A Farewell

With this issue of Seed, we cease publication.

When we began publishing this journal four years ago, we announced that we were embarking on an experiment: the experiment has yielded its results. These are in many ways disappointing; we have certainly not changed "the course of events"; nor did we expect to. We did, however, hope to stimulate thought by looking at "phenomena" from what we regard as a coherent and "orthodox", though unconventional and unpopular, viewpoint; we even spoke ingenuously of "the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects". Though it is impossible to measure the extent to which our explorations have resulted in the dissemination of ideas, we can say that the perceptible response has been small, that the mutuality that must characterize a vital association has not developed. Seed has not "grown"; the experiment has yielded a generally negative result.

That is not to say a worthless result, for we know something now that we did not know before — if only that our idiom was inappropriate. We have said what we had to say, but that is not all that there is to say. We have done what we thought was to be done; now something else must be done.

What this is, I do not know. I suspect — though I do not wish to appear a prophet of doom, feeding rancour with vile prognostication — that the "crisis" to which we have so regularly referred will become more and more tangibly a crisis. Perhaps it will be only as the situation becomes more palpably intolerable that something will be done, that movement will occur; ideas are not enough. It is a sad reflection that people, for all their supposedly characteristic foresight, are insensitive to imminent calamity until it arrives — and, often, not even then. Thus, as things deteriorate, perhaps things will improve.

There are signs of this: a man and a woman starting their own small postal service in the United States because the Post Office cannot deliver a letter in the town in which it was mailed on the day that it was mailed; a few parents educating their children at home or in small, cooperative private schools because public education is so miserable a failure. Instances like these do not solve the major problems, they do not obviate the large coercions, but they are examples of the persistence of initiative, or, to use a "victorian" word, self-reliance. In fact, perhaps hope can lie only in small, unconnected, "uncoordinated" efforts like these. And, as centralization moves towards its inevitable collapse — because it contradicts the nature of things — something else may emerge, albeit not without enormous waste. Perhaps that "something else" will even be the practical application, or real (as opposed to theoretical) expression of the principles that we have tried, however tentatively, to elaborate. Indeed, if that "something else" is to succeed, we are convinced that it must incarnate those principles.

If we are wrong, and if what we see about us is the best that can be done, then the only reasonable reaction is despair. And, of course, that is precisely what those who would control us want us to believe and to feel.
Our Policy

SEED aspires to fulfil a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals.

Our purpose is neither to propagate nor to promote a fixed point of view or body of thought nor merely to comment on current events. Our partisanship does not extend beyond two considerations. Firstly, we believe that reality does exist; it is not a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. Man cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. If we carry our investigation of the nature of reality far enough, we shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and will which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the entropic phenomenon that paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at the least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community — and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.

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The Basis of Our Doing

Neglect of the great liberating principle that the aim of life is not thought, but action, is a strange anomaly in our liberation-obsessed age. Two explanations of this neglect seem plausible. The first is that a single concept that transfigures every aspect of human life is beyond the capacity of assimilation of the timid believers in a gradual or fragmented approach to liberation. The other is that the principle of the primacy of action devolves from the Christian heritage, which many people nowadays regard as obsolete and hence unworthy of attention.

The linking of Christianity with a policy of action might surprise those persons who are convinced that the dominating characteristic of the religion is "other-worldliness". After all, action expresses itself through the material of this world. However, a much greater surprise is had by anyone whose experience of the Gospels is direct at the notion that Christianity can in any way be thought of as dissociated from action. The Founder of the faith certainly evinced no distaste for contacting the material of this world. This is confirmed by virtually every chapter in the New Testament. The Carpenter's first miracle was the conversion of water into wine for a party. He fed the multitudes and healed the sick. He did not (unlike the typical oriental wise-man) tell people to forget their bodies; rather, he gave of his energy to restore their physical well-being and pleasure in it. The admonition to "do unto others" is the signal not of retreat from, but of participation in, society.

