for instance had you a long custom to apply the income inconsistently with the Trust. Deed the passage of time would not now have given you a right to continue to do so.

"There are in fact two ways of altering Trusts of Charities—one by a scheme under the Charitable Trusts Acts or made by the Courts of Law, the other by a scheme under the Endowed Schools Acts. The second is the method adopted in this case, and these Acts give a very wide power to change trusts, and when the scheme is approved by His Majesty in Council it takes effect as an Act of Parliament, and can and will operate so as to abolish the original trust entirely.

"The Minister hopes that with this explanation you and your churchwardens will see that nothing illegal or unconstitutional is being attempted in this case.

"The old school itself is not in the scheme and will not be affected by it."

It will be seen that the Law is in a fluid state when it can be so easily altered. Referring to criminal law, Blackstone wrote: "It should be founded upon principles that are permanent, uniform and universal; and always conformable to the dictates of truth and justice, the feelings of humanity and the indelible rights of mankind." Stability is the opposite pole to present day procedure, which may rather be compared to the many violations of common law in earlier times. For instance, statutes kept adding capital crimes to the statute book until there were 160 capital offences. The barbarous law against heretics in 1401 was a violation of the common law, and eventually had to give way to ancient practice. But Blackstone made a remark (before the industrial revolution had had much effect) which may well have made "reformers" suspicious of his value to them: "Part only of society was sufficient to provide for the necessary subsistence of all; and leisure was given to others to cultivate the human mind."

While the "British" are busy handing away and destroying their heritage, a reminder comes from India of the benefits we are losing. Vigil is a New Delhi weekly which at one time had an advertisement on its back cover for American broadcasting implements which aided the liberation. It is therefore in no "reactionary" spirit that the following appeared within the cover: "It is one of the ironies of our times that the British-trained judiciary stands today as a bulwark of the people's freedom against the encroachments of Congress Government." This would suggest, at the very least, that there is, or was, a heritage.

REALISTIC CONSTITUTIONALISM
(Notes for an Address to the Constitutional Research Association at Brown's Hotel, Mayfair, May 8, 1947)
by C. H. DOUGLAS
PARLIAMENT


North Atlantic Defence (Supreme Naval Commander)

Mr. Churchill (by Private Notice) asked the Prime Minister whether he has any statement to make about the appointment of a Supreme Sea Commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir. The North Atlantic Treaty Defence Committee have agreed that there should be a Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic and that he should be an American. An American officer has already been nominated for this appointment, and it is expected that an announcement will be made on this matter very shortly.

Mr. Churchill: Were there no British admirals capable of discharging these functions; does not Great Britain lie at the very key of all communications across the Atlantic with Europe; are not the sea approaches to our island in the event of submarine attack vital to our life; and how is it, with our experience, which is longer and wider than that of any other country, and when we have all agreed with so much pleasure that General Eisenhower should command the Armed Forces on land, that we should have resigned any claim that we may be thought to have to the command of the sea on the Atlantic?

...The Prime Minister: In an organisation of a number of Powers, as in the North Atlantic Treaty organisation, an appointment is made by those Powers. No Power has an absolute right to dictate its views as to any appointment. I understand that the proposition that an American admiral should be appointed was generally acceptable.

Mr. Churchill: Does this not argue a great decline in our influence and in the esteem in which we are held by other countries with whom we are in the most friendly relations? Did the right hon. Gentleman make any effort to put our claims forward in a sober and earnest fashion, or did he simply accept the fact that we are to be brushed out of the way in this matter which, of all others, apart altogether from history and tradition, is vital to our existence.

Hon. Members: Answer.

The Prime Minister: Hon. Members must give me a moment to get up; I am perfectly prepared to answer. This matter was, naturally, very fully discussed, but I say again that this is a matter for agreement. The general conclusion was that this was the best appointment. I cannot at the moment say whether there was an elaborate discussion or not, but in any international organisation of this kind, of a number of—

Mr. John Hay: Where is British leadership?

Mr. James Hudson: Not over there, on the other side of the House.

The Prime Minister: In an organisation of a number of countries, it is not possible for one country to insist on its right to some particular office. It is a matter for discussion.

