From Week to Week

A Coventry firm has secured a £5,000,000 order for tractors to be delivered to the United States of America. We are assured that the greatest care will be taken to avoid collision between these and the $20,000,000 worth of tractors being imported from the United States of America.

The best rum costs 5.39 pence per gallon (six bottles) to produce. The Government "controlled" price is 30/- per bottle, £9 per gallon.

A fundamental of Socialism is the abolition of profit. Without Government intervention (i.e. Socialism) a profit of 500 per cent. on cost could be made, and rum still sold at 3/- per bottle.

Taking an average present day wage at 2/- per hour, a man worked 15 hours for a bottle of rum, gin or whisky. Fifty years ago, when better whisky was 3/6 a bottle, and an average wage was 10d. per hour, a man worked about 4½ hours for a bottle of whisky, rum or gin, and got it.

If there is one thing on which the present (and every Socialist) Government prides itself, it is its high moral justification. In consequence, official, commercial, social and domestic morals are almost non-existent.

One of the many curious features of these very curious times is the almost complete lack of discrimination exhibited by the general public in regard to the sayings of Cabinet Ministers and others. Sir Stafford Cripps, speaking on January 15, said the abolition of the basic petrol ration was saving enough dollars to buy all the raw cotton to clothe the population, or all the timber to house them. Nobody seems to enquire why they are not clothed and housed, or why we are not taking an average present day wage at 2/- per hour, a man worked 15 hours for a bottle of rum, gin or whisky. Fifty years ago, when better whisky was 3/6 a bottle, and an average wage was 10d. per hour, a man worked about 4½ hours for a bottle of whisky, rum or gin, and got it.

If there is one thing on which the present (and every Socialist) Government prides itself, it is its high moral justification. In consequence, official, commercial, social and domestic morals are almost non-existent.

No doubt under the orders of its new control, The Canadian Social Crediter of December 18, 1947, publishes in a prominent panel the following notice:

"In strict accordance with our new editorial policy, the second part of the article by Dr. Homer, entitled 'Clues to the Determination of Certain Sections of Jewry to secure Palestine as a Jewish State' WILL NOT be published."

Dr. A. Homer is of course the distinguished authority on the mineral wealth of Palestine and in a Memorandum to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine, remarks:

"Long ago I came to the conclusion that Financial Jewry (both Zionist and non-Zionist) was furthering the aspirations of fanatical Zionism for its own ends, namely, in order to gain possession of the colossal oil and mineral resources of Palestine and 'Greater Palestine' ... and that they would be kept fallow until such time as they could be developed for the aggrandisement of financial Jewry, preferably under the aegis of a Jewish State."

This opinion is anteceently confirmed by the South African Jewish Chronicle January 14, 1938:

"It is the hope of many that neither oil nor any other valuable resource will be found in Palestine before its political future is settled. If important oil or gold deposits were found, further serious obstacles would undoubtedly be put in the way of the establishment of a Jewish National Home."

It is of course well known that the mineral wealth of Palestine probably exceeds that of any other explored area of similar size in the world.
Six Lectures on Politics and Political Action*

(2)

In the first of these lectures, we outlined the real interest of men and women in politics, showing how all of us, whether we know it or not, are seeking the answer to the question which underlies politics, and traced the development of politics from the measures taken to adjust the demands of the government and the demands of the governed. The supply and allocation of funds of money were at the root of this contention. King and populace stood on different sides. The problem as the King saw it was how to obtain money with the least possible friction. The rôle played by the subjects was largely that of providing money while securing liberty and avoiding punishment because of the primacy of the King's power.

It was implicit in what we said that the political problem itself was the problem, whether or not King and Nation could associate to the mutual advantage of both, but particularly Nation; and, if so, how this could be done. This is by no means the whole truth of the relations of King and people; but it is one aspect.

We showed that in the course of history the King had been exchanged for some power not so easily identified, and that the power he wielded had also become, in the course of time more complex: that Government and Governed had not yet come to terms, and that an element, at least, in this failure to solve the political problem lay in the elaboration of a technique of government, with which we recognized such abstract principles as that of "majority rule" and such inventions as what is called "the Party System" as a part.

