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Supra-National Socialism

The Schuman 'Plan'

By ELIZABETH S. DOBBS.

The debate on the Schuman Plan in the House of Commons on June 26 and 27 was embedded on both days in business concerning the invasion of South Korea and the action to be taken about it—a hint recalling the now classical “We have started from the position that only in war, or under threat of war, will a British Government embark on large-scale planning.” The hint was not, on this occasion, taken.

With the single exception of Major Legge-Bourke, whose courageous speech was printed in full in *The Social Crediter* of July 8, every man who spoke advocated the cession of sovereignty to some authority other than our own; whether now or later, or of high, low, federate or confederate, supra- or infra-national or quadripartite sort. But each Conservative now crowned his customary opposition to nationalisation with a demand for supra-nationalisation; while each Socialist modified his theoretical internationalism to exclude (for the time being) all countries which are not ‘social democracies.’ Mr. Arthur Greenwood called the debate play-acting, but this was thought untimely flamboyance.

What is the Schuman Plan? As many speakers pointed out, M. Schuman proposed not a plan but a principle.

The French proposition, as expressed in the first communiqué received by the British Government on May 25, said:

“The Governments of . . . are resolved to carry out a common action aiming at peace, European solidarity, and economic and social progress by pooling their coal and steel production and by the institution of a new higher authority, whose decisions will bind . . . and the countries which may adhere in the future.

“Negotiations on the basis of the principles and essential undertakings contained in the French proposals of May 9 last will open on a date which will be proposed almost at once by the French Government with a view to working out the terms of a treaty which will be submitted for ratification to the respective Parliaments.”

The French were insistent that agreement on the principle should precede any practical proposition; the British that they should see a scheme worked out before committing themselves to it. Each country substantially maintained its attitude. Great Britain has not joined the ‘plan’, though it has taken some interest and part in the conference at Paris.

Since M. Schuman gave it birth on May 9 his brain-child (or is it his, or even M. Monnet’s?) has been constant in one feature only—the insistence on the creation of a high authority to control the pooled coal and steel resources of the nations taking part. This authority was first envisaged as very high, then as lower; at first it was to control distri-

bution as well as production, but then, production only; at first it was answerable to none, then to some higher, obscurely elected body. Yet, however it palpitates under the onset of the brainwaves of Dr. Schuman and M. Monnet, the insistence on the ‘high authority’ remains.

Though the present lineaments of the ‘Schuman Plan’ are elastic, its provenance is quite clear. It carries at least as far back as the de Wendel—Thyssen agreement in the 1914-18 war. The iron, steel and coal industries of France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Germany have always been closely connected and interdependent for raw materials. In the 1914-18 war one of the first German objectives in France was the capture of the Briey Basin, source of coal and above all iron ore for the German steel industry. The French in lines before Briey subsequently watched the Germans turning out millions of tons of raw materials for munitions. But, by order of the French General Staff, the enemy was not disturbed in possession. Yet the iron ore from this district supplied 70 per cent. of German needs for munitions. At a later official investigation it was affirmed that officers who, observing German activity, bombarded Briey in spite of the ban, were punished. After some scandal, official bombardment did at length take place in 1917—but according to testimony at the enquiry, the officer who did this “so skilfully commanded the bombing operations that no damage was accomplished at all.” During the five months after this ‘attack’ the French lost 170,000 killed and missing and 263,000 wounded.

Who was behind the French General Staff? Briey was French Territory owned by the Comité des Forges, which was controlled by M. François de Wendel, M.P., and director of the Bank of France. He had a brother who before the war had become a naturalised German, and an M.P. During the enquiry a ‘gentleman’s agreement’ between M. de Wendel and Herr Thyssen, the German industrialist, came to light to the effect that all the profits arising from the Briey Basin would in the event of war be divided equally. Thyssen was a member of the management committee of the German Reichsbank. This combination was powerful enough to bring pressure to bear on the French General Staff; the officer who so skilfully planned the raids over Briey was admitted by M. de Wendel, at the investigation, to be an employee of the Comité des Forges.

The supra-national authority then, was in operation 35 years ago. In the 1920’s the German industrialists were anxious to restore it in a less overt form.

In the second day’s debate on the Schuman ‘plan’, Mr. Boothby mentioned the leaders of the German coal and iron and steel industries whom he met in 1928 in Germany: “Do not forget that these were the men who carried through the rationalisation of German industry which restored German industrial power. Do not forget that these were the men who founded the modern working parties in industry, who arranged for the scientific concentration of firms within an industry for the execution of common functions by means

of a central executive. And do not forget that there is little doubt that their prototypes still exist in Germany today.

"These industrialists, including Fritz Thyssen, expounded to me a plan for a European coal, iron and steel consortium under British leadership. They said that in the modern world this would have to be under political control, and that the problem would therefore have to be approached at the political level. They also said that it was the only hope of avoiding a Second World War. . . ."

