From Week to Week

Those who have eyes to see (few they be) may have noticed the Light Horse in the banner headlines—and, if they have not seen farther, we commend to their notice the accusation brought against the Noble Animal; eiz., that it is not running according to the Rules:—

Let us drop this attack on universal suffrage. (*)
If the masses are sufficiently organised to demand the vote, they can intervene in politics (**) whether they get it or not—the Nazi Party would have been a factor (***) in German politics with or without the vote—and it is better that they should intervene according to the rules, and so learn the rules, than against them? (****)

Yes, there is still more that is pertinent: Like 'Social Credit' in Alberta, "Democratic Socialism and Tory democracy have both provided ... perfectly good governments." These quotations are from an article heading the leader-page of the Sunday Times of May 10, and profess to meet the case suggested by our quotation from Mr. Raymond Mortimer in our issue of May 2.

We have indicated above some points inviting examination:

(*) For our part, we are not attacking universal suffrage. We are proposing that, whether the suffrage is extended or not, it shall be made responsible instead of, as now, being irresponsible. And the simple means for securing that have been proposed in detail. Unless an election is a choice, it isn't an election. An election under "the rules" is not a choice that matters to anyone except the rule-makers, who have designed the rules in such a fashion that their policy is 'chosen,' whatever the party programmes may be and whoever advances them in public.

(**) The underlying notion of our broad franchise is not a choice by "organised masses," but by un-organised masses, i.e., the individual members of the community.

(***) Compare with "Nazi-Party" Social Credit Party." It is the Party that is the factor, not the vote or the voter.

(****) Does the writer of the article (Mr. Hugh Trevor-Roper) think with King John that the rules should be alterable at will by King John, or does he agree (because this is the basis of what was our constitution, or this part of it at least) that the electorate, the choosers, whether the barons at Runnymede or the "masses" at a general election, may, if they desire, say: "We object to changes in the rules"—"We object to changes in the Laws of England" (Non estimus leges Angliee mutari)?

All he says is that they "Must learn the rules." This, of course, is part and parcel of State Education, a vicious system. From its nature all education, and particularly political education, is part of all religion and is ultra vires of the State.

"What think ye of little Muses (Mus)?"
"Who thought it much advancement"
"When colleges were built by Puss in Boots"—"For 'learning's' great enhancement?"

*(Mus: mouse).

Whether this little rhyme will be clear to any but close students of parasitology, is, in the present state of general education, uncertain. What is certain is that the electorate (the mice) stand to gain no advantage by submitting themselves to the care of an enemy (the cat) whose prime interest is to make himself invisible in preparation for 'good government.'

We have no hesitation in thus widening the application of Mr. Hugh Trevor-Roper's dubieties. As The Social Crediter foretold as long ago as September 23, 1943, control of education by the State is about to be consolidated. That is, we believe, the meaning of the impressive address by the Archbishop of York in Liverpool Cathedral last week. He was saying with his lips (and, so far as that goes, great credit to him for doing so) the opposite of what they are about to do with their hands—merely a variant of the Toynbee prescription. Observe that a reaction, easy in association with an enlightened Medical Profession in 1943 (had there been one), will be difficult (though not impossible) in 1953 after ten years of softening-up of the would-be reactors.
PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: April 28, 1953.

National Finance (Post War Credits)

Mr. Aveling asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer what would be the estimated cost of paying out post-war credits to men at 60 years of age and women at 55, and of paying to next of kin all post-war credits on the death of the holders, respectively.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. R. A. Butler): Post-war credits are at present being repaid at a rate of just over £16 million per annum. If the age for repayment were reduced by five years the total repayment in the year of change would be about £100 million and the annual repayment thereafter would be £17½ million. If repayment were made immediately on the death of the holder the total repayment in the first year, including repayment in respect of deaths which have already occurred, would be about £86 million and the annual repayment thereafter would be about £21½ million.

Mr. Aveling: Is there not a moral obligation on the Government to repay this forced loan to the old men as quickly as possible, particularly as unemployment among aged men is growing and their balance of payments problem is greater than the Chancellor's? Will he give the problem further consideration?

