The Invasion and Occupation of Goa by the Indian Union

(Continuation of the speech delivered by the Prime Minister Prof. Doctor Oliveira Salazar, during the Session of the Portuguese National Assembly held on January 3, 1962, issued by the Secretariado Nacional da Informação.)

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II

The question was aggravated by the warlike threats of the Indian Prime Minister and the order given for the mobilization of the Indian military forces. The time had come for us to use the political elements which we believed we could count on for support. This explains our inquiries of the governments of Great Britain, the United States and Brazil.

Between Portugal and Great Britain there exist old alliances which both governments consider to be still in force. It is not worthwhile mentioning them all here, for the essential elements for my purpose are to be found in the declaration of 14 October 1899, commonly called the Treaty of Windsor. This expressly ratified the validity of art. 1 of the 1642 Treaty and the final article of the 1661 Treaty. The former refers generically to the alliance between the two nations whereas the latter contains the obligation of the British Government to defend Portugal's overseas territories or, in the language of the time, all the conquests and colonies belonging to the Portuguese Crown, against all their present and future enemies.

It has been the view of the two governments that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance is not automatic; its application depends on the casus foederis, that is, the opinion formed by each of the States on the war situation and the possibilities of intervention therein. This refers to the alliance as such because the obligation of the British Government to defend the Portuguese overseas territories cannot be legitimately understood by us or by anybody else to be dependent on the casus foederis, since it is expressed in so precise and absolute a manner in the Treaty of 1661. That is, the obligation to defend our overseas territories in a manner suited to the circumstances cannot be omitted.

Yet it would seem that the British interpretation seeks to diverge from this principle in view of the declaration made on 19 May 1958 in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who referred to the form of application of the Treaties to territories and to particular circumstances, without the distinction that I have just made. The very prudent British school of diplomacy has one special feature that I greatly admire, which is to make every effort even in the gravest circumstances to obtain concrete undertakings in exchange for vague promises. In view of this tendency, a mere parliamentary declaration, not the result of an agreement between the two governments, has not seemed to us to be valid as the genuine interpretation of a Treaty which contains, furthermore, an express reference to the advantages which Portugal had yielded in exchange for the obligation accepted by Great Britain. Our interpretation should thus be the better of the two.

In over thirty years of government I had never appealed to the Treaties of alliance, it being my belief that a constant fidelity had transformed them from documents to be invoked and discussed into deep feelings and permanent attitudes in the policy of the two nations. But Great Britain had expressly invoked the alliance. One example is the request for the concession of facilities in the Azores in 1943 in spite of our declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war. The white paper on the Azores published in London in 1946 omitted any reference to the notes on June 16 and 23, September 14 and October 4 of that year, which were precisely the notes referring to the guarantees given by the British Government on the maintenance of Portuguese sovereignty in the overseas territories. It is true that while that same most prudent British diplomacy had not limited in time the assurance given, it had indirectly limited it to the threats or risks which might result from the concessions we then made. In view of the desperate situation in which Great Britain then was, we did not think it appropriate to raise the question at that time and waste time on useless argument, so that I did no more than outline the matter in passing in one of the notes I have mentioned. What is certain is that whatever the circumstantial limitations of the promises made at that point the generic guarantees or, rather the British undertakings, continued to be without any possible argument those enshrined in the 1661 and 1899 Treaties. We therefore based our request to Great Britain on those two undertakings.

My personal dislike of asking for the services of others, even when they are due by contract, had to give way before the gravity of the cause. What the State of India represented and still represents for the Portuguese Nation cannot be measured by the smallness of its territory but by the greatness of the history of which it forms part and the nobility of the mission which took the Portuguese there in the first place. On the basis of our interpretation of the 1899 Treaty and not forgetting a rather ill-timed and purely unilateral reaction by the British Government in 1954, recently recalled in the House of Lords by the Secretary of State, the Portuguese Government thus asked the British Government on 11 December to indicate what measures it could adopt to co-operate with the Portuguese forces to frustrate the Indian aggression. The reply of Her Majesty's Government was soon received and consisted, in essentials, of the following: in the eventuality of an attack

(continued on page 3)
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The Delusion of Super-Production

"There is no more dangerous delusion abroad in the world at this time than that production per se is wealth—it is about as sensible as a statement that because food is necessary to man he should eat continually and eat everything. Production is necessary and desirable but as long as the actual thing produced is a means to something else which is necessary to humanity, and like everything else the thing produced has to be paid for by effort on the part of someone. So far from the necessity of this country and the world, being an orgy of unlimited production, the first need is for revision of material necessities, combined with sound scientific efforts, to produce a programme framed to meet the ascertained demand, not artificially stimulated, but individualistic in origin whenever possible."