Fritz Thyssen had already, since 1923, been backing Hitler. "I was always guided by the idea of Napoleon," he wrote in his book *I paid Hitler*, "who in my estimation desired—like Charlemagne—a united Europe. In German history books, it is true, Napoleon is always represented as one who wanted to dominate Europe. I, however, believe he was animated by a higher thought." Curiously, P.E.P. also wrote, in its broadsheet *Planning*, No. 182, December 9, 1941:

"To Hitler, indeed, Europe will owe, as it owed to Napoleon, a number of achievements of permanent value. Above all, he has succeeded in recreating the basis of European unity, although on lines very different from his aims. Much of what he has done in building up economic and administrative unity in Europe, and in breaking down barriers, it will be neither desirable nor possible to undo. The issue is no longer *whether* Europe should remain united, but in what form and by what leadership."

In 1940, conquest of France by Germany achieved the desired consortium—under German leadership. Yet here too there is a hint that behind everything was another supra-national authority:

"Is it true," asks Heinz Pol in the *New York Protestant* for December-January 1943, "that part of the negotiations to bring about a fusion between the German and French industry and finance was conducted 'privately' by members of the board of directors of the Bank of International Settlements? And is it true in this connection that Flandin and Pucheu, both of them commissioned by the French de Wendel group, met some of the members of the Board of directors both in Basle and Geneva shortly before they emigrated in Algiers as supporters of the Allied Nations?"

It is certainly true that many on the Allies' side did appreciate and approve of some part of this centralisation. As early as 1941 P.E.P. were writing (in the broadsheet quoted above):

"The war strength of Germany, as of any power, rests largely on the centralised control of its potential war industries. It so happens that some of the principal industrial areas of the Reich lie on its frontiers, for example the Rhineland and Silesian systems. Geographically and technically the natural affinities of these systems are with complementary systems beyond the original borders of the Reich, in Belgium and Luxembourg or in Poland; and the centralisation of their control in Berlin is in a sense artificial.

"The overrunning by Germany of neighbouring states has to a large extent broken down the barriers created within these systems by the old frontiers, and enabled the Germans to develop them as unitary systems, though of course maintaining the final controls in Berlin. It might well prove feasible, in planning the reconstruction of these areas which war devastation will in any case render necessary, to maintain and develop their character as areas of unified admin-

istration, at the same time eliminating the centralised control from Berlin and substituting for it a system of autonomous regional commissions of a public international character. . . ."

In the event it did not prove feasible. Hence the idea's newest incarnation as M. Schuman's 'Plan.'

Finally, let us add the experience of Mr. R. H. S. Crossman, which he related in the debate on June 26, 1950. He quoted "a distinguished German diplomat over here" as saying to him, "After all, we ran France for five years. We are not going to worry about the terms that are signed. We sign first and change after."

Steel and coal are the sinews of modern civilisation: who controls them controls the destiny of Europe. Who joins such a 'pool' hands over the control of their sanctions, their defence, the shape of their culture and a large slice of their people. That being understood as it is plainly intended to be understood, then it is not surprising that power monopolists, whether political, economic or financial, who have good prospects of gaining control of such an instrument should push for its formation by *anyone*, in the hope of taking it over later. No doubt France, whose resources are much smaller than those of Germany, and whose steel industry depends on German imports, hopes thus to maintain a measure of control over the Ruhr industries. But Germany realises that the size of her contribution must give her a powerful influence on such an authority. And an already 'supra-national' if anonymous authority able to restrain the French General Staff in the first War, would be quite capable of pushing these suggestions from both sides to gain an open political status by which it could over-rule governments.

The inducements M. Schuman offers on behalf of his 'plan' are, on their various planes, (a) full employment and increased production, (b) a step towards the union of Europe and (c) peace. There is no assurance that these would be the results of the plan.

In the House of Commons the debate on the Schuman Plan was officially restricted to appraising the propriety of Britain's refusal to accept without further examination of its results, M. Schuman's principle of a supra-national authority and its consequences.

To defend their position it was necessary for the Socialists to array against supra-nationalisation precisely the arguments they had been rejecting for five years from the Conservatives about the nationalisation of industry. These arguments had to be given convincingly: some did give them seriously, some smugly, some with poisoned darts admixed, others with fierce and contradictory homage to the greater internationalism. It was quite a show.

Mr. Bing (Hornchurch) quoted Mr. Lyttleton's speech on the Third Reading of the Iron and Steel Bill, and was prepared to quote Mr. Eden on the Coal Bill. Mr. Carmichael (Glasgow, Bridgeton)—who made it "quite clear to the House that we are not attempting tonight to defend the Empire as formerly understood by hon. Members opposite." Mr. A. J. Irvine (Liverpool, Edge Hill) on the other hand, was for confederation, not federation. Mr. Crossman and Mr. Edelman in a clearly more personal line, threw together a rival authority of unspecified elevation—"a quadripartite organisation of employers, trade unionists, consumers and governments which would have the effect of synthesising the views of the French and ourselves" (Mr. Edelman). The lushest piece of oratory was undoubtedly Mr. Crossman's speech, from which we gave extracts last week: a passionate

lucid entirely admirable denunciation of the evils of federation—capped with proposals for another sort of international authority. We have already quoted his anecdote about the German diplomat.

