The Cult of Sterility

It is a remarkable fact that as late as 1862 John Ruskin could divide "labour" into the categories of "positive" and "negative" on the basis of how it conduces to "life": positive labour is "that which produces life; negative, that which produces death; the most directly negative labour being murder, and the most directly positive, the bearing and rearing of children" (Unto This Last, para. 256). He is invoking, or reflecting, here an attitude that seems to have been deeply infused in human nature — the conviction that "birth", both as fact and, subsequently, as metaphor, is fundamentally desirable as an aspect of the processes of what has been called "great creating nature".

The force and universality of this image is attested to in the great literature of our culture, as well as elsewhere. One aspect of the calamity that has befallen Thebes at the beginning of Oedipus Rex is a blasting of reproduction: "A blight is on the fruitful plants of the earth./A blight is on the cattle in the fields./A blight is on our women that no children are born to them" (11.25-8). It is clear that the image is intended to evoke something insupportable, the consequence of the most terrible kind of sin and contagion. Again, when King Lear wants to call down the most dreadful of curses, he cries out to the heavens to interrupt or to annihilate the creative process itself: he asks the goddess Nature to make Goneril sterile: "Into her womb convey sterility!/Dry up in her the organs of increase./And from her derogate body never spring/A babe to honour her!" (I, iv, 284-90); in his bitterness and rage, his disintegrative passion, he cries for an end to procreation altogether, beseeching the thunder to "Crack Nature's moulds, all germens spill at once/That makes ingratitude to man!" (III, ii, 6-9) Shakespeare, like Sophocles, could assume in his audience a common horror of the destruction of fecundity.

In view of the archetypal nature of the idea of fecundity (not to mention the essential function of the principle itself), it seems surprising, if not appalling, that so many today so readily acquiesce in (if they do not actively support) attacks on it. This is true not only of more indirect betrayals of the creative process — for example, the "dumping" of produce for the sake of "maintaining price levels", or indeed the general pursuit of entropy for economic reasons — but even directly and immediately with respect to human life: a plethora of experts are kept busy trying to guarantee and refine sterility, and, as we know, publicists are not wanting for the calculated elimination of the results of temporary lapses from the sterile ideal.

One cannot but wonder what kind of comment on our "advanced and enlightened civilization" this sanctifying of a principle generally feared and abhorred by our forbears affords. Nor can one help reflecting that, apart from having terrible consequences for the victims of the professors of sterility, the betrayal of an archetype (or, more plainly, a truth?) must entail grave results for those who imagine themselves to have been liberated by such betrayal.
The I.M.F. Makes Its Move

Various articles in SEED have advanced the hypothesis that the recent spate of world crises (energy, monetary, political, etc.) could be components of a program planned to concentrate power at the international level. Some readers probably found this suggestion too cynical for their taste—especially those who accept the view that failures in dealing with these matters result more from the intractability of the problems than crooked motivation on the part of those supposedly contending with them.

Some trusting souls continue to dismiss the proposition (and the evidence) that a drive is on to create an international money cartel. The fact that comparable goals are being openly pursued by such commodities as oil, sugar, coffee, and the like are concerned makes no impression upon these innocents. We hope that the future will treat them kindly; but recent events confirm our suspicions that world-wide crises are the stepping-stones to success for aspiring monopolists and would have to be organized if they did not arise in the nature of things. An article appearing in TIME last month shows how accurate SEED’s predictions, based on this perspective, have been.¹

¹The piece in question describes how the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, Johannes Witteveen, lately managed to "herd" representatives of 14 nations together at a conference in Paris to establish a special $10-billion fund to be loaned out by the IMF to nations forced into "borrowing madly" by the energy crisis. The new fund, explains TIME, ... will greatly expand the IMF’s rapidly growing importance as lender of last resort to countries about to go on the rocks—and demander of unpopular economic steps that nations must take to qualify for their loans. That is a role that was never planned for the Fund when it was created at the Bretton Woods, N.H., international monetary conference in 1944 and would have seemed unlikely even four years ago.