"This Needs an Answer"

There reaches us with the postmark 'Bournemouth-Poole' anonymously a cutting from The Brooks Bulletin dated March 15, 1962, as follows:

"ALBERTA IS HIGHEST COSTING PROVINCE"

"Editor, The Bulletin,

"Dear Sir: I read a letter written to The Bulletin by Soren Petersen saying that we are being over-taxed.

"Well, that is nothing new in Alberta. That is one of the Social Credit policies. They make us pay plenty so that they can be debt-free and have a surplus to boast about.

"We pay more for our licenses, power or anything else here in Alberta than in any other province and, as the Social Credit speaker says, that, as long as we vote for them, they will think that that is the kind of deal we want."

"J.P.

"Tilley, Alta."

In red ink above the printed text are the words "This needs an answer!"

Those who have followed the history of Social Credit will know to what extent J.P. is deceived by the name of his government.

In Africa

(Extracts from a report, dated March 22, 1962, from our Correspondent in Southern Rhodesia).

The Europeans at present are extremely angry that people like Joshua Nkomo and Garfield Todd are allowed to go and talk treasonable nonsense to the U.N. Committee on Colonialism. Surely it is proof of the real freedom of Rhodesians, black or white, that these men are allowed to do this, and can return without action being taken.

... The amount of space given by the Press to reports from Israel is interesting, but not surprising, considering the large Jewish communities of both Salisbury and Bulawayo. In today's paper there is a report, with no adverse comment, on the assistance being given by Israel to the emergent African states, chiefly in the form of advisory missions and facilities for students.

... It is not generally realised overseas that the European wishing to start his own private business here has everything against him, and must have tremendous courage, a capacity for sustained hard work, and plenty of capital, to make a success of it. The African on the other hand, gets constant and plentiful encouragement and assistance from the government, while the European has to take outside expensive licences and can only operate from approved premises.

... Alteration of the law is contemplated in Northern Rhodesia, so that a previous jail sentence will not debar a person from sitting in the Legislature. Most of the leading members of both U.N.I.P. and the A.N.C. have done time for offences varying from seditionary speech to drunken driving.

Meanwhile the 60,000 or 70,000 Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, who have made the country what it is, are wondering anxiously what is going to happen to them in the near future.

A New London

The following letter appeared in The Times, April 24, 1962:

Sir,—While respecting the uncompromising boldness of Mr. D. P. M. Clover's proposal, in his letter on April 19, for a "New London", I must protest against his unquestioning acceptance of the main social purpose for which we continue to plan and to build: the provision of "employment". Until we can escape from our conventional conviction that the provision of "work" for everyone for ever (in the sense of toil imposed not by Nature but by Man) should be the first aim in life and therefore the first expression of architecture, we shall not achieve a civilized environment, whatever plans for preservation, adaptation and renewal may be evolved.

A more reasonable objective, and the first required ingredient of a healthy cultural complex, is the deliberate and cherished growth of personal creative leisure, that Cinderella
of the Freedoms. Very few responsible people—least of all architects and town-planners—yet dare to discuss the fundamental work-leisure issue of our times. With the Second Industrial Revolution upon us, we shall have to face the issue sooner or later. For the sake of the viable and lovable City of Tomorrow alone, the sooner we face it the better.

Yours faithfully,

ERIC DE MARE.

3, Stanley Crescent, W.11.

THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF GOA BY THE INDIAN UNION

(continued from page 1)

on Goa there would be inevitable limitations on the aid which the British Government would be in a position to give the Portuguese Government in a struggle with another member of the Commonwealth. This euphemistic reference to "inevitable limitations" had to be interpreted in this case as meaning that the British Government was excusing itself from carrying out the obligations of the Treaties.

I am among those who are convinced that the British Government made many more efforts and much more urgent appeals in this emergency to prevent the Indian aggression than those rejected in the press or directly communicated to us. The reason for this is a simple one. Although Goa could never represent for the British view of such problems what she means to us, an integral portion of the Portuguese Nation, it is extremely disagreeable for the honour and prestige of a great power to avoid fulfilling definite obligations which were duly balanced by benefits conceded by Portugal. We should also consider it intolerable for the upbringing and the individual moral sense of the British for Great Britain to acquire, through the Commonwealth, any piece of territory, however small, stolen from its oldest ally.

