Rosebery on Chatham

by H. SWABEY.

Until quite recently it was unusual for politicians to run a literary side line. Disraeli was an exception, and Gladstone—as became the puritan's leader—wrote several pieces which might be called tracts. The productions of Lloyd George, Mr. Churchill and, it might be added, Mrs. Roosevelt have changed all that. Nevertheless Lord Rosebery's Chatham: His early life and connections (1910) is worth inspection, if for no other reason than that neither Rosebery nor Chatham quite fitted into the party political scheme.

F. J. C. Hearnshaw wrote, in British Prime Ministers, "On the very day (March 3rd, 1894) that Gladstone handed the seals of his office to Her Majesty she invited the Earl of Rosebery to accept them. His appointment as Prime Minister was unquestionably a mistake. He had no enthusiasm for Liberal causes. He did not believe in Home Rule for Ireland. . . . He was an Imperialist. . . . True, he wished to reform the House of Lords; but he wished to reform it to make it stronger, not, like his colleagues, to reduce it to impotence." He lasted for fifteen months. As for Chatham, "The one thing (he) had in common with George III. was dislike of the Whig oligarchy—to whose inner circle he had never been admitted—and desire to escape from the party system of government generally."

Rosebery says that he "bequeaths to us the most illustrious name in our political history," which is high tribute from a Liberal ex-premier to one who might be considered the last Tory as well as the last Statesman. He "raised Britain from abasement to the first position in the world." In 1738, Rosebery records, "war was brewing with Spain. Our traders were constantly encroaching on her rights and monopolies in the New World. . . . There can be little doubt that the British merchants were in the wrong. But trade has neither conscience nor bowels . . . ." The Opposition, similar to that of two centuries later, hated that the army should be reduced and war declared against Spain.

After the fall of Walpole in 1742, there was "a jobbing distribution of places to the same sort of people as vacated them . . . people turned their attention to other things more honest and more practical than party politics." One of the notes of the book, indeed, is that of the author's disillusionment.

Pitt lamented that English foreign policy was framed in the sole interests of Hanover, and declared "These (Hanoverian) troops are hired only to drain us of our money." Rosebery's comment follows: "The wonder is that the English should have had the civic courage in the cause of religion and liberty to endure the compact (with William and the Georges)." But he commends Walpole and rapturously compares him with Sir Robert Peel, "For Free Trade and Whiggery were, in the opinion of the two statesmen, essential to avert the revolution which the opposite system would have involved."

In 1744, Pitt was complaining of Carteret, "the rash author of those measures which have produced this disastrous, impracticable war." For Pitt wanted a purely naval war against France and Spain and opposed war on the continent.

Rosebery makes an interesting comparison: "Now, if a man be a bold and popular speaker, both in Parliament and on the platform, but more especially on the platform, he leaps into the Cabinet at once; he disdains anything else. . . . But in the middle of the eighteenth century. . . . there was no such thing as platform speaking outside the religious movement. The Sovereign exercised a control, not indeed absolute, but efficacious and material, in the selection of ministers. The great posts were mainly given to peers. . . . The peers lived, as it were, in the steward's room, and the commoners in the servants' hall; in some parlour, high above all, sat the King." Pitt made a speech in 1751 not disconnected with this matter, when he said: "No search is a stipulation which it is ridiculous to insist on . . . the Crown has the sole power of making peace and war . . . encroachment on the King's prerogative has always hitherto proved unlucky. Nor did he want the unconditional surrender of Spain: "Such a low ebb it is not our interest to bring that nation to."

Rosebery describes how Pitt broke a long silence: "By an Act passed in June, 1753, foreign Jews had been rendered capable of naturalisation. The Bill had passed into law without serious opposition, but soon aroused great popular clamour. Grub Street, as usual, was called into requisition:

"But Lord! how surprised when they heard of the news That we were to be servants to circumcised Jews, To be negroes and slaves instead of True Blues, Which nobody can deny."

"On the meeting of Parliament in November, Newcastle at once moved to repeal it . . . Pitt supported the repeal in a speech on which his admirers would not desire to dwell. He was still in favour of the Act, but should vote for its repeal, because the people wished it, having been misled by the 'old High Church persecuting spirit.' . . . The repeal was passed."

The relations of Pitt and Bolingbroke are touched on. Pitt found the old viscount's arrogance irritating (he died in 1751) but warmly recommended his "Remarks on the History of England" to his nephew.

