of imitation lies in an artificial dissociation of thought and emotion from action, as a result of which 'the auditor is called upon not to relive, but only to grieve' and 'his pleasure is enhanced by the measure of his grief'. It thus promotes in a subtle way the forces of de-moralization by stimulating the tragic emotions only to drain them away into the barren sands of inactivity (392). Tragedy teaches that there is nothing to be done. In so far as the arousal of emotions is the end of tragedy, it, in Cochrane's words, "fails to disclose any principle of integration capable of giving to [the satisfactions it promises] permanent value and significance" (392). In fact, tragedy is the dramatization of disaster, and the psychological concomitant of this is despair. It may be true, as Kierkegaard suggests, that despair is not only "the most wretched" but also "the most hopeful stage of man's sub-Christian existence", that it is the prelude to some kind of reconciliation. However, it is doubtful that this reconciliation is in any way implicit in tragedy.

The reader will probably have noticed that the argument of this paper is circular: the tragic vision so convincing to many people is dualistic; dualism is in some ways unsatisfactory: one response to dualism is tragedy; tragedy is in some ways unsatisfactory. The circularity is unavoidable: tragedy and a sense of the ultimate contrarieties of the universe are mutually dependent; each implies the other. It is noteworthy, however, that each tends to issue in the dissipation of energy. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that vicarious participation in the tragic experience is of a lower order than the tragic experience itself. The tragic experience is an assertion of one sphere of value against the other; the love of tragedy is simple immersion in the realm of sensation — and is therefore akin to lesser forms of titillation.

Reconciliation?

To argue that dualism or tragedy is unsatisfactory is to suppose a standard of valuation, a point of reference, outside the dualist conception. It may be wrong to do so; however, if the dualist vision is accurate, then 'life' is radically unsatisfactory. As we have seen, dualism suggests two forms of response — renunciation of the world and absorption in a transcendent One, or immersion in some form of tragic subjectivism. The first of these is unsatisfactory because, aside from its vagueness, it appears to deprecate the value of personality; the second is unsatisfactory because it permits expression of personality only at the expense of its destruction. What is required, as Jonas observes, is a "third road" — one by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic in-
An Unworkable Policy

Of all aspects of the criticisms of the wage and price controls imposed by the Canadian Government, the strangest is the lack of comment on the complete absence of even the pretense that the program will eliminate the problem of inflation. Price increases which several years past would have been considered as ruinous are now apparently accepted as normal—"the best we can do." This anomalous situation is the progeny we could have expected to be born of the kind of twisted perception Mr. Trudeau exhibited five years ago when he asserted that "Inflation no longer exists in Canada."

Even if price increases were to moderate somewhat as a result of the controls (which in itself is improbable), this would mean little. Viewed most comprehensively and realistically, inflation is any dilution of purchasing-power. On this understanding, upward variations of prices are not the only manifestations of the phenomenon. True, a higher monetary price expected for the same goods constitutes inflation; but so does the same price for an inferior article or one whose real costs of production have been reduced through improvements in technique.

It should be obvious that something analogous to a cancer is developing in the economic system against which the conventional wisdom of economists is helpless. The Government wants to wall it in rather than to have it out. However, this policy of attempted containment has always failed and must continue to do so.

The man chiefly responsible for current approaches to economic problems is the late J. M. Keynes, whose writings were supposed to hold the answer to the "boom and bust" cycles. But his theories wrongly assumed that fine-tuning of the economy by government could correct its flaws. The difficulties—indeed, the threat—we face today are direct consequences of this approach.

Of considerable interest is the exactitude with which sometime communist theoretician and post-war British Minister of Food, John Strachey, predicted the effects of Keynes' policies. In 1940, just four years after the latter published his General Theory, Strachey wrote that such efforts to maintain economic expansion "point in the right direction", not because they work

(continued p. 8)

To Those Who Share Our Concern

The publication of SEED is an enterprise which we feel is of cardinal importance to the revitalization of our culture. This endeavour represents the concern of a few individuals sensible of their responsibility to reverse, where possible, what they perceive to be the deterioration of the ideological and practical bases of this culture, and prepared to make personal sacrifices in the accomplishment of this objective.

However, our success can only be in proportion to our resources, which—particularly in their financial aspect—are quite limited. We are determined to proceed, even within those limitations. But we would like to do more.

Therefore, if you respond to the challenge that SEED has set for itself and would like to contribute to our venture, we invite your donations.

If you know anyone who would like to receive SEED, GIFT TRIAL SUBSCRIPTIONS are available at a rate of $4.00 half-yearly. QUANTITY ORDERS of any issue can be obtained at the following prices (post-paid):

10 for $4.00; 25 for $8.00; 50 for $12.00.

Seeds
Ouida Publishing, Box 3184
Sherwood Park, Alberta, Canada T8A 2A6

Enclosed is my cheque/money order in the amount of $ .................. for:

Canada & U.S. —

☐ Annual subscription ($7.00)
☐ Semi-annual subscription ($4.00)

Overseas airmail

☐ Annual subscription ($9.00)
☐ Semi-annual subscription ($5.00)

Name ...........................................................
Address .......................................................... Postal Code .................
but because:

...the loss of objectivity and intrinsic value of the currency which is involved will sooner or later make necessary, on pain of ever-increasing dislocation, a growing degree of social control.

For the partial character of the policy will itself lead on to further measures. The very fact that no stability, no permanently workable solution, can be found within the limits of this policy will ensure that, once the community has been driven by events to tackle its problems in this way, it cannot halt at the first stage, but must of necessity push on to more thoroughgoing measures of reorganisation.1

Seldom has a prediction been more completely fulfilled. One wonders how much of what we see unfolding today is determined by recognition on the part of certain persons that the "reorganisation" necessitated can enhance their own power.

Clearly, inflation is an integral part of the present system of establishing prices according to current financial costs rather than real productive capacity. And ever more serious penalties will be imposed upon the members of the community—whether in the form of eroded buying-power, social disintegration or diminished freedom—as a result of persistence in this policy. In the kind of program the Government has embarked upon, there can be no winners—except those who, like Strachey, are doggedly striving "to increase social controls".

R.E.K.

1A Programme for Progress, published in London by Gollancz, 1940, p. 128.

("Inclusion", continued from p. 6)

sight saved to uphold the humanity of man" (340)—in other words, one which violates neither the essential unity of "the world" nor the facts of human experience. Once the tragic question has been put (as, perhaps, it must) and grasped, one can either take it as an answer and respond accordingly, or he can seek elsewhere—outside the tragic—for the solution to what Tudor Jones has called "the problem of Opposites".

D.R.K.


7This statement is, of course, tautological and asserts what it assumes. I want to imply the possibility of a perspective outside dualism.


10Quoted by Sewall, 6.

11Quoted by Krieger, 11.