Mr. Butler: This is always a subject of anxiety to me and to the Government and, I suspect, it was to previous Governments, but I am afraid that in present circumstances I am unable to go any further.

Mr. J. T. Price: Will the Chancellor consider applying to these credits the law against perpetuity? As matters stand, the credits can be passed on from one generation to another, and, in my opinion, that would offend against the law of perpetuity.

Mr. Butler: I am aware that if death occurs just before 65 there will be this perpetual—i will not say “motion”—delay in these matters, and I agree that there are very great difficulties.

Mr. S. Silverman: Is it not clear that the vast majority of the people whose money was loaned in this way during the war years will never be repaid in their lifetime? If that is so, would it not be honest and decent of the Government to repudiate any liabilities more frankly?

Mr. Butler: I do not see that that would make things any better. Naturally, if there is a hope of dealing further with the matter, one would like to keep the hope alive. I repeat that this is not a matter which has concerned this Government only; it has concerned previous Governments.

Scientists and Technologists

Mr. Lee asked the Chancellor of the Exchequer the output of scientists and technologists per head of population in Great Britain.

Mr. R. A. Butler: The number of scientists and technologists coming from the universities and technical colleges of Great Britain with degrees, Higher National Certificates and Higher National Diplomas, or their equivalent, in the academic year 1951-52, is estimated to be one in about 2,600 of the population.

Mr. Lee: Is the Chancellor aware that upon the results of Government activities in this direction may well depend our chances of maintaining our position in the world, particularly in engineering, and is he satisfied that we are making progress at least comparable with that of the United States, Switzerland and the Soviet Union?

Mr. Butler: This has always been a subject near my heart, and the Government are proceeding to do their best to improve the facilities. The hon. Member asked a Question on 28th February, and the proportion has ever so slightly improved since then.

Mr. Woodburn: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that though Scotland produces a large number of graduates, there is still a great difficulty in persuading engineers and other firms to employ the scientists and technologists in the works, and industry requires a great deal more encouragement to make use of the highest and best form of knowledge?

Mr. Butler: I am aware of that.

House of Commons: April 30, 1953.

Agriculture

Fertilisers (U.S. Grant)

Sir L. Plummer asked the Minister of Agriculture why he has accepted a grant from the United States Mutual Security Agency to meet the cost of demonstrating the use of fertilisers to British farmers; and what was the amount of the grant.

Sir T. Dugdale: I can see no reason why this generous offer should not have been accepted. The Agency recently decided to set aside a proportion of the counterpart funds they retain in each of the countries receiving defence aid to promote agricultural productivity in those countries. Her Majesty's Government were invited to make proposals; and a series of demonstrations to show the effects of improved fertiliser practices was decided upon. I am satisfied that these demonstrations will make a very valuable contribution to the Government's policy of stimulating greater agricultural production. For England and Wales, the Agency are contributing £41,000 towards the cost.

Sir L. Plummer: Does not the Minister think that at a time when the Chancellor of the Exchequer is making considerable tax concessions to the farmers the acceptance of charity of this kind is humiliating? Does he not think that the time has arrived when farmers who do not understand the use of fertilisers should be invited to get out of the industry?

Sir T. Dugdale: That is a different question altogether. This suggestion comes from the Mutual Security Agency themselves, and it would be wrong if we refused their generous offer.
Sir W. Smithers asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that a number of farms which have been taken over by him under the Agriculture Act, 1947, have been allocated to members of the county agricultural executive committees and to their relatives; how many such cases have been brought to his notice; and if he will give instructions that these practices are to cease.

Sir T. Dugdale: No, Sir. When a tenant farmer is dispossessed for bad husbandry, the owner of the land is required either to farm it himself, if he wishes to do so, or to let it to a tenant approved by the committee. If the occupier is also the owner he is required to let the land to a tenant approved by the committee, or he may sell it with vacant possession if he chooses.

Only when the owner fails to make satisfactory arrangements within reasonable time do committees take possession of the land. They have done so in 17 cases. In three of those cases, the land has been subsequently released, in three it has been kept in hand by the committee, and in 11 it has been let. I am not aware that in any instance has it been let to committee members or their near relatives.

