

THE SOCIAL CREDITER

FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

Vol. 34. No. 3.

SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1956.

6d. Fortnightly.

The Devil is God Upside Down

At Major Douglas's invitation, the Directors, the Secretary, and the Treasurer of the Social Credit Secretariat and Mr. Torben Laub, Mr. John Mitchell, Commander Richardson and Captain Story met at lunch shortly before Christmas, 1938.

Dr. Tudor Jones expressed the satisfaction of those present at being together again, and in thanking Major Douglas for his hospitality, asked if he would care to speak to them.

What Major Douglas said is re-published from The Social Crediter, January 14, 1939:

The primary purpose I had in mind in inviting you to lunch with me was to enjoy the personal pleasure it gives me to see you all. Any enterprise, such as we contemplate, must involve, in itself, a sifting process. We have just experienced something of that kind, and, while having taken very little part in it, I have watched with the greatest attention, the sifting process going on. It has been, to a great extent, a sifting of character. If this *sounds* like rudeness it is really far from it—but it has been a sifting of character far more than of brilliance or superficial ability. I discount brilliance and superficial ability for very much the same reasons that even a salesman discounts "flashy" brilliance. There is a process by which, to use the jargon of modern psychology, things become driven down into the subconscious, and it is by a steady process of that kind that the composite parts and tendencies of individuals become character, which is something very important. Dr. Tudor Jones has very properly defined character as "the policy of the individual."

Well, it is almost exactly twenty years ago that the first article specifically devoted to our interests was published by Austin Harrison in *The English Review* for September, 1918. It would be a very dull man who had devoted twenty years to a subject of this kind without learning something, and I think I *have* learnt something since that time. When I first started, I had the idea that I had got hold of some specific technical information and I had only to get it accepted: I had the idea that I was like a clever little boy and that I had only to run to father and he would be very pleased about it.

I got rid of that idea in about 18 months or two years, for very far from anyone wanting to put what I had to say into operation, it took me about two years to grasp thoroughly why it was that it was not likely, at that time, to be put into operation. It was pointed out to me that there were two things to be done at the same time, outlining the job and getting the job itself done—the latter a matter of strategy not of design. I then grasped that I was in for a political job that was going to last a lifetime. I developed from that stage into the third stage, namely that it was not only going to last my lifetime, but it was going to last a great many people's lifetime: the knowledge that we should do no significant part of it unless we touched a great many

aspects of life that were a long way away from A + B. That was the third idea—1935-36.

Now in one of the books I wrote about that time I quoted the English translation of the Latin proverb *Daemon est deus inversus* and I have been continually impressed by the fact that there are very few policies of modern governments which would not be first class policies if they were turned upside down. The excellent example of the policy known as Collective Security comes to mind. It does not seem to be perceived that this is excellent if it begins by being not collective but individual security, in which case, the collective security would follow as a matter of course; but if it means security for anything but the individual it means worse than nothing at all. That is the meaning of the idea that you would not have war if you had an omnipotent League of Nations; whereas actually, if every individual were secure no one would want, or could be made to fight. We know, as a matter of fact, the nearer you get to the idea of the omnipotent world state, the more the friction; and the wars and dangers of wars increase. And everywhere you see this tendency towards making things bigger. I dare say some of you saw in a Sunday newspaper a peevishly tendentious article hoping that there might be a referendum to increase the power of the Australian Federal Parliament at the expense of the power of the State Parliaments. It is all the same thing. And the total drift of the official and orthodox policy at the present time is towards making things larger and larger, and with that goes—at any rate contemporaneously—this increasing friction and danger of war.

Now, in dealing with this problem, I wish first of all that you should recognise the essential falsity of what you are told is the result of orthodox policy; to recognise the determination to assert that success is being achieved, when the reverse is the case. "Shall the railways be allowed to die?" Well, who has been running the railways? The Bank of England of course! Continuous dissatisfaction has resulted from that. What are they going to do as a result? Have fewer railways and group the few that are left so that there is only one railway, under the Bank of England. All the time you have one policy which is pursued in defiance of the results which ensue from it. A miniature picture of

(Continued on page 2.)

THE SOCIAL CREDITER

FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: *Home and abroad, post free:**
One year 30/-; Six months 15/-; Three months 7s. 6d.
 Offices—*Business and Editorial:* 11, GARFIELD STREET, BELFAST.
 Telephone: *Belfast 27810.*

*Note: The above rates cover subscription to *Voice*, appearing fortnightly in alternate weeks with *The Social Crediter*.

