"The Anger of the American People."

Speaking in the Defence Debate on September 12, Mr. Churchill said that there were two factors in the present international situation which we in this country could not calculate. They were the "designs of the autocracy of the Kremlin and the anger of the people of the United States to which they were receiving and the burdens they had to bear."

The average Britisher who gets his information from a Press and Radio fed by internationally controlled news-agencies is quite ready to agree with his political leaders that the ways of the enigmatic men of the Kremlin are unfathomable (although their design for World Conquest is outlined with brutal honesty in the major works of Lenin and Stalin) but he must feel rather bewildered, if he feels anything at all, that his "American cousins" should still be in the grip of a great wrath, for although he has been allowed a glimpse, now and again, of passing moods of gloom and despondency among the hard-pressed G.I.'s in Korea, and of their feelings of annoyance at having to fight a lone battle for freedom for several weeks without outside help, the British reader had been given to understand that once "our boys" and "boys" from the other "United Nations" rallied in sufficient numbers to the white-and-blue colours of Mr. Trygve Lie, once the Communists had been taught their lesson, "all the initial bitterness of the G.I.'s, and their folks at home, would be forgotten."

Mr. Churchill's statement is the first official intimation that neither the arrival of British ground troops, nor the prospect of improvement in the military situation, has stilled this anger which, apparently, is growing, and may have repercussions with which both the politicians in Washington and Westminster will have to reckon.

The expectation of official America (mirrored in the reports of Washington correspondents during the first phase of the Korean war) that "Korea" would switch the attention of the American public from the back-stage activities of key officials of the State Department (Foreign Office), has not been fulfilled. The widespread malaise engendered by increasingly scandalous disclosures, and the growing number of sudden deaths which accompanied them, has, it seems, been changed into blazing indignation as the public is coming to see that the responsibility for the defeats in Korea rests with the New Deal politicians who surrounded President Roosevelt and are now commonly known as the Men of Yalta.

That large sections of the American public have learnt that particular lesson quickly, and are in a dangerously receptive mood for more instruction of the same nature, we may judge from an article entitled The Korean Crisis and American Opinion—written by Mr. Denys Smith in the September issue of The National and English Review—"the admiration for the way in which the (U.S.) administration has rushed to save the country from the raging torrent is tempered by the reflection that after all it may have been this same Administration which pushed it in. The American people do not take kindly to defeats. Fortunately defeats have not led to defeatism, but to a determination to reverse them and to search for scapegoats. Among the leading scapegoats are "the highly vulnerable" Mr. Johnson, Minister of Defence, and Mr. Acheson, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr. Denys Smith judges that Mr. Johnson, at least, is safe, and refers to President Truman's assertion that as long as he remained in the White House both Ministers would stay at their posts "if they wished."

Since Mr. Denys Smith composed his article—presumably some time during the latter part of August—things have apparently moved quickly, for by the middle of September Mr. Johnson "expressed his wish" to be relieved of his post; his resignation was accepted and General Marshall was appointed as his successor.

The choice of the gentleman who has given his name to the European Aid Programme might indicate that the eleventh hour has struck, and that the number of political agents in whom the White House Inner Circle—known in Washington as the "Palace Guard"—can place full confidence, is restricted to a small group of men who have all, at one time or another, assisted the consolidation of the "Soviet" World Empire. The peculiar part played by General Marshall when he, as head of the U.S. Mission to Peking in 1946, recommended to the Chinese Generalissimo a Nationalist-Communist Coalition, renders him at least as "vulnerable" as many of his colleagues who during the last two years have suddenly retired from public life.

General Marshall's Mission to China is now commonly regarded as one of the chief milestones on the road leading from Yalta to Korea. Mr. Denys Smith, in the article mentioned above, writes:

"In the background is the accusation that the Korean Communist invasion is but the culminating point of a long series of errors in [U.S.] Far Eastern policy; it is a symptom of a condition which the State Department had done nothing to cure and apparently had even failed to recognize. There was the Yalta agreement which gave Russia a favourable strategic position on the Asian mainland at the expense of China; there was the effort to force Generalissimo Chiang to accept a coalition with the Communists; there was the refusal to follow the advice of General Wademeyer and give enough military assistance and advice at both the command and supply levels to enable the Nationalist forces to defeat the Communists.

"Then, having created a situation in which Korea was endangered, the State Department shut its eyes to the danger, pressed forward with an economic aid programme and opposed giving the Korean army weapons needed to repel attack."

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That this "background accusation" should receive such attention in a journal devoted to the interests of official British Conservatism is perhaps the best indication of the Korean incident, so far from allaying the suspicions of the American public has in fact quickened them and that the anger to which Mr. Churchill refers, may hasten the growing realization that the real enemies of the U.S.A., and the world, have their most effective agents in the White House, the Departments of the U.S. administration, and in the secretariat of the United Nations Organisation.

