A lecture by Mr. Frank Lloyd Wright at the annual prize-giving of The Architectural Association, London, on July 14, 1950, was published in The Architects' Journal on July 27, 1950. With the permission of the Editor and Mr. Wright we re-publish this lecture.

I have had experience of a great many imports in my own country, but I stand here today an import, by way of the A.A., and a very happy thing I find it. It is a very nice thing to be an import as an architect, and I hope that all of you young people will some day grow up and be imported yourselves.

Some of the young people who are starting out to practise architecture are receiving prizes today. In the giving of prizes it is just as it is in any competition. First of all the judges are selected from among those upon whom the circumstances, whatever they might be, can agree, so that you get the average of an average, and then they always go through them and throw out the best ones and the worst ones, and then they get together, and average upon the average, so that the prize or the result of the competition is an average of an average of averages. It does not matter if they do throw out the best ones, but it is important they should throw out the worst ones.

You are coming into this field of architecture. I do not know what else to call it; I do not like to call it a profession, because I think that the profession of architecture is the form-giver of his society. That must be so so long as it is a matter of taste, a matter of fashion, so long as we have the 57 varieties to choose from and never do a thing for ourselves.

Now, it is my fear, as I stand here today before you, that the little prophetic insight into the nature of building which organic architecture represents, having produced effects at the beginning of an era which was ushered in, I think, by Mr. Louis H. Sullivan and alongside him myself, may become, by way of these effects which were produced, another effect, another fact. I think that you can see all over the world today indications of a new style. But we do not want another style; we have had enough of styles in architecture. We want a new reality; we want to face reality.

What would reality be in a civilisation committed to the ideals of democracy? What would it be? A style? No. That commitment would be a commitment to the ideal of freedom, would it not? Freedom in architecture—what would it be like? Every man for himself and the devil take the hindermost? No; that would be licence. Where does this freedom come from that we profess as the normal aim of our democratic life? It comes from within you. It is not something that can be made for you, that can be handed to you, but it is something in which you can be allowed to develop and in which you can be protected, and that protection is what we need now for the individual.

I think you will realise now that when you speak of individuality you are not speaking of personality. That distinction is usually missed. Our personalities we have nothing to do with; they are accidents. It is by what we do to develop our personality into a true individuality that we begin to differ from animals and become really man-like, really human beings, capable of being. Democracy is the championship and the protection of the individual per se, as such. That means that organic architecture is per se, of the individual for the individual by way of individuals. There is lots of room for error, lots of room to go astray, very little to go upon except inner ideas, except that from within the nature of everything must come whatever you do in the way of making a form or making a plan or whatever you do as an architect.

(Continued on page 4.)
THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

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From Week to Week

"For I believe that the whole trouble with this country is not that we don't work hard enough, but that we have been working far too hard for far too long. . . ."

"If we are not careful we shall find ourselves a nation of ants, working overtime to make labour-saving devices for other people. . . ."

"It is perhaps time that the structure of the Welfare State was examined. And time, before we start working even harder, that the questions were answered:

"What are we slaving for? For how long must we slave?" And "Is it worth it?"

—Lord Hailsham, Sunday Graphic, October 23, 1955.

The change from "inexorable economic laws" to a managed economy was skillfully effected under cover of war, and it is as well to make careful note of the change. There is no indication that on the technical level there is any limit to management, unless it is in the disposal of the products of industry, or the exhaustion of raw materials.

The possible limits ("What is not possible is not interesting") are on the psychological and the spiritual planes.

"The debate in the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe to-day on re-launching the European idea was dominated by a speech from Mr. Spaak, the Belgian Foreign Minister, who said it was clear that the political Europe which many had wanted was not yet possible, although the constitutional method was obviously the quickest and most logical. As the European Defence Community had not been accepted, the same aims must be attained by other methods on the economic and functional plane."

—The Times, October 22, 1955.

Perhaps this has something to do with the peculiarly synchronous "balance of payments" crisis which has hit Great Britain, Australia, and other countries all of a sudden.

Social Credit Secretariat

Mr. John Mitchell has resigned the position of Deputy Chairman for the United Kingdom of the Social Credit Secretariat, and all other offices held by him in the Secretariat, effective from 14th October, 1955.

BRYAN W. MONAHAN, Chairman.

