Confounding the Persons

An interesting aspect of contemporary prejudice has to do with the connotations of the word "authority" and its near relations. More often than not, "authority" is used pejoratively, and is linked to "power" of a particular kind ("Power or right to enforce obedience"—OED) and opposed (as in the OED's definition of "authoritarian", "favourable to the principle of authority as opposed to that of individual freedom") to "freedom". Such connotations convey a distorted idea of the correct relationship of "authority", "power", and "freedom".

In the first place, it makes "authority" contingent upon "power", which is an exact inversion of the proper relationship. "Authority" comes from the word "author"; the author of anything is "the person who originates or gives existence" to it, or, more comprehensively, "The Creator". Therefore, "authority" must be that which reflects the purpose or intention or design of the creator; it must be the law of the creature's being. To suggest that "power" can exist independently of or prior to "authority" is simply contradictory; "power" is "the ability to do or effect something or anything, or to act upon a person or thing", and cannot be in isolation from the Law. Thus, for example, my ability to write these words derives from the operation of a complex of laws which express the design of some "author"; I could not do what I am doing by ignoring that authority and standing on my head in a corner eating grapes. Any whim of mine, by which I attempt to bring reality into obedience to my will (into my "power"), remains merely fantastic unless it is "re-ligated" with authority.

Thus, in one very important sense, defiance of "authority" is no more than insanity. Any power(s) that we possess we possess only by virtue of our deference to "authority". The confounding of "authority" with "power" gives rise in turn to the false dichotomy, "authority" (or "power") versus "freedom".

Again, it seems axiomatic that if "freedom" is real, it must be supported by authority. If the universe is so authored that freedom is not integral to it, then to speak of "freedom" or to fight for "freedom" is merely vain sentimentalism and self-indulgence, the yearning for a fanciful ideal. If, on the other hand, "freedom" is real in the sense that it is part of the "warp and woof" of the universe, then, far from being antithetical to authority, "freedom" is contingent upon it. Like "power", it has as the ground of its being some law which inheres in the very nature of things. Moreover, of course, "power" and "freedom"—both intimately involved with "authority"—are intimately involved with each other: we can scarcely be said to be able to do something if we have no freedom to do it. "Power", then, derives from "authority"; at the same time, "freedom", far from being of another nature from these two, proceeds only from the realization of the proper relationship between "authority" and "power". Thus, if the conversion of "power" into "authority" represents a "confounding of persons", then no less does the opposing of "authority" and "freedom" represent a "division of substance". In the elaboration of this set of associations lies the explanation of the apparent paradox that "service" can be "perfect freedom".
Our Policy

SEED aspires to fulfill a unique role transcending the functions of other magazines and journals. Our purpose is neither to propagate nor to merely comment on current events. We believe that reality does exist: it is a matter of opinion and will assert its authority over all opinions that contradict it. All sanctions reside in reality; opinion has none. Secondly, we believe in the desirability of extending human freedom. Genuine freedom is contingent upon our comprehension of reality, since to the extent that men disregard reality, they court personal and social disaster.

In other words, far from conforming to the modern view that value judgments are to be avoided, SEED will intentionally consist of a succession of value judgments, which will constitute the principal criterion of its success. We cannot approach truth without rigorous formation of value judgments and perfecting of definitions. Discovery and refinement of the correct principles for human action and association will be the focus of our attention within the field of reality. We shall illuminate the way to the formulation of sound policy.

We have no delusions about the facility of the course on which we are embarking. It is possibly the most difficult course open to us. However, its value should be proportional to the efforts it requires. If the distractions to intelligence and which characterize contemporary society are, as we believe them to be, fundamentally unsatisfying, we are confident that some seekers of truth will involve themselves in the experiment that SEED represents. Such persons are the only ones capable of responding to such an experiment.