Undeniably, a place of honour has been accorded in the Christian tradition to certain individuals who followed the routes of material abnegation or social isolation; but to concentrate exclusively on these persons as representatives of Christianity (a practice especially common among religious eclectics) is to distort history. The tapestry of the Christian past is woven of many fabrics, reflecting the fact that Christ's message was as multi-faceted as reality.

Life and action are, then, in a sense almost synonymous. However, it is not true that mere action — any action — is the proper end of life. The worshipping of mere movement and noise and sensuality is as much in error as the man who disdains to move or hear or
Recapitulation

C.H. Douglas writes of "the superior persons who dominated the Age of Reason" who "used to marvel delicately at the simple credulity of the Scots of the sixteenth century who were split in twain by arguments regarding salvation by Faith and Grace, and salvation by Works". He points out that, however "precious" such theological controversies may appear, "the Scots made no mistake in their estimate of the issue" and explains: ""Salvation by Works" is not primarily a justification of work, which needs no justification, but a condemnation of the Creator. He didn't know enough to make the lovely vales of Cheshire and South Lancashire properly; So Jehovah, the God of the 'Old Testament' took them over, and made them into Warrington, Widnes and Wigan!"

What is primarily interesting about these observations is that they are an insistence that theological issues are not merely abstract or "otherworldly"; but that they have practical implications and consequences. At least two doctrines are involved here: the doctrine of the creation and the doctrine of salvation by grace, and they are regarded as closely related, for each carries with it the concept of "something for nothing", something free, undeserved, or unearned. One implication of the doctrine of the creation is, of course, that "work" must be regarded within the context of principles instituted at the creation; the notion of "salvation by works", on the other hand, tends to obscure the fact that it is only through "grace" that we are able to do anything at all, and encourages the notion that human beings are the ultimate "doers" in the universe, and the ultimate arbiters of what constitutes "work". This in turn leads to the belief that human beings, or the "illuminati" among us, can re-make the world according to their own designs.

As Douglas's comments indicate, one prominent feature of these designs—and one supported by the belief that human labour is the source of all economic values—is the proliferation of arbitrarily-defined "work" or "employment". The denial of the immanent reality of grace, and the concomitant devotion to the idea of "work" at any cost results in the fouling of the created world. The dichotomy between "the Creator" and "Jehovah" also requires comment, especially since it is in the Old Testament that the story of the creation occurs. I can only assume that Douglas sees in the Old Testament emphasis on satisfying (or trying to satisfy) the "law" a relation with "earned salvation" and, by extension, the doctrine of salvation by works. Again, this can be contrasted not only with the "something from nothing, or for nothing" which epitomizes creation, but also with the New Testament emphasis on the redemption.

Since this sort of problem has been the subject matter of Seed—that is, we have been preoccupied with the relationship of theory to practice, of philosophy to policy—it is appropriate that, in our final issue, we should recur to this emphasis and reiterate some central points. We have said many times that philosophies or religions either tell us something about the way things are, or they are just sets of more or less interesting opinions, the objects of intellectual gymnastics with which agile minds can amuse themselves. In estimating the validity of these theories, we have consistently argued that their practical implications (which can often be predicted) must be examined: do they work out in reality? what are their "fruits"? As the example with which I began this essay suggests, we have seen the working out of some of the practical consequences of the doctrine of "Salvation by Works" in the employment system and the waste and coercion that typify it. What would an economics that took account of the operation of grace be like? We have attempted to answer this question in these pages.