We made considerable use of Edward Jenks's History of Politics to illustrate and explain this development, and, before we leave him, we may pay some heed to what Jenks had to say about the general question of Majorities and Parties. His work, valuable as it is, and designed, as he claimed, to supply the need for an account of action in politics as distinct from theory—our own objective—is not the last word on this all important subject.

The origin of the idea of "representation" we saw was the political hostage, held to ransom by the King for payment of dues. In the course of time the status, respectability, honour, and functions of the "representative" (hostage) have changed. It has changed in order to make things more comfortable for the "representative" (hostage), without diminishing his efficiency for extracting money from the public, but, on the contrary, enhancing this efficiency. And Jenks points out that a feature which has everywhere become identified with this progression, "without which," he says, "political representation, as understood at the present day, could not be worked" is the doctrine of majorities. "Strange," says Jenks, "as it may sound to modern ears, it is yet unquestionably true, that there was once a time (not so very long ago) when the fact that a proposal was supported by a majority was considered no reason whatever for its acceptance."

We are now dealing with facts, not with matters of morals (although they too may be matters of fact, but fact of a different order); and we should heed what Jenks has to say on these matters of fact. The question is not whether majorities ought to impose their will on, let us say, ourselves, whether, that is to say, millions of voters, a hundred or two, or a thousand or two, more numerous than millions of other voters, should be able, let us say, to live at the expense of the minority, to decide how, where, and with what satisfaction to themselves the rest might live, how much they might eat, how they should employ their time, and so on. The question at the moment is not whether this is in any sense "right"; but what was the idea behind the proposal that the affairs of the community would be conducted to best advantage if this were so. Why, if it was not always entertained, was the notion ever embraced? How did majority rule come into effective being, and what did its adoption entail, in the way of institutions, which, you will remember, Jenks said were often instituted for one purpose and found later to be useful for another quite different purpose?

Let me quote:

"Strange as it may sound to modern ears, it is yet unquestionably true that there was once a time (not so very long ago) when the fact that a proposal was supported by a majority was considered no reason at all for its acceptance."

He goes on:

"This is the more curious, inasmuch as primitive society was full of communities, i.e., groups of people having interests in common, and conducting their business in common. Surely, it will be said, these communities must have had some method of settling their differences of opinion by votes? No. The answer is, that if custom did not settle the matter, or compromise, then the only remedy was a fight, in which the strongest party got its own way. Unanimity or a fight were the alternatives of primitive times. This is one of the chief reasons why primitive society was so stationary for centuries together.

"We cannot suppose, that, in its origin as we have seen it, political representation found any urgent necessity for contested elections. There would hardly be much competition for the unpopular part of hostage, or even of member of an early Parliament. Apparently, at first, the royal officials laid hold of those whom they considered to be suitable persons, and packed them off to Parliament. In the boroughs, there are some traces of a rotation of service among the leading burgesses.

"But, as it began to dawn upon people's minds that, in some countries at least, Parliament was a very powerful institution, and membership thereof a thing to be coveted, contested elections began to make their appearance. In England, by far the best example of early political representation, there are traces that, at the commencement of the fifteenth century (when Parliament was about two hundred years old), people were beginning to covet the position of member of the Commons House. The old idea of the unwilling hostage had died out. The new idea of agency, introduced, perhaps, from the Roman Law by means of the Church, was offering a more satisfactory explanation of the position of the Parliamentary Representative. He was the agent of his constituency, therefore his constituents had a right to choose him. But how if they disagreed? The question evidently caused great difficulties; and, although, unhappily, as in so many really interesting matters of history, precise evidence is wanting, we can make a shrewd guess as to what happened.

*Lectures prepared for and delivered to the members of an ad hoc body active in some parts of England and since revised.
“Most people, probably have noticed that the language of elections is somewhat bloodthirsty. We speak of the ‘party war-chest’, the ‘election campaign’, the ‘enemy’s stronghold’, ‘laying siege to a constituency’, ‘leading troops to victory’, ‘carrying the war into an opponent’s territory’, and so on. Much of this is, no doubt, the decorative language of the New Journalism; but it is interesting to find that, the further back we go in history, the more nearly does it tally with the actual facts. It is one of the numerous examples of the survival, in language, of practices which have passed away in reality. Most things in the Middle Ages ended in a fight. The victorious party routed its opponents, drove them from the hustings, and carried their man, i.e., to the sheriff, who forthwith recorded his name, and sent it up to the Clerk of the Crown.