Sir W. Smithers: Has my right hon. Friend noticed that in the many letters which I have sent him there are cases of alleged nepotism? Will he introduce legislation or amend the 1947 Act to enable dispossessed farmers to have the right of appeal on points of merit and of fact, which they do not have at present?

Sir T. Dugdale: That is an entirely different question. My hon. Friend and I have had a considerable correspondence. I have checked it over and I have not found any instances where he has suggested that a farm has been let to a committee member or to a relative.

Sir W. Smithers: What about the Odlum v. Stratton case?

Annual Review (Labour Costs)

Sir W. Smithers asked the Minister of Agriculture if he is aware that in Command Paper No. 8798, Annual Review and Fixing of Farm Prices, 1953, Appendix III, the increase in the cost of labour taken into account at the market worth of what the tenant is acquiring or is it to be market value of the land—will my right hon. Friend, if he wants to secure increased production, stop interference with the agriculture industry and allow farmers and their men freely to make their own wage agreements?

Sir T. Dugdale: That is far wider than the Question on the Order Paper, and deals with the whole procedure of the Agricultural Wages Board.

Leasehold Property

The Secretary of State for the Home Department (Sir David Maxwell Fyfe): I beg to move,

That this House takes note of the proposals relating to leasehold property in England and Wales (Cmd. 8713) and Leases in Scotland (Cmd. 8714).

This Motion calls attention to the proposals set out in two White Papers, Command Papers Nos. 8713 and 8714. I intend to deal with the proposals relating to leasehold property in England and Wales, and I must leave it to my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Advocate to speak about leases in Scotland. . . .

Let me begin with the question of leasehold enfranchisement, a subject which has attracted a good deal of attention. Everyone will agree, whether they agree with its contents or not, that the White Paper deals with the subject fully. We are not in favour of enfranchisement, but we are very anxious that the subject should not be discussed on abstract grounds of a political character. I desire to make that point clear from the start. That is why we have sought, in the White Paper, to direct the attention of the House and of the country rather to the practical problems than to the philosophy of the matter. We have tried to do this reasonably and dispassionately, and our conclusion is that even a moderate scheme of leasehold enfranchisement runs into such difficulties that it is simply not worth while.

Paragraph 7 of the White Paper poses the two fundamental questions on which the advocate of any scheme of leasehold enfranchisement must first make up his mind. Is the compensation payable by the tenant to be related to the market value of the land? It is or is it to be something else? Is the right of enfranchisement to be limited to the leasehold occupier or to extend to the leasehold investor who sublets at a rack rent?

The minority of the Leasehold Committee, that is the right hon. and learned Member for Leicester, North-East and the hon. Member for Oldham, West, gave clear answers to those questions. They said that the compensation should be equal to the market value and that the right should be limited to existing leaseholders. As a result, they erected a scheme of leasehold enfranchisement which, I say with complete sincerity, is undoubtedly one of the most moderate and sensible that has yet been produced. It was limited to occupying ground leaseholders of residential property; and it would provide that the price to be paid by a leaseholder on enfranchisement would be the market value of the landlord's interest.

Again, I am speaking sincerely when I say that we were grateful to find such a scheme before us to help us (Continued on page 7.)
Language

We have pointed out before the importance of resistance to the campaign, long conducted, for so degrading language that it becomes a tool which is useless for any honest purpose and valuable only as a means of spreading confusion and deceit. Therefore we welcome the following from an article, "Satirist in the Modern World" in The Times Literary supplement:—

"Confucius was once asked what he would do first if it were left to him to administer a country. The Master said (in Professor Waley's scholarly translation of the Analects): 'It would certainly be to correct language.' His listeners were surprised. 'Surely,' they said, 'this has nothing to do with the matter. Why should language be corrected?' The Master's answer (more freely translated) was: 'If language is not correct, then what is said is not what is meant; if what is said is not what is meant, then what ought to be done remains undone; if this remains undone, morals and arts will deteriorate; if morals and arts deteriorate, justice will go astray, if justice goes astray the people will stand about in helpless confusion. Hence there must be no arbitrariness in what is said. This matters above everything.'