THE DEVIL IS GOD UPSIDE DOWN—

(continued from page 1.)

this may be seen at the present time in New Zealand, where they get exactly the same result: the railways don't pay! Therefore, reduce the number of trains. They don't pay! Therefore, take off all the restaurant cars. There are none at all now. You have to travel two or three days in the hope that you will be able to get a meal at one of the eating stations.

The primary problem in all this is to realise that there is increasing divergence between facts and words. All the time you are being given a word-picture of something which is not in fact happening.

That brings me to what I have already suggested to Dr. Tudor Jones, namely that the keynote of our immediate action should be what has been called moral re-armament. I don't want to give any special personal meaning to moral re-armament. One of the principles upon which the power of those forces which seem to be driving our rulers to destruction is based, is "divide and rule."

Therefore the reply is *unite and don't be ruled*. Another basis of (I hope) realism to which I come is this: don't at all assume that you are going to do something with large masses of people, without being perfectly clear as to *why* you should be able to deal with large masses of people. In this matter, we are dealing with forces which, however different they may be from mechanical forces, are nevertheless forces, and obey laws which have all the appearance of being just as rigid. I am sure many causes failed by basing action on the assumption that if you take a perfectly good and sound thing you can get a very large number of people to attend to it, or enlist a large number of people who, by their attention to what you have to put before them, would get the thing done. Much more important is to find out why they are already joining battle over some objective. If you can, get hold of what already someone else is doing and help him to get it quicker. Our friend C.H.J. has been showing us what may be done in that way. He is not telling farmers what they have to do. They are telling him what they want done. My impression is that we have to develop that principle to the maximum possible degree. We have to get organisation which works on what lawyers call "enabling bill" lines. We have not to suggest what to do, to be done, but make it easier to get done. In doing that I believe we shall be pursuing a novel method with attention to that supremely wise saying, if any man would be greatest among you let him be your servant.

The Aims of Education

by BRYAN W. MONAHAN.

Originally published in *The Social Crediter*, in 1944.

1. THE DIRECTION OF EVOLUTION

(Continued.)

The existence of this external inheritance is the reason for the differentiation of various human groups, far more rapidly than can be accounted for by any genetic changes. It is also the reason why writers such as Julian Huxley and such geneticists are able to pour scorn on "racial" theories. On the genetic basis they are right; on the cultural they are wrong. In man, it is cultural inheritance that is decisive. That this is so is apparent if one considers the development of which negroes are capable in, for example, America. Genetically the negroes are different enough from other groups to be classed as a distinct race; yet the *effective* difference between the American negro and the native negro is far greater than between the American negro and the American white. Again, Americans have differentiated into a type, almost into a race, despite their genetic impurity, and in a much shorter time than would permit of genetic stabilisation.

It is important to realise that external heredity is just as *real* a thing as genetic inheritance; it has a definite mechanism, and this mechanism has its own laws. It is, further, interconnected with the genetic mechanism, and together these mechanisms subserve purpose. Now, *the direction of evolution is shown by the progressive shift of emphasis to the external heredity, with a correlated increase, through the genetic mechanism, of lability. The direction is towards an increasing mastery of individual purpose (it is manifested in individuals) over mechanism.*

2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN INDIVIDUAL

The concept of the subservience of mechanism to purpose can be considered further from the point of view of purpose acting outwards, in the first place on and through the material nearest to hand. Original growth, organisation, and development is thus the first manifestation of the individual's purpose, a purpose making use of the laws of matter, without, in this aspect, transcending them. The principles underlying this development are the proper subject of biology and other divisions of science, and are outside the scope of these articles. Here we are concerned only with the post-natal development of the individual, where this is conditioned by the interaction of the cultural inheritance.

The human individual, as born, carries still a high potential for continuing physical development; but his mental development has relatively hardly begun, and the special mechanism of the mind—especially the nervous system—is in high degree labile. It appears likely, as Jung has shown, that the mind of the individual contains certain basic material—the "collective unconscious," features of mind found universally. It seems likely that a considerable amount of this basic material might be what Samuel Butler

regarded as the unconscious memory of past phylogenetic achievements, appearing, as Jung suggests, in symbolic form. . . . But to return to the infant: It is born helpless, but with a continuing potential for physical development to a completed form which varies remarkably little from one man to another (which is not to say that the differences are not significant)—a potential carried through the genes. On the other hand, a large proportion of the functional connections of the nervous system are not inborn, but are developed in interaction with the wider field of the environment. For the human, the significant element of the environment is cultural.

