THE SOCIAL CREDITER

FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

Vol. 25. No. 19. Registered at G.P.O. as a Newspaper. Postage (home and abroad) 1d. SATURDAY, JANUARY 6, 1951. 6d. Weekly.

The Emerging Pattern

By NORMAN WEBB

The pattern of Socialist technique is rapidly becoming familiar to everyone. This is a hopeful sign; for what the Dark Forces require for their discomfiture is to be brought to the surface of men's minds, and recognised for what they are. It is all to the good that Society is getting to note the cheap and monotonous reiteration of the political parrot-cries of expanding Communism, as it "liberates" one patiently Christianised and civilised national unit after another, and fills its key positions with blue-jowled, "freedom-loving" aliens. Gradually it is coming to be recognised that *humanitarianism* is no more than the Socialist's pass-word, by employing which he gets the door open and his foot inside. And that the cause of the oppressed is just the stock excuse, on the strength of which he asks insatiably for mandates and comprehensive powers, and justifies his use (and ab-use) of both.

We begin to see all this; but one further step is wanted, and it is a vitally important one, and that is to realise that he—the political Socialist, the vocal, impatient, envious, self-righteous minority everywhere—is not the decisive factor in the movement he supports. He is merely used by power-groups, which are themselves controlled by individuals, not a great many in number and still largely unidentified, to mobilise the genuinely under-privileged and degraded everywhere as shock-troops, Black, White or Yellow, for the achievement of their megalomaniacal object of World Dominion.

For this wild purpose, what more apt than the plight of the South African Native—not to mention the Hindu immigrants of the Eastern seaboard—in contact with modern Industrialism at its lowest and worst, in the bowels of the earth. Even without this further complication, it is a profound, and apparently baffling problem, this of the living together of the White with the Black races, not to mention the Perilous Yellows, and Christian society has been regarding it for a long time now with increasing apprehension, and a conspicuous lack of inspiration. A solution might be more readily forthcoming, however, if only Western civilisation could bring itself to realise that, as Mr. Douglas Reed points out in his latest book*, it is the exploitation of the situation by the Dark Forces of Internationalism that makes, and has always made, the matter so intractable.

Of its nature the envy-making British Commonwealth is inevitably the focus and chief objective of this international pressure, and it is clear that South Africa has long been a major point of attack in the strategy of anti-British global politics. India, Ireland, South Africa are all precarious outposts of Empire, fortresses to be held, and at the same time points of extreme weakness in its defences to draw attack. India at least has technically capitulated. Ireland, thanks primarily to Ulster and her Orangemen, is still partially and effectively held. South Africa, representing the only potentially homogeneous block of Whites in a vast continent of Blacks, hangs by a thread. What actually is the cohesive force that has kept the South African Union even nominally inside the Commonwealth up to now, it would be hard to say.

In Mr. Reed's opinion, unless the disproportion of Whites to Coloured population in South Africa can be reduced, little can be done to improve the situation. But the opposition to European immigration—apparently the only point upon which British and Afrikaner residents can even faintly agree—blocks this road. No doubt the spectre of unemployment lurks in the minds of both; but the really final embargo comes from the Afrikaners, with their intense national isolationism, of the Irish, Sinn Fein brand; to whom their homeland among the North Sea dunes is almost as foreign a country as England, and Dutch a foreign language. For them European immigration of any kind is tantamount to racial suicide.

In a well-balanced article in the June issue of the *National and English Review* by Lawrence Gander, this aspect of the matter is less stressed than that of the mishandling of South African affairs by the British Colonial Office, and the lack of appreciation and understanding of South African difficulties, and of what has already been done and is being done by the South African Government to meet them. He accuses the British press of uninformed criticism, especially on the question of the Colour Bar. His standpoint, which is also Mr. Reed's, is that racial distinctions and even discrimination, while they are to be regretted, are presently inevitable, and in South Africa not intrinsically worse than anywhere else. "It is only when it affects the marginal fringe of educated and cultural Africans and Indians," Mr. Gander says, "that it constitutes a pure colour-bar, with all its hideous effects. But as there are no more than perhaps 50,000 of such people out of a total non-European population of nine millions, it is clearly foolish to view the colour-bar as if, in fact, this hardship was the general rule." It is this captious spirit that he regards as the really disintegrating element that threatens the cohesion of the British Commonwealth; this essentially socialistic and doctrinaire assumption that everywhere abroad, and more particularly under the Union Jack, the Native is exploited in a manner which he, the Socialist, would never tolerate were he on the spot. Sad experience has taught us in this country how potent that self-righteous attitude proved in breaking up our domestic social structure, and just how inhuman Socialism actually is in practice.