The King shocked his Chancellor when he said that he would be guided by the opinion of the Cabinet about a new chief, a matter, said Hardwicke, that "should only be settled in his closet." As for the leadership of the House of Commons, Horace Walpole said: "Pitt has what in this case is allowed to operate, the King's negative." In November (1754) Pitt brought forward a Bill for the relief of Chelsea Pensioners who, "receiving their pensions a year in arrear, fell inevitably into the hands of usurers" (Rosebery). Then he told the Commons, "You will degenerate into a little assembly serving no other purpose than to register the arbitrary edicts of one too-powerful subject." He told Newcastle (First Minister 1754-6) that the King's departure to Hanover was unpardonable "without a man about him.
that has an English heart." He would be no party to the system of subsidising foreign powers. And he told Newcastle that the House of Commons must have a leader with a responsible office of advice as well as of execution, asking him: “Why cannot you bring yourself to depart with some of your sole power?” Pitt said he had more dread of arbitrary power “dressing itself in the long robe than even of military power.”

In 1755 Pitt warned: “We are losing sight of our proper force, the Navy... We cannot remove the laws of Nature or make Hanover other than an open and defenceless country.” We may compare this outlook with modern attempts, pitiful enough, to set Europe and the world in order!

Rosebery then criticises Pitt: “Indifference to the fact that pecuniary independence is a main though not necessary base of moral independence was the flaw in his own life, and was the worst inheritance that he transmitted to his illustrious son.”

In December, 1755, he drew a picture of a French invasion reaching London, “of the consternation in the City, where the noble, artificial, yet vulnerable fabric of public credit should crumble in their hands...” For want of foresight, shocks will fall and hurry along with them the ruin of the City, vulnerable in proportion to its opulence. In other countries the treasure remains in a city which is not sacked. But paper credit like ours may be wounded even in Kent.” He claimed that when sitting, speaking and voting in his legislative capacity, “the King himself was not his superior.” He complained of treaties that violated the Act of Settlement, asking: “Could Russia, without our assistance, support her own troops?” And he said that “resistance to these treaties might save us from a Continental war.”

Rosebery notes wistfully that “The taxes altogether were not to produce £80,000 a year” (1756). He records Pitt’s definition: “That state alone is a sovereign state, qui sui stat viribus, non aliena pendet arbitrio,” which subsists by its own strength, not by the courtesy of its neighbours, and he comments that they were “words which may have inspired Lord Lyndhurst a century after with his famous phrase with regard to a state existing on suffrage.”

Calamity came, the French occupied Minorca, and Byng was sacrificed “in spite of Pitt, who had the fine courage to support him,” and Voltaire remarked that it was done pour encourager les autres (to encourage the others). Here Rosebery modestly brings his book to an end, feeling himself unequal to describing the “four years unrivalled in the annals of Great Britain.” Enough has been said to show that Pitt put British interests first, and he was to continue this policy to the end (1778). “Always maintaining the cause of the colonists against the coercive policy of the King and his Minister, he constantly urged conciliation and concession, lest the struggle should lead, as it ultimately did, to the separation of the dominions from the Mother Country.” (Hearnshaw).

Rosebery concludes, “Hereditary counts for much, for more than we reckon in these matters. We breed horses and cattle with careful study on that principle; the prize bull and the Derby winner are the result. With mankind we heed it little or not at all. With Pitt it was everything or almost everything.”

A cool and classical judgment of this kind was possible in a public man of forty years ago. It compares, in quality and content, with that made well over two thousand years previously by Aristotle (384-322 b.c.). “It is thought that justice is equality, and so it is, though not for everybody but only for those who are equals; and it is thought that inequality is just, for so indeed it is... for those who are unequal; but these partisans strip away the qualifications of the persons concerned and judge badly... it is proper for the laws when rightly laid down to be sovereign, while the ruler or rulers in office should have supreme powers over matters as to which the laws are quite unable to pronounce with precision... We classified the right constitutions as three, kingship, aristocracy and constitutional government, and the deviations from these as three, tyranny from kingship, oligarchy from aristocracy and democracy from constitutional government.” (Politics—H. Rackham’s translation).

**PARLIAMENT**


British Commonwealth (Migration Statistics)

Mr. Russell asked the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations if he will publish in the **Official Report** figures showing the number of emigrants from the United Kingdom to Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa in each of the years 1934 to 1938, 1946 to 1949, and to the latest available date in 1950.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (Mr. Gordon Walker): Yes, Sir.

