Leahy’s “I Was There”  
by H. SWABEY.

Fleet-Admiral W. D. Leahy was U.S. Ambassador to Vichy and then Chief of Staff to both wartime Presidents. But this proximity to the politicians—a sub-criminal class, evidently—did not quite warp his values. He wrote from Vichy, in March, 1941, “The only two persons who have impressed me as completely devoted to France without thought of personal advantage are Marshal Petain and General Weygand.” Mr. Churchill told the Marshal “that de Gaulle has been of no assistance to the British cause.” Admiral Leahy judged de Gaulle to be a power-seeking politician.

Leahy’s Anglophobia changed into Russiaphobia before the end of his book. At Casablanca (January, 1943) he was surprised by “the announcement at the final news conference held by the President and the Prime Minister of the principle of ‘unconditional surrender’... there were occasions when it might have been advantageous to accept conditional surrender in some areas, but we were not permitted to do it.” At Washington in May, “the agreements were more advantageous to the American cause than those originally proposed. . . . Roosevelt later confided to me that he felt a qualified satisfaction with the results. . . . Roosevelt seemed to dominate the conference.” Another conference at Quebec followed in August, and Leahy’s verdict was: “the military decisions reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff were definitely advantageous to the United States.”

But Leahy warmed to the British point of view: “When the Allied Nations took up the question of the trial of German officials not based on established judicial procedure, I was to find myself in sympathy with Churchill’s objections, made first at Tehran, that such trials would be in effect ex post facto criminal proceedings.”

After Chiang had left Cairo (November) “fully expecting his allies to make good their promises,” the entourage arrived at Tehran. Roosevelt tried to dismiss with a joke Churchill’s plea for “the traditional English concept of justice which rejected any proceedings under ex post facto laws.” Churchill, who was getting into very deep waters, attempted later to restore harmony by telling Stalin that the British might almost be called “pink.”

By the time of Yalta—February, 1945—the shooting war was nearly over, but the cold war was beginning. His was present. Meanwhile, the Senate had refused to confirm Wallace as Secretary of Commerce, in spite of the efforts of Judge Rosenman, Mrs. Roosevelt and Henry Morgenthau. Roosevelt brought up the Palestine question before Teheran was reached. There the Polish question was more to the front. Roosevelt did not object to the Curzon line; on the Western side, said Stalin, very few Germans remained in the areas occupied by the Red Army. But “Churchill objected violently to the recognition of the Lublin regime and to abandoning the present Polish Government in London.” He objected again when Roosevelt brought up “the system of trusteeship as proposed in the draft charter of the United Nations Organisation... He said, ‘While there is life in my body, no transfer of British sovereignty will be permitted.’” And he protested again on the war criminal issue.

Although “Churchill even went along finally with this point of view,” Admiral Leahy says: “A soldier carries out the orders of his government. He defends his country to the best of his ability, and when he loses a war he must take the consequences.” And as to branding enemies as war criminals, “It is difficult for one who has spent his lifetime as a professional military man to square this concept of justice with the practice of American jurisprudence as I have understood it.” He considered the proposed peace a “sowing of dragon’s teeth”; but admired Churchill at Yalta “completely and wholeheartedly devoted to the interests of the British Empire.”

The probable effect of the veto also disquieted him at the time, and the agreement to destroy German militarism would make Russia the dominant power in Europe. That in itself, carried a certainty of future international disagreements.

On his way back, Roosevelt held court and was visited by several potentates “in the traditionally British sphere of influence.” Churchill was unaware of this plan, and hurried to see the potentates himself. Ibn Saud pointed out to the President that “if Jews from outside Palestine continued to be imported with their foreign financial backing and their higher standards of living, they would make trouble for the Arab inhabitants.” Judge Sam Rosenman boarded the Quincy at Algiers to help Roosevelt prepare his report to Congress on the Crimea Conference (Yalta). The President reported that the decisions at Yalta spelled the end of the system of balances of power. But they did not spell the end of altercations. A sharp dispute about German surrender in Italy broke out at once, and Leahy noted his “conviction that we were making a mistake to embrace the Soviet Union as a co-partner in the final stages of the war on Japan.” The Polish problem was not settled, France was split.