It is this small, but strident section of the community that is everywhere used by the World Propagandists—tormented busybodies—in their attack on nationalism. Both Mr. Reed and Mr. Gander are agreed that what is publicised and condemned as the Colour-Bar has little or nothing to do with colour, but is cultural, temperamental. In proof of which both cite the example of Natal, with its additional

**Somewhere South of Suez,* by Douglas Reed.

bedevilment of Indian immigration. Here the Hindus segregate themselves as severely from the African Natives as do the Europeans, and seek to dominate them and keep them down as harshly as the Afrikaners do.

The South African scene is certainly a complex one, the most extraordinary mixture of incompatible elements containing, besides these of local politics and of race, Internationalism entrenched in the shape of the Rand and its gold, superimposed on them. Mr. Reed paints a forceful picture of Johannesburg, with all its flavourless cosmopolitanism, and underworld terrorists; where weathly suburbanites keep night-guards round their houses, and the opulent, garish facade hides what must be the crudest and most degrading example of human exploitation outside the Russian Labour Camps, known as the Native Mining Reserves. Beyond these lie the Shanty-Towns of the unregulated Black immigrants, drawn from their kraals and native way of life by the magnetic attraction of mere human aggregation; as they are to all the big cities, which in their philosophic civilisation are almost equally products of the gold complex.

Speculations on the actual and symbolic significance of this scene are literally boundless, and restraint is required in the interests of a coherent picture. One is quite unable to follow all the lines of thought started by Mr. Reed, tempting though they are. There is more than enough already just to consider this situation.

Here, in the uplands of the great and still largely unexplored continent of Africa, glitters Johannesburg, one of the chief seats of neo-Judaism; civic sister to pre-war Berlin, and to New York, and now Tel-Aviv, and sky-aspiring Moscow. Enthroned Internationalism, which is usury for power; intolerant, dictatorial, reformist. And only a short motor-run away stands Pretoria, founded, as was New England, by that other neo-Judaic school, Puritan Protestantism, deriving no doubt, more from Calvin than Luther. Here, before the gold was thought of, came the Boers, in disapproving republican revolt against association with the British Royalists of the Cape. Mr. Reed traces a convincing resemblance between the sober-garbed Pilgrim Fathers, sea-trekkers from Restoration England, who brought Republicanism to the American continent, and who led the subsequent revolt against the rule of the Mother-country, and the equally puritan, psalmatical Vootrekkers, led by Paul Kruger in his frock-coat and top hat. Similar, too, was the intolerant Puritan spirit behind what seemed to the Nineteenth Century English settlers at the Cape, the brutal attitude of the Boers to the native African, which led to the split there, and which was largely responsible for the virtual extermination of the native population of North America.

Here, then, we see them encamped, cheek by jowl, these two rigid sects of the same communion; fundamentalists both, believers in the Inspired Word, economic as well as Mosaic. The mutual hate was abiding; and yet, in fact, it was rather the irreconcilability of bitter rivals, than the incompatibility of dissimilar spiritual cultures. It was this last that had already driven the Boers northward, to found their republics of the Transvaal and Orange Free State—settlements, which Lord Bryce in 1895 judged to be "ideal commonwealths," with their dignified, Quakerish, republican capitals of Pretoria and Bloemfontein—in an attempt to get away from the hated British Imperialism. They distrusted the wisdom of the Englishman's careless treatment of the natives, which appeared to them sentimental, as did also his attachment to his homeland, which they had long ago thrown off.

There is without doubt a strange echo in it all of the situation leading up to the American Civil War, even if the issue has taken a different course, and Paul Kruger with Johannesburg proliferating, as it were, at his back-door, must have felt much as did Abraham Lincoln when he cried out against New York and its High Finance as "the enemy in his rear." So must it always be when Greek meets Greek. Extreme Internationalism cannot allow extreme or indeed any degree of Nationalism, to have control of the key to financial domination without a struggle. So a struggle there had to be. And since Mammon has always, cuckoo-like, to get outside hatchers for its fertile designs, we see the enthusiastic Victorian Imperialist, Kipling's easy-going, Absent-minded Beggar, guilelessly drawn in, ostensibly to teach Oom Paul and his Boers where Capetown stood, but in fact to confirm and consolidate international control of Johannesburg and its mines via London and ultimately New York. Hence the South African War, and all that has stemmed from it—and what hasn't!—and the remarkable spectacle of the young Zionist-to-be, Winston Churchill campaigning against his future war-comrade and potential co-Zionist, Jan Christian Smuts.

