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PUBLIC OPINION, THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND NATIONAL DEFENCE
By Dr. Frank R. Barnett

From EAST WEST DIGEST (The Journal of the Foreign Affairs Circle, Petersham, Surrey) November 1965, we reprint below, almost in full, one of six essays originally published in a study called PEACE AND WAR IN THE MODERN AGE by The National Strategy Information Center, New York. (In spite of some inaccuracies the essay is worthy of close study)

Can democracy which cherishes dissent and encourages diversity, compete with totalitarian dogma in an ideological struggle in which repetition, simplicity of theme, and professionalism in propaganda techniques are not irrelevant to changes in the minds of men? Can men who cherish peace even comprehend the goals and ambitions of those for whom revolution, violence and the future good of mankind are synonymous? These are questions which pose themselves in any discussion of public opinion and citizen action in relation to national defence.

Professor Toynbee, in recording the demise of many civilisations, talks of "challenge and response." There are at least two reasons why America has failed, thus far, to meet the challenge to her survival with an adequate response. First, we do not admit, as a government, or as a people, that we are "at war" with a conspiratorial elite which has perverted every form of human activity to the cause of conflict. Hence, we have no grand strategy and no sustained tactics, either for offensive or defensive action. We tend to treat the siege of Berlin, the capture of Cuba and the guerrilla wars in Southeast Asia as isolated incidents which only temporarily interrupt the world's "normal state of peace." We fail to perceive that to the Communist every armistice is merely a cloak for unconventional warfare.

Second, although the Soviets have developed nonmilitary combat to an exact science, we have neglected to perfect any comparable cold war weapons system. Thus, between the military hardware of the Pentagon and the orthodox diplomacy of the Department of State, the Communists continue to drive their irregular spearheads tipped with propaganda, psychological warfare, strikes, student riots, precinct politics, blackmail, insurgency, and coups d'etat. The current Soviet leaders, despite images of "moderation," have by no means dismantled the formal academies in which agents are trained for sabotage, subversion, street fighting and the manipulation of mob opinion. There are few Americans who can compete on the psychological squares of the cold war chessboard with the professional graduates of those Iron Curtain institutes for nonmilitary or political warfare.

POLITICAL WARFARE DEFINED

What precisely is political warfare? Various clichés, such as the "contest of ideas," are often mistakenly used as if they were interchangeable with political warfare. Some diplomats seem to believe that the term means nothing more than trade fairs or the exchange of tourists with Iron Curtain countries. Political warfare is a sustained effort by a government or political group to seize, preserve, or extend power against a defined ideological enemy, through all acts short of a shooting war by regular military forces, but not excluding the threat of such a war.

Political warfare, in short, is "warfare"—not public relations. As practised by the Communists, it is one part persuasion, two parts deception, and four parts coercion and blackmail. It embraces diverse forms of violence. The aim of political warfare is not to "promote mutual understanding" between differing points of view: it is to discredit, displace and neutralize an opponent; to destroy a competing ideology; and to make one's own values prevail.

It is a grave error to regard political warfare as a magic weapon that can be divorced from military capability. Political warfare interacts with the other components of power, such as economic growth and space technology. Actually, there is much evidence to suggest that a primary object of Soviet political warfare is to degrade U.S. military strength, unravel the NATO alliance, and—through "peace charades"—stultify our weapons development while the Kremlin gains more time for Soviet science.

OTHER FORMS OF NONMILITARY WARFARE

An important component of nonmilitary warfare is ideology. Pragmatic Americans are often impatient of metaphysicians who talk about dialectics. Ideology is something so alien to our culture pattern that we prefer to explain the behaviour of Soviet leadership in terms of more familiar phenomena such as "peasant manners," or a deprived childhood, or the Russian heritage. Nor have we discriminated in favour of Communists in this respect. Fascists, too, have enjoyed the benefits of our unbelief in the power of dogma.

For example, until Allied armies at the end of World War II actually broke into the death camps of Nazi Germany, most people in the West couldn't really believe that a theory of race supremacy could lead in practice to the construction of bake ovens for human beings. It didn't seem "plausible." Most of us assumed Hitler was simply the Kaiser all over again.

But Hitler was more than a repitition of the Kaiser. Ideology had been added to the old-fashioned nationalism and had converted aggression from a contest for real estate into a struggle, literally, for the soul and destiny of man. The Nazis took their ideology seriously and so do the Communists. Failure to understand the ideological grounding of our adversaries has led to a great deal of wishful thinking about Moscow's intentions.

