

THE SOCIAL CREDITER

FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

Vol. 25. No. 6.

Registered at G.P.O. as a Newspaper.
Postage (home and abroad) 1d.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1950.

6d. Weekly.

Disraeli's Endymion

by H. SWABEY.

Endymion (1880) appeared very near the end of Disraeli's political career, and indeed almost at the end of his life. His second term as Premier lasted from 1874 to 1880, and he died in 1881. The book's principal interest is whether Disraeli, at seventy five or six, recanted any of his ideas or excused any of his observations. The story is about the political career of Endymion, who becomes a successful liberal, rather surprisingly, after a change of party. Disraeli lets that pass, but points out that Palmerston remained in office most of his life by changing his allegiance. Mr. Churchill, however, is not the only successful politician to follow these tactics, for Disraeli himself first stood for Parliament as a radical in 1833. The fortunes of Endymion give Disraeli the chance to review political events in England over about half a century, but he does not mention politicians by name after Peel, who died soon after falling from his horse on Constitution Hill in 1850. Disraeli understood a good deal of this history, and A. Kitson noted in *The Bankers' Conspiracy*: "As Disraeli stated on several occasions, England was only saved from final ruin by two accidents, *vis.* the discovery of gold in California and Australia, which, by providing a large increase in the volume of money, reversed the policy of Peel and brought about an era of prosperity." And he evidently found little reason for changing his views.

A mysterious baron suggests the existence of irresponsible power: "The most powerful men are not public men. A public man is responsible and a responsible man is a slave. It is private life that governs the world . . . Do not be discontented that you are unknown. It is the first condition of real power." Another character, hearing of the ministry's intention to dissolve, says: "If they lose, they will have gained at least three months of power, and irresponsible power. It beats the Bed Chamber plot." And, very near the end of the book, another man "had been aware that the plan of Sir William Temple for the reorganisation of the Privy Council, depositing in it the real authority of the State, would be that to which we should be obliged to have recourse." Disraeli, in fact, leaves less and less to the *de jure* government. He gives some attention to secret societies and a good deal to finance. But it might be worth while, first, to see what the baron says about race:

"No man will treat with indifference the principle of race. It is the key of history, and why history is so often confused is that it has been written by men who were ignorant of this. In Europe I find three great races with distinct qualities: the Teutons, the Slavs and the Celts . . . the Semites now exercise a vast influence over affairs by

their smallest though most peculiar family, the Jews. There is no race gifted with such tenacity, and such skill in organisation. These qualities have gained them an unprecedented hold over property and illimitable credit. As you advance in life, and get experience in affairs, the Jews will cross you everywhere. They have long been stealing into our secret diplomacy, which they have almost appropriated; in another quarter of a century they will claim their share of open government . . . Language and religion do not make a race—there is only one thing which produces a race, and that is blood . . . The prince may not believe in the Latin race, but he may choose to use those who do believe in it." The author, it is true, wrapped up these views in one of his characters, but they surely stand as his last intellectual testament on the subject. If anyone suggested such things today, he would probably be arrested.

The Earl of Beaconsfield had not forgotten the secret societies. Commenting on the year 1830, he says, "Europe is honeycombed with secret societies," and the baron remarks: "You have no conception of the devices and resources of the secret societies of Europe. He was immured for life, but secret societies laugh at governments and . . . the world has recently been astounded by hearing that he had escaped . . . Half Europe is in a state of chronic conspiracy." A Tory proclaims, some fifteen years later, "There is more true democracy in the Roman Catholic Church than in all the secret societies of Europe." Almost at the end of the book, an alliance is commended because "it secured for us the aid and influence of the great liberal party of the continent as distinguished from the secret societies and the socialist republicans."

The author glanced back at history, noting: "the assumption that the execution of Charles was the act of the people; on the contrary, it was an intrigue of Cromwell, who was the only person who profited by it. . . We owe our Navy entirely to the Stewarts. James II was the true founder and hero of the British Navy. He was a worthy son of his admirable father, the restorer, at least, of ship money; the most patriotic and popular tax . . . The Non-conformists thought themselves so wise in resisting it, and they have got the naval estimates instead."

But his chief interest, in this work, is in the history he has seen. He traces with care the rise of the house of Neuchatel, and shews that in politics the leading figures were undistinguished and ineffective. "Knowledge of human nature was not Sir Robert Peel's strong point," while "1832 is one of the most striking instances of all the elements of political power being useless without a commanding individual will." The Church was similarly futile, for, in 1830, "The English Church had no competent leaders among the clergy."

