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The Election
by C. H. DOUGLAS.

It has been and is an almost universal tenet of Social Crediters that ballot box, or "secret" elections are primarily a trick, and, subsequently, a delusion. They ensure the submergence of informed opinion in a mass of prejudice and ignorance; and they give a spurious mandate from a heterogeneous electorate almost as incapable of stating their opinions as they are unaware of the results of their embodiment in law.

It might be said with some reason, that in these circumstances the logical procedure of The Social Crediter would be to ignore the contest between Mr. Attlee and Mr. Churchill as unlikely to have any practical value. But of course it is not so simple as that. While it is clear that the programmes of the Socialist and so-called Conservative Parties do not differ radically, it is quite probable that the temperament and attitude to life of the candidates who, if elected, will support those Parties, displays significant and possibly vital differences.

Now a typical and most effective Socialist, as mischievous and ignorant of practical political economy as he was brilliant as a playwright, was Mr. George Bernard Shaw.

Mr. Shaw was much annoyed by the introduction into political controversy of something he described as "a kind of hot air called credit," and it was apparently impossible to get any conception of it into his mercurial mind other than that of the deferred payment of his grocer's bill. I recall this matter because it is fairly certain that the fundamental and significant difference between the two allegedly contending parties in the coming fiesta of democracy is their unconscious conception of Credit, and in particular, their outlook on one of its important components, prestige.

I am satisfied that the erosion of British prestige has been a major objective of the enemies of this country and its indigenous people, for at least a hundred years, and that the Labour-Socialists have been the indispensable tool of these foes, in succession to the Whigs.

It is related that, on one of our newer great enquiring with some condescension of an old Etonian who had learnt anything at Eton, he received the reply, "Yes, I learnt to know my place, and keep it." Is there any prejudiced person who would contend that the affairs of this country have been so conducted that it could be said of us that we have kept our place, or who would deny that we give no visible signs of knowing what our place should be? We have presented the picture of Mr. Levinsohn of the Levinsohns, you know, every other inch a gentleman, dancing an eightree reel at the Caledonian Ball.

Sweeping aside programmes, it appears to me that this question of imponderable values is the real line of cleavage in the electorate, and it is evident that it does not wholly conform to party lines. Even a landowner may have his higher moments, and a Trades' Union Official a glimpse of railways for transport.

But it is clear that Mr. Attlee does start with a definite and ultimately fatal, handicap. To him, all men are equal, even if some, such as Mr. Aneurin Bevan, are more equal than others, and equality and prestige are incompatible. The real politicians of the world recognise, have recognised for centuries, that "Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité" form a sovereign prescription for centralising power in their own hands, but they have never had any delusions as to what they would do with its exponents after it had served its purpose of eliminating an independant middle class.

The Fabians have had their thirty pieces of silver, and we should not be surprised if quite a number of them hanged themselves.

But, you may say, how do I vote, if at all?
Not for programmes. They all come from the same synagogue. But for men, on the basis of past performance, on their attitude to personal responsibility, to their repudiation of the Laskian theory of the omnipotence of Parliament, on their awareness of the Mountbatten relation to coming events, in short, Policy.

Whether a House of Commons elected on these principles could save the situation at this late date, I do not know. But I am fairly confident that no other can.

"The Year of Decision"

"H. G. Wells pointed out that decisive wars are fought, not between two armies face to face, but between supporters of things as they are, and an aggressive dynamic challenger using a wholly new strategy, usually the outgrowth of new kinds of weapons. The problem of the defenders then is not merely to resist but to think—to grasp the new strategy as a whole, and invent a counter-strategy. If they depend on their existing stock of ideas they are lost.

"The same principle holds in decisive political wars. When money became easy at the height of the Middle Ages, the petty feudal kings discovered that they could use gold and silver to hire mercenaries, armies which were politically more reliable than local feudal forces. . . .

"The political offensive today is using the powerful weapon of easy money to raise a political hired army, directed from the centre to destroy the representative principle. There is no hope of success for the defenders of liberty if they rely on old weapons and tired ideas.

"Whether the opponents of absolute power today will succumb like the opposition on the Continent, or carry the political philosophy and grand strategy of liberty to new heights, is the question of the hour. If they are to win, the defenders of liberty must find the counter-attack soon, because every day the net closes tighter." (Edna Lonigan in Human Events).
PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: August 1, 1951.

Royal Air Force (Equipment)

House of Commons: August 1, 1951.

