The Realistic Position of the Church of England

By C. H. DOUGLAS

III.

The reader will probably have by now suspected that we are coming to grips with the preamble to the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, “The political has nothing in common with the moral... Our right lies in force. The word ‘right’ is an abstract thought, and proved by nothing. The result justifies the means.”

Or, as Frederick of Prussia, the so-called Great, put it, slightly differently: “Above all, uphold the following maxim ‘that to despoil your neighbours is to deprive them of the means of injuring you.'” (Political Testament, pp 8-9, Boston Edition, 1870).

It is unnecessary to waste time on the “forgery” issue in regard to the Protocols. The Protocols have existed for at least forty years; and they are certainly one of two things—either a Plan or a Prophecy. Someone or some group either drew up the most able and cold-blooded scheme, which requires and has obtained world-wide and powerful co-operation; or someone or some group was and is gifted with a clear insight into what it is the fashion to call “trends,” surpassing anything in history, and more precise and unequivocal than anything recorded and historically proved of the “old testament” prophets.

But at the moment, this issue is not vital. What is the philosophy, and, in consequence, the policy embodied in the Protocols, and in Frederick of Prussia’s “Political Testament”?

The first point to which due weight must be given is that there is a great deal of realism in both of them. Protocol No. 1 premises that men with bad instincts are more numerous than those mainly actuated by good; that everyone who has penetrated even the fringe of Big Business and world politics cannot fail to surpass anything in history, and more precise and unequivocal than anything recorded and historically proved of the “old testament” prophets.

But it is not necessary to go outside the experience of an ordinary lifetime to learn that the doctrine of original sin has a real meaning, while anyone who has penetrated even the fringe of Big Business and world politics cannot fail to have sensed something of the spirit which the Protocols embody. It is not the everyday transactions of commerce which are objectionable, such as the abused profit system, or the “capitalism” of the local garage proprietor. For the most part, the wickedness of the world is not even understood by the masses who are affected; and it is never attacked in Party Politics.

It is important to notice that the “Elders of Zion,” however they may be, have certain premises in common with their irreconcilable antithesis, Christianity.

Both philosophies explicitly and implicitly condemn and discredit the idea of human equality. (”In my house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you.” “Doth a bad tree bring forth good fruit?” “He that would be greatest among you, let him be your servant.” There is no essential difference in the premise; there is every difference in the policy as we can see when we come to examine that aspect. There is nothing in the Protocols so devastating as the injunction: “Cast not your pearls before swine, lest they turn upon you, and rend you,” although the same idea is emphasised.

But the agreement on premises goes further. Both Christianity and the Protocols recognise the primacy and formative nature of ideas. “My Kingdom is not of this world.” “There is nothing more dangerous than personal initiative” (the pursuit of an inborn idea), Protocol V, par II, Marsden Translation.

Christianity, moreover, does not scorn this world. “Seek ye first the Kingdom of God, and all these things shall be added unto you.” It is not improper to say that Christianity is inter alia a technique by which a man, by control of his idea, may gain such part of the world as in the nature of things appertains to him, and there is no injunction of which I am aware against that. But there is a warning. “What shall it profit a man, if he gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” The objective of the Protocols is to gain the whole world.

It would be possible to pursue this aspect of the matter to much greater length. The objective I have in mind, however, is to establish the fact that the Protocols are a Book of the Bible of Anti-Christ, and that its policy, Communism and Socialism, which can be easily linked with Frederick of Prussia as their first prominent and identifiable exponent, are essentially the policy of a religion, of which the energising factor is physical force and the fear of it. And the policy of that religion is plainly labelled in the names Communism and Socialism—it is the treatment of men as a collectivity. The civilisation which results from that policy is exemplified in Russia and in that to which we are fast moving in this country, the Police State, with its “direction” of “labour” (notice the collectivity). Its essential characteristics are fear and violence—cf. the Protocols. The civilisation of Christianity was incompletely embodied in the culture of medieval Europe, and is exemplified in Magna Carta. Its essential characteristic is courage, allied to “love,” cf. “Perfect love casteth out fear” (a rather unsatisfactory translation). The knight of chivalry, the militant Christian ideal, watched his armour alone in the chapel through the night, and then went out to do battle alone for love against fear and oppression—a very complete allegory. The “mass” is unsavable, just as a mob is insane (“without health”); the object of Anti-Christ is to keep mankind in ever larger mobs, thus defeating the object of Christ, to permit the emergence of self-governing, self-conscious individuals, exercising free will, and choosing good
because it is good. The energising factor is attraction, inducement.