We approach our undertaking in the spirit of making an offering that will call forth latent creative capacities. If the ideas that SEED disseminates have validity and settle in good soil, they will grow. Moreover, their growth will be progressive and cumulative. SEED will serve as a medium permitting the cross-fertilization of adventurous intellects, thereby diminishing the effects of the atropic phenomenon which paralyzes development by compelling men to struggle to find truths that they have lost sight of and had to rediscover repeatedly during the past.

If our project is conducted correctly, it will at the least generate a new conceptual vigour among a segment of the community—and perhaps even result in the formation of new men.
Religation
by Geoffrey Dobbs

An expansion of a discussion paper read to the Science and Religion Forum on April 9, 1976, at their meeting at Cumberland Lodge, Windsor Great Park, on the theme: Man's Responsibility for Nature.

Our President is on record as stressing the need for philosophical sophistication in the science-religion debate—a need which I cannot supply, but the remark drove me to the dictionary to confirm what I understood by the word 'sophistication'. Just as I thought, according to the S.O.U.E.D. it means 'the employment of sophistry, the process of investing with specious fallacies', although, no doubt, the Bishop meant no more than 'up-to-date and academically acceptable in the use of current philosophical terminology'. However this may be, this Forum is concerned with science and religion, not philosophy and religion, and there ought therefore to be room in it for the scientist who is not sophisticated in academic philosophy.

Science shares with religion another dimension, beyond the cerebro-verbal plane of academic philosophy, namely that of the external world, in that its thoughts and symbols must be 'bound back', in detail, to an external, non-cerebral, non-verbal, reality. It is of the essence of the scientific method that theory must constantly be checked by observation and experiment. It is of the essence of religion that the professed faith must be put to the test of practice, both on the individual scale, and on the more visible, general, social scale. It is of the essence of words and of symbols of all sorts, that their connection with the referent is indirect—entirely through the human mind, and hence easily confused or diverted or even inverted. Hence it is natural enough that a scientist should view with some scepticism and distrust any lengthy or complex verbal process which is not constantly tied back to some observable reality, and to demand of it: 'What does this mean in practice?' And in so far as one applies this to the current state of the! world and of our society, it would seem apparent that the currently fashionable and accepted philosophy is widely at variance with reality, and that, wherever else we may look for a correct viewpoint, it cannot be in a direction which could be welcome or acceptable to those who lead the intellectual fashion.

While both complexity and simplicity have their proper and their corrupt uses, it is of significance that the word 'sophistication' should have been upgraded from a backword to a fashionable goodword, and that the word 'simple' is seldom used in a favourable sense but has been largely replaced by the sneerword 'simplistic', which is trotted out almost invariably to discredit any broad outline of the fundamental considerations or policies underlying a complex verbal statement, particularly where sophistication has been used for the purpose of deceiving the unsophisticated.

Philosophy may, or may not, be sophisticated. In the important, practical, and everyday meaning of the word, in the sense of a man's 'philosophy of life', everyone, necessarily, has a philosophy, that is, a conception of the nature of things, or of the universe, whether this is extremely simple, very complex and sophisticated, or even confused and wavering. Whatever it is, it determines his objectives, his long-term aims and the action directed thereto, which may be called his 'policy' in life, and it is this 'binding back' to reality which is probably the most useful meaning to attach to the word 'religion'. In this sense the Christian Creeds, for instance, constitute formulations of a 'philosophy', as does Marxist-Leninism, or a vacillating agnosticism or humanism, however vaguely formulated. Inevitably, they manifest themselves, individually, and socially where they are widely enough held, in 'policies' of action and inaction, and it is the completed whole which constitutes a religion, while the word 'religation' used, for example, by Coleridge and Gladstone may


2 Although the O.E.D. gives the pronunciation of 'religation' with a short 'e' and 'i' as in 'relief', this so closely resembles the more familiar word 'relegation', which has a contrary sense, that I have thought it justifiable to avoid confusion by pronouncing 'religation' with a long 'e' and a long 'i' as in 're-migration'.
serve to designate the process of 'binding back' the idea of reality to the actual reality of the world in which we live.