Mr. Proctor (Stratford): ... My charges are threefold. I charge the Air Ministry, first of all, with being guilty of seeking to foist off the Army with a second-rate tactical transport aircraft. Second, I accuse them of being guilty of jeopardising the future of the British aircraft industry; and, third, I accuse them of following a policy which will tend to make us dangerously dependent on the United States of America....

... If my information is correct, it is over 12 months since the first approach was made by His Majesty's Government to the United States in order to get the Fairchild Packets for this job. If the House will forgive me for a moment, I will explain that there are two types of Fairchild Packets: there is one called the C-82, which has an all-up weight of 54,000 lb., and there is the rather more modern C-119, which I think has an all-up weight of 74,000 lb., as no doubt my hon. and gallant Friend could confirm.

In my opinion it is very unlikely that we shall get any of these C-119's in the foreseeable future because, as far as I can gather, the United States are ordering them as fast as they come off the production lines for their own Air Force. It is much more likely that we shall be offered the older type, the C-82, from reserve stocks as and when they are rendered surplus by delivery of the C-119 to the United States Air Force.

I agree that the C-82 is better than nothing, particularly in the position in which we find ourselves today. But we must be quite certain about this point—that aeroplane does not to any appreciable extent meet the requirements of the Army, which is where the War Office comes into the picture. In the position in which we find ourselves today. But we have written it myself—and it says:

"If ever there was an acid test of aircraft practicability it was there for all to see at Abingdon."

There was a demonstration to the Staff College at Abingdon the other day:

"Three different types of military transport aircraft were lined up for the Army—the Fairchild C-82 Packet, the Handley Page Hastings and the Blackburn General Universal Freighter. The Army produced a load of heavy equipment."

That was quite natural. The report continues that they "wanted to see how each of them would take it to Watchfield, unload it, then re-load it and fly it back. Watchfield is a small grass field,"

as the right hon. and learned Gentleman knows.

"The Hastings and Packet did not attempt the operation. The freighter sailed gently into Watchfield with its load, sat down in 300 yards and disgorged it. In due course it flew the load out and back to Abingdon."

It seems to me that the report alone shows that the British aircraft is superior to the American type. The Army has, quite naturally, a large list of equipment which it wants to be able to have carried by air. The Fairchild Packet is unable to load a considerable proportion of these, whereas the Blackburn Universal Freighter can carry nearly all these articles. The all-up weight of the Fairchild Packet is less than half that of the British Freighter. Let us consider what that means. It means that for every one British aeroplane we have to have two American aeroplanes. That means double crews, a double lot of pilots, double maintenance and double spare parts—and let us not forget that the spare parts have to be brought here all the way across the Atlantic.

Beggars cannot be choosers, however, and in our present position we shall have to put up with these troubles, if the Americans will give the aircraft to us for an interim period, but I ask the Minister this: assuming that the United States agree to supply the Fairchild Packets, which type are we to be offered? Shall we be offered the C-82 or shall we be offered the C-119? Perhaps even more important, on this side of the House we should like to know whether there is any estimate of a delivery date.

Can we be certain as to how long it will take, because if it is to take two or three years we might as well put our own aeroplane on order now and have the British aircraft. How long will it take? After all, the United States Air Force are needing more and more of the products of their own aircraft industry to equip themselves—at any rate as far as combat aircraft are concerned. Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman let us know how certain he is about delivery?...

... I believe that in this case we can have the best of both worlds. My information is that the Universal Freighter is so good that within the last four months the United States authorities have been making inquiries about it for their own Services. Here is an aeroplane which might easily accompany the Canberra into production for the U.S.A.F., but the Ministry of Supply has stopped work on the second prototype and no production order has been placed at all. Very strange—very strange indeed. We might sell the manufacturing rights to the United States, and in that case we could achieve not only standardisation of a first-class aeroplane, but we could also earn dollars, very vitally required, with which to offset the purchase of the military type aeroplanes which we must have as an interim measure. It does seem to me to warrant internally a large allocation of our defence budget.

... I think that I have made my case. I yield to nobody—to nobody—in my gratitude to the Americans for the help with which they are providing us, but let us remember that a permanent dependence upon such help will have very serious consequences indeed. It means that we must depend for delivery of all our vital equipment on the United States President and the United States Congress. Can we be certain—and I think this is the point—can we be certain that we can depend on the present scale of generosity, even if they run into a major economic slump in the United States? At this very moment we are awaiting from the United States a decision about Sabres.

The Secretary of State for War himself said the other day that we did not control the United States Government, and that the only thing we could do was to wait until we
got agreement from them. So that is the situation. We have become far too dependent upon the resources from the other side of the Atlantic for far too much equipment for our own British Air Force—fighters, bombers, and now transport aircraft. This means that Parliament has no longer really any control over our defences.