Thus the well-timed stubbornness according thoroughly with the mood of most people in this country, was the result of infidelity to an ideal which most of them would disapprove.

For the Tory party, which fought the nationalisation of steel, is the party pressing for its 'supra-nationalisation.' The Tories predicament was very well expressed by Mr. Silverman (Nelson and Colne), who said: "... it really will not do for right hon. and hon. Members opposite to go up and down the country foaming at the mouth because the Government wish to nationalise our steel industry, and then to become frantic with indignation in the House because the Government are reluctant to internationalise it . . . it makes nonsense of the five years' opposition which the party opposite have conducted to the policies of this Government ever since the General Election of 1945."

Mr. Churchill answered, "In our opposition to nationalisation we have never objected to a proper degree of Government supervision; indeed we have always insisted upon it. What we have opposed, and shall continue to oppose, is State ownership and management—or mismanagement as it has proved so far—of the industry.

"Under the Schuman proposals, ownership remains unaffected . . ." He added later, "... The Conservative and Liberal Parties say, without hesitation, that we are prepared to consider, and if convinced to accept, the abrogation of national sovereignty, provided that we are satisfied with the conditions and the safeguards.

"Nay, I will go further and say that for the sake of world organisation we should even run risks and make sacrifices. . ."

It took Mr. David Eccles (Chippenham) to rationalise this, and deck it out with economics:

Mr. David Eccles (Chippenham): "... I am going to submit arguments to the House to show that the more free an economy is, the more necessary it is for it to make international arrangements to maintain world demand for its products.

"At the other end of the scale, a totalitarian country like Russia, which produces almost all the raw materials, is from its very nature a bitter enemy of any such international arrangement. At the price of personal freedom the Soviet Government have obtained the power to employ all their people at some standard of life. Their liberty is exchanged for some kind of economic security. On these benches we are determined to have both a high and stable level of employment and personal freedom. We are resolved to preserve a comparatively free economy, because we do not see how personal freedom could survive in a Socialist State.

"Also, a smaller point—we have a shrewd suspicion, which is now being proved correct by experience, that nationalised industries, are not as efficient producers as private industry. In the past a liberal economy of this kind has revealed a terrible defect. It has generated booms and slumps, and especially after the distortion of a great war has thrown up massive unemployment. Lord Keynes who called unemployment the serpent in our Paradise, came forward with a remedy. He said that a free society could spend itself out of unemployment by stimulating demand at home when it falls off from any quarter. His policy assumed that at all times we should be able to pay for our essential

imports. Today we know that if we tried to do this we should spend ourselves straight into a foreign exchange crisis. Therefore, there is something lacking in the Keynes policy.

"I concede here that a liberal economy is in a weak position to resist the contagion of slumps from abroad. If we rely on tariffs rather than quotas, if exchange control is abolished and consumers allowed to choose what they want to buy and to buy at competitive prices—all these things I wish to do—then, of course, the economy would be ill-prepared to deal with a trade recession coming from the outside world. Against this contingency there are two kinds of remedy and only two. We can barricade ourselves in at home with all manner of controls—and that is Socialism—or we can make adequate international arrangements to prevent a serious slump from ever taking place. That is the choice. We cannot hope to succeed with the second method unless we are ready to endow with considerable powers a number of international institutions. It is a recognition of this fact that makes the Governments of Europe on the economic side enthusiastic supporters of the Schuman Plan. . . . My point is that international arrangements supervised by Governments are now the answer if we are to have freedom at home. It is that fact which accounts for the duality in American economic policy. The old Democrats still believe in multilateral free trade without international planning, while the new men, like Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Harriman and the Secretary of State are pressing Europe to undertake such planning and are quite willing that the United States should participate in it.

"The modern Conservative or Liberal, be he in Europe, the Commonwealth or the United States, recognises that if he wants his society to be both free and fully employed, then his economic policy must be international and not isolationist. On the other hand, British Socialists are next to Communists in rejecting international arrangements for full employment. The Socialist Government relies upon physical controls, bilateral treaties, exchange control, and so on. I do not dispute that these controls are very powerful, but they have not yet been tested. We have not yet experienced either a considerable recession outside Britain or life without American aid inside Britain. If these controls are, then, our only defence, it will be found necessary to increase them to a degree which will destroy a large part of the liberty which we on these benches are determined to preserve. . . . the Schuman Plan is merely a step in the direction of organising a full employment policy throughout the whole free world, but it is a sensible step in that direction. It is the conviction that we have to do these things that attracts me to the idea of the Schuman Plan. Coal and steel are very sensitive industries. They usually feel the first onset of a slump when the rate of investment falls off, and is it not common sense to try to maintain effective demands for the products of heavy industries over as wide a field as possible? Of course, I suppose the hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry, East (Mr. Crossman) would agree that if the United States would join the Schuman Plan, so much the better. . . . As was said by a distinguished French Minister in Paris at the time when we refused to go into the talks, had this plan been an Acheson plan, the British Foreign Secretary would have committed his colleagues to full membership without even hanging up the telephone receiver. . . ."