Mr. Russell: Do not the figures show that, taking the post-war years as a whole, there has been far more emigration than before the war, and that any recent falling off in emigration to Canada cannot possibly be due to full employment.

Mr. Speaker: The hon. Gentleman asked that certain figures should be published, and he must not make insinuations.

Following are the figures:

**EMIGRANTS OF BRITISH NATIONALITY TRAVELLING DIRECT BY SEA FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTH AFRICA.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Future Permanent Residence*</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>2,167</td>
<td>4,572</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,175</td>
<td>4,552</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>2,281</td>
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<td>1937</td>
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<td>1938</td>
<td>3,367</td>
<td>5,472</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>52,479</td>
<td>9,392</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>22,960</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>34,487</td>
<td>34,445</td>
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<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>20,762</td>
<td>53,059</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7,307</td>
<td>28,620</td>
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**NOTES:**

* Residence for a year or more is treated as permanent residence for the purposes of this classification.
† Includes Union of South Africa, South-West Africa, Southern
Rhodesia, and the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. Separate figures for the Union of South Africa are not available.

**Naturalised Citizens (Convictions)**

Brigadier Clarke asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department if he will consider withdrawing naturalisation papers from people who have been convicted of offences against the laws of this country.

Mr. Ede: The British Nationality Act, 1948, enables me to deprive a naturalised person of his citizenship if within five years of becoming naturalised he has been sentenced to a term of not less than 12 months' imprisonment, and if I am satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that he should continue to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies.

Brigadier Clarke: I did not ask a Question about a specific person, and I did not understand what the Minister said. I wanted to know if he would withdraw naturalisation papers from anyone who is convicted of an offence in this country. The right hon. Gentleman referred to a particular case.

Mr. Ede: I am not responsible for the hon. and gallant Gentleman's understanding, but if he would take some advice about the answer I have given he will find that his Question has been answered.

Mr. J. Langford-Holt: Could the right hon. Gentleman tell the House how many times this action has been taken in the last five or ten years?

Mr. Ede: No action has been taken in any case in the last ten years.

**Kingston Victoria Hospital**

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter asked the Minister of Health whether he has now considered the proposal of the British Medical Association that a public inquiry be held in connection with the dispute as to the future use of the Kingston Victoria Hospital; and what action he proposes to take.

Mr. Ede: The future of this hospital has been very fully and carefully reviewed, both by the regional board and by my own Department, as well as having been the subject of a debate in this House. I certainly do not think that the proposed inquiry would either be appropriate or would add to our knowledge, and I see no reason to intervene.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that one of the major reasons why local opinion feels that injustice has been done is that no opportunity has yet been given for local opinion to express itself directly to those responsible? Would not a solution such as that suggested by the British Medical Association give an opportunity, so far denied, for local opinion to express itself?

Mr. Ede: I do not believe that there exists in Great Britain any better court of inquiry than the House of Commons itself, especially on a matter of this kind. If the hon. Gentleman thinks that the matter has not been adequately ventilated he can seek further opportunities.

Mr. Hastings: Would not my right hon. Friend agree that the opinion of experts in hospital management is much more important than local opinion?

Mr. Ede: Yes, of course. This is the view which has been taken by the management committee and the hospital regional board, who have had all the facts before them, and, as I have said, the House of Commons as well. If the matter is not yet sufficiently ventilated I shall be most happy to recount the facts again.

Colonel Stoddart-Scott: Is it not true that the Minister of Health, throughout the whole of the passage of the National Health Service Bill, advocated again and again the establishment of general practitioner hospitals similar to this one at Kingston-upon-Thames, and that ever since the Act was passed he has closed one general practitioner hospital after another?

Mr. Bevan: The statement of the hon. and gallant Gentleman is as prejudiced and as inaccurate as most of his statements.

Mr. Boyd-Carpenter: Following the twice-given invitation of the Minister, I beg to give notice that I shall seek an early opportunity to raise the matter again.

**India, Pakistan and Ceylon (Sterling Balances)**

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gaitskell): I promised last week to make a further statement to the House about the recent discussions which we have had with the Governments of India, Pakistan and Ceylon on the special position of their sterling balances in relation to the period covered by the Colombo Plan for Co-operative Economic Development in South and South-East Asia.