Should this growing realization be extended to the real dangers that beset the U.S.A. and ourselves, the world will owe a debt of gratitude to the small band of fighting editors of the patriotism editorials, to the men of the Nationalist "underground," who against the heaviest possible odds, and constantly threatened by the agents of the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith, have carried forward what may be described as the Dearborn Independent tradition in American journalism.

Addressing various levels of American readers (often in a language which must appear both crude and superficial to the European reader, who is apt to forget that a fastidious and subtle approach would be lost on the average politically immature American) such people as Gerald L. K. Smith in his Cross and the Flag, Mrs. Van Hying in Women's Voice, Mr. McGinley in his Common Sense have with vigour and persistence told the story of the Plot against Humanity which has now entered upon its final phase, a story related with greater detachment, and deeper perception and erudition by Major Robert H. Williams in his Intelligence Digest, by Mr. Hart in his Economic Council Letter, and by Miss Lonigan and her capable colleagues in Human Events.

To all of these it must have seemed like an emergence into daylight when on May 27 Col. McCormack's paper, the Chicago Daily Tribune carried an article by Mr. Walter Trohan who in simple language—but without using the epithet 'Jew'—told the identical story of America being governed by a Secret Administration headed by Zionists like Lehman, Morgenthau and Frankfurter which they for years had been attempting to "get over" to the American public. Mr. Trohan's article which has been widely re-printed throughout the States revealed the connection between Wall Street High Finance and the Roosevelt circle of "advisers" on the one hand, and between the New-Dealers of the Communist International on the other. Attention was drawn to the fact that Mr. Alger Hiss, of Yalta, San Francisco and U.N.O., who was convicted of perjury early this year with the implication that he was part of the pre-war Communist apparatus in Washington, was the guest during the critical times of his trial, of Senator Lehman's niece, Mrs. Buttenwieser, whose husband recently gave up his directorship in Kuhn, Loeb and Co. to become U.S. Deputy High Commissioner in Germany.*

The harm done to their cause by the publication of the article must have appeared great to the leaders of American Jewry who at once set in motion the machinery of their Anti-Defamation League. Yielding to the pressure of this nationwide, viciously effective "smearbund," Col. McCormack was forced to proffer his apologies for the appearance of the 'antisemite' article.

One of the interesting results of this Jewish "victory" was the admission by an exuberant Jew, Mr. Phineas J. Biron, in the B'nai B'rith Messenger for June 15, that "as a matter of fact we were told by a reliable source that the Chicago Anti-Defamation League office did have an arrangement with the Tribune, which permitted it to 'censor' the Tribune's anti-semitic mail before publication."

This statement, which is certain to be quoted and re-quoted in the "antisemitic" press long after Mr. Trohan's article and Col. McCormack's apology for it, will have been forgotten, lends additional interest to Intelligence-officer Major Williams' brilliant exposures† of the activities of the Anti-Defamation League, an organisation which at the moment acts as a Jewish Private Gestapo and could easily be transformed into the Secret Political Police of a "Soviet" America.

The Korean war "broke out" when the repercussions of the Chicago disclosures were beginning to be felt in wider circles and the public uneasiness at the never-ending exposures of Communist-Jewish traitors in governmental key positions continued to grow. But, much to the annoyance of the "Sons of the Covenant," the very circumstances of the Korean conflict seemed, perversely, to play right into the hand of the patriotic avant-garde who lost no time in broadcasting the fact that the controllers of what Major Williams calls the "minority machines" seemed to have a monopoly in wartime appointments: All U.S. field forces are under the supreme command of General Mark Clark whose mother is a Jewess, and who directed the Soviet-Jewish trek through central Europe to Palestine from 1945 onwards. A New York Zionist, Mr. Marx: Leva occupies the key position of Assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Acheson. A New York Jewess, Mrs. Anna Rosenberg, is special consultant on manpower problems to the National Security Resources Board while an Act conferring sweeping powers of conscription on the President translates into the realm of Law the Prepared-for-War Plan urged by Mr. Bernard Baruch ever since the end of the last war. It is an open secret that every position in U.N.O. of any consequence is held by a co-racialist of Mr. Bernard Baruch.