Embodying the Abstract

A crucial dogma that at once leads to and validates this approach—that is, the integration of theory with practical consequences—is the doctrine of the incarnation. This, like the doctrine of creation, is a profound response to abstractionism of all kinds. In the creation, God made immanent in the material world the laws of being, the principles of association: a law is an abstract statement of a generalization; it can exist in the mind alone, in the imagination, but it is manifested in reality. I can make up a "law"—for example, "all men can fly"; I can even picture in my mind men flying; but, as I leap from the edge of the Grand Canyon to prove my point, I find that my "law" was a fantasy. The doctrine of the creation reminds us that to behave as if there were a discontinuity between the
"Ideal" world and the created world is disastrous: the world is God's idea given physical and moral form. If our ideas contradict His embodied ideas, then, whether we like it or not, we are in trouble. This fact—that the law informs the world of things—is reiterates in the doctrine of the Incarnation: "The Word was made Flesh and dwelt among us". What is abstract is also imminent. To postulate, therefore, that the world which we can apprehend with our senses, say, is illusory, or radically unrelated to an ideal in our minds, is a dangerous form of wishful thinking. God's immanence at once tells us that "the world" must manifest law and that in and through this world we can discover at least some aspects of God's ideas, and conform to "reality".

This point is intimately related to another theological controversy, one in which Augustine found himself entangled and to which we have often referred: Manicheism versus Christianity. Once again, references to "Manicheism" these days are generally received with derision: people just cannot conceive that a religious argument that took place a millennium and a half ago could possibly have anything to do with their real world. Ironically, this response itself is a manifestation of "Manicheism", for it implies a habit of mind which divorces the world of ideas from the world of things. Manicheism, or dualism, maintains that there are two separate, independent principles operating in the universe, that, for example, the "spiritual" and the physical or material are radically incompatible, and therefore antagonistic. One practical or moral consequence of this belief was that since the body was only "matter", it was irrelevant what one did with it—as long as one did not use it to produce more "matter" and thus imprison more "spirit". Thus, procreation was a serious sin, whereas sodomy was not.

Does this have anything to do with our reality today? Certainly, one variety of popular morality holds that it is permissible, indeed desirable, to do anything with the body except use it to reproduce (that is, to participate in the creative process). This is, perhaps, a form of disguised Manicheism: Those who practice it are reacting, as often as not, to "puritanism", which tended to regard the flesh with suspicion and to be stringently "moral" in the old sense. This reaction takes the form of a divorcing of morality from the corporeal world—a kind of dualism. However, instead of vocally belittling or denouncing the flesh, adherents of this school idealize it. Thus, unlike the old dualism, which postulated an exalted alternative to "matter", the new dualism repudiates the idea of value, and becomes a kind of monistic materialism.

Clearly, a philosophy which holds that God created the material world and pronounced it good, or that God loved the world so much that He became incarnate, implies radically different attitudes towards the "flesh" than either the old or the new Manicheism. The body is at once valuable and subject to the laws informing it; either to denigrate it or to abuse it would be destructive.

Real and Ideal Worlds

Other present-day attitudes and practices are merely the old Manicheism in new guises. The science-religion antagonism is one of these, often taking the form of "science tells us about the real (that is, the material) world; religion deals with spiritual questions, which exist only in people's minds". The two spheres seem to be radically separated. Logically, the scientist must be a materialist, for he is dedicated to the measurable, the perceivable, the empirical; at the same time, the question arises whether materialism can adequately account for the "mind" of the scientist. Again, the concepts of creation and incarnation, which imply a material world informed with mind, seem to reconcile the apparent dualism. In this, and in the concomitant idea that since law is inherent in the world of phenomena to be discovered (as opposed to the sort of law that is asserted a priori) it can only be revealed by careful observation, Christianity is perhaps unique in the support it gives to the scientific method.

If some scientists are inclined to discount the "spiritual" sphere, a good many "believers" are equally prepared to show an indifference to the material world which is just as misleading. Many sincere persons will tell you that they have "accepted Jesus Christ as their personal saviour", and they very likely have an emotional conviction that this is so. But, if you ask them, "What is Christian agriculture?" or "What are Christian economics?" they will, as likely as not, have no views on the subject, although they will express a general benevolence. More particularly, when asked about some of the central doctrines of their religion, they may say that these are mysteries that have no
temporal or material correlates, and must be believed, although they have nothing to do with anything in the empirical world.