Mr. Hewlett Edwards

Readers at home and abroad will sympathise with Mr. Hewlett Edwards, who has been ordered by his doctor to rest "for a month at least." With Mr. Edwards's many correspondents who appreciate the exceptionally high standard of his work, we hope for the early resumption of his activities on our behalf.

WHAT IS SOCIAL CREDIT?

Social Credit assumes that Society is primarily metaphysical, and must have regard to the organic relationships of its prototype.

PHILOSOPHY

POLICY

Economics

Administration

CONSUMER CONTROL OF PRODUCTION

INTEGRAL ACCOUNTING

HIERARCHY

CONTRACTING-OUT MECHANISMS

OBJECTIVE: Social Stability by the integration of means and ends.

INCOMPATIBLES: Collectivism, Dialectic Materialism, Totalitarianism, Judæo-Masonic Philosophy and Policy.

Ballot-box democracy embodies all of these.

C. H. DOUGLAS.

(Reprinted.)

February, 1951.
Hitler*
by DRYDEN GILLING SMITH.

(continued).

Herr von Papen often remarks that he had never known a military alliance with less cooperation between the powers concerned than that which existed between Germany and Italy, and later with Japan. Hitler never gave Mussolini any idea of his next move, in the international field, and so the latter started repaying his partner in similar coin. Even later on in the war when von Papen said that the Italians should be informed that their code had been cracked, arguing that what the Germans could do the British could do also, von Ribbentrop replied "But, we wouldn't know what the Italians were up to." He was more worried about this than the fact that the Italian code weakness might sabotage the combined operations in North Africa.

The Italian invasion of Albania in the spring of 1939 caused a crisis in German-Turkish relations. Turkey, like the western powers regarded the axis as a single unit and presumed that any operation by one power was part of a carefully prepared plan made by the two of them. Turkey immediately suspected German designs in the Balkans, and since Hitler had no reason to make an enemy of Turkey and could not deal with her as he could deal with his nearer neighbours, it was in his interest to be diplomatic. After considerable persuasion he succeeded in getting the best and most proved German diplomatist, to accept the post of Ambassador in Turkey.

Herr von Papen, who had gained a knowledge of Turkey during the first war, went to Istanbul in April, 1939, and in a short time had found the reasons for the prevailing Turkish attitude towards the axis. He returned to Berlin to suggest the type of concessions which would be most effective in obtaining better relations with Turkey. There he met Count Ciano, who turned out to be less diplomatic and to have even more limited horizons than Ribbentrop. It was useless to explain to such a man the absurdity of provoking potentially friendly powers, or to suggest to him that the offer of one of the Dodecanese islands which Turkey wanted would eradicate Turkish fears and put Italy in a very good bargaining position vis-a-vis Turkey. Ciano merely became irritated and stormed over to Ribbentrop "with a shower of gesticulations," and Ribbentrop in turn became angry asking von Papen what he meant by sticking his nose into Italian affairs. One can see that many of the mistakes in Italian foreign policy during Mussolini's later period, can be explained by his having this pig-headed son-in-law as his chief contact with the outside world.

Von Papen did not know of Hitler's plans to attack Poland and divide the country with Russia. However, before leaving Germany for the second time, Hitler confided to him that he was on the point of torpedoing the British guarantee to Poland by shattering their attempts to make an alliance with Russia, and making such an alliance himself. Von Papen knew that this would be difficult to explain to the Turks who would fear a combined attack on the Dardanelles. After the defeat of Poland the war seemed purposeless since Germany had gained her objective and Great Britain and France had not succeeded in stopping her. "The German armies had hoisted banners proclaiming their intention not to start the shooting (on the western front) and the French soldiers had replied with the same assurance." The time seemed ripe for peace negotiations, which von Papen was attempting via the Dutch Ambassador in Ankara. On a visit to Berlin in October, Ribbentrop told him he was not to talk to Hitler about peace plans. Hitler would not commit himself but told von Papen to continue his talks. Hitler later became more difficult, owing it seemed, to the pressure of unstable advisers. "Every member of his entourage considered himself an expert in foreign policy, from Bohle, Rosenberg, Bormann and Goebbels to Hoffmann, the court photographer, and the various ladies who visited head-quarters."

