The U.N. is Dead
U.S. Policy Makers—Please Note

(Reprinted, with permission, from Human Events, Washington, D.C., December 8, 1961)

On the morning of October 24, the 16th anniversary of the United Nations, that world organization lay prostrate—fatally and hopelessly ill.

This melancholy end to an outfit which was oversold in the first place long ago was foreseen by sensible men. Nevertheless, the U.N. was presented to the American public as a refuge for suffering humanity, as the cornerstone of our foreign policy and as mankind’s best and only real hope for peace.

Unfortunately, some of our own policy makers acted as if they believed this propaganda. The minor tragedy of the U.N.’s collapse—minor in view of its beginning—is compounded because the United States has allowed the U.N. to be misrepresented and a lot of illusions to be built around it.

Many persons in this country actually believed that the U.N. furnished full-coverage peace insurance. Not only has the U.N. furnished no guarantee for peace; it has become an agency which damaged the vital interests of the United States itself. For some time now the U.N. has been a liability to us; it probably will be a liability so long as it continues in being.

Just before Dag Hammarskjold’s death, the U.N. made one last desperate effort to amount to something. It sent its troops against Katanga’s pro-Western president, Moise Tshombe. Somebody had decided that the Congo had to be united and that the way to unite it was to suppress our friends and elevate our foes.

With typical fatuousness, the United States backed this attack on its own interests. For a few days it looked as if the frenzied and cockeyed effort had succeeded. Then Katanga fought back, and the Irish, Indian and other U.N. contingents showed no stomach for the fray. They looked on the U.N. as simply a tremendous pile of glass, steel and concrete in New York. Shortly afterward, Dag Hammarskjold’s plane crashed; with it crashed the U.N.

Once the Soviet Union insisted on veto power over anything of consequence the U.N. tried to do, the world agency was hamstrung. The Soviet Union used the veto power shamelessly and brazenly on its famous like-it-or-lump-it theory. The Soviet Union has no intention of allowing the U.N. to regain power or prestige unless the Soviet Union controls the U.N.—which seems unlikely despite the aberrations of the U.S. State Department.

An exception to the Soviet veto policy, amazing and not yet fully explained, took place after the North Koreans attacked their southern neighbours. The Russian representative stayed away from the Security Council meeting where U.N. military action in Korea was voted. Yet even with U.N. might turned loose to crush an aggressor the result was an exposé of U.N. weakness. The United States bore the burden of the fighting in Korea; other nations, for the most part, contributed vocal support and good wishes.

This country itself could not make up its mind to win, although victory required only a little more push on several occasions. But with the Communist supply areas off limits to attack, a stalemate developed. The American people grew sick and tired. The eventual truce raised Communist prestige and lowered that of the United States, a trend which has gone on steadily since the end of World War II.

The question as to why the United States, with overwhelming superiority in nuclear weapons, let Red China, backed by Russia, push it around in Korea has never been answered. But that query is only indirectly related to the U.N. decline.

In the early years of the United Nations, the United States clearly controlled the actions of the body up to a point. If the Soviet Union wanted to stop a proposal, it blocked it as a good goal tender stops a soccer ball. In theory, this aroused ‘world opinion’ against the Soviet Union to the benefit of the United States, but the Russians did not seem to mind. They displayed the same contempt for ‘world opinion’ that they did in resuming the testing of atomic weapons. They got away with it too, just as they did with testing, and they managed to use the U.N. at frequent intervals as a megaphone for their own propaganda.

This Soviet attitude toward ‘world opinion’ and that of the United States presents a dramatically-sharp contrast. The contrast also is a sad commentary on the world in which we live, and the tragic results of miscalculation.

Unswervingly, pitifully, the United States has clung to and supported the U.N. At the same time, Americans have brought relentless and insistent pressure upon our allies to rid themselves of their possessions in Asia and Africa, doing this as part of our design to win new nation support in the U.N.

One result has been a rapid increase in the number of U.N. members. In 1945 there were 51 members, of which three were African nations. Now there are 103, 29 being African.