Mr. Churchill: It was possible, anyhow, not very long ago, for one country to sink 525 German U-boats compared with 174 by the United States. No one is going to argue that I am hostile to the United States, but I do not think that our country ought to have fallen so far into walks of humility.

Mr. John Hynd: Without endorsing what the Leader of the Opposition has said about the question of substantiating our particular claim, or the credit of any country, or any prior rights of any country in any field, does the Prime Minister not consider that there is a very important psychological question to be considered here, a question which ought to be appreciated by the Americans as much as by ourselves? The world at large is beginning to think that there is something wrong when the Americans have leadership of the Atlantic Forces on land, leadership of the Korean Forces and now, presumably, are to have leadership of yet another Force. I am not arguing the merits or demerits of any claim that any individual American may have, but this is a matter of collective force and world psychology. Will the Prime Minister look into it?

Mr. Somersde de Chair: If it is too late to make any further suggestions about the appointment of a supreme Allied naval commander, will the Prime Minister see that the claims of the British Commonwealth to hold the appointment of Allied air commander are considered, when this matter comes up?

Mr. J. Hudson: Will the Prime Minister take into account that as we have committed ourselves to the full principle of collective force and world psychology in this matter, we may be thought to have to the command of the sea on the Atlantic?

The Prime Minister: I will certainly look into the matter. I cannot say more than that. As I understand it, they have selected the admiral who seems most suitable for this matter. [HON. MEMBERS: "Name."] The name I cannot say. [HON. MEMBERS: "Who are 'they'?""] "They" are the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The name has not yet been announced. I will take into full consideration everything that the right hon. Gentleman has said, and will look into the matter.

Sir H. Williams: Who represented us?

Mr. Churchill: It is late in the day for the Prime Minister of this country to look into the matter. Might I ask him whether he was not consulted beforehand?

Hon. Members: Answer.

The Prime Minister: Yes, Sir, the matter has been very fully considered. I am saying that I will reconsider it and look into it.

Mr. Churchill: I am much obliged to the right hon. Gentleman for saying that he will look into it again and see what can be done.

Captain Ryder: Before this matter is finally decided, can we have a chance to debate the nature of this appoint-
ment? To whom is this man to be responsible? What is to be the extent of his command, and the position of the Commanders-in-Chief of the Home Fleet and Coastal Command? Can we have an assurance that our extensive merchant fleet will not pass out of British control?

The Prime Minister: All these matters will be properly covered when the details of the appointment are announced.

Mr. Thurtle: Has not the Leader of the Opposition, by raising this issue, implied lack of faith in our great American allies—[HON. MEMBERS: “No.”]—and is it not deplorable that there should be divisions between America and ourselves over a point like this?

Mr. Collick: May I ask the Prime Minister whether any British admiral was nominated for this position?

Mr. Boothby: The Prime Minister said just now that he understood that the Americans had selected an admiral whom they considered most suitable. [HON. MEMBERS: “No.”] I would like an assurance that that answer did not imply that we ourselves had no say in the choice or selection at all, because that implication seemed to give rise to the answer which he gave.

The Prime Minister: Of course, we had our say.

Mr. Chetwynd: In regard to the land Forces, was it not obviously a case of the best man for the job, and will not my right hon. Friend make it clear that the appointment of a naval commander will also be on that principle—the best man for the job, regardless of nationality?

Major Legge-Bourke: Will the Prime Minister bear in mind that his apparent aloofness this afternoon can only give the impression that he has never taken a personal interest in this matter? Will he give an assurance that he will make this his personal business and do his best to ensure that Great Britain is properly represented?

Sir R. Acland: Is it not a little strange that a statesman who so loudly proclaims his belief in European unity should protest so violently when a decision with which he disagrees is reached by a group of nations, many of them European?

Aliens (Naturalisation Sponsors)

Lieut.-Colonel Bromley-Davenport asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department whether, in view of the fact that it is already compulsory for aliens seeking naturalisation to arrange for the prior insertion of advertisements to that effect in the Public Press of this country, he will arrange that such advertisements shall include the names of the sponsors of the aliens who seek naturalisation.

Mr. Ede: I do not think that any public interest would be served by the publication of the names of sponsors.

House of Commons: February 26, 1951.

Supreme Commander Atlantic

The Prime Minister: With your permission, Mr Speaker, I desire to make a statement.