... I want to say in conclusion that if we continue to depend on the supply of aeroplanes from America, it can only lead to the entire termination of our sovereign rights, and, indeed, to our becoming the 49th State of America.

Mr George Ward (Worcester):... The Speech of the hon. Member for Preston, South (Mr. Shackleton) was very much on the same point, but he was emphasising the importance of having a strong striking force and the importance of offence for defence. His point was that it was important that we should concentrate on that and not disperse our efforts by building too many types of aircraft. There is quite a lot in that, but the difficulty is that if we believe we ought to have a balanced force of our own—I firmly believe we should—we cannot rely on any foreign power, however friendly, to provide us exclusively with any one type of aircraft.

I believe we should have our own British made, balanced Air Force, with British aircraft performing every duty in it, whether it is a large or a small force—whatever the shape of it may be. Whether the offensive side of it is bigger than the defensive side or the transport side is a matter for the air staff; but I do not think that we should hand over any single command to the Americans, or anyone else. This policy is very much that of the Secretary of State for Air, because in March, 1950, he said:

"I am clear that it must be our aim to build up a compact, balanced and mobile force."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 21st March, 1950; Vol. 472, c. 1769.]

I am sure we all agree about that. What we are arguing about today is not his policy to build up a compact, mobile and balanced force; we are arguing that he is not doing enough about it, and that he has been putting it off much too long, long before he made that statement.

We have now got into the position where we have to call on the Americans to help us out—I agree temporarily. We are in the position where the Americans have to help us out in almost every branch of the Royal Air Force. We do not think that is at all healthy or desirable. There seems to be no sense of urgency about getting on with this plan of building up a balanced force. If there were a sense of urgency about it, I feel quite sure that we should not only be seeing more aircraft coming out of the factories, but we should be hearing that orders had been placed, in which case I think that the benches on both sides of the House—particularly the benches opposite—would have been very much fuller than they have been all the afternoon.

Let us look at one or two of the points which have been mentioned. Take Fighter Command first. It was our proud boast not so very long ago that we have the best fighters in the world. It was certainly our proud boast that we were furthest ahead of any nation with the development of jet engines. But only today the Secretary of State for Air has said at the Despatch Box that the fastest jet fighter in the world today is the American Sabre and the second fastest the MIG.15. He has admitted that. Incidentally, it was strange to hear him say that so soon after the Air Estimates debate of March this year, when the Under-Secretary of State for Air said this:

"Regarding the MIG.15, I have no doubt whatever that our fighters—the type we are now using—will give a very adequate account of themselves against the MIG.15 or any other aircraft. I am not going to indulge in a lot of speculation about the performance of the MIG.15. Some of the very interesting figures given by the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick (Mr. Lucas) and by others cannot be described as anything more than an estimate and a speculation."—[OFFICIAL REPORT, 6th March, 1951; Vol. 485, c. 379.]

But it is the hon. Member for Brentford and Chiswick who has been proved to be right—it has not been a speculation at all.

... The fact remains that we have now taken at least third place; but, for all we know, the Americans may have the third place and the Russians may have the fourth. That is very bad considering the start we had, and I blame His Majesty's Government very largely for this. Not only have they delayed giving orders to the British aircraft industry so that they can get on with the development of these new prototypes, but they have handed to the Russians on a silver platter much of the know-how which we developed through years of extremely hard work by selling them these Rolls-Royce Nene engines.

What is the position today? The position is that while we have no suitable fighters—by that I mean no very fast modern fighters—in our squadrons, we are begging the United States to come to our help with some Sabres, and nothing seems to be happening. What does the Secretary of State do? He throws up his hands in despair and says, "We do not control the United States Government. We can only wait until we can get agreement on it." But if these fighters had been ordered in plenty of time and were coming out—the Swifts and Deltas mentioned this afternoon it would be quite unnecessary for us to be begging the United States to help us out.

In Bomber Command once again we find ourselves relying on the Americans for Washingtons. I am not saying that the policy of the Government not to build more piston-engined bombers is necessarily wrong. Indeed, I believe that the policy of trying to produce a new jet bomber instead of a new stop-gap piston-engined bomber is right. But if we accept that policy—as we do—surely the next step to take is to say, "These things cannot be built overnight; therefore, we must apply a sense of urgency to them as we have never applied a sense of urgency before."

We have to get a move on quickly, because there is bound to be a gap. But we have not applied urgency or, if we have, how is it that we have ordered only 20 or so of the new Vickers 660? The Handley Page has not yet flown, and neither has the Avro. Why are we so far behind the Russians in this matter? Once again we have had to fill the gap by begging the Americans to help us out with Washingtons, which are not very satisfactory, because many of them are often kept on the ground through want of spares.