The general basis of the proposed arrangements is that the sterling balances of the three Governments concerned should be reduced over the next six years, in the context of the Colombo Plan, to something like the amounts which they would wish to hold in any case as their normal reserves.

We have already been able to examine in some detail with India and Ceylon the use of their sterling balances in this way. As a result of this detailed examination, we have agreed in principle with both countries on the use to be made of the balances during the period of the Plan. Discussions are in progress with the Government of Pakistan and it is hoped that an agreement can be reached at an early date. It is intended that in due course these arrangements should be the subject of formal agreements between ourselves and the three Governments concerned.

The agreement contemplated with India would provide for transfers to their No. 1 (free) Account whenever the latter falls below £30 million, with a transfer of up to £35 million in each of the six years beginning on 1st July, 1951. Provision would be made for a measure of flexibility from year to year in the size of transfers, and for full consultation between our two Governments to ensure the smooth working of the agreement.

The agreement contemplated with the Government of Ceylon would be on broadly similar lines. The intention is that under it the Government of Ceylon should be able to draw £21 million of their sterling balances during the period between 1st July, 1950, and 30th June, 1957. Transfers to the No. 1 (free) Account within this maximum would be made when the balances in the No. 1 Account fell below £12 million. Transfers in any one year would normally be limited to £3 million. As in the case of India, there would also be provision for flexibility and for consultation.

I hope that we are thus on the way to finding a solution (Continued on page 6)
From Week to Week

"Principal Taylor went on to say that the other danger which seemed to him to confront schools and universities was one that also confronted the nation as a whole. It was the exaltation of means over ends. Production, we were told on every hand, was the end to which our contemporary activities were directed. Production with a view to maintaining our standard of living was now, it appeared, the chief aim of political action. It was accepted as a maxim by politicians of every view and every party.

"There is such a thing as justice," he continued, "and there are conditions of living which should not be tolerated, and most of us have had consciences about these conditions. Those who are more fortunately placed are very unwilling to oppose measures which are designed to give a semblance of justice to the under-privileged. Yet the truth must be of principle between this and the doctrine of the Marxist, of the primacy of production.

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"It seems to me that ancient schools should not hesitate to maintain that the quality of living is more important than the standard of life, which easily may become pseudo-scientific jargon for that love of comfort which is the mother of servility. Further, they must assert that there are things that make for quality that cannot be used as means to anything else, precisely because, like persons, they are ends in themselves. They ought to assert that truth is not just anything that serves the party line, that beauty is not just something to boost morale in mine or factory, and that goodness is not just being in the good books of the secret police..."


Without, we hope, withholding from the Aberdeen Grammar School's Former Pupils' Club anything which we should accord on the ground of its importance (and it is not only—or always—the great and famous which are important), it does cross our minds that the number of interesting statements which are being made to rather obscure audiences is on the increase. Someone should try Dr. Taylor out. It might thereby be discovered what, for example, Kipling meant when he asserted that a hair divides the true from the false. Or it might be discovered what general principle, if any, unites those modest persons who are now willing to at least suggest some aspect of truth (not truths) provided the
The Emerging Pattern  
By NORMAN WEBB  
(Conclusion)

Among a considerable number of authorities quoted by Mr. Reed in his interesting book* perhaps the most striking is Anthony Trollope, who visited South Africa in the Eighteen Seventies. The observations of this West Country novelist, show mid-Victorian England to have been the possessor of a prescience that seems nowadays to be getting more and more scarce, almost in proportion as the sources and volume of detailed information multiply. From the quotations, the author of Barchester Towers would appear to have sensed the coming Boer War, still over thirty years ahead. Equally, he seems to have apprehended the inherent danger of the bitterly divided White population, in face of the potential threat represented by the overwhelming majority of the native Blacks, already being taught to demand the franchise. It appeared obvious to Trollope even then that sooner or later they would come to be instruments in the hands of what he terms, "European politicians not of the first class"—by which he obviously means what we call international financiers—for disruptive purposes. "After awhile," says Trollope, "the Natives will learn the power they possess as have the Negroes of the Southern States." "In 1948," concludes Mr. Reed, "the Negro Council in Chicago announced that its three million voters in Illinois, Ohio and California, had been instructed to vote for Truman . . . if this was truly so, they decided the issue."

