The Solution to the Problem?

In an interview published in *The Paris Review* (Summer-Fall, 1962), Ezra Pound said: "My method of opposing tyranny was wrong over a thirty year period... If the individual, or heretic, gets hold of some essential truth, or sees some error in the system being practiced, he commits so many marginal errors himself that he is worn out before he can establish his point". And, in a fragment appended to his long poem the Cantos, he wrote: "I lost my center/fighting the world". These words are a poignant reminder to those who would "change the world".

Pound, of course, was a poet, an artist who felt powerfully the need for form or "order"—particularly the order of personality or its concomitant, the order of creative activity. However, incensed by the evils around him—political monopoly, obstruction of knowledge, frustration of creativity, deadening of sensitivity—he too often gave himself up to "causes", among them fascism, which he thought could war successfully against the enemy. In the process, far from securing victory, he did wear himself out, he lost his centre—some say he went mad.

Many of us who see evil manifest in economic and political monopoly—in "tyranny"—are tempted to behave similarly: we speak of joining "forces", of raising an "army", of narrowing the "front", of winning the "war". Each of these metaphors implies that the reality of our situation is a dualism of good confronting evil in a pitched battle; we like to think that we are on the side of the forces of good. Very often, this attitude involves our allying ourselves with "movements" or "groups" defined negatively, that is, by their opposition to what we perceive to be "evils". We are tempted to regard these alliances as temporary and strategic—not representative of our ultimate objectives or policy, but necessary "in the short term".

Without wanting to diminish the importance of the danger, I wonder if this is not giving the devil more than his due? Certainly, in Christian terms it is. We have often observed that, in Christian doctrine, evil—far from being an autonomous "power"—is a privation or defect of good: evil has no reality, except in so far as it feeds on or perverts good. The question is, then, can evil be obviated by "fighting" it? Can a defect, or privation, be destroyed in battle? Or must it be "made up"? Is wholeness not the answer or solution to privation? Can perversion be eradicated? Or is the solution to perversion straightening?

When we direct our energies towards warring against evil, are we not using a technique (a means) dissociated from our policy (end), which is the expression of a philosophy? Is not a dualistic technique in the pursuit of "Christian policy" a failure to integrate means and ends? If we perceive reality as a violent confrontation in which we must take sides, what will happen to our energy? If it is expended in a losing battle (or even in some kinds of winning battles), it will be dissipated or wasted: it will come to nothing. In other words, when we "fight" evil, we are in danger of becoming the thing we oppose—we are "wasted".

The problem is to be "real". If reality is a dualism, then we can be realized in joining battle. If, on the other hand, evil is merely privation or perversion, we subscribe to it by devoting our energy to fighting it. The solution to this kind of evil (the only kind?) is wholeness or integrity; the correct response to the distorting of reality is the discovering of and conformity to reality—in whatever ways we can. Our problem is how to conserve energy creatively, how to remain or become "sane" (whole, healthy, balanced). Can we solve this problem by subscribing strategically to the disintegrative principle of dualism? Or can we really overcome evil with good? How?
Our Policy

SEED aspires to fulfill a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals. Our purpose is neither to propagate nor to comment on current events. Our participation does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist: it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority on all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and will which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the entropic phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.

Quebec Nationalism

The election in Quebec of a government committed to separate that province from the rest of Canada is a symptom of a much more profound conflict that has been waged in many guises for years — namely, the opposition between the totalitarian claims of the Church and the totalitarian claims of the State. Quebec was long known as a Church-dominated (or "-ridden") society whose inhabitants looked for authority in the Catholic faith. Bowing to the commands of priests was the pattern of life of the Quebecker for centuries; and a people does not throw off hundreds of years of experience overnight. Viewed in this context, the late outbreak of Quebec nationalism seems more likely to be an expression of the old search for external authority and the comfort of absorption by the group than the "coming of age" of which its proponents speak — with the place of the clergy being taken by social scientists. Maturity is evidenced by contending with the world, not by encapsulating yourself in a restricted, ingrown environment. The preoccupation (especially of the young people of Quebec) with retaining and purifying abstract concepts of what constitutes "la vraie culture Quebequoise" is as unreasoning as the former compliance with the dictates of the local and. Deprived of one simple faith, they have found another. Despite all the abuses for which the Church can be blamed, the change could well be for the worse.