“But fighting, though it has its charm, has also its drawbacks, especially when a royal official is standing by, who may inflict fines for breach of the peace. And so it would appear that a fiction was gradually adopted, by which it was assumed that there had been a fight, and that one party had gained the victory.

“But which party? Well, other things being equal, in any fight the more numerous party will win. And so, it seems to have gradually become the custom, where party feeling was not very strong, to settle the matter by counting heads instead of breaking them. . . . Thus we see what a rough test the verdict of the majority is. It is not based, historically, on any ethical considerations. It makes no allowance for difference of merit in the combatants, or for generalship, both of which tell in real warfare. But it is a simple and enormously useful practical way of settling disputes, and it has had a world-wide success. Curiously enough, it has often been reckoned the child of its own offspring. It is usually said that it is the logical result of the doctrine of the equality of man. Historically speaking, the dogma of the equality of Man is the result of the adoption of the purely practical machinery of the majority. But the adoption of the majority principle is also responsible for another famous institution of modern politics, . . . the party system. The party system is an elaborate piece of machinery, designed to secure that whenever an opportunity for a vote occurs, there shall always be two opposing forces, at least, in existence to contest it. Its chief advantages are, that it makes representative institutions something of a reality, by interesting a large number of people in politics, that it provides an effective criticism of the existing government, that it affords a scope for the energies and an outlet for the ambition, of a large number of wealthy and educated men, and that it guarantees a certain consistency in policy.”

I will read those alleged advantages over again more slowly, in order that you may consider them at leisure, and that you may weigh them with the vital personal interests which have brought you to study with me these important matters.

Very well. “These three institutions,” says Jenks, “political representation, verdict of the majority, and the party system . . . are the mainsprings of modern political machinery. They can be and are equally applied to central and to local government; and, by their adaptability to all kinds of purposes, they are rapidly becoming looked upon as ends in themselves, rather than as machinery for the achievement of ends.”

I do not think it would be possible to conclude this lecture more suitably to our purpose than by quoting with emphasis Jenks’s concluding sentence in this passage. It is this: “It is hardly necessary to point out that the best machine in the world will not produce good results unless good material is put into it.” What is the requisite material for desired results? We shall have to consider this later. Possibly, Jenks had merely good men in mind. They are necessary; but good men are not enough without right ideas.

You may consider that in the two preceding lectures, a third of the total in which we have undertaken to condense what can usefully be said on a vast subject, so vitally important to all of us, a disproportionate length of time has been spent on the opinions and demonstrations of a single individual, writing rather a long time ago (1900), from the relative seclusion of Oxford, and not, even in his time, by any means the best-known student of politics, though one highly competent and respected. At the end of a short note of fewer than 300 words with which Mr. Jenks introduced his little book, he defended its small size by stating the doctrine which, he said, “paradoxical as it may sound, is yet maintained by very able writers, that the greater the subject, the smaller the space in which it can be treated.” I think you will agree with me that he was right; that our reliance upon him has brought us to a very critical point, and that we cannot do better than carry on from where he left off. The single brief interjection which is the outcome of unflinchingly honest observation of actual things has often more worth than windy dissertations, the real motive of which is hard to discern. It is not unjustly that the “Sermon on the Mount” is more widely famous than “The Wealth of Nations.” It is very much shorter.

Jenks linked together three elements of political action, political representation, the verdict of the majority, the party system, and said of them that “by their adaptability to all kinds of purposes they were rapidly becoming looked upon as ends in themselves, rather than as machinery for the achievement of ends.” I want to draw attention to this evidence of the fact that our present discontents arise from a cause clearly seen fifty years ago, and also to the fact that discussion has by no means centred around this crucial point, but has, on the contrary, been persistently steered away from it. Actually, the detection of the root trouble goes back much further.