I wish to make a short statement on the question of the appointment of a Supreme Commander Atlantic. As I promised when the matter was raised in the House on 22nd February, I have again looked into this matter of the command organisation of the North Atlantic Ocean. The House will appreciate that this matter forms only one part of the general plans which are taking shape within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation under the direction of the Standing Group, which comprises representatives of the United States, United Kingdom and France.

One of the most important features of these plans in relation to the North Atlantic Ocean is an agreement on the system of command which will obtain in war. Preliminary arrangements must, however, necessarily be made in peace-time in order to ensure quick and easy transition to war if the need arises.

The area which will be under the Supreme Commander is the North Atlantic Ocean, excluding the Mediterranean and British European coastal waters. This ocean will include an eastern and western area. The eastern area, which for us will be the most vital and crucial, will be under the command of a British admiral, in association with the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force. This British admiral will be the Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet — an appointment at present held by Admiral Sir Philip Vian. In his capacity of Commander-in-Chief of the Eastern Atlantic, he would, in time of war, exercise command not only over British Forces, but also over Forces of the United States Navy and those of other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers. Conversely, the American admiral commanding the Western Atlantic would, likewise control British and other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Forces.

As the House will no doubt realise, the whole problem, embracing both command and areas in the North Atlantic Ocean, has for some time past been fully discussed in all its details, not only by the British and American Chiefs of Staff, but also by the representatives of the other Powers interested in the Atlantic, namely France, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, Holland, Portugal and Iceland. In the light of the experience of the last war it has been agreed on both sides of the Atlantic that it is of the utmost importance that an overall Supreme Commander for the North Atlantic Ocean should be appointed in order that the naval and Air Forces specifically assigned to him, not only from this country and from the United States, but from the other North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers, should be used to the best advantage throughout the whole of these waters.

The outstanding lesson of the Battle of the Atlantic in the late war was that the Atlantic is one battlefield in which the mobile threat represented by the submarine must be matched by an equally flexible system of defence. Too often during the last war, we had to wait until serious losses had been incurred, or great opportunities missed while discussion went on in Washington and London about the re-disposition of naval or Air Forces. Thus all our experience at that time proved that there is a need for a single command in the Atlantic which can allocate and re-allocate Forces to meet the shifting threat as it develops. One of the principle duties of the Supreme Commander will be to move Forces to the area where the danger is greatest and to make representations, when the need arises, for the particular requirements of the Atlantic in a global war.

In considering the nationality of a Supreme Commander His Majesty's Government and their Service advisers have had a number of factors to take into account. There is the question of the relative sizes of the various naval and Air Forces that the other Atlantic Powers will contribute to the defence of the area. In this connection we have to remember (Continued on page 6).
From Week to Week

If or when Dean Acheson is removed from the American presidential cabinet, will he become the invitation of the “British” Prime Minister to replace Mr. Ernest Bevin at the “British” Foreign Office.

No Minister of the Crown in our lifetime has been submitted to such a campaign of vilification, from so unanimous a source, for so long, successuflly or unsuccessfully, as the man Mr. Churchill left behind him to conduct the foreign policy of once-Great Britain. (We do not refer to him as the man with Mr. Herbert Morrison’s uncanny impudence, to which we thus draw attention as we might to the scarcely audible rattle which distinguishes the snake from less dangerous reptiles). Whether it ever comes to light, and whether it matters or not at this late hour what it was (or is), there must be something more than a little dangerous to the early or complete fulfilment of Wall Street and Pitt Street aspirations in Mr. Bevin’s tenure of the Foreign Secretaryship. It may be only that he knows more than is thought to be healthy, though having regard to the ease with which any opinion not serviceable to those in control of the world’s movements is now suppressed, we doubt it. It doesn’t look as though there would be any more Oudendykes, Buchanans, or Walter Pages. The breed is extinct, and the gossip-writers of anti-anti-Americanism do not repair the loss, though they do provide fuel for hysterias of the kind to which the Americans are becoming susceptible—which may lead anywhere but to the place we desire to reach.