(To be continued)

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Saturday, July 22, 1950.

From Week to Week

There could be no better example of the mockery called democracy than the course of events in this country at this time. Nine tenths of the population probably do not know where Korea is situated and do not care; about the same proportion cannot spell it; and of the remaining tenth not five *per cent.* could relate the invasion of, and British fighting in or off Korea, to any intelligible policy. Yet the intervention on behalf of "the Americans," without even the formality of notifying the House of Commons until intervention was a *fait accompli*, appears to raise barely a ripple. To say that it is a direct denial of the sovereignty either of demos (democracy) or of the British over themselves, while obviously true is far from disposing of the issue raised. We believe that Captain A. K. Chesterton, writing in our esteemed contemporary *Truth*, is putting the case as simply as it can be put—that though the first enemy of "the Americans," in the World War was the Axis, the next objective for elimination was the British Empire and the reduction of the British to insignificance.

We do not (and we think Captain Chesterton does not) identify "the Americans" with the average citizen of the United States of North America, any more than we should regard Sir Stafford Cripps, Mr. Strachey, Aneurin Bevan and Mr. Emanuel Shinwell as either typical or representative Englishmen. We think the connection between these kinds of people and the general population ends with the ballot box, either *in esse*, or *in posse*.

The relationship is one of convenience—if Mr. Snooks, Mrs. Snooks and (soon) the little Snooks believe that they elected Sir Stafford and Co.; it keeps them quiet and enables them to take a modest, if somewhat vague pride in the heights of political freedom and self-determination to which they have attained.

But we do not believe that any considerable portion of the electorate of this country would tolerate for one week what is going on, if they understood it, and we also do not believe that the forms of pseudo-democracy would be retained if the real rulers of the country were not satisfied that they can always prevent the majority of the electorate from understanding the trend of events. In Belgium, for instance, circumstances (and possibly the Church) have combined to present "the democratic" process with the only type of question on which it can conceivably function—a plain "yes" or "no" to an interrogation on a clearly defined course of action. The answer given by the Belgian electorate was not that desired by the sponsors of democracy everywhere, and after failing to get the decision reversed, the "principle" has been abandoned in favour of strikes, public disorders, and stark threats of "revolution."

Now if, as we believe, Captain Chesterton is right in his suggestion that "Governments" everywhere are serving the ends of a group of Satanists more or less in control of them, it must be indisputable that democracy is a sham.

We believe that this question transcends in *immediate* importance any other, because it conditions every succeeding action. Sovereignty controls policy, and it is a sheer waste of time to discuss policy except in relation to the *locus* of sovereignty.

The subject is too extensive for disposal in the limits of a short note, but one statement can be made with confidence. Whether or no the democratic idea in some form or another is sound, it is quite certain that ballot box voting does not embody the sound element. That is why the Satanists are so enthusiastically democratic. Any sound element must of the nature of the case be negative in form—contracting-out—and that is why compulsory voting is of the Devil.

• • •
 "Throughout all Europe, and by means of relations with Europe, in other continents also, we must create ferments, discords and hostility . . . All these countries are accustomed to see in us an indispensable force of coercion.

"We must be in a position to respond to every act of opposition by war with the neighbours of that country which dares to oppose us; but if these neighbours should also venture to stand collectively against us, we must offer resistance by a universal war.

"In a word, to sum up our system of keeping the Governments of the *goyim* in Europe, in check, we shall show our strength to one of them by terrorist attempts, and to all, if we allow the possibility of a general rising against us, we shall respond with the guns of America, or China, or Japan."—Protocol VII of the *Learned Elders of Zion*.

• • •
 Our readers will have noticed that the Post Office has given a direct hint to traders to increase their charges. Both the Post Office and the industrial system generally have already abandoned all attempts at quality. Have you noticed our "biscuits"?

In America To Day

"In spite of revelations in hearings that Foreign Service Officer John S. Service had 'slanted' reports in favour of Chinese Communists, and in spite of his admission that he had given secret information to *Amerasia*, The State Department Loyalty Board yesterday cleared him—right in the middle of the international crisis. How much confidence will the people continue to have in the Department in view of this action? The American people feel concern, if worse comes to worst, about the safety of their sons. How will they feel, should their young be sent on amphibious landings in Asia, while 'security risks' hold office and help shape policy?

"They do not want the President to maintain security risks. For the same reason, General George Washington did not think it necessary to wait until Benedict Arnold had delivered West Point to the enemy before he acted. If the President still remains timid in this vital matter, then the Opposition has a duty that transcends all politics and appeals to 'stand by the President.' Washington said, 'Put none but Americans on guard to-night.' The words have immediacy."—Edna Lonigan in *Human Events*, June 28.

PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: July 4, 1950.