Baruch only appears as Roosevelt’s host at Hobcaw and at his funeral, apart from giving a strange opinion: “He was convinced that in spite of the existing condition of discouragement in Britain, the Empire could, with very little assistance, rebuild itself into a position of great power and prestige in the world. Baruch had so informed high British leaders in London, including the King.” But Churchill was not so happy, “completely fed up” with de Gaulle, and “even more bitter” towards Tito, and exhibited “bitter hostility towards the Soviets.” He was, in fact, resisting “the unpleasant fact that his government no longer occupied its former degree of power and dominance in the world.” Despite
Baruch's reassurances, Leahy did not accept Marshall's opinion that an invasion of Japan was necessary, for by June he considered Japan "thoroughly defeated."

On his way to Potsdam, Leahy passed through Berlin. "The kind of destruction we saw in Berlin was against the civilized laws of war." Stalin had anticipated the conference by arranging the boundaries of Poland in such a way as "precluded the possibility of Germany subsisting on German agricultural and industrial effort." The refusal of Truman to recognise the existing Governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary before he was satisfied that they were in accord with the desires of those peoples "might be said to have been the beginning of the cold war between the United States and Russia."

Admiral Leahy apparently prevailed on Roosevelt not to use germ warfare, protesting that it "would violate every Christian ethic I have ever heard of and all of the known laws of war." But Truman was persuaded that the atom bomb would shorten the war, and gave his consent to its use, although "the Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender." Leahy's final comment shews that he belonged to a generation that still preserved some values: "My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children... These new concepts of 'total war' are basically distasteful to the soldier and sailor of my generation. Employment of the atomic bomb in war will take us back in cruelty towards non-combatants to the days of Genghis Khan. It will be a form of pillage and rape of a society... These new and terrible instruments of uncivilised war represent a modern type of barbarism not worthy of Christian man."

Churchill had vanished. He appeared as only half an American, clearly realising at the end that Britain was being reduced to a corridor. Through "Hitler," the barriers that should contain North Asia had been flung down; and "America" had abandoned the Monroe doctrine to sprawl over the globe. "One effective factor was a decline of the power of the British Empire." Leahy was not as pleased at this prospect as might be expected from his comment on the Washington Conference when "Winston Churchill appeared to carry his insistent campaign to preserve the British Empire to a point where it might not be in full agreement with the President's fundamental policy to defeat Hitler as quickly as possible." But Leahy was barely half a politician.

**What is the Use of a Secret?**

Looking back through the files of *The Social Crediter* for the past eleven years we find that the subject of Freemasonry has been dealt with repeatedly and very adequately and we may well conclude that the recent wider publicity is not unconnected with these efforts.

When people have been cheated they look round for the trickster and we are not unfamiliar with the Jewish financiers' trick of providing a scapegoat. So it is very important that we should link up Freemasonry with the fraudulent balance sheet, twin lairs for the so-called "occult." Both of them are "discovered" and talk in railway carriages has the stamp of realism.

At the present juncture it does not seem that there is any better procedure than the ridicule of secrecy. The dupes of this myth, Masonic and otherwise, cannot answer back and as one warms to the fraudulent balance sheet the unfortunate worshipper of mumbo-jumbo is left high and dry faced with the national swindle which the High Priests of the Unholy Order cannot "square."

For what, after all, is a secret? The thought of an individual known only to him and his Creator. Spoken to one trusted friend it may still be termed a secret. But to more than one? Who can be certain of secrecy and who can one blame if the "news" leaks out? Human nature is such that unless checked by cupidity or fear, hardly one of us does not take delight in "spilling the beans." Even when hedged in with oaths and promises, the adventurer cannot repress his initiative and will take a chance for suitable inducement. So it is with the "secrets" of Freemasonry. The records of centuries of tale-bearers and of history present a consistent picture of perversion and conspiracy.

What is the use of these so-called secrets? From the conspirators' point of view they have a double use. First, the practice of "secrecy" enables the instructor to test the mentality of the instructed. Secondly, certain kinds of information, limited to a circle of initiates, have a commercial value. The initiated can exploit for personal gain, the ignorance of the public, the fringes of the "craft," forming an alibi for the centre. The selling or betraying of atomic "secrets" is no exception. We can regard the concentration of research in the U.S.A. as a "Lodge" - a workman's bench for a new source of power and the sharing-out of technical knowledge, in line with the well-known practice of international trusts. By admitting into the circle of initiates types of mind which are certain to pass on the "secrets" to a predestined quarter, the Grand Masters of the Atomic Lodge secure their aim without personal danger.

These "secrets" are as well-known in England as Russia, but it has not escaped the notice of Social Crediters that to have the information is one thing and a financial licence to develop it is another.