(To be continued)

"To Create a Really Serious Crisis"

The Editor,

The Social Crediter.

Sir,

I would like to draw your attention to a review by Roy Harrod on the life of J. M. Keynes, which has appeared in the issues of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, the 18th, 19th, and 20th December respectively, of the *Financial Times*. In the issue to-day, Wednesday, he quotes:—

> After the negotiations in Washington in 1943 which preceeded the Bretton Woods Conference, Keynes next spent some days in New York, where he attempted the hard task of converting the bankers to the desirability of an international Fund. His old friend, Mr. Russell Leffingwell provided him with a room to himself in the offices of J. P. Morgan.

and also the following letter from Keynes to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in October, 1943:—

> There is one point of some importance that I forgot to emphasise in my letter to you of October 14th reporting the outcome of our conversations.
>
> In addition to the chief objects we had in view as catalogued in that letter, I forgot to add a sixth object, which is by no means the least important—namely, to get the principles so drafted that one of the prime purposes of the Clearing Union—namely, to put pressure on creditor as well as debtor countries to restore equilibrium—should not wholly disappear. We have in fact got this (the 'scarce currency clause') back to an extremely drastic form. Clause 10 of the Statement of Principles, which deals with the apportionment of scarce currencies, puts the creditor country on the spot so acutely, that, in view of us all, the creditor country simply cannot afford to let such a situation arise.
>
> . . . We, in fact, suggested something rather milder. For we had doubts, and in fact still have doubts, whether Congress can be expected, if they understand

it, to swallow anything so extreme. Nevertheless, the U.S. Treasury, the State Department and the Federal Reserve Board quite deliberately prefer this ruthless provision, since in their view it is essential that the U.S. is to be brought to do what it should, to create a really serious crisis. They think this clause will make it necessary to find some way of preventing it coming into effect.

If the Americans really live up to their present proposals it will be the U.S.A. and not the rest of us which will get into real trouble, if the U.S.A. develops a favourable balance which is not adequately disposed of by foreign lending or in some way.

The clause was safely passed by Congress in the summer of 1945.

Yours faithfully,

ALEX S. LOVE.

69, St. Thomas Street,
Weymouth. December 20, 1950.

Agriculture Act, 1947

The Editor,
The Social Crediter.

Sir,

May I point out how the so called Impartial Commissions and Tribunals, set up under the Agriculture Act of 1947, are depriving the Citizen of his elementary right of Trial in the Law Courts of the Land, in cases of Dispossession and Acquisition of the Land by Compulsory Purchase? (*i*) *The Agricultural Land Commission* (whose function is to Investigate and Report to the Minister whether certain lands should be Acquired under Section 84 of the Act) is sent to Survey Areas, to which the Ministers attention has been drawn by the County Committee. The Minister is obviously satisfied that a *prima facie* case exists for Acquisition, or he would never send his Commission to investigate. Owners are given opportunity to make representations to the Commission against their Draft of the Report, and this is called an appeal, but it amounts to little in reality for the Minister is bound by law to consider the Report, but not bound to act upon it.

If the Commission recommends Acquisition and the Minister does so, he hands the area over to the Commission to hold on his behalf, and they become responsible for its future development and Estate-management.

Thus the body which started as impartial judges now after the take over become vitally interested. (*ii*) *The Agricultural Land Tribunal* (whose decisions are binding upon the Minister) is a body of appeal which tries cases of owners who wish to appeal against the judgement of a Land Commissioner (an Official not to be confused with the Agricultural Land Commission) under Section 85 of the Act, against a Supervision or Acquisition Order. The Tribunal consists of one Legal Chairman appointed by the Lord Chancellor's Department and a member of each of two private bodies the National Farmers' Union, and the Country Land Owners' Association. I saw, at a recent Tribunal, this trio; judging the appeals of owners all of whom were members of the C.L.A. and some of the N.F.U. as well, defended by Counsel partially paid for by the C.L.A. presenting the case as prepared by their legal department. Opposed to them as witness for the Minister, was a member of the Land Commission (who sits with the Commission as an impartial judge, and if the appeal is dismissed will have to take over the management of the land) and supporting witness was a Land Commissioner (imported from another area, who at home would judge cases under this Section 85 of the Act before they reach the Appeal stage). So low has the British judicial system sunk that the C.L.A. in their recruiting pamphlet touting for members can say " we have representatives of your interests on County Committees and Agricultural Land Tribunals." The first body suggests land for Supervision, and Acquisition; and the second hears the appeal of the Owners against dispossession. There is no appeal even on a point of Law beyond this legal Chairman. No Citizen of this country should be deprived of the right of testing judgment in the Law Courts of the Land (the finest in the World) when:—Home land, livelihood, life's-investment, and heritage, can be taken away; intolerable hardship caused and no provision made whereby successful defendants can obtain legal costs or damages. How ludicrous is the state of things, when the rich can be dispossessed of one piece of land and move immediately, and purchase another farm. The poor broken and ruined, all to pursue a Will of the Wisp the vague indefinable, indeterminate 'Maximum Production.'

