Sabotage

Among the many inconveniences caused by the recent protracted strike of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers has been an interruption in the distribution of Seed, for which we apologize to our subscribers.

The withdrawal of service by post office employees is but another example of what has come to be accepted as an unavoidable feature of our economic life—the notion that progress results from the confrontation of opposites. The parties in the confrontation are not genuine opposites, of course; both the government and the union are centralized power structures dedicated to the limitation of alternatives and to the reduction of persons to the condition of functional units in the "organization". Thus, their policies are identical; only the rhetoric has changed to delude the innocent. Like most conflicts, this strike has been contrived, and, far from demonstrating that the "law of opposites" is inherent in the nature of things, it merely illustrates that the theory of dialectical materialism (of which it is a manifestation) is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Let me explain. One of the fundamental (and, therefore, obscured) issues in this whole business is the question of the effects of automation. This is a fundamental issue because it raises the question whether these workers have to be employed at all: it challenges the philosophy or creed of "full employment". The disputing parties (who share that philosophy) agreed fairly readily on this article. What all the haggling has been about is not the implications of employment itself, but merely the details of the conditions of employment. The postal workers do not seem to mind being functionaries; they just want to be slightly higher paid and less efficient functionaries.

Thus, many of us have seen the stickers on mailboxes: "Boycott the postal code". Why? Because the postal code is an aspect of efficiency—of, in fact, the release of human energy from mindless mechanical drudgery. But the postal workers (like most other "workers"—people who can conceive of themselves only as economic units) have reacted vociferously against the prospect of such a release. So, the Quebec regional division of the CUPW circulates propaganda not merely advising people not to use the postal code, but threatening them: "For a more rapid service, boycott the postal code . . . postal workers give priority to unencoded mail". They argue that automation will gradually deprive 22,000 workers of their livelihoods—that is, their "jobs". What they fail to realize is that their continued employment in a monopoly situation is the condition of their future blackmail by the government and unions. They have failed to make the crucial distinction between "livelihood" and "employment"; as a result, they are fighting to remain slaves.

The absurdity of the situation was made clear by Bryce Mackasey before the strike began. If there is a strike, he said on CBC radio, we will simply automate the system and eliminate the need for the further employment of these people. An interviewer (strangely) put the obvious and logical question: Do you mean to say that you are deliberately retarding automation in order to keep people working? The Postmaster-General's assertion is a blatant admission that the government is sabotaging efficiency in the name of a dubious political objective.

Well, the strike has occurred. However, we have heard nothing more about Mr. Mackasey's "inadvertent" ultimatum (a much more significant one, incidentally, than those which he has subsequently made). Why? Probably because it would expose the damnable folly of the myth of "full employment" and free "employees" from the fear and trembling which induces them to surrender more and more of their personal autonomy—if not to the union hierarchy, then to the state.
Everything and Nothing

There is a kind of menace that threatens any society in which tolerance is preached as a virtue—namely, that tolerance should evolve into indiscrimination. The continuous circulation of various and conflicting opinions can easily engender the notion that mere exposure to ideas adequately substitutes for the obligation of critically examining them to discover which are best. The successor of the credulous society is liable to be the bland society—and the latter is possibly more resistant to improvement than any other type. The step from the belief that any idea is as valid as any other to the belief that any course of action is as creditable as any other seems to be another natural progression. It cannot lead to significant human initiatives for the simple reason that it does not recognize the potential for outstanding worth in anything that a man might do.

Nowhere to Go

If there is one characteristic inseparable from the mind that takes all policies as indifferently acceptable, this is slovenliness of understanding. One can comprehend the handicap under which it operates: the motive for intellectual pursuit is vitiated by lack of respect for what is pursued. A mind is not going to be led anywhere when it takes for granted that there is nowhere worth going.

The prevalence of this type of mental suspended animation in our time is remarkable. It would have been unheard of during those vigorous periods of Christian culture when the moral capital now being spent with such prodigality was first accumulated. Christian thinking was oriented towards specific ends, which provided at once the meaning and practical criteria of life. Ironically, the age in which people reflexively assume their superiority to their "ignorant and superstitious" forbears is the age that has given serious consideration to the most pathetic proposition in history—namely, the proposition that life is not worth living. (You must not let the problem of reconciling this idea with "superiority" trouble you—or the problem of reconciling a reflexive sense of superiority with a philosophy that denies that anything can be better than anything else: how they consist with each other is a mystery we are not intended to explore.)