Lord Bryce, the famous author of The American Commonwealth, once wrote an introduction to a voluminous work by M. Ostrogorski, called Democracy and the Organization of the Political Parties. The book is a withering exposure extending over to a thousand pages, of political trickery in England and the United States. It disturbed Lord Bryce’s spirit. He saw that it confronted the world with a mass of evidence “not deemed worthy of the attention of historians and political thinkers,” (but evidence); that, “relegated to unimportant paragraphs in the newspaper,” it was nevertheless painfully collected by “personal testimony” and “direct observation”; and Lord Bryce could only say that M. Ostrogorski was “a singularly painstaking and intelligent student,” scientific in method and philosophical in spirit, who had examined the facts of caucus government with exemplary diligence, describing them with careful attention to the smallest details, bringing to their investigation breadth of view, minute, accurate and fair.” So Lord Bryce sat back and
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The “British” Representative

The general level to which comprehension (or concern) with current events has descended is illustrated by the character presented by the Press of Sir Ernest Cassel’s granddaughter’s husband, Lord Mountbatten. Probably never in British history has so appalling an exhibition of incompetence and callous maladministration been sponsored on the British people as that provided by their “representative” at New Delhi; as we write the representative of Pakistan at the “United” Nations assembly at Lake Success is concluding a three hours’ speech in which he charges the ersatz “India” of the Viceroy’s friends, the Congress Party and the Birlas, with a calculated plot to exterminate whole sections of the Moslem community; yet, with a really superb unconcern for current events, a considerable section of the Press is booming Lord Mountbatten as a heaven sent administrator, and suggesting that he should repeat his triumphs in the Middle East.

The really amazing fact is that people who consider themselves educated and intelligent accept this steady perversion even of current history without comment; naturally the idea that past events have been edited out of all relation to reality and that the editing is a plot against their welfare, neither interests them nor in fact penetrates their consciousness.

Poor Queen Victoria, if she could see the condition to which, in less than fifty years from her death, “the brightest jewel in the Imperial Crown” has been brought under the imprintur of her grandson, we imagine that the fur would fly.

Reorientation?

Just how much the British-Iraq Treaty, signed at Portsmouth on January 15, can be taken as an indication of a general re-orientation of British policy in the Middle East, we do not know, although Mr. Ernest Bevin’s remarks on it could be construed to suggest that idea. But that a general rapprochement with the genuine Semitic, as distinct from the ersatz Jewish-Semitic world might possibly be the greatest achievement of modern statesmanship cannot be doubted by anyone with even a nodding acquaintance with the Eastern mentality. The British in India have never really come to grips with the mind of the Hindu, for reasons which are not difficult to understand by anyone who has tried that feat. But the Muslim, with his veneration for the Founder of Christianity, and consequent real, though latent, understanding of European civilisation (to which, through the Moors in Spain, he has made a substantial contribution) has always been the backbone of our influence. We have been quite widely accepted as the legitimate heirs of the Great Mogul Empire; and anyone who has come under the spell of Agra and (old) Delhi, and believes that architecture is one of the surest guides to civilisation, will appreciate the compliment.

From Hellas

“The world’s great age begins anew,
The golden years return,
The earth doth like a snake renew.
Her winter weeds outworn;
Heaven smiles, and faiths and empires gleam,
Like wrecks of a dissolve dream.

* * * *

“Oh, write no more the tale of Troy,
If earth Death’s scroll must be!
Nor mix with Laian rage the joy
Which dawns upon the free:
Although a subtler Sphinx renew
Riddles of death Thebes never knew.

* * * *

“Another Athens shall arise,
And to remoter time
Bequeath, like sunset to the skies,
The splendour of its prime;
And leave, if nought so bright may live,
All earth can take or Heaven give.”—Shelley.

Criminal Justice Bill

A new clause to the Criminal Justice Bill has been tabled by Mr. Hector Hughes, the Labour member for North Aberdeen. The committee stage of the Bill will shortly be resumed by the House of Commons. The object of the clause seems to be to limit the public advocacy of anti-Semitism though its terms are general. The proposed clause reads:

Every person who, with deliberate and malicious intention of outraging the religious feelings of any class of His Majesty’s subjects, by words, either spoken or written or by visible representations, insults or attempts to insult the religion or the religious beliefs of that class, shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction thereof liable to imprisonment for not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding £100 or both such imprisonment or fine.