I cannot emphasise too much the importance of the striking force. As I have already said, our best form of defence is to strike at the enemy's strength. I hope that the Government are really treating this question of Bomber Command with the urgency that it deserves. We really must build up a bomber striking force.

(Continued on page 6)
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Totalitarianism on the March*

The late Professor Harold Laski, a pro-Communist and one of the leaders of the Socialist conspiracy in the English-speaking world, often emphasised the importance of Government by Regulation in the campaign to obtain a Socialist victory: "The necessity and value of delegated legislation and its extension is inevitable if the process of socialisation is not to be wrecked by the normal methods of obstruction which existing parliamentary procedure sanctions." (Vide the Fabian Socialist journal, The New Statesman, September 10, 1932).

Under the guise of defending Australia against Communism, the Menzies-Fadden Government now openly proclaims itself as having succumbed to the very totalitarian virus it says it proposes to destroy. Not only does the Federal Government's Defence Preparations Bill seek to concentrate enormous economic powers under Commonwealth control; Mr. Menzies specially states that, "The Bill will confer power to make certain regulations to speed the Government's aim." In other words, the vast powers sought by the Federal Government will be the plaything of anonymous bureaucratic planners, who will be a law unto themselves. Power without responsibility can only result in even more widespread corruption than is so manifest in the community today.

Preparation for "total war" has a fascinating appeal for immature minds, who accept the false idea that strength comes from centralised planning. Hitler's "total war" organisation did not enable him to win; rather was it his greatest weakness. Australia's "total war" organisation during the last war resulted in the greatest waste of manpower and most inefficient production this country has seen. Mr. Menzies and his colleagues apparently have learned nothing from past experiences of centralised planning. Even if confronted with an orthodox military threat, there is no reason why the Western Powers should submit to centralised economic planning. But Communism is not an orthodox military threat; it is a conspiracy and a revolution which seeks to destroy every country from within by exploiting the evils of centralised policies.

If the Federal Government really believes that it can implement some centralised controls, and then stop, it is clear that it does not understand the problem to be solved. John Hladun, a former Canadian Communist Party member, who had been sent to Moscow for special training, has made the following observation: "... one control tends to cause another, until, as a logical result, the State controls and finally owns everything."

Before Members of the Federal Government permit themselves to be stampeded any further along the Communist road of centralism, they might profitably consider the warning of the noted British authority on Soviet Russia, Edward Crankshaw, who, in his latest work, Russia by Daylight, reaches the conclusion that there is only one way by which the Communists can conquer the West, and that without war: "It is by so frightening us (but it is we who allow ourselves to be frightened), that for fear of the enemy within, we transform our society imperceptibly into an apparatus of totalitarianism indistinguishable in essence from Soviet Russia..."

The Cross Removed

The Church Times for October 5 says:

"The cross was removed from the altar of St. Giles-in-the-Fields, Holborn, on Sunday, before a special Masonic service began. The service was organised by the Holborn Borough Council Lodge. The Rev. E. G. Turner, Vicar of St. Giles, Cripplegate, a Past Grand Chaplain, preached, and the Rev. G. C. Taylor, Vicar of St. Giles, Holborn, who is not a Freemason, took part in the service. The lessons were read by two high-ranking Freemasons, Sir Bracwell Smith (a former Lord Mayor of London) and Councillor E. Ling-Cooper (Mayor of Holborn). The congregation of four hundred included the wives and daughters of the Freemasons.

"Alderman Horace Langdon, the oldest member of Holborn Council, was director of ceremonies for the service.

"Alderman Langdon told a Church Times reporter this week: 'The cross is always removed from the altar at Masonic services as a matter of courtesy, because we have with us not only Christians but Moslems and Parsees. The order of service was checked by the United Grand Lodge, to make sure that it contained nothing which could in any way offend a Jew who might attend. "All our prayers ended in thy Holy Name or for thy great Name's sake. None of the ten hymns sung bore any reference to the Trinity. At these services, if any hymn selected has a reference in a verse to the Trinity, we omit it.'"

"The Guardian"

Publication of The Guardian, founded a hundred and five years ago to strengthen the Catholic party within the Anglican Communion, is suspended with the issue for October 12.

Grand Orient

FREEMASONRY UNMASKED

by MGR. GEORGE E. DILLON, D.D.