With such apology as may be necessary for this incursion into theology, we can return to the unsatisfactory part which the Church of England plays in the world drama, and the altered attitude which seems to be essential to its survival. It appears to be axiomatic, as the Roman Catholic Church contends, that Socialism and Communism must be fought by any church which calls itself Christian, whatever may be the differences of opinion as to the weapons to be employed. A church which cannot see that Europe was free and attractive to just the extent that it was Christian, and is torn with dissension and is losing its charm to the extent that it is Socialistic, has betrayed its vocation.

(To be continued).

PARLIAMENT

House of Lords, October 22, 1947.

Address in reply to His Majesty's Most Gracious Speech.

Lord Rankeillour: My Lords, I desire to take up very little time on the question of Burma. I will not review the policy of the Government on this occasion; I will only remark that recent events in Mandalay do not appear to constitute a happy augury for peace and harmony under the new order.

But what I am most concerned with is the question of minorities in Burma...

What safeguards will there be for them and for their rights? I am afraid I have said this several times before, but even if I drive your Lordships to extremity of boredom, I must say it again. The only safe protection for minorities lies in a fixed Constitution with organic laws. Outside this House, if you attempt to talk about fixed or fluid Constitutions, even with a person of the highest education, who has not given any special attention to this matter, you are stared at with a look I can only describe as one of goose-eyed stupidity. People do not seem to understand the difference, and I think the difference is essential. If, for example, in this Burmese Constitution there is a section saying that there should be no discrimination on the ground of race or religion, that is no use unless it is embodied in an organic law. If the legislative body can change the Constitution as and when they choose, on the long view at any rate and maybe on not so long a view, the safeguard is worthless. Besides which, it must be interpreted by an independent supreme court. The model, of course, for a fixed Constitution with organic laws is the United States of America. Although organic laws are not always properly applied, they are a very great safeguard, not only to the minority principally concerned but also to the minorities who might be unpopular at the time. Therefore I would ask the noble Earl who is to speak for the Government, what are the safeguards embodied in the Agreement, and how is the intended Supreme Court sought to be constituted?

I shall not go back to the position of India, but I must express the opinion I expressed before, that the abandonment of India was a grievous national sin, and although in Burma the tragic consequences may be on a lesser scale and may be much longer deferred, all the elements of future trouble are there. I therefore put these three points to the Government.

The Marquess of Reading: My Lords, looking back upon yesterday's debate I have come to think that perhaps those who spoke from the Opposition Benches were a little hard upon His Majesty's Government, who deserve commiseration rather than condemnation, after all, they were with one crisis, a coal crisis, behind them, with another crisis, an economic crisis, all about them; and then suddenly out of the blue overnight, or anyhow over the weekend, bursts upon them a new vast momentous crisis of this menacing struggle of the Peers against the people...

Viscount Swinton: The noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, is the ablest advocate the Government have. Therefore, we must assume that what he said yesterday was the best defence that could be put up for this strange proposal. I never heard him make a worse speech. Perhaps, as my noble friend has said, he never had a worse case to defend. In so far as he made any case at all, it was a case for the reform of the composition of this House and for the limitation of its powers. He spoke of the possibility of the backwoodsmen suddenly emerging from the back woods. If that argument has any value at all, other than a bogey value, surely it is an argument for the reform of the composition of the House of Lords and has nothing whatever to do with its powers. The Lord Chancellor rejected that. He said: "Here you are, a perfectly admirable body, doing your work in a most admirable manner." That is what he and his colleagues have been saying for the past two years.

In the early days they may perhaps have been a little surprised (I do not think they need have been) at the wise leadership of the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, or surprised at the loyalty with which he was followed. He was followed, loyally because those whom he leads shared his opinions, and would not have accepted leadership in any other direction. We were led where we desired to go, as a united team, thinking the same and trying to do our duty. The Government have long since ceased to be surprised. Your Lordships will remember that the noble and learned Viscount, the Lord Chancellor, cited the case of the Coal Act. He said how difficult it would have been if the Coal Act had been held up. But it was not held up. If that argument has any validity, it is not an argument for introducing a Bill now. It might have been an argument for introducing a Bill at the beginning of the first Session of this Parliament.

As for the flimsy claim to a mandate, I do not think that that was made seriously by him. The best case he can make is this. He says, in effect, that we have a very reasonable Government (let us accept that, for the sake of argument) and a Second Chamber which behaves in the most medled manner. But then he says we must look ahead for thirty-six years. That, indeed, is facing the future! If that is the claim, observe what it means—permanent legislation. This is not a case of temporary emergency powers. Let me put to the noble and learned Viscount the application of his own argument. Be it that this Government are as reasonable as he himself and his colleagues in both Houses have said this House is. If that is true, then why take any action at this time? He says that we must legislate for thirty-six years. In thirty-six years shall we always have such a reasonable Government? Can he so guarantee?