(continued p. 7)
The Reconciliatory Symbols

In last month's issue of Seed, a number of the implications of the dualistic philosophy (an aspect of which is the "tragic vision") were explored. The following article attempts to elucidate a philosophical account of reality that involves neither the repudiation of the notion of law (or order) nor the suppression of personality, and, thus, that claims to reconcile the apparent oppositions proposed by dualism and to avoid the destructiveness of those oppositions.

Near the beginning of his article "Postscript: Christianity and Art", W.H. Auden makes the gnomic, but interesting, statement that "Art is compatible with polytheism and with Christianity, but not with philosophical materialism; science is compatible with philosophical materialism and with Christianity, but not with polytheism". What precisely Auden means I am not quite sure. However, I am willing to venture that it is something like this: "art", by its nature controlled by personality (the mind and will of an individual), requires the autonomy supported by the diversified reality suggested by polytheism; science, on the other hand, depends upon the uniformity or repeatability of events suggested by some philosophy of law, order, or determinacy. Auden's logic precludes the co-existence of art and science in a world accurately described by either "polytheism" or "philosophical materialism". Moreover, he implies that a world accurately described by "Christianity" can somehow accommodate both science (the unity of law) and art (the demands of diversity).

The Tragic Antinomy

These observations are directly related to speculations made in the article "The 'Tragic' Delusion", which appeared in a previous issue of Seed. There, it may be recalled, the point was made that the "tragic vision" is essentially dualistic, that it postulates the coincidence of two autonomous, antagonistic principles—as Karl Jaspers explains: "Tragedy occurs wherever the powers that collide are truly independent of each other. That reality is split, that truth is divided, is a basic insight of tragic knowledge." He makes the same point in slightly different terms:

The mythical mind sees the world's basic disharmony reflected in the multiplicity of gods. No man can do justice to all of them: somewhere the cult of one god is bound to offend against that of another; the gods themselves are at war among themselves... (35). Tragedy, then, appears as the consequence of a schism between "gods", which implies the existence of two or more independent and conflicting "laws" or orders of truth. Thus, if at one level the "polytheism" of Auden's assertion is a necessary postulate of a universe in which art is possible, it is certainly a necessary postulate of a universe in which art and scientific determinism can be said to co-exist. That is, one inference to be drawn from Auden's statement (if it is accurate) is that the coincidence of science and art implies the co-existence of two contradictory principles in reality: in short, it implies a kind of dualism or antinomy. (In this regard, we are reminded of the attitude of C.P. Snow, which maintains that, while the life of the individual must be tragic, science can improve the lot of the collectivity.)

Personality

We saw also that a fundamental objection to dualism as a reading of reality is that, because it involves the conflict of opposites, it is essentially entropic; it fosters the waste of energy. This is a criticism that has been made by both C.N. Cochrane and Hans Jonas. At the same time, however, both Cochrane and Jonas admit that a simple monism is not an adequate interpretation of reality: the former speaks of the need to fulfill "the great desideratum of Classicism viz. an adequate philosophical basis for humanism"; the latter suggests that "philosophy" must find a road "by which the dualistic rift can be avoided and yet enough of the dualistic insight saved to uphold the humanity of man".

Let us be quite clear about this. The tragic presents a picture of what Cochrane calls "the antithesis between human liberty and natural necessity" (410) or, as A.P. Rossiter says of Shakespearean tragedy, "a fundamental antinomy": "the 'moral order' has a double heart: i.e., the universe is quasi-Christian, and...human greatness (which is one God's 'good') is the evil of the other God (i.e. the God of order and degree)." Rossiter is suggesting that a universe ordered by "law" is somehow inimical (at least in the tragic view) to the realization of the personality. The problem is, therefore, one of finding an account of reality which
will allow the expression of personality while avoiding the destruction of personality that is the price of its expression in the tragic vision. The problem is one of integrating the unique and particular with the universal without destroying the nature of either.

Three Laws

The solution to this problem has been suggested by Paul Tillich, as Nathan A. Scott, Jr., explains in an essay entitled "The Modern Experiment in Criticism: A Theological Appraisal". Tillich, he says, describes three possible relationships of law to individuals or cultures. The first he calls autonomy, the notion that "man himself is the source of the law of life" (179); this, of course, is similar to the Protagorean maxim "man is the measure of all things", and, while it supports humanism, it tends to lead to dangerous or chaotic subjectivism. The second is heteronomy, the derivation of "laws and authoritative criteria that are not organic to" the nature of the cultures or individuals adopting them: the principle of order is seen as external, arbitrary, and oppressive. The third Tillich calls theonomy, which "regards the transcendent as being not a dimension external to, and therefore to be imposed upon, man's cultural life but rather as the inescapable spiritual ground of all our art and philosophy and science". This last suggests that there is one truth (not the many implied by Jaspers), that it is not the consequence of human whim or "opinion", and that, far from being external to or imposed upon men, it is integral to their being and nature.