From K.R.P. PUBLICATIONS, LTD. £1-

*From The New Times (Melbourne).
Oil and Israel

The late summer was dominated by the 'Persian' oil crisis, and Mr. Averell Harriman, of Washington and Wall Street, played the central part in the Abadan drama. As the weeks passed, it became increasingly difficult to know whether Mr. Harriman acted on behalf of the U.S. State Department or the British Foreign Office. Perhaps the distinction is no longer valid.

As reported in The Social Crediter on August 18, Mr. Harriman was accompanied to Persia by Mr. Walter Levy who had been trained for his present job as international advisor on 'oil' at six German Universities and the London School of Economics. The Jewish Chronicle of August 31, when the negative outcome of the negotiations was becoming apparent, devoted the initial paragraph of its personal column (headed 'Individually') to Mr. Levy.

"The recent discussions," it said, "which have now been suspended, with the Persian Government on the future of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, were in no small measure due to the efforts of Mr. Walter Levy, Mr. A. Harriman's advisor, who is regarded as one of the world's leading oil experts. Mr. Levy, a former German-Jewish refugee, is a prominent consultant on petroleum matters both to the United States and the Venezuelan Governments. He was in England from 1933 to 1941 and worked with the British Government on German petroleum matters. In 1941 he went to the United States to work in the Petroleum Branch Office of Strategic Services, where he did outstanding work in the location and pin-pointing of synthetic oil plants in Germany for strategic bombing.

"After working in the U.S. Government Service and the State Department he became a petroleum consultant to the Economic Co-operation Administration, the Marshall Aid Plan Agency. Mr. Levy, now an American citizen, is married to a former German-Jewish refugee. His father was murdered by the Nazis."

Mr. Levy's interesting career would seem neatly to support the contention that Hitler's 'anti-semitism' was an integral part of a Judaic strategy which placed Jews in key positions in the world's governments. Obviously Mr. Levy is in the running for a top-flight post in the Unitled States to work in the Petroleum Branch Office of Strategic Services, where he did outstanding work in the location and pin-pointing of synthetic oil plants in Germany for strategic bombing.

*Mr. Attlee: "We are deliberately putting a world order before loyalty to our country." (Labour Congress, 1934).

Mr. Churchill: "The Conservative and the Liberal Parties say without hesitation that we are prepared to consider, and if convinced, to concede abrogation of National Sovereignty, provided that we are satisfied with the conditions and safeguards. I will go further and say that, for the sake of world organisation, we will even run risks and make sacrifices." (House of Commons, June, 1950).

Mr. Clement Davies: "If mankind is not to endure unparalleled catastrophe, some way must be found of establishing peace over the whole of this planet—peace under the rule of law. . . . the free world could go on to form a world parliament of the free world prepared to meet whatever the future may hold," etc. (At the Parliamentary Conference for World Government, London, September 24, 1951).

what we hope will be a losing battle, and whose seat seems likely to be in Jerusalem.

During the month of August an American firm of geologists reported in the New York Tribune that the territory covered by Israel may become a major oil-producing centre and that the Negev is one of the most promising areas. The Government of Israel, the report ran, is preparing to open the territory to American oil companies for exploitation on competitive terms, and 'oil might do for Israel what it did for Venezuela and Persia.' The Jewish Chronicle stated briefly on September 14 that "Israel is preparing legislation which, it is hoped, will induce foreign investors to prospect for oil in Israel. Drilling on a small scale was carried out by the British during the Mandate period, but it was not developed. A recent report by American experts has, however, renewed hope that there is oil in Israel."

The long, thrilling and involved story of how the leading Anglo-American Zionists baffled the persistent efforts of British scientists and businessmen to prospect for oil in Palestine has been told in detail by such experts on Palestine as Dr. A. Homer, Captain Arthur Rogers, Miss Frances Newton and others. The dramatic end of that story, as far as the British and, for that matter the Gentile, world is concerned, was the murder of Count Bernadotte, a distinguished member of the Swedish Royal Family, the Swedish Masonic Craft and the International Red Cross who, as U.N. Mediator in Palestine, committed the mistake of suggesting that the Jews should give up their claim to the Negev and content themselves with part of Galilee.

Count Bernadotte was succeeded as conciliator between the Jews and their enemies by Dr. Bunche, an American born on the wrong side of the colour bar. Dr. Bunche is still alive, the Jews and the Arabs still unreconciled, but the question of the Negev has, by circumstances beyond the control of international mediators, been 'decided' in favour of the Israelis. It is in the Negev that the Americans have been drilling for oil.