Lord Calverley: Yes, if you return us.

Viscount Swinton: Suppose we had a Government not so reasonable, which was determined to carry legislation for which it had no mandate whatsoever, to which the majority
of the country was bitterly opposed. That, after all, as we all know—and I do not think there is any difference between us on this—is the regular Communist technique. It is the technique of all minority dictatorships which, by hook or by crook, seize power. One of the first things they do is to try to sweep away both Chambers; and they certainly wish to sweep away any revising Chamber. If we had a Government like that, determined to carry legislation to which the country was bitterly opposed, they might be well content, rather than face the country, to wait a single year and get this bitterly opposed legislation through. In such circumstances, the safeguard of democracy is imperilled, and might well be destroyed. It would be wicked to pass legislation of this kind to meet a temporary internal difficulty in a Parliament at such risk to the best interests of the country.

The Earl of Ildefonse: My Lords, like the preceding speaker, I am proposing to avoid touching upon the constitutional issues except perhaps to say this, that His Majesty's Government may have found that the ermine-trimmed robe of the Peer is a very useful red rag waved in the eyes of John Bull in order to divert his attention from other aspects of the Government's programme which are likely to be of much more immediate effect, and perhaps of even greater ultimate effect, upon the lives of His Majesty's subjects.

I beg your Lordships to read and read again the fifth paragraph of the gracious Speech, in which the subject of the proposal then we shall be in the dog fight ourselves, and we shall, no doubt, find ourselves divided, some for and some against, and that unity of the men of good will of no Party will be broken. Can we go on bidding our people to continue with their hard work, with their sacrifices, with their saving of everything they can save, with their united effort and their Dunkirk spirit, as if this dog fight were not there at all? No doubt, if no other course is left to us, we shall do precisely that thing, but what we say will be drowned by the noise of the fight and will not be heard, and so our dearest efforts will be frustrated.

Lord Altrincham: My Lords, we have reached the end of the debate, and I only regret that so many of your Lordships silently faded away before the most reverend Primate spoke. That is how authoritarian governments and how dictatorships have become established again and again in the history of the world, and by constitutional means.

That danger is gravely accentuated in this country by two features of our political system. One is that we have no written Constitution. Parliament can, at any time, do anything it likes. The other is that we—or at any rate both the great Parties, for I know that the Liberal Party is not of the same mind—favour an electoral system which provides for large majorities and strong Executives out of all proportion to the majority of votes on which these Executives are based. Both these features give exceptional importance to the constitutional procedure in the relations of the two Houses of Parliament. The Parliament Act deals with that point. It makes express provision in one matter, and it is a matter in which, and the only matter in which under the Parliament Act, the power of this House is unlimited. That is, if the Lower Chamber, the popular Chamber, proposes an extension of the life of Parliament—proposes, that is to say, to prolong its own existence beyond the five years laid down in the Parliament Act.

The Lord Chancellor may say: "Well, we will not touch that. You may rely upon us to leave that in the Parliament Act." I believe him when he says that. It would not enter my imagination to suppose that Ministers of the character now governing us would make a change of that kind. But what is the value of the assurances they give us? What right have they to give us their assurances? How can they pledge the future? Once they have opened wide these gates, once this precedent is established, then a fundamental change in our Constitution can be introduced by the will of one House, without consulting the people whose liberties are at stake, without a mandate of even the shadowiest sort. Then indeed the gates will be wide open for further amendments of any kind by the will of one House.

This sudden departure, in the circumstances which have more than once been faithfully described in the course of this
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From Week to Week

The Administration's fairly narrow escape from defeat in connection with the abolition of the basic petrol ration confirms the observations of a Scottish political observer in whose judgement, as well as sources of information, we place much confidence. Before giving these at some length, it may be emphasised that the leit motif of petrol rationing, or the withholding of it is primarily tyranny, politely called control. We doubt whether an appreciable quantity of petrol will in fact be saved, just as we doubt whether there is urgent need to save it. But a whole new series of crimes will be created, and selected criminals will be taught that it is better not to incur the dislike of political bosses, even minor ones.

Our informant finds that in practically every rank and grade of society with which he comes into contact—a wide range—there is astonishing unanimity in assessing the nature of the Administration. It is National Socialism closely allied to, if not identical with, Hitlenism, popularly, if not very accurately called Fascism.