At the end of July, 1940, von Papen tried again. Hitler's refusal to agree to Italian territorial demands and his attempt to soothe French pride by allowing them to keep their fleet were signs that he had learned nothing of European equilibrium, and it seemed that he might be more reasonable in any peace negotiations. However Churchill was at the head of the Government in England and doing his best to put under lock and key any reasonable people on that side. Finally Hitler brought out his schoolboy economic theories and said to von Papen "How are the expenses of the war to be covered if a peace is signed which does not include reparations clauses."

The British had sent Sir Stafford Cripps to Moscow to try and persuade Russia to change sides, offering British recognition of Russian dominance in the Balkans and of her aspirations in the Dardanelles. This was when Turkey was her formal ally. However, Molotov went straight to Schulenberg, the German Ambassador, with these proposed terms, and said "This is what we have been offered. Can you improve on it?" In November, 1940, von Papen went again to Berlin to explain the Turkish reactions to Italy's attack on Greece. Instead of getting any help, he was told by Ribbentrop that Germany would now have to offer the Dardanelles to Russia, and Hitler merely asked him in desperation what he could offer the Russians to keep them on his side, "A share in the British Empire and a share in the Persian gulf oil reserves?" However, Molotov's demands were so outrageous that when Hitler heard them in detail in November, 1940, he ordered the preparation of "Operation Barbarossa" for May 15, 1941. The unexpected developments of the 1941 campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece caused some delay in the plans for Russia.

However two things combined to make von Papen's task in Turkey much easier. He was, to the annoyance of King Boris of Bulgaria, able to persuade Hitler to place part of the Greek corridor to Svilengrad, between Turkey and Bulgaria, under Turkish administration, so that Turkey's main railway to Europe crossed directly into Bulgaria. After this, the fact that Germany was fighting Turkey's traditional enemy, enabled von Papen to arrange a German-Turkish friendship pact, giving Germany the bulk of Turkey's chromium exports until the summer of 1944 when the allies prevented further deliveries.

Von Papen remained at his post in Turkey throughout the war, and although someone tried to assassinate him by hurling a bomb while he was walking along a deserted road

in Ankara, the presumed Communist origin of this attempt on his life did nothing but raise his prestige in Turkish circles. From Germany's point of view he played an important part in keeping Turkey out of the war and thereby preventing an allied invasion via the Balkans. He was helped in this by an employee of the British Embassy who presented him with photostat copies of all the documents and telegrams which the ambassador received from the Foreign Office, including details of the offers which were being made to Turkey to get her into the war. With advance knowledge of all these proposals, von Papen was able to make counter proposals to the Turkish Foreign Minister and prime the latter with answers to give to the British. The code name for the source of his information was Cicero, and its story has been told in detail in the book Operation Cicero (Wingate, London, 1950). The German government believed the whole thing to be a hoax until they learnt in advance, by this means, of the bombing of Sofia. By "Cicero" they learnt of the decisions taken at Teheran and Cairo, though Ribbentrop kept Hitler any reports that might have too defeatist an effect. By "Cicero" they learnt that the plans for the Salonika invasion were cancelled and therefore saved themselves the necessity of keeping reserves of German troops in the Balkans. Another sidelight on this aspect of the war is provided by Mr. Paget, who describes a social evening in Germany while he was working with von Manstein on a preparation of a brief for the latter's defence. One of the men whom Paget had brought to help the defence had been in charge of British Intelligence in Turkey, and among the Germans, with whom they discussed the case for the defence, was the head of the German Intelligence in Turkey. They spent an evening comparing notes, after which they came to the conclusion that most of their agents had been on both pay rolls.