That the concentrations of atomic plant are in alien hands where the Jewish financial stranglehold is most intense is certainly a danger to European civilization but we must remember the purpose behind it is intimidation and not necessarily use. The audited balance sheet is the answer to unpreparedness and military impotence. One-hundredth part of the sterilised power in the bureaucratic direction of our economy would provide more than enough atomic weapons and atomic energy to ensure the respect of the world.

"Tear the mask off Freemasonry," said Pope Leo XIII. It was never easier to do than now. Major Douglas has given us the final devastating answer. Attack the nests of nonsense day by day and in our own locality. Ninety-nine per cent. of Masons do not know what it is about and there must be more than one who would be glad to contract-out, at least as far as they dare, if they had the information which Social Crediters alone can give them in full.

Sweat are the uses of secrecy to conspirators and the ridicule of secrecy and humbug is a sweet diversion in these grim days.

PASCO, LANGMAID
Mr. Snadden asked the Secretary of State for Scotland if he is aware that Constructional Scheme No. 25—Breadalbane Project—of the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board is likely seriously to affect large sheep stocks in Perthshire; and if he will give an assurance that before confirming this scheme the interests of food production will be fully considered.

The Joint Under-Secretary of State for Scotland (Miss Herbison): Objections to this scheme may be made before this scheme the interests of food production will be fully considered.

Mr. Snadden: Is the hon. Lady aware that a large part of the land affected by this vast scheme to cost £15,500,000 is land that has already been rehabilitated under the Hill Farming Act passed by her own Government? Is she further aware that there is grave apprehension because of the discharge of water from the scheme into the River Earn, serious flooding will take place over this rich agricultural land? Will she see that her right hon. Friend looks into these two points in particular, and has regard to agricultural and food production interests in general?

Miss Herbison: All of these points are being taken into consideration. At the present time technical officers of the Department of Agriculture are carrying out a survey on this very ground. Their report will be in the hands of the Secretary of State before he reaches any decision.

Colonel Gome-Duncan: Is the hon. Lady aware that on this occasion this period of forty days is really too short to enable people to examine this very big scheme carefully, because for the first time, I think I am right in saying, in any of these schemes really rich, first-class agricultural land is affected, as opposed to the important but much less valuable hill land affected in some of the earlier schemes?

Miss Herbison: It seems to me that the time is a little more than 40 days. It was first decided on 23rd March, and there is until 5th May. I am sure that if there is an objection there is sufficient time to make the objection.

Housing, Cove and Kilgreggan

Mr. Steele asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the number of applicants on the waiting list for houses in the Burgh of Cove and Kilgreggan.

Mr. T. Fraser: I am informed that the number is 44, Sir.

Mr. Steele: Would my hon. Friend bear in mind that is a Tory local authority who were allocated 20 houses by his Department in May, 1948; that building did not start until January, 1950; and that, as far as I understand, no houses have yet been completed? Would he arrange for the Scottish Special Housing Association to go into this local authority area and build houses for the people who are still waiting for them?

Mr. Fraser: I should like to consider my hon. Friend’s suggestion.

Agricultural Production

Mr. Manuel asked the Secretary of State for Scotland what increase has taken place in our meat production in Scotland since the commencement of the agricultural expansion programme in June, 1947.

Mr. T. Fraser: The estimated increase in 1950-51 in the production of beef and veal, mutton and lamb, pigmeat and poultry over that produced in 1946-47 is 33,000 tons, or 22 per cent.

Mr. Manuel asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the extent of increase in Scotland in the production of cereals and potatoes; and also the figures of the acreage under cultivation since the commencement of the expansion programme.

Mr. T. Fraser: The estimated increase in cereals production between 1947, the first year of the expansion programme, and 1950 was 57,000 tons, from a decreased acreage of 68,000 acres. The figure for potatoes was 223,000 tons increase from 17,000 acres less. The total area under cultivation in 1947 and 1950 respectively was 1,859,000 and 1,768,000 acres.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: Will my hon. Friend tell us to what extent this is due to Government subsidies, and whether he is considering the suggestion of the hon. and gallant Member for Pollok (Commander Galbraith) that those subsidies should be withdrawn?

Mr. Fraser: We are not seriously considering the hon. and gallant Gentleman’s suggestion.

Commander Galbraith: Does not the hon. Gentleman consider that these figures reflect the very greatest credit on our Scottish farmers?

Mr. Fraser: Yes, certainly.

Mr. Snadden: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that direct subsidies paid to the whole of agriculture are only £20 million?

Hon. Members: Only.

Mr. Manuel asked the Secretary of State for Scotland the total volume of agricultural output estimated for the year ending May, 1951; and also the comparable figures for the years 1947 and 1939.