This brings us back to Aiken's assertion that Christianity can accommodate both art and science (which, in other contexts, are seen to be philosophically contradictory). The point is that the postulation of autonomy implies disorder, the postulation of heteronomy is a violation of personality or initiative, and the postulation of the coincidence of the two involves a potentially tragic antimony. In what ways can Christian doctrine be said to reconcile these contradictions? It does so, I think (and I am trying not to say anything "new"), in at least three ways.

Unity of Being

The first is, of course, the doctrine that God is essentially One, that is, that there is one principle of law in reality: God is the 'Maker of Heaven and Earth' (not, as in Manichean theology, the creator only of the material universe). This means that there is no independent or autonomous principle of, say, evil—or, for that matter, of human "virtue". "Evil", therefore, is not essential; it is merely a form of rebellion against the principle of being. To postulate (as tragedy often does) that the energy of personality can be thrown into conflict with divine law involves an absurd contradiction: if there is only one God, then all energy derives from him and the defiance by "energy" of "authority" (the ground or "author" of its own being) is merely self-destructive. Far from being a reflection of, say, human power, it is a reflection of energy dissipating itself.

Differentiation

This, of course, raises the question how—if reality is a unity—"rebellion" is possible: if everything is one, how can dissent arise? What is required, then, is some principle of differentiation—which is suggested in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. This is the second of the ways in which Christian doctrine accommodates what seems to be a tragic antimony. The Trinity, as a symbol (and much more than a symbol; however, we can apprehend it only analogically) of diversity in unity, seems to supply a picture of reality that allows the distinction of personality within the unity of substance. That is, this view supports the notion of differentiation of persons without maintaining (as Manicheism and polytheism do) the necessity of a division of substance.

G. Inglis James, in an essay entitled "The Autonomy of the Work of Art", has made precisely this point. He relates that during the classical era "the individual was dismissed as something incapable of becoming the object of knowledge, save as a particular instance of a universal rule", and that during "the Trinitarian controversies of the first four centuries A.D.", a new value was given to the notion of "person". In the trinitarian concept is suggested the communion not of typical "units", but of persons. James sees in this a warrant for maintaining "the freedom and dignity of the human person and of the importance of personal relationships" (191).

He is not the first to have held this position, for, as Cochrane observes, St. Augustine "discovered in the Trinity a fresh foundation for what we have called the
values of personality" (410). These "values of personality" are the will and the reason, as Cochrane says elsewhere: "in the Trinity, [Augustine] discovered a principle capable of saving the reason as well as the will, and thus redeeming human personality as a whole" (384). This validation of reason and will is, if not explicitly stated, certainly implied in Augustine's perception of an analogy of the Trinity in the human mind: "the mind itself, its love and knowledge are a kind of trinity", he says, and "in these three, when the mind knows itself and loves itself, a trinity remains: the mind, love, and knowledge...". Being is completed by the knowledge and love of that being, as Cochrane observes: "Accordingly, they [the Persons of the Trinity] present themselves as a Trinity which may be described as that which IS unchangeably and KNOWS unchangeably and WILL unchangeably" (410).

Thus, man not only is, but is capable of being conscious of being: he is not merely a passive unit determined by external forces; he has personality. Moreover, his personality is not realized by defiance of the law of his being, but by the discovery of and willing adherence to that law— which, as I have said already, is not external to human nature but immanent in it. In the Trinity, the union of persons is perfect: being, knowledge, and love are complete and integrated and God is in the most whole sense. Man is, in the sense that he is created, but his wholeness attends the realization of his personality, the integration of his knowledge and will with his being. It is, we may recall, the knowledge (and, presumably, the love) of the truth which will set us free; this freedom lies in the integration (not subversion) of personality with authority; not in its defiance of "law". Thus, to the extent that our knowledge and our love are impaired (and the doctrine of Original Sin suggests that they must be), we will be incomplete, unintegrated, tragic—"evil". And, as I have pointed out, "evil" is not autonomous; it persists only as an inadequate approximation to good. It is, in fact, a diminution of being; therefore, any adherence to evil is an allegiance to nothingness. Yet the personalities of men (faint reflections of personality in the Trinity) depend upon the possibility of just such an allegiance, upon the possibility of imperfect knowledge, of imperfect love. At the same time, such an actual allegiance in the Christian view cannot but diminish the personality.