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IN AUSTRALIA—

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Manners

Lord Salisbury, whom the Rhodesians would accept, and the Governor, acceptable to the British, might be able to work out a satisfactory solution to the Rhodesian problem. And, I thought, perhaps the Bishop of Mashonaland could join them. The bishop, incidentally, has just been honoured by the Orthodox Church on completing the fortieth year of his priesthood and is to be invested with the insignia of the Order of St. Mark.

This view received support as (Church Times, March 18, 1966), “The Bishop of Mashonaland (the Right Rev. Cecil Alderson) last week accused Fr. Hugh Bishop ... of ‘irrelevancy’ to Rhodesia’s problems.” We may recall that members of the congregation protested against Fr. Bishop’s sermon in Salisbury cathedral by walking out, on February 27. The preacher quoted in a letter from the Zambia Times, and the bishop said, “In my judgment ‘indiscriminate beatings, the use of torture and even the killing of Africans are reported’ is simply not good enough. Unless the preacher has very sure information, this was an improper quotation to make from a pulpit.”

The bishop had pronounced the régime unconstitutional, but trusted that no preacher in his diocese would use in church the expression “the illegal régime”, which he said “contradicts the principle of charity.” He said that the dictum “one man—vote” was not part of the Christian religion, adding: “The Church must say that deliberate refusal to grant votes on grounds of colour is unjust; but that does not apply in Rhodesia.”

He reminded his clergy and others to bring to his attention or that of the authorities any facts known to them “beyond reasonable doubt.” He added, “I believe the authorities would welcome this. The Minister of Law and Order gave me much time on this last year ... We must be just and true in all our dealings with all our fellow-citizens.”

By contrast, Bishop Skelton of Matabeleland announced that he is to publish a dossier of acts of brutality and as chairman of “the Christian Council of Rhodesia” accused Mr. Smith of blasphemy when he claimed that UDI was a blow for Christianity. This must have amused the communists.

Meanwhile the Smith Government discards any Britons it does not want, including a grand-daughter of Prof. Toynbee who was working for Amnesty International and the shadowy figure of Mr. Duncan Watson, Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office, hovers in Lusaka, apparently to report to London. He is said to have met Sir Humphrey Gibbs twice (Daily Telegraph, March 24, 1966) and to have visited Rhodesia “to sound out the possibility of negotiations with the Smith régime.” Ghana has also sent home its unwanted Briton, Mr. Bing, Q.C.

—H.S.S.

Correction Please!

ITEM: From an Editorial in the Hartford Times, February 10, 1966:

The spread of Communism is in some ways an example of the hopefulness of the world, for the poor nations see in it a path to development and self-determination.

CORRECTION: Hopefulness? The spread of Communism is an example of the ignorance and/or apathy of individuals who have been beguiled by Communist propaganda, betrayed by Communist subversion and overwhelmed by Communist trickery and might.


Public Opinion, The Private Sector and National Defence (continued from page 1)

Thus, it is argued in some circles in America today that the cold war may almost be over; that a “moderate” class of new Bolsheviks are trying to lead a Russian middle class away from world revolution toward the rule of law and membership in the racquet club. It is asserted that, since the Kremlin is now introducing “profit and incentive” into the Soviet system, these capitalistic devices will destroy Communism as they mature.

It is maintained, moreover, that the Communist Party in Russia has been forced to train a managerial and technical elite to run an increasingly sophisticated industrial economy, and that these managers and technocrats will exert a “moderating influence” on old Bolshevik ideology and objectives.

Obviously, everyone hopes these expectations may prove to be true; but there are certain grounds for scepticism. Nazi Germany probably had more private capitalism, more profit, more incentives, a larger middle class, more managers, and more technocrats per capita than any other country in the world except the United States, Switzerland and Great Britain. In other words, if an historian looked at Nazi Germany only from the standpoint of management techniques, technical personnel, heavy industry, profit structure, capitalism, banking networks or literate middle-class, he might conclude that Nazi Germany and the United States were far closer together, sociologically and economically, in 1939 than Russia and America could be, even by the year 2000. The crucial difference was that an ideological Nazi Germany was governed by a ruthless party elite which brooked no opposition, and that political fact made economics, sociology and middle-class morality irrelevant.