In the early part of September, Mr. Attlee, speaking at the opening of the giant refinery built by the Esso Petroleum Company at Fawley, England pointed out that our recent oil difficulties with the Persians had, as it were, underlined the importance of this new Anglo-American enterprise. Mr. Attlee shared the platform with Mr. Frank Abrams, chairman of the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey. Mr. Abrams reminded his audience that the U.S. group had invested £37,550,000 in the venture in the expectation 'that it can count on respect for its title-deeds to its property.'

Was there a note of anxiety in the voice of Mr. Abrams—a foreboding that the sun might begin to set on that "mighty American Empire" which has been erected in the space of a few decades by the Abrams, Levis, Cohens, Samuels, Untermyer, Frankfurters, Morgenthau, Lehmans, Rothschilds, Baruchs, etc. (with the co-operation of the Harrimans, Hopkins, Roosevelts, Churchills, Marshalls, Eisenhowers, Hisses, Achesons, and Attlees, etc.) on the ruins of the pre-1914 European Powers before the British (who never knew when they were beaten) have been completely eclipsed and before the long-heralded Universal Kingdom of Judah could be convincingly proclaimed? B.J.
I turn to Coastal Command, on which we rely very largely to keep our vital sea routes open in war. We have heard of these 300 fast modern submarines possessed by the Russians. What are we doing about that? We are waiting hopefully for the United States to give us Neptunes. That is the third Command of the Air Force which is now relying it may be only temporarily, on the United States.

I am not quite sure of the position of the Shackleton, but so far as I know there are not any in Coastal Command.

Mr. A. Henderson: Oh, yes.

Mr. Ward: Not very many. To rely on the United States for Neptunes cannot possibly be the right policy. We should have our own aircraft.

We have had an excellent speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Brentford and Chiswick about Training Command. Let us not forget that Reserve training schools are today still using an aircraft which was designed over a quarter of a century ago. If we are really serious about this matter, if we really mean that we want to maintain peace through strength, how on earth are we to do it if we expect our pilots to train themselves on aircraft that are 25 years old?

Is this force which I have rapidly outlined really a compact, balanced and mobile force? That is very difficult to believe. What does the Secretary of State say when we complain about Transport Command, when we complain that no transports have been ordered, that we are short of transports to carry the Army to the Middle East? He says, "I cannot just wave a wand and do something about it." He says, "We are in touch with the Ministry of Supply. The matter is under active consideration," and that sort of thing. Once more the answer is that he is hoping that the United States will come forward and give us some Packets. If that is not true, I shall be very glad to hear what else we are doing about it.

I hope that we shall be told a great deal about the Blackburn Universal Freighter. The Secretary of State in an intervention, in reply to a question by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Air Commodore Harvey) said that the Blackburn Freighter was still doing trials and that they were not yet prepared to order any of them. But that is very weak indeed. The first prototype of the Blackburn Freighter has been flying for over a year; they must know something about it by now.

The second prototype has been cancelled altogether. Why is that? Why was it cancelled? I hope that we shall hear about that. It is a much better aeroplane than the Packet, and it suits Army requirements much better. Even the United States think it is a good aeroplane, because it is a much better aeroplane than the Packet, and it suits Army requirements much better. Even the United States think it is a good aeroplane, because they have been making inquiries about it and are obviously interested in it. I should have thought that there were an ideal opportunity to let the Americans build some of them under licence, if they wished to so, as in the case of the Canberra. If, as we hope and pray, we do not have to use these machines in a warlike way, we shall have an ideal potential export for peace-time use.

The Secretary of State said that we did not need "a vast armada of transport aircraft." Nobody on this side of the House suggested that we should have a vast armada. He went on to say that the ambulance service in Korea had been taken off for some reason or another, and he thought it was a great pity. But he is the Secretary of State for Air. Does he not know why it was taken off? What does "some reason or another" mean?

Mr. A. Henderson: I said that it was because we were concentrating all the four-engined long-range transports for purposes connected with the situation in the Middle East, and that there was one four-engined transport in use each week which was taken off that particular service. I say again that I regret that it was, but I accept responsibility for it having been taken off.

Mr. Ward: I beg the pardon of the right hon. and learned Gentleman if I misunderstood him. I thought he said, "for some reason or another." I accept what he says, but it merely strengthens my argument that we have not got enough transport aircraft and that the sooner we get the better it will be for everybody. . . .

The Under-Secretary of State for Air (Mr. Crawley): . . . One has to take the air threat which exists to this country as something which is most severe. I do not say that it would be impossible to meet that threat alone. I do not say that it would be impossible for this country to meet it without any help from the Americans; but I do say that it would be impossible to do that unless we went on to a full war footing and remained on that basis. The sooner the people of this country, and hon. Gentlemen opposite recognise that, the better. Not only would it mean doing that but, by doing that—by putting the country on a full war footing, and keeping it there—we should be throwing away all the advantages of collective security and all the advantages of alliances. It would give the people a standard of living which might prove intolerable and which might undermine all that we are trying to do.