The first serious attempt to bring Turkey into the war was made when the Turkish President was invited to Casablanca. He told Mr. Churchill that the Turks were far more concerned about future relations with Turkey than about coming into the war. "The complete defeat of Germany," he said, "would give Russia the chance of becoming a great danger to Turkey and Europe." He asked Churchill if he would like to discuss the possibility of peace with Herr von Papen "who he described as representing a school of thought which would prefer to accept even an unfavourable peace for Germany if this would guarantee the prosperity of Europe. In spite of the President's insistence, Mr. Churchill declined. I was told he felt that such a conversation would be treasonable." This argument of Churchill's should be borne in mind, when one reads the argument put forward in Chester Wilmott's Struggle for Europe, which maintains that Stalin was able to get all he wanted at Teheran by threatening the alternative, that he make a separate peace with Germany. Why Churchill and Roosevelt did not 'threaten' Stalin in the same way is not said. Wilmott's theory therefore postulates that (a) Churchill and Roosevelt were sentimental softies like their "Second Front Now" compatriots, (b) that they were deliberately treasonable. Whichever alternative one accepts, one is left, as ever, asking what on earth their respective countries can have been dreaming about to allow such figures to look after their international interests.

The allied Foreign Ministers' Conference in Moscow decided that Turkey must be brought into the war by the end of 1943, and the Turkish Foreign Minister was then invited to Cairo to meet Anthony Eden, who presented him with something in the nature of an ultimatum. This was followed by the withdrawal of the British Embassy to Istanbul, as in the days before British recognition of the Ataturk government, and the presentation of a further ultimatum. As the Turks were dependent on the western allies for rubber, tin, textiles, some cereals and of course oil, they were prepared to enter the war if the only alternative was to sacrifice their economic position. They did their best to play for time, demanding large stocks of military equipment, and pointing out that as they did not intend to join 'nobody's army,' they must, in order to retain Turkish control over Turkish forces, be given specific operations to perform. They also argued that as the British had shown nothing but contempt for Italy's eleventh hour entry into the war, in order to gain spoils, it was odd that they should be so keen to persuade Turkey to behave in the same way. Finally in 1944, the success of the allied landings in Europe led them to intensify their pressure on Turkey. "The growing power of Russia made it impossible for Turkey to risk falling finally into the Allies' bad graces. They alone would be in a position to check Russian ambitions in the Dardanelles and the Eastern Mediterranean. On August 2nd, the Turkish National Assembly approved the severing of diplomatic relations with Germany."

Von Papen returned to Berlin where the war was known to be lost and morale was at zero. "I was struck by the attitude of two National Socialists of long standing, both with an aristocratic background—Count Helldorf, the capital's chief of police, and Count Gottfried von Bismarck, the local government head in Potsdam. They had joined the party in the early days from idealistic motives and had reached high positions which gave them a clear view of the situation. Both were now convinced that the Bolchevist methods introduced by Hitler could only result in the complete collapse of Germany. . . . They then disclosed to me the plans of a small group, headed by the former Chief of Staff, Colonel-General Beck, who had made up their minds to remove Hitler. . . . However tension and unrest inherent in changing the regime at such a critical time could only be risked if we had certain guarantees from the enemy powers concerning Germany's future."

This group needed to know whether the western allies would abandon the formula of unconditional surrender, should a changed German government agree to make constitutional and territorial adjustments. Von Papen agreed to contact President Roosevelt via his personal representative in Turkey, Mr. George H. Earle, and give the German group Roosevelt's reply. Mr. Earle had left the Republicans and joined Roosevelt in 1932, had been governor of Pennsylvania, and later Minister to Vienna and to Sofia.

Before he could get any reply from Roosevelt via Earle, von Papen received a mysterious visitor travelling on a Portuguese passport. He knew nothing of Earle's mission but produced two inches of microfilm showing the conditions that might serve as a basis for peace. He further suggested that von Papen fly to Cairo and meet the President at a forthcoming meeting there, but von Papen replied that he could not do this secretly, and that as an emigré he would be no use to anyone wishing to negotiate with Germany. There was no sequel to this mysterious visit.
Mr. Earle however continued to press President Roosevelt for an armistice. Von Papen had offered to fly Earle to a secret meeting with Helldorf and Bismarck. "The offer to the American President specified that the unconditional surrender formula must be modified to permit an armistice in the West and the transportation of German troops to the Eastern front to prevent Russian troops occupying territory within the borders of Germany and her Balkan allies. Roosevelt rejected the offer and said that all negotiations must be made through General Eisenhower."