Truth deserves to be congratulated on having succeeded in introducing the inflation question if only by a back door. The latest issue to hand carries a ‘tall’ story of a youth charged with having evaded the air-ration laws by drilling some holes in his breathing tube, thus increasing his allowance of oxygen. He pleads (as we have long pleaded) that there is plenty of air about; but is fined by a not inconsiderate magistrate £500,000. This means that he cannot take his ‘girl’ to the ‘flicks’ without exchanging the comparative luxury of the £300,000 seats for something cheaper. Our readers will appreciate that the date of this distressing incident in the life of a great nation must have been before the revaluation of the currency now still in prospect.

Perhaps some of Truth’s readers thought the story funny. Frankly, we didn’t (for reasons stated). The Inflation of 1951 has begun.

To judge from the distinct note of irritation in The Times Literary Supplement’s review of Oxford Studies in the Price Mechanism, at what is happening in ‘not-respectable’ economic circles, the re-examination of Douglas’s propositions conducted intensively at Oxford some two or three years ago may have borne some fruit.—But perhaps this is the fruit. We have said before that this problem of costs and prices is the problem of the Sphinx, which man has to solve or die. The core of the problem is cost. “Either the industrial-technological system provides lower unit costs or it is valueless. It is not an attractive system, per se. If it provides lower unit costs these ought to provide lower unit prices, i.e., higher purchasing-power per monetary unit.

“We are more than ever, if possible, convinced that a falling price level, without loss to producers and entrepreneurs is the very core of social and industrial pacification. And we are equally convinced by thirty years’ specialised experience and observation that the coterie which is at the core of world unrest knows it too, and is determined that at whatever cost, extending to the complete destruction of civilisation, and even of the terrestrial globe, it will not have that solution, which would automatically wrest power from it as nothing else would.”

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Thus the Sunday Express, March 4. The list of “attractions” while not exhaustive is surely sufficiently comprehensive to explain why there were nearly 100 applicants for each of the last three vacant Tory seats.

“The ability to read of pupils of 11 years and 15 years old was found [in 1948], on the average, to be behind that of their fellows of 10 years earlier by 12 and 22 months respectively.” But illiteracy does not account for the universality of corrupt and incompetent government. The Garden of Eden was illiterate before the Fall.

Well Trained

“Students armed with lists of questions on personal savings, among other subjects, were sent out from the London School of Economics, the point being to see how they got on as interviewers compared with professional investigators. Of course, the fledglings met with more refusals, but still, they managed remarkably well. securing completed interviews from 70 per cent. of their calls. This seems to show that, however it may be with the students, the public is already pretty well trained.” (Liverpool Daily Post, March 1.)
The Way to End the Soviet Menace

The Memorandum, of which the first part appeared last week, is by Captain Arthur Rogers, certain of whose earlier memoranda on the Russian question have been published by the Social Crediter.

(Conclusion)

The Russians now outside the Soviet sphere fall into two general categories: the relatively small number who became exiles at the time of the revolution and the great number who have left their country since 1941. Of the latter, there are hundreds of thousands, most being former soldiers who succeeded in escaping the consequences of the Yalta Agreement, whereby it was intended that they should be handed over to the Soviet authorities, to be killed, after being assembled by the allied authorities in western Europe. Thus, among the Russians now in the west, including Great Britain, there are many of mature age, some having administrative experience, and still more who are quite young but the best judges of the form of persuasion most suited to their recent army comrades. These Russians have their own organisations and formulated policies, both for the restoration of their country to the comity of nations and for its government when the Soviet tyrants have fallen. They are neither extremist or reactionary. They cannot bring their plans to fruition without outside support, but no such support has yet been forthcoming. They are not recognised or consulted, but studiously ignored, although ready and anxious to help.

Without a reversal of the present policy towards the Russian exiles, there can be no hope of gaining the initiative in world affairs or of there being any ending to the present tension except in a war which would prove an unqualified disaster to one and all.

It must be realised that a formal and official recognition of a Free Russia Organisation would have to be carefully timed—although the necessary preparation ought to be made without delay. Meanwhile, these Russians can be of great use. They have means of communicating with their compatriots which are now far greater than at any time since the Revolution. They would like to tell their own people in Russia—if only it were true—that the Western Powers are their friends and seek to become their liberators. They are certain that this news would be joyfully received and that the people of Russia, once convinced of its truth, would join the enemies of Communism at the first opportunity. The maintenance of their own position in the Soviet Union could thus be made the first concern of the Red dictators, who would for that reason lose their present initiative in relation to the Western Powers and their stranglehold over the countries they have overrun since the Yalta Agreement. Later, but perhaps very quickly, the Soviet menace would become a thing of the past even in Russia itself.