Disraeli was by then very judicious in handling the financial question. No more wild views are to be found like this in *Tancred*: "By bill or by bond, by living usury, the sinews of war would have been forthcoming . . . Death was preferable in his view to having such a name soiled in the haunts of jockeys and courtezans and usurers." Perhaps Baron Rothschild had put in a word, or said that such small fry were not worth treating as rivals. However, the hero is on intimate terms with the Neuchatels. "One of the Neuchatels was a favourite of Mr. Pitt, and assisted the great statesman in his vast financial arrangements. Adrian had waited in Downing Street on Lord Liverpool, as his father had waited on Mr. Pitt . . . What delighted Adrian was to bring down a troop of friends . . . Sometimes it was a body from the Stock Exchange, a host from the House of Commons, a board of Directors." He says, "We City men must see what we can do against the Dukes; . . . A balanced state of parties and the House of Neuchatel with three votes—that will do. We poor city men get a little attention paid to us now . . . On Wednesday I am going to have the Premier and some of his colleagues." Disraeli says, "Forty years ago the great financiers had not that commanding, not to say predominant, position in society which they possess at present." Neuchatel explains: "After all, wealth is the test of the welfare of a people, and the test of wealth is the command of the precious metals." And, the banker advises, "If our fine friends will not help us, you must try us poor business men in the City. We can manage things here sometimes which puzzle them at the West End." The Count's view is "that a ministry which is upset by finances must be essentially imbecile. And that too in England, the richest country in the world!" Disraeli continues his financial investigations: "The depression was produced in 1842 . . . by an abuse of capital and credit." Then came the railway boom, and "The mighty loan mongers, on whose fiat the fate of kings and empires sometimes depended, seemed like men who, witnessing some eccentricity in nature, watch it with mixed feelings of curiosity and alarm . . . The potato famine did more than repeal the corn laws. It proved that there was no floating capital left in the country. When the Rothschilds and Barings combined to raise a loan of a few millions for the minister, they found the public purse was exhausted." These remarks of Mr. Neuchatel support the contention that the great financiers had gained rather a lot of power: "I am in favour of all churches, provided they do not do anything very foolish" . . . "Your master has only to be liberal and steady, and he may have anything he likes. But we do not want any wars; they are not liked in the City."

Church and State, then, were not to have much say in their own affairs. Peel, indeed, "put the Church into a lay commission during his last government." Incompetent statesmen feel, "what is wanted is some great coup in foreign affairs" . . . towards the end of the year, the 'great coup in foreign affairs' occurred . . . the ministry was elate." But they still had another trick up their sleeve: "It was unusual, almost unconstitutional, thus to terminate the body they had created. Nevertheless the Whigs, never too delicate in such matters, thought they had a chance and determined not to lose it. They succeeded in frightening their opponents; a dissolution with a cry of cheap bread amid a partially starving population was not exactly the conjuncture of providential circumstances which had long been watched

and wished for." Near the end of the book, "Then the country was governed for two years by all its ablest men, who succeeded in reducing the country to desolation and despair." So much for the politicians.

It was not all as gloomy as that. In earlier days recorded, "Some traditional merriment always lingered among the working-classes of England . . . the turf at that time had not developed into that vast institution of national demoralisation which it now exhibits." A sinister development was taking place, however: "The French Revolution had introduced the cosmopolitan principles into human affairs instead of the national, and no public man could succeed who did not comprehend and acknowledge that truth." As a result, "Mr. Tremaine said that he comprehended philanthropy, but patriotism he confessed he did not understand: 'I think myself our colonial empire is a mistake, and that we should disembarass ourselves of its burden.'"

Disraeli had little use for *economists*, for "though ingenious men, no doubt, they are chiefly bankrupt tradesmen, who, not having been able to manage their own affairs, have taken upon themselves to advise on the conduct of the country . . . Adam Smith is the best guide, though we must adapt his principles to the circumstances with which we have to deal." A Tory declares, "The home market is the most important element in the consideration of our public wealth, and it mainly rests upon the agriculture of the country." A Radical says, "They will never convince me that a slip of irredeemable paper is as good as the young Queen's head on a 20/- piece . . . if we are to be ruled by capitalists, I would sooner, perhaps, be ruled by gentlemen of estate who have been long among us, than by persons who build big mills." Another opinion is, I think, worth recording: "The moment sedition arises from taxation, and want of employment, it is more dangerous to deal with in this country than in any other." Disraeli should, of course, have said want of money; his books are full of *unemployed* people who are far from seditious.

The Count of Ferrol is the foreign correspondent of the book. He was "brooding over the position of what he could scarcely call his country, but rather an aggregation of lands baptized by protocols, and christened and consolidated by treaties, which he looked upon as eminently untrustworthy." His view in 1841 was, "There is no movement in Europe except in France, and here it will always be a movement of subversion. The system is supported by journalists and bankers; two influential classes, but the millions dislike both . . . Europe is a geographical expression. There is no State in Europe; I exclude your own, which belongs to every division of the globe, and is fast becoming more commercial than political, and I exclude Russia, for she is essentially oriental and her future will be entirely the East."