Have we Englishmen really sold our souls for a bag of beans?

Yours faithfully,

E. A. MARSH.

The Vicarage,
Over, Cambridgeshire. December 20, 1950.

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This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: *Home and abroad, post free:* *One year* 30/-; *Six months* 15/-; *Three months* 7s. 6d.

Offices: (*Business*) 7, VICTORIA STREET, LIVERPOOL, 2, *Telephone*: *Central* 8509; (*Editorial*) 49, PRINCE ALFRED ROAD, LIVERPOOL, 15, *Telephone SEFton Park* 435.

Vol. 25. *No.* 19. *Saturday, January* 6, 1951.

From Week to Week

An "Intelligence Digest" which has from time to time caught our speculative eye in this column, announces the Year 1951 as "historic," a journalese adjective which has always seemed to us to withdraw some of the blessedness from even the blessed word Mesopotamia. Perhaps the unusual arrangement of the five-pointed stars which introduce the introductory paragraphs of the latest issue has some bearing on 'historicity' as understood by the promoters. They are in little coronets of three, hinting perhaps at a "Royal David Year?"

That a bid for the final accomplishment of the Plan outlined in (but not only in) *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion* will be made we have not a shadow of doubt, and this year seems as good as another.

The outcome?—our opinion seems to us as likely to be right as almost any body else's bar the conspirators'. We can see no *reason* why they should not prevail. But these things don't run according to "reason" but to something higher than reason.

• • •

We take due note of the following from widely different sources; but we don't build anything on them. The conspiratorial gang in administration of this country (and the equally-conspiratorial gang ready to replace it when its time is up) pay no heed to your opinion or mine, and we see not the slightest sign that the American variant differs in this respect from the indigenous model. Populations will be pawns until they learn to break down initiative into parcels small enough to ensure, at will (and not a dictator's will), concentrations, temporary in character but effective to secure a variety of policies wide enough to satisfy individual requirements. It looks as this threatening year opens as though decentralisation, when it comes, will not be voluntary or indeed a choice of any kind but irresistible and catastrophic:—

"In an obscure report in its issue of October 30, the Melbourne *Sun* was the only Melbourne daily to reveal that the celebration of United Nations week in the U.S.A. resulted in nation-wide protests against the flying of the U.N. flag.

"At one meeting of educationalists a majority condemned the proposal to fly the U.N. flag as 'part of an international plot to produce World Government and to subvert American traditions.'"—(*The New Times*, Melbourne).

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"On one point . . . , Eisenhower's ability to save the projected European army, we must report negatively. After the announcement of the General's appointment, we queried a particularly well-informed source. For several years, this individual has been a strong advocate of the European army. In recent months he shifted—saying that the opposition of France, and the developing opposition of the Germans, has ruined chances of such an army. When we consulted him yesterday, he replied, 'Eisenhower's appointment hasn't changed the awful situation in the slightest.' The name of Eisenhower—from all reports we receive—is literally anathema to the mass of the German people and their leaders. Rightly or wrongly, they bracket the General together with Morgenthau, as symbolising the worst of the post-war treatment of Germany. If the Americans think that Ike is the ideal man to win over the Germans to rearmament, they had better have another 'think.' Not a single newspaper we have seen has touched on this point—evidence of the continuing execrable coverage of the German problem."

—(Frank C. Hanighen, Dec. 20).

• • •

It must surely be pathognomonic of our plight that no one seems in the least surprised that a large stone slab can have been whisked away from under the noses of its custodians in a great church and deposited goodness knows where. If the Speaker of the House of Commons, with his Chair, were reported next week to be installed at Tel-Aviv —we don't say "would it matter?"; but would anyone mind?

• • •

A ripple of interest is reported from Scotland Yard occasioned by the report that the Loch Ness Monster has gall-stones.