There are important reasons—strategic, economic and political—why the Governments of the British Empire should make the moves advocated here without waiting upon any hesitancy that may be shown by associated Powers, which is to be expected in some cases for purely domestic reasons.

Strategically, vital British interests are in far greater and more immediate danger than those of the other Great Powers now ranged against the Soviet dictators. The Middle Eastern gap in the defensive ring leaves exposed to Soviet "liberation," direct or indirect, the oil-fields upon which depends the mo-
PARLIAMENT. (Continued from page 3.)

that these Forces are represented not only by the active Forces, but also by potential reserve Forces. We have also to recognise that while the defence of the sea approaches to these islands, and indeed, of the whole of the Eastern Atlantic, is quite literally a matter of life and death to us, our American Allies are also concerned with the defence of the Western Atlantic.

The House should not forget, moreover, that despite our great naval traditions, the defence of the North Atlantic ocean cannot possibly, in a future war, be undertaken by this country alone. The defence of this great sea area, like the defence of the whole western world, can only be successfully maintained by all the North Atlantic Powers acting in close concert.

Taking these factors into consideration, the Chiefs of Staff submitted recommendations to His Majesty's Government on the command system in the North Atlantic ocean—and I refer now not only to the Supreme Commander, but to the area commanders serving under him—which would best meet the overall needs of Atlantic defence. The arrangements which were recommended will ensure not only that responsibility for the home defence of these islands, including British coastal waters, will remain firmly in British hands, but that a British admiral will be responsible, under the overall command of the American Supreme Commander, for the command of the Eastern Atlantic. The Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, has been designated as Commander-in-Chief, Home Station, and will be in sole command of all naval operations in British home waters. The present Commander-in-Chief is Admiral Sir Arthur Power.

His Majesty's Government are satisfied, that, in time of war, the proposed arrangements, not only for command, but also for the division of responsibility, will ensure both the defence of these islands and the fullest participation of all the North Atlantic Powers over the whole of the North Atlantic ocean.

In peace, there is no question of our placing any of our naval or air forces in the Atlantic under the Command of the proposed Supreme Commander. If, however, these Forces are to be fully ready for their war-time role, they will necessarily have to undergo a measure of combined training in time of peace. For this purpose, the Supreme Commander will assume command for the period of exercises needed to carry out this combined training. He will be served both in peace and war by a fully integrated staff, in which we will be represented at all levels. The Deputy Supreme Commander will be British.

For these reasons, I am entirely satisfied that the Government were right in giving their approval to the proposed appointment of an American admiral as Supreme Commander.

Mr. Churchill: The very complicated statement which has just been read to us will, as I am sure the Prime Minister will agree, require study and consideration, and it may well be that we shall find it necessary to raise the matter in debate, in which case it would be a subject for further discussion through the usual channels. I do not propose to embark on any comment upon it today...

... Captain Ryder: It seems to me that the Admiralty will, in fact, lose operational control over the Home Fleet. Could the Prime Minister say whether I am right or wrong?

The Prime Minister: I think the hon. and gallant Mem-

ber is wrong. I read an interesting letter which I think he wrote on the question of convoys, and so on. They will be under the operational control of the Fleet and of our own British admiral. It is the general co-ordination which is taken by the Supreme Commander. The operational control, in home waters and in the Eastern Atlantic, as I pointed out, will be under a British admiral.

Mr. Emrys Hughes: In view of the very wide experience which the Germans have had of submarine warfare, will the Prime Minister bear in mind that the Germans, in view of the fact that we are re-arming them, are equally entitled to a say? Will he consider the claims of a German admiral now under lock and key?

... Mr. Eden: Could I ask for some clarification of the question asked by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Merton and Morden (Captain Ryder,) which is important? As I understood the statement of the Prime Minister, the complete control of the movement of all the Forces under the Supreme Commander will rest with the Supreme Commander; that being so, how can it be true to say that we have complete operational control over our own Fleet?