Disraeli certainly had the purpose of instructing as well as of amusing: possibly he intended to apologise as well, by shewing why not even he, as prime minister, could do any better? There is some evidence to support this interpretation. Writing of the year 1876, E. T. Raymond (in *Disraeli: The Alien Patriot*) calls the Gladstonian group "an essentially religious party . . . all the forces of finance were ranged on the side of the Prime Minister . . . Beaconsfield had the Rothschilds at his back; Mammon having declared

on his side, Disraeli cared little for the fury of the saints." It is true that the *saints* were flushed with the spoils of the Irish Church, and numbered among their triumphs the Elementary Education Act and the Ballot Act (1872). But such a *perverse deviation of political parties from their original significance* as that over which Disraeli was presiding would sufficiently account for his cynicism and would call for some explanation from a man who all the time knew exactly what was happening. For Disraeli found himself no less subservient to finance than Peel had been, and his party no less allied to those interests than the "conservatism" at which he had jibed forty years before.

The rival factions put a premium on irresponsibility. The reason, said Blackstone, why certain people had no right to vote was that they had *no will of their own*. Gladstone and Disraeli tumbled over each other to enlarge the suffrage. It was a poor substitute for economic enfranchisement—or re-enfranchisement—and these measures lifted from the voter his responsibility both for his opinions and for his family. *Endymion* gives several broad hints as to the whereabouts of the real repositories of power.

The Purge

"The firing of Secretary of Defence Johnson, and his replacement by General Marshall, constitutes a big victory for the Fair Dealers in the Democratic Party. As we pointed out at the time, the Fair Deal intrigue—with backing of the usual collaborationists in the press—began immediately, with the triple objective of ousting a Cabinet member who did not take their orders, of replacing him with one of their own, and of thereby protecting their highly vulnerable puppet, Acheson. The first and third targets have been brilliantly achieved.

"But is Marshall one of the Fair Deal's 'own'? If Congress provides the proper legislation and Marshall becomes Secretary of Defence, his appointments will be scrutinized to provide the answer. At present, all evidence available suggests that the triumphant Leftist camarilla has obtained a pliable figure. Marshall was probably the most important agent in destroying the Nationalist regime in China, and this Marshall achievement prepared the way for the Soviet onslaught on Korea. In his Asiatic policy, Marshall slavishly followed the advice of the Far Eastern Division of the State Department, whose pro-Communist proclivities led the Scripps-Howard press to describe it as the 'Red Cell.' As for the General's famous plan for containing Communism in Europe, see Edna Lonigan's piece, *Re-Examination of the Marshall Plan* (*Human Events*, August 30). If the Fair Deal camarilla finds Marshall a disappointment, we shall be very surprised.

"It remains to be seen whether the Opposition in Congress fulfills its role as an opposition to the legislation to permit Marshall to fill the post. The GOP record is not promising. Many of its members fell right in with the manoeuvre of Fair Deal to oust Johnson and preserve Acheson. Since the GOP has chosen to fight its Congressional campaign on the record of the Administration in the Far East, it is decidedly 'on the spot.' How can it accept Marshall and

carry on its campaign against Administration policy in the Far East?"—Frank C. Hanighen in *Human Events*.

• • •
"Republican as successor to Mr. Douglas: Mr. W. Gifford to be U.S. London Envoy.

"Washington, Wednesday.

"... Mr. Gifford is a close friend of General Marshall, the new Secretary of Defence who is said to have inspired the appointment..."—*The Daily Telegraph*, September 26.

PARLIAMENT (continued from page 8).

Mr. Leather (Somerset, North): . . . May I now refer briefly to a Motion on the Order Paper in the names of a number of hon. Friends and myself? By this Motion we have merely sought to draw attention to this central problem, and to thinking about this problem, particularly in Canada and the United States which seems to have been overlooked in this country. I would quote what Senator Robertson, Leader of the Canadian Government in the Senate, said in winding up the Debate on the resolution to which our Motion refers:

"What has been accomplished up to the present time has been done through the co-operation of sovereign countries, and we hope that more will be accomplished. However, history shows that co-operation, desirable though it may be, presents great difficulties and many pitfalls. Napoleon is credited with having said, 'Give me allies to fight.' His meaning was that sovereign States in military association traditionally suffer from a host of hardships, divided commands, ragged strategy, uncohesive forces and international jealousies."

We overcame this in S.H.A.E.F. in the last war, but they are still very much with us today. That is a third view, this time a Canadian one, supporting Lord Montgomery and Mr. Cooper of the State Department.

Senator Robertson summarised the problem in a way which perhaps the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydvil may dislike, but which I can endorse. He said that the only way to ensure peace is to be in such a position as to say to a potential aggressor, "You attack us at your peril." Whether we believe in force or whether we do not, is there any man or woman in this House who does not wish that we were in such a position—who does not desire us to be so placed that there is no one in the world who would dare attack us? As we are perfectly well aware, we are not in that position.

The debate in the Canadian Senate and a lot of the things said in Washington at present indicate that Canada and America are prepared to go a great deal further along the lines of co-operation than we have ever discussed in this House. Senator Robertson, whose views I have quoted, is the Leader of the Government in the Canadian Senate, and presumably he did not speak in the way he did without at least consulting his Cabinet colleagues. . .

For correct information concerning the Constitution of
THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT,
Social Crediters and others are invited to apply for
the Statement published in July, 1949, (*postage 1d.*)
K.R.P. PUBLICATIONS, LTD.