The danger in the transition is that the constraints that the Church imposed on itself by its scrupulously preserved precepts might have no replacement in the new secular society. Henceforth, the only limit on the government's ability to run everything may be the interplay of raw power. A Church whose central doctrine ascribed that men as individuals are so important that God Himself submitted to an agonizing death for their salvation has some difficulty reducing them to the status of puppets or cogs. If it tries, sooner or later somebody will point out the contradiction between word and deed. This was a potent corrective factor when the Church encroached too much on individual integrity. No such inhibition is operative in or on the State worshippers surrounding René Lévesque. Without the least qualm of conscience, they will be able to contend and suppress the personality of the individual to fit their mould. The latter's worth will cease to be absolute and consist solely in his utility to an elite of planners.
Evolution, Entropy, and Epigenesis

In this continuation of an article begun last month, the author discusses some aspects of the ethical implications of “Darwinism”.

“Social Darwinism”

This question of “art”, of consciousness, of imagination, brings us to a consideration of the ethical implications of Darwinism—which have been outlined by, for example, Gertrude Himmelfarb in the chapter “Varieties of Social Darwinism” in her book Victorian Minds (New York, 1968). In their cruder forms, she points out, social theories related to Darwinism focus on the idea of “the survival of the fittest”, often defining “fittest” in essentially materialist terms (that is, in terms of bodily or economic suitability to survival). The obvious objection to such theories is that they ignore what we think of as essentially human, for example, the moral faculties of reason and will. Thus, there seems to be no particular relationship between the kind of “progress” involved in evolution and moral progress.

In fact, this is the crucial issue involved in even the most sophisticated evolutionary theories: evolution, as a “self-determining, self-operating, unending process”, seems to exclude the possibility of purposeful intervention by mind. That is, evolution implies determinism; morality requires freedom. Thus, the Marxists who saw affinities between their doctrine and Darwinism were no doubt justified, as Himmelfarb notes:

There was another and perhaps more important sense in which Darwinism bore a real affinity to Marxism. What they both celebrated was the internal, necessary rhythm of life, the one of nature, the other, of life of society. God was powerless to interfere with the natural laws and processes of nature, and by the same token individual men were powerless to interfere with the natural dialectic and course of history. Social Darwinism thus appeared as a vindication of social determinism, more particularly of that form of determinism known as historical materialism (325).

And, as Himmelfarb further relates, it was this crux that led T.H. Huxley to repudiate “Social Darwinism”:

T.H. Huxley testified to the gravity of the issue when he deliberately [in his Romeues lecture, “Evolution and Ethics”, 1893] withheld the sanction of Darwinism from social ethics or social policy—any ethics or any policy, even one of which he might have approved. To withhold the sanction of Darwinism, to deny the legitimization that had been so eagerly sought was in effect, to try to neutralize, to keep in check one of the most potent forces in modern society, the authority of science (332).

The implications of Darwinism—or, indeed, of determinism of any variety—are incompatible with what we think of, conventionally, as “ethics”.

Freedom and Necessity

The logical problem is this: if morality depends upon man’s power to choose, then an explanation of human behaviour which asserts that “choice” is in fact determined by material (or other) causes—which opposed to “reasons”—obviates morality. The distinction between a “cause” and a “reason” is crucial: the one implying an automatic, unconscious force, the other, a conscious decision.

This question, as we have seen elsewhere, is raised by some “biophilosophers” when (in effect) dispute whether anything has a “reason” for being and/or happening. Thus, for example, Bernard Rensch has stated that, in terms of the laws of conservation of energy and physical cause-and-effect, the notion of “free will” is untenable. “Consciousness” is a physiological process, determined by the availability of energy, and the physical stimuli to which that process is reacting.

