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FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

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From Week to Week

"The old *Truth* was not anti-Semitic when on occasion it criticised certain Jews, any more than it was anti-French when it criticised Frenchmen, or anti-German when it criticised Germans, or anti-Scottish when it criticised extreme Scottish Nationalism. It was pro-British, unwearyingly defending the cause of British interests.

"Any criticism of the Jew, however, evokes the cry of 'anti-Semitism,' and it is the dread of this smear which silences both the Press and politicians. *Truth* refused to be silenced."

The quoted paragraphs are taken from Mr. A. K. Chesterton's "Open Letter to Mr. Ronald Staples: '*Truth* Has Been Murdered'," copies of which are obtainable from our publishers for cost of postage, 1½d., plus the smallest possible charge for service, ½d.

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Neither the "new" nor the "old" *Truth* is our particular concern. It is our very particular concern that in all matters affecting the life of this country, the conduct of its affairs, the support (or decay) of its culture, a single rule and guiding line should have come into force, an alien rule, inspired by an ancient enemy, backed by what is mistakenly called "the terrible power of the purse." The purse has no power. There is nothing in it but trash. The power is the power of organised conspiracy against individual good, personal good, wherever it may be. The purse is merely one of many devices of the conspirators. It is right and necessary that every instance of this encroachment should be detected and understood.

We are sure our own supporters do not at all clearly understand the ramifications of the immense organisation they are enlisted to combat: how literally it is true that everything is grist to its vast impersonal mill—no, *not* everything. One thing alone, so it seems to us, is exempt. But the task of defining that one thing is well-nigh impossible. As Douglas once wrote: "Probably none of us knows what it is, but nearly all of us recognise it when we meet it. . . . An apt phrase, a racing yacht, the Quebec Bridge, all in their special way may have it. They are Right in the sense that the engineer speaks of having got it Right, because they are as nearly as possible the embodiment of the ideal in the mind of their creators, and they do their job."

"Nearly all of us recognise it when we meet it."

Assuming this assertion to be true, how comes it that it occupies so small a place in the effective conduct of life, and, being of such importance, is nevertheless submerged by the avalanche which pours into the mill to which all is grist? We believe there is a simple answer to that. "In my father's house there are many mansions." Many ideals in many minds. Must we list them? Manning's? Mr. Eric de Maré's? Mr. X's? Mr. Y's? Mr. Z's? ("And they do their job"). Concerning Mr. de Maré, it is now clear what ideal occupies his mind; what his job is. It may be that his construction is a perfect embodiment. The Company of Free Men, which takes the place of the defunct Social Credit Party, is 'the embodiment.' It is "working to unite the whole Social Credit Movement and to cleanse it of all anti-Semitic tendencies at the same time." Just like *Truth*. We almost feel we ought to apologise to Mr. de Maré for singling him out when we have so many more subtle serpents on our very door-step; which is to say the doorstep of the Secretariat. Those who are not with us are against us. What is the next phase in the strategy of resistance?

Yes, we know; but we do not know that the time has come to publish it, though it is very near.

Mr. Norman Webb was right in quoting from Lord Acton the opinion that to expose the *pedigree of ideas* is to discover something potent. But let there be no mistake: without exception, each and every opponent of the Secretariat and of those things for which the Secretariat stands can, if he will, trace his own pedigree directly to the serpent Mr. de Maré desires to take to his bosom (whether the serpent will take as kindly to his place of repose remains to be seen). Some we have with us go back to the first century, some to the second, some to the fifteenth, some no farther than last week; but the inheritance is all the same.

PARLIAMENT

House of Commons: February 24, 1953.

Agriculture (Amendment) Bill

Mr. F. J. Erroll (Altrincham and Sale): I beg to move,

That leave be given to bring in a Bill to amend the law relating to dispossession of owners or occupiers of land under the Agriculture Act, 1947.

I wish to secure only a very small amendment of the law by a Bill which is designed to relieve hardship to a certain class of very small farmers. As hon. Members will know, under the Agriculture Act, 1947, if a farmer is inefficient he may become subject to supervision by his county agricultural executive committee, and if, after a period of supervision, he does not show the necessary degree of improvement a dispossession order can be issued against him by the Minister of Agriculture on the instruction of the executive committee.

He has, of course, a right of appeal to an agricultural land tribunal, but from that tribunal there is no further appeal, except on the very limited sphere of points of law. At least, that is what I am led to understand. However, it is not in regard to the appeal procedure or, indeed, in regard to the workings of the tribunal that my small Bill would be directed. I am concerned with the especial hardship which is caused to some of the very small tenant farmers who are actually living on holdings when they are thus dispossessed, and, for the sake of brevity, I will confine myself to one example, about which I know a considerable amount, concerning one of my constituents.