Who will take encouragement from the fact that Russia is “introducing profits” into the Soviet system, when the evidence suggests that the largest bonuses go to the most inefficient managers of Soviet munitions factories, artful propagandists and those Soviet scientists who show ingenuity in advanced weapons re-
search? As a matter of fact, Russia has never had as much “socialism” as Great Britain, in terms of equal shares for the working class. The U.S.S.R. is more nearly a system of monopoly state capitalism run by nineteenth-century Russian robber barons. The Soviet system is characterised by extraordinary salaries and privileges for the economic czars, piecework for the proletariat, and conscription for labour.

Moreover, those who believe that Communism is gradually evolving toward peaceful convergence with the United States, in a sort of Fabian, social welfare, world state, evidently forget that Moscow has reintroduced the death-penalty for so-called “economic crimes” against the state—a form of state terrorism that disappeared in the Western world over 150 years ago.

Also, in both the Soviet Union and Poland, the Communist Party is reimposing rigid conformity on the intellectuals who have dared raise their voices in what they thought was going to be a permissive atmosphere. We know also from reliable sources that the Communists are spending not less than one hundred million dollars a year on subversion in Latin America alone. Does this sound as if the Soviets are moving toward middle-class morality and a “live-and-let-live” philosophy?

A LESSON FROM CUBA

There is an aspect of the Cuban coup which illuminates the Communist strategy of nonmilitary warfare. On the theory that “we are waging a battle for men’s minds,” many Americans urge that we develop a more positive propaganda for our own ideological position. Many Americans would favour that. But what happened in Cuba proves that a contest at the level of pure ideology would be almost irrelevant. Castro and his cohorts seized Cuba by masking their Communist beliefs not by exposing them. In Cuba, Communist intellectuals did not create a climate of opinion sympathetic to Marx, and then, inside that climate of opinion, gradually assume power. Not at all. The Communists who boarded the Castro bandwagon carefully concealed their Communist ambitions, so as to enlist the initial support of Cuban middle-classes for the Castro revolution.

Castro was helped to power by Cuban businessmen, doctors, publishers and lawyers fed to the teeth with Batista but wholly opposed to world Communism. It was only after Castro had come to power that hidden Communists discredited, isolated and destroyed their temporary allies in the popular front movement. It was not Marx who persuaded Cuba with ideas; it was Lenin who captured Cuba with proxy fighting and nonmilitary warfare.

It is precisely because Communists can be expected to continue “twilight aggression,” through psycho-social weaponry aimed in large part at civilian minds and motivations, that the question of public opinion looms so importantly in the equation of national defence. Some observers feel so keenly that we are losing the idea war that they have turned to calling for our own omnipotent Ministry of Propaganda. It is my thesis that the private sector can cope with the problem, provided it will take pains to introduce professionalism into an area too frequently occupied solely by good intentions.

Since some people doubt the need for cold war education, or question the capacity of the private sector to do anything responsible and effective, it is only reasonable to set forth the assumptions on which subsequent recommendations for civic action can be based.

THE PROFILE OF FUTURE CONFLICT

Despite mounting hostility between Moscow and Peking, the struggle between Communist powers and the free world may last another forty to fifty years. The interoffice memoranda of the Communist world reveal that “peaceful-co-existence” is expected to provide new opportunities to expand class war, ideological war and wars of national liberation. The strategy of the “peace charade” is a time-tested gambit designed by Lenin, not Khrushchev. It was used successfully by Stalin and Mao when they needed a respite to consolidate forces. When Khrushchev talked peace and asked for trade while he subsidized proxy war, thereby both strengthening and safeguarding the Russian heartland, he had only adapted the techniques of Lenin and Stalin to the nuclear age. We can scarcely expect that Khrushchev’s protégés, steeped in the ideology of the higher Party schools, will preside over the liquidation of Marxist faith or abandon efficacious Leninist techniques.