Mr. T. Fraser: The total volume of agricultural output in Scotland for the year ending May, 1951, is estimated to be 18 per cent. greater than in 1946-47 and 47 per cent. greater than pre-war.

Mr. Manuel: Will my hon. Friend indicate to the Scottish farmers and farmers our great satisfaction at this tremendous increase in productivity throughout rural Scotland? Will he further indicate to the people of Scotland generally the tremendous fillip that has been given to Scottish agriculture by the Labour Government?

Mr. Fraser: The farmers and farmworkers of Scotland are due the greatest credit for their wonderful efforts since 1947; but I should just like to say that as they are, by and large, the farmers and farmworkers that we had before the

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THE SOCIAL CREDITER

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From Week to Week

THE COIN CLIPPERS:—"The internal purchasing power of the pound sterling is now about 10/- as compared with 20/- in 1938." (The Chancellor of the Exchequer).

The statement is, of course, just as false in its arithmetic as in its morals, and the ratio, 2/1, must be multiplied by a figure representing the average rate of improvement of process over the period 1938-1951. No one knows what this figure is, and the government of Mr. Jay (yes, Jay), is determined, as all governments which implement the policy of Finance are, that no one shall know. (See Mr. Jay’s answer to Mr. Granville at the foot of the next column). Explicitly, Mr. Gaitskell’s computation applies to “what you can buy, if you want to, in a shop,” a volume of production which is constantly shrinking both in proportion to “what you don’t want but must pay for” outside of a shop or any establishment at least like a shop, and to “what you pay for but don’t get, e.g., ‘postal service’.” This new ratio should be a further factor in arriving at a correct figure for the current inflation of the pound sterling. We will venture this assertion, which is, admittedly, subjective: that during our lifetime we were better off with £200 than we are now with £2,000, and that, for us, the pound sterling is worth about 2/-.

The Evening Standard, announcing the advent of synthetic fertilisers made without sulphuric acid, says they are the result of ‘team-work.' “The team,” they say, “could not have timed their triumph more happily.” But did they?

A letter to the Irish Times claims that a price discount of 60 per cent. is in existence in Yugo-Slavia payable to nationals on purchase of consumer goods. We have one here—of Americans attending the Festival of Britain. (See London Transport announcements).

Lord Amwell writes to The Times to say inter alia that “Mr. Bevan and his friends ... do not understand the distinction between money, credit and consumable wealth.” The remark, which may or may not be true—"The Labour Party does not entertain the Social Credit objective” [vide Report (1922) of the Labour Party Committee composed of C. D. Burns, F. C. Clegg, G. D. H. Cole, H. Dalton, A. Greenwood, J. A. Hobson, F. Hodges, C. M. Lloyd, Sir Leo C. Money R. H. Tawney and S. Webb]—confirms an opinion about the Bevan revolt which is best expressed negatively: it is not the unaided conception of Mr. Bevan; it is not the undeserved windfall of advantage to the “Conservative” party which Mr. Brendan Bracken seems to think it is, and if it does lead to the rapid advancement of the central figure, which is the “tip” from the Beaverbrook stable, it bodes no good to anybody—unless the Trades Unionists wake up.

British” Railways (for OGPU methods against the Press) and the G.P.O. (for cheating in their dealings with telephone subscribers’ accounts) are under fire.

... in Paris in April, 1751, the Encyclopædia began to appear—that immense work of anti-religious propaganda, which was given all too much assistance by those of the Versailles Court and the worldly higher prelates who imagined that they could add to the pleasures of scepticism to the pleasures of social privilege and ecclesiastical preferment. They have had their parallel in our own day in the intellectual and educated people who have dabbled in parlour-Bolshevism, forgetting that the first duty of the educated is to understand and to be able to defend the basic structure of human society, and to know and love, if not their Aquinas, at the very least their Aristotle.

Of the two Editors of the Encyclopædia, d’Alembert is a more attractive figure than Diderot. It was d’Alembert who answered, when asked why he bothered so little with criticism and critics, by quoting the fable of an Italian writer Boccalini, which everybody, and in particular Editors, perhaps, should treasure. A traveller on his way let himself grow so irritated by the chirpings of grasshoppers that he went after them with his stick, trying to finish them off. He could not find them all, it grew late, and he lost his way; whereas, left to themselves, they would all have died anyway within the week.