It is, I think, as most people will agree, a particularly unfortunate case. Mr. Brookes lives with his wife on a smallholding of nine acres, and he produces enough from this holding not only to pay his rent and rates, but to keep himself and his wife. I should add that I have made inquiries of his landlord, who is completely satisfied with his tenant and would be quite content for him to remain in possession of his holding indefinitely.

Mr. Brookes has been recovering from a severe operation, but, nevertheless, the production from his holding is increasing. But this is not good enough for the agricultural executive committee who, having supervised him, have decided that he must go, and have asked the Minister to issue the necessary dispossession order. The irony of the situation is that had Mr. Brookes' nine acres consisted of rose gardens and croquet lawns he would not have been dispossessed, but because he earns his modest living off his land he must go.

He is elderly and he will not find another job very easily. He will have no house to go to, and for him and his wife it will be Public Assistance and a futile search for "digs" in a densely populated district. The tribunal have confirmed the decision of the agricultural committee, and the Minister is compelled therefore, to issue the dispossession order, as he has no powers of discretion in the matter.

My little Bill would prevent dispossession in cases of this kind. Supervision would continue where necessary, but there would be no dispossession of owners or occupiers of agricultural units comprising fewer than 15 acres of agricultural land, provided the owner or occupier was actually resident on the land.

The House may like to have a few figures to show how modest, though genuine, my proposals are. In 1952, 25 occupiers of land of fewer than 15 acres were dispossessed, but only seven of those were actually resident on their holdings. If my Bill is passed by the House, and the same situation applies in 1953, only about 45 acres of land would be involved. Last year, although 45 acres of land might have been tilled more efficiently, seven homes were broken up in the process. My Bill would prevent these small dispossessions and, if passed, it could take effect before my constituent is himself dispossessed. I, therefore, commend my modest Measure to the House, and I hope most sincerely that it will give me leave to introduce the Bill.

Mr. Anthony Hurd (Newbury): I rise to object to leave being given. I think that my hon. Friend the Member for Altrincham and Sale (Mr. Erroll), while putting his case with disarming charm, as always, is really trying to do too much under the Ten Minutes' Rule procedure. No one wants to inflict the hardship of dispossession in cases which would be of little account in food production. I know that I shall have the House with me when I say that the county agricultural executive committees are practical men. They do not attempt to tackle little patches of weed-infested land unless they are becoming a real nuisance in the neighbourhood, either by spreading weeds or by setting such a bad example as to discourage everyone else.

The Cheshire County Agricultural Executive Committee, which I met during the war was a first-class committee, and no doubt it is a good committee today. It consists of 12 members, five nominated as usual by the Minister, three nominated by the National Farmers' Union, two by the County Landowners' Association and two by the workers' trade unions. The committee comprises a good body of practical men who are not likely to bother themselves with something unless it is worth tackling.

I have tried to find out how many cases there may be in the 15-acre group for the whole country. I am told there were only 25 dispossession cases last year, but there are 150,000 agricultural holdings under 15 acres and they total 850,000 acres. We spent last Friday deploring the loss of good, fertile agricultural land. Here are 850,000 acres. Is the House lightly to discard food production from that area as being of no account?

My hon. Friend said that his little Bill would protect only those who are living on their holdings. Nothing is easier than dumping down a caravan or a shack on a piece of empty ground and staking a claim in that manner. We shall be well advised to keep all agricultural holdings within the framework of the Agriculture Act, 1947. Part of the Act provides guarantees in respect of prices and markets and another puts an obligation on the agricultural community to farm properly and imposes a responsibility for self-discipline, and it is in that respect that the committee are concerned. They have a by no means enviable task, but they do it well. In this case, they have decided that the smallholder really was not trying to make the best of his land.

I ask the House not to give leave for the introduction of the Bill. Rather, the House should turn its mind to reviewing the machinery of the Agriculture Act, 1947, to

see where, after five years' experience, it needs to be improved. My view is that the good husbandry provisions, and particularly cases of dispossession, should come for final sanction before a court of appeal, and I hope it will not be too long before a Measure on those lines is brought forward. But we must do nothing to undermine the Agriculture Act. I am sure my hon. Friend did not intend to do that in his proposals, but I am afraid that that would be their effect. For this reason, I urge the House not to agree to the introduction of the Bill.

The House divided: Ayes, 65; Noes, 314.

House of Commons: *March* 11, 1953.

Hydro-Electric Development, Scotland

Colonel Alan Gomme-Duncan (Perth and East Perthshire): I beg to move,

That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board (Constructional Scheme No. 25) Confirmation Order, 1953 (S.I., 1953, No. 138), dated 30th January, 1953, a copy of which was laid before this House on 2nd February, be annulled.