Incarnation

The Christian account, therefore, suggests the unity of the ground of being and a personal diversity within that unity. A third (and perhaps the definitive) article of Christian doctrine—the Incarnation—emphasizes the relevance of the "law of life" not only to the material world, but to the human condition. It seems to me patent that the created world must reflect the idea (or "law") of its Creator. However, can it know itself? Can a tree, which exists, reflect upon itself and love its existence? I cannot say; one does not usually think of trees in these terms. Man, on the other hand, is capable of reflecting upon himself and of willing to do so or that. Certainly, in the Christian myth, it is this that distinguishes man: he wanted knowledge, and, specifically, moral knowledge—"the knowledge of good and evil". The acquisition of that knowledge, however, entails his alienation from the automatic law of nature, his moral autonomy (not, however, his essential autonomy or his becoming a law unto himself). He no longer acts correctly as an automaton; he now can act correctly or incorrectly on his own initiative. Perhaps he falls into the error of believing that "law" is something external to himself and arbitrary, something that his humanity must defy to realize itself: he falls into "the tragic delusion".

The Incarnation reminds us that the law—rather than being external, arbitrary, and oppressive—is the very ground of our being, the condition of our becoming real. If, in the notion of Trinity, we have an image of the diversity of persons in the unity of substance, then in the notion of Incarnation, we have the image of the diversity of natures in the unity of a person. The second Person of the Trinity—the Logos, the Word, the "law"—was 'made' flesh. The "law"—in, say, Old Testament philosophy regarded as non-immanent and prescriptive—is now joined with human nature, made immanent and essential. The law is now in the world—not as a series of regulations or arbitrary fiats—but as part of what we are, as the center of all our relationships. The Incarnation, then, is the resolution of the old dualism, giving to man the possibility of apprehending the truth not through a denial of the world, but through its correct apprehension, as Cochrane observes: "It saved the reason because, while denying its pretensions to omniscience and infallibility, it nevertheless af-
firmed the existence of an order of truth and value which, being in the world as well as beyond it, was within the power of man to apprehend" (384). The ineffable and the unknowable God reveals Himself through the Incarnation of the Logos, as Augustine explains by analogy:

For just as our word in some way becomes a bodily sound by assuming that in which it may be manifested to the senses of men, so the word of God was made flesh by assuming that in which He might also be manifested to the senses of men (477).

We know God not abstractly, but incarnately: the Christian idea involves an epistemology that is essentially "sacramental".

"Conformity"

If the Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity suggests a warrant for "science" (for knowledge), then the operation of the Third Person suggests a validation of volition, or will— as Augustine's analogy implies. He makes, in fact, an explicit link between the Spirit and the will: "If the will of God is also to be specially attributed to any Person in the Trinity, then this name, just as love, belongs more appropriately to the Holy Spirit. For what else is love than will?" (505)

Again, Cochrane elaborates:

In this formula [the Trinity] the first hypostasis, Being, the creative principle so called, strictly speaking, unknown and unknowable, except insofar as it manifests itself in the second and third; the second hypostasis, the principle of intelligence, reveals itself as the Logos, ratio, or order of the universe, while the third, the hypostasis of spirit, is the principle of motion therein (410).

God is: there is a "law" or norm informing reality; law is revealed in the Incarnation: it is possible for us to apprehend it. Apprehending it, we can love it or despise it: we can will either to conform to the revealed truth, or to defy it. If the former, our energy (love, a principle of motion, is a kind of energy), conforming to authority, should make us "powerful"; if the latter, our love or energy, denying the ground of its own being, must be wasted.

In the Christian view, then, this is precisely what happens to the tragic figure: trying to assert the power or creative capacity of his own personality on the basis of a misconstrued understanding of his autonomy, he attempts to deny the authority of God. Since the "power" he has—even the power to resist—derives from God, he is involving himself in an en tropic process.

The only way that the energy of the personality (the will) can be conserved is to adhere to authority. Thus, idiosyncracy is a disastrous criterion of greatness.

Realization

In what, then, does the 'greatness' of personality consist? This question brings us to another issue, that of human 'creativity', for the 'heroic' personality attempts to create its own moral form. In one sense, therefore, it is not knowledge that promises to make men gods so much as it is creative power—precisely the thing that, say, Satan lacks. The point is, of course, that man is not creative in the sense that God is, as Denis de Rougemont has explained:

I am not at all sure that man is capable of creating, in the true sense of the term: that is, of producing an absolute mutation, an absolute novelty in the universe. That which is currently called today a 'creation' is in reality only a slightly different arrangement of elements already known according to laws known or knowable. Therefore it is a composition.

Man cannot create ex nihilo: he must use already created materials and put them together according to the workable principles of association. The 'greatest' thing that he can do is to put to fashion novelities or monsters (the inordinate or incompatible juxtaposing of elements), but—exercising the powers of his personality, his human-ness, his mind and his will, his discrimination and intention—attempt to place into correct or just relationship those elements which the fallen nature of man tends habitually to put out of joint.