Some of these new members have populations smaller than many cities in this country. Quite a few are either ruled by dictators or will be in the near future. Many are in a most chaotic state, politically and economically. Who ever heard of Chad, Dahomey, Gabon, Malagasy, Somalia, the Central
Correction of False History

Addressed to the Editor, the following letter appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* and *Morning Post*, December 13, 1961:

From Prof. Robert Sencourt

Sir—the late Lord Halifax, both in letters and in talk, often impressed on me the need of correcting false history of current affairs; he touched on this too in his autobiography, *Correction of False History*. He asks what authority I have for writing that the heads of the Services gave the warning that to go to war on the issue of 1938 was to court certain defeat. Well, if he had taken the trouble to read recent correspondence in your columns, he would have had to recognize that the letters of Sir John Slessor, Chief Air Marshal, were conclusive: the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence in 1938, Lord Chatfield, told me that he gave that advice to the Government; Lord Halifax told me he received it.

The time has come when young historians recognize that the heads of the Services gave the warning that to go to war on the issue of 1938 was to court certain defeat. Well, if he had taken the trouble to read recent correspondence in your columns, he would have had to recognize that the letters of Sir John Slessor, Chief Air Marshal, were conclusive: the Minister for the Co-ordination of Defence in 1938, Lord Chatfield, told me that he gave that advice to the Government; Lord Halifax told me he received it.

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with the Soviet Union, if necessary, to win and woo the new Asian-African nations. This startling attitude, labelled by some cynics as 'policy boomerang', first manifested itself last March.

With familiar and planned spontaneity, the regime of Antonio Salazar, Premier of Portugal, became the object of widely scattered attacks early in 1961. A Portuguese ship, the 'Santa Maria', was seized by opponents of the Salazar regime. This was an act of piracy, but the formidable liberal element in the United States regarded it benevolently. After all, wasn't Salazar a dictator and, what was more important, a conservative? Coincidentally, a series of outbursts arose about conditions in Angola, a West African Portuguese province.

Most of the four million natives in Angola were living as peacefully and primitively as they were before the white man discovered Africa. Yet, suddenly, conditions in Angola were described as terrible, with forced labour prevalent and the proverbial reign of terror going on all over the place. There were rumours of rebellion and uprisings, and of terrorists training in the Congo for an invasion of Angola. The Portuguese refused to believe these reports. Race relations in the Portuguese provinces were the best in Africa.

The Portuguese, to the disgust of most other European nationalities in Africa, persisted in pursuing a multi-racial policy. Intermarriage between the races is fairly common. In such instances, the Portuguese upgrade the Negro, instead of downgrading the white, as is the common custom. Many mulattoes and Negroes in Angola become leaders and are fully accepted in all respects. Actually, as The Reporter—a liberal publication and enemy of Salazar—said in its issue of April 13:

'A Negro in Angola or Mozambique can ride in a white man's bus or marry a white settler's daughter without hindrance, provided he is sufficiently civilized—the word is official—to own a pair of shoes.'

Yet most of the agitation against the Portuguese in Angola was on a racial basis. The inference is that ignorant, helpless Negroes are being exploited by rapacious whites. A systematic effort has been made to turn American Negroes against the Portuguese on this basis.

Early in 1961, a resolution introduced by Liberia, calling for an inquiry into conditions in Angola, went before the U.N. Security Council.

Amazingly enough, the United States and the mortal enemy of the United States, Soviet Russia, voted for the resolution.

The vote of the Soviet Union could be easily explained. The Portuguese government is staunchly anti-Communist and has long been friendly to the West and the United States. In fact, Portugal is a member of NATO, the Western military alliance. In striking at Portugal, the Soviet Union was pursuing its policy of trying to disrupt the Western alliance.

It isn't quite so easy to explain the U.S. vote. Apparently, we had decided to go any length to win the new-emerging African nations. Privately, State Department spokesmen said these countries were 'uncommitted'. They implied that failure to agree with the Africans on almost everything might throw them into the tentacles of the Russian octopus.