. . . I wish to make it perfectly clear that I am not opposed to electrical development in Scotland. Praying to annul the Order is the only course open to us; we cannot pray to amend or change it. We must pray to annul it, which very often gives the impression in the country that we are opposed to electrical development in Scotland. . . .

Does our experience of previous schemes inspire confidence in results from the expenditure we have to make? I do not know, but I feel very certain that a scheme like this requires most careful consideration by the House before it is accepted. The scheme proposes to cover an area of roughly 1,600 square miles in one of the most lovely parts of Scotland, all of it in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Kinross and West Perthshire. There are to be seven new power stations, about 25 aqueducts, six dams and 15 to 20 reservoirs in this scheme.

The first thing I want to know is what will be the effect on the water supplies of that area of Scotland if this scheme is carried into effect? What will be the effect on the water supplies to farms, towns and for purposes other than hydro-electricity? I have always pleaded since I came into the House in 1945 that there should be an overall consideration and examination of the potential water supplies of Scotland as a whole so that the proper proportions for hydro-electricity, town use, and so on can be established. That has never been done.

We should realise that this scheme will use a vast amount of material, particularly cement and steel. I am not sure that that material could not be put to better use at this stage. The scheme will also take a large amount of efficient labour. Among the labourers concerned are highly expert tunnellers, a number of whom have come from the mines where I understand there is a shortage of labour today. Is that the best use that could be made of them, or should those men be returned to the mines? Work on roads and on forestry, particularly in the devastated forestry areas, are two other points which spring to mind when we consider the use of the available labour.

On the question of expenditure, the estimated sum was at first £15½ million, but as a result of Questions in the House we have learned that this has since been amended to about £18½ million. That is a very large sum of money. I do not care to anticipate what will be the total when this scheme is completed. If the other schemes which have been put into effect are taken into consideration the ultimate cost is going to be vastly greater.

In view of the Chancellor's warning about capital investment are we quite sure that at this stage we are justified in accepting a scheme costing £20 million or perhaps £30 million, judging from what has happened with regard to previous schemes? However desirable it may be, should it be given first priority at the present time? I can think of a vast scheme which is urgently needed for draining land which is liable to flooding in Scotland, which would probably cost £8 million, and would rescue or save anything up to a quarter of a million arable acres. . . ,

At the present time should this scheme have first priority for whatever amount of capital is available? We have given borrowing powers to the North of Scotland Hydro-Electric Board up to £200 million, but whatever we may have given them in that respect we should consider what is most desirable in the interests of Scotland and of Britain as a whole, and what can be done with the money available. It is on those grounds that I ask the House to consider this Motion, and to think well before deciding how this vast sum of money should be expended.

(*To be continued*).

From "The Spectator"

SOCIAL CREDIT. Sir,—In criticising my description of the Alberta Social Credit Government as 'a form of experimental Socialism,' your correspondent, Mr. Eugene Forsey, is merely emphasising the disparity between theory and practice. I agree that the Alberta Government conducts its affairs in an eminently conservative manner; the fact remains that it was returned to power—and at present maintains its semi-hypnotic hold on the rural electorate—by nominally advocating the most violent fiscal reforms *which would certainly produce a Socialistic egalitarianism if they were ever carried out.* The Alberta Government, in common with its avowedly Socialist counterpart in Saskatchewan, has been distinguished by the speed with which its zeal for social justice evaporated in face of the sudden prosperity resulting from oil and natural gas revenues. But Premier Manning's Fundamentalist disciples would probably desert *en masse* were he publicly to repudiate the Social Credit dogmas which so captivated his predecessor, Aberhart—notwithstanding the fact that Manning has neither the intention nor the legal power to put them into effect.—

"Yours faithfully,

"DESMOND. E. HENN.

"2066, Angus Street, Regina, Saskatchewan, Canada."

The words italicised in the above (unemphasised in the original) embody a variation from current practice in the misrepresentation of Social Credit which should be noticed.

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Douglas and the Ironical

Commenting on one of his most veridical creations, (Irene, in "Smoke") the Russian novelist, Tourgenieff (or 'Turgenev' as it is spelled without regard for Russian phonetics), said she was feared and disliked by men because she had 'the gift of irony.' Irony *is* a gift; it is even a sublime gift: it is the gift of detachment from unadulterated self-interest in alliance with an impulsion towards reverence for Truth. Simulation is thus seen at a disadvantage besides *dis*simulation (*eironeia*), simulation being the bigger liar.

So the introducer, modestly innominates as "H.M.", of Shelley's youthful translation of the "Menexenus" of Plato, has our regard when he refers to "this admirable specimen of Socratic irony." It begins:—

"Whence comest thou, O Menexenus? From the forum?"