Such a deterministic conception avoids a difficulty already touched upon: if the will were free, man’s evolution and his complex cerebral activity would contravene the laws of causality which has governed the course of events for millions of years. For every “spontaneous” thought (in a strict sense) which is also matched by processes of excitation in the cerebral neurons would represent the “fresh beginning” of a causal sequence, and would thus conflict with the conservation of energy as well as with the uninterrupted action of the causal law.

Although Rensch speaks of “responsibility” and of “reflexes” and of “instincts” as characteristic of the infant stage of development, it is not clear to me how what he terms a thought differs from a physical reflex in response to physical stimuli. Note here again the identification of “evolution” with the automaticity of the law of cause-and-effect.

The Moral Implications

Rensch devotes a chapter to the ethical implications of his position, for, as he says, “To deny that the will
is free naturally involves grave consequences for our ethical, religious, and juristic ideas" (235). However, the explanation which he offers is not as comforting (at least to me) as he suggests: it is the new familiar one that, since behaviour is the result of 'conditioning', anti-social behaviour (that is, presumably, behaviour that does not conform to the model of society that those who control society envisage) ought to be subject to reconditioning. Thus, Rensch observes:

There are still many countries of which it cannot be said that justice is based upon recognition of the absence or restriction of free will. In some, however, it has been taken into account that crimes are largely determined by inherited or non-inherited causes, and increasing efforts are being made to reform the wrong-doers and reintegrate them into society. The Communist countries in general, and the USSR and China in particular, have apparently gone farthest in this respect, and they seem to have had a fair measure of success. Convicts in these countries are "re-educated" in social thinking... (312).

To point this out is not new: but it is not surprising that Marxist countries, whose dominant ideology teaches that the material precedes and determines "consciousness", should lead the world in the application of this theory of "justice".

Note again the implications of this view: "evil" is not something intrinsic to personality; it is characteristic of concatenations of material causes (presumably, "good" is similarly an automatic attribute, physiologically determined). Man is amoral. The consequences of this are obvious: if one is amoral, he has no responsibility. That is, not only should he not be "punished", but (as C.S. Lewis has observed), since he is not responsible for his actions, there is no limitation on the extent of his "re-conditioning". Thus, paradoxically, the "human" theory of justice is perhaps less humane in fact: a criminal whose punishment is, under the old system, limited to, say, five years' imprisonment, may now be subject to a "cure" that goes on indefinitely. Moreover, the human self-definition which has for so long been worked out in a moral context (see most great or significant literature) will ostensibly be obviated by the prevalence of such a view. Human life may, in fact, move towards a dead level of uniformity and indistinction—perhaps justifying Douglas's suggestion that "evolution" (in its various manifestations) is, even morally, an entropic process. Perhaps "energy"—real human energy—is an attribute of "free will": the description of human being solely in terms of the material may very well entail increasing entropy—at least, psychological entropy.

This question has, of course, a dual aspect. On the one hand, if the "evolutionists" are correct in regarding human behaviour as the efflorescence of material cause-and-effect, then that behaviour is merely part of the great entropic tendency in the nature of things. More important, perhaps, because unnecessary and therefore alterable, are the implications of their being wrong, for their propaganda is itself demoralizing. Emphasizing as it does the priority of environment, it tends to lead to paralysis of the will of persons: if we can be made to accept that we are merely the puppets of our chromosomes and our environment, the impulse to exercise the faculties of discrimination and intention will tend to be stifled. The consequences of this can only be spiritual lassitude and increasing acquiescence in the decrees of the environment—manipulated, of course, by those to whom we have relinquished power. The centralization of initiative that must result can only increase "social entropy": the surrendering of imagination and initiative, the loss of will—despair—is the psychological equivalent of the physical phenomenon of entropy.