He is confident, and we agree, that official Conservatism has made little or no headway. (We do not think it has a hope until Mr. Churchill, Mr. Eden and Mr. Harold Macmillan are eliminated). The lower class of unskilled labour has never been so well off in modern history, and it would ensure the return of "Labour" if there was an election in the near future. It is doing little or no work, and being paid fantastic wages most of which are spent in the Black Market, and the Black Marketeers are equally delighted with the state of affairs. These sections of the country are entirely contemptuous of national or any other interest save their own—even that of their wives and children, whom they intimidate.

The remainder of the population is sullenly antagonistic but helpless, and, outside professional electioneering circles, nearly apathetic to official Conservative appeals. The small body of Liberal persuasion is more antagonistic to Conservatism than to Socialism; but is losing ground steadily.

Two other points mentioned by him are informative. The first concerns the aggressive, almost impudent, confidence of the German employes of L. G. Farben, the opposite number of Imperial Chemical Industries (I.C.I.). And the second is that there is an impression that the immediate Big Idea is to cause an American industrial crash by choking U.S. exports and forcing imports—the reverse of the Cripps policy.

All we can say in regard to this is that it is so insane that it might easily be true.

It might have been thought that Mr. Churchill's record as Chancellor of the Exchequer would have warned him off the economics race course, but evidently he is all for letting bygones be bygones. It is a policy in which he was brought up; politics, to him, is a game in which the Lord's Schools play each other year after year with fresh teams but unchanging conventions, and it is the game which is important, not who wins. That was all right when it was the Lord's Schools, and the conventions, even if not unexceptionable, were observed. The crowd, on the whole, did not do so badly, whichever side won.

But we have changed all that. The Lord's schools are not what they were, a good deal of baseball has been introduced into the game, and barracking by the crowd has come to be the main return for their money. Mr. Churchill's cleverness, which is undoubted, is nor of the type to make him a convincing exponent of realistic industrial and financial policy nor do his advisers and transatlantic friends commend him to a population which has not quite made up its mind which of our glorious allies it likes least.

How long will be the period of development for atomic energy, and, perhaps more important, how soon nuclear fission can be applied to some more plentiful "element" than uranium, we do not pretend to guess. But that the derivation of immense quantities of power in available form, by the agency of nuclear energy, is fairly certain. Perhaps more important than the technical aspect of the matter is its bearing on industrial politics. The outlook in this regard is disquieting.

The Pendulum

The first consequences of the results of the municipal elections will doubtless be a whoop of joy from the party organisers of the "Conservative" Party and steps to consolidate an "on to victory" movement with a general election in prospect. Not only may much happen before a general election comes, but even should it come soon there is no certainty that a "landslide" from under the feet of the Labour Party would occur. However that may be, the task before Social Crediters is clearer than ever: to seize upon what is real in the situation and to attach to it organically elements of reality which will not cohere spontaneously. The "feeling" is evident. It is also real. But even right and real feeling is useless in a political vacuum. The action which should accompany it is problematical and direction of it into inappropriate channels is easier than into appropriate channels. Demos can see the colour of the string, more easily than the breed and temper of the pup. A "national" newspaper chooses the occasion to herald Mr. Macmillan as a rising star. It may be a compromising testimonial.

Many of our readers are now aware, and all will be, of a campaign, which has not been publicised in this paper, to extend our sphere of influence. We are greatly encouraged by letters we have received from new readers. Those who are most real in their own lives are perhaps the last to turn to the unreality of politics, and do so at all very often only under compulsion. At least it seems that the compulsion is beginning to be applied. It is natural to expect that a greater realism will be imported into political action.
"The First Overt Act"

At about twelve midday on December 7, 1941, President Roosevelt was shut in his oval study with Harry Hopkins. All incoming telephone calls were shut off; Roosevelt had his stamp collection spread out, Hopkins played with the dog. While they did this, they, and a handful of others, knew that within the next hour Japan would launch a 'surprise' attack, and that the U.S.A. would be irrevocably at war.

The background of the Pearl Harbour catastrophe has received very little publicity in Australia; in America, however, it has been the subject of a number of enquiries, first administrative, and ultimately Congressional. The latter made public a wealth of hitherto secret information; and from the vast mass of evidence and records, Mr. Morgenstern has pieced together in orderly and consecutive fashion the story of which Pearl Harbour was but the culmination.

The key to the whole sequence is contained in a message dispatched under the signature of the Chief of Staff, General Marshall, on November 27, to General Short, the officer commanding Hawaii. Included in this message were the words "If hostilities cannot, repeat cannot, be avoided the United States desires that Japan commit the first overt act."

General Short, in consequence, was instructed to "take such measures as you deem necessary," but "not to alarm the civil population or disclose intent."