The contributors to the Encyclopædia, who were carefully selected—for there was a great deal of window dressing, to prevent the real subversive purposes from standing out too clearly—covered a whole lifetime. The earliest contributor was a man born in 1674, and the youngest was Condorcet, who was born in 1743; and it is perhaps needless to say that he did not contribute to the first volume, for the Encyclopædia took sixteen years to come out.”—The Tablet, April 21.

Debt and Credit

In the House of Commons on April 19, Mr. Keenan asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer how much of the sum authorised out of the Consolidated Fund, the sum of £535 million, for the permanent annual charge for the National Debt, would be used for the reduction of the debt.

Mr. Jay: £20 million.

Mr. Granville asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer if he would consider the setting up of a judicial inquiry into the assessed value of the real credit of this country in the form of productive capacity and production, in order to see how this information could be used to lower prices, costs, rates, taxes, Death and Estate Duties.

Mr. Jay: No.
At Close Quarters

Books like At Close Quarters are useful additions to the indictment when their author possesses a standard of conduct, as is the case with Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Murray. The earlier chapters deal with World War I, when a very dangerous method of communications was employed: "It gradually became the habit of Gray, as Foreign Secretary, and later of Arthur Balfour, to exchange messages of an intimate and confidential nature with President Wilson through Colonel House. . . . Wiseman was gradually drawn into the political net . . . The Ambassadors knew what was going on and it is not unnatural that they displayed no particular enthusiasm for a procedure which continually by-passed them." Power in the hands of such as Wilson and Lloyd George was equally alarming. Of the President he says, "Anyone who has studied his Mexican policy will understand the remarkable parallel which the Russian situation presents, and realise that this is to him more than a passing political question, but a matter of principle . . . we are up against a new conception of foreign policy which no amount of argument will reconcile with, for instance, traditional British policy . . . my feeling is that he is probably right in not taking Reading into his confidence to the extent and in the manner the latter would like. It would inevitably arouse jealousy." Drummond commented that "His (Reading's) value is so great that he would be able probably to dictate his own conditions.

Meanwhile at home, "The officials of both parties are averse to an Election, the former because they feel that they would have to 'toe the line' behind Lloyd George, and the latter (Unionists) because they think it would make Lloyd George much too powerful." Lloyd George wanted an election. Sir William Wiseman said of Wilson, at the time, that he was "a pretty extreme radical, I am afraid, with that curious uninformed prejudice against the so-called governing class of England. I think he would prefer the Lloyd George of Limehouse rather than that of the Guildhall . . . distinguished Americans you mention get most of their information regarding labour conditions in England through a man called Buckler, an alarmist and more or less of a Bolshevist."

Towards the end of 1918, Asquith refused to agree to a General Election. The price offered was the Lord Chancellorship. Wiseman and Murray exchanged views: "If the two governments are to continue to pull together, it seems to me to be very important that there should be some sort of a check here upon the activities of Lloyd George. Who else is there besides House? It has been suggested that Brandeis and House might take it in turns to be over here." House said that Lloyd George was "really very difficult indeed to work with." And Murray lamented that he did not ask Asquith or Gray to be a member of the British Delegation. But "he lacked 'greatness' in matters of that nature."

Murray blames the deterioration of the Irish question first on Carson, then on the repressive measures of the Lloyd George government. The 'Black and Tans' followed, the Government called for a Report. "The Government—Winston Churchill and Lord Birkenhead being amongst its most prominent members—at once capitulated; turned a political somersault; and invited representatives of the Sinn Fein Party to a Conference." He contrasts this with the handling of the South African trouble earlier in the century. Asquith, Murray says, was willing to solve the Irish problem but the other politicians opposed him.

Meanwhile Lloyd George created a private secretariat, known as the 'Garden Suburb' and "rapidly acquired for himself from other Ministers powers and privileges which should never have left their hands." The resultant tendency was for foreign policy "to be conducted with no fixed principles, to lack of stability of purpose, and to become increasingly opportunistic and hand-to-mouth." But "the House thought Lloyd George could do no wrong, and was almost completely under his domination." Lord Curzon allowed his powers as Foreign Secretary to be so filched away that when Gray sent a suggestion about his successor as Ambassador to Washington, Curzon replied that he quite agreed but that the bearer of the message had "better go and consult the Prime Minister, by whom the appointment will be made. Curzon's answers gave me some insight into the 'working of the machine' in the days of the great Dictatorship." The advice was not followed.

Murray gives further interesting details about the Irish question, but his final chapter brings the work up to date (1948). He knew Roosevelt when he was Assistant Secretary to the Navy, when he was "cheery, warm-hearted and fiercely determined to get at the Hun by every means in his power . . . a junior member of the Government, nevertheless one of its most powerful assets for war-making purposes." This he certainly retained to the end, laying the trail for further wars. Indeed they do not seem to have been for long far from his mind.