The author of the article at this point does some astounding logic-bending in an attempt to suggest that the new initiative, which leaves national economies subject to discipline from outside because of a problem they have often played no part in creating, is really quite normal. After all, "The Fund is a giant organization" having "a Washington headquarters outfitted with teak-panelled walls and leather-tufted elevators." (continued p. 4)
Understanding Inflation: A Concrete Approach

In this continuation of an article begun last month, the author examines verifiable causes of rising prices. Having warned readers about the shortcomings of the abstract proposition that inflation is caused by "too much money chasing too few goods," he is endeavouring to show how cost factors exert a continuous upward pressure on prices. The first two of these factors—taxes and financing costs—were dealt with in the previous issue. He now extends this list and suggests how a general resolution of the fundamental cost problem could be achieved.

Cause No. 3: Depreciation

As a factor of inflation, depreciation is of special interest, for through its study we can comprehend the mystery of the hidden inflation (i.e., price decreases that are due, but that never become effective) which was mentioned earlier.

A company whose capital is being consumed or rendered obsolete over time naturally regards this loss among the costs of operating the business and recoups it in the prices demanded for product. Therefore, the greater the investment in mechanical means of production in a given economy, the larger the sums the public will ultimately have to pay for goods.

This may seem to be the exact opposite of the result we would expect. After all, the raison d'être of capital investment is to enhance efficiency. If prices rise as productive technique improves, the value of the improvements seems questionable. Why should capital growth generate inflation?

The answer is to be found not in the phenomenon of investment per se (which is generally a deflationary influence in real terms), but in the financial arrangements surrounding it, which make every capital development the inevitable cause of others. The normal effect of investing in new means of production is the increased availability of consumer goods; but, in the present financial context, an ancillary effect is the need compulsively to compound the means of production themselves.

To understand how this situation arises, we should consider what happens when a company is set up to manufacture some product. Typically, the initial step will be to obtain short-term financing in the form of a bank loan to get the organization of plant underway. The bank, let us recall, increases its assets by the amount of the loan, which goes to the company as an addition to the aggregate money supply. As installation of the plant proceeds, the money passes over from the company into the hands of the members of the public involved in the work.* The company at this point may seek more permanent financing for its project and "go public"—i.e., issue shares. Members of the public buy these by drawing on their savings, and the company can use the funds raised in this way to repay its bank loan, which is then cancelled out of existence.

At the end of this process, the financial relations among the bank, the company, and the public are as they were at the outset, with one exception—namely, that a mass of capital has been brought into existence whose depreciation is a liability against the money holdings of the public. The problem is that the public no longer possesses the money equivalent of this depreciation, for it has been annihilated by the bank.

Ironically, the public has built the new plant, but cannot meet the prices that must be charged for its product. The only way (apart from borrowing) to make up the shortfall in buying power is through the building of more plant, at least as costly as that just completed, to temporarily increase the pool of money in the hands of the members of the community. This second-stage expansion will necessitate a third, which will necessitate a fourth, and so on. In the end, the multiplication of capital becomes an end in itself—designated in bureaucratese as "make-work"—merely as a means of distributing income to cover the inflationary flood of depreciation charges flowing into retail prices.

The position may be summarized in the statement that the public are being fully charged for capital depreciation without being properly credited for capital appreciation. This explains why consumers enjoy only a small fraction of the benefits of improvements in the productive apparatus.

*At this point, the economists' maxims about "too much money chasing too few goods" may apply, because the money gets into the hands of the consumerate before the goods in whose prices the outlay will be included come onto the market.
Cause No. 4: Wages

Wages are direct production costs, and increases in wages therefore contribute to rising prices. Profits used for personal consumption can be included in this category.