To grasp the significance of this order, it is necessary to comprehend the constitutional position of the President. The President of the United States has the virtually unfettered power to conduct the foreign policy of the country up to the point of signing treaties (which requires Senate approval) or of declaring war (which requires Congress action). Up to those limits he can do very much as he likes, without disclosing what he is doing.

Now, in a number of ways, but more particularly in a secret agreement with Churchill at the Atlantic Meeting, Roosevelt had engaged to get into the war; at the same time, however, he had also engaged, particularly in election speeches, not to send Americans to fight overseas. The problem of foreign policy, therefore, was to produce a situation where America would have to fight, public opinion notwithstanding.

The solution was easy. Some time before, America (i.e., Roosevelt) had begun economic sanctions against Japan. These were intensified. Now Japan is one of those nations which must receive imports in order to exist, let alone carry on a war; and the provision of scrap-iron and oil over a number of years by America had permitted her to become thoroughly embroiled in the China "incident." The progressive embargo on these and other supplies faced her with the alternatives of stopping the war in China, or of risking everything by entering the world war.

From the documents adduced by Mr. Morgenstern it is quite evident that Japan was not only willing, but anxious to give up the China "incident" and come to a lasting agreement with America, and made proposals accordingly. The story of the negotiations which followed is somewhat complex, but it is dominated by two factors. On the side of the United States, there was a refusal to agree to anything which would debar the States from entering the European war; on the side of Japan, there was the time-factor. Japan's situation was that she must reach an agreement, cave-in completely, or fight. An agreement would safeguard her national existence; a cave-in would place her at the mercy of the Powers of the world; and the possibility of fighting was conditioned by the time-factor. In these circumstances, the position was entirely dominated by the United States.

On top of this, however, was the fact of crucial importance that the States had 'broken' the Japanese secret codes—an achievement referred to in the small circle aware of it as Magic. In consequence, the States (i.e., Roosevelt and his immediate circles) were aware of the instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to its diplomats and agents, and knew also what intelligence was being submitted by Japanese spies. In these circumstances, Roosevelt and Co., were able to 'see through' the Japanese diplomatic negotiations; they could assess them at their true value.

While it is true that there was a vicious war party in Japan, it is certain that those genuinely desiring a peaceful settlement held the power, and made sincere attempts to reach a peaceful and satisfactory solution. Great efforts were made, for example, to arrange a meeting between the Japanese Emperor and President Roosevelt. But all these negotiations and attempts were stalled by the Americans, who were well aware that if a solution was to be found short of war, it must be found before a 'dead-line', the date of which was known to them from Magic. They chose war. They turned the screws on Japan, sabotaged all negotiations, and even then were fearful until the end that Japan would fail to commit the 'first overt act.'

This aspect, and its immediate consequences in the casualities and losses of Pearl Harbour, are what particularly concern Mr. Morgenstern. But the great interest and significance of his book are revealed in a much longer perspective.

Roosevelt was, of course, a member of what was known colloquially, even before the outbreak of the war with Japan, as the "War Cabinet" which included the Secretary of State, Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and usually the chief of staff and chief of naval operations. It is predominantly these that Mr. Morgenstern is concerned. But Roosevelt belonged to another high group, the so-called "Brains Trust"—an unofficial Cabinet, and the equivalent in America of Political and Economic Planning in England, with which it had actual links. The Brains Trust was largely composed of, and was certainly dominated by Zionist Jews of whom some were financiers.

Now this Brains Trust was not peculiar to Roosevelt. It represented nothing more than the metamorphosis of the group which for some decades had constituted the important part of the 'set-up' behind successive Presidents. Its members were not Americans, but Jews, and their interests were not American, but international: America was to them merely the most suitable base for their operations, and the American Administration the most suitable instrument outside their peculiar and essential instrument—international money power.

So far as their policy involved Japan, the history dates from the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese war. In order to "admonish the ruling class [of Russia] by an object lesson" ("Mr. Schiff had a grudge against Russia on account of his race") (Jacob Schiff, Life and Letters, by Cyrus Adler), an...
Imperial Japanese Government Sterling loan was arranged, the effect of which was to put the British to work building the Japanese a navy, thus inaugurating an Asiatic war complex. At the same time, Schiff subsidised the Nihilists in Russia at a cost estimated at more than fourteen million (gold) roubles (Figuaro, Paris, February 20, 1932). In short, Japan was financed by the Jews to make war on a Russia which they weakened by financing subversive activities.

The next incident in the chain of events we are considering was the abrogation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance under pressure from Washington in 1921—an abrogation which limited Japan to a position of naval inferiority. In the meantime, the "ruling classes" in Russia had been overthrown, their place being taken by a revolutionary government composed at that time almost entirely of Jews.