"Even so; and from the senate-house."

"What was thy business with the senate? Art thou persuaded that thou hast attained to that perfection of discipline and philosophy, from which thou mayest aspire to undertake greater matters? Wouldst thou, at thine age, my wonderful friend, assume to thyself the government of us who are thine elders, lest thy family should at any time fail in affording us a protector?"

"If thou, O Socrates, shouldst permit and counsel me to enter into public life., I would earnestly endeavour to fit myself for the attempt. If otherwise, I would abstain. On the present occasion, I went to the senate-house, merely from having heard that the senate was about to elect one to speak concerning those who are dead. Thou knowest that the celebration of their funeral approaches?"

"Assuredly. But whom have they chosen?"

"The election is deferred until tomorrow; I imagine that either Dion or Archinus will be chosen."

"In truth, Menexenus, the condition of him who dies in battle is, in every respect, fortunate and glorious. If he is poor, he is conducted to his tomb with a magnificent and honourable funeral, amidst the praises of all; if even he were a coward, his name is included in a panegyric pronounced by the most learned men; from which all the vulgar expressions, which unpremeditated composition might admit, have been excluded by the careful labour of leisure; who praise so admirably, enlarging upon every topic remotely or immediately connected with the subject, and blending so eloquent a variety of expressions, that praising in every manner the state of which we are citizens, and those who have perished in battle, and the ancestors who preceded our generation, and ourselves who yet live, they steal away our spirits as with enchantment. Whilst I listen to their praises, O Menexenus, I am penetrated with a very lofty conception of myself, and overcome by their flatteries, I appear to myself immeasurably more honourable and generous than before, and many of the strangers who are accustomed to accompany me, regard me with additional veneration, after having heard these relations; they seem to consider the whole state, including me, much more worthy of admiration, after they have been soothed into persuasion by the orator. The opinion thus inspired of my own majesty will last me more than three days sometimes, ..."

The fragment ends (unswervingly ironical—*i.e.*, incorruptibly faithful—to the last) with the promise of Socrates himself to deliver an oration, not his own, but one of his teacher, Aspasia's.

Anyone who sees in Douglas more than a star to which they may hitch their nugatory wagon will know exactly what they may do to commemorate him and achieve themselves at one and the same time. If they don't, it is because their attention has too soon been diverted from the printed page of his words to something nearer and dearer. It is nevertheless our opinion that in this case the nearer and dearer will be extinguished, lose its light, before the impersonal word burns to its last intensity. It is almost the only hope there is that it will be seen to burn at all.

Not in this but in a related connection, it may be soon our need to write more scathingly of a hindrance which must somehow be set aside. Douglas on one memorable occasion, hearing the opinion that only individual initiative backed by genius could defeat the enemy of mankind, retorted: "Ah, yes! That may be. But it does not mean, neither does it say that genius backed by individual initiative will do anything at all." What more than initiative trying ineffectually to back itself is a public memorial to anybody? We do not know. It is what Socrates, in the quoted passage said; and since, having said it, he agreed to play his part, so, we think, may we. For our part we do so knowing and confessing what it is.

The desire for a Memorial to Douglas is wide, and spreads more widely as it is resisted. It is a surrogate phenomenon, and, as such, would be better expended of its force than inflated by the force of resistance. There may be a form in which to clothe it which, however indifferent to the mind of Douglas, is honourable to us. Steps have been taken to discover it and to realise it when it is discovered. These will shortly be announced.

Lao Tsu

"As restrictions and prohibitions are multiplied in the Empire, the people grow poorer and poorer. When the people are subjected to overmuch government, the land is thrown into confusion. The greater the number of laws and enactments, the more thieves and robbers there will be. Therefore the Sage says: 'So long as I do nothing the people will work out their own reformation. So long as I love calm, the people will right themselves. If only I keep from meddling, the people will grow rich. If only I am free from desire, the people will come naturally back to simplicity'."—Lao Tsu.

The German Empire*

by DRYDEN GILLING SMITH.

