The Portuguese-Angolan Tragedy

The United States Forsakes An Ally

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On top of the Cuba and Laos disasters, and the Viennese fiasco where Khrushchev lectured Kennedy as if the latter were a schoolboy, the signs point to another debacle for the United States, the delivery of the West African Portuguese province, Angola, into chaos and eventual Communist domination.

This will be done in the name of freedom and anti-colonialism. The result, however, could be not only the further deterioration of the African situation, but the downfall of conservative government in Portugal and Spain. This, of course, would mean removal of those two key countries from the Western bloc, and a disaster of stunning proportions to the United States.

The Portuguese say, and there is plenty of evidence to sustain their charges, that a terrorist camp had been maintained in Thyville, in the Congo, outside of Angola, for more than a year in preparation for the assaults.

In any event, the attacks found the Portuguese, whites, mulattoes and negroes in Northern Angola unprepared. There followed massacres which went beyond anything the Mau Mau ever did in Kenya. Those slain outright were fortunate, for the tortures for the captives, including women and children, were indescribable.

George S. Schuyler, American Negro journalist, writing from Luanda for the Pittsburgh Courier, said:

"Whole families have been violated, murdered and dismembered, and the enterprise of a lifetime destroyed in a truce."

The Portuguese defended themselves valiantly. Troops were rushed to Northern Angola to repel the invaders and the native tribesmen who had joined them, many under the threat of death. Apparently the Portuguese have had some success against the attackers.

On its face, the resolution calls for the Portuguese to cease defending themselves. The United States had decided against them before the U.N. inquiry ever started, although press dispatches and other reports clearly indicate that the Portuguese were not the aggressors.

The Angolan outbreaks and other developments outside the U.N. clearly indicate that Angola is the focus of a carefully planned and skillfully executed Communist campaign. The U.N. maneuvering with the U.S. in the role of catspaw, is simply one phase of the programme.

In January, 1961, the Portuguese luxury liner, Santa Maria, was seized by a small band after she left the Dutch island of Curacao. The pirate group was headed by Henrique Galvao, an opponent of the Portuguese government. The plan (continued on page 3).
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Ideas For The Destitute

"It is one of the hard things for a teacher to know how close a man has come in reading poetry. How do I know whether a man has come close to Keats in reading Keats? It is hard for me to know. I have lived with some boys a whole year over some of the poets and have not felt whether they have come near what it is all about. One remark sometimes told me. One remark was their mark for the year; had to be—it was all I got that told me what I wanted to know. And that is enough, if it is the right remark, if it came close enough. I think a man might make twenty fool remarks if he made one good one some time in the year. His mark would depend on that good remark.

"The closeness—everything depends on the closeness with which you come, and you ought to be marked for the closeness, for nothing else. And that will have to be estimated by chance remarks, not by question and answer. It is only by accident that you know some day how near a person has come.

"The person who gets close enough to poetry, he is going to know more about the word "belief" than anybody else, even in religion nowadays. There are two or three places where we know belief outside of religion. One of them is at the age of fifteen to twenty, in our self-belief. A young man knows more about himself than he is able to prove to anyone. He has no knowledge that anybody else will accept as knowledge. In his foreknowledge he has something that is going to believe itself into fulfilment, into acceptance.

"There is another belief like that, the belief in someone else, a relationship of two that is going to be believed into fulfillment. That is what we are talking about in our novels, the belief of love. And the disillusionment that the novels are full of is simply the disillusionment from disappointment in that belief. That belief can fail of course.

"There then is a literary belief. Every time a poem is written, it is written not by cunning but by belief . . . .

"Now I think—I happen to think—that those three beliefs that I speak of, the self-belief, the love belief, and the art-belief, are all closely related to the God-belief, that the belief in God is a relationship you enter into with Him to bring about the future.