THE SOCIAL CREDITER

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: *Home and abroad, post free:*
 One year 30/-; Six months 15/-; Three months 7s. 6d.

Offices: (Business) 7, VICTORIA STREET, LIVERPOOL, 2, Telephone: CENTral 8509; (Editorial) 49, PRINCE ALFRED ROAD, LIVERPOOL, 15, Telephone SEPTon Park 435.

Vol. 25. No. 6.

Saturday, October 7, 1950.

From Week to Week

With acknowledgements to that charming feature of *The Scotsman*, *A Scotsman's Log*:—

NESS ENTERPRISES

The unabated interest in the Loch Ness Monster, switching as it does from the credulity to the folk-lore level, is a tribute to the questing spirit in man and to the popularity of an old, if untried, favourite. It is now a moot point whether the summit of Mount Everest will be trodden under-foot before the pride of the Caledonian Canal comes to terms. Both events are obvious "musts" in the calendar of mortal achievement.

The theory that the monster could be brought to bay by token forces only has had its day. The arm-chair strategists are converging on the view that nothing short of a war of attrition can bring results. We need, not only overwhelming forces, but also unlimited *matériel*. To this we, for our part, add the plea that if we must tighten our belts so that the monster may be routed out then let us willingly pull them in a couple of notches.

The Charter of the United Nations made no stipulation about freedom for monsters. Monsters have never done anything to show that they are ready to wear the yoke of freedom round their humps. The little we know about them suggests that they are politically immature, emotionally unstable, imperfectly democratised, and as yet fit only for United Nations trusteeship.

CO-OPERATIVE APPROACH

What is needed is a master plan. We suggest the following steps. First of all a Loch Ness Monster Bill should be introduced in the House of Commons. The main object of the Bill would be to extraterritorialise the monster and to transfer all interests in it from the local rating authorities to the United Nations.

By the terms of the Bill the banks of Loch Ness would become scheduled as an international development area. Each nation would contribute from its national exchequer a predetermined allocation sufficient to settle and maintain scientific and industrial installations devoted to monster research on the shores of Loch Ness. Priority would be given in all U.N.O. agenda to activities concerning the monster and an international force would be created to enforce and implement all decisions.

If such a plan were carried out it would inevitably promote a *détente* in international relationships. A common and universally acceptable target for national ambition would gradually erode the veto. The nations would be spending so much of their incomes on fighting the beast of Loch Ness that they wouldn't have any left over to fight one another.

It is now reasonably clear that there is (E. & O. E.) no immediate danger of a clear cut war with Russia, although for obvious reasons, it is not desired that the general public of these islands, or of the U.S.A. should feel any confidence to that effect. The general basis for such a statement is that the ends of the Sanhedrin, or B'nai Brith, or Zionists, or the "Less than four hundred men who govern the World" of Herr Rathenau, are much better served by a series of medium sized wars, no one of which settles anything and all of which serve as a cloak for MONOPOLY and centralisation, than by an atom-bomb conflagration in which there would be serious risk of injury to some of the Chosen, or Four Hundred.

We are as confident as it is reasonable to be on such a subject, that President Truman received assurances for which it was not necessary for him to leave Washington, that a "war" with North Korea would be absolutely safe (to him), that Stalin would be instructed not to interfere, that the "British" would be still further humiliated, and the World Government at Lake Success would be saved thereby from ignominious dissolution in a storm of exasperated ridicule.

The technique of fomenting little wars has been one of the major tools of "American" finance, commonly called Dollar Diplomacy—a tool developed and perfected in South America in the nineteenth century, with India and South Africa as sidelines of increasing importance. It is easy to see that the apparent genesis of such wars can be shifted from New York to Moscow almost in a week, and it is by no means certain that the growing hostility to "Communism" and its identification with Zionism in the United States, may not have just that effect. In the meantime, Fifth Columnists everywhere can be trusted to see that the excuses for a fight are ready for use almost anywhere, as required.

Sir Frank Whittle, of power-jet fame, speaking in Toronto, asserts that twenty millions of the population of these islands ought to be forced to emigrate at once.

This type of quantitative statement always interests us. What happens to the other thirty millions? If emigration is so important, why are we importing aliens as fast as they can be smuggled in? Is this the final stage of "Building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land?" Perhaps in that case, there is a secret assurance that England won't be bombed, but in that case, also, it seems a pity.

The filthy noises emitted by the "B"B.C. to cheer "the workers" before 7 a.m. are evidently musical(!) conditioning of the mass mind to the level of the Bowery and the Bronx. The general idea seems to be the glorification of ugliness and the hatred of rule and order. Notes are either out of tune or mishit and slurred; the melodies are reminiscent of a voodoo incantation; and the *motif* is a curious, defiant, frustration. The "B"B.C. requires very serious investigation.

PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: September 13, 1950.

Defence (Government Proposes)

(Debate continued from issue of September 23).

Miss Jennie Lee (Cannock): . . . I would like someone to explain to me why we should be asked to build up munition expenditure beyond our resources, and then get America to help us pay our way. Why should not each country, including America, pay according to its resources? If we have the types of factories in this country that can quickly contribute to our common defence, why should not we sell arms to America in the same way as, at one time, America sold arms to us? I see nothing unco-operative or unfriendly in that proposition. It would certainly be a much more dignified relationship between Great Britain and America.