I cannot stress this too strongly. Unless it is realised that every conception of the universe and of man's place therein must issue in its resultant policy it is not possible even to begin to consider or discuss or compare the validity of different conceptions, or to study the vital process of religation in any detail or with any understanding. If the word 'religion' is restricted, as it usually is, to the organised Religions, or to a belief in God, or in the supernatural, those who reject these conceptions and adhere to atheistic, humanist, or materialist beliefs are never challenged to formulate their ideas and to relate them to policy, but are allowed to adopt the pose of persons with no commitment to faith or policy, who claim merely to be pursuing the path of reason. In fact, the policies which most of these people openly pursue are based upon assumptions about the universe and about man's place in it which are everywhit as much based upon faith as are the more precise statements formulated in the Creeds, and unless the nature of this faith is revealed or exposed, its religation in the world of today cannot be followed or ascertained, its ideas and policies cannot be related, and we cannot even start to escape from our present confusion, or to develop, in the Baconian phrase, "a just and legitimate familiarity between the mind and things".

Religion in Biology

I come now to the particular theme of the religation of different beliefs to the policies which determine teaching and research in biology—a subject in which a marked divergence of policy has again become manifest in recent years, although, in fact, it has been present, and at least implicit for over a century. That this is, fundamentally, a religious difference is obvious, much as it has been confused by the mass of verbiage expended upon it; and for any attempt at clarification it may be necessary to reconsider the great evolutionary conflict of the last century, as epitomised in the notorious confrontation at the British Association at Oxford in 1860 between T.H. Huxley and Samuel Wilberforce, which resulted in so famous a victory for the evolutionists over the 'special creationists' that neither side has yet recovered from it.

It has been said that Evolution expanded men's idea of the Creator in time as astronomy and physics had expanded it in space; but in both cases the enlargement was too vast, too sudden, too appalling. For centuries men had worshipped an Almighty and Everlasting God, Creator of all things, but when science lifted the curtain and gave a glimpse of what these words might begin to mean the sight was too much. A reasonable degree of almightyness, such as could create the world in six days and rest on the seventh, was conceivable, but when space and time yawned upon us in this awful way, the God who could create such a Universe became inconceivable. Indeed, we had always been told that He was beyond human conception, while we satisfied ourselves with conceivable images such as the Grand Old Man enthroned above the clouds; but when the traditional language concerning God was manifestly justified by our expanding knowledge, the inconceivable became the incredible, because beyond the finite scope of our imagination. Perhaps it is not surprising that the awe-inspiring process of Creation, as revealed under its new name of evolution, should have seemed a sufficient object for worship rather than the Creator.

Meanwhile, the idea of Creation had become identified with a shaman-like process of instant verbal magic, under the term 'Special Creation', in which one recognises what has been called 'the technique of the essential adjective'. For differentiation is necessary of the essence of creation, which can mean only that every creature must be 'special'—of distinctive character and marked off by distinguishing features—so that 'Special Creation' is a tautology meaning no more than 'Creation' if taken literally. But when this term is applied to a childish conception of the Creation based upon the literal interpretation of the words of Genesis, which is then superseded by a more mature conception involving time and continuity, it is not only the idea of conjuring into existence by verbal edict which is discredited, but to some extent also the idea of Creation and of a Creator altogether, in so far as the verbal situation is not consciously analysed.

Thus, what for some was the greatest enlargement and enrichment of the idea of the Creator for centuries, for others was the greatest retreat in history. For if 'Creation' is taken to mean that all species were brought into existence and fixed forever by divine edict in 4004 b.c., which we can now see to be mani-
festy untrue, then 'Creation' ceases to be credible, and we must seek another religion. For many scientists this religion has been achieved not only by substituting the fascinating and awe-inspiring impersonal process of evolution for the Creator, but further, since this process is held to culminate in Man, by substituting Man, or the Mystical Lump of Mankind, for God, as the Supreme Being of the Universe.