"Trade"

The *Daily Mail* on December 22, reporting of the United States crisis coal to reach Britain—4,411 tons of it—at Cardiff, said:

"There was a scramble at the dockside to find 260 rail wagons to transport it to various centres in the Midlands and London areas.

"The coal, first of 1,000,000 tons ordered by the Government, is intended for British Railways. Another 50 ships are expected to complete delivery.

"While dockers got down to the unusual task of unloading coal, on the other side of the dock workmates were loading 4,900 tons of Welsh steam coal for export to Argentina.

"By the time American coal reaches British consumers it will have cost about £8 a ton, freightage costing nearly £3 2s. a ton."

PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: December 12, 1950.

Coal Supplies

Colonel Lancaster (South Fylde): The hon. Member for Bolsover (Mr. Neal) said at the beginning of his speech that he was surprised that nationalisation was not in question today. There was never any suggestion that we on these benches would adopt that attitude. What we are concerned with is whether the system under which nationalisation has been applied is likely to secure for us the coal we need. I have attended a great many coal debates in this House during the last 12 years or so, and I say frankly that I have never listened to one in which hon. Members on both sides of the House have spoken with a greater sense of restraint, or indeed contributed more effectively, than they have done today.

I believe that everyone is seized of the fact that we are approaching a very grave crisis, unlike the crisis which arose in 1947, because this one gives us cause for much greater concern. Not only is national recovery at stake, not only may there be domestic distress; more important than that, our rearmament programme may be jeopardised. In the light of that situation, hon. Members have contributed to the best of their abilities, and I want for a few moments to add my contribution on a slightly different line from that which has hitherto been discussed. It is one with which I have dealt on past occasions and if on this occasion I go even more deeply into the question than previously, I hope hon. Members will forgive me.

To me this is a matter of vital importance, and since I have made very definite claims and have made some public statements, I feel under a sense of responsibility to justify my view on the whole question. To get this matter into proper relationship, we must go back to the early days of nationalisation. Hon. Members will recollect that although the Bill to nationalise the mines was passed in the summer of 1946, it was only a matter of six weeks before the end of that year when the decision to create vesting day on January 1st of the following year was made. Although, no doubt, a good deal of preliminary work had been done in the intervening months, in fact during those six weeks a great many important decisions had to be made in regard to organisation, administration and personnel. It is hardly to be wondered that during those very hurried six weeks a good many fundamental mistakes were made. I shall refer in detail to these matters later on, but that is the background of the position which we have to consider today.

Something happened at the beginning of 1947, and what happened I consider is fundamental to the problem which we are now discussing. To the eternal credit of the present Minister of Defence, having made a number of mistakes, he subsequently freely admitted them. We on these benches opposed the vesting date very strongly and said that it was too early, and the right hon. Gentleman at the time said that the co-operation, good will and enthusiasm of the men would more than make up for the hurried manner in which the whole organisation was being assembled. As I say, he subsequently acknowledged that a good many fundamental mistakes had been made. During his successor's time little, in fact, occurred to rectify the original mistakes.

As hon. Members know, we had the inquiry under Sir Robert Burrows. What in fact occurred, perhaps we on these benches may never know, but not a great deal was decided. The Minister was wrong when the other day he said that the Coal Board was no longer functional, because four members of the Coal Board preside over their separate departments, and to that extent the Coal Board does remain functional. As far as the present Minister is concerned, as has been freely acknowledged in a good many speeches today, he started off on the wrong foot. When he spoke to this House in July he did so with a degree of optimism which later events have shown to be wholly unjustified. We can forgive him that; but not only has he spoken with his degree of optimism, but I think personally that in doing what he did again today—namely attempting to assess the situation on the false premise that 1945 was an important date—he got a great many of his ideas misconceived.

It is no good going back to a period at the end of a long war when the industry was lacking in steel and equipment, when a great number of Bevin boys had been introduced into the pits, and when there was the usual run-down which occurs after a war. If we are to form a basis of comparison we must take some earlier date when conditions were more stable and where we can reasonably equate what happened in the past period with what has happened today. We have got to see this thing, and see it whole.

The National Coal Board were by no means heirs to the "poor bag of assets," as the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster described the railways. A good deal had been happening in the coal industry. The period between the wars can be described as one where mechcanisation and intensive mining was getting well under way, and during the latter decade, the period just before the war, a great deal of research and experiment was occurring, not only in this country but throughout the world. The results of that research work and those experiments were available to the National Coal Board when they took over.