Mr. Earle has given his account of the episode in the Philadelphia Enquirer, January 30, 1949. He says that he then flew to Washington to emphasise to Roosevelt that with Germany's coming defeat the whole of western Europe would be threatened by Russia. Roosevelt's reply was that the Normandy invasion would soon be launched and Germany beaten in a few months, and that 'Russia, made up of so many people's speaking so many languages, need not be worried about and would, in fact, fall apart after the war.' Earle then threatened to make a public announcement that the President's foreign policy was false and that Russia presented the main threat to the American continent. "The President at once wrote in stern terms: 'I specifically forbid you to make public any information or opinion about an ally that you may have acquired while in office or in the service of the U.S. Navy.' The President also revoked our agreement; I was to resign my commission as Commander and be turned over to the Navy Department, which sent me to Samoa as Deputy Governor of 16,000 natives." The view that explains Roosevelt's foreign policy as 'genial, well-meaning and sentimental fades quickly before these glimpses of his prompt action when it was threatened. We have already seen how he reacted to Stilwell's threat to expose his policy in China. Some may remember the case of Tyler Kent, who was imprisoned in England, at Roosevelt's instigation, after he had cracked their code and tapped the secret messages in which Roosevelt announced to Churchill the maturing details of his plan to force Japan to start the war in the Pacific.

While the negotiations in America failed, the attempt to overthrow Hitler also failed, owing it is said, to the action of Colonel Remer, who now leads the neo-Nazi party in Germany. That he represents the latter-day state of Nazism, when it had become to all intents and purposes identical with Communism, is borne out by his behaviour to a friend who obtained an interview with him. According to the latter's account Remer displayed the symptoms of an epileptic, and indicated that his hatred of the western powers was so great that he would prefer to fight on the side of the Russians than on the side of Great Britain and America.

After the attempt on his life anyone wishing to see Hitler had to pass through a large number of check points, in which they had to hand over hats, coats, brief-cases and anything else they were carrying. However no one asked von Papen on his final visit to Hitler whether he were carrying a weapon. "After I had waited a few minutes Hitler came in, ashen pale, one arm in a sling, trembling in every limb. The man was a nervous wreck. He tried to greet me in hearty fashion. His first remark referred to the plot. As far as I could distinguish from his disconnected sentences, he was trying to minimise the whole affair..." He then offered von Papen the Knight's Cross of the Military Merit Order.

Von Papen could not understand this "and can only suppose that Hitler had done it deliberately to counter the supposition abroad—to which even Mr. Churchill had given expression in the House of Commons—that I would be included in the July 20 death list. In his arbitrary fashion Hitler had made up his mind to prove the opposite. As I left headquarters I noticed that a new pyramid-shaped concrete bunker was being built for Hitler's personal protection." This is the last we hear of Hitler, and it is true to the tone of these Memoirs, that instead of the heroics of a romantic Adolf walking arm in arm with Eva Braun into the flames of his never-never land, we should see the Fuhrer, like his Pharoic predecessors, trying to perpetuate himself in a pyramid (this time of concrete).

(To be continued.)

PARLIAMENT — (continued from page 3.)

in our study; but when we subjected it to critical examination we concluded that even this scheme would not do. The results of our examination are set out in detail in the White Paper, but perhaps I may summarise the serious objections that we see to the scheme.

The first is that the cost to the tenant will often be so high that poorer tenants will be unable to take advantage of the scheme: that objection is developed in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the White Paper. The second is that there will be great complications about apportionment when more than one house is comprised in the ground lease: we deal with that point in paragraphs 19 and 20.

The third objection is that it would be fair to exclude from the scheme cases where either the tenant or the landlord had bought his interest during the last few years of the term... .

... It has been suggested that the Government do less than justice to the very strong feeling among leaseholders in certain parts of the country for some form of enfranchisement which would benefit them. Naturally, I have in mind South Wales in particular. The Government, and certainly the Minister for Welsh Affairs, are indeed well aware that such a feeling exists. No one could hold the office of Minister for Welsh Affairs for 18 months without knowing that there is a special problem in South Wales... .