Once the significance of these major moves is grasped, the subsequent fate of Japan is easily explicable. Japan was used, as one country after another is used, as a piece in the game of super-national politics. The objective of the game is world dominion for the small group of Jews who are behind the Brains Trust, the Palestine Economic Corporation, and Wall Street, and P.E.P., the London School of Economics, the Bank of England, Imperial Chemical Industries, etc., in Great Britain.

The strategy is war, war, war. One country after another is manoeuvred into conflict with others—a process which normally would terminate in one country ultimately emerging as the sole victor. And if the effective government of that country is in the hands of Jews, the hegemony of the world will come to them.

Seen from this point of view, it is clear that the end of the second World War was merely the end of an incident in long range strategy. The plans of the plotters are to be furthered only "in war, or under threat of war." That is why 'Roosevelt' backed the Russians during the war, and his successor sponsored U.N.R.R.A., which General Sir Frank Morgan characterised as an umbrella for subversive activities.

'American' policy has blockaded Great Britain since the war ended—an undeclared war, the purpose of which is to dictate British policy. And as a result we now have two huge power groupings—the penultimate situation preceding world domination by one. The situation might be resolved by a deal between 'Washington' and 'Moscow'; or by a final war—either solution leading to a single world government over a defenceless people.

Pearl Harbour should be studied by all those who desire an insight into the way in which the policies of nations are manipulated by men behind-the-scenes. It is true that Mr. Morgenthau does not touch on the aspect we have just discussed: but then his treatment does not exclude it. He limited himself to one aspect which in itself is sufficient to reveal that the American public was hoodwinked and manipulated just as much as was the German. It was within Roosevelt's power easily to achieve peace in the Pacific, and to make the Tri-partite Agreement "a dead letter," in Prince Konoye's words. But 'Roosevelt' wanted war—and just why is now made plain in the 'Marshall' Plan for the reconstruction of Europe. That is to say, not war, but the 'American' reconstruction of Europe was the real aim; and for that, it was essential that America should be involved in the European war. An "overt act" by Japan would, and did, ensure just that.*

PARLIAMENT—continued from page 3. The debate, is proof enough that the Moderates in the Government cannot always be counted upon to resist measures which they themselves condemn. There is no assurance, except in adequate powers in a Second Chamber, esteemed by the country, that moderation will prevail. . . .

The real issue, therefore, is not the powers of this House, but the composition of this House, and the Lord Chancellor, himself, in fact, conceded that. If the Government will face that, the real issue, we shall welcome it. . . .

It is no fault of this House that reform has never taken place. It is the fault of all Parties in another place. It arises from the fear of the overshadowing of the Commons by this House—a fear which is caused by a proper jealousy of the rights of the other place. I am a very old Member of that other place, and it may be taken in this matter that I am speaking the truth. We have no quarrel here with that sentiment. We feel that the Second Chamber should be so constituted as to balance and complement, but not to overshadow, the popular House. But we also hold, and this we surely will make good if it is challenged before the country, which is the ultimate judge, that a balanced Second Chamber, with adequate powers, is an indispensable guarantee of the liberties which have made this country great. We stand for parliamentary as against authoritarian government and the steps that lead to that. We stand for sanity and moderation and tolerance, without which parliamentary government will be doomed to fatal and final eclipse.

House of Commons, October 22, 1947.

Business and Sittings of the House

The Lord President of the Council (Mr. Herbert Morrison [After moving a Motion on the Business and Sittings of the House]): . . . The question upon which I imagine that the Debate will largely turn, and which, I admit, is a potentially controversial, is the issue of the Government's taking Private Members' time—that is to say, the time which is set aside under the Standing Orders for Private Members to bring in Bills and Motions, subject to their good or ill fortune in the Ballot. It is proposed under this Motion that those facilities to Private Members should, in this Session again, for the third time in this Parliament, be denied, and that the Government should have the exclusive right to bring in legislation and, generally, to take the time of the House . . . .

Mr. Hopkin Morris (Carmarthen): . . . The status of every Member of Parliament, whether he sits upon the Treasury Bench, the front Opposition Bench, or merely on the back benches, is precisely the same. It is a status common to all, and enjoyed by all, in whatever part of the House one sits and whatever office one holds, whether one belongs to the great majority or to a very small minority. It is the status of representing in this House one's own constituency.

Mr. McEwan (Galloway): In theory.