The other issue about which I feel even more strongly is the decision to ask the young men of this country to serve in a conscript Army for two years. It is serious enough when we are talking about a nation's material resources and its finances, but when we are talking about what we are going to do with its young men, then we are talking about the most precious factor of all. Why are our young men being asked to serve for a longer time than Americans? Because we are poorer than the U.S.A. and they can therefore coerce us? But that cannot be the reason because some of our European allies are poorer than us. So here we are, a kind of little Lord Fauntleroy of the western world telling everyone to lean on us. Quite frankly, I do not think that we give the impression of strength when we try to do more than we have the resources to do. Rather, we should say to the other United Nations Powers, "Let there be fair shares in all this. Our position in Great Britain is that we are willing to ask our men to serve as long as those in America, France, or in any other nation, and no longer—not to do more and not to do less."

I believe that had we approached the problem like that, it would not only have seemed fairer to the ordinary man and woman, but it might also have helped to educate opinion throughout the world, particularly opinion in certain sections of the American Press, for from all the reports, even while we are doing more than some of our neighbours, we are credited with doing less. I am not suggesting that we can now retrace our steps. Also I would be the last to start arguing about the length of conscription on technical military grounds. But this much I insist on, that if it requires two years to train our men adequately—since they are certainly not more stupid than other European or American recruits—for an efficient Army, then plainly other nations need that length of service too.

Mr. Emrys Hughes (South Ayrshire): . . . I will now deal with some of the points raised yesterday by the Leader of the Opposition. The right hon. Gentleman has been arguing in favour of rearming Germany and of Germany playing its part in a European Army. He says that here we have the Russians in Western Europe and that we need a greater potential military force to hold Western Europe against them. What I want to know is what part the Leader of the Opposition played in bringing the Russians into Western Europe. If the Russians are in Berlin today, if the Iron Curtain stretches along the banks of the Oder, and if

our frontier is on the Rhine, then one of the architects of this policy is undoubtedly the present Leader of the Opposition.

I certainly do not subscribe to the idea that on matters of military organisation and strategy concerning international policy we must accept the doctrine of the infallibility of the right hon. Gentleman. The best military brains in the world do not do so. For example, Mr. Hanson Baldwin, the military critic of the "New York Times" says:

"Unconditional surrender was an open invitation to unconditional resistance; it discouraged opposition to Hitler, probably lengthened the war, cost lives and helped to make abortive peace. Unconditional surrender meant the complete disappearance of any European balance. War to the bitter end was bound to make Russia top dog on the Continent, to leave the countries of Western Europe weakened, and to destroy any buffer in Europe."

As I have said, if the Russians are in Europe today, that is largely a result of the policy of the Leader of the Opposition, for which he must accept a great responsibility. I remember during the war hearing the same lurid descriptions of the Germans that we now hear today of the Russians. Having got the Russians into Europe in order to kill the Germans, the right hon. Gentleman now wants us to organise the Germans to kill off the Russians.

Let us examine some of the arguments which he put before us. He told us that the atomic bomb casts its strange and merciful shield over the free peoples. That is the most remarkable description of the atomic bomb that I have yet heard. . . we can quite imagine the Russians living in Leningrad and Moscow saying, "Well, if the atomic bomb is a merciful shield, why cannot we have some of these merciful shields so far as the U.S.S.R. are concerned?" Therefore, we get the situation of two nations preparing for the atomic bomb race and with that weapon in the possession of both potential enemies. The Leader of the Opposition seems to argue that the benefit is all on our side, but that is not the opinion of some of the greatest military writers in this country. For instance, it is not the opinion of Captain Liddell Hart who, writing on the strategy of the atomic bomb, said:

"While it may be difficult for Russia to catch up with the Americans' lead in the production of atom bombs or match them in a Russo-American bombing duel, she might more effectively use any atom bombs that she has produced to retaliate on Western Europe if the Americans bomb her centres."

He points out that far from the atomic bomb being a military advantage to us, a few atomic bombs dropped on the capitals of Western Europe might cause much greater paralysis in those countries than a larger number dropped on the Soviet Union. If that is so, I fail to see the force of the argument which has been the keystone of much of the war strategy and advice of the Leader of the Opposition during the last five years. I do not think it holds good.

The next suggestion is that we should build up a huge European Army, but nobody seems to face the fact that the Russians may do the same. [HON. MEMBERS: "They have already got it."] Then they may increase it. If they look at the decisions in this White Paper and see that there is to be a new European Army built up with German assistance, is there not every reason for supposing that the inevitable result will be that the Russians will increase their divisions, will call upon their bigger reserves

of man-power, with the probable result that we shall be precisely where we were before?