... I was saying that we recognise the feeling in Wales, and we had, first of all, to face this position, that the difficulties which I have endeavoured to put forward and which lie in the way of any scheme of enfranchisement still exist after one has considered the opinion in favour of it. It would have been very wrong for the Government, in deference to representations in South Wales, to hold out hopes that a sensible and workable scheme could be devised when, in fact, their dispassionate review of the problem had led them to the conclusion that it was impossible.

Fortunately, one must not stop at negation. There is a positive and hopeful aspect, and I should remind the right hon. Gentleman the Father of the House, for whose views and background in this matter I have every sympathy, that...
the campaign for leasehold enfranchisement has a long history and that it started long before there were any provisions for protecting the right of occupation. I would ask everyone to approach this matter as frankly as old ideas and preconceptions allow. I feel that today the main need is for the right of occupation to be protected rather than for a new right of ownership to be conceded.

It may well be that the many advocates of leasehold enfranchisement have never seriously considered whether they would continue to feel so strongly if there were a guarantee that every occupying long leaseholder should continue in protected occupation of the house after the expiry of the lease. That is what we now propose, and we think it probable that once that is realised among the general body of long leaseholders, their general desire for leasehold enfranchisement may be diminished by that great change in the circumstances.

Mr. Barnett Janner (Leicester, North-West): No.

Sir D. Maxwell Fyfe: I have not yet had a chance of hearing from anyone the answers to these difficulties that I have found. I have spent 15 months in considering this matter with the greatest care and in great detail, and I say with complete sincerity that I want to hear today the answers to these points. These points are independent of party differences. They stand out for us all to consider. They are practical points, and that is why I said that I was very glad and anxious that this debate should take place because I want to hear the answers. When I hear them I will be prepared to consider them.

I now pass to Part IV of the White Paper, dealing with business premises, and I should like to make a few general remarks about it. I think everyone would agree that the relations between business tenants and their landlords are those of mutual convenience and mutual service; and I should like the House to ignore for the moment the cases where the relation is purely and genuinely temporary—where the landlord means to get possession on the expiry of the lease for his own occupation or development. These cases represent a very small proportion of the leases of business premises at any time.

I should like hon. Members to ask themselves this question: in the normal run of cases what does each party expect from the other? The landlord expects to conserve his capital and to earn a reasonable return on it. He wants a fair rent and a secure rent. So he wants a good tenant who will preserve the value of the property by looking after it well, by complying with his covenants and by conducting a sound business which will be good for the rent.

Then we turn to the tenant. We have to ask ourselves why he is a tenant at all. The answer is that he does not want to incur the capital cost in providing his own premises. There are some sorts of businesses where—because of their size, or the expense of heavy machinery and equipment that is required, or for some other reason—the occupant must have a freehold or a very long lease; but, generally speaking, the business man wants to put such capital as he has available into his business rather than into his premises. He, therefore, finds a landlord who can provide the premises for hire and he pays the rent out of his business profits. That is a great service to him. In return, the tenant should comply with the reasonable requirements of the landlord.

What can the tenant, on his side, reasonably expect? He can expect that the landlord will treat him with reasonable consideration when the tenancy comes up for renewal; that he will not use the tenant's desire to stay on as an occasion for extorting an unreasonably high rent or other onerous conditions. The tenant will not expect his landlord to say, "I have had a fancy offer of rent from a big firm," or "I could sell these premises with vacant possession for an enormous sum: if you do not give me something comparable you are out." That is a state of affairs which I do not think any of us can face with equanimity. After all, that is a state of affairs which has been envisaged as requiring statutory attention for 26 years since the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1927.

I want to make it quite clear that I believe that the landlord is entitled, on renewal of the tenancy, to a reasonable increase of rent if that reflects an improved condition in the community or improved conditions in a locality inside a town. In other words, as is set out in paragraph 43, he is entitled to the contemporary market value and that is what our proposals suggest he should have.

There is no doubt that as between a reasonable landlord and a reasonable tenant reasonable terms normally prevail, and what our plan does is to ensure that they shall prevail even if one party or the other is being unreasonable. It is as simple as that. No doubt, in some cases there will be room for discussion and differences of opinion when we come to the details of the plan, but with the general principle which lies behind our proposals—I have been dealing with cases of investment in business premises—I do not think there can be any real controversy, political or otherwise.