In October, 1938, Murray attended a picnic with the President, "Bill Bullitt, the American Ambassador in France, and Senator Josh Lee . . . to Roosevelt's mind is was by that time a certainty that Germany definitely intended to launch another war upon civilization." The book concluded with the historian Trevelyan's commendation of Roosevelt, and other complements. But it should be read by those who desire further information on the points dealt with, and is commendably brief.

H. SWABEY.

Law No. 11

The following from Die Zeit of April 19 is informative: [Trs.]—The Russians speak of the unification of Germany and mean the annexation of the Western Zone, they speak of the German Democratic Republic and mean the dictatorship of bureaucracy, they speak of the ownership by the people and mean state-ownership, they speak of the Union of Farmers' Mutual Aid and mean the gradual expropriation of farmers, they speak of assuring the fair distribution of agricultural products and mean their requisition at impossible low prices.

The latest example of this dialectical ability is the Soviet Zone Law No. 11 of 30th January, 1951, which is supposed to regularize "advisory matters" and is described as a law to consolidate the organizational and financial arrangements of village life. In reality the Law is designed to introduce the Russian form of collective state farm viz. the Colchose.

In May last year the quotas of products to be supplied by small farms of 10 hectares were fixed so high that they could not be fulfilled. Fulfilment was indeed not the real purpose. The farmers were by this means to be brought under such great pressure—it was hoped—that spontaneously, unanimously and voluntarily they would agree to set up village
associations (Dorfgenossenschaften), otherwise state farms. Already in the winter of 1949/50, 524 tractor stations were established. Each station was to be equipped with 50 powerful tractors (40-60 H.P.), but this was not achieved. In the summer, they were equipped on the average with 22 tractors, many of which were not usable.

Now, it must be remembered, Stalin established the Colchose in Russia in 1929 without tractor stations and had a very bad experience; the terrible three years' famine of 1929/32 caused the death of millions. Today, the Russians dare not risk a similar development in the Russian Zone of Germany where the Western Zone is so near. So the development of the Colchose has had to be postponed. Only the unfilled demands on the farmers remained and a great number of them have been condemned to two years' imprisonment.

Thus, in order not to allow the idea of the Colchose in Germany to hibernate, Law No. 11 has been promulgated. It orders the establishment of a bureaucratic pyramid of advisers, otherwise Colchose leaders, the head of which is the Ministry of Agriculture. To correspond with the 750 tractor stations allowed for in the Five Years' Plan 750 agricultural advisers are to be nominated and placed in "vital districts." They are to be appointed by the Union of Farmers' Mutual Aid, i.e., by the Ministry and their choice is not to be based on technical knowledge but according to political reliability. The expenses of these advisers will be met by the village associations but the advisers are being financially consolidated. These leaders of the future Colchoses will be approved by the Ministry in Berlin, e.g., by the Russians themselves.

In this manner the organisational framework for the expropriation of the German farmers in the Eastern Zone has been established. The practical realisation of this prospect will depend, apart from foreign political developments, upon how soon the Russians succeed in equipping the tractor stations adequately. Step by step, Asia marches forward against the West and Europe quarrels like the shepherds over a pound of wool while the wolves pounce upon the flock.

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Mr. H. Wilson: I understand the output of protein fibre in 1951 will be of the order mentioned by my hon. Friend. As he was informed in answer to his Question on 12th April, only a small proportion of this fibre will, I understand, be made into suitings. The number of suits which this will make must, of course, depend upon what blend of wool and protein fibre is found to be technically satisfactory for suitings. This is a new fibre and its development continues.

Mr. Dodds: Would my right hon. Friend agree that this is a discovery with a great future, and would he state whether or not he is wearing today his famous monkeynut wool suit?

Mr. Wilson: Yes, I have already said I am, and I have not changed it since I gave that answer. I believe that this development, and a number of others, in synthetic fibres have great hopes of future development.

Mr. Shepherd: Is it true that the right hon. Gentleman was the centre of attraction in Paris when he went out arrayed in his suit?

Squadron Leader Burden: Will the Minister give an undertaking that this monkeynut fibre will not be described as animal fibre when used alone or in conjunction with wool or other fibres?

Mr. William Ross: Can the President tell us how the cost of this fibre compares with the present cost of wool, and also the percentage of this fibre that is now being produced in Scotland?