Here some may object that I am contradicting the "thrust" of my first two or three paragraphs: there, I seemed to be questioning the doctrine of salvation by works; here, I am criticizing the doctrine of salvation alone. What I am doing is saying that faith versus works is a false antithesis; the two are not contradictory, nor can they be separated. "Faith without works" may be death; but works without faith must be even more terrible—work from despair, or to avoid despair, work from fear, work in the service of someone else's perverse faith (for example, that it is his prerogative to dominate you). There is, I think, a priority here: faith (perhaps evoked by contemplation of the works of the Creator and reflection upon the corresponding limitations of human powers) must come first, but it must be incarnated in "works”—that is, in cooperating with the creative principles inherent in the universe. "Works" which do not conform to or express these principles must evince despair of the power and intentions of the Creator; moreover, they will be self-defeating. "Faith" which, in the name of a transcendent good, disregards violations or perversions of those principles is itself incompletely realized.

Pluralism

An extension of the principle of dualism produces the principle of "pluralism", many manifestations of which we see today. Again, to some extent, pluralism is fundamental to science, which begins by observing separate, individual phenomena. At the same time, science depends upon relation, upon unity: some phenomena at least are similar; groups of phenomena must be describable by laws; an experiment must be repeatable. Postulation of the absolute singularity or unrelatedness of each "individual" must involve a chaotic universe. Science, therefore, is based not only upon the apprehension of unique events or entities, but also upon the integration of these into a larger, even comprehensive, whole.

In the moral or political realm particularly we see the principle of "pluralism" upheld—largely in response to the moral "monism" which is popularly associated with an earlier era. Thus, today, we have the doctrine of subjectivism expressed in various formulae, many of them embarrassingly sentimental: "if it feels good, do it"; "you do your own thing, and I'll do mine"; "we all march to a different drummer"; "we cannot discriminate on the grounds of sexual preference". An important difficulty with this philosophy is precisely that it annihilates the grounds of "discrimination": if every individual has his (or its) autonomous principle of being, one cannot judge any person, thing, or event according to an objective standard. Each individual must by definition embody perfectly the law of his being. You can no longer say "Paul is a good man, or a bad man"—only tautologically that "Paul is Paul", for it would be absurdly redundant to say that "Paul is a good Paul". You can, of course, say "I don't like Paul", for that is consistent with subjectivism. Not only is one individual as "good" as another, but any philosophy or policy is as good as another; everything is a matter of "opinion". As W.H. Auden has observed, this sort of "atomism" is, finally, a species of atheism: there is no unifying principle, no external law, no standard of evaluation.

Deifying the Political

Auden also suggests, we may recall, that in such a situation—that is, where the existence of a God, an absolute, is denied—people tend to substitute some absolute compatible with their preconceptions about "individualism". As often as not, they make the political into God. They reconcile this with their subjectivism by creating "democracy", in which each individual ostensibly expresses, equally with every other individual, his "preference"; these preferences are counted (they are all "equal", it must be remembered) in order to ascertain the "majority will", which now becomes the principle of social order. The assumptions involved in this process are worth reiterating: (1) there is no absolute law or standard; (2) nevertheless, society requires some kind of order, which has to be invented by people democratically; (3) each individual is the measure of himself, and therefore as "good" as anyone else; (4) therefore, each individual must have a vote; (5) the sum of these votes—since quantity has displaced quality as a criterion—will give us political truth.

Paradoxically, of course, this process leads to precisely the situation to which "pluralism" purports to
be the reaction: monolithic government. A good many people do not regard it as such, though, because they have accepted, psychologically, that they really have an effective say in this kind of "democracy". But, in fact, they are duped into acquiescing in a tyranny little different from the old autocracies.