Franz von Papen's family came from the province of Westphalia, and is mentioned by name in royal decrees as early as the 13th century. When the Holy Roman Empire finally broke up under the attacks of Napoleon the family continued its allegiance to the Emperor in Vienna. The connection with Prussia began with his father, an officer in the Dusseldorf Uhlan regiment, who had fought in the campaigns of 1864, 1866 and 1870 leading to the unification of the German states under Prussia. Franz von Papen was accepted as a cadet himself in 1891 and describes the thrilling experience of his final years of training in Berlin, when the guard regiments paraded before the Emperor. He adds "But I do not believe these sentiments were any different from those of any other country with strong regimental traditions." In 1897 he was selected for the Imperial corps of pages which brought him into intimate contact with the royal household. He attended the Emperor on state occasions, the opening of the Reichstag, royal levées, investitures, and observed from close quarters many of the leading soldiers and politicians of the period. Looking back from the year 1952, he says "The German nation, brought up in monarchist traditions of authority, obedience and sense of duty, was to learn how scandalously these traditions could be misused by unscrupulous leaders. If we had been allowed to retain the institution of the crown there would never have been a Hitler. If President Wilson and his advisers had known Europe better and had had a greater appreciation of the historical processes that had formed it, we might have been given an opportunity to develop our own form of modern democracy, instead of having forced on us a parliamentary system which, by 1932, had reduced itself to absurdity. . . . In Berlin's eastern sector the old royal palace has now been demolished, the site being marked only by the red flag of Asiatic slavery."

In 1903 he obtained leave from the Cavalry School at Hanover and came to England to enjoy a season's hunting near Market Harborough. He had never ridden better horses. Afterwards he went to London and enjoyed the social life he was able to lead. He came again in 1913 in search of stud horses for the Kaiser's Master of the Horse. "I have not seen England since and have no great wish to experience its present-day austerity. Even so, I still envy the British their constitutional monarchy, although I have never really been able to understand how such a country, basically conservative—in spite of its Liberals and Socialists—could have supported so readily the abolition of the monarchy in Germany." These comments on Wilson and England should not be treated as a significant part of the work but serve to delimit the field of Von Papen's special experience and knowledge. We are already familiar with the works of other writers who have shown us the reason's for this, at first sight, "odd" behaviour of Wilson, and of English foreign policy, and what interests they were serving.

In 1905 Herr Von Papen married the youngest daughter of a Saar family, the Boch-Galhaus, who had many relations in France and Luxemburg. French was the normal language spoken in the house of his in-laws. In 1907 he began a three year course at the War Academy in Berlin which was the training for the General Staff. This included detached service with different branches of the army and a long leave in France to obtain greater knowledge of the language and the people. In 1911 he was accepted for General Staff duties, and spent two years combining work in the capital with social life in Potsdam. He says that from his own observation, he saw nothing in the work of the General Staff that hastened the coming of war. They had no secrets as far as the Danube Monarchy was concerned, and had a constant exchange of staff officers with the latter. "Our intimate knowledge of the effects of modern weapons and the scale of European armaments made us more anxious to maintain peace than most of the politicians." The Austrian Commander in Chief often tried to persuade Germany to join Austria in a Balkan campaign but Moltke, the German Chief of Staff, knew that this would mean war with Russia and also the military weakness of Austria.

After his visit to England, Von Papen acquired the reputation of being an anglophile, and was teased that having British breeches, boots and saddles, he would soon be wearing a British uniform. In 1913 he was appointed Military Attaché in Washington. Before leaving he was invited to lunch with the Kaiser, who told him to "Learn to speak English well, study the mentality of the people, and I will send you to London in due course." He gave a special message of goodwill to Theodore Roosevelt to whom the Kaiser had taken a liking.

Von Papen arrived in America to find the two countries to which he was accredited, Mexico and the United States, on the brink of war. In Mexico City he was asked to organise a volunteer brigade of Europeans to protect their lives and property then menaced by revolutionaries. An American flag had been torn down by a Mexican mob in Tampico and the American press was agitating for reprisals. The American ultimatum expired in April 1914. Von Papen was reminded of this by a similar incident in Austria in 1938, when he said that what had served as an excuse for President Wilson to declare war would no doubt serve as an excuse for Hitler. He was attached to the American expeditionary force where he met Captain MacArthur, though he had no hand in the latter's exploit of crossing the frontier disguised as a cowboy and bringing back three Mexican locomotives.

At this period official quarters in Germany had not considered America as a power to be reckoned with in world affairs. Von Papen was quick to notice the facts that came to his attention. "Although small, the American army had excellent officers and first class troops. In my reports to Berlin I insisted, at this early stage, that with American industrial capacity in the background, the United States would be able to expand their army almost without limit within a very short time. . . . The interesting point to remember is that the British were highly dissatisfied and suspicious of what they regarded as reawakened American imperialism. Relations between the representatives of the two powers were by no means cordial. . . ."