Commonwealth Relations

Mr. Blackburn (Birmingham, Northfield): . . . In raising the subject of the strengthening of Commonwealth relations, I am not asking the Minister to make any statement which will commit the Government in a manner likely to cause embarrassment. I recognise that there are grave difficulties in the way of this country in giving a lead to the Commonwealth because, after all we are the centre of that Commonwealth and it is perhaps more appropriate for other members of it to take the initiative; but I hope that the Minister will agree with me that we should accept this proposition in principle—that permanent machinery should be set up, as soon as possible, for the purpose of establishing first, a Commonwealth defence policy, secondly, a Commonwealth foreign policy, and thirdly, a Commonwealth economic policy. I feel that it is far more important for us to get Commonwealth foreign defence, and economic policies than it is for us to take the lead in any other sphere in foreign affairs. . . . I am not trying to make a party point, but am saying sincerely that in my view the Schuman Plan, with the commitment which His Majesty's Government had to accept before they went into the conversations, is a plan which one could not possibly consider carefully without having in advance the fullest understanding of the way in which one ought to plan the British Commonwealth. . . . it would be stupid to go into a conference in which we might commit ourselves in relation to Western Europe unless we already knew where we stood in relation to the Commonwealth. That is a simple and limited proposition and I should have thought it was fairly obvious.

May I say here that I agree entirely with the document which has been criticised a great deal, namely, the document on foreign policy which has recently been produced by the Labour Party and which I believe many people have not read. In this document it is clearly stated—and I agree—that the economy of the Commonwealth is complementary to our economy, whereas the economies of Western Europe are not. Therefore, if we wish to plan with anybody it is with the Commonwealth and Empire that we should wish to plan. . . . I am not here trying to embarrass the Government by making any immediate suggestion in relation to machinery. I am asking them, in effect, to accept a principle, and that principle is that the existing machinery is inadequate for Commonwealth and Empire co-operation in relation to foreign policy, defence and economics; that we are in favour of that machinery being improved at the earliest possible moment, and that we recognise the fact that we need no longer be apologetic in our attitude towards the great Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

There used to be a lot of talk about the so-called "Third Force" as if there were only two big Powers in the world. I have not the slightest doubt that the British Commonwealth and Empire remains a Power as great in the world as either the Soviet Union or the United States of America. Indeed, as has been pointed out recently by many scientists, the British Commonwealth and Empire, because it is so widely dispersed, in the unfortunate and tragic event of another world war would survive that world war better than either the United States or the Soviet Union. We are still more powerful than either the United States or the Soviet Union, and I believe that by a greater degree of concentration of

Commonwealth planning in the directions I have mentioned we can once again establish ourselves in the world, as I think on the whole we have been establishing ourselves since the war, pre-eminently as a country which can once again give the hope of peace to the peoples who now live in the valley of the shadow of death.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Gordon-Walker): . . . On the main point which my hon. Friend raised, he said he realised that this was not a question for the United Kingdom alone. It is often regarded and represented as if we could create the machinery in the Commonwealth. That is not so, because all the countries of the Commonwealth have views on this matter, and there are, quite frankly, divergent views on this very point of permanent machinery and so forth. There are certain lines of development, which I think would be unwise and impracticable and we should rule them out. They would be against the nature of the Commonwealth. Anything that would lead towards the creation of a super-state or federation would be quite against the nature of the Commonwealth, and would be bitterly resisted by the members of the Commonwealth. It is also most important that we should not think in terms of ganging-up in a tight community of nations that agrees on every point of policy and always speaks with exactly the same voice.

From the point of view of machinery, which was mentioned by my hon. Friend, it sounds attractive to talk about better and more permanent machinery, but we have to be very careful not to have too much formalism in the Commonwealth. If an attempt is made to get everything written down and agreed to, and to understand exactly what every nation is to be committed to, the result will be to drive us further apart rather than to unify us. It would force the nations of the Commonwealth to emphasise their differences and to make provisos to protect their sovereignty. The result would be that we would get further apart.

It seems to me that what is needed—and I am glad it has been raised tonight and I hope it will be discussed more often, because it is a continuous problem—is that there should be new ways continuously found of getting the earliest possible consultation and exchange of views between the free countries of the Commonwealth, quite freely knit into a pattern, though not always exactly in step, but in the main agreed on important things. We have to find new and more flexible methods of consultation, and there is a general feeling in the Commonwealth at the moment that the present methods which we have evolved are better and more suitable than the more formal and elaborate system of the Imperial Conferences of the past. That view may, of course, change again. . . .

House of Commons: July 5, 1950.

KOREA

The Prime Minister (Mr. Aitlee): I beg to move,

"That this House fully supports the action taken by His Majesty's Government in conformity with their obligations under the United Nations Charter, in helping to resist the unprovoked aggression against the Republic of Korea."

The issue before the House this afternoon is a simple one although it involves very grave issues of peace and war. I am asking the House to support the Government in the action which they have taken in resisting aggression. That action is fulfilling our obligations under the Charter of the

United Nations. The policy of supporting the United Nations has the active support of all parties in this House, and, therefore, the only question before the House today is as to whether or not the Government are right in the action which they have taken in the circumstances which have arisen in Korea. . . .