I have many times argued that the Christian answer to this dilemma of the chaos of particularism versus the tyranny of monism is contained in, especially, the doctrine of the Trinity, which describes the coincidence of the unity of "substance" and the diversity of persons. Analogically, this leads us to seek a situation in which distinct persons can be unified, one with another, in relations, while they retain their uniqueness. At the same time, it implies that relations, or associations, are good only in so far as they reflect the principles of association epitomized in the ground of being. Thus, presumably, any relationship which has as its object the frustration of the creative process is to that extent compromised—whatever positive qualities it may manifest. Similarly, any association which involves the trespass of one person upon the "properness" of another is, in effect, a "confounding of persons". This sort of thing operates not only at the private social level but also in the political sphere. Thus, when a government institutionalizes the negation of the creative process—by supporting abortion programs, by sabotaging production, by maintaining all the entropic conditions associated with "full employment"—it is perverting relationships whose prototype is the Trinity. Similarly, by perpetuating and augmenting coercions, it is compromising the personalities of persons—trespassing on their "property" not only in the economic but also in the human sense. Again, to use the analogy of the Trinity, it is fashioning an association in which the participants are not "equal"—not in the sense of being the same, but in the sense of having sovereignty over the attributes which are proper to themselves. When Athanasius, for example, fought so tenaciously to preserve trinitarianism against the Arians, he was not merely pleading for an abstract formula, but for a principle of reality. When the state arrogates to itself priority, when it encroaches on the proper domain of persons, it is merely falling into an old heresy, saying that one of the parties to an association has unlimited powers over the other(s).

That persons have "property"—if not autonomy—is emphasized, once again, in the implications of the Incarnation. From the Old Testament model of a remote and abstract Jehovah, dispensing laws to a stiff-necked people, the pattern becomes one of a God who is immanent, indwelling: we have, in fact, a radical transformation from non-immanent sovereignty ("Thou shalt not, or else", emanating from a voice above Mt. Sinai) to immanent sovereignty ("Whoever looks upon a woman with lust in his heart..."). The law is not abrogated, but internalized. The first picture, the 'Old Testament' picture, supports the concept of the omnipotent state, regulating persons' lives; the second implies that choice is an internal, personal matter—that good must be chosen because it is understood to be good, not because of intimidation. This is not to say that morality is relative or subjective; the mere fact that the prototype to which I am referring is absolute good should obviate any temptation to infer that. The law persists; but the emphasis is now on the possibility of each individual's actualizing it through the exercise of his own consciousness and intention.

This immunence of the law is emphasized further in the idea of the indwelling in each person of one of the Persons of the Trinity: the Holy Ghost. Not only is He the Person of the Godhead particularly associated with this indwelling; He is also the God of distribution of gifts. And these gifts are diverse—as diverse, perhaps, as persons are. Yet they are all of God; they are associated with supreme good, with rectitude, with "law". The picture, once again, is one in which unity is not limited to uniformity; conformity to the law does not involve the sameness of persons. This is compatible with the demands of the "pluralists". However, the differences among persons are valuable only as they bear relationship to God, and therefore are not mere subjectivism. Gifts can be abused as well as used; they can be perverted, but, properly used, different qualities can manifest the same righteousness. What is required is a political dispensation which reflects this distinction of persons within the unity implied in relationship to "God". Again, we have tried to describe some of the elements of such a political dispensation.

Obviously, I cannot here go into these matters in detail; my colleagues and I have already discussed aspects of them rather thoroughly. This can be only a summary of what has gone before. But it does emphasize
the radical and real differences that arise from different "religions"; theological issues are real issues, even though some persons who belittle them will deny that they themselves are adopting a theological position, and even though theologians themselves, in embarrassment, often will maintain that they really do not mean what they are supposed to believe.

D.R.K.

("Basis", continued from p. 2)

contact his environment. The end of life is action, but a certain kind of action: selective action, or what is referred to as "right action". This proposition inevitably provokes the Pilatian retort (intended as a scoff more than as an inquiry), "What is right action?"

With respect to action in detail, an answer is not always easy. Fortunately, however, in the light of the Christian doctrine that love is the binding and moving force of the universe, a comprehensive response becomes possible. Action is "right" when it facilitates the co-ordination of all systems (psychological, material, emotional, spiritual) in the world, encouraging all the pieces to fit together without leaving any ragged and irritating joints (as the dialectician would have) and without the pieces ceasing to be pieces (as the oriental guru would have). The detailed act appropriate to a specific situation is that which best respects this principle.