At the same time, the disclosures concerning Atomic "leaks" from governmental bureaus continue to come to light while the fact that every fresh person convicted is the bearer of a Jewish name lends itself to further elaboration of the by now almost threadbare theme that Communism is a Jewish conspiracy guided and controlled by the leaders of World Jewry. In Congress, Mr. John E. Rankin goes so far as to maintain that none of the persons convicted as transmitters of Atomic secrets are White Christians and is duly taken to task for his "antisemitism" by the World Zionist Press, which includes the London Jewish Chronicle. It is to this latter journal that we turn for the latest, and perhaps most significant comment on that new and incalcul-
The many Jewish names mentioned recently in connection with the arrest of Communist spies and propagandists in the U.S.A. has apparently caused much anxiety among American Jews. Last week one of the liveliest Jewish newspapers of the Middle West The Intermountain Jewish News, of Denver, published an interview by its editor, Mr. Robert Gamzey, with Mr. Louis Levand, publisher of the Wichita Beacon, of Kansas... Mr. Levand who is described as the dean of Western publishers and a good friend of the Jews, is reported to have said that American Jews have been 'irreparably damaged' by the handful of 'so-called Jews' whose arrests in Atom Spy cases were universally publicised... Mr. Levand emphasised that the combination of the Korean War, the American reversals, and battle casualties, and the recurrence of Jewish sounding names in spy cases, have already resulted in a set-back to Jewish public relations as far as Kansas and the Middle West is concerned.

And the set-back is, apparently not confined to the Middle West, for the New York report is deemed sufficiently important by the editor of the Jewish Chronicle to call for editorial comment. The leader-article called "American Jewry" containing the following passage:

"It is deplorable... that this antisemitic campaign can be conducted so venomously in the United States. The great Republic of the West is everywhere regarded as the most powerful protagonist in the struggle to maintain freedom and democracy in the world, while American Jewry is incomparably the largest and most influential Jewry of the Diaspora. There would thus appear to be something almost paradoxical in the persistence of antisemitism in such an environment."

It will be instructive to see how the leader of American (and World) Jewry proposes to solve the problem presented by this paradox and it will be even more interesting to learn how the American public, now thoroughly alerted to the danger presented by the enemies in their midst, will react to further attempts to solve it.—B.J.

Mr. Winston Churchill.

"... the Jewish people must ever remain profoundly appreciative of how magnificently Mr. Churchill has championed, throughout his long and distinguished political career, the general cause of Jewry. Some of his finest utterances in Parliament have been devoted to this theme. And outside Parliament also, he has constantly gone out of his way to express his deeply held convictions on the subject of Jewish rights and wrongs. In September, 1937, when the Palestine problem was acute, he specially wrote for this paper a forcible article entitled 'Why I am Against Partition.' To our centenary issue in November, 1941, he contributed a personal message of hope and encouragement to Jewry which will live in Jewish history. The eloquent message which he issued a few months ago, on the occasion of the semi-Jubilee of the Hebrew University, proclaimed him 'an unflattering Zionist and one who has always had the interests of the Jewish people at heart.'—Jewish Chronicle, October 6.
From Week to Week

"The political has nothing in common with the moral...Our countersign is Force and Make-believe." Protocols of the learned Elders of Zion I.

A respectable minority of those who have been impressed by the importance of the Protocols, as for instance, Mr. Henry Ford, Sr., and Lord Sydenham, take the attitude that the origin of the Protocols is a matter of comparatively small importance; that it is their almost uncanny correspondence with events which did not transpire until many years after their publication which gives them the importance they have.

We have never been able to follow this argument in its entirety. We imagine that if Scotland Yard were to receive a schedule of the major crimes which would be committed over a period of the next fifty years, and the events of the first five years of the period corresponded with the programme, they would be primarily concerned to know who was in a position to draw up the schedule. But if it became evident that all, or a great part, of the resources of Government, propaganda, the educational system and some of the dignitaries of the State Church were involved in the Schedule, then the matter would clearly require attention at higher levels.

The dominance of Force in current affairs, whether police force internally or military force internationally, does not require to be stressed. It is obvious and inescapable. But the growth and prevalence of make-believe requires far more attention than it receives.

At the outset, let us notice the accuracy of the phrase, make believe. That is a short description of hypnotism: the use of mental domination which, for evil purposes, is Black Magic.

Once that is grasped it is easy to see that the Protocols are the Gospel of Black Magic applied to human affairs. Now let us turn to a specific instance.

That shop-front for the Sanhedrin of Satan, U.N.O., the last assertion of the Monothetic principal of Government, is a sham founded on shams. Its mechanism is a franchise founded on arbitrary units called nations each of which in theory has a vote irrespective of its size, history, ideals or other qualification. Not half of one per cent. of the populations of these nations had the most distant conception either of the implication of its creation, or the interests it was intended to serve, although Mr. Attlee declared in advance that "Labour" when it came to power would subordinate British interests to World interests (which is of course the explanation of the "enigma" of Mr. Attlee's Prime Ministership).