A Fairy Tale

The ship was crossing the wide ocean, just then calm and smooth. It was a sound ship, had weathered many a gale. The crew were going about their various duties and the passengers lounging, strolling, reading, flirting, as passengers are wont to do. Suddenly there is the dull rumble of an explosion below decks. Sabotage! An infernal machine has blown a hole in the hull just above the water line. With each roll or pitch of the ship some water floods into the damaged hold. The passengers panic and are persuaded by agitators to rush with what belongings they can lay their hands on to the damaged, the port side. Below decks some of the crew move freight to port. The result is that there is now a steady stream of water through the hole and the ship gradually lists more and more to port.

One man among the passengers can see that if the weight of passengers and freight was transferred to starboard the hole would be well above the water and the ship could be saved. But have you ever heard of a panicking mob listen to reason? After a time this man persuades another and still later yet another of the sense and urgency of his advice. If unchecked, the list to port will at some moment reach an angle when no shifting of weight will keep the gaping hole above water. It is therefore a race in time between the cruel sea and the man and women of sense persuading the crew to shift all weight to starboard. When the moment of no return is reached the fate of ship and crew and passengers is sealed. The evil men on board will have made arrangements to get away on one of the lifeboats; but all the other boats have had their bottoms stove in with hatchets. Whatever the men of sense may think of their chances of persuading the mass of passengers to act correctly, they will certainly not give up trying until the crucial moment of catastrophe arrives.

Analogy can never be more than illustrative and always breaks down at some point, so we will leave it here. The Social Credit Movement is represented in the story by the men of sense. In them apathy, selfishness, and moral cowardice become an even greater sin than they normally are. The men of evil are plotting to enslave the human race under the tyranny of a small handful of power maniacs. If they are successful then Christian civilisation will disappear and barbarism take its place for centuries, perhaps for millennia. The human race may with luck slowly and painfully climb out of the pit into which it has been thrown; or some "scientist" will succeed in discovering what appears to be the present atomic scientists' dream, a bomb to set off an atomic explosion, and still later yet another of the sense and urgency of his advice.

H. R. PURCHASE.

An Introduction to Social Credit
by Dr. Bryan W. Monahan.

Relating the later to the earlier phases of the doctrine first enunciated by Major C. H. Douglas thirty-seven years ago, and developed by him over a period of thirty-four years.

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The Social Crediter

Metaphysics

In his essay “An Introduction to Social Credit” which, after appearing serially in The Australian Social Credit and The Social Crediter in 1947, was published in book form, Dr. Bryan W. Monahan devoted the last of the four parts to Metaphysics. We re-publish this in two sections, the first of which follows:

Zeno brought to his problem[1] two concepts, those of time and distance, and by cutting those concepts into unimaginably small pieces, ‘proved’ that motion was impossible. He might, in the same way, have applied to the measurement of length a wooden yard-stick, and then, by shaving the stick with a knife into splinters, so ‘proved’ that length was impossible.

There is no essential difference in the way by which the official economist ‘refutes’ the analysis demonstrating how the gap between purchasing-power and prices arises. Zeno in his argument omitted the one significant factor—motion—from his premises, and consequently it was absent from his conclusion. The economist subdivides a flow into static stages; he omits the rate. He assumes that a payment made to a worker remains in the worker’s hands until the item part of whose cost it represents is ready for sale.

But there is a deeper resemblance, which is merely exemplified in the official economist. It lies in the notion that because you can, within the limits of your imagination, do anything you like with concepts, you can, thereby, do anything you like with Reality. You can, and it has been done, imagine all kinds of ‘possible worlds’; but so far as we are concerned, only one of those worlds has found expression, and forms one aspect of what we know as Reality. Zeno with his eyes open and for the sake of argument took a ‘possible’ world as real—a world in which time and distance were infinitely divisible. In that sort of world Achilles never would overtake the tortoise, and similarly in the economist’s conceptual world Utopia would be actualised.

The scientific method is properly the technique of ‘restoring or cultivating a just and legitimate familiarity between the mind [concepts] and things,’ in Bacon’s words. It is the setting of Achilles to race against the tortoise. It is the genuine proof of the concepts employed. Now, probably the greatest fallacy of our times is the notion that Reason in itself provides a proof; that because an argument is logical, its conclusion has any concrete embodiment. It is not necessarily, or even probably, so; “The Reason, like a slide-rule, is incapable of furnishing anything more than the logical sum of the data provided. It is pure instrument, and can prove nothing.” (Douglas.)