This brings us to the controversy "nature or nurture." Like so many controversies, it is based on a misapprehension of what is in question. Both answers, or the compromise, imply that the individual is the passive object of impersonal and irresistible forces. In fact he is the embodiment of purpose. As an "embodiment," he is naturally subject to the laws of matter; on the plane of matter, he cannot transcend its laws. A man will always be burnt if he puts his naked hand into a fire. But what is embodied in man's nature—that is, in his genetic constitution—is the set of solutions to the problems of physics for which satisfactory solutions, in the pragmatic sense, have been found in ages past. Structurally, the problem has been to organise matter to constitute a suitable material mechanism—a problem no different, in principle, from that of building a house or bridge, *etc.* Such problems as the latter are in fact only an extension, or continuation, of the genetic problem; a house is a manifestation of individual purpose.

Now just as purpose selects and organises matter to build a body, so it selects and organises elements from the cultural tradition to build mind. Some of the attributes of mind are of universal serviceability—such as the instincts, for example—and thus have become, in all probability, embedded in the genetic structure. (By instinct I mean an inborn capacity for a type of response to a general and recurrent type of situation—food-seeking, sex, self-preservation, *etc.*) On top of these general responses, nurture provides the possibility of more specifically appropriate responses.

The next stage in the development of the individual is the acquisition of habits, which again are instruments of purpose—special mechanisms of expression of purpose each suited to some particular end. In the sense used here, habits are characterised by being *acquired*, and *this is the significance of lability*.

"The plasticity [lability] of the living matter of our nervous system, in short, is the reason why we do a thing . . . more and more easily. . . . Our nervous systems have (in Dr. Carpenter's words) *grown* to the way they have been exercised.

"Habit is thus second nature or rather, as the Duke of Wellington said, 'ten times nature'—at any rate, as regards its importance in adult life. . . . Ninety-nine hundredths or, possibly, nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of our activity is purely automatic and habitual. . . .

"The great thing in all education is to *make our nervous system our ally instead of our enemy*. . . . The

more of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their own proper work:" (Wm. James, *Talks to Teachers on Psychology*. Italics in original.)

I do not know what weight James placed on the fractions he suggested, or Wellington on "ten times nature." But that the fraction is a large one is indubitable. That is demonstrated by, for example, the fact that children, almost without exception, soon learn to speak, as pointed out recently by Dr. Tudor Jones, and for the most part, to speak well; an astounding accomplishment so ordinary as to be unremarked. That is why "intelligence" measurements are of only slight interest apart from providing "employment" for State-school psychologists, for they are, as it were, concerned with inches of difference in the lengths of poles whose dimensions we do not know, except that they run to many feet.

From this point of view, then, we may conceive the individual as an embodiment of purpose, in his beginning concerned to acquire, organise and vitalise matter, and subsequently acquiring, inbuilding and utilising elements provided by the cultural tradition. We may distinguish instinct—inborn and generalised habit, with a genetic basis—; habit, characterised by being acquired within the lifetime of the individual; and a growing-point of development, the locus of free-will, the intersection of mind and matter and purpose, the point of continuous becoming. But we shall see later that this "point" is more adequately conceived as a boundary.

For every *why* there must be a *how*; every event must have its mechanism. In principle, therefore, a mechanism can be found, even if only in hypothesis, for any event. But the *how* is not identical with the *why*: a description of the mechanism is not a description of the event. Often, too, more than one mechanism is possible for a particular event. In evolution, one function has been served at different times by a variety of structures because function transcends structure, just as function incarnates purpose. Nothing, therefore, could be more sterile than the materialist point of view, which regards a description of the mechanism as exhaustive. Except in the mechanic's sense of mending, a knowledge of mechanism is empty knowledge, and hardly more significant than an adequate, though incorrect hypothesis. One can imagine the physiological psychologists after decades, if not centuries, of research presenting us with a complete account of the neuro-muscular mechanism of speech, complete with tables of electrical potentials in nerve and muscle for every word of the dictionary. It would mean as much as the photo-electric graph of a note by Kreisler on a Stradivarius. Against their achievement is to be set the fact that one may understand Shakespeare at the first hearing. Though purpose manifests itself through matter, matter must conform to the laws of matter. Speech *must* have a complete neuro-muscular mechanism, and in theory at least, it can be discovered and described. And if we lived in a vacuum, speech as we know it would not exist, but no doubt the *function* of speech would exist, and would be served by an appropriate mechanism. It is, therefore, the *existence* of the event, and its relations to other events, which is important. It is the existence of evolution which concerns us.

(To be continued.)

Social Credit on the Air

It would be as easy, I think, to attach too much, as too little significance to the appearance of Social Credit in the Home Programme on January 12th last; or to see anything or nothing either hopeful or sinister in the staging of this discussion. It was just one in a Series; the promoters may have come to the letter S in the alphabet, and hesitated between Socialism and Social Credit; plumping for the latter, in the hope that it would prove the less boring of the two.