Mr. Hamilton (Fife, West): How does the hon. and gallant Gentleman reconcile that part of his speech with the findings of the Reid Report and the fact that the industry was substantially subsidised between the wars?

Colonel Lancaster: There was no question of any substantial subsidy during the period which I am discussing, and I have never contended in this House that all was right with the coal industry. All I am saying is that a great deal of research occurred in this industry not only in this country but throughout the world, and whoever has been responsible for the coal industry of this country during the past four years has had the advantage of that research. Hon. Members familiar with coal mining will be aware of the great advances which have occurred.

There have been great strides in power loading in this country through the Meco-Moore system; in the matter of pneumatic stowage; a revolution in under ground haulage with the introduction of locomotives, either diesel oil or battery operated; skip winding; and the introduction of drifts and slopes with the attendant pneumatic conveyors. There has been a great deal of improvement in surface machinery, particularly with regard to washeries, and, as hon. Members are no doubt aware, we have made considerable strides in freezing water measures, boring and prospecting and matters of that sort. All these improvements represent a great advance, and if we fail to turn them to advantage we must consider whether or not the system which we have set up is the right one. But that does not enter into the question of nationalisation. What we are concerned with is the system

under which nationalisation is being applied.

To go back to the period when the Coal Board was set up, in my submission two fundamental mistakes were made. The primary mistake was in having a functional board at the centre. That mistake reflected itself in the whole system and organisation throughout the industry, including the divisions and areas. The second, and equally fundamental mistake was in making the heads of the divisions the executive heads of their divisions. They were men who had not the necessary experience and knowledge to do the job which they were given to do. I have talked about this before, and I am devoting a few minutes to these mistakes now to show what I believe has been their ultimate effect.

As hon. Members know, there were set up eight divisions and, under them, 48 producing areas. When the men in charge of those producing areas—the area general managers—took over, they had an immense task. They had to do a whole number of things which very many of them had never done before; they had to answer a lot of questions many of which were strange to them. They each had as their immediate superior a man who was not versed or trained in that particular field of productive administration, and consequently they had to answer those questions themselves. The result was that the strain on those men was very real. So real was it in fact, that the Coal Board recognised that something would have to be done. They introduced administrative officers and a system of production officers under each area general manager.

What was the effect of that? I think it is fair to say that when the industry was handed over in 1947, there were probably of the order of between only 130 and 150 men who were capable of controlling an output of a million tons or more and who had the experience and technical knowledge to do that job. There were not many more suitable men than that in the whole of the industry. But 48 men became area general managers, and another 48 had to be sent to help them. In addition, a number of men went to each division as production directors, assistant production directors, deputy chairmen, and the like, and, of course, a handful or so went to London. If we take the sum total of 48, plus another 48, a score or more at the divisions and a few in London, there are not very many left out of the 130 or 150 I have mentioned. Yet the sub-area points—that is, the points where coal is produced—had to be manned with what was left of that very limited number of men.

As hon. Members know, the general organisation of the industry is 48 areas, divided mostly into about four sub-areas, which in some cases represent two, three or more pits with a production of a million or so tons. If that sub-area point, the point where the coal is produced, cannot be manned with proper technical ability, then a weakness begins to be seen in the system; and any system which strained available technical ability as did this system, was doomed to failure. That is what has happened.

All those various men are embodied in this very involved structure, all doing a hard day's work and putting their hearts into their jobs, but immensely immersed in paper, with a very centralised bureaucratic machine working on them from day to day, with paper coming down on them in a steady stream, all of them doing a great deal of work which keeps them away from the main work which the coal producer has to do in and about his pit. This system is so involved that the actual point of production lacks the men who are needed.

What has happened is that there have had to be upgraded men who previously, under any system, would not have been considered experienced enough to deal with a production of the order of a million tons. There is at this production point a very real weakness, a weakness which is inherent in the existing system. If I and others of my hon. Friends, and Sir Charles Reid and men of that calibre, all say the same thing, I believe that we are fully justified this afternoon in saying that there must be an inquiry into the situation.

There are of course a great many other aspects of this matter on which one could dwell. I want for a moment to deal with two matters which have been discussed at some length. One is the question of recruitment. I should not be very worried if the number of men in the industry, which is falling, were falling under a regulated basis, but it is not doing so, it is going too fast. Too many men are leaving and have left too quickly. That position has to be reversed. I believe far too little attention has been paid to recruitment. Of necessity, a great deal of time has been taken up in all ranks of the National Coal Board in producing the coal plan and in doing 101 other things, but I believe that the hon. Member for Gower (Mr. Grenfell)—who is not here today—was right in 1941 when, as Secretary for Mines, month after month he put his finger on that point and said that we must never disregard recruitment. But we have done so and that is one of the reasons why there has been this very rapid run down.