Understanding of what constitutes right action grows with its practice. The practice never ends. It might be said that Christian society has been practising for two millennia, yet has always found itself in the position of having much farther still to travel than the distance it has already come. The practice is not only interior—the quickening of the mind and the burnishing of the soul—but also exterior. The integrating work spreads out from the individual in an ever-widening circle which permeates those which are extensions of human will and transforms them to levers multiplying the efficiency of the work. This action is the key to pushing back the environmental constraints upon the physical and mental freedom of mankind.

The advent of Christianity not only clarified the purpose of our existence, bringing into focus what man had previously glimpsed hazily, at best, but also provided new tools to assist in the fulfillment of this purpose. It offered a complexly balanced perspective on reality to correct the human tendency to become excessively preoccupied with its remote corners. It informed us that our proper position is in, not of, the world, allowing us to relate vigorously with our environment on the sole condition that we not be absorbed by it. Christianity also stressed the importance of choice, which meant personal freedom—the implications of which for human action are profound, since nothing so vitiates the quality of a deed as the rebellion of the heart of its doer against it.

Apart from all this, Christian doctrine supplied a unique revelation of the foundations of the creative process in its teaching about the nature of the Creator of all. The doctrine of the Trinity is an aid of indescribable value to understanding of the essential components of the right act. Father—Son—Holy Spirit: the Idea—its Expression—the link of Love. The three pediments of creativity, which contain the formula for efficiency in our doings; the integrated core of the Universe, whose ruptures we are to work to repair.

The realization that the failure of an act can always be attributed to one or more of three causes (namely, weakness in conception, weakness in execution, or inability of the personalities involved to relate) is a tremendous aid to effective action, for it facilitates the tracing and redemption of our errors. It furnishes criteria against which to evaluate our success, becoming, with time, a navigation device of great precision for keeping on the course of sanity through all our undertakings. Moreover, it enables us to maintain a healthy consistency among our minds, energies, and emotions and avoid the impotence which results from

(continued p. 8)
Freedom and Inflation
By Bryan W. Monahan

Inflation has been officially (for example, by Lord Rothschild and President Ford) designated an enemy. Of course, it is nothing of the sort. Inflation is an instrument of policy, and the enemy is the group ultimately responsible for the policy which is producing disaster and thereby catastrophe. The technical solution to inflation is quite simple, and is undoubtedly understood but opposed by higher financial circles whse re international monetary policy originates—a position of immense power. The elimination of inflation requires a challenge to that power. The essential facts concerning the mechanics of inflation, and the accountability modifications which would eliminate it, are outlined in the booklet Freedom and Inflation. If this can be brought honestly to the attention of business leaders and others obviously concerned with the ridiculous and dangerous situation developing daily in what should be this increasingly prosperous and happy land, and if it can be made known to politicians that the excuse of misinformation will no longer suffice as chaos increases under the pretence of ‘mismanagement’, the fate now so imminent may be averted. Totalitarianism in America is the alternative—inevitable unless informed public opinion becomes effective.

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[The creeds of Christendom concerning] God the Creator are not, as is usually supposed, a set of arbitrary mystifications irrelevant to human life and thought. On the contrary, whether or not they are true about God, they are, when examined in the light of direct experience, seen to be plain witness of truth about the nature of the creative mind as such and as we know it. So far as they are applicable to man, they embody a very exact description of the human mind while engaged in an act of creative imagination. ... The Christian affirmation is that the Trinitarian structure which can be shown to exist in the mind of man and in all his works is, in fact, the integral structure of the universe, and corresponds, not by pictorial imagery but by a necessary uniformity of substance, with the nature of God, in Whom all that is exists.


... the image of the Trinity was made in man, that in this way man should be the image of the one true God.

St. Augustine, On the Trinity