Before continuing with his experiences in America Herr von Papen makes one or two of his own comments on events

**Franz von Papen—Memoirs,* André Deutsch, London, 1952.

immediately responsible for the 1914-18 war. As he sees it the decisive factor had been the signing of the Anglo-Russian convention in 1907. In the days of Bismarck and Salisbury, Russia was regarded as an Asiatic power whose influence in Europe had to be neutralised. The Convention, by giving Germany the threat of war on two fronts, was one of the main causes of the ensuing arms race. With the Entente Cordiale this deprived Germany of the security she had once enjoyed through British support; for France made no secret of her determination to obtain revenge for the defeat of 1870. However in the Balkan war of 1912, when war threatened between Austria and Russia, the Bismarckian policy, of never committing Germany unless Austria was actually threatened, was followed and peace was maintained by close co-operation with the British government. The British who have never had the sense to see the value of giving as many European powers as possible a vested interest in "occupying" Asia and Africa, have now to face the growing problem of native insubordination almost single handed. They have been so pig headed about stopping European powers from getting colonial or similar interests in other parts of the world, that they have twice let this make them abandon their strategy in Europe—both times with disastrous results. In 1914 it was the possibility of the German development of Turkey, the Baghdad railway and the opening up of the middle east to German trade, that, according to Von Papen, alarmed the British into refusing to take a stand with Germany, as they had done in 1912. It was of course the crazy (to most Europeans 'hypocritical') behaviour of the British over Italy's colonisation of Abyssinia, that was instrumental in breaking the balance of power in Europe and forcing on Italy the politics of the Rome-Berlin axis. Looking at press cuttings for the 1935-6 era one realises the extent to which this diseased affection of friend 'paleface' for his black brother, by then his black superior brother, had taken root to the elimination of all other considerations. The majority of Englishmen seem really to have believed that the noble savagery of some East African tribes was more important than any attempt to preserve civilised life in Europe. I am here recording a state of mind, without reference to the people responsible for inculcating that state of mind.

The Von Papen pleas that German interests in the middle east were 'only trade' shows that he did not realise that the British government (A Liberal complement of Lloyd Georges, Samuels and Rufus Isaacses) had no more concern with real British interests than east-end barrow boys. It was precisely this 'trade' that they, or their associates, were most concerned with.

Peace had been maintained in 1912 only by close co-operation between Great Britain and Germany. In 1914 once it was clear that Russia intended to aid Serbia and that the Danube Monarchy was in direct danger, with Germany also threatened, "Peace and Europe's equilibrium could only have been maintained if both Britain and Germany had brought pressure to bear on the same side. But the British government chose to take another decision. . . . I do not deny the many mistakes of the Wilhelmian era. After Bismarck disappeared from the scene, our foreign policy was confused and often high-handed, and our attitude to some of our neighbours psychologically ill-judged. . . . The German people entered the conflict in 1914 in the honest conviction that they were engaging in a defensive war. French policy since 1871 had always been conducted with a view to regaining Alsace and Lorraine . . . and Russia sought to regain some of the prestige she had lost as the result of her defeat in the Far East by obtaining some of her European objectives. Germany and Great Britain entered the war without any territorial demands which required a war to satisfy them."

As to the 'piece of paper' pretext for our entering, to protect 'poor little Belgium' (making it a four year battlefield could have little practical value as 'protection') this possibility never even occurred to the German government. Ever since the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, when war on two fronts became a definite threat, the General Staff had, as an annual exercise, to prepare a campaign to give a quick decisive victory on one front to enable the transfer of forces to the other. When the German Chancellor wished to adapt this to the prevailing political situation, the Chief of Staff, Moltke, was obliged to reply that the plan of campaign led through Belgium and could not be altered without running the risk of losing the war on the first day. Though this particular move had unfortunate results for Germany, it contrasts favourably with the gyrations of our leaders who are forever allowing politics, or equally absurd red herrings, to interfere with concepts of strategy. We could not even be allied with the Soviet without turning them into "Gallant Russian allies."

German diplomatic contact with America had been so limited that Herr Von Papen found himself engaging in an ever widening sphere of activities. He was the only military representative of the Central Powers in the U.S.A. The German embassy in Washington became ineffective the moment war broke out. The Foreign Office in Berlin was so unprepared for war that it had not foreseen the cutting of cable communications by the British. There was no German source of news in the U.S.A. whose press spoke entirely of German defeats in France, "although a careful reader was able to appreciate that the place names mentioned indicated fairly constant German advnces. . . . The worst aspect of this isolation was the fantastic atrocity propaganda with which our enemies filled the vacuum." Another difficulty of the German diplomatic corps was their lack of contact with President Wilson and the Democrat Party, for their contact had been with the party supported till then by most German-Americans, the Republicans. An interesting sidelight is offered on the 'level' of the 'German elderly aristocrats' by Von Papen's remark that they instinctively shunned Bryan, the renowned Democrat Leader and Secretary of State, because of his continued 'attacks' on such people as J. Pierpont Morgan, August Belmont and other financiers who "belonged to the social strata in which moved most of the elderly German aristocrats who made up the diplomatic corps. . . ."