In regard to absenteeism, the tragedy is that it is worse in the high producing districts. It is among the coal face workers in the high producing districts that it is highest. I do not say that necessarily as a criticism, but the fact is that it is very real. . . .

Five years ago this House welcomed the Reid Report. They recognised it as the work of a number of men who were in a sense politically detached. They were experts and technicians in their own field and with a very competent secretariat they brought out what I think was acknowleged by everyone to be a first class report. We wish today that the development and extension of all the recommendations of that report were getting well under way and that we could see the fruit of their endeavours. But we must recognise quite clearly that something is radically amiss when we find that all the senior members of the Reid Committee have left this industry and of the very highly specialised secretariat one man did not join and the other is leaving at the end of this year.

We know that the chief production officer of the Coal Board has left—I am not going to enter the controversy of whether it was right or wrong, but we cannot ignore the fact that he and Sir Charles Reid have left. These men's interests and loyalties lie wholly in this industry. I am sure they are not actuated by political bias in one direction or another, but the fact is that they are leaving it. They must be leaving for some reason——

Mr. Glanville: What is the reason?

Colonel Lancaster: There is a sense of frustration and I believe they recognise, as Sir Charles Reid pointed out very clearly, that the system by which they are trying to run this industry is wrong and they have not been able to get their point of view accepted.

Mr. Glanville: Surely the Reid Report was issued when private ownership was rampant in the industry.

Colonel Lancaster: That has nothing to do with it. I

am trying to point out that these men in these high executive positions, who obviously can do more than anyone to affect the future prosperity of this extractive industry, are disgruntled and are leaving, and there must be a reason. I submit that the reason is not far removed from that which I have stated time and time again. I believe the system under which nationalisation is being run is the wrong system. . .

Pound Sterling (Value)

Mr. Osborne asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the purchasing power of the pound to the nearest convenient date as compared with the pound in August, 1945.

Mr. Gaitskell: About 16 shillings in mid-October, 1950, as compared with 20 shillings in 1945.

Company Offices (Transfer)

Mr. Molson asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer under what enactment the consent of the Treasury is required for the removal of the registered office of a limited liability company out of the Kingdom; and how many companies have been given this permission since the termination of hostilities.

Mr. Gaitskell: I presume that the hon. Member is referring to permission to transfer abroad the control of a company in which case the relevant enactment is subsection 2 of Section 30 of the Exchange Control Act, 1947.

Since this Act came into force on 1st October, 1947, 30 companies are known to have been given permission, but records for the first few months are not complete.

Mr. Erroll asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he will publish a list of companies to whom he has given approval this year for the transfer of their registered offices to places abroad.

Mr. Gaitskell: No.

Periodical "Target"

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what is the present cost of the periodical entitled "Target" issued by the Economic Information Unit; whether he is satisfied that the cost justifies the expense involved; and if not, whether steps can be taken to close it down at an early opportunity.

Mr. Gaitskell: The present cost of "Target" is £921 a month. Although some 50,000 copies are circulated each month there is a waiting list of applicants and requests for it are still coming in from factories and trade unions. This continuing demand from industry is good evidence that "Target" provides a useful service and I do not, therefore, intend to close it down.

China and Woollen Goods

Mr. De la Bère asked the President of the Board of Trade whether, in view of the difficulties in securing china and some woollen goods, and since the only available supplies are rejects from the export markets, he will take steps to ensure that the public are given larger allocations in the immediate future.

Mr. Rhodes: No. As my right hon. Friend informed the hon. Member on 24th October last, the reason for the shortages on the home market is our continuing need to earn dollars.

Electrical Generating Equipment (Export)

Mr. Gammans asked the President of the Board of Trade what is the value since the end of the war of exports of electrical generating machinery and equipment of all sorts which could be used either in the building of new generating stations or in the extension or modernisation of old stations; and what is the value of such equipment sent specifically to countries beyond the Iron Curtain.

Mr. Rhodes: Equipment intended for use in generating stations is not separately distinguished in the Trade Accounts but the value of electrical generating equipment of a type used in power stations produced between January, 1946, and September, 1950, for export amounted to £32 million. Less than £2½ million of this total went to countries beyond the Iron Curtain.