Man is held to be the Supreme Being because of his power—power, that is, to dominate and manipulate and change and impose his will upon all other beings by virtue of his Great Brain, which has enabled him to develop language and numbers and other symbols, and hence abstract thought and cumulative knowledge and method and cunning in imposing those thoughts upon the world around him.

There are many versions and variations of this widespread but unacknowledged anthropomorphism, in some of which the Supreme Being is represented by Groups other than the whole of Mankind, such as the State, the Party, the Class, or the Race, and in all of them the power to dominate is the criterion of supremacy, which necessarily results in a built-in policy of progressive centralisation of power in the hands of fewer and fewer, more and more powerful men, operating in the name of the Group, as the Head and Brain, so to speak, of the Collective Being. For the most part these philosophies are ill-defined, the most definite being that of Marxist dialectical materialism, though even that is drowned in a mass of chaotic literature; but they are discernible through hints and innuendoes, and by their relegation into policy. Among scientists a vague 'scientism', or scientific humanism, is fashionable, which among biologists may take the form of evolutionism, or evolutionary humanism, of the type publicised by Julian Huxley. Whatever the precise form of this substitute religion, it now dominates science, and especially biology, and in recent years, particularly, has been determining policies in teaching and research in a manner widely at variance with former policies largely determined by a general background of assumptions based upon Christianity. In view of the dangerous potentialities now deemed to be within reach of biological science, it is urgently necessary that we should take note of the direction in which that science is moving, and relate that direction to the religion of those who are directing it.

But until the science and religion discussion can escape from the distorted myth that the evolutionary conflict was between science and religion, in which, as school children are now being taught by anti-Christian theologians, science 'debunked' religion, it cannot begin to get off the ground. To a large extent it has become a contest between two religions, in which anthropomorphism made use of nineteenth century science against the prehistoric Chaldean science of the Old Testament, doggedly defended by a small group of Christians. In contrast, its even more famous predecessor in the reputed 'Science vs. Religion' contest—the confrontation between Galileo and the Inquisition—was not, basically, concerned with religion at all. All the participants were Catholic Christians, and the conflict was between the classical, pagan science of Ptolemy and the then modern, scientific viewpoint, developed under the influence of Christianity by Copernicus, Kepler, and Galileo.

**Evolution as a Religion**

In about half a century of experience of academic biology in various institutions, as student, teacher and research worker, the writer has always been aware of the dominant influence of evolutionary theory which, so long as it has remained what it claims to be: a scientific theory, has usually been constructive and stimulating; but in so far as it has, at certain periods, been held, and taught, as a religious doctrine opposed to that of Christianity, has become a mental prison, stifling the subject. For instance, one remembers that in the late 1920's biology was still dominated by eminent professors for whom the great evolutionary conflict of their nineteenth century youth was the chief inspiration, and who, in consequence, could scarcely look with interest at any organism from any other viewpoint but that of speculating about its ancestry and phylogeny. This had a particularly dreary effect upon the branch of biology to which I became attached, namely, mycology—the study of fungi—of which, at the time, there was virtually no fossil record, but which, by virtue of certain similarities, were deemed to be a degenerated group of algae which had lost their chlorophyll. This grossly distorted both the teaching and research on the group and delayed the development of the subject until the 1930's, when the late Professor Reginald Buller broke away from this traditional approach.
and initiated a lively and direct observation of these unique organisms, which turned out to possess a fascinating and distinctive character and nuclear life history, quite different from those of plants and animals, which is now widely held to justify classifying them as a separate Kingdom.