Following the first vote, the United States went right down the line with the Soviet Union again in voting for a U.N. General Assembly resolution which established a special committee to inquire into conditions in Angola.

Meanwhile, heavy fighting had broken out in Angola. Terrorists from the Congo invaded the Portuguese province in force on March 15—the very day the United States sided with the Soviet Union against its ally, Portugal.

After the second resolution, the United States took sides against its ally Portugal for the third time in a resolution before the Security Council which called on Portugal to 'desist forthwith from repressive measures in Africa'.

This third vote was an amazing exhibition. There had been no investigation of Angolan developments. Even so, it seemed pretty clear that the Portuguese were not the aggressors. Later it came out that the terrorists swept down on the unsuspecting Portuguese in an area of several hundred miles along the border. They tortured, killed and mutilated without mercy, sparing no age or sex. The United States then was condemning the Portuguese, citizens of a friendly nation and ally, for defending the lives of their women and children and themselves. Arthur Krock, columnist for the New York Times, called the resolution—supported by the U.S.—'a form of lyncheright'. So it was.

This fetish by the United States about colonialism, this frenzy to support nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, has resulted in some strange and ominous developments. Tribal strife, held down by the Europeans, has broken out again in many parts of Africa. Removed from white domination, the Negro leaders are going on a racist spree, a real binge, regardless of the consequences. A flourishing crop of native dictators has arisen.

Only a short time ago, Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah was being hailed as a black Abraham Lincoln. Now, he's acting like a Negro Hitler, throwing his opponents in jail and restoring the death penalty for political opposition. Many former viable economies are in difficulty as the Europeans have fled or have been ousted, leaving management to untrained natives.

The Congo is a case in point. Pushed by the United States, the Belgians turned things over to the natives. Immediately ensued, a period of violence, confusion and chaos. Only Katanga, ruled by Moise Tshombe, remained friendly to the whites, kept them as helpers and technicians, and as officers in his army.

TSHOMBE REMAINS IN POWER

Tshombe is still in power, but this in spite of the U.S. We are behind Premier Cyrille Adoula in Leopoldville, who is becoming increasingly hostile to this country and increasingly friendly to the Communists. Nevertheless, when the U.N. decided to use force to bring Tshombe into line so Katanga could be turned over to the Leopoldville regime, our State Department still went along.

That seems to make no difference. The policy defies explanation, but that does not faze the liberals, who follow every torrentious turn in our twisting and bizarre foreign policy line. Not long ago, three staunch Administration supporters—Senators Gore of Tennessee, Neuberger of Oregon and Hart of Michigan—returned from a jaunt in Africa. They did not visit Angola, but condemned the Portuguese regardless. They dutifully praised Adoula of Leopoldville, even though he sounds more and more like the late Patrice Lumumba, Moscow's darling.

Although the State Department kept on trying to win the struggle with Russia by helping our enemies and harming our friends, the Katanga affair damaged the U.N.'s already
diminishing prestige. Even if the U.N. had won, there would have been uneasiness and misgivings. Our European allies did not like the use of force against Tshombe at all. It made no sense to them.

Even such fervent U.N. organs as the New York Times and the Washington Post scratched their editorial heads uneasily. They might have reconciled themselves if the U.N. had pulled it off, but it had only bungled and blundered. The U.N. had failed and stood weak, inept, futile and a flop of gigantic proportions.

Hadhammarskjold remained alive, even our own State Department might have raised some questions. As it was, he became 'Saint Dag', although many wondered whether he was not seeking to reinstate himself with Khruschev by getting hard with Tshombe. The Russians, when thwarted, are disagreeable to deal with. The United States smiles nervously and turns the other cheek, and the original cheek back to be slapped again.

Even prior to the Congo climax our U.N. policy had gone bankrupt. Twenty-five so-called 'uncommitted' countries met at Belgrade in September. They included most of our new African nations. The United States had gone with them all down the line. We had given them economic aid; we had aligned ourselves with the Soviet Union against an ally in order to placate them.