"There is a national belief like that too. One feels it. I have been where I came near getting up and walking out on the people who thought they had to talk against nations, against nationalism, in order to curry favour with internationalism. Their metaphors are all mixed up. They think that because a Frenchman and an American and an Englishman can all sit down on the same platform and receive honours together, it must be that there is no such thing as nations. That kind of bad thinking springs from a source we all know. I should want to say to anyone like that: 'Look! First I want to be a person. And I want you to be a person, and then we can be as inter-personal as you please . . . . First of all, you have got to have the nations and then they can be as international as they please with each other.' "


America and Europe

Britain's decision to apply for membership of the Common Market is a "victory" for the American policy of European unification, says the New York Times.

The newspaper warns America that she will meet more competition in the world market, but if she can meet it she will profit from the political strength of a united Europe—"an ever-increasing market for our goods."


UNO and Angola

". . . . Since the middle of March, neither the Council nor the Assembly found an opportunity to order the terrorists to stop the massacres and depredations. Yet so many of the members could have done it with authority and efficacy.

"But when the authority having the duty to guarantee the life, work and property of the whole population intervenes, fulfilling the primary duty of a State, this may not be done, because it is necessary that the terrorists continue with impunity their mission of extermination and of return to savage life.

"The consideration that the situation in Angola is susceptible of becoming a threat to peace and to international

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security may indeed have some foundation, but only in the measure in which some of the voters decide to pass from the political and financial support they are now giving to direct aid by using their own forces against Portugal in Angola.

"Everything begins to be topsy-turvy in the world: those who aggress deserve well, those who defend themselves are criminals and the States which, conscious of their duties, do no more than enforce order in their territories, are discriminated against by those very parties which are at the bottom of the disorders taking place there."

"No. Let us not take these excesses to tragic extremes. The General Assembly of the United Nations functions as a crowd, which it is, and, therefore, according to the psychological laws which govern all crowds . . . ."

—Dr. Salazar in an address to the Portuguese National Assembly, June 30, 1961.

“A Disciple”

As our readers well know, the commonest form of attack upon Social Credit, next to behaviour which suggests that it is non-existent, is to say that it is the opposite of what it is, e.g. Communism, Socialism, Idealism, “funny,” Anarchism, Imbecility, Inflationary etc. etc. Often the means adopted to convey one or other of these opposites is simple attachment of Social Credit ideas to someone who has passed them by unexamined or unembraced. The latest example of this is a few paragraphs in The Sunday Telegraph for August 13th, headed “Canadian Folly” reporting the alleged expropriation of the privately owned British Columbia Electric Company. The fifth paragraph states that Mr. W. A. Bennett, the Premier of British Columbia, is “a disciple of the late Major Douglas.”

We don’t know what he is, but he is certainly not that.

THE U.S. FORSAKES AN ALLY

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was to take the ship to Angola. It failed and the ship sought refuge in Brazil, where it was eventually turned over to its owners. It is noteworthy that the Portuguese crew had little sympathy for the proposed insurrection; their failure to support Galvao was one of the reasons for the failure of his mission.

However, before the Santa Maria docked tamely in Brazil their baccanalian exploit had been used as the inspiration for world-wide propaganda attacks upon the Portuguese government headed by Dr. Salazar.

Prior to the March 15 invasion there had been a few sporadic attacks on Portuguese in the extreme northern portion of Angola.

Familiarly enough, a sizeable segment of the liberal press and commentators and magazines in the United States, so oftentimes dupes of the Communists, have joined in the Angola campaign.

The May issue of Harper’s magazine carries an article about Angola which calls the territory “Africa's most oppressed colony.” Significantly enough, however, the author of the piece remained anonymous. The excuse which Harper’s editors offered for this was that the writer is allegedly an American businessman familiar with Angola. Although he has now retired, the revelation of his identity, it was said, might subject him and his informants to reprisals.