Mr. Hughes has also tabled new clauses defining “culpable homicide” and “murder” and proposes that every person convicted of either shall be obliged to pay to the dependents of the victim “such compensation as the court shall see fit to award.” After the offender’s death it is proposed that compensation should be charged against his estate.

Mr. Hugh Lyon

We are informed by Mr. Lyon, the Headmaster of Rugby School, that he is not descended from John Lyon, the Founder of Harrow School; that he has not yet resigned from the Headmastership of Rugby School; and that the reference (quoted by us from a press report) to the attitude of the contemporary Rugby boy to current affairs does not correctly represent his views.
The Church of England

[The following are individual observations on a few of the issues raised in Major Douglas's recent essay, "The Realistic Position of the Church of England", in The Social Crediter, October 25—November 27, 1947, and we print them to stimulate attention to the important argument they concern.]

Doctrinally the Church holds grimly on to much it would be far wiser in all probability to relinquish. But politically and socially it seems to have lost all grip, and goes floundering forward in space-time in the wake of the so-called Progressives, the Socialists and anti-Christian exponents of the largely discredited creed of Inevitable Progress, towards an ever-receding material millennium. That to a large extent was the Victorian Fallacy; so that, in fact, Socialism is passé and out of date—a hang-over from the pre-atomic infancy of the so-called Scientific Age. This same blindness, presumably, is the cause of the Church's inability to see the necessity of returning politically to First Principles, and acknowledging the profound error it has committed in allowing its flock to stray from them.

SECTIONS I AND II

With this fact in front of him, Douglas cites Magna Carta, which might be called the charter of the Christian Sovereignty of the Individual. All three estates of the realm were represented at Runnymede—the King, the Church, and Democracy; for the barons, he contends, represented the general population, at any rate more closely than the present popularly elected member of Parliament. The King was, and is, the essentially religious symbol of the body politic, and the guarantee, the keystone so to speak, of its organic structure; in the psycho-physiological sense, its literal head. The confirmation there given was not of the pre-eminence of any one part of the whole—certainly not a confirmation, as is sometimes contended, of the supremacy of the Pope, but of all three equally.

It was imposed on a would-be dictator king, who was compelled to sign it on behalf of all three parties; clause 69 stating that, "All the aforesaid customs and privileges, and liberties ... in as much as it belongs to us towards our people, all our subjects, as well clergy as laity, shall observe as far as they are concerned towards their dependents."

As Douglas says, "In order to constitute a sovereignty there must be present form, substance and sanction"; the whole must be autonomous, and each part, within its own province and domain, must be functionally autonomous, which implies as an elementary prerogative the appointment of its own officials. Douglas contends that since the Reformation the Church of England has had no true sovereignty, but has been potentially and progressively a State Church. This ideal autonomy or tripodal structure, comprising form, substance, and sanction within the functional area, goes right down through every part of the body politic. To make the analogy easier to grasp one might substitute the lesser social faculty of Medecine, at the moment threatened with Reformation. What is at stake is, in fact, the sovereign autonomy of the profession of Medecine. Only a born fool can suppose that a medical civil servant would be able really and effectively to administer Medecine. What he administers is "government" in a medical form. The same applies to a Religious Civil Service, which is what incidently the Church of England has been ever since the Reformation.

In Douglas's opinion what passes for Christianity today under the aegis of the Reformed Churches is really Liberal Judaism, and involves an entirely different kind—not degree merely—of acceptance to that actually demanded by the true followers of Jesus of Nazareth and still, at least theoretically, if not more than theoretically, upheld by the "unreformed" Church of Rome. The basis of real acceptance is embodied in the doctrine, founded not on the theory, but on the fact of the Incarnation; incarnation as a working political principle. He says: "At bottom, what we have got to make up our minds upon is whether human political action is subject to the same kind or some kind, of compulsion to be 'right' as we accept in doing a multiplication sum, and if so, whether the Christian Church, the Mystical Body of Christ, is the living incarnation of that 'rightness'?" So to speak truly embodies that idea or truth, and brings it down to earth, and into practical politics. That is essential Religion (or binding again, or back); the relating of ethical truth to natural fact, or vice versa. That Church—and we must not forget that Douglas is speaking of the structural, organised religious body—that Church is right, he contends, in spite of all its defects that upholds Reason, in face of all dialectical and 'rationalistic' arguments.