I would point out that the position regarding man-power is worse than was stated by the Minister of Defence. General Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States of America, stated last autumn that Russia had 175 operational divisions. That has been the figure quoted from both sides in this House. He went on to say that Russia could increase this total to 300 divisions within 60 days and to 500 divisions within a month of mobilisation. If that is so, we have not only to face the fact that we have to build up a European Army to face 150 divisions, but that Russia and other countries east of the Iron Curtain can call up huge reserves.

If that is to be the reply of the eastern countries to the preparations of the western democracies, then the inevitable result will be that we shall not be in a position of greater superiority in two or three years' time; indeed we have to face the fact that we may be even worse off than we are today with this huge crippling burden of armaments on our shoulders, and no nearer reaching superiority or even equality with the Russians . . .

I do not believe that this world can be divided into peace-loving democracies and aggressor countries which are in favour of war. If one reads the Russian Press and the American Press these days and listens to and reads the comments from American generals, one will find that from the point of view of bellicosity the Americans can beat the Russians every time. I want to quote the views of Major-General Orville Anderson, commandant of Maxwell Field Air War College at Alabama. [AN HON. MEMBER: "He is not the commandant: he has been sacked."] I want to read the passage for which he was suspended, not sacked. He said:

"Give me the orders to do it and I can break up Russia's five atom bomb nests in a week. And when I go up to Christ I think I could explain to Him that I had saved civilisation."

He was suspended, and rightly so, but that does not dispose of the fact that he stated, in crude and brutal terms, one of the essential aims of American strategic policy. President Truman has to repudiate some general every other day. He has actually had to repudiate General MacArthur, and I do not believe that if we follow blindly the policy that is practically dictated by the United States of America we are really making our contribution to the solution of this great international problem.

. . . Mr. Walter Lippmann warns America and the world that, far from having reached security as a result of these so-called security policies America is in a more dangerous position than ever. He says:

"We are in this most dangerous position because the President and his Secretary of State have lost the control of the United States' foreign policy. They are captives of their critics."

Let the Government beware that they do not become captives of their critics here, and that they do not have to play up to the Leader of the Opposition. Mr. Walter Lippmann said:

"They are carrying out unhappily and ineffectively a policy imposed on them by their political opponents. And they, in turn, though they are dictating the policy, have neither the power to make it work nor the responsibility if it does not work but leads to a kind of global Korea."

With this prospect of a "global Korea" in front of

us, is it not time we tried a new kind of diplomacy, a new kind of appeal to the so-called aggressor country and once more asked them to face the fact, as General Marshall has admitted, that neither side can possibly win another war? I believe that, even in the realm of diplomacy, it should be the business of the Government at the present time to outline a new world plan in which it could be clearly stated how the economic and financial resources of the world could be used for the benefit of all the nations of the world. I believe that is the main line on which we can hope to deal with this problem. . . .

Mr. Blackburn (Birmingham, Northfield): . . . Some three weeks ago, having resigned from the Labour Party, I offered to resign my seat if the Labour Party asked me to do so. That offer not having been taken up, I now intend to be an independent Member and to speak and vote in accordance with what I believe to be the true interests of the country. But if I should feel obliged to vote against any part of the programme for which the Labour Party stood at the last Election, I should immediately offer to resign my seat.

This is a matter which must obviously rest between myself, my constituency and the divisional Labour Party. I know of no hon. Member who, having left or been expelled from the Labour Party, has offered to resign his seat if the Labour Party wished him to do so, as I have.

Mr. Poole: All I wanted to ask the hon. Member, in fairness to himself as much as to anybody else, was this, Surely he does not agree for one moment that any political party has the right to ask a Member of this House who has been duly elected by the electors in a division to resign his seat? Surely he knows that is the stand which the Birmingham Labour Party has taken? Any demand for his resignation must come from the people who elected him.

Mr. Blackburn: I am not aware of that fact, but I have received no communication of any kind from the Labour Party or anyone else. I have made my position perfectly clear. As I pointed out, I have gone a good deal further than some predecessors of mine who occupied this unenviable position.

I do not believe that this House of Commons, let alone the Government, has measured up to the gravity of our dangers or even considered the measures which must be taken within the next few months if war is to be avoided. The decisive events of the world take place when men are asleep. By the time they awaken to their danger it is too late to prevent disaster. The last war could not have been prevented in 1939; it could only have been prevented years earlier than that, when aggression first started. By the same token the next war could have been prevented in 1947. It may be that war can still be prevented. I hope and pray that is so, but the whole difference between this period and any other comparable period in our history is that today time marches against us with relentless rapidity.

Within a year or two from now the Soviet Union is bound to possess so many atomic bombs that war with her would mean the destruction of the ports and main centres of this country. We must have a settlement with the Soviet Union before she possesses so many atomic bombs that war would mean the end of Britain. That is the formula which I have advocated for a long time, but surely, the time now is exceedingly short. If I am right in that proposition

then the present emergency is desparately grave. As the hon. Member for Preston, North (Mr. Amery) said in his maiden speech, it is later than we think. In my view, we must achieve victory over Communism throughout the world within the next few months, and then inaugurate personal talks on the highest level, for that course alone can hold out any possible prospect of peace.