The New York Times has expressed approval of the United States' vote at the U.N. The New York Post, always leftist in attitude, has raised its voice denouncing Dr. Salazar and urging Angolan freedom. Much of the radio and TV comment during the Santa Maria episode called Dr. Salazar’s government a dictatorship. The comment omitted any reference to Portugal's friendship and assistance to the United States. There was little mention of the overwhelming support within Portugal for the government's Angolan policy.

As to the actual situation in Angola, itself, there is agreement on only a few facts. One is that the retention of Angola an area about twice the size of Texas and rich in natural resources, is a matter of extreme importance to Portugal. Another is that there is little or no racial prejudice in Angola. The Reporter, a liberal magazine, in its issue of April 13, 1961, puts it thusly:

“A Negro in Angola or Mozambique (another Portuguese African province) can ride in a white man's bus or marry a white settler's daughter without hindrance, provided he is sufficiently civilised—the word is official—to own a pair of shoes. Fraternisation and intermarriage are taken entirely for granted.”

The article, “Portugal’s Ancient Empire,” is not sympathetic on the whole with Portugal or with the Salazar regime.

Dr. Salazar has said after describing the Portuguese policy of racial equality:

“A multi-racial society is therefore possible, be it Portuguese-American as in Brazil, or of Portuguese-Asian stock as in Goa, or still, as we find in Angola and Mozambique, based on Portuguese-African association. There is no, nor has there ever been, anything which could lead us to the opposite conclusion. The simple fact is that these societies exclude all racialism—be it white, black or yellow—and spring from the soil of centuries within the principles underlying Portuguese settlement. We would indeed be ill advised to change the practices, feelings and concepts which have been the secret of our achievement and still are our best safeguard for the future.”

There are about 4,500,000 natives in Angola who have a tribal status. There are approximately 270,000 whites, negroes and mulattoes who have full citizenship status. The remainder of the negro population is primitive. Angola is even less prepared for self-government than the Belgian Congo.

The Portuguese government flatterly denies charges of forced labor that are made in such spectacular fashion in Harper's. While by European standards the economy is backward, even such a critic of the Portuguese as James Duffy, author of Portuguese Africa, admits that great material progress has been made since the 1940's and that more is in prospect.

The time has come, however, when the argument over Angola's internal situation should be subordinated to the question of the national interests and national security of the United States.

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. policy has been anti-colonial; that is our government has brought steady and unremitting pressure on its European allies to get rid of their overseas possessions. This policy has had the enthusi-
astic and unwavering support of our leading liberals outside government and also of tremendously influential newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. Joining in have been columnists like Walter Lippman and Marquis Childs, and TV and radio commentators like Edward R. Murrow. These have fortified government policy and have been instrumental in shaping public opinion.

Not only that, the liberal press, columnists and commentators have waged incessant war on right-wing dictatorships such as that of Franco in Spain and Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. These assaults largely have been on moral grounds: the dictators censored the press, abridged freedom, squelched the opposition by using violent means, etc. Also there has been the argument, most persuasive on the surface, that we should support liberal, democratic and progressive movements.

The failure of many of our aid programmes, according to the liberals, is that we have helped the wrong people, the reactionaries. They insist, in effect, on massive interference in the internal affairs of friendly countries, ignoring the difficulties involved.

The instances where aid to the so-called liberal forces dropped dismally, and there are many, are ignored for the most part. A case in point is Bolivia, for years under a left-wing regime. Since 1952, that unhappy country has had more help in the form of outright grants than any other Latin-American country. Yet, the country's situation grows worse every year. No right-wing dictator could have wasted our money any more flagrantly than Bolivia's leftists.

What is the standard which the liberals use for attacks on dictators?

1. The dictator must be anti-Communist and friendly to the United States.
2. He must have some respect for private property.
3. He must maintain order and keep his economy in fairly good shape.