Reason is specially active in the construction of Utopias; and the most devastating demonstration of its nature lies in the fact that every Utopia we hear of differs from each of the others in significant particulars. Ely Culbertson adapts the game of Contract Bridge to produce a statistically invincible Police Force; H. G. Wells solves all by Science; and the ‘British’ Socialists find now that a Super-Planner is required to reconcile the ambitions of varied segments of the governing bureaucracy each to further its own plan.

As Zeno left motion out of the data, so the Planners ignore the organic; Life, the Living, and in particular, Human Nature—the thing-in-itself that produces the diversity in plans. The proof that this is so is not verbal; it is the experience we suffer of Planning. Planning assumes—it must assume—that the number of factors involved is sufficiently small to allow the Intellect to cope with them, or else that it can select sufficient factors for its purpose. The only possible proof of this hypothesis has failed by the pragmatic test; and the cost of the failure has been the sacrifice of literally millions of human lives, through famine and concentration camp, without reckoning with the culmination in war.

Major Douglas has specifically described Social Credit as “the policy of a philosophy.” Since then he has emphasised time and time again that any and every policy is the outcome of some particular philosophy. In particular, Socialism—Socialism as we know it from the practice of Soviet Russia, the Corporate State of Italy under Mussolini, the National Socialism of Germany particularly under Hitler, and the developing Socialism in Great Britain particularly under the Attlee Administration—is a policy, the outcome of a philosophy. The philosophy in question has innumerable particular expressions, but in principle they all derive from the idea that the Intellect, or Reason, is not only the supreme Power in the universe, but that it is supreme as manifested in Man.

This view of things received a great strengthening from the successes of modern science—for a time. But the scientific method is only a tool; it is only a method of dealing with concepts; it is only, in fact, a refinement of Zeno’s argument. In the last few years this disconcerting truth has emerged very plainly. The pursuit of Zeno’s problem leads to the most beautiful development of mathematical theory; but it is found in the end that the elaboration is an elaboration of the relations between concepts—“pure” mathematics. And so it is with science. The enormous discoveries tail out into entirely abstract concepts. Matter quite literally disappears, and God re-appears as a super-mathematician with the world as his equations. What science has really discovered is the necessary consequences of the concepts employed.

It is necessary here to guard against misunderstanding. The scientific method leads to an enormous increase in knowledge about Reality. The point is this: the knowledge comes from Reality, and not from science as such. Science discovers, it does not create. So long as we seek information about the properties and behaviour of matter, it supplies the answer—if the right questions are asked. But exclude matter from the enquiry, and it returns the answer “nothing there,” just as, by excluding motion, Zeno proved that motion was impossible. And since science excludes the concept of creative activity, creative activity is absent from the logical sum of its conclusions.

It is, of course, impossible to explore the vast field referred to here; the object is merely to identify it, to name
it as the philosophy behind Socialism. Its name, indeed, is legion, and it has many aspects. But what we refer to is that common body of belief underlying what we variously call Materialism, Collectivism, Pantheism, according to the manifestation.

And so we return to the original question. What is Social Credit?

(To be concluded.)

The Control of Power

"... [What] we have to ask ourselves here, and this without trespassing beyond experience, is what the notion of temptation means and in what circumstances it may become active. My view is that is is invariably bound up with power. The moment that we are endowed with power of whatever sort we are exposed to the temptation of abusing it. . . ."

"... The exercise of any sort of power should by rights be accompanied by the exercise of control over this power itself—this is a sort of "power at one remove." But in practice such concomitance of strength and control over that strength is by no means inevitable. We find, on the contrary, that the more suddenly power is acquired—or at any rate the less the conditions of its acquisition are like those of natural growth—the more does it tend to behave like a parvenu: like a self-made man who believes (always quite wrongly) that he is in no man's debt, it rejects, as though it were an unwarrantable intrusion or encroachment, any form of limitation or control over itself.