At first sight that seems to be a difficult statement to follow, but it will help us if we keep in mind that the very foundation of all reason, all conscious mentality, is the fact that this space-time universe of the senses is a relative universe, and contains nothing absolute in a dialectical sense—as it were, nothing absolutely worshipful as being real in itself. Of that natural fact or idea the Church is, or should be, the incarnation, exemplifying it in its own organic structure or organisation. Magna Carta, which, as Douglas says, "remains as a witness that that idea was inherent in English life seven hundred years ago" proclaimed that Supreme Power rested with no one part, or leg, of the body politic; but that it was to be seen, as reflection (relatively revealed), in the Law governing the relation of the parts to the whole and to each other ... .

Current so-called democratic ideas, with their absurd assertion of the absolute rights of majorities, and the unqualified supremacy of Parliaments; the whole ignorant, childish and essentially modern movement of Supreme Statism, is the denial and defiance of Natural Law. To bring the matter down from the nation to the individual, Douglas says, "For all practical purposes, a man has an unqualified supremacy to jump off Beachy Head; but he cannot avoid the consequences. A Cabinet cannot pass laws, confiscating under the name of taxation, the work of a man's lifetime and the land his family has dignified for centuries; but he cannot avoid the consequences. The crucial point is ... is there a moral law connecting political transgression with national punishment? Contemporary governments clearly think there is not, that they are free to legislate in a moral vacuum."

That they do so think and act, is their aberration which will have its retribution; but that they do so without rebuke from the Church of England, without the whole body of the Reformed Christian Churches rising up to point out how seriously and desperately they are in error, is the measure of the separation of those Churches from realism and the Christian concept of Natural Law. That is effective Religion; the continuous rebinding or "binding back" and relating of human political action to the Natural Law of Cause and Effect, which is the function of the Church.
Sections III and IV

Douglas here quotes the antithesis to the Christian concept of the Rule of Natural Law from the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion: "The political has nothing in common with the moral. . . . The word 'right' is an abstract thought, and proved by nothing. . . . The result justifies the means." That is the authentic voice of the abstract State, reflected and operative through the individual. It is not concerned with groups, as groups, but in them only as means. That is the authentic voice of the abstract State, Learned Elders of Zion: "The political has nothing in Natural Law, but Christianity proclaims the Natural Law, accepted as the rule to preserve in separativeness. "The mass is unsavable," says Douglas, "just as the mob is insane. . . . The object of anti-Christ is to keep mankind in ever larger mobs, thus defeating the object of Christ." And he alludes to "the unsatisfactory part which the Church of England plays in the world drama, and the altered attitude which seems to be essential to its survival." No matter what may, or may not be the shortcomings of the Church of Rome, its contention that Socialism and Communism must be fought by any Church calling itself Christian, whatever may be the difference as to the precise weapons to be used against them, is incontrovertible. And he concludes: "A church that cannot see that Europe was free and attractive to just the extent that it was Christian and is torn with dissension, and is losing its charm to the extent that it is Socialistic, has betrayed its vocation."

The attack of the collectivist Might-is-Right school on the Christian individual is occult, underground and terrorist. As long as it can avoid exposure, it operates with deadly effect; so that its first objective is control of the means of information, in order that it may form opinions favourable to its thesis, and discourage those opposed to it. As an example of the methods of occultism, Douglas alludes to the presumption of Lord Samuel, with his particular background and racial origin, assuming with superficially philosophic blandness in the House of Lords the discreditability of the hereditary principle, when his own race, of which he makes no disclaimer, exists and is solely maintained by a passionate and obsessed devotion to the principle of heredity.

The combination of that statement and the particular man who made it, constitute an "incarnate lie", an embodied contradiction in terms, and a personal exemplification of the statement from the Protocols, that "the word 'right' is an abstract thought, and proved by nothing." Either the noble Lord is all that or he is the prince of self-deceivers. Most likely he displays both aspects concurrently. In which case he represents an acute case of schizophrenia, embodying in himself the negative proof of what he states to be unproveable: Right. It is but a step, as Douglas comments, "to saying that it is equally indefensible for any man to sit in Parliament merely because he is an Englishman."