A leading agent in its hasty launch at San Francisco was stated to be Mr. Alger Hiss, now serving a long sentence in gaol for treason to the United States.

There are three fair-sized wars in progress under its direct and indirect management, the whole world is becoming mortgaged to the power behind its policy, the United States perhaps better described as Wall Street, "Britain" has "won" one more war and lost one more "peace," together with the most successful Empire known to history, and the people of these islands are governed for all essential purposes by ideals and, in a large part, personnel derived from the Polish and Russian Ghettos.

It is beyond question that there is an intimate connection between the course of events and the schedule which foretold them. Whoever constructed that document or its essential features, should be the primary objective of an outraged humanity.

"MAN V. THE NATURAL ORDER.

"It would be interesting to know how many members of the 'C.G.A.' read the article 'Phosphorus Insecticides' in the August number of the Estate Magazine without superstition, without feeling approaching almost reverential awe at the stupendous arrogance implicit in the warning instructions to wear, when using these latest scientific marvels, rubber or plastic aprons, gloves, boots and eye-shields, to avoid the faintest breath of the sprays or splashing with them, etc. This latest picture of man, a puny integral fragment of the natural order, riddled with every disease his clumsy disturbance of the delicate ecological balance of that order has so far set free to assail him, now clad in plastics and taking yet another chance in hand to wage further war on the majestic might of an earth which has eternity to work in, is one which must make God sigh again. A voyage through the chambers of the minds of the men who produce such things, and of those adolescents who use them must be like visiting another planet. What do they imagine the results of their next 'step' in the 'war against nature' will be — their next 1,000th — their next 10,000th? Can it really be possible they suppose that man alone of living species will remain immune the while they continue to tamper with the laws of ecological equilibrium established on this earth thousands of millions of years ago? One would have thought history's chapter of occurrences covering only the last few centuries would have been devastating enough of an answer to such pretensions."


We gather from unimpeachable sources that Mr. David Lilienthal made a very private visit to this country recently, and had, inter alia, a personally conducted tour by Mr. Thomas Johnson of the Scottish Hydro-Electric Schemes. Before being placed in a strategic position in regard to the atom bomb, Mr. Lilienthal was head of the Tennessee Valley (T.V.A.) project. Oddly enough, some people do not approve of Mr. Lilienthal.
PARLIAMENT

House of Lords, October 17, 1950.

Grain Supplies and Storage

Earl De La Warr rose to call attention to the need for greater provision for the storage of grain in this country, and to move for Papers.

The noble Earl said: . . . When Parliament met last September it was notable that in neither House was there a single mention from the Government Benches of the question of our food supplies for the purposes of defence. Yet I feel we all know that if we are to get the best results from our preparations for defence, those preparations must be balanced. Thus, our Armed Forces must match and be matched by our munitions, our industrial capacity, our raw materials and, last but not least, our supplies of food. The strength of the chain must, as always, be its weakest link. It may well be that the Government are doing more than we think about the link that I propose your Lordships shall discuss to-day—namely, food. It may be that they are in fact stock-piling and making preparations for growing more food in this country. If so, all strength to their elbow. But they are acting with exceeding stealth. So far as most of us can see, there are no special steps whatever being taken to strengthen this particular link. During the last two wars, as we all well remember, there were times when this country was nearly brought to her knees as a result of the attacks on our shipping by submarines and, during the latter period of the war, by aeroplanes. To-day, on such evidence as has been laid before us, the Russians may well have five or six times the number of submarines as those with which the Germans started the last war, and, whereas the German ocean-going submarines were capable of doing something in the neighbourhood of nine knots, we are told that the modern submarine can do twenty knots under the surface.

How far have we faced up to what these figures mean? . . . No one concerned with agriculture to-day can see, either in the speeches or in the actions of the Government, the slightest sense of urgency in preparing to meet this truly—I do not want to use exaggerated words—desperate danger . . . I cannot help feeling that if a visitor from Mars were to come here and find, as is the case, that as the present moment the granaries of the United States of America are bulging with grain, to her own embarrassment, while Britain one of her main allies and supports, is facing the possibility of a blockade in the event of war, with her stocks in a low condition, that visitor would think it exceedingly strange. It might be that we should explain to him our dollar difficulties, and so on; but even if he were able to understand those difficulties he would find it even harder to appreciate how it is that neither country feels that it would be wise now, while the seas are still open, to take some action to transfer at least some of that grain to this country.