"... the activity among all others which can most truly be described as power at one remove is reflection... Already we see logico-mathematical neo-positivism, a philosophy which denies the role of reflection altogether, gradually invading England and a part of the United States; to the philosophers of this School, the idea of a philosophy of reflection is utterly alien, they almost put it aside as a sort of mysticism."—Gabriel Marcel in The Decline of Wisdom.

ARCHITECTURE AND CHRISTIANITY—

(continued from page 1.)

to follow unreasonably and blindly and unthinkingly, but whenever you see an effect which appeals to you to get behind and inside that thing to try to find out why it is as it is; and, knowing that from the inside out, you become a competent member of the society in which you live, and that should be your authorisation to practise architecture.

Now, of course, this inner ideal, this sense of what is within being projected into a harmonious and beautiful exterior as a circumstance is, I suppose, a religion, isn't it? I was talking to the boys over here the other day, and, as I was going out, one of the little boys said: "Mr. Wright, you believe this, that a good architect has to believe in the life of a democracy, and that is by experience—experience to the truth that the application of distinct names wherever clarity has been achieved. It may even be true that there has never been a period when it was of more importance than it is now to resist all forms of 'double-think', I fancy that the man of today who would think it worthy of honour to burn at the stake for the difference between 'but' and 'and,' is the man whose standpoint is of the greatest importance to the course of the history now being made. What, however, I am immediately concerned to assert is that the man who would burn at the stake to keep 'but' distinct from 'and' is in the right of it only if he remembers that the distinguishing of "but" from 'and' was originally an act of creation. To say that Adam in the Garden named the creatures is not merely to add a likely circumstantial detail to a legend; it is to give symbolic expression to the truth that the application of distinct names to distinct things is not an inevitable process which takes care of itself, but is at every stage the outcome of a creative process by some particular person."—(Winifred M. T. Nowottny, reviewing Martin Buber's 'Between Man and Man' in the Quarterly Review of St. Mary's, Pimlico.)

From within comes everything that you will ever have. From within comes that development which will make all the difference between you and an animal, and therefore the core, the essence, of the new architecture for democracy. Up-to-date democracy has built nothing. We have talked about it and pretended to be democratic, but I do not think that any of us have looked that definition in the face or made one for ourselves; so let us say that democracy is the highest form of aristocracy that the world has ever seen, because it is innate, it is of the individual. It cannot be transmitted; it cannot exist by privilege; it is the gospel of the doer and the be-er.

Well, that is the new architecture; that is the spiritual basis of the new forms and the new life that we may gain when we have had enough of, and become sick enough of, the superficial pretence which surrounds us in the rubbish heaps in which we live and we try to clear the decks and really live like men and women, like individuals, not mere personalities.

First of all, let us have the human being, capable of bossing himself around. To get that, let us make use of the best material that we have in our social fabric today, and I think you will all agree with me that it will be none too good. Then let us work upon it by working with it, by not trying to teach it anything, by merely opening the doors and windows, with what vision we have, so that we do what is possible by way of encouragement; but only in one way can we get this thing which is so essential to the life of a democracy, and that is by experience—experience that you see, experience that you hear, experience that you feel.

The Names of Things

"It is important to realize that to give a name to a thing is in a sense to get it over, to have done with it, to relegate it to the category of things which are accountable, things which no longer constitute a problem, a challenge, a demand on one's profoundest attention. . . . it is the responsibility of all responsibly-minded persons to preserve the clarity of names wherever clarity has been achieved. It may even be true that there has never been a period when it was of more importance than it is now to resist all forms of 'double-think', I fancy that the man of today who would think it worthy of honour to burn at the stake for the difference between 'but' and 'and,' is the man whose standpoint is of the greatest importance to the course of the history now being made. What, however, I am immediately concerned to assert is that the man who would burn at the stake to keep 'but' distinct from 'and' is in the right of it only if he remembers that the distinguishing of 'but' from 'and' was originally an act of creation. To say that Adam in the Garden named the creatures is not merely to add a likely circumstantial detail to a legend; it is to give symbolic expression to the truth that the application of distinct names to distinct things is not an inevitable process which takes care of itself, but is at every stage the outcome of a creative process by some particular person."—(Winifred M. T. Nowottny, reviewing Martin Buber's 'Between Man and Man' in the Quarterly Review of St. Mary's, Pimlico.)