Now Smuts is gone, and it is the spirit of the frock-coated Kruger that ostensibly rules again in Pretoria and Capetown. There they are, the Isolationists, the apparently implacable enemies of all outside influences; of all Internationalism, either of the Jo'burg, cosmopolitan brand or of the British Commonwealth of Nations. It is indeed an intriguing speculation what line Dr. Malan and his government will take. For just as in Oom Paul's time, so today the two objects of the Afrikaner hatred, Internationalism (U.N.O.) and the British Commonwealth, cannot realistically be bracketed together—indeed, refuse to be—and opposed in a single line of policy. As alternatives these two systems may appear to the Mricaners equally dictatorial and distasteful. Nevertheless, Isolationism is an even more impossible ideal than old Paul Kruger found it in his time, when he woke up in Pretoria to the view of Johannesburg, with its inter- national Jews and its slag heaps, so to speak, at the end of his garden vista.

It would not seem improbable, therefore, that the choice before Dr. Malan may turn out to be an anticipation of what awaits, not only the individual national units of the British Commonwealth, but the whole Christian world as well in the not very distant future. And that choice for members of the Commonwealth at least, is no more and no less than the decision to accept either true, or false Internationalism, one or the other symbolised respectively by Pretoria, with its Union Building, and by Johannesburg with its disrupting economic stranglengale. It is the choice on the one hand of a voluntary association of economically sovereign communities, under one flesh-and-blood, Christian king, of which the British Commonwealth of Nations is the prototype and encouraging example, or on the other, of the counterfeit propounded by those who are actually behind U.N.O. and Zionism, of a compulsory economic dependence under an abstract Authority; a fore-doomed and diabolical experiment in global tyranny. It is an immense issue, which if it were realized—which, of course, it isn't—would focus the gaze of the whole Christian world on South Africa today. Indeed Dr. Malan and his Afrikaner government have need to be careful, since upon the choice they now make may depend the acceleration, or the arrest of a further break-up of the greatly threatened Pax Britannica, and with it the future of Christian civilization. For if it is true, as it most certainly is, that it is impossible to serve two masters, what confronts the Union Government are simple alternatives; there is no clear or safe third course open, certainly not isolationism in an atomic civilization.

Mr. Reed has much to the point to say about Zionism, that issue, which from being a cloud the size of a man's hand, has come to dominate the whole political sky and condition the world climate in the space of a generation. Speaking of Churchill and Smuts and their support of it, he says, "Apart from that, both their life-lines were clear and straight and comprehensible. Both spake the language of Christians and patriots; both upheld lonely and unpopular causes when they thought them right. Yet the life-line of both contained this inexplicable loop. I wondered if both had been caught in a McLuhanian, the consequences of which were unforeseeable when it began, but are now becoming plain. 1917 was the year of this country's calamity." And elsewhere Mr. Reed states that from his first visit to South Africa he sensed that Smuts's influence in the country was by no means as great as outsiders thought. And he adds significantly, "The reputations of public men outside their countries in the last thirty years have often depended on their attitude towards Zionism."

Later Mr. Reed met the Field-Marshal. He found, however, "that his mind dwelt on the lofty heights of philosophic detachment, from which, I thought, he looked down on the world with a growing conviction that God alone now could, and would restore order. 'It all began with the South African War,' he said, in allusion to the great confusion today. I mentally agreed, thinking of the rise of the money power between Johannesburg and New York. But probably he did not intend such a meaning." He comments on Smuts's reported admission to a hidden pressure behind recent calamitous events such as German Imperialism and the rise of Soviet Russia, which the Field-Marshal stigmatized as "experiments that issue, which from being a cloud the size of a man's hand, has come to dominate the whole political sky and condition the world climate in the space of a generation. Speaking of Churchill and Smuts and their support of it, he says, "Apart from that, both their life-lines were clear and straight and comprehensible. Both spake the language of Christians and patriots; both upheld lonely and unpopular causes when they thought them right. Yet the life-line of both contained this inexplicable loop. I wondered if both had been caught in a McLuhanian, the consequences of which were unforeseeable when it began, but are now becoming plain. 1917 was the year of this country's calamity." And elsewhere Mr. Reed states that from his first visit to South Africa he sensed that Smuts's influence in the country was by no means as great as outsiders thought. And he adds significantly, "The reputations of public men outside their countries in the last thirty years have often depended on their attitude towards Zionism."