However, the contention emanating from certain quarters that wage increases are the overriding or sole cause of inflation are untrue. The continual dissemination of this thesis reflects the inability of the individual to disguise his role in the problem as successfully as such powerful institutions as governments and banks.

Popular concern about obtaining wage and salary hikes becomes obsessive when upward-spiralling prices are destroying financial security. In other words, extravagant demands for raises are a response to, rather than an original cause of, inflation. If people were confident that a stable income would retain its purchasing power (or increase its purchasing power because of price declines reflecting more efficient production), the inflationary pressure exerted by the wage factor would almost certainly become insignificant.

Cause No. 5: Purchase of Intermediate Goods

The raw materials and semi-manufactures that producers buy constitute another important element in the costs of production. At every stage of refinement of these goods, the inflationary influences described above are operative. Each component of increased cost is added into prices as these goods move from factory to factory, until eventually the cumulative bill is presented by the retailer to the consumer.

Synthesizing a Solution

We hope that the preceding exposition has demonstrated to the reader's satisfaction that mere monetary stringency—the classic and rightfully detested response to inflation—can never adequately answer the problem, because it disregards the cost dilemma posed by the government's war, the banker's internal financial folkling, and the super-production treadmill. Curtailing credit to control inflation is like treating heart disease by draining the patient of his blood.

Once the public has been convinced of not only the nature but the artificiality of the problem of ever-rising prices, a solution will be possible. Fortunately understanding of the causes of inflation embraces all the knowledge required to synthesize such a solution. The credit-making power of the banking system is power not only to create costs, but also to cancel them. New credit could just as easily be used to discount prices as to inflate them.

This reform would rid us of a blow of the banker's racket and the burden of compounding depreciation charges; and, with these quandaries disposed of, people would be able to act on principle with respect to limiting the government's access to private property and conducting economic functions on a basis other than salaried one-upmanship.

The effects of thus eliminating cost pressures sustaining inflation would be as pervasive and salutary as the effects of allowing them to run unhampered have been pervasive and degenerative.

R.E.K.

("I.M.F.", continued from p. 2)

"Yet for almost three decades, it was content to monitor the system of fixed exchange rates of member countries." Of course, nobody believes any more that an organization should actually do what it was set up to do!

SEED's clairvoyance was purely deductive, for (TIME's assertions notwithstanding) the role initially envisaged for the IMF was the one it is just now assuming. Enhancing control by international finance over national economies was the purpose of the two basic plans given consideration at Bretton Woods. Both the Keynes and White schemes provided for the establishment of an international central bank with power to make or break nations through control of financial credit. The White plan eventually won favor, but ended up being adopted in a "grievously pared-down form," possibly because its "solid internationalism" was thought to be premature in view of public opinion at the time.

Promotion of the original conception has never let up since Bretton Woods, and the "central bank for central banks" now taking form under "the pressure of events" (contrived or otherwise) could have been predicted by anyone aware of this background.

R.E.K.

2 The phrasing is from THE LIFE OF JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, R.F. Harrod (New York, 1963), 551, 540.
John Wyclif: The Trinity in Politics

Among our special preoccupations has been the discerning of the "practical implications" (or practical applications) of religious doctrines, and we are therefore interested in examples of this endeavour among those who have preceded us, not only as precedents, but as analyses which might deepen our own understanding or alter our own perspective. John Wyclif's interpretation of political association in terms of the Trinity is a particularly intriguing instance of such analysis.

We have frequently in Seed alluded to the doctrine of the Trinity, which most people who have bothered to think about at all probably regard as a kind of mathematical mumbo-jumbo wholly consonant with what they feel is the essence of religion: obsfuscation. Others would call this obsfuscation a "mystery" and dismiss as irreverent any attempt, not just to explain it, but even to suggest that it has practical implications. While we certainly agree that the Trinity is a great mystery, "incomprehensible" (according to the Athanasian Creed) in both senses of the word, we cannot accept that this description of ultimate reality, so intrinsically maintained by the Church at various times, should have nothing to do with the world that that reality informs. To confess each Sunday that God is the Trinity while affirming in our daily lives, in our economic and political organization, etc., that He is only a unity, or a duality, or a disintegrant plurality, or illusory puff-paste, is more than a contradiction: it is infidelity.