That is the accepted technique of forensic aggression, or mental intimidation to assume that the foundation of your opponent's whole case is universally discredited. Western Christendom would appear to have no answer to these "third-degree" methods on the part of the Devil's Advocate. The reason for this is that in as far as any person or group of persons espoused Christianity, or the cult of Truth, they have abandoned argument and dialectic as entirely alien to Truth, which is, and may not usefully protest, and which is essentially whole and not partial (partition). Ultimately such a group, or individual, is, in a quite literal sense, reduced to silence, and can only present "itself", the incarnate word, as the irrefutable statement of its own belief. Such was the experience of Jesus of Nazareth, and such, possibly, is the position today of Christendom, or more narrowly Great Britain and the British Empire.

That, no doubt, is only partially true, because it cannot be denied that modern Christendom has seriously wavered in its faith, and fallen down on its convictions. From this Douglas concludes that Christianity must first of all regain its lucid stand, as something "inherent in the very warp and woof of the universe, and not just a set of interesting opinions." And he maintains, not without reason, that the Roman Church alone among Christian Churches, has never given way on this point, quoting the Roman Catholic bishop's direction to voters in the recent Scottish municipal elections, that "No Catholic can in conscience vote for the representation of a party that denies the fundamental truths of the Christian philosophy."

In order to be functionally autonomous, the Church needs to be, and should and could be, mentally autonomous. It could and should, know its own mind on every conceivable subject, even municipal elections; and he alludes to the success of Barrabas at the polls in what he calls the first secret ballot in recorded history, and asks what the Church of England has to say about secret voting; or about secret societies.

(N.F.W.'s notes on part V of the articles will appear later.)

Six Lectures on Politics and Political Action (Continued from page 3.)

sighed, saying: "I am myself an optimist, almost a professional optimist, as indeed politics would be intolerable were not a man grimly resolved to see between the clouds all the blue sky he can." It seems as though Jenks slipped a little to the side when he said that the tripod upon which our security and social happiness rests was becoming an end in itself, or that each foot was an end in itself. They were "adaptable to all kinds of purposes." A thing which is maintained in existence because of its adaptability to all kinds of purposes, is not being maintained in existence because it is an end in itself.

Now the immediate reason for the existence of an organisation such as yours is political representation of policy, and all of you have studied the statement of your policy and have subscribed to it, approved it, united yourselves with others to further it. This is rare in political action. Few in the community who deem themselves to be banded together for a political purpose could hand you a clear statement of the policy which has united them—a form of words, yes, possibly; but look into the meaning of the words, take the words to a solicitor and ask him, as you would concerning a contract to buy a house or sell a horse, "I want you to tell me, exactly what do I get out of this? If I sign this what does it mean?. To what do I commit myself? Can he do this or do that?" I know there are honest solicitors, and I can imagine the amusement you would arouse if you took a document of the "Lend to Defend the Right to Free" variety, or the Party Programme variety to a responsible lawyer together with your simple question: "Sir (or Madam), this is politics, not law: so far as I can see, although perhaps drawn up in a spirit which illustrates the triumph of hope over experience, it doesn't mean anything at all except that,
if you put your signature to it you promise to allow yourself to be made a tool of.” For a long time, politicians have disguised from those whom they persuade to elect them their own interpretation of what political representation means. Few of them believe, as doubtless their constituents do (until they learn by experience, usually bitter), that political representation consists in the representation to Parliament, or to “The King in Parliament” of the policy of their constituents. John Stuart Mill wrote a book about Representative Government, which was published in 1861. Listen to him:

“Should a member of the legislature,” he asked, “be bound by the instructions of his constituents? Should he be the organ of their sentiments or of his own?”