It will rightly be said that it is impossible to turn our present weakness into strength within a few months. If the Government and this House continue to adopt the attitude which they have shown in this and previous Debates, then I will agree, but I believe this attitude must be changed. We must plan for a complete reversal of the tide of events to take place within the next six months. To achieve this will require a full awakening to our danger and a common unity with the resolve that the century of the common man shall cease to be the century of the concentration camp. If, indeed, it is true that the great issues are once again at stake, then all party interests should be subordinated to the interests of the country. There is, I believe, an overwhelming case for the formation of a National Government to demonstrate to the world the temper of the British people in face of this supreme challenge.

. . . I believe the march of events will move men of good will in the direction of a national Government before many months are passed. We are using military conscription to force young men—and in principle I agree with it—to sacrifice their lives in Korea. It would be unthinkable for hon. Members to be willing to sacrifice young peoples' lives for national safety and not, at the same time, be willing to put their own party political interests in subordination to the interests of the country as a whole. I recognise that at this stage I cannot carry the House with me upon this proposition.

But recognising that, for the moment, a national Government is not practical politics, I beg the House to consider what can be done, short of the formation of a national Government, to take defence out of party politics and to achieve unity in defence. In the proposition I am now going to put forward I am not, in any way, attempting to reflect upon the present Minister of Defence; but I believe a Minister of Defence ought to be appointed who stands entirely above party—[*Interruption.*] Hon. Members might give me an opportunity—

Mr. Shurmer (Birmingham, Sparkbrook): The hon. Member wants a recruit for his party.

Mr. Blackburn: The need today is for highly efficient volunteer forces to be switched to wherever the danger is great, whether in Malaya, Korea or elsewhere, and to strike terror in the hearts of our enemies. A non-party Minister of Defence would be pre-eminently suitable to appeal for volunteers, far better than any party man. Moreover, we have at least two men available, the appointment of either of whom would immediately hearten our friends in Western Europe and warn our foes that in defence, at any rate, we are united. I suggest Lord Mountbatten or Field Marshal Lord Alexander are individuals who would satisfy the test to which I have referred.

I feel now, as I felt in 1939, that it is morally wrong for a party Government to use military conscription to send young men into battle without taking every possible measure to remove defence from party politics. To leave in charge

of defence men who have aroused bitter party feelings is not fair to the young men who are asked to volunteer and who may violently disagree with those Ministers. I am interested to see that America has already taken this step in the appointment of General Marshal as Secretary of Defence.

I come now to a subject upon which I am astonished that so little has been said on both sides of the House, namely, Korea. We ought to recognise that Korea has followed, so far, a familiar pattern. We have sustained a series of defeats in Korea, and, at the moment, we are in an exceedingly serious situation there. I have no doubt we shall maintain our position in Korea, but when one considers that we have complete air supremacy, a very powerful bomber force and that so much time has elapsed, no one, surely, can be satisfied.

It becomes more serious when one considers the British contribution. It is about 2,000 soldiers. I have asked the Secretary of State for War a question about this, to which I have not yet had an answer; but I am proposing to give my own estimate. My estimate is that, so far as the 1st Middlesex Regiment is concerned, the average age of those boys is under 20. If the right hon. Gentleman wishes to have some evidence of this I will give him some. I will give him the name of a private soldier, Lionel Wragg. He was called up at the end of January, 1950. After just over four months' training, he was sent to Hong Kong to be attached to the Middlesex Regiment. His own Regiment is the Queen's. He landed there, on 21st July and exactly one month later, on 21st August, he was packing his kit to go to Korea. The day he embarked for Korea he reached the age of 19 years.

If anybody in this House is really satisfied with the fact that, where the flower of our troops ought to be, we have a hastily-skimped-together battalion, including a boy who has just attained the age of 19 and who has done only four months' training here at home—and some of us know what that means—then I think it is time we started to revise our opinions. I do not intend to blame the Minister of Defence on this matter because it goes a long way back; I think many people are to blame. But I say it is a shocking thing that we were not able to put a whole brigade of seasoned troops of an excellent quality and experience straight into action.

. . . I ask for a pledge from the Minister of Defence that at the earliest possible moment these men will be replaced by seasoned troops. I ask for that pledge. Is the right hon. Gentleman willing to deal with the point when he winds up the Debate tomorrow? It seems to me that on any view, whether we take it on moral grounds, whether from the point of national prestige or whether from the point of view of efficiency, we ought to have really first-rate and seasoned volunteers out there. . . .

. . . I agree with Mr. Victor Gollancz, who wrote in "The Times," that what is needed is to convince the British people that if they make the sacrifices, we have a plan which may produce peace and prosperity.

I make three practical propositions on that. First, I do not believe great economic sacrifices are necessary if the whole country is prepared to work hard. . . if hon. Members are prepared now to do their duty by their country they will go to their constituents and advocate longer hours of work in order to prevent these economic sacrifices which

this country cannot afford. . . . If an appeal is made to them, the workers of this country are perfectly prepared to work longer hours, upon proper terms to be agreed by the trade union movement, which will properly safeguard them.