Suppose that we decided to stockpile grain, what about our storage capacity? First of all, how much do we want? Let us assume that we take the decision that we should like to have stored in this country grain for one year's consumption. That would come to about 5,000,000 tons of which something over 2,000,000 tons would be grown here. In arriving at that figure, I assume that one acre in this country will grow approximately one ton. That is not an absolutely accurate figure, but it is close enough for discussion of general policy. I have not been able to ascertain how much storage capacity we have in this country, because so much storage capacity being used to-day is of a makeshift character and would certainly not be available in time of war. There is one thing we do know, however, and know with great certainty: it is that our modern methods of harvesting are every year decreasing the amount of storage capacity we have available in this country. In 1939 the combine harvester in this country—and I am dealing with harvesting conditions in this country—was more or less an experimental machine. To-day we have nearly 12,000 of those combine harvesters at work. The official figure on January 1, I believe, was 10,000; but it has been increased since then, and I am informed that the figure is now nearer 12,000. These combines are for the most part pouring grain on to the market in the space of a few weeks, grain which in the old days stayed for months in the ricks on the farms, and was slowly and steadily threshed out. . . .

I see that the Ministry of Food is building a certain number of drying stations and central storage plants—I think the figure is either six or seven. That is all to the good, and it may well be that the millers, and possibly the merchants, may be prepared to help by increasing their storage capacity. But that is by the way. The best place for the storage of home-grown grain is where it has always been stored in the past, and that is on the farm; and the right people to provide that storage are the land owners and farmers themselves. How are they to do it, and how are they to be encouraged to increase their storage capacity? The price of wheat—for the moment I am discussing wheat—was 26s. 6d. per cwt. in August, and by June of the following year it had risen in stages to 30s. That is a price differential of 3s. 6d. per cwt., or £3 10s. per ton. It would not cost the Exchequer a penny if they were to widen that margin, maintaining the existing average price at 28s. I want it to be clear that I certainly should not ask for the considerable widening of that margin, because I will admit that there is already a reasonable profit in the present figure. But if we wanted a stimulant to encourage the provision of extra storage I would say that we could get it by widening that margin, and it need not cost the Exchequer a penny, because the average price of 28s. per cwt. could be maintained.

I should also like to suggest to His Majesty's Government that it would be worth while their considering the question of giving a higher depreciation allowance for buildings. We can say that a farm store ranks as a building and therefore qualifies for the 10 per cent. depreciation over ten years. That is perfectly all right providing we have confidence that it is going to pay us in this country to grow grain for as long a term as ten years. I would suggest to your Lordships and to the Government that in influential quarters there is far too much talk about high prices in agriculture, "feather bedding," and so on, for us to contemplate with any confidence an item of expenditure on which depreciation runs for ten years and for which there will be no other use. . . .

Ventilated silos are probably the best and cheapest form of drying, so far as modern knowledge takes us. There is progress every year, and therefore I make that qualification. This form of storage would give farmers drying capacity that they must have if they are to make proper use of their combines and at the same time give the nation the increased storage capacity that it needs. It is simple to build, cheap to operate and cheap to maintain. Also there is the great...
advantage that this form of storage would be dispersed on the farms, a point of very considerable importance when we are discussing a defence measure. Firstly, I again stress the point that storage for combine grain on the farm will only replace storage in the rick that has been lost, and that if additional capacity is needed for stockpiling the Government will have to take further steps to provide that additional capacity.

I turn now to what seems to possibly the best form of food storage of all; that is, having good grassland in such a state of fertility that when the emergency comes it can be ploughed into good crops. To say that we could double the production from our grassland at the moment is, I am quite sure, an under-estimate. I think the noble Earl, Lord Huntingdon, will bear me out in that. But it might be more relevant to say—as we are discussing the immediate increase of production, but storage—that the more we increase the productive capacity of our grassland, the more fertility we are building up into our land as a store for the future. The better the sward, the stronger the root system lying there waiting to be ploughed in, and the greater the crop we are able to grow with a minimum of fertiliser. I know quite well that His Majesty's Government are doing what they can to improve the use of our grassland, but there is the whole difference in the world between a quiet peace-time educational campaign and a war-time drive—and I suggest that we want more of the spirit of the latter.

I know that, so far as agriculture executive committees are concerned, their chairmen have received letters drawing their attention to the gravity of the situation. But those of us who were concerned with the war-time increased production drive know well that we never got anywhere by a Ministerial letter, or a number of Ministerial letters. The hard fact is that we all know perfectly well that a great deal of our land at the present moment is being farmed at half cock, and that we are not producing the food that we could produce.