The Prime Minister: First of all, the general control of Forces will, naturally, be decided by the Chiefs of Staff of whatever the organisation is at the time of war. At the moment it is by the representatives on the Standing Group. Then there is the admiral who is in command of the Atlantic area. His main business is to carry out the main strategic decisions. The actual operations are under the admirals in command of the particular areas—the Western Atlantic and the Eastern Atlantic. As I said, the coastal areas are under a separate control. Therefore, I think the right hon. Gentleman will realise that while the overall strategic command is under the admiral of the Atlantic Command, the actual operational control will be under the commander of the particular part of the Atlantic.

Mr. Churchill: But the Admiral of the Atlantic can transfer Forces from one of these area commands to another?

The Prime Minister: Yes, I think that is quite essential. [HON. MEMBERS: “Oh!”]. The right hon. Gentleman will

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remember that in the last war there were very heavy submarine attacks in the Caribbean, and that Forces were transferred from our commands here to assist. Then the situation changed and we did not at that time, I think, get back our Forces in time because of the rather elaborate machinery. The whole purpose of this is to facilitate the switching of Forces where necessary. It will be recalled that the Forces with which we are dealing are not an exclusive British Fleet in the Eastern Atlantic and an exclusive American Fleet in the Western Atlantic; they are composite Forces drawn from all the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Powers.

Mr. Churchill: In the late war all these matters were regulated by discussions between Governments after careful consideration by the combined Chiefs of Staff. I am not aware that any very great difficulty occurred, except the difficulty inherent in the disposition of Forces which were not equal to the many needs and demands made upon them. But now the right hon. Gentleman, if I understood him aright—and I had not intended to develop this now—intends to support a policy which would give an American Supreme Commander the power to transfer powerful Forces from this coast to the other side of the Atlantic, or make other dispositions of that character. Nothing like that ever existed in the late war and never could have been accepted, I think, in view of the fact that our life depends upon the maintenance of the sea approaches whereas, though the United States may suffer a great deal, her life is unaffected by them.

The Prime Minister: This will take place under the general direction of the Standing Group which is, in effect, the equivalent of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But it is proposed to give power to a Supreme Commander. As I am advised, the experience is that in these matters a Supreme Commander needs to, and always does consult, but it has been put up to us by all our advisers that there is need for this essential power, in wartime, of being able to transfer Forces.

... Mr. Churchill: But this Standing Group has now apparently replaced the combined Chiefs of Staff, who were in such close and intimate relation and enabled these matters to be transacted. Is not that so?

The Prime Minister: No, the Standing Group are in intimate touch with the combined Chiefs of Staff. [Interruption.] Be quiet, hold your tongue. Go and talk to the Italians. It is all you are fit to do. [Interruption.] Does not the right hon. Gentleman think that it was a great disaster when the combined Chiefs of Staff organisation was terminated?

The Prime Minister: I quite agree. The right hon. Gentleman knows that that was not due to our action. We are trying to build this up....

... Mr. Harrison: Is my right hon. Friend aware that the manner in which this question was raised last week has caused more anti-American feeling in this country than anything the Communists have done for the last three years?

Commander Noble: Could the Prime Minister say whether the British Chiefs of Staff put forward the proposal he has just told us about before or after the decision had actually been made?

The Prime Minister: I really do not understand what the hon. and gallant Gentleman means. What does he mean? Is he suggesting that this was imposed upon us? This was a matter fully discussed by the Chiefs of Staff, by our technical advisers, on both sides, and this was the proposal put up to us. I resent the kind of suggestion made by the hon. and Gallant Member.

Mr. Paton: Would it be consistent with any scheme of integrated defence for every country to claim the right to do what it likes with its own?

Mr. Henry Strauss: Did His Majesty's Government ever put forward the name of a British Admiral for this post; and, if so, on what date?

The Prime Minister: The matter was considered first as one of general principle—

Air Commodore Harvey: Answer the question.

The Prime Minister: That was decided first of all, before any question of personalities. I should like to appeal to the House—[Hon. Members: “Answer.”] I am answering.

Mr. Braine: The country wants an answer.

The Prime Minister: I quite agree that the country wants an answer. I do not know whether hon. Members opposite heard my reply. The question was first of all discussed from the point of view of arriving at certain general principles with regard to the commands, and the question of names came up afterwards. If I might, I would ask everybody in the House to realise that we do not, I imagine, want to create rifts between allies, but I must say that some of the questions from all parts of the House seem to be directed to trying to make the greatest amount of trouble and the greatest divisions.