But if the "inevitable limitations", now invoked mean that it is impossible for Great Britain to act effectively in the case of armed attacks by members of the Commonwealth on Portuguese territories, there is another aspect of the matter to consider. Given the extension of the Commonwealth and the aggressiveness and expansionist ambitions of its new members, the Portuguese Government should now study what positive content still remains in the second part of the Declaration of Windsor of 1899. On its conclusions it should base its future attitude towards the obligations that exist between the two countries. The pragmatism of British policy is admirable, but unfortunately it cannot always avoid the awkwardness of painful contradictions.

We also asked the British Government for permission to use some aerodromes necessary for connections with Goa. I am sorry to say that the British Government took a week to inform us that we could not use them. Had it not been for this delay we should certainly have found alternative routes and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material which we thought necessary for a longer sustained defence of the territory.

Now let us consider the United States.

Thanks to effect of two great victorious wars and their economic and financial power, area and population, the United States were raised to the highest level among the nations and considered to be the highest expression and leader of what we consider to be the free world. It is of no importance whether they deliberately and intentionally sought to reach this high position or whether they were merely raised to it by a series of historical circumstances. What matters to all of us is whether, now that they occupy this position, they are also ready to carry out its inherent functions.

For these reasons and because of the special relations which have been formed between us for the express purpose of defending the principles fundamental to the life of civilized peoples, the Government thought that it would be showing untimely pride if it did not solicit the intervention of the United States. There was another reason too.

I should here reveal that on 7 August 1961 the United States informed the Portuguese Government of the following: "The support given by the United States to the concept of self-determination does not in any guise imply American support of any interventionist or expansionist aspirations or depredatory attacks on Portuguese overseas territories by other nations. On the contrary, the United States would undoubtedly oppose politically, diplomatically and in the United Nations any attempts by neighbouring states to annex Portuguese overseas territories." On 9 December the Portuguese Government received an explanation of that first attitude—we cannot yet be sure how far it is invalidated by the explanation—, but in spite of this we considered it a very serious matter for the relations and agreements between the two States that the first declaration should not be the expression in words of an established, unconditional policy, the result moreover of a common adhesion to a state of law which constantly opposed the violent use of force in international life. So we got into touch with the American Government.

It was in fact very active both in Washington and in New Delhi in its attempt to dissuade the Indian Union from attacking Goa. It seems that President Kennedy even wrote to the Indian Prime Minister, while the last appeal to dissuade Nehru by the American Ambassador in New Delhi was made no more than two hours before the order to attack was given.

We cannot doubt the force of these requests and those made by Great Britain, nor the political and ideological interest of the two nations in that the Portuguese State of India should not be invaded so as to be annexed by the Indian Union by an act of war. Both were afraid that the pacifist legend of the Indian Union would finally and completely disappear and also that it would be recognized how fragile and ineffective was the edifice they had so lovingly built and maintained for the preservation of peace. But in that case we must realise that today in India there is a small country deprived of its territories by force, and that at the gates of Goa two great powers, Great Britain and the United States, are also defeated, which predicts a fearful catastrophe for the world. When small nations are defeated it is sad and affecting, but the powerlessness of the great to defend the right is incomparably graver.

Let us now turn to our Brazil.

The treaty of Friendship and Consultation which laid down the basis of the Luso-Brazilian Community did no more than transfer an existing reality to the sphere of law, but only when it was formulated in law could it effectively guide the policy of the two countries between themselves and above all between the Community and the world at large. Its outline, at once extensive and impregnable, may serve as the foundations of an international edifice of the widest significance or be no more than the timid inspiration of sentimental message.
this basis statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic should in fact construct a Community to the benefit of the two lands, as History created them—two homelands—and as the Portuguese and Brazilians seek to perpetuate them. We for our part shall make every effort in this direction.

Anti-colonialism is a constant feature of Brazilian policy, but another is the refusal to recognise the annexation of territory by force. The former should only concern us to the extent that unawareness of the real nature of the Portuguese overseas provinces might possibly obscure understanding of what is happening there; the latter would always work in our favour in the would-be subjection of Goa to the Indian Union. In spite of certain fluctuations this year in the association of Brazil with the Afro-Asian countries, at least the attitude of its responsible leaders towards India did not need to undergo any alteration, maintaining always its condemnation of any aggression and, consequently, a Brazilian refusal to recognise any annexation which might be the result. Goa has always been a case apart in the Brazilian view.