Power

As we have often observed, the trinitarian concept is especially relevant to the question of "power"—not only political power, but the power to do anything. Dorothy Sayers has argued that the creative process, and its human imitator, artistic "creation", are essentially trinitarian, and, centuries ago, John Wyclif wrote that "God the triune is with each creature both myght, wisdom & goodnesse to kepe it, for ellis it schulde turne to nought", clearly indicating that, to the Christian, what gives us being is a trinity. Here, we see might, or power, implicitly opposed to "nought", to nothingness, or, perhaps, to entropy. "Power" cannot be isolated from 'wisdom' and "goodnesse"—or else it must come to nothing.

Political power, then, is merely a special case of power in general, but it is one in which, again, the trinitarian structure may be crucial. We have elsewhere mentioned G.K. Chesterton's contrast of the political implications of monotheism with those of trinitarianism: the one is a form of tyranny, the other a prototype of shared, concordant sovereignty, of harmonious differentiation. C.H. Douglas, too, repeatedly insists upon the importance of the trinitarian, as opposed to the monotheistic (or crudely monotheistic) concept. In Realistic Constitutionalism (1947), he wrote: "I want to put to you that this obsession with pure materialism—a special kind of monotheism—can be identified with both Professor Lukis's idea of the British Constitution, as a non-archy, a unitary sovereignty, the drive towards industrial and financial monopoly...", and, "Whether we look on...trinitarianism under the name of King, Lords and Commons or as Policy, Sanctions and Administration, the Trinity-in-unity has existed, and our national success has been greatest when the balance (never perfect) has been approached" (7). Christian doctrine, it seems to me, requires that such assertions be taken seriously, since, however else they may be criticized (Douglas's concluding statement, for example, needs to be documented), they are attempts to focus attention on the practical implications of Christian concepts.

The Three Estates

Such attempts have been in other ages more "normal" than in our own—which should surprise no one. Noteworthy in this regard is Wyclif's (and perhaps others') anticipation by nearly 600 years of Douglas's emphasis on the importance of the trinitarian structure of the social order. In a work attributed to Wyclif, "The Clergy May Not Hold Property" (1365-75?), reprinted by the Early English Text Society, the author argues that the three estates in society "answer to", or correspond to, the three Persons of the Trinity: "Almighty god the trinitye, fadir, sonne and holy gooste, bothe in the olde lawe and the newe hath foundi his churche up-on thre statis, answercyng or acordyng to thre persones and hir propirtes" (562). The first estate, corresponding to "the fadir in trinitye, to whom is a-
propred power", consists of secular lords, "the highest knyghte...the emperours, to the lowest saywer"; their function is the enforcing of law, "honyshynge and rewardyng to the enemies and servandis of god". "To the secunde persone in trinitye", Wycliffe goes on, "to whom is apropred wisdom or knynge, aswerswerth the state of the cleyry or of prestode"; their function is to get "heevenly knynge" and to teach people "the way to heuen". The special property of the third Person of the Trinity is "true loue or goode wille"; to this Person "aswerswerth the state of the commone [the commons] the whiche swich true loue & obedience wille to the statis of lordis & prestis" (365).