The Theological Question

Another matter germane to this topic (and, indeed, implicit in all that I have said) is what might be called the "religious issue". Rensch himself, insistently a "scientist", raises the question:

In the epistemological sphere, the religious ideas which emphasize the destiny determining all existence have more in common with the conception I have advanced. The Greek belief in moira as the supreme and absolutely determinant power, or the Islamic idea that all existence is irrevocably predetermined (kismet), or the Christian doctrine of predestination, do not contradict the conclusion that the whole course of the universe and of each human life is determinate and that the will is not free... And the monistic version of the Indian doctrine of brahman, the All-One, into which the atom (the individual being) re-enters after death, corresponds at least to a certain degree with my conception of being as a uniform and lawful system of relationships which is psychical in character (322-3).

Rensch, here, is trying to reconcile scientific determinism with various religions—all of them, as he notes, necessarily allowing "god" to be present only impersonally in "all things and all events". Thus, for example, he sympathizes with interpretations of Christi-
The Test of Efficiency

This journal has regularly insisted on the folly of permitting a continual disparity between price accumulation and income distribution in our economic system. The policy of maintaining this disparity can be attacked on every ground, from the scientific to the aesthetic. The primary purpose of the policy is, of course, to keep the planning departments of governments and large corporations on top of the community generally—and financial institutions on top of the planning departments.

Our criticisms are, we feel, both well-founded and forceful. However, there are two arguments that supporters of the status quo use against our proposal to bring consumer buying power up to the level that would enable the members of the public to draw fully on the productive capacity of the economy. Fortunately, one of these arguments (that "people cannot be trusted with the independence accruing from the possession of adequate purchasing power") does not really require rebuttal: the fact that it is usually made by persons who themselves have ample money disposes of it quite effectively.

More serious is the argument that the disparity between consuming and producing potentials, by creating a stress situation which stimulates human inventiveness and initiative, is the chief source of technological and organizational progress. In other words, failing finally to liquidate costs as these come due spurs us to increase our efficiency.

Now, that there are advantageous spin-offs from the pressure to reduce outlay and find better ways to get the job done is indisputable. Acute forms of competition have pushed men to impressive achievements. An obvious example is war—a stress situation that has generated many inventions having important and constructive non-military applications. Indeed, looking at these results alone, some people might advocate a permanent state of war as a boon to mankind; but, naturally, one must consider other results, as well.

The analogy with the artificial stress situation in an economy that always requires more production before consumers can have access to what they have already produced is apt, for the obligation to meet both current costs and costs carried over from the past is a flail that has certainly led to improved productive technique. Nevertheless, as in the case of military war, there is a debit side to the ledger. For instance, the chronic shortfall of income via-à-via production has caused adverse relations between employers and employees, resulting in energy and time being wasted in negotiations, slowdowns, and strikes. It has caused the smothering of initiative under layers of union-imposed regulations. It has caused the proliferation of "public relations", which is not only non-productive, but often a cover for shoddy work. It has meant government "make-work" programs and the waste and bureaucracy associated with effort separated from the desire for its fruits. It has meant the death of the psychological rewards of craftsmanship. It has meant mountains of surplus production, often disguised as obsolete war matériel whose cost is registered as national debt." In its ultimate lunatic expression, it has meant contractual agreements to prevent machines from freeing men to devote their attention to something more suited to their special faculties than mechanical tasks.

Thus, in so far as efficiency is defined as a ratio between actual output and potential output, the present system leaves much to be desired. This is even more true when efficiency is viewed from a more realistic perspective.

After all, where men are involved, efficiency cannot be regarded merely as, say, yield per unit of capital invested. The proper criterion of efficiency consists in whether the system satisfies individuals and extends their opportunities to bring their talents to fruition and to make reasoned, self-disciplined choices. However, as things stand, the vast majority of the population have no positively expressed will: they allow the Rockefellers and the Brezhnevs to set policy—pitifully hoping for a reward for their passive collaboration.