Mr. Hopkin Morris: Not only in theory, but in practice. An hon. Member carries a two-fold responsibility. Every hon. Member represents the whole of his Division. It is his duty to represent every person, and to meet the needs and demands of every elector, irrespective of that person's political colour or party allegiance. There is a large number of issues covered by that alone, where there is common ground between Members of Parliament, whatever party they may support in
the House. The other function and responsibility is entirely different. No hon. Member represents every shade of opinion in his Division. He may represent majority, or minority, opinion, but he represents party opinion, and that party opinion is for the convenience of the government of the country. It is a great convenience for the carrying on of the government of the country that there should be majority opinion on general issues and that we should divide as far as we can in blocks. The one great difference between the Government of the day and the official Opposition in this matter is not so fundamental as the difference between them on other matters, as might be illustrated by the Brighton Conference.

The Government of the day, having the bulk of opinion behind it, has the first power to initiate legislation and carry it through. The official Opposition party can express its own opinion and organise opinion, and, on specific days, initiate Debates. That has nothing to do with private Members, but it has to do with the main political division of the country. There is no opportunity there at any stage, whether chosen by the Government or by the Opposition, for a Member of Parliament to carry out his other role. Private Members' time, in some form or other is the only means whereby that can be done. I believe that the old method of drawing lots by ballot did not meet it. There may be better methods, and I think that the force of the appeal made by the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough (Captain Crookshank) to the Lord President of the Council to reconsider the matter.

I should like to enforce the plea for the Ten-minute Rule by which Members could bring before the House issues which were not only alive in their own Division, but were matters of common ground between Members of all parties. To-day the overwhelming majority happens to be in the Socialist Party. The minority parties have some opportunity on the main issues of voting against or criticising the Government, but not of initiating policy. Therefore Private Members' time becomes more important to them. However, it is not upon that basis that I urge it, but upon that of the common status of every Member of Parliament alike—that there should be the opportunity for every Member to initiate legislation. That status should be recognised, and for that reason I hope the Lord President will listen to the appeal of his own supporters, even if he will not listen to the powerful plea made by the right hon. and gallant Member for Gainsborough.

Mr. Charles Williams (Torquay): . . . The first thing we should remember when considering Private Members' time, is that, when we are asking for it, we are not taking anything away from the Government. We are asking that Members of Parliament, who have been elected by their constituents to come here to represent them and to put forward their grievances, should have restored to them the time specially set aside for that purpose. That time has been stolen from their constituents and not from hon. Members by the Government of the day for their own purposes. We as hon. Members are nothing. We come and go, just like Ministers—sometimes here and sometimes there. I have been rather surprised at some of the faces I have seen here. I suppose it is coming back and seeing them below the Gangway. But that is neither here nor there.Quite frankly, we are talking of the time which we use as if it were something belonging to the Government or ourselves. It is nothing of the sort; it is really the time we are able to have in this House for carrying on the affairs of our constituents. I fail to see how any hon. Member, no matter to what party he belongs, could say that the time which we have had for such a long time should be taken away from us at the behest of the Government of the day. The Government have their programme, and they have any amount of time in which to carry it forward. It is not our time but our constituents' time which is being taken away. There must be hon. Members opposite as well as on this side of the House who have received indignant letters asking, "How long are you going on without having those hours which we thought we gave you when we elected you?" To-day, the initiative is with the Government and not with the Private Member; that is what is wrong. We want the initiative to be with the Private Member who very often is much closer than the Government to the people of the country.

Mr. Norman Smith (Nottingham, South): I rise in this House, stung by the speech which we have just heard by the hon. Member for Handsworth (Mr. Roberts). He recalled the events of 1945 when the American loan became an issue in this House. What he did not tell the House was that the official Opposition on that occasion had not the courage to take a definite point of view, and most of the Party opposite, including the leaders of that Party, sat on the fence and refused to go into the Division Lobby.

. . . . The Tory Party say they want this country to export more coal. Every time we export coal we enable an overseas customer to set factories working and to generate electricity wherewith to make the goods which we should like to supply. This is not a crisis of the Labour Government. It is a crisis of the capitalist system. No one knows that better than the hon. Gentleman the Member for Handsworth. All that the war did was to bring to a head a crisis which has been developing for more than half a century, World War II did three things. It deprived us of shipping which was sunk, shipping which used to earn us foreign currency. It deprived us of overseas investments which we sold, before America came into the war, to pay for munitions. It deprived us of export markets, due to the arrangement to which I have referred and for which the Leader of the Opposition was responsible. It was a good arrangement in the circumstances of that time, but he clean forgot to take the necessary post-war precaution.