Mr. McAllister (Rutherglen): . . . We have got to change the constitution of the United Nations. In the Charter of the United Nations it is laid down in Article 109 that it can be changed, and, indeed, after 10 years it must give consideration to the question of changing its constitution. We are merely saying that the time has now come when the United Nations should give consideration to this problem and should transform itself from a loose amalgamation of nations, however strong, however determined, into an effective world government. We are out to support the rule of law and to deny the rule of force. But, before we can support the rule of law, there must be law, and before we can expect that law to be accepted by the peoples of the world, there must be an assembly capable of passing the laws and a government capable of enforcing them. It must be a democratic assembly answerable to the ordinary people of the world.

There the United Nations organisation is open to some criticism. Can anyone defend the proposition that it is democratic and equitable that Luxembourg, with a population of 300,000 people, should have one vote in the United Nations, and that the Indian people, 300 million strong, should also have one vote in the United Nations? Is that really our conception of world democracy? If it is not, should we not set about putting in order the constitution of the United Nations in order to see that it becomes a real government answerable to the people?

When we talk of world government, and I would point out that over 40 hon. Members of this House have declared in favour of world government, we are accused of being starry-eyed idealists. I have never been afraid myself of being—

“afar with the dawning and the suns that are not yet high.”

I think it would be a great pity if the Labour Party ever forgets that it, too, was once “afar with the dawning.”

But opposed to our idealism there is what goes by the name of realism. What is realism today? Is realism the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb? Is realism the steadily mounting horror of modern war—60,000 people killed in the United Kingdom by air raids in five years of war, 60,000 people killed in Hamburg in an air raid in one single night, 60,000 people killed in one split second of time at Nagasaki. Are we going on with that steadily ascending scale of horror? Is that realism and facing the facts, or is the true realism the idea of establishing some system of world law and getting the nations of the world to adhere to it? Is it not much more realistic than anything the realists can do?

Now, I would like to quote a scientist Dr. Brook Chisholm, Director-General of the World Health Organisation of the United Nations, who said:

“The world has changed, changed so drastically that one can only compare that change with such a situation as obtained during one of the greatest geological ages, when many species of animals disappeared from the earth. Many of them had lived at least as long as man has lived in the world; many of them had lived far longer. There is nothing to make us suppose that man must go on living on this earth, but we do know at least that many of us would like to, and would like our children and our

children's children to carry on with this great evolutionary experiment.

Dare we then turn this world over to them in a worse state than we found it when we took over? Must this generation accept utter defeat, throw up their hands and still stick to the same old methods, old attitudes, old exclusive nationalism? These are the marks of immaturity”—

and I commend this to my hon. Friend the Member for Stalybridge and Hyde—

“almost of infancy. This kind of world requires a new type of maturity that goes far beyond the bounds of any required maturity of the past.”

We who are called starry-eyed idealists have behind us in this movement for world government some of the greatest men in the world today. I think I can claim that we have the right hon. Gentleman the leader of the Opposition, we have Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, we have Professor Einstein, we have Lord Boyd Orr, we have Lord Beveridge. We have great men of every party—*[Interruption.]* Indeed, since the hon. Member for Carlton (Mr. Pickthorn) interrupts me, we have the hon. Member for the Yardley Division of Birmingham (Mr. Osborne), who has given so much single-minded devotion to this project. We also have men like Henri Spaak of Belgium.

May I say this in conclusion? In the United States, there is a great movement which is forming in every State, and already 26 States of the American Union have formally passed in their own State Parliaments resolutions calling for the reform of the United Nations to make it an effective world government. The right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition has said:

“Unless some effective world organisation with the purpose of preventing war can be set up the prospects for peace and human progress are dark.”

My right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary says:

“I am willing to sit down with anybody of any party of any nation to try to devise the franchise or constitution of a world government with a limited objective—the objective of peace.”

Now is the time to begin these discussions. Even if we have got to wage a major counter-offensive in Korea, that should not prevent us from striving for and attaining this objective. The fact that we had to fight a war on several fronts did not prevent us going to San Francisco or from carrying on great conferences during the war, nor should it prevent us from going forward with this idea of making the United Nations a real and effective world government.

Captain Ryder (Merton and Morden): . . . It is a test case that is fraught with the gravest consequences which we have to decide here tonight, and on which will depend the future continuance of the United Nations.

We have, of course, still fresh in our minds the sad and dismal failure of the League of Nations before the war, the causes which led up to that failure and the war which inevitably followed. There are many people who feel that there is little hope that any instrument of world government or any instrument to control the world and avoid these greater conflicts will ever be successful. I cannot accept such a defeatist attitude, although I have no doubt that it will be many years before a world authority is fully and finally accepted. We will, I am sure, get a nation or a group of nations who feel that they can advance their own particular cause by recourse to war. They will challenge the authority in the world. That is the case which is presented to us today.

We must take heart that each time a challenge of this

sort is made and overcome, the prestige of the world authority will be enormously enhanced. We have, as is only too lamentably clear, a deep cleavage at the very centre of the United Nations, and we are, of course, left to ponder whether this cleavage can be overcome without recourse to force. I would suggest that at this critical juncture we must act not only with resolve and determination, but with a full understanding of the problem which lies before us and of the resources that may be needed. Let us not underestimate the art and cunning of our opponents, who have shown such skill in espionage, sabotage and in propaganda.