Neither the Kaiser nor Moltke had realised the potential of the United States as a factor in a European war. Von Papen suggested in September, 1914 that the relatively few American war factories should be given enough orders to occupy their full capacity, but this repeated suggestion was ignored, while the allied purchasing agents arrived in droves to arrange arms contracts. However, the Americans were "not inclined to take undue commercial risks . . . The

prices for these immense orders were raised to a level which offered some possibility of amortising the cost of the additional plant . . ." and contracts were not settled until the late spring of 1915. However, with the aid of an American friend Von Papen formed "The Bridgeport Projectile Company," which gave two years' full capacity orders to every firm making machine tools, hydraulic presses and rolling mills for the manufacture of war materials. Permission to do this arrived only just in time from Germany, but by the time the allies had settled prices and started to place orders they found all the contractors with the equipment needed to build the necessary factories already booked up. The secret was well kept and it was generally believed that other firms had bought machinery to produce for the allies. Of course this material could not be sent to Germany and there was some difficulty in disposing of it so that the allies could not lay their hands on it, but arrangements were made to send some to Mexico, Norway, Sweden and Spain. One evening the brief-case of Albert, the commercial attaché and financial adviser to the Company, was stolen in the underground and the contents finished up with the American or British Secret Service and later in the American press. There was an outcry among those with a financial interest in supplying the allies, and the 'Bridgeport' contracts were challenged, cancelled or replaced by 'priority' orders.

Herr Von Papen refused to countenance any of the illegal and often crazy attempts to hold up American production by 'outrages.' He knew that such attempts would have little or no practical effect except to aid the high-pressure campaign to prepare America for a declaration of war. His chief difficulty was in dealing with the army of free lance bandits who came to his office with schemes, such as that of blowing up the Canadian Pacific Railway at key points to stop troop trains. Among these was the famous Von Rintelen, 'The Dark Invader' who showed the amateurish nature of his pursuits by going straight to Von Papen's office, which was the last thing anyone who did NOT want to be followed should have done. There were also many agents provocateurs and the American Intelligence Service "discovered" the most sensational plans for blowing up all New York's subway and port installations, which the Governor of New York, General Leonard Wood frankly admitted at a tea interview were part of the campaign to reduce the public's resistance to entry into war. Finally in December, 1915, Herr Von Papen was declared to be *persona non grata* to the U.S. government, though no specific charges were made.

He returned to Germany and tried to explain to the Chief of Staff, the Chancellor and the Kaiser, the tremendous effect of the allied propaganda machine in America. This was chiefly relying on the moral element of 'criminal' Germany and got its main boost from incidents like the sinking of the Lusitania. He urged the immediate restriction of the scope of U-boat warfare since in these circumstances it was doing more harm than good to the German cause. However the Kaiser was unable to imagine a situation in which such 'moral sentiments' could influence national policy, and paid little heed to Von Papen's warnings. The Chief of Staff could do nothing because the Navy occupied a highly independent position, as the spoilt darling of the Kaiser. Bethmann-Hollweg, the Chancellor, persuaded Von Papen to give a press conference on the subject. However, no sooner had this been arranged and official approval sought, than Herr Von Papen received orders to join an Infantry Regiment on the Western Front as battalion commander.

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Von Papen says that his experiences on the Western Front differed in no way from those of millions of others who took part, but offers one or two personal observations, which confirms the widely held view that the strategists on both sides were trying to fight Napoleonic wars with modern weapons, and had learnt nothing from the first 'modern war' waged in America from 1861-5; either this or else the fantastic slaughter was caused by the continuous interference of politicians, thinking only of holding on to positions 'at all costs' for propaganda purposes. It is interesting to note that the excellent biography of Field Marshall Von Manstein by R. T. Paget, shows Hitler as behaving in exactly the same way. He shared with the Russians an absurd veneration for the prestige value of positions and continually obstructed those generals, who were pursuing the more realistic aim of keeping their armies intact to attack the Russian *armies* when and where they were most vulnerable.

Von Papen says that "The terrible losses caused in the Battle of the Somme, due to the manner in which relatively unimportant tactical positions were defended to the last, convinced every front-line officer that the German system of defence was out of date and far too rigid. *The principal problem in any war has always been to use human lives as sparingly as possible.*" Bertrand de Jouvenal, writing in *Humanitas*, has explained that the French Revolution reintroduced into Europe the 'popular war,' waged by a 'people' whipped up to a religious frenzy by its 'leaders.' It did not 'count the cost' and willingly voted universal conscription, so that Napoleon could dispose of huge armies of 'cannon fodder,' and employ tactical methods (such as the column formation) that none of his opponents dared risk using. Modern 'democratic' wars are waged on the same principle, with the same unlimited objectives, so unlimited that no one (among those taking part) really knows what he is fighting for or gains any practical objective at all in return for his unlimited sacrifices. It is on a par with the unlimited objective of some one who votes for the Socialist, the Liberal, the Conservative, the Communist or any other Party and gets nothing of any practical use from any of them. The point I am trying to bring out is that the *mental attitude* so far shown by people in 'democracies' *towards war* ("fighting for freedom," "fighting against aggression,"