Viscount Bledisloe: I should like to emphasise the fact that before you can store wheat you have to grow it. Of course, the trouble to-day—at any rate, to those of us who hail from the South-West of England, or from Wales—is not the difficulty of storing the grain, but of harvesting it. It is an almost grim irony to some of us in the far west to be told that on balance the wheat harvest is almost up to average. Let any member of the Government go down to Devonshire, Cornwall, Carmarthenshire, Pembrokeshire, Cardiganshire, Glamorganshire or Monmouthshire and talk like that, and there would not be many votes available for his Party at the next Election, at any rate in the rural areas.

The Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster (Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough): We are not responsible for the weather.

Viscount Bledisloe: I am talking about the official announcement that, on the whole, the harvest has been reasonably good, and does not differ materially from the average. The position in those countries with which I am associated is really grim. I am told on good authority that in Wales alone something like two-thirds of the whole of the cereal grain of every description is ruined this year. Incidentally, I would remind my noble friend Lord De La Warr, in whose part of England the harvest has been comparatively favourable, that he, like other progressive large-scale farmers, owns a combine harvester, while we poor people in the West, more indigenous, with smaller farms and with smaller fields, do not, in the very large majority of cases, own combines, because we cannot afford them.

... the late Lord Chaplin emphasised that a premium should be placed upon the retention in the farmers' stackyard of wheat in good condition—that is, placed in stacks upon stone or metal staddles raised above the ground so as to be free, or relatively free, from the ravages of rodents. The amount of corn that is damaged by rats to-day in this country is very serious indeed. We are told on reputable authority that as much grain in the United Kingdom is consumed or spoiled by rodents as is actually consumed by human beings. Whether or not that is an exaggeration it is not for me to say. But it is surely good policy and in the national interest to see that all those counties where in peace time the bulk of wheat is raised are fully equipped with combine harvesters and drying plant. Surely, too, the bulk, if not the whole, of the wheat that can be raised from the soil of our country will be raised in those counties, to the exclusion of those counties in the south-west of England and Wales where wheat-growing in normal conditions is not a sound economic proposition and, in normal climatic conditions, is not even a reasonably good speculation.

I would further venture to say—and I defy refutation—that we should bear in mind that what those of us who are raising stock, particularly dairy and fattening cattle in the south-west of England and Wales, most want is concentrated food to enable our cattle to yield a full supply of milk. That is what is so scarce to-day, and we are threatened during the coming winter with a serious shortage of milk for lack of concentrated foods. If the Government would cease to ask us, still less to compel us, to grow wheat, and would allow us to grow on our own farms crops like beans, lucerne, kale and other crops that are relatively high in their protein content, the nation would have available from the land of this country more balanced food than it is getting at the present time.

Lord Kinnaid: The big problem in Scotland is not one of storage but of conditioning the grain—the drying and the dressing of the grain. There are the problems of storing wheat and barley. As your Lordships will be aware, one aspect of the question of the storage of wheat in Scotland is that the moisture content of wheat is, on an average, not less than 22 per cent. and it cannot be stored. The percentage has to be reduced before it is safe to store it; so we have the problem of wheat being conditioned. With regard to barley, we have the problem that if it is dried by artificial methods our malsters in Scotland—and I think there has been the same difficulty in England—look with great suspicion upon it. They say they are taking too big a risk in buying dried barley. I do not think our farmers should have their own drying plants; nor in many cases do I think that it is wise for them to have their own combine harvesters. Lord Bledisloe mentioned that in his part of England and in Wales the farmers were too small to have combines. The expense of buying a combine is really not justifiable for a large number of the farmers—and certainly not a drying plant. Also, in our part of Scotland, and in many parts of the wheat-growing areas a farmer will cut with a combine perhaps only one field out of three, because he needs his wheat straw for potato pits and for thatching his stacks. Therefore, only a small amount of his crop will be
cut with a combine, and it is not worth his while to buy one.

What is the way to meet the problem of making wheat fit for storage and to make barley fit for the merchant or the maltster? I suggest that centralised drying plants are the way. When one talks of centralised drying plants one comes to a practical problem, and I believe that the Secretary of State for Scotland will not feel inclined to put his capital into storage or into drying plants. I think that that problem must be tackled by the farmer and the merchant—with the good will of the Department of Agriculture, certainly, but it is a problem that the farmers must face. In the part of the country where I live we have watched with great interest the development of such a centralised drying plant and combine. One enterprising farmer who now owns seven or eight combine harvesters has put up an up-to-date drying plant, properly controlled, with oil heating, with a clock to tell you the exact temperature and the length of time the drying has taken. He is harvesting the crop of about 2,000 acres in Perthshire and Angus. I might add that his grain is now bought by all the leading merchants. His barley is bought by most of the leading merchants in Perth without any hesitation, because he has proved that he can dry barley well and efficiently.