By the 1930's the dead hand of evolutionism had been, to a great extent, lifted, and most people had, by then, accommodated the facts of evolution in their religion, so that the biological sciences were able to expand, diversify, and explore their subject matter more freely and directly, especially in the fields of physiology and ecology; also in cytology and genetics, although it was a curious fact that, at this period, nearly all the more eminent geneticists were outspoken Marxist-materialists. It was during this period that the 'New Soviet Genetics' of Michurin and Lyvenko, made its appearance in the U.S.S.R., and drew attention to the power of political 'religion', commonly called 'ideology', to impose its nature upon science. 'Western' Genetics, condemned as 'Mendelistic-Morganist-Weismannite-bourgeois-reactionary-deviationism', was 'anti-dialectical' because of its insistence on the definiteness and relative immutability of the physical basis of heredity, which would impose unacceptable limits on the power of Man, the Supreme Being, to change 'Nature' as he wishes. As the following statement by the Presidium of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (quoted from Julian Huxley's Soviet Genetics and World Science, 1949) put it:

Michurin's materialist direction in biology is the only acceptable form of science, because it is based...on the revolutionary principle of changing Nature for the benefit of the people. Weismannite-Morganist idealist teaching is pseudo-scientific, because it is founded on the notion of the divine origin of the world and assumes eternal and unalterable scientific laws. The struggle between the two ideas has taken the form of the ideological class-struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Ironic as it may have been that committed Marxists and atheists such as Huxley, Haldane and Darlington should have been accused of adhering to the divine origin of the world, so far as they assumed unalterable scientific laws, the conclusion is quite logical that if there is an external reality, a nature of things not subject to the will of Man, then Man cannot be the Supreme Being. Conversely, if Man is the Supreme Being, then the 'nature of things' must be totally manipulable at his will, and, indeed, exists, and is created, in and by his brain, which, itself, is the highest product of the material process of evolution, and hence comprises and controls all that is 'below' it. There can therefore be no 'things-in-themselves', with their own nature, external to, and not totally knowable and manipulable by Man. This is condemned as the bourgeois deviation of 'objectivism', the 'crime', particularly, of the scientist who studies his subject-matter 'for itself', rather than on the revolutionary principle of changing it for human purposes.

There is a fundamental contradiction in the Marxist claim that their ideological science (even if the ideology is called materialism) puts them in touch with an objective reality external to the human brain, while at the same time they insist that this reality contains 'nothing but' that which can be fully understood and known by the human brain; but a faith in such contradictions is of the essence of dialectical materialism. Marxists, however, are unaware of their own 'fideism', but deceive themselves, with Engels, who wrote: 'The materialist outlook on nature means no more than simply conceiving nature just as it exists...'. If this were so, materialist science would necessarily be completely static, having achieved objective truth at its first step in every field; and, indeed, such materialists are liable to the illusion that they know everything—and that 'what they don't know isn't knowledge'. Their religion is based upon the projection of a property of human language and thought upon the external world. 'Dialectics', wrote Lenin, 'is the study of the contradiction within the very essence of things'. The very word 'contradiction' relates only to the use of words, and, if we think about it, we must realise that there can be no 'contradiction' in reality. A real thing cannot contradict itself in its being; it is only unreality which can be said to do this. There is no such direction as 'north-south', though the words may be said or written, as, for instance of a line running both north and south. There is no such tinge as 'black-white', though a thing may be part black and part white, or each in turn, or grey. But reality cannot contradict itself, as God cannot be mocked. Perhaps those two phrases may mean the same thing. In the end, even in the U.S.S.R., ideological genetics, which could maintain itself only by the brute force of the state, had to yield to the greater realism of the monk Mendel, though not until it had imposed imprisonment and martyrdom upon the great gene-
ticist N.I. Vavilov and many of his followers.

It may be that the brutal force of lyseanokism did something to postpone the dominance, in biology, of the evolutionary religion; but, in any case, the breakthrough into molecular biology initiated by the elucidation of the DNA molecule by Watson, Wilkins and Crick in the 1950's, plus the invention of the electron microscope revealing a whole new world of fine structure in the cell, resulted in a sweeping 'religious' revival which has transformed many biological Departments, especially those with younger and more 'withist' Heads, into chapels of evolutionary humanism, in which the traditional Christian is made to feel that he is under suspicion of 'heresy' or 'scientific deviationism', since, by now, the evolutionist has lost his power to distinguish between his science and his faith.