Whether this is an adequate analysis or not is problematical; it is more likely a preliminary intuition. For one thing, Wycliffe appears, to me, to emphasize too much the separation of the spheres of the three estates and to neglect (here, at least) their inter-relatedness: while he is properly wary of "confounding the Persons", he does not really caution against "dividing the Substance". Thus, if it is the place of temporal lords to execute the law, and that of the clergy to study and expound the divine law, what happens when the administration of secular law contravenes the authority of religion? In one sense, of course, if the divine (or natural?) law is the way the universe works, its contravention will bring inevitable natural consequences. At the same time, the elaboration of the divine law or authority must constitute not only a description of the conditions by which "power" (not tyrannical force) can remain effective, but a sanction against the misappropriation or misuse of power. Then, too, Wycliffe assigns to the third estate, the commons, the role of obedience. But, is that "true loue or goode wille" which is coerced? What responsibility does the person who obeys or accedes to a violation of divine law carry? Will and love both, by their nature, involve choice; choice requires the freedom to choose. Thus, while obedience to or service of the divine law may be (must be) "perfect freedom", simple submission to any kind of arbitrary "law" certainly is not. The secular power, then, can be effective only when it conforms to the laws of its own being, which it is the role of the "clergy" to describe, and when it earns the good will of persons in the community—who can, in turn, exercise this good will only when they themselves are "powerful", able to discriminate and to love, or choose. Perhaps it need not be said that the exercise of will supposes individuality; only persons can "love", although different persons may each love the same thing.

Even though Wycliffe's discussion of the three estates and their respective roles (and my commentary on it) may be in some ways inaccurate or imprecise, they do indicate the direction in which "Christian constitutionalism" should be looking. His use of the Trinity as the prototype for a constitution is crucial, for the Trinity is the pattern of differentiation, of balance, of harmony in distinction—of the society of Persons in the unity of Substance. As such, it seems an obvious exemplar (and more) for human society, in which we attempt to make freedom and law function together, and in which the science of power is so central. Here, the mutual dependence of power, wisdom, and will which Wycliffe describes is illuminating: power depends for its being upon wisdom (that is, discrimination of truth) and upon love (that is, choosing what is right); power which ignores these must dissipate. Thus, power is necessarily limited, and, paradoxically, when it is most limited, it is strongest. It is limited by law, but is effective only when it conforms to law, and it is limited by will, which means that it is greatest when it is operating in as many wills as possible, when it is distributed. The attempt to isolate power or 'might' from wisdom and good will must be attended by calmness; it must come to 'thought'.

This matter has been imperfectly elaborated—by Wycliffe, and, certainly, by me. But its importance is attested to by those who have had "intimations" that the trinitarian structure is essential, and we have quoted many of these elsewhere. Two others are worth mentioning.

**Triple Sovereignty**

One is a certain G.H. in his book _The Mirror of Malaclese_ (London, 1619)—a book of emblems and explanatory poems. Emblem 2 depicts a lion, sitting upon a "three-headed Mountain high, Which represents Great Bronzeke Monarchie". In his right hand, the lion is holding a sword and a balance, which represent "<b>Force to punish or protect"; above his head is a caduceus, representing "Wisdom from above"; and in his left hand is a cornucopia, representing abundance and distribution. These three correspond roughly to Wycliffe's power, wisdom, and "true love"—at least insofar as
abundance can be said to be the gift of grace and to involve, like love, distribution. G.W., of course, gives all these attributes to monarchy, whereas Wyclif divides them among the several estates. Nevertheless, here again is an intimation that sovereignty is somehow three-fold, consisting of law sanctioned by heavenly wisdom, and involved with distribution. The relation between the first two of these is made explicit in Emblem I, which displays a crown and a bishop's mitre side by side; the commentary cautions kings against violating divine law: "...rums more power not built on Wisdomes fort,/Does rather pluck downe kingdoms than support./Perfectly mist, thus Power and Knowledge mov'd/About thy lust designes enspear d with Love". Here, once more, we see emphasis placed upon the tri-unity of power, knowledge, and love.