On this question of American help, hon. Members opposite are suffering from a form of schizophrenia which, in some ways, calls to mind that of the bad baron in "Ruddigore." Their intelligence forces them to admit that they need American help—but every time they admit it, some ghost gets down from one of their ancestors' photographs and says, "In our day Britain had the most of the best of everything, and it is a surprising thing that Britain cannot have most of the best of everything now." It is time they realised the world has moved on a little and, that they really cannot face any of these problems without realising that this must be a joint undertaking.

Air Commodore Harvey: I do not think that the hon. Gentleman is clear about what we have been trying to put over this afternoon. Our main criticism has been that we are accepting assistance—I say that we should accept that assistance—in penny packets. We are taking various types of aircraft and engines instead of planning ahead and marking out where the real assistance will be required in one sphere, rather than spreading it over the whole.

Mr. Crawley: I do not think that the hon. and gallant Gentleman can even sustain that criticism. The fact is that in one very large sphere—that of strategic bombing—we have planned that, for the present, the Americans should undertake almost the whole of it.

For the rest, obviously there are two requirements—intelligent co-operation and two-way co-operation. I should like to point out that at present we have both ways of co-operation with the Americans. I think our co-operation
is intelligent, because it is sufficiently flexible to enable us to fill in each others' gaps wherever they occur, and it is two-way, and I doubt if the balance is so wholly one-sided as some people seem to think. The fact that the Americans have accepted and adopted the Canberra and are going to produce very large numbers of them, and that they have adopted and are producing a very large number of Saphire engines and are trying various other types of equipment, engines and aircraft, shows that they are prepared to fill in gaps to a very large extent with anything we can produce. That shows that this is a thoroughly two-way and reciprocal proceeding.

Surely, what we want is not less but more of that. We want to pool both planning and productive resources and to get the best out of both. I wish, therefore, that when hon. Members opposite talk about this question, they would leave aside the general attitude of criticism of the mere fact that we welcome, at this or that time, the addition of some American aircraft to our Air Force, just in the same way as they welcome our aircraft. I hope that in the future they will see that that is the right sort of cooperation. I hope that they will appreciate that in any air force there will always be gaps of some kind which, if one is lucky, one may find that one's friends may be able to fill. Let us be only too thankful if they can....

I am not pretending that we have got everything we want now. The fact is that demands are going up, and we are, therefore, planning a larger Transport Command. We have not yet, in fact, ordered the freighter because the tests are not complete, and we want it to complete its tests, so as to give a complete order and not to have a second series of tests and troubles. I cannot emphasise this point too much. By ordering off the drawing-board, we are apt to run into development difficulties at a later stage which might well delay production far longer than if we had gone through full trials.

That is one of the reasons why, with an aircraft, as important as the heavy freighter, which is a very vital part of the transport force, we do not want to order it off the drawing-board, especially as this aircraft has been flying for some time. We want it to complete its tests, so as to give a complete order and not to have a second series of tests and troubles. I cannot emphasise this point too much. By ordering off the drawing-board, we are apt to run into development difficulties at a later stage which might well delay production far longer than would otherwise have been the case.

I should like to deal with a number of points which have been mentioned in the debate. First of all, there is the accusation of one hon. Member about the MIG. 15. I repeat what I have said and sustain it. I said that our aircraft would give a very good account of themselves if they met any other aircraft. All the evidence we have had—and it is American evidence—shows that that is likely to be perfectly true....

Finally, I want to deal with the question of the accident rate. It has been suggested in speeches by hon. Gentlemen opposite today that the rate of accidents in the Royal Air Force is increasing alarmingly. The facts are otherwise. With the amount of flying increasing enormously the fact is that the accident rate per number of hours flown is staying almost exactly the same. In regard to jet aircraft, it is steadily going down. The number of accidents per hours flown on jet aircraft is not only going down, but it is well below what it was with Spitfires....

Telephone Service, Short-Wave System

Mr. A. Lewis asked the Postmaster-General if he is aware that telephone subscribers in Paris are to have a short-wave radio-telephone system installed, enabling them to dial telephone calls within a 200-mile radius with immediate connections, obtaining the need for telephone wires, poles and cables; and whether, in view of the need to conserve this type of telephone equipment, he will make inquiries, and take the necessary action, to have a similar system installed in this country.