Non-Biology

Some of the leading revivalists, however, are in no such confusion. Dr. Francis Crick, for instance, in his book Of Molecules and Men (1966) clearly wants to substitute teaching in schools about natural selection and DNA for Christian education. Concerning the borderline between living and non-living he writes: "...only by a very considerable act of faith could one believe that an explanation would be possible in terms of physics and chemistry", but as a dedicated preacher of this faith he has done much to determine "the ultimate aim of the modern movement in biology" which is "to explain all biology in terms of physics and chemistry". One might add, that if this were the aim of a modern movement in physics and chemistry, it would be a perfectly legitimate application of these sciences. It is only as applied to biology that its implicit reductionism is ideological, rather than scientific, as also is his dogmatic conviction that Christian doctrine is 'utter nonsense' and that what he calls 'scientific values' should replace 'Christian values'. Science, in fact, does not deal with 'values', and the word should be 'materialist', or perhaps, in his case, 'evolutionist' rather than 'scientific'; but the use of the word in this context clearly shows us that science is being used as a 'cover' for a clash of religions.

These two religions, Trinitarian Christianity and various forms of materialism tending towards Anthropos- theism, relegate in widely different ways, both in society at large and, in particular, in the teaching of (continued p. 9)
("Religion", continued from p. 7)

biology and in the direction of biological research. As the potentialities for disaster inherent in recent advances in biology now rival, and perhaps surpass, those inherent in nuclear physics, it becomes, literally, a matter of life and death that the policies implicit in those concepts of the universe should be understood, and that their religion, or expression in practical affairs, should be studied in detail, and, moreover, studied with integrity and by acute intellects, since the situation is far from simple. Now that 'dogma' and 'doctrines' have become 'dirty words', there are so many vague ideas passed under the name of Christianity that their religion has become desperately confused; while on the other side, most of the materialists and evolutionists have never verbally formulated their beliefs at all, so that in practice the only way of arriving at them is to work back from the real policies which they generate. A further complication arises from the fact that many people suffer from a sort of religious schizophrenia, professing a Christian philosophy which they attempt to relegate in their 'private' lives, while supporting in public affairs an anti-Christian policy, derived, very often, from dialectical materialism which they have absorbed unconsciously through environmental pressure from their colleagues and from the mass media. The individual case, therefore, if not fully analysed, can be very misleading; but, even so, certain broad outlines in the relation between belief and policy can at least be discerned.

As Dr. Crick makes very clear, what he would call the 'modern' biologist, and I should call the atheist-materialist biologist, is not primarily interested in biology, in the sense of the study of living organisms as such, since his 'ultimate aim' is to explain them all in terms of physics and chemistry. This is no more theory, for in recent years it has been working through quite blatantly into University syllabuses and modes of teaching. Another natural tendency for anthropocentric, rather than theocentric, science, is to impose the fashionable opinions of influential or 'top people', often exaggerated in importance by the careerist and political set-up, upon the reality which is the subject of study. Thus, in recent years, the vogue for the Unity of Biology has inverted the order of teaching, so that first-year students are introduced first to the most advanced and complex aspects of the subject, such as DNA and electron micrographs, which can be genuinely studied only with the use of expensive and complicated apparatus far beyond their scope, while, very often, an elementary introduction to the actual organisms is postponed until the Final Honours year, or even omitted altogether. So University Departments are now turning out graduates with Honours Degrees who lack even a commonplace general knowledge of the common organisms in that branch of biology in which they are supposed to have been specialising. Living beings are deemed to be 'nothing but' lumps of DNA, mitochondria, etc., illustrating the Unity of Life. Their immense variety and peculiarities are considered just a crushing bore which interests no one but amateur naturalists and out-of-date, theocentric biologists.

(To be continued)

Now the word "religion" ... derives from a word meaning to bind back; it is related to the word ligament.... the word religion has to do with a conception of reality. It is the binding back either of action, or of policy—to reality....religion is any sort of doctrine which is based on an attempt to relate action to some conception of reality.

C.H. Douglas, The Policy of a Philosophy