Looking sufficiently far ahead, however, I think it is correct to say that the statesman in all of us—in all decent intelligent human beings—is for Internationalism in the proper sense of that term. We are all at heart true One-Worlders, with the significant and decisive exception of the few hundred power-maniacs, strategically ensconced about the world, and controlling world events by means of credit manipulation. It really begins to look as though the apparently minute and insignificant difference between anti-Christ and Christianity is no more than a difference in tempo;
of being in a hurry, and not being in a hurry. It may at the first glance seem strange, if that is really all it is, that the effect should be so radical and profound. But is it so strange? To hurry Nature requires force, pressure, coercion; and experience has invariably shown that, applied in excess, it inevitably results in disaster, as must all things un-natural. It is, then, the whole abysmal difference between the voluntary system and compulsion that is involved in this question of time; besides which all other differences are as nothing. Is there need for hurry, or isn’t there? I suggest that it is quite possible that somewhere round this point is lodged the clue to the conundrum of contemporary international strife. And that probably—for such almost abject patience as Nature’s unhurried, and unhurriable ways demand of the vaulting human intellect—nothing short of the caritas, the charity, the tolerance which Paul describes so minutely in I. Corinthians, xiii can suffice.

PARLIAMENT. (continued from page 3).

which will be satisfactory to all parties concerned of this difficult question, which has been the subject of so much consideration and discussion since 1945.

Mr. Oliver Lyttleton: We frequently ask the Chancellor for as much information as possible on sterling balances, and we are therefore grateful for any advance information which he can give us. At the same time, I think he would agree that the statement he has made is of a very imprecise character, perhaps necessarily so at the moment. He says that the balances of the three Governments concerned should be reduced to something like the amounts they would wish to hold in any case as their normal reserves.”

Later, he makes further reservations. Accordingly, we perhaps better refrain from any further comment until we have had an opportunity of studying the the matter in greater detail, because the statement does not carry us very far.

Mr. Gaitskell: Until the agreements are signed and published we shall not have the full details, but I think that I have given the House a fairly clear idea of what these agreements will contain.

Mr. Churchill: Are we right in understanding that these are in fact arrangements for the repayment of British debts to these countries which were incurred by us in the process of defending them from invasion by Japan?

Mr. Gaitskell: Yes, Sir. They are, of course, debts incurred during the war in that way, but, as the right hon. Gentleman knows, the countries concerned look upon them very much as ordinary commercial debts, and they would certainly hope, and I should have thought we should encourage them to hope, that they would be able to draw on these balances to develop the economies which are so vividly described in the Colombo Plan report for the benefit of that part of the world.

Mr. Churchill: Surely some consideration should also be given to the fact that these debts were incurred for the defence of these countries, and that our right was always reserved until quite recently to make a counterclaim for the immense expense to which we were put? Surely these matters should be considered with a view to thinking sometimes of the interests of our own country?

Mr. Gaitskell: I do not consider that the interests of our own country would be well served by repudiating debts which we have incurred, or by cutting off badly needed supplies from that part of the world.

Mr. Churchill: Is it not a fact that we have always reserved the right to put in a counterclaim for the expenses or a portion of the expenses to which we were put, and that these counterclaims need to be considered not only against these countries but also against Egypt at a time when these settlements are being made?

Mr. Gaitskell: It was never considered that it would be either practicable or wise to pursue the matter of counterclaims.

Mr. Churchill: Is it not a fact that until quite recently that has always been maintained as the British position?

Mr. Gaitskell: That is certainly not the case. The Prime Minister made it perfectly plain on an earlier occasion that we did not consider it feasible to put in these counterclaims.

Mr. Churchill: Was not the Prime Minister a Member of the Government which definitely laid down the principle of reserving the right to make a counterclaim?

Mr. Gaitskell: The Prime Minister also happens to be the Prime Minister of this Government, and has the right to make the decision.

Mr. Norman Smith: Would not the Chancellor agree that this arrangement is part of the healthy process of seeking to equalise standards of living as between the advanced industrial countries and the less advanced countries of Asia? Does he not understand that the Socialist movement welcomes this sort of thing?

Mr. Gaitskell: Yes, Sir.

Mr. Boothby: Does the Chancellor’s announcement today mean that the Government have abandoned any hope of achieving a general settlement with our creditors which would involve some scaling down of the capital obligations involved? Has that been completely abandoned?

Mr. Gaitskell: This announcement relates, of course, to these three countries only; it is not a general settlement beyond that. So far as these countries are concerned, I think it is fair to say that any idea of a general scaling down of balances is in our view impracticable because it could only be done by unilateral repudiation, which we are not prepared to contemplate.