May I recall events which have occurred in Europe since the war? There was the sudden seizure of Czechoslovakia from within to secure the uranium deposits. There was the fracas over Finland; there was the siege of Berlin and the Communist-inspired strikes in France and elsewhere and the peace campaign. Is it not now clear that these were all separate moves in a master campaign? What were they out to achieve? It was not only to secure the uranium deposits in Europe, but it was also to draw our attention away from events that were happening elsewhere. While we were, in fact, still congratulating ourselves on the success of the Berlin airlift the most momentous political events were taking place on the other side of the world that have probably ever been seen.

We are like a spectator at the centre court at Wimbledon. Our eyes are directed first at one court and then at the other. Now it is to the East. We have disturbances which have been very skilfully engineered in Malaya, tying down our forces. We are heavily committed to the defence of Hong Kong, with troop movements reported in the vicinity. The French Empire is also fully occupied in attempts to establish law and order in Indo-China, and now we have this fresh disturbance coming like a vortex to draw in the remaining resources of the democratic countries. Meanwhile, all is quiet elsewhere. There is no disturbance in Europe and no breeze ruffles the deep political currents in the Middle East. It is all quiet there. We may well ask ourselves what this new, sudden and cleverly planned move portends.

Our problem is not an easy one. . . .

Mr. Hollis (Devizes): . . . I want very briefly to concentrate on one or two particularly small points, though points of some importance. . . . I think myself that the legal argument that the Prime Minister adduced was a perfectly satisfactory one, and that this Motion is, in the fullest technical sense, in conformity with the principles of the Charter. Therefore, we might as well say so.

Nevertheless, I was also very glad that the Prime Minister made it clear that he did not rest his case alone upon some legal technicalities, and I think it is very important that we should make it quite clear that the British Government recognise the inherent right of self-defence both in themselves and in other people. It seems to me that the particular arguments that are adduced in criticism of the present action are irrelevant. . . . We are, therefore, at the moment in this situation that we are acting in conformity with the United Nations Charter.

At the time it is very important that we should not in any way bind ourselves never to do anything beyond what may be technically laid down in the Charter. We are living today in a very confused world, which is much more confused than international lawyers recognise. The other day I heard a comedian say that he had been reading Tolstói's

War and Peace. He remarked, "Tolstói is a very clever man. He is the only man of whom I have ever heard who could tell the difference." That is very much like the world we are in today. Events are, to a very large extent, in control. Last week we spent Monday and Tuesday debating whether it was possible to submit any British authority to a supra-national authority. We decided the time was not ripe for it. On Wednesday we put the British Naval Forces under General McArthur. Events are to a large extent in control.

It is most important that the British Government should not bind themselves. Today we may be in conformity technically with the articles of the United Nations constitution, but there may come a time when we are not. We have got to take account of what President Truman said in his statement on 27th June:

"The attack upon Korea makes it plain beyond all doubt that Communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations, and will now use armed invasion and war."

He very properly put the responsibility not merely on the North Koreans but on Communism.

There is a further situation arising from conformity with a purely legal situation, which could be an extremely difficult one. By the Cairo Declaration we have granted the right to the Chinese to be owners of Formosa and we have recognised Mao Tse-tung to be the owner of China. It might be very difficult technically, supposing he attacked Formosa, to say that he was the aggressor. At the same time there is the further point that it is a valid argument to say that the present action of the Security Council was a legal action, because abstention is something different from the veto. By abstaining the Russians have not vetoed our action, but supposing the next attack takes place on Ruritania. The Russians, having observed our arguments this time, will say, "We will go down and veto the attack on Ruritania." Then we should be in a very difficult position if in any kind of way we now pledged ourselves not to go beyond the wording of the United Nations Charter, or do anything to deny our inherent right to self-defence.

I was very glad that the Prime Minister warned us not to bear too much upon legal niceties, because it is vitally important, as hon. Members have said, that we should at this time give the assurance that we will give all the support that we possibly can to anybody in any part of the world who may be victims of future aggression. . . .

Mr. Emrys Hughes (Ayrshire, South): I beg to second the Amendment.[*]

. . . I have never been associated with the organised Peace Committee sponsored by the Communist Party. I have kept rigidly aloof from it. As for being a fellow traveller, last year I tried to travel in Russia but was refused a visa by the Soviet Government. I want to put the point of view against the policy and methods of war which has been put in this House for over 100 years, ranging from the opposition to the Crimean War by John Bright and the opposition to the First World War by Lord Morley and by the old I.L.P., and the opposition to the last war put by people who did not share the Communist philosophy or point of view.

[*]An Amendment moved by Mr. S. O. Davies calling on the Government to withdraw all British naval forces from the affected area. The arguments used have appeared in the *Daily Worker*—Ed., *The Social Crediter*.