The other is William Lee, a chaplain to James I, who in his Vox Clamantis, a still voice to the three three-honorable estates of Parliament (1621), points to the tri-partite structure of 'PARLIAMENT, which consists of a three-fold State, and all of God, the King as the Monarchy, the Upper-house the Aristocracy, and the Lower-house the Democracy..." (41). Interesting here is the implicit suggestion that neither monarchy, nor aristocracy, nor "democracy" can stand alone; any one of these is a unitary sovereignty, and therefore potentially a tyranny. Lee seems to recognize, again, that a three-fold sovereignty is desirable, but he is unsure precisely how this should be constituted. Subsequently, of course, we have done no better—worse, in fact, since we have merely substituted the unitary sovereignty of democracy (the ballot box) for that of monarchy (if there indeed ever was absolute monarchy in England or her constitutional offspring). In fact, the conventional notion of democracy—and its practice—doubly betray the concept of trinitarian sovereignty: first, of course, the "commons" are exalted at the expense of the other two spheres, until, as Prof. Laski has said, "The core of the British Constitution is the supremacy of Parliament [i.e., the House of Commons]; second, "majority democracy" effectively obviates the exercise of responsible choice, which Wyclif regards as integral to the "commons".

Again, the picture which emerges from these speculations is a paradoxical one, and one concerned with the science of "power". Power can persist only insofar as

(continued p. 8)
Freedom and Inflation

By Bryan W. Monahan

Inflation has been officially (for example, by Lord Rothschild and President Ford) designated an enemy. Of course, it is nothing of the sort. Inflation is an instrument of policy, and the enemy is the group ultimately responsible for the policy which is producing disaster and threatens catastrophe. The technical solution to inflation is quite simple, and is unaccountably understood but opposed in higher financial circles whereas international monetary policy originates—a position of immense power. The elimination of inflation requires a challenge to that power. The essential facts concerning the mechanics of inflation, and the Accountability modifications which would eliminate it, are outlined in the booklet "Inflation and Inflation". If this can be brought forcefully to the attention of business leaders and others obviously concerned with the ridiculous and dangerous situation developing daily to what should be the increasingly prosperous and happy land, and if it can be made known to politicians that the excuse of mismanagement will no longer suffice as chaos increases under the pretence of "mismanagement", the fate now so imminent may be averted. Totalitarianism is the alternative—inevitable unless informed public opinion becomes effective.

$1.00 each posted

OSUIA PUBLISHING

("Wyclif", continued from p. 7)

it is circumscribed by law and "love"; "law" suggests the existence of unalterable external principles, while "love", although it has objective characteristics, operates subjectively: that is, only individual persons can love. Therefore, one of the laws of power is that love, or will, or choice, must be distributed; by definition, it has to be. Thus, it appears that an adequate political dispensation must somehow accommodate the individual relationship of each person to "authoritative" (in both the popular acceptance of the term, and the special way in which we have used it). Once more, the situation suggested is one in which what Wyclif calls "power" is in fact only delegated power or executive power—those executing it are empowered only by the willing obedience, or voluntary subscription, of those in whom "love" or will resides, individual persons. At the same time, such executives are subject to the sanctions inherent in natural law, which describes the conditions under which all associations work. In terms of this analysis, one can only wonder what is the status of a social organization in which both "law" and "love" are defined by mass prejudice.

D.R.K.

1. "The Ave Maria", reprinted in The English Works of Wyclif, Early English Text Society. All subsequent citations of Wyclif will be from this edition. I have taken the liberty of modernizing the spelling of some words in the quotations.

Now it may be emphasized that a centralised or pyramid form of control may be, and is in certain conditions, the ideal organization for the attainment of one specific and material end. The only effective force by which any objective can be attained is in the last analysis the human will, and if an organization of this character can keep the will of all its component members focused on the objective to be attained the collective power available is clearly greater than can be provided by any other form of administration, and for this reason the advantage accruing from the use of it for the attainment of one concrete objective... is quite incontrovertible; but every particle of available evidence goes to show that it is totally unsuitable as a system of administration for the purposes of governing the conditions under which whole peoples live their lives, and that it is in opposition to every real interest of the individual when so used.

C.H. Douglas, "The Pyramid of Power"