Dartmoor National Park (Inquiry)

Mr. Keeling asked the Minister of Town and Country Planning why the National Parks Commission was not represented at the public inquiry into the Admiralty and War Office proposals for using over 5,000 acres on Roborough Down and Ringmoor Down, which are likely to be within the area of the Dartmoor National Park.

Mr. Lindgren: Because the Commission prefer to express their views in a letter to the chairman of the inquiry.

Non-Trade Unionists (Unemployment Benefit)

Miss Ward asked the Minister of National Insurance why persons who have been dismissed owing to non-membership of trades union are being refused unemployment benefit, having regard to the fact that trades union membership is not, by statute, essential to employment.

Mr. B. Taylor: I am aware of only one such case of recent date. As it is at present the subject of an appeal to the National Insurance Commissioner, it would be improper for me to comment upon the matter at this stage.

Local Government

Mr. Shepherd asked the Minister of Health what are the Government's intentions in respect of a revision of the structure of local government.

Mr. Blenkinsop: This matter is under consideration, but the Government are not in a position to make a statement.

Leeward Islands (Constitutional Reform)

Mr. J. Hynd asked the Secretary of State for the Colonies if he will make a statement about constitutional reform in the Leeward Islands.

Mr. J. Griffiths: In June last, Lord Baldwin had discussions in the Colonial Office on proposals for constitutional reform in the Leeward Islands. I have carefully considered his proposals and I have now accepted, in principle, that certain changes should be made in the General Legislative

Council of the Colony, and in the Presidential Legislative Councils of Antigua, St. Kitts and Montserrat.

My view is that these changes should be broadly similar to those recently approved for Legislative Councils in the Windward Islands, and should include provision for unofficial elected majorities on the General Legislative Councils of the Colony and the Legislative Councils of the three Presidencies. The details of the proposals have yet to be determined, but it is proposed, *inter alia,* that Presidential Legislatures shall elect certain members to the Executive Councils.

Marshall and MacArthur

MARSHALL AND KOREA: From a well-informed source, we have received some interesting hitherto unpublished information about the original, ill-fated decision to land troops on the Korean peninsula last June. There has always been a good deal of mystery about how the President reached the decision to send ground troops and engage in land warfare. Last summer, this column gathered various bits of evidence and hearsay which suggested that the military chiefs were either opposed or reluctant. (It is now known that they were inclined to adhere to a secret plan which limited retaliation to air bombing and naval blockade). Generally, it has been believed that the responsibility for the landing was solely that of Truman and Acheson. Now comes word that there was a third partner in the decision. We hear from a usually well-informed source that President Truman paid a secret visit to General George C. Marshall some time in the 24 hours preceding the afternoon of June 26. According to this information, the President motored to the General's home at Leesburg, Virginia, about thirty-five miles from Washington—although it is not explained why, instead, the General did not come to the White House. The President was reportedly absent from the Capital for about four hours. As such a motor journey should have consumed about an hour-and-a-half (down and back), there was ample time for a considerable review of the Korean situation. While our source gives no details about what was said at the meeting, we are justified in concluding that General Marshall urged or approved the plan for landing U.S. troops in Korea. It would, indeed, be surprising if Marshall's assent was not given, for it is well known that the President has long esteemed Marshall's military counsel. Finally, it was after this secret meeting that the President made the decision of June 26 to undertake the ill-starred Korean landing.

MACARTHUR: Amid the continuing pother about General MacArthur's failure to foresee the massive invasion of North Korea by the Chinese Communists, we learn of an explosive fact. This fact, if ever produced before an open hearing, would destroy the talk of MacArthur's 'reckless tactics."

"From a source, peculiarly in a position to know, we hear that the Far Eastern Commander, before his final thrust toward the Yalu river, read an intelligence report from Washington. The report discounted chances of the Chinese Communists intervening in serious force. This report came from the office of General Walter Bedell Smith, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, and represented the considered view of that body's experts.

"Now the Central Intelligence Agency is the overall Agency for gathering intelligence and evaluating it from all angles—including the political. Hence, it took account of the various political manœuvres in the U.N., the atmosphere of the moves in the diplomatic chess game—and thereby gave MacArthur the decisive information that he sought. For the Far Eastern Commander necessarily had to consider the state of negotiations as one factor affecting the picture along the Yalu. With such an opinion from Washington, and the U.N. mandate to recapture all Korean territory, it would have been surprising if MacArthur, or any other commander, had hesitated."—(F. C. Hanighen in *Human Events,* Dec. 13).

Published for the Social Credit Secretariat by K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 7, Victoria Street, Liverpool, 2. Printed by J. Hayes & Co., Woolton.