Mr. Shepherd: Is it not a fact that this agreement is a breach of the undertaking entered into with America at the time of the American loan? Further, does not the publication of this agreement at this time preclude all possibility of the scaling down of such debts in the case of other countries in respect of which we have a much stronger case than the ones mentioned here?

Mr. Gaitskell: The answer to both questions is “No, Sir.”

Mr. Wyatt: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the supplies of stores involved in these sterling balances caused tremendous inflation in India during the war, and widespread suffering, including a famine in Bengal and that if we had now to say that our sufferings in the war had been greater than those of the Indians we should lose our allies in the East at the moment when we need them most?

Mr. Churchill: Will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that this is by no means an agreed matter between the different parties in the House?

Mr. Gaitskell: It is, I think, well understood on this side of the House that the right hon. Gentleman’s attitude to
India and the other countries concerned has always been unrealistic and, if I may use the term, totally lacking in humanity.

Mr. Churchill: May I say that I should have hesitated a long time before making such a filthy charge?

Mr. Snow: On a point of order. Is that language which we have had from the right hon. Gentleman—[Interruption.] Is that the sort of language we should have from the right hon. Gentleman, bearing in mind the remarks he made about the Prime Minister in the matter of the settlement of India?

Mr. Speaker: That is not a point of order. That is a matter entirely for the judgment of hon. Members themselves.

House of Commons: December 8, 1950.

Sugar

Mr. Maudling asked the Minister of Food what amount of sugar was imported into the United Kingdom during the last 12 months for which figures are available; what part of such imports came from Empire and non-Empire sources respectively; what quantity of the non-Empire imports was subsequently exported in a refined form; and, having regard to these figures, what is the estimate of his Department of the benefit received by the British beet sugar industry during 1949-50 from the indirect subsidy resulting from the fact that the Excise duty on home-produced sugar is less than the Customs duty on non-Empire sugar.

Mr. Webb: The total imports of sugar into the United Kingdom during the financial year 1949-50 (the last year for which figures are available) and the part thereof which was subsequently exported as refined sugar were, according to the records of my Department:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Approximate Tonnage in Terms of Raw Sugar</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From the Commonwealth</td>
<td>1,142,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From non-Commonwealth sources</td>
<td>630,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less re-exports as refined sugar</td>
<td>512,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net imports</td>
<td>1,497,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Our total purchases of Commonwealth sugar during that year were in excess of total net imports into the United Kingdom and amounted to 1,565,000 tons. In order, however, to keep freight charges to the minimum and to supply the Canadian market from its normal Commonwealth sources, we diverted some 580,000 tons of these purchases to Canada and other destinations for which we have a responsibility, the remaining 985,000 tons being actually imported into the United Kingdom. Of the 580,000 tons of Commonwealth sugar so diverted 512,000 tons were replaced by imports of non-Commonwealth sugar for United Kingdom consumption.

Notionally, then, the consumption needs of the United Kingdom in 1949-50 were met entirely from Commonwealth sources, since the diversion of Commonwealth sugar to other destinations (with replacement from non-Commonwealth sources) was only arranged in order to secure the objects already mentioned. The benefit received by the British beet sugar industry during 1949-50 from the indirect subsidy resulting from the fact that the Excise duty on home-produced sugar is less than the Customs duty on imported sugar should be calculated, therefore, on the basis that all sugar imported for United Kingdom consumption in that year was derived from Commonwealth sources. On this basis the total indirect subsidy was about £500,000.

The cost to the Exchequer of the total 1949-50 net imports for United Kingdom consumption was not higher than it would have been if all the imports had been actually from Commonwealth sources.


East Africa (Constitutional Changes)

The Secretary of State for the Colonies (Mr. James Griffiths): With your permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement about Colonial Territories in East Africa.

As the House will be aware from my speech in the Colonial debate in July, I have been much exercised about the position in East Africa. Recently it has appeared to me that there has been a growing uncertainty throughout the area. I have, during the last few months, been considering the matter in consultation with my advisers and with the Governors who have been over here on leave or on visiting, and have had the advantage of the views of the Minister of State, who has recently visited East Africa. I have come to the conclusion that it will be best to pursue the matter, for the time being at any rate, separately in each territory rather than on a general East African basis.

In Uganda there have very recently been constitutional changes which have increased the African membership of the Legislature from four to eight and which have provided for a measure of popular selection of those representatives. I feel that Uganda should develop in its own way, for its circumstances differ much from those both in Kenya and Tanganyika.