Again, this humility before the 'law', this conformity to the order of things, does not involve a denial of personality: on the contrary, it is the only guarantor of the survival of personality. Ignorance (wilful or otherwise) of the 'reason' that informs reality can lead only to the denial of the self, which partakes of and is sustained by that reason. The personality that, in the name of 'expressing' itself, attempts to deny the objects of the faculties which define it as a personality is destined to oblivion.

And, to return to Auden, a corollary of the foregoing is that art and science—in a Christian perspective—come to very much the same thing.

D.R.K.

"Everything", continued from p. 2

Thus, the nihilism of purpose associated with clover and indiscriminate intellect does occasionally excuse into a sort of unrestrained criticism—especially of purposive concepts. Besides the fact that they constitute a grotesque contradiction of the aim of the doctrine of aimlessness, the criticisms have little intrinsic potency. Nevertheless, their widespread acceptance in our society compels one to deal with them.

Slight Criticisms

Now, the most rigorously purposive set of beliefs in the world are almost certainly embodied in the Christian religion, and the sort of mind which nibbles here and there and never gets around to digesting anything tends to fall into two patterns as regards its attitude towards Christianity. One insists on being able to pick and chose in the field of Christian doctrine—to label some parts of it beneficial, other parts detrimental, and still others irrelevant. The trouble with this approach is that it ignores the absolute nature of the claim to represent truth that Christianity makes. To say that the doctrine has certain meritorious aspects might sound broad-minded and conciliatory, but in fact it is equivalent to rejecting the doctrine tout court. Christianity does not claim to be right for a part of

("Symbols" continued from p. 6)

7. See Cochrane: "This vision of the Godhead served to dispose of many erroneous philosophic fancies. To begin with, it excluded the possibility of an independent, contrary principle; and, from this standpoint, the devil himself was not independent; his very devi-
liness, indeed, lay in a false claim to be so" (417).
8. In The New Orpheus, 190.
man: it claims him entirely. And the idea that a man can be made fundamentally better by placing his faith in in a creed consisting partially—perhaps even largely—of falsehood, gobbledygook, and superstition is tantamount to saying that foolishness is a virtue. The proposition need only be stated in so many words to be exposed as preposterous.

The other typical reaction to Christianity is at an even lower level of intellectual commitment than naive equivocation just described. Its basic contention is that Christian doctrine is too dull or uninteresting, to merit consideration. There is no internal contradiction in this position—although it does force confirmation of the argument put forward by such writers as A.R. Orage that the only real dullness in the world is in the mind of the person who habitually attributes this quality to what he contacts in his environment.

A Measure of the Loss

To hear Christian doctrine described as "fantastic" or "unbelievable"—or even "mad"—would be comprehensible; but "dull" is the last word to apply to it. For dramatic effect alone, there is nothing in literature more compelling than the story of the Christ. And such doctrines as the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the Trinity have fascinated and challenged many of the best minds in the world for two millennia.

In the mountains of books on psychology that have poured forth since, say, the past century, is there one containing a concept whose scope and profundity rival the viewpoint that Good is the substance and cement of all Reality and man's whole purpose is to discover it and release it from the paralysis of confusion in a fallen world? In all the tomes about "humanizing" the environment can anything be found which offers more opportunity for the exercise of human faculties or makes human existence more significant? The Christian who understands something of what his beliefs imply must be continually concerned with this potential for uncovering, drawing out, and quickening Good. He is, in this sense, an artist throughout his life—just as Michelangelo was an artist when he "released" the David in a huge block of marble that others had because of its irregularities rejected as unworkable.

The world as seen by a Christian is one of infinite possibilities for constructive initiative. Of course, someone who does not conceive that there is anything that can be built will be blind to them. But his blindness is merely the proof of his incapacity as a guide.

This is not to imply that worthwhile actions cannot be taken with reference to any philosophy other than Christianity. However, the substitution for this, the most challenging and enabling perspective on our position in the universe, of a conception that excludes purpose and commitment is one of the bleakest developments in history. Moreover, the worst of the ill effects of this substitution are undoubtedly yet to be experienced.

R.E.K.

"But it is an illusion to suppose that there can be any escape from the evils of organized society through a return to primitivism, since this involves the fallacy that 'nature' is intrinsically virtuous and 'law' the mark of degeneracy. This, however, is a heresy, for it presumes that corruption is somehow inherent in the political fabric, independently of the wills which create and sustain it."

C.N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture, 494