I dissociate myself from the policy of the Government with great regret, because I believe, not that this policy will prevent war but that it is a step towards a further development of the international policies which are just as likely to end in the greatest possible catastrophe of all, a third world war. . . .

. . . I ask the House to face the fact of the situation in Korea. The Prime Minister has told us that at the United Nations we have 46 different nations on our side. But look at the other side; does it not contain three-quarters of a continent? Are there not, on the other side of the Iron Curtain, in China and in Russia, hundreds of millions of people who—I do not know—probably far outnumber the people who are represented and give their vote at the United Nations Security Council? What is the attitude of India? India is not wholeheartedly in favour of supporting the United Nations resolution in this matter. It may give theoretical adherence to this policy, but it is not backing it up with force of arms.

And so we have to face the inescapable fact that the hundreds of millions of people of China and Russia, and the whole of Europe east of the Iron Curtain, are asking about, and looking critically at, the action which has been taken. Are we entitled, therefore, to say that the United Nations is really an international organisation which is running some kind of international police force? I fail to see the parallel, and I wonder what will be in people's minds in Asia, in China and in Russia. They will look at the facts. They have to look at the matter from other points of view—for instance, that this is not merely an aggression by North Korea backed by the Soviet Union; they look upon it as an aggression by capitalist America. That is their point of view, and we may have to face the fact that if we go into this war, we will have to go into a war against three-quarters of the world. I ask the House to look at this matter very carefully before giving a blank cheque for the action that has been taken by the United Nations at the instigation of the United States of America.

I wish that the Soviet Union had gone to the Security Council. Had the Russians gone there and proposed the veto, what would be left of the leading arguments of the Government? . . .

. . . I listen with a certain amount of interest to the views on military strategy of the hon. Member for Blackpool, North (Mr. Low) and I have learnt a great deal from him. I think he will agree with me on this. Recently we had a book on *The Defence of the West*, by Liddell Hart, a stimulating book which should be read by people interested in defensive strategy. What is the defence from the atom bomb? If we are prepared to follow this argument to its logical conclusion, we have to be prepared to face the atom bomb. Captain Liddell Hart, in *The Defence of the West*, which I hope hon. Members are going to read, points out that if we are to have defence against the atom bomb, we must have certain defensive measures which are economically impossible in this country. Liddell Hart says:

"The soldier's idea of marshalling a great expeditionary force to go overseas, drive the enemy back and then capture his launching sites is so slow as to be hopeless."

He adds, and this is what we must be prepared for if we are going to accept as inevitable that we must prepare against atom bomb war:

"In the first place, we should develop a pattern of dispersion, not merely an emergency evacuation, but a planned dispersion of industry and population, beginning without delay.

"This, however, is not nearly enough. Essential services and industries must go underground in another war. That means they must have the underground sites prepared in advance. Nor will it suffice to be thus protected. The workers would need to be provided with quarters of a kind where they could be in conditions adequate for health."

Does anyone say that this country, faced with its financial and economic difficulties at the present time, can undertake an adequate defence of the civilian population of this country? If we cannot adequately defend the civilian population of this country, if we cannot defend the women and children—and we are going to have, as Lord Trenchard said, 10 million casualties in this country—let us think twice before we agree to the inevitable course which leads to destruction and war.

. . . I want to end with a quotation from a prominent American, General Marshall, who said recently:

"The Western European Powers realised that, whoever won another war, their generation would lose it."

He also said:

"It would be unwise, it seems to me, to console ourselves with the thought that we would ultimately win if hostilities should break out again, because I fear that the victorious power in another war will stand amidst its own ruins with little strength left to re-establish itself or to offer assistance to its neighbours. It will only enjoy the empty triumphs of inheriting the responsibilities for a shattered and impoverished world."

Hon. Members opposite talk about Communism. The First World War brought about the Communist Revolution and a totalitarian régime in Soviet Russia. The next World War led to the spreading of Communist totalitarian régimes over the greater part of Europe. China is Communist. To say we are going to win a war against Communism and that if we have this war we can escape the conditions which lead inevitably to Communism, is, I am afraid, to live under a delusion. It is all very well for the Government to say "Yes, but we must help to deal with the problems of poverty among hungry nations that create Communism." If we prepare for war we inevitably prepare for poverty and the conditions which lead to Communism. If we prepare for war we inevitably end in creating Communist conditions over the greater part of Asia and the greater part of Europe. . . .

Mr. Eden (Warwick and Leamington): . . . The immense advantage which the United Nations seems to me to command today is the sense of world responsibility and world leadership which the United States is now displaying. As I see it, all the nations engaged in it are trying—and I believe sincerely trying—to establish the rule of law, not in a vindictive or hostile spirit, but because we are convinced that we must uphold that rule if peace is to be preserved. Is it too much to hope that the rulers of Soviet Russia themselves will come in time to understand these truths which we all feel deeply in the free countries of the world? There is not any hostility in this House tonight to the Russian people, not the slightest. On the contrary, most of us can still remember, and can still recall with gratitude the unparalleled losses they suffered in the years of war, heavier in numbers than any other nation in Europe.

(To be continued)