Mr. Ness Edwards: I understand that the French Government is in course of constructing a radio system between Paris and Lille, which is to be equipped to provide a television channel and telephone circuits. Such a system already exists in this country in the radio television link between London and Birmingham, which is also designed for development for telephone purposes. It has still to be demonstrated whether this system of telephone transmission by radio has advantages over our present system by means of underground cables of modern carrier type, and experiments are proceeding to this end.

New Schools (Development Charges)

Mr. J. Morrison asked the Minister of Local Government and planning what is the total of development charges so far levied on local education authorities in connection with the erection of new schools.

Mr. Dalton: Up to 30th June about £110,000 had been paid as development charges on schools and similar buildings. It is not possible to say how much of this sum was paid by local education authorities, nor how much of it related to the erection of new schools.

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Statistics

Mr. Hurd asked the Minister of Food what proportions of the more important foods are now provided by home production, with comparable figures for 1939 and 1945.

Mr. Webb: The following table shows the percentage by weight of the total supplies of the more important foods provided by home production in the years 1945 and 1950. As 1939 was an abnormal year for imports, the pre-war average figure which is generally used for purposes of comparison, has been given:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pre-war average</th>
<th>1945 per cent. of total supplies</th>
<th>1950 per cent. of total supplies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wheat and Flour (as wheat equivalent)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oils and Fats (crude oil equivalent)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar (refined value)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carcass Meat and Offal</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bacon and Ham (including canned)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fish (including canned and shell fish)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Butter</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cheese</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Condensed Milk</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Milk (whole and skimmed)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shell Eggs</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk for human consumption (as liquid)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes for human consumption</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>94</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The pre-war average figures are for the years 1936-37 and 1938-39 with the exception of oils and fats and fish, which are for the years 1934-38.

(Further answers to questions at this sitting will appear next week.)

Hydro-Electricity and Inflation

The following appeared in The Scotsman for August 13:

Sir,—There are some very curious aspects of what one of your readers recently called the hydro-electrocrucifixion of the Highlands.

The Scottish hydro-electric schemes have this in common with vast hydro-electric enterprises in other parts of the world, that unlimited funds appear to be available for their execution and that neither wars, cease-fires, world crises, nor social revolutions seem to affect the determination of their sponsors to see them completed.

Those of your readers who have written to complain of the niggardly attitude of the board vis-à-vis possible consumers might be interested to have the information elicited by Col. Gomme-Duncan (House of Commons, July 2) from Mr. McNeill. Col. Duncan learns that the estimated cost in 1944 of the three projects of Loch Sloy, Loch Morar and Lochalsh was £4,600,000, but that the expenditure to the end of May, 1951, was £9,043,000, while the latest (sic) estimated cost for their completion (excluding those parts of the Morar and Lochalsh schemes which have been postponed) is £9,235,000—more than double the estimated cost, but, with the exception of a few minor modifications, “we” carry on “our” original programme. No monetary difficulties there.

The board may (and probably will) write and explain that they are subject to those universal “trends of inflation” of which we all are the victims. They will omit to point out that any enterprise which pays out wages, salaries, and dividends in respect of which no consumer-goods are immediately available, must needs contribute to the inflation of prices, to the shrinking of the purchasing power of our monetary unit.

I think, by this time, we are justified in disregarding the protestations of officials of public bodies. Much time, and some damage, might be avoided if we regarded the hydro-electric board and its activities as part of that wider military-inflationary programme, the “export trade” and the “rearmament production,” the combined effect of which is to produce “full employment,” alias industrial conscription, with no increase in consumer-goods on the home market.

We are, in other words, face to face with another manifestation of the financier-Socialist (“Soviet,” if you like) urge to monopolise the primary necessities of life, of which water is the most important.

If we are witnessing a bold move for final control of our planet’s fundamental element (and much of the early hydro board propaganda followed the classical leftismaterialist international “line”) much that has been puzzling in the board’s methods becomes understandable: the ruthless-ness with which their policies have been pursued; their impatience with sound technical counter-argument; their disregard of elemental British rights; their (in Lord Mansfield’s words) “fascist” manner.

More revealing than anything is their impatience to have all their schemes—the complete monopolisation of Scottish water power—finished before—well, before the myth of the efficiency of bigness (the mammoth enterprise, the huge conscripted army, the immense centralised State) is finally exploded. Our international planners are quite aware that their time is short, so forty days is all they allow the individual British property owner and local interests to object to schemes that may take much more than four years to complete and which it has taken at least 40 years to bring to fruition.—I am, &c.

W. L. RICHARDSON.

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