R.E.K.

*Not consumer debt, which, as it places a lien against future income, is illusory as buying power. The buying power we are talking about would liquidate costs, rather than transmute them and defer their payment.

**It has been estimated that, since the end of the Second World War, the nations of the world have spent about $7 trillion on arms, and that current spending is, on the average, about 6 percent of their gross national products.
("Evolution", continued from p. 4) 

Unity which conceive of God "in a largely impersonal manner as immanent in all created beings, or even the whole universe"—in short, with pantheism.

Personality

It is at this point, of course, that Christianity diverges radically from "evolution", materialistic determinism, and pantheism. The central doctrine of Christianity, the Incarnation, insists that God is personally immanent in the world: Christ is two natures in, notably, one person. God is not immanent in the world only in so far as the body and mind of the man, Jesus, reflects the operation of natural laws which God may or may not have ordained: the Second Person of the Trinity is incarnate in a human being, a person who is at once "perfect God and perfect man". What this means is perhaps a mystery: what it implies is that God, far from making the universe and then "going away" after setting it in motion to "evolve", is actively involved in what happens in the world. As C.N. Cochrane has remarked with reference to St. Augustine, "history in terms of the embodied Logos means history in terms of personality". What happens is the result of conscious decision, of "policy". Whether Rensh is right or wrong in his philosophy, his efforts to reconcile it with Christianity (for whatever laudable conciliatory or consolatory reasons—or "causes") is mistaken.

An irreconcilable alternative to the view that the universe (and man) are merely the products of "matter-in-motion" is the Christian insistence upon the personal immanence of God in the world, in the person of Christ.

Monism

Rensh's "religious" assertions raise another crucial question. As he says, his view is essentially "monistic": that is to say, individual being is merely part of a universal, ultimately undifferentiated all (defined by material or scientific laws); in this all, differentiation is merely quantitative: he observes, for example, that "diversity of species rests upon purely quantitative differences in the hereditary factors" (31). All matter (the basis of his position) can be reduced to simple constituent particles (quarks?); it is only the numerical combinations of these that make from taking part in decisions—all those of importance are pre-determined by the momentum of events.

The only point on which Mr. du Cann is certain in error is his contention that all this has come about by accident. Promoters of bigness for its own sake have had the ear of governmental executives in both his nation and our own for years. No should it be assumed that everyone is distressed by the confusion that has developed. There are fortunes to be made in it—and if the acquisition of the fortunes involves a bit of crookedness, the probability of identifying the guilty parties compares with that of finding a needle in a haystack.

Mr. du Cann realizes that a correction of the situation must imply a reversal of the centralization of financial management. He also foresees that this will be opposed by vested interests. His solution is to restore "full parliamentary control, that is to say the control of the backbench MPs, the people's representatives, over Ministers."

[This proposal is unlikely to recommend itself either to Ministers, or to their party apparatchiks. It is unlikely to be in the interests of either that the position of the individual MP should be enhanced.]

Alas, the reform he advocates is too near the centre of the monopoly to be anything more than a pipe-dream, as he visualizes it. If the back-bench MP is to practice any initiative in this matter, he will have to be got into the position where he is a genuine representative of his constituents. The latter will then have to inform him that they prefer to set their own priorities and spend their own money—and that he should keep this uppermost in his mind in his conduct in the house. It is the longer, but the surer, route to undoing the harm being caused by the present mismanagement.

R.E.K.