Mr. Wilson: Until it is in full production I do not think it will be possible to get exact costings, but I understand from Imperial Chemical Industries that it will be very cheap in relation to natural wool production.

North Atlantic (Supreme Commander)

Mr. Churchill (Woodford): . . . Let me return to the first point I am making, that there is no need for a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic. That is the point which I submit to the House, and, not only to the House, but to the Committee. The overwhelming weight of British naval opinion supports the view that there is no need to appoint a Supreme Commander of the Atlantic.

Admiral Andrew Cunningham used the expression that it would be "a fifth wheel in the coach." Admiral Tovey, who commanded the Home Fleet for a long time, and had a very important action at sea, and Lord Cork and Orrery have spoken in the same sense. I have here a letter, which I am authorised to read, from Sir Percy Noble, who has not hitherto expressed himself in public, but who has unequalled credentials, because he managed the business himself with success last time. It says:

"My dear Mr. Churchill, From experience in the last war—first in command of the Western Approaches and then as one of the Combined Chiefs of Staff—it is my opinion that there is no need for a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic at all. In 1942, when I was at Liverpool, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound discussed this very question with me, and we agreed that such a form of command was not only unnecessary, but might (and probably would) impose an undue strain on the already very complex system of wireless and other communications.

"When I was in Washington in 1943 the whole of our machinery for controlling the North Atlantic convoys was again re-examined by Admiral King and myself with Admiral Sir Henry Moore, who was at that time the Vice-Chief of the Naval Staff in London. Had it then been considered wise to introduce a change in the system, it is probable that a British officer would have been selected for this Supreme Command as Britain and Canada were providing almost the whole of the escorting forces in that area. However, we decided that no change was necessary.

"Great Britain is 'the receiving end' of the Atlantic life-line and the jumping-off place for forces entering Europe.

"In view of certain statements to the contrary which have appeared in the Press, I feel it is worth mentioning that in my experience no serious confusion ever arose in regard to the exercise of control by the methods we employed in the last war."

That is not an opinion which should be dismissed in contemptuous terms. It is not an opinion which should be ignored, and I am sure our American friends with whom Admiral Noble worked so intimately will give it full weight in considering this matter now under discussion between us. My first submission, therefore, to the Committee is that there is no need for the appointment of a Supreme Commander in the Atlantic.

Let me now approach the question from another angle. We all rejoiced when General Eisenhower was appointed Supreme Commander of the Armies of the Atlantic Powers. There is no man in the world who can do that job so well. Although the American troops under his command will only be a fraction of the whole of the European Forces which are needed—and far less than the French Army which, if France and Europe are to live, must be reborn—yet everyone was contented, and have been more contented every day since his appointment. It was a great shock however to most of the 50 millions in our island when they learned that a United States admiral was also to be put in command of the Atlantic and of a large proportion of our Fleet employed there.

During the war the life-lines across the Atlantic fell in an overwhelming degree to the care of the Admiralty. We were always most anxious for the Americans to extend their zone eastwards towards us, even during the first two years of the struggle when we were alone and they gave us magnificent help. But in 1942, after they had come into the war, their major theatre in that war—I say that war—was inevitably and rightly in the Pacific. They suffered terrible losses in the massacre of shipping through their own ineptitude of dealing with the U-boat. The "U-boat paradise"—the Germans called it—took a terrible toll of their own Eastern coast in 1942, and hard pressed though we were ourselves, we were very glad to send them all the help we could in creating their convoy and escort system. They did not suffer to any serious extent from the mining danger.

But the climax of the U-boat war was reached in 1943, and during this struggle nearly the whole business was managed and the burden borne by Britain and Canada. In fact it was by agreements reached between the British and American Governments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and between the Admiralties, that Britain and Canada assumed full responsibility for the protection of all trade convoys, apart from American troop convoys, in the North Atlantic, and the American naval contribution fell by agreement to a little more than 2 per cent. of the total. This was the period when the U-boat attack was decisively broken by all the means that were available.

We have become relatively, I regretfully admit, a weaker Power since those days—not only on the seas. Nevertheless, we have the experience, we have the art. Our latent resources in trained sea-faring personnel are out of all proportion to what we have presented in recent years. We need, of course,
American aid. So does the whole world. We need aidparticularly in the air at the reception end, but I can find no valid reason for subordinating Great Britain in the Atlantic Command. The responsibility should be shared on equal terms and with equal status between the two chief naval Powers. That is my submission.