The event has reverberations, of course. The last time that Social Credit was "featured" by the 'B.'B.C. must have been away back in the Thirties, when the late A. R. Orage, editor of *The New Age*, spoke on the evening preceding his death. On the present occasion Mr. C. M. Grieve (Hugh MacDiamid), better known for his Scottish Nationalist affiliations than in connection with Social Credit, was the exponent. His critics were Messrs. A. J. Brown and Victor Wiseman, both of Leeds University, with Mr. Dennis Chapman in the chair.

This is not meant to be a criticism of Mr. Grieve's performance, as such. There are other aspects of the matter more important to our purpose. I have actual experience of the process by which such discussions as this come into being, which has taught me not to be too critical; for a better method for extracting the real substance from a subject, and handing on the shadow, could not possibly be devised. So that when I say that the impression was, to one listener at least, as far removed from genuine conviction, or even honest heat, as is conceivable, I mean no personal disparagement of Mr. Grieve. The angle, I think, from which Social Crediters must be interested in the discussion, is to appraise its real value as an attempt to put over the Truth—our particular glimpse of it—to those prepared to listen in. No one can say categorically that Douglas was for or against any legitimate and open method of making Social Credit known. He himself took part in a broadcast debate with Geoffrey Crowther, the Editor of *The Economist*, in the early days. What we can be sure he would deprecate is any waste of energy or opportunity, through wrong application; and also, of course, the creating of a positively bad impression.

It is a fact that cannot be avoided, that the truth has, in some manner, to be incarnate—in voice, gesture, appearance, behaviour—some one of these, or better, in all. This it is that constitutes the substance or authority of any proposition, and this is, as I said, what the general conditions and technique of broadcasting is calculated completely to destroy. For the atmosphere in which such performances are evolved is at once tense and frivolous, an unhealthy compound out of which to produce anything of value. The present instance can have been no exception; it was both depressing and dull, and could hardly have failed to confirm all those who had made up their minds that there was nothing of any value in Social Credit beyond an obscure proposal for the solution of an equally obscure monetary problem.

If that was all that could be done with it—and perhaps in those conditions it was—then I feel one's judgment must go against its ever having taken place. It is true that, for the full and comprehensive understanding of Social Credit, a knowledge of Douglas's technical argument and his proof

of the deficiency of consumer purchasing-power is necessary. But as a subject for public debate, in *vacuo* as it were, the discussion demonstrated its complete unsuitability—a point upon which Douglas was always convinced. Orage, on this great occasion, tried the parabolic method, dividing, if I remember, the functional producer and the political consumer by a plate-glass window, behind which were displayed all the technological triumphs of the age—its gadgetry, at least. The effect was brilliant; but just how effective as propaganda, it is not so easy to judge. None the less, it was a brave effort, and in accord with Douglas's own views. In all his major addresses, his themes were always philosophical and political. Except in his answers to questions, there was no talk of methods.

Perhaps I do Mr. Grieve an injustice in classing him with that school of thought which is inclined to regard mental independence as incompatible with the taking of advice. But that surely depends to some extent on the quality and source of the advice, and whether it is meant to be blindly followed, or be used as a basis for individual action. The danger of this frame of mind is that it opens up the way to a completely erroneous approach to such individuals as Douglas, regarding them as though they were of the same kind as all other natural scientific pioneers and discoverers, with the proverbial incapacity of such minds to exploit and develop their own discoveries. But with Douglas that represents a profound error; obscuring the fact that he belongs to the category of reconcilers who have within themselves brought means and ends together. The correctness of Douglas's ideas can only be judged by their results, as he always averred. Consequently, any attempt to separate Douglas the thinker from Douglas the doer or executant of his own thought is bound, just as often as it is made, to bring failure. For it is the attempt to re-introduce disunity between principle and idea, ends and means, the reconciling of which was Douglas's great achievement; and as well, to rob him, or rather the Truth he exemplified, of its demonstrations, its only vehicle of proof. Such temptation is of the devil; whose policy, as we know, is to divide, and play off the two ends against the middle.

NORMAN WEBB.

THE FIG TREE

A Douglas Social Credit Quarterly Review.

Vol. 1. No. 4. (NEW SERIES).

MARCH, 1955.

"Whose Service is Perfect Freedom"

by

C. H. Douglas.

Foreword by Tudor Jones.

5/- Post Free.

K.R.P. Publications, Ltd., 11, Garfield Street, Belfast.

Published by K.R.P. Publications Ltd., at 11, Garfield Street, Belfast.
Printed by J. Hayes & Co., Woolton, Liverpool.