Mill, as we all know, was a victim of parental idealism harnessed to what was known on the Continent of Europe as “Liberalism”—not quite the same thing (whatever it is) as English “Freedom-ism”, nor even the Banker-Quaker-Industrialist amalgamation which arose in the 19th Century out of Whiggism; but, doubtless closely connected with it at more than one point. Liberalism in Europe means Revolution in the broadest sense. A stupendous plan of studies was imposed upon their young hopeful by Bentham, the Utilitarian, and the elder Mill. He was a prepared and designed fullfiller of hopes; and it is not remarkable that he should have missed features in the political landscape which had been obscured by the doctrinaire habits of his teachers. In any case, his answer to the question he had propounded was that “Law and Custom warranted a Member of Parliament in voting according to his opinion of right, however different from that of his constituents. But he was not happy about this answer. He was full of anxiety about it.

“Let the system of representation be what it may,” he said, “it will be converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose. As long as they are free not to vote, and free to vote as they like, they cannot be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex to it.” He even went so far as to picture their compelling their Member of Parliament, “in honour” to resign his seat.

Let it be remembered that this was not before the days when Members of Parliament had become, so Ostrogorski said, “commercial travellers for their parties in the employ of the Associations,” ceaselessly emitting an “oratorical electricity which they discharge on the masses,” steeping them “in the party spirit with which they themselves are profoundly imbued.”

“Alas!” thinks Mill; and he says: “The laws cannot prescribe to the electors the principles by which they shall direct their choice.”

Then, with a boldness ill sustained in the conclusion, he says:

“No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion as to this matter, results from the general principles which it professes . . .” a promise followed by the lame ending that it “seems quite impracticable to lay down for the elector any positive rule of duty.”; and he goes on: —

“We have from the first affirmed and unvaryingly kept in view, the co-equal importance of two great requisites of Government; responsibility to those for whose benefit political power ought to be, and always professes to be, employed; and jointly therewith to obtain, in the greatest measure possible, for the functions of Government, the benefits of superior intellect, trained by long meditation and practical discipline to that special task . . . It is so important that the electors should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom . . . While it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have opinions, should not enter largely into their judgment as to who possesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct. . . . Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use if they do not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study: and if it be an object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to average electors, it must be counted on that the representative will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents, and that when he does, his opinion will be the oftener right of the two . . . In this opinion, oftener right than his own, the elector is to concur. He must defer to it. “If they could ascertain, even infallibly, the ablest man, they ought not to allow him altogether to judge for them, without any reference to their own opinions.” This is an afterthought. Why should not the electors do always what is, in principle, right? “Because,” says Mill, “The ablest man may be a Tory!”

This, I submit, is rather pitiable reading. Why extend the franchise if, with every extension, you only make it more certain that the electorate will not be wise enough to elect wiser men than themselves? Is our whole system merely a trap set by knaves to catch simpletons? It seems to be; but let us not give up hope, for there are clearly matters to which Mill as well as Jenks has omitted to attend. The first of these is the distinction between those things for the settlement of which special knowledge with or without “wisdom” may be necessary, and those matters which no man, however wise, should undertake to judge for another. It is obviously wrong that a “majority” built up by appeals to individual cupidity, or whose highest motives are exploited by immensely powerful forces, (propagandist or otherwise), for the sake at attaching them, irreparably, to courses which they would disown if they correctly apprehended them, should be able to sweep away the heritage of many generations of men and women toiling steadfastly towards the attainment of an objective which claims and receives universal assent, as being good and right —that the very ground of a successful society should be swept from under its feet by a mass verdict gained by a trick. It is wrong that anyone should claim that because of his exceptional abilities the fruits of his efforts should be unloosed on a population to its detriment. It is wrong that because a Strachey is good at argument a people should go short of food. This particular argument is yours at the present moment, and you can carry it if you learn how to do it.

(The Report of the Royal Commission on Soviet Espionage in Canada)

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Mr. Glenvil Hall: Yes. Following is a statement giving the figures for 1945-46 (actual) and 1946-47 (estimated). These are comparable with the figures published in the Official Report for December 20, 1946 in respect of 1944-45 and 1945-46.

[The table which follows was omitted from The Social Crediter of last week.]

Unemployment on Merseyside

Civic authorities on Merseyside are to confer with the President of the Board of Trade concerning unemployment, which now involves 25,000 persons. Another 5,000 may become unemployed during the next three months. Improvement of transport to out-of-town jobs is being considered, but mass evacuation of workless is not contemplated.