3. Ibid., 153. 4. Ibid., 156. 5. Ibid., 158.
Embarrassments of the Socialist State

The recent urgings by Mr. Macdonell, the Auditor-General, for better supervision and control of government expenditures are hardly surprising. The judgment of virtually every unbiased student of current budgetary policy has been that spending has become unbridled. For instance, in December 1975, Mr. Macdonell's predecessor, Maxwell Henderson, stated bluntly that, "there is no longer any control of what a greatly enlarged government does" with its "tremendous influx of revenue money." Citing numerous examples of what he termed "playing fast and loose" with public funds, he continued:

... Sir Bruce Fraser, the British comptroller and auditor-general, was flabbergasted when I told him what is going on in Canada. He said that no government in the U.K. could ever get away with that. If this statement is correct, the Canadian situation must be horrendous, indeed, for analyses of the operation of the British system have lately ranged between despondent and desperate. The Rt. Hon. Edward du Cann, chairman of the Select Committee on Public Accounts at Westminster, said in an article published this summer:

Never, in my 20 years' experience as an MP, has there been greater popular interest in the subject of the control of expenditure by the state.

Never, in my view, was public concern more justified.

For never was public expenditure less controlled. The supervisory machinery simply does not work.

In theory, the control should be absolute. But it is not absolute, and it is obviously not so. The figures show clearly the lack of control: no one can argue with any hope of conviction that what has happened was planned by anybody.

For all their application... I do not doubt that most members of the PAC [Public Accounts Committee] feel, as I do, that however significant our work may be, to some extent we are merely scrambling about on the tip of an iceberg, a mere one-eighth of that massive potential economic ship-wrecker which shows above the surface.

And he makes the revelatory statement that, "Government expenditure is, I believe, the largest single inflationary influence in the United Kingdom."

It is Mr. du Cann's opinion that, "Not only is public expenditure uncontrolled, but as matters stand it is uncontrollable." This, then, is the result of acquiescence in socialist economic policies: we are exclu-

(continued p. 6)
for individuation. Thus, in evolutionary terms, "life" is the result of more complex associations of the same basic elements as constitute non-life (or nothingness?). These basic units of matter (whatever they are) and their laws are the ground of being. And, it is to these that life ultimately returns: "Death is followed by decomposition, and this means disintegration of innumerable relationships and a return to the protophysical 'All-One', the brahman" (336).

Significantly, this is an image, once again, of entropy—of de-individualization, of disorder, of uniformity. The complex associations that make a distinctive order or individual (or person) are successively broken down until that individual merges with the environment; he is "reabsorbed". Thus, the monism of Rensch's view implies the disintegration of the unique being, the reduction of a complex number to its constituent units.

Again, the Christian account of diversity-in-unity differs radically from this conception; again, the "image" (this is how we apprehend it) of this account is the Trinity. Once more, the distinguishing characteristic of the "elements" in the Trinity is qualitative, not quantitative: they are "persons", not numbers. The issue involved is clearly enunciated in the Athanasian Creed: we are neither to divide the substance nor confound the persons. If the ground of being is a unity (as Rensch would probably accept), it is nevertheless a unity in which distinction of personality is an essential element. Rensch's picture of a reality diversifying and then, ultimately, resolving itself into uniformity seems to be an instance of "confounding the persons".

This is not, of course, to assert that the material world is "God" or that the differentiation evident in nature is an aspect of the trinitarian deity. It is only to suggest that differentiation, in the Christian view, is characterized by "personality". Moreover, that this principle is intricately bound up with human nature is suggested in the doctrine that divine personality became incarnate in human nature. Note again that the incarnation of the Logos (which, as one of the Persons in the Trinity, is of one substance with God) involves the incarnation of the substance. The substance of God is immanent in man as personality.

If there is a Christian "challenge" to the implications of "evolution", it seems to me that it must focus here. We saw earlier in this article that evolution (and entropy) fail to account for the existence of energy (or, of negentropy) in the first place. This may have been the creation of God: if it was (and if, in addition, He ordained the laws governing the behaviour of that matter-energy) then of God we can say: He has "imagination" (to see what He was to create), and He has purpose (to direct His creation). If this is true, and God is immanent in man, then perhaps man, too, has "imagination" and "purpose" (though not creative power in the sense that God has)—and perhaps these are not mere concatenations of chemical reactions. If they are not, then the answer to "evolution" and its concomitant, entropy, may very well be the Immanence of God.

D.R.K.