The neutral nations showed unconcern about the Berlin crisis; they couldn't have cared less about the plight of the Hungarian people, or the East Germans because of Russian oppression; it didn't bother them at all that India refuses to permit a plebiscite in Kashmir where the Moslems are in the majority; Red China's rape and domination of Tibet did not concern them.

Russian resumption of nuclear tests was not singled out. The Russians exploded bomb after bomb in the air, winding up with the 50-megaton plus blast. The African nations, whose good will and support are supposed to mean so much, have been ultra-cautious in their comment on the explosions and tenderly considerate of Russian feelings.

But the Belgrade nations were upset about our naval bases at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba; they did want Portugal to get out of Angola; they were angry at the French for not giving in to the Algerian rebels; it was so, so evident that they did fear and respect Soviet Russia, but the U.S. not at all.

So there it was. The Kennedy Administration heaved a great sigh of relief that Congress was back home and the foreign aid bill safely through. Otherwise there might have been a lot of grumbling about Yugoslavia, for example. We have given Tito more than $2 billion on the theory that he differed with Russia on the majority; Red China's rape and domination of Tibet did not concern them.

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This one really hurt, but now the word is going round that we helped Tito on the theory that he differed with Russia on a good many points and that probably the $2 billion accentuated these differences.

This is a perfect rationale for giving $2 billion to Communist China, or to Russia itself, since after all the Chinese Reds differ with Soviet Russia on many matters. Certainly under the accentuation-of-differences theory, we ought to give Albania a big wad of dough.

The Belgrade Conference was overshadowed to an extent by the Berlin roaring and rumbling. A lot of other things were going on too, but they could not hide the truth about the poor old U.N.

It is a debating society, a debating society which is broke. The members aren't paying their dues. The U.N. must liquidate the Congo operation or induce the United States, the easy mark, which now pays more than half the cost, to come forward and pay it all.

Even as a debating Society the U.N. will become more and more a liability to the United States. An example of this will be forthcoming when the discussion of Red China's admittance to the world organization begins. We may keep the Chinese Communists out one more time, but we'll have some verbal scars after the row is over.

The report of the U.N. Committee which investigated conditions in Angola—without ever going to Angola will be forthcoming soon. Undoubtedly Portugal will be censured. There will be proposals for punishment of this friendly country, and the new African nations will be yelling loudly for the expulsion of the Portuguese from Africa. Here we are confronted by still another dilemma.

WE'RE WRONG AGAIN

We backed the terrorists, but once again we guessed wrong. The Portuguese not only refused to flee; they fought back and ran the invaders home. The trouble was confined to a small sector along the Congo border, belying the claims that the uprising had wide native support, and, as time goes by, the evidence of Communist involvement in Angola grows more and more evident.

We backed a loser. Now what do we do? Does the United States side with those who want sanctions or other moves against Portugal, even though it is evident that the separation of Angola from Portugal will give us another Congo crisis?

Will the United States continue to support Adoula's demand that the United Nations overthrow the Katanga government, even though Adoula sounds more and more like the late Patrice Lumumba? If Katanga goes down, the terrorists will have another area bordering Angola from which to work.

Does not the United States recognize that in backing Adoula and the terrorists it is going right along with Russian plans for the eventual destruction of this country?

The answers seem so plain that even Adlai Stevenson and Chester Bowles should pass the examination. Yet they have failed equally simple questions in the past.

If we do not continue to vote with the so-called neutralists at the U.N. we'll lose the good will gained—theoretically—when we turned against Portugal in the past.

Perhaps even Stevenson, Bowles, and 'Soapy' Williams are catching on at last. It doesn't matter too much what the U.N. does or doesn't do. That outfit is through.

The danger to this country itself draws closer and closer. Some day calamitous events will force decisions based on hard, cruel realities. The U.N. will NOT figure in those decisions.

What is Social Credit?

Social Credit assumes that Society is primarily meta-
physical, and must have regard to the organic relationships of its prototype.

(These initial lines of the 'specification' were inadvertently omitted from our issue of December 23).