Mr. Wyatt: Is it not a fact that there will be more American ships than British ships under the command of the Supreme Commander Atlantic; and is it not therefore deplorable to make political capital out of this appointment, particularly as we may be expecting ourselves to get the command in the Mediterranean?

Sir Ian Fraser: To avoid any possibility of misunderstanding, which, I think would be hurtful, can the right hon.
Gentlemen make clear one sentence in the statement which he read out, where he attributed some part of the responsibility for the choice of Supreme Commander to the British Chiefs of Staff? Were they called in to advise as to disposition to be made under the Supreme Commander, or were they called in to advise who should be the Supreme Commander?

Mr. Attlee: The Government take full responsibility for their actions and I am never willing to shelter myself behind my official advisers, but I think it right to say in this matter I have throughout acted on the recommendations of the Chiefs of Staff.

Several Hon. Members rose

Mr. Speaker: I think it would be better if, before asking all these supplementary questions, hon. Members read the statement. Then we might know more about it than hon. Members obviously do now.

Mr. Glenvil Hall: I beg to give notice that at a convenient opportunity I shall raise this matter on the Adjournment...

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Israeli—Jordan Frontier (Incidents)

Major Legge-Bourke asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he is aware that since the first week in February Israeli troops have carried out seven raids into the Hashemite Kingdom of the Jordan, involving on one occasion the murder of 10 persons, of whom five were children; and, in view of these acts of aggression what steps His Majesty’s Government propose taking under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty.

Mr. Ernest Davies: His Majesty’s Government are aware that such incidents have taken place, but there are conflicting reports whether members of the Israel armed forces or other persons operating from Israel were responsible. These incidents were reported to the Mixed Armistice Commission and at its meeting on 14th February complaints regarding these particular occurrences were disposed of by agreement. In addition, a resolution was passed condemning such outrages and requesting the Governments concerned to endeavour to prevent further incidents. It was also agreed that the Deputy Chiefs of Staff of Israel and Jordan should meet to discuss measures to improve frontier control and thereby to avoid a recurrence of such breaches of the Armistice Agreement. His Majesty’s Government do not consider that any action is called for under the Anglo-Jordan Treaty and no request for such action has been made by the Jordan Government.

Major Legge-Bourke: Would the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that an impression is being steadily built up now in Transjordan that His Majesty’s Government are weakening in their adherence to the Treaty, and that this impression is having the disastrous effect of encouraging these incidents all along the frontier?

Mr. Davies: If that impression exists in Jordan there is no justification whatever for it. I hope that the fact that this Question has been put and answered will assist in disabusing the minds of those who hold that view.

Mr. Janner: Will my hon. Friend point out the necessity of not presenting one-sided matters to this House? Is he aware that in recent months some 20 Israeli citizens have been murdered by raiders from the other side? Will he not agree that the best way of dealing with these matters is to allow the Jordan and Israeli people to decide these matters for themselves by agreement, as they have done recently, and that we should encourage that process?

Mr. Davies: It is not for His Majesty’s Government to prejudge these matters, which come before the Mixed Armistice Commission. In their view it is far better that it should be for the Mixed Armistice Commission to decide.

Major Legge-Bourke: Is it not a fact that the Mixed Armistice Commission has no power, because it is equally divided and has one chairman at the head who refuses to take any decisions at all until the others agree, which they never do?

Mr. Davies: A report of the Mixed Armistice Commission is shortly to be made to the Security Council, in accordance with a resolution which was sponsored by His Majesty’s Government. It is hoped that the whole matter will then come under review.

Baruch Wars—I, II, & (?) III.

The Editor, The Social Crediter.

Sir,—Bernard Baruch labelled World Wars as his own when he told an American Senate Committee:—“ I had more power than any other man in the war ”—in Baruch War I. In Baruch War II. presidents and premiers obeyed Baruch on pain of losing their jobs. The Wars were his and he made them, on his power-maniac principle “ Wreck and Rule.” Baruch is now preparing his Third War.

Yours faithfully,

GEOFFREY BOWLES.


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