On the question of the marketing of barley, I should like to make a suggestion. If such central plants were introduced, a certificate as to the drying should be given by the person owning the drying plant. If it is properly constituted and recognised as a well-run drying plant under proper control, I suggest that in order to meet the needs of the maltster or the merchant who wants to be sure of his grain a certificate might be given by the owner of the drying plant to guarantee that the barley has not been overheated and that it is fit for malting or for the use to which it is to be put. I know that the centralised drying plants and combine harvesters which I am suggesting have already been developed in other parts of Scotland, and I believe that will be the way in which we must face this problem. I was told yesterday that in the Kingdom of Fife a group of farmers have got together and have set up their own drying plant and, in the same way as in Perthshire, the crops from all around go into that central institution. With that and the certificate, I think we could do something to meet the problem not only of keeping our wheat dry but also of keeping our barley dry and fit for the maltsters to take. As Lord De La Warr and Lord Bledisloe have said, if we can get our wheat dried by a central drying plant, it can go back to the farmer and be stored in the farm. That will help us to meet the problem of storage and the difficulty of having all the grain on the market at the same time . . .

Lord Hawke: . . . I think that everyone of us will admit that, from the strategic and from the marketing point of view, the ideal system of storing our grain is our traditional one in the stack on the farm, so that it dries out slowly and appears on the market slowly, as the engines get round to thresh it out. But we have invented these wonderful new implements which enable us to grow grain where we could not grow it before, and we have now to solve the problems which they have created. . . . Expecting that most of your Lordships who spoke to-day would speak as farmers, I took some pains to ascertain what would be the views of the grain merchants and the maltsters in this matter, though I hasten to add that I have no interest whatsoever, except as a consumer of their products. First of all, take the case of the maltsters. They deal, roughly speaking, with something like 850,000 tons of barley out of some 2,000,000 tons grown in the country. What are their requirements? They require, first, a barley that will sprout—that means reliability. Secondly, they require a barley that will sprout all at the same time—that means uniformity. It follows, therefore, that to fulfil the ideal store conditions we want the same variety, the same field, the same stack, and the same length of time maturing in the stack. . . . It is possible that in the course of time some growers will acquire the skill necessary to enable them to dry their barley in a way which will entirely give satisfactory results on the matting floor. But this is by no means certain. So the most sensible thing to do is to provide for increased drying and storage capacity at the maltings; that is, for the malting barley.

As to the other grains—and by that term I mean all grains not used for malting—we expect that about 2,000,000 tons have been combined this year, and there may be more in future . . .

But whether the solution lies in the drier or in new storage methods, naturally the question of finance arises. Finance is called for, both in connection with the driers and the stores and in connection with the grain actually in the stores. The treatment of the grain actually in the stores we can ignore, because that is a normal banking transaction. It is in the provision of these other capital items that the Government can come in. The most effective way of providing the capital items is for the Government to facilitate and induce the private individual to provide them. First of all, there are price inducements; then tax inducements, and finally loan inducements. These should be available to both merchants and farmers and also, if necessary, to maltsters. Price inducements have already been mentioned by my noble friend Lord De La Warr, who spoke of the differential between grain placed early on the market and grain placed late on the market. I believe that that differential should be greatly increased and that it should extend to barley as well as to wheat.

Tax inducements for farmers to provide capital equipment are already quite good, and I can see no reason why merchants supplying the same type of capital equipment should not be allowed the same tax inducements as regards writing off. The Select Committee on Estimates, 1948-49, on page XXXVII, paragraph 4, recommended that buildings for the storing of grain should qualify for a depreciation of 10 per cent, under the Income Tax Act of 1945. It seems to me that if merchants provide the same equipment as farmers they ought to be allowed to write it off in the same time as the farmer. Again loan inducements to farmers are quite good. Frankly, I do not know whether facilities given to merchants are so good. I do not know whether the facilities under the Agricultural Credits Act are available to such people as grain merchants, but it would seem that something of that nature ought to be provided for them. These three methods, if they are used properly and in balance, will eventually produce the solution to our problems . . .

Viscount Alexander of Hillesborough: . . . As a West Countryman by birth, I have a great deal of sympathy with what the noble Viscount, Lord Bledisloe, said about the troubles of West Country farmers this season. My grandfather was a West Country farmer. But I happen to do a little farming now in East Anglia and I have seen something of the other side and something of the ruin in East Anglia as
the result of the bottom falling out of the grain market after the First World War, when there were no such facilities as we have now for long-term fixed prices. I hope the noble Earl did not intend to try to put some fear in the minds of farmers. . . .

Viscount Bledisloe: If the noble Viscount will forgive me for interrupting, what I want to emphasise is what is the optimum form of husbandry to be adopted in the national interest in different regions of this country.

Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough: I understood that point very well, and I found myself once again, as an old West Countryman now doing a little agriculture in East Anglia, wondering how it would work out. I believe that what the noble Viscount suggested is sound in principle, and it will certainly be examined. But there is a point beyond which in the Eastern Counties you cannot switch over to more and more grain without getting yourself into unbalanced husbandry. The people who used to grow most of the grain had some big problems to face in the conditions in which we imported such a large proportion of our wheat requirements in peace-time; and it has not been unreasonable for them to have some share in the movement towards balanced farming as a whole, towards more livestock and milk production in that good, productive, arable land. It is true that in the hill districts, and the like, we are now assisting with beef and sheep raising in places which have been driven for cash to the milk trade. But, generally speaking, I am anxious to see that in all good arable areas there should be sufficient mixed balanced farming to give each of the farmers concerned a reasonable opportunity.

As to the actual reserves required for war, not the least problem there, as the noble Earl will agree, is what shall be done about this great wheat production now, and how will it affect the future. The noble Viscount who spoke used words—I do not think he intended to—indicating that we were compelling the farmers in the West Country to grow wheat. We do not compel the farmers to grow wheat, but we do place great emphasis in all our approaches to them, in the present dollar situation in relation to imported wheat, and the desire to improve general husbandry over the country and the general expansion of the need to grow more wheat than they have been doing. There is the inducement of the fixed price, the prospect of a long period of fixed prices and reasonable annual or periodical arrangements for inquiry and revision of whatever prices are settled. On that basis, I believe that farmers have never had such a prospect of permanence and confidence in peace time as they have now. But if you want to consider how you are going to get great fertility and expanding productive capacity in war, you must be careful how you advise people to go on. If in the north eastern counties we adopted too rigidly the suggestions of the noble Viscount we should find the farmers so unbalanced in their husbandry as not to be able to produce the reserves we should require in war-time. . . . I myself feel that the suggestions which have been made are not likely to be very cheap.

It is significant that, whilst the cost would not be very great, as was stated in the last speech to which we listened (Lord Hawke always seems to be well advised from the grain trade, and he is not without financial knowledge), in one or two other respects the capital would not be found easily. It would require at least inducements from Government sources, either by further relief from taxation or by the provision of still further loans to farmers, or to merchants engaged in business. This last is quite a new suggestion to me and I do not think it is one that is likely to be popular with His Majesty's Treasury. . . . My recollection was that, in the actual wheat handled through the various stages, up to date no more than about 10,000 tons was certified as non-millable, which was almost exactly equal to the amount certified as non-millable in 1948. Last year, 1949, was exceptional. Of course, as the noble Lord [Lord Hawke] has said, all returns are not yet complete, but up to date the amount certified as non-millable has not been higher, for the same period, than that certified in 1948. That is a rather remarkable tribute to the progress which has been made, to the emergency storage which the Ministry of Food arranged in various parts of the country, and to the extent to which the Ministry of Food had also hired private drying capacity not actually in use at the time. . . . There has been a programme of erecting other shelters in rural areas so as to have the same general security by dispersal. They are not concentrated so much as they were thirty years ago, when we tended to have our storage capacity at the ports, instead of scattered over the country.

Lord Hawke: This is very important. Would it then appear to be the policy of His Majesty's Government that the extra grain storage capacity required is to be provided by Governmental action at Governmental centres, rather than by the encouragement of the private farmer and the private grain merchant to provide them for himself in a more scattered way?

Viscount Alexander of Hillsborough: The noble Lord has anticipated me a little. I was giving first the main scheme which has been proceeding for providing silos and drying apparatus, which has been increasing the number of hours given to drying. I was going to say next that part of the programme is that in this increasing number of scattered storage places we hope to be able to introduce some drying apparatus, as well as having mere storage, so that we can do some drying on the spot. . . .

Earl De La Warr: My Lords, I am sure your Lordships would like me to thank the noble Viscount for the speech he has just made, although I think I shall be expressing your view if I say that I listened to it with a certain amount of disappointment. It seemed to me that it would have been an excellent speech from a Back-Bench member, or from someone sitting on this side discussing the subject generally. As an example of benevolent cotton wool it was charming, but it does not leave us with any more real information about the real position and about what is to be done to face what we consider an even more vital and desperate danger, than we knew before.

Would the noble Viscount mind if I took him up on two points? One is the question of compelling farmers to grow wheat, because I think there is strong feeling on this. It is perfectly true that, sitting up in London or Whitehall, we can say that in fact there is no compulsion to grow wheat. But if you are down in the country and know how these men go round the farmers (who are not well informed about the exact powers which exist), and are aware of the very con-