In Tanganyika a local committee is consulting all shades of opinion before making proposals for constitutional advance. I am sure the House will agree that the process of local consultation should be carried through before constitutional changes are made.

As regards Kenya, the Governor will, following on his discussions here, shortly be consulting with local opinion on the next steps. When he has carried out that consultation he will be in a position to put forward proposals and I hope then to be able to make a further statement to the House.

In the meantime it may be useful if I make clear certain basic principles of policy which must be observed:

(i) As has been repeatedly stated by His Majesty's Government with the assent of all parties, our objective is self-government within the Commonwealth.

(ii) Self-government must include proper provision for all the main communities which have made their home in East Africa, but in the long run their security and well-being must rest on their good relations with each other. Good relations cannot flourish while there is fear and suspicion between the communities; it must therefore be our task to create conditions where that fear and suspicion disappear. In any constitutional changes in the direction of self-government, care must be taken to safeguard the proper rights and interests of all the different communities. Future policy must be worked out in full consultation with those who belong to the territories.

(iii) By our presence in these territories and by the assistance which we have given them in developing
their resources we have set Africans on the path of political, social and economic progress and it is our task to help them forward in that development, so that they may take their full part, with the other sections of the community, in the political and economic life of the territories.

(iv) When Africans have reached that stage and the other communities feel secure as regards their future in East Africa, we can hope for a state of mutual confidence and harmony; that will be a sound basis for a Government in which all sections participate. It will be some time before that stage is reached and meanwhile it is essential that His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom should continue to exercise their ultimate control in the East African territories. It is their firm intention to do so, while encouraging all reasonable freedom of action by the local Governments.

I would conclude by expressing the hope of His Majesty’s Government—a hope in which I am sure the House will join—that all persons who are concerned with the future of these territories will work together towards that goal of true partnership on which, and on which alone, the future prosperity and happiness of all in East Africa must depend.

Mr. Lemmon-Boyd: While, of course, we must retain our freedom to consider this statement very carefully, as it does, the future welfare of millions of our fellow subjects in the British Empire, may I ask the right hon. Gentleman whether he realises that one of the most important parts of his statement was that proper provision must be made for all the main communities which have made their homes in East Africa? Does he realise that high in importance among these communities is the large British community which have made their homes in Kenya and Tanganika and in future years are anxious to do so for their families as well, and without whom no development of that territory is likely in the future?

Mr. Griffiths: My statement was intended to cover that community. I would again express the hope that all communities in East Africa will realise that it depends upon developing true partnership together.

Mr. Fenner Brockway: Can my right hon. Gentleman indicate to the House when it is likely that, following upon his statement, the new proposals will be announced?

Mr. Griffiths: I should not like to set a date. In Kenya the proposals have to come forward in such time as to make it possible to apply them in 1952. In Tanganika the committee are now touring the country consulting local opinion. I could not set a date when they will be able to report.

Sir Peter Macdonald: Will these constitutional changes mean holding up any co-ordination of the services of the three Colonies, or will they proceed as previously intended?

Mr. Griffiths: The statement refers to the conditions in each individual territory and not to the co-ordinating work of the High Commission.

Colonel Ropner: I am surprised that the Minister says nothing about the unity of Uganda, Tanganika and Kenya. Are the Government of this country or the Minister himself not going to give any lead with regard to this most important matter, which, so far as I know, is giving rise to more uncertainty about the future than any other matter?

Mr. Griffiths: The hon. and gallant Gentleman will know that there is a good deal of co-ordination between them through the East Africa Commission and they have a large number of common services. This statement does not refer to that. For the moment, from the point of view of political and constitutional development, I have come to the conclusion, for reasons I have set out in the statement, that at present it is best to proceed separately in each of the three countries.

Mr. Alport: Does the right hon. Gentleman consider that it is practical and realistic to make a statement of the sort we have just heard without any reference whatever to the High Commission and apparently without taking into consideration the effects of constitutional developments in the various Colonies upon the High Commission? Will the right hon. Gentleman consider dealing with this aspect at an early date?

Mr. Griffiths: This statement was made after consultations which I had with the Governors concerned, about future constitutional advance, as I indicated in the statement. I thought it was necessary to make the statement at the present time because I hope it will help to create the necessary feeling of co-operation and harmony in which the next steps can be discussed between all concerned.

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