There was thus no difficulty or resistance to be overcome before Brazil could possibly declare, as it has more than once done, its official view on the imminent or current attacks on the Portuguese State of India. We are sure that this attitude did no more than reflect the general opinion of the Brazilian Nation. The fact that Brazil had agreed to defend Portuguese interests in the Indian Union placed it in a special position to defend the people of Goa against the act of absorption that was being prepared.

The intervention of Brazil, like the others I have enumerated, proved unavailing, as did the requests and inquiries made in New Delhi by Spain, Canada, Australia, West Germany, Argentina, Belgium and Holland, to mention only those of which we have direct knowledge.

Apart from the three countries I have mentioned, whose political activity was especially justified, the Portuguese Chancellery sought to warm friendly nations in all continents, more as a moral mobilization to defend the right than as an action from which decisive effects were expected. It was not necessary to knock at the doors of some because common principles and identical interests pointed unequivocally to the road to be taken. It is only just to put Spain in the first place, far in advance of all others, for itself and together with its friends in South America, as worthy of our gratitude. It has accompanied us in living the drama of Goa, and rightly so, for if there is a Portuguese territory which has been formed under the joint influence of the two penultimate States it is Goa, which owes as much to the genius of Alfonso de Albuquerque as to the teaching of St. Francis Xavier. Furthermore, in a Europe which is in danger of collapse because it has lost its self-confidence Spain has tempered in the fire of a painful experience its faith in the principles of the civilization it spread over the world, and is a nation where the great and the heroic still find their place in life and have a moral sense. Spain thoroughly understands the Portuguese state of mind in all its aspects.

The means of the nations taken individually to check Indian aggression were exhausted and recourse could now only be had to the action of the world organisation, called the “United Nations”, through a call for the urgent meeting of the Security Council. Our study of the problem and the experience we are acquiring of the system adopted did not leave us with any doubts about how futile our appeal was. But, on the one hand, our presence in the organisation could hardly be understood if we were not ready to have recourse to it; on the other, the way in which it was bound to act would be no further revealing proof that, as at present functions, it is not only useless but is actively harmful.

The question was put before the Council on the first day of the invasion of Goa and soon after it had begun. It was a case of unprovoked aggression on territory still not occupied by the enemy, in fact an extraordinary simple case for the application of the principles embodied in the Charter. The motion which ordered a suspension of hostilities was approved by a majority of seven votes, calling on the invading forces to retire to their initial positions and calling for negotiations for the solution of the conflict. It was nevertheless vetoed by Russia and thus nullified. The naturally parallel attitudes of the President of the U.S.S.R., who in New Delhi had incited India to attack Goa, and the Russian representative in the Security Council who vetoed the motion approved by a majority, once more drove the Indian Union into the arms of the Soviets, but also clearly showed the paralysis of the so-called collective defence system against Russia or against any power protected by her.

The outcome of the appeal was foreseen but it alarmed the world. The declaration made by the Indian representative that his country would go on with its policy, Charter or no Charter, Council or no Council, legitimately or not, was such a challenge to the aims and legal structure of the institution that it would have been better to consider it defunct on the spot. The United States believed that in fact what had happened foretold the impending end of the organisation but, in an attempt to consolidate it, they joined all the other nations the next day in a vote against Portugal and two days later hastened to assure the Indian Union of the financial support. This is no doubt correct but it is very difficult for us to understand; above all it does not fit into the pattern of our moral sensitivity.

We might licitly ask what our role is in the United Nations, or that of those minor powers who do not enjoy the favour of Russia or whose solidarity with the West calls down upon them the open hostility of the anti-western bloc. The question will also be asked how we came to enter the organisation.

The Government’s policy followed that of very wise Switzerland, that is, not to seek admission to the United Nations Organisation. We did so later at the request of Great Britain and the United States who argued that was necessary to reinforce the western position for any emergency. For years we ran up against the Russian veto and we finally entered the organisation as “small change”. With the transfer of powers from the Council to the Assembly, the first dominated by Russia and the second by the communists and Afro-Asia countries, the western powers, in which I include South America, lost every possibility of employing their wider experience in conducting the affairs of the international community, moderating certain unthinking impulses and preventing the government of the world from domination by an intolerable dictatorship of racist passions and irresponsibility.

(To be continued)