If this yardstick is held inadequate and misleading, one has only to reflect that the principal liberal targets over the years have been Franco in Spain, Batista in Cuba (ousted), Somozoa in Nicaragua (dead), Chiang Kai-Shek in Formosa, Rhee in Korea (ousted), Trujillo in the Dominican Republic (dead), and now Salazar in Portugal.

Peron, the ousted dictator of Argentina, probably would not meet the standards outlined above. But then Peron had a profound contempt for the democratic press, and so drew the wrath of the New York Times, the New York Post, etc., upon himself.

Occasionally our liberals do hit at Khruschev, Mao Tsetung, and the lesser Soviet dictators. Nevertheless, there is no sustained campaign such as that which helped overthrow Batista, and which is now aimed at Salazar.

Tito of Yugoslavia furnishes an example of gentle treat-ment by our liberals. He is a dictator, and a Communist dic-tator. After World War II, his airmen murdered without provocation some American fliers. There was an outcry in America, but this died down with the revelation that Tito was not completely subservient to Soviet Russia. On the doubtful theory that he might be an ally, we have given him hundreds of millions of dollars. This has had the strong approval of our liberals, press and all.

But Salazar, long-time friend and ally who has given us valuable bases in the Azores, becomes our target.

Batista's downfall and the rise of Castro illustrates the effectiveness of the liberal propaganda campaigns. The New York Times led the verbal assault on Batista. His faults were sharply outlined. The purges, repressions and graft of his regime were megaphoned. There were articles about the em-battled revolutionists in the mountains; Fidel being portrayed as a saintly, selfless man. When Batista fell under the onslaught, one of the New York Times editors helped in the briefing of American diplomats who were to go to Cuba.

We have had little but trouble in our anti-colonial policy. This policy, admirable in theory, becomes ridiculous when it results in the Congo mess. The aftermath is at once farcical and ridiculous. The futility and impotency of the United Nations is etched in the area from which we helped force the Belgians. Yet many of our liberals continue to act as if the U.N. were the last hope and refuge of the world, and as if anti-colonialism were one of the Ten Commandments. Apparently, the fixation about the importance of the U.N. accounted, in part, for our votes on the Angola matter. We were out to win a popularity contest no matter the consequences.

The position of the West is deteriorating steadily: the Communist position growing stronger all the time. All the brave words of the President cannot hide the extent of the Cuban and Laos catastrophes, nor the gloating of Khruschev.

In all probability, there is more to come. Under such circumstances the situation in Angola must be examined with a view to the consequences of forcing Portugal to turn it loose.

On this point, the testimony of the liberal publication The Reporter—no friend of Salazar—must be given a lot of weight. It concludes that if Angola is turned loose, the Russians probably will take it over and turn it into the "Soviet version of an ideal African pilot state under bi-racial rule."

The Reporter adds that if Angola goes, Portugal will be "left alone to face the massive assault of African nationalism and Soviet imperialism—or worse, be left with Spain as its only ally." Finally, the magazine concludes that, if the conservatives go down in Portugal through the loss of Angola Franco is doomed.

Nobody knows what we want for Portugal. The Adlai Stevenson speech at the U.N. on the question at the time of the first vote spewed confusion as a cuttlefish does ink. Stevenson was absent when the third vote was taken, having been sent to Latin-America on a goodwill mission.

Nobody knows just what we want, but it is evident that our vote in the U.N. means that we are co-operating in the Soviet campaign aimed at Portugal. No wonder then that even good liberals like Dean Acheson are reported to be dismayed over our Angola stand. Robert Murphy, former Under-Secretary of State and president of the United States Council on NATO, is said to view our stand as calamitous. There are others.

With the way things are going, even the doctrinaire liberals soon reach a fundamental conclusion: that the time has come for all good Americans to concentrate on one objective—how to save the United States of America. Anyone who can help us toward this goal, we should help. Anyone who stands in our way, we should oppose. It is a simple, but fundamental, doctrine. If we do not adhere to it, we could commit national suicide.