That was the same sort of statesmanship as was displayed by the right hon. Member for Woodford in 1925, when he accepted, as he afterwards admitted himself, the advice of alleged experts on something which he did not understand, and put this country back on to the 1914 gold parity with disastrous consequences, described eloquently in the report of the MacMillan Commission on Trade and Industry, published in 1931, consequences which in the homes of the people I represent meant continued misery and long drawn-out poverty. . . .

I heartily defend His Majesty's Government in what they have so far done. If I have any suggestion to offer as to where we go from here, it is that we have to learn that this is a little island whose assets are not sufficient in the modern world. Those assets consist only in a fertile soil, coal mines which have been let down, and a very fine people with skill, courage, intelligence, and initiative. This little island is not a sufficiently big economic unit to function satisfactorily in a world where power production demands, under modern technological conditions, an immense scale of output. America, with 139 million people, is a satisfactory technolog-
ical economic unit. Russia, with, I believe, 180 million, is a satisfactory technological unit.

 Somehow or other we have to integrate this little island with those great Dominions, mention of which has been made to-night, and many of which, I am happy to say, have Labour Governments. Somehow or other, Statute of Westminster or no Statute of Westminster, it has to be done. There is no other way. . . .

House of Commons, October 23, 1947.

Debate on the Address

Lt.-Commander Braithwaite (Holderness): . . . The dollar situation, about which the right hon. and learned Gentleman said so much this afternoon, in my submission is no more than a smoke-screen covering the real cause of our troubles. During the last three months, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer knew that our payments in sterling would be convertible, the Argentine, Egypt and other holders made a run on the balance of our loan to the extent of nearly 1,000 million dollars, which reduced the money available for food, and consequently our standard of living. It must be understood by the country that the cause of our present trouble is that the Chancellor backed his economic theories with the people's food supplies and lost. This tragic miscalculation will become increasingly apparent as the nation gets hungrier.

We must also consider the miscalculations of the fuel position by the late Minister of Fuel. Surely, our hearts go out in sympathy at this moment to those at the War Office who are responsible for tendering expert advice. Consider this miscalculation and the shut-down of industry which cost £200 million in export trade last winter; and another £200 million for the run on sterling which might have been prevented, but for the Chancellor's lack of foresight; add many more millions for losses on bulk purchase trading, consider the delay in the reorganisation of the steel industry owing to doubts and threats of nationalisation, which is now causing us to buy heavy machinery at increased prices from other countries—these and many other blunders have landed us in this Socialist pickle, and it is no consolation to know that it contains so many ingredients. May I quote what the right hon. Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) said two years ago during the Debate on the Address:

"Freedom and abundance—these must be our aims. The production of new wealth is far more beneficial . . . than class and party fights about the liquidation of old wealth."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, August 16, 1945; Vol. 413; c. 93].

Instead of that, we have had for two years Marxian theories of class struggle, confiscation and now industrial conscription—a form of serfdom by which men and women are to be chained to their machines. No Government, in my view, can ever create prosperity; only industry can do that. A Government can, however, create confidence. A Government cannot create prosperity, but it can create famine in this Island by tampering and tinkering with the delicate machinery of production, distribution and exchange. My constituents want petrol; they are to get penal reform. They want spare parts; they are to get State gas. They want feeding-stuffs; they are to get an unprovoked attack on the House of Lords. It is not surprising that, wherever I went during those 2,000 miles, I found the view expressed in all the villages and hamlets that the prerequisite of recovery is that the Socialist Government shall be sterner and decisively voted out of office by a disillusioned and, indeed, disgruntled electorate.

House of Commons, October 24, 1947.

"Jewish Standard" (Government Advertising)

Sir E. Graham-Little asked the Prime Minister, in view of the successful prosecution for seditious libel brought by the Director of Public Prosecutions against a provincial editor, whether he will instruct the Director of Public Prosecutions to consider prosecuting on a similar charge the editor of the Jewish Standard, and whether he will now reconsider his answer of April 18, 1947, to the hon. Member for London University with regard to advertisements by Government Departments in that journal.

The Prime Minister: I am informed that the case to which the hon. Member refers is still sub judice. With regard to the second part of the Question, all advertising by Government Departments in the Jewish Standard has now ceased because of an increase in that paper's advertising rates which was considered to make the cost too great in proportion to the results.

National Health Service (Medical Practitioners)

Sir E. Graham-Little asked the Minister of Health how many times he has personally met the Negotiating Committee appointed with the approval of the Minister by the medical profession, to discuss regulations to be made under the National Health Service Act; and what was the date of the last such meeting.

Mr. Bewick: These discussions have so far taken place with my officials following a procedure which I believe to be entirely acceptable to the Negotiating Committee. At their request I have arranged to meet the Committee myself next month.

BOOKS TO READ

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