"fighting against Fascism") *is*, like their way of treating politics as a party matter, *fatal* to their ever achieving success in war any more than they have succeeded in party politics. This is not to say that democracies have *always* gone to war without reason, or that this mental attitude is responsible for war. Some people obviously profit from the spectacle of European powers periodically decimating each other, and no doubt do their best to encourage the suicidal state of mind to which I have referred. However there have always been people capable of turning other men's imbecility to their own account, and they will continue to do so in this case until a sufficiently large number of potentially sane individuals can learn to extricate themselves from the group infection that breeds such ridiculous mental attitudes. War is, constitutionally, the last resort of a nation needing, for the security of its members, to prevent another nation gaining a specific objective. Once the other nation's military commander recognises that he cannot achieve the objective intended, or alternatively when the first nation has seen that it cannot prevent the attainment of the said objective, the war ceases, the aim of each military commander being to preserve the greatest possible part of his armed force intact so that he can use it with greater tactical advantage on a future occasion. It is obvious that this classic military conception of war is much more conducive to peace than the behaviour of the "pacifist" politicians who hurl endless abuse at "militarist war mongers," but nevertheless always succeed in landing their countries in war on very unfavourable terms.

Of the English tactical warfare, Herr Von Papen says that he remembers the allied attack between Ancre and Chaulnes in September 1916; when the British and Canadians first used tanks. "A complete tactical break-through, the achievement of which the enemy dreamed, had taken place, although they did not seem to realize it. A few dozen administrative personnel was all that stood between the enemy and a major victory. . . . This curious failure of the British to exploit success was something I was to experience on several occasions."

In June, 1917 Herr Von Papen was appointed operations officer under his old chief Falkenhayn in the Middle East. He conversed with Turkish officers in French, and explained to them his experience of Allenby's methods at Vimy Ridge. These were to precede an attack with days of bombardment, against which the cactus groves of the desert offered no real defence. He explained that it was necessary to man the forward positions as lightly as possible, and keep his main strength in reserve. His efforts at convincing the Turks were without success, for the Turkish infantryman was accustomed to defending a given position to the last bullet but had no taste for open warfare. Allenby used the methods predicted and achieved a complete break-through at Beersheba, but this time the English distaste for tactical warfare prevented the allied armies from profiting greatly from this victory, and marching on Jerusalem. "This was a tactical error which I have never understood to this day. . . . It was the story of the Western Front—Thiepval and Arras—all over agian. The enemy seemed to be content with his early success and now paused for the regrouping of his own units. If Allenby had known how near he was to complete victory, he could have ended the Palestine campaign in November 1917 and brought Turkey to her knees a year earlier."

Of T. E. Lawrence he says that although the military value of his exploits was limited, he was "a constant threat to our rear." "A truly remarkable performance on the part of our engineers enabled us to keep this railway (to Hedjaz) running until the end of the war, in spite of the ever repeated Bedouin attacks, and the Turkish division in Medina was maintained until the end. . . . . The Arabian tribes who still adhered to Turkish suzerainty kept us continually informed about Lawrence's whereabouts." The oases were easily found by the air reconnaissance units and a white tent amidst a group of black tents told them where he was, though it was still an accepted convention of desert warfare that peaceful Arab camps were not attacked.

The military outcome of the war was decided in Europe and the news only gradually filtered through to the Germans in Turkey. ". . . for most of us the worst blow was the abdication forced on the Kaiser . . . . after President Wilson's refusal to deal with the existing German régime." All earlier offers of peace to President Wilson by the Central Powers had been rebuffed as "German propaganda." As for Wilson's peace proposals, the "fourteen points," including "no annexations, contributions, or punitive damages;" these had been made impossible before their declaration by the various pacts which the allies had signed.

Secretariat Correspondence

During the last six months it is notable that there has been a considerable increase in doubtless well meaning but more or less irresponsible correspondence between social crediters in general. It is recognised that difficulty may well exist in assessing the authenticity of what is received, particularly overseas. Correspondents are therefore advised that all correspondence authentically from the Social Credit Secretariat is written as from 49, Prince Alfred Road, Liverpool, 15, and (even if a director's personal address is added for speed and convenience) reply may always be made to Headquarters at that address, where enquiries should be made concerning the standing of anyone who may be in question.

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