... No one can doubt that it was a great shock and even an affront—quite unintended by the United States—to the whole nation when, following on an American general's supreme command in Europe, which we all welcome, we were told that an American admiral would have the supreme command of the Atlantic. It was also a shock to see that our Prime Minister had so little knowledge and even less feeling in the matter. However, the United States themselves should consider the sentiments of others in executing their great mission of leading the resistance of the free world against Communist aggression and infiltration. It should not be possible for their enemies to say that they are grasping the supreme command everywhere—on the land, in the air, on the sea. Moreover, it is not true; that is not their wish or their desire.

To create this superfluous supreme command of the Atlantic would be a psychological mistake, making things harder than they are already. Of course, it plays right into the hands of the Communist propagandists and their fellow travellers who declare, in their lying fashion, that we have all been bought up by Wall Street and the almighty dollar. Why make them this present in the discussion when the matter is not, as I have said, of real and fundamental importance? It would, I think, have been a natural thing in sentiment, and also on practical and technical arguments, to have shared the Atlantic Command with equal status between the Admiralty and the United States Navy Department.

... I have heard the argument used—and it is even suggested in the last senence of paragraph 28 in the White Paper—that we shall get much more out of the Americans by letting them have the command even though it is mainly nominal. That, I think, is a train of thought unworthy of the dignity of both our countries. It implies that the Americans are willing to be fooled by being flattered and that the British have no pride if they can get more help. We should dismiss such arguments from our thoughts. But still we can see the traces of them on the last page of the White Paper. The issue, I think, should be settled between comrades and brothers in common danger and on a self-respecting moral basis, and with the sole desire and resolve to find the best way of winning victory and salvation from our dangers.

It is true, no doubt, that the United States has a larger fleet than we have—double, we are told—in ships in commission, and a great preponderance in the air. Also, they have wisely and carefully kept in "mothball" many scores of war vessels which we have improvidently scrapped, sold or given away. Thus, they have a larger material reserve. Broadly speaking, it can be said that the Supreme Command in war goes naturally with the size of the forces involved, and I accepted and affirmed that rule in the late struggle.

... I was saying that, broadly speaking, the supreme command in war goes naturally with the larger forces. I think that may be taken as the rule. Nevertheless, in the campaign of Tunis we did not hesitate to allow our armies to remain under General Eisenhower's command, although we had 11 divisions in action to the Americans' four. On the other hand when, later in that year, the United States asked for an American Supreme Commander to have control both of the "Overlord" campaign in France and also of the Mediterranean, I refused to agree, and although there were tense arguments the matter was settled agreeably, as so many other matters were settled between us, and it was settled without any ill-feeling.

How was this accomplished? It was accomplished by the personal relations between the Heads of Governments and, of course, based upon the continued comradeship and intercourse of our Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee. . . .

... Now I come to the existing organisation for the Atlantic Pact. The costly error was made when the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff Committee was dissolved of sweeping this away, of breaking up this organisation. It was a disaster. We speak the same language; we have many other ties. What a pity it was to let go that organisation which served us so well, and which carried the direction of war between allies to the highest and most smooth-working efficiency ever reached in history.

The Prime Minister told us that he regretted the abolition of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee. But why did he not put up a fight about it? Surely this was an occasion when he might have crossed the Atlantic and had a personal talk with the President on the top level. Keeping the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee in existence need not have prevented a co-existent instrument with other powers on it for the purpose of executing the Atlantic Pact. Half the misunderstandings which have been so dangerous as to Anglo-American relations during the Korean War would, I believe, have been avoided had there been a regular and constant meeting, as there were in the bygone years, between our two Chiefs of Staffs Committees. We cannot afford in the dangers in which we now stand to make mistakes like this. By mismanaging these affairs the responsible Ministers may bring untold miseries upon the hard-working helpless millions whose fate lies in their hands.

What organisation have we got now to replace the contact between the President and the Prime Minister and the continued daily intercourse of the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee? We are told of a standing group of Powers under the Atlantic Pact. This group which deals with the forces deployed under that Pact consists of three men—a French General, a British airman and an American vice-admiral. There is not a British sailor on it at all; not at the head of the Fleets nor in this higher organisation. But surely the carrying of food and supplies from which Britain lives, carrying the armies of the New World to Europe, and maintaining them there across the broad oceans and through the narrow seas—surely that is a business in which sailors and merchant seamen and ships of all kinds, and naval skill and knowledge have their part.

I hope that the House will carefully consider many of the arguments that I have ventured to put before them, and I hope that we shall not allow this matter to rest as a thing definitely settled. I hope myself that the mistakes that have been made will be recovered. . . .

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