Secondly, I believe that there should be something in the nature of a new Ministry, first for immensely increasing our propaganda behind the Iron Curtain, which is of vital importance. We should double and redouble the expenditure upon it. . .

Third and last—and I believe this is to be of vital importance—we ought to make clear that, as soon as we have achieved this clear, immediate victory, we will promote a conference at the highest level, between the Prime Minister of this country, Stalin and President Truman, at which, in secret, there may be some possibility of coming to a final settlement. The thing which absolutely staggers me is that there is no plan for peace. I quite sincerely say that I feel relieved, and have felt very relieved during the last three and a half weeks, because I no longer bear the very grave responsibility which hon. Members on that side of the House have, because at the moment, as far as I can see, we inevitably face a drift to war. . . .

Viscount Hinchinbrooke (Dorset, South): . . . We seem to live in an age when the State, not only in this country, but in many others, takes increasing power over the lives of the people, and causes the people to hand over 40 per cent. or 50 per cent. of their own personal resources. In these circumstances it is not without the bounds of possibility and imagination that the State could develop ambitions of its own apart altogether from the aggregated opinion of the mass of the people; that the State could of itself create an objective for the nation to attain which, in the event, was impossible, and without the capacity of the millions that compose the State to attain to.

If we accept that proposition and then look at the stage that goes beyond it we see very much the same thing. The State itself becomes a member of an international organisation, and after a time the international organisation develops an ethos of its own and ambitions of its own and the State is required, even against its best counsel, to fulfil them. If we link these two things together, we can see how easy it is to find evidence for what was said tonight by the hon. Member for Northfield (Mr. Blackburn) in quoting the "Sunday Times"—the disillusionment of young men, conscripted and fighting 10,000 miles away for a cause of which they are not fully aware.

I am not trying to suggest that anything we are doing in Korea today is wrong. I fully support the attitude of H.M. Government in fulfilling their obligations to the United Nations. Nevertheless, Mr. Walter Lippman is quite right. We have not the power to ride quixotically all over the world trying to put down every quarrel which arises in every place at every moment of time. There must come a moment when the citizens are able to say to the State, "Our capacity is almost exhausted; limit your commitments." There must come a moment when the State must say to the United Nations organisation, "We are over-stretched; you must limit your demands." Otherwise, we may find chaos prevailing and great unwillingness and alarm.

. . . We are told that we cannot get along without the numbers which Germany makes up. But I have been very

struck by an article which appeared in "The Times" of 31st August quoting the French newspaper "Figaro" in a series of three unsigned articles believed to come from the pen of a highly qualified, responsible French military authority. If I may just quote a short paragraph from the article it will give the argument conclusively.

"The author analyses the potential strength of Russia and then the potential of Western Europe, prescribes the minimum requirements in men, material and certain political and economic conditions, and finally shows how these are within the possibilities of the countries concerned without their even having to call on the assistance of Germany or Austria or requiring any change in the treaty limitations imposed on Italy, or dislocating their own economies. . . . The author sets out correctives to the widespread impression of Russian omnipotence on this continent. Russia has not quite 200 million inhabitants, of whom probably 125 million are of the white race and in Europe. The five Brussels Treaty Powers alone can muster 104 million inhabitants; and if to these are added Norway, Denmark, Italy and Portugal, the number is 162 million. Thus the advantage of numbers does not lie with Russia."

Then he goes on to say that if one adds in the satellites and regards them, as one surely should not, as automatic friends and allies of Russia in all circumstances—one can counterbalance that again by Germany, Austria, Sweden, Ireland, Switzerland, Spain, Greece and Yugoslavia.

. . . We must also ask what intentions the Russians have towards the West from an ethnic, economic and ideological point of view. There surely is no parallel between now and 1938 and 1939. Hitler had ethnic and economic reasons for attacking the West. The Russians have no ethnic reasons. They have no economic reasons, unless one is to say that Marshal Stalin must grab the factories and cities of the West to sustain himself with the civilisation which flows from them. The Russians already have enormous territory undeveloped. We read only this morning in the newspapers of the intention to spend millions of pounds on converting a desert.

What economically profitable to them is there in an attack on Western Europe? I can see nothing of the kind. Would it be for crusading purposes? If Communism is a crusade which has to be followed up ruthlessly by armed force why is not Tito invaded because of his deviation from Moscow and brought back to the Communist line? These seem to me some of the questions we have to ask. . . .

. . . I finish with the plea that this country should develop, as soon as it may be, an independent policy of its own. We have a very great Empire. We have immense responsibilities in Europe, and we also have our association with the United States. It would be a disaster if one of these links became too strong and if the others were allowed to be weakened. I think that, for the present, the Anglo-American alliance is strong enough, and I would like to see Britain pour more of her energies into a Commonwealth and European arrangement. I believe that the high civilisation of the Western world and the immense moral background to this island of ours provide enough and more than enough of what is required to repel aggression and the evil things that we fear.

If Communism is to be answered, it must be answered by a great message from the centre of civilisation. It must be answered by a vast cultural and social effort. . . .

(continued on page 3).