Contrary to sentiment in Western capitals, economic gains are not likely to civilise the Communists. The ideological heirs of Marx, do not live by bread alone; it is doubtful if the Party elite can be “bought off” with trade or reconditioned by bourgeois gestures of friendship. Certainly not on the eve of triumph! From their point of view history has already passed its verdict in their favour. Communist leaders have broken the chain of capitalist encirclement. Lenin had no country forty-eight years ago, whereas today Communists have thirteen in hand and ninety-one Parties spread over the globe. They scent victory within the lifetime of the next generation. Their enemies, they feel, are in retreat, “compelled” by Socialist power to sign treaties on Moscow’s terms and increasingly coerced by the force of world opinion to accept Soviet definitions of peace, aggression, colonialism and world law. To Communists our era is not one of détente but of transition to victorious Socialism. This means that U.S. national security in the 1960’s and ’70’s may be in greater jeopardy than it was in the tense days of naked Stalinism.

CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT

Communist power is no longer rooted exclusively in ideology, espionage and mass peasant armies. The Russian ox-cart economy has planted its banners on the moon. The modern counterparts of Genghis Khan are armed with machine tools, electronics, the hidden persuaders of modern psychiatry and the maps of outer space. Communists are not only philosopher-thugs, they are also engineers, linguists and students of cybernetics. They have fashioned new weapons, not only from the laboratory of physics, but also from the arsenal of the behavioral sciences; and they practise guerrilla diplomacy as cunningly as they wage guerrilla warfare and paramilitary precipice politics.

A Bolshevist conflict manager, in short, is the reincarnation of a Cesare Borgia, blind to the treasures of Florence but equipped with computers, the dialectic, mass media and solid fuel rockets. Such an opponent will not be turned from his designs by the “personality” of a Western statesman, or by rituals celebrating the virtues of free enterprise, or by unilateral disarmament, or slogans that reiterate the benefits to be derived from world peace through world law. This means the American people will have to develop and sustain, over a long period of time, a national will somewhat alien to a pluralistic society which traditionally has wanted as little national purpose as possible in order to make ample room for private and corporate purposes.

NO STALEMATE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

There can be no such thing as stalemate in the contest between free men and Communist aggressors. Woe betide that greater power which, at the most revolutionary moment of history,
assumes status quo in alliance systems or stalemate in weapons systems. Since World War II, revolutionary change has become self-renewing, whether in international politics or the internal social structures of nations or research laboratories. Fifty years of "normal" change, as our grandfathers would have defined that term, are now compressed into eighteen months.

Presumably, scientists on both sides of the Iron Curtain are experimenting with lasers, masers, electronic force shields, electromagnetic flux phenomena and/or other offensive or defensive devices which, by definition, are "inconceivable" to laymen, including many policy-makers and authors of books on strategy who are often oriented more toward political science than technology. One would suppose that the giant computers, the new metallurgy and the miniaturisation of parts—plus automation, operations research, cybernetics, teaching machines, and so on—will virtually guarantee that new breakthroughs are highly probable in many "unexpected" directions.

It is worth remembering that on at least three dramatic occasions the U.S. was nearly caught off guard in the arena of science; first, when Russia tested the hydrogen bomb five to eight years before most Western scientists thought it possible; second, when the Soviets launched sputnik; third, when they exploded their more than 50-megaton device in 1961—an achievement which may have given them dread insight into methods by which a pre-emptive strike could jam the communications and control systems of their adversaries. If we have underestimated our opponents capability before, almost to the brink of disaster, it would be prudent to assume that we live in an era of scientific leapfrog where every innovation, instead of being the ultimate discovery, only makes more invention possible. Thus, "Excellence in America's Classrooms" is not a pious slogan but the necessary formula for survival.

Is it not also self-evident that, in the face of continued Soviet refusal to accept meaningful inspection and control of armaments, it would be folly to tempt the totalitarian taste for surprise assault with unilateral U.S. initiatives to de-accelerate the search for military supremacy? Given undiminished ideological convictions in Moscow with regard to "socialist" victory over the decadent bourgeoisie, psychological gambits based on chivalry and the Judaeo-Christian ethic may be misconstrued as weakness and invitations to treachery by the heirs of Ivan the Terrible. Finally, so long as the Soviets maintain the cloak of police state secrecy over their own military research, and gain much access to our industrial techniques and scientific discoveries through open sources and massive espionage, the "knowledge race" is not likely to be symmetrical.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR

In an open society, people get the foreign policy they deserve and the national security they are wiling to pay for. The government of a free people can lead. It cannot run counter to the priorities of the electorate. For example, in the 1930's, England wanted above all else "peace in our time." Hence, Englishmen sold machine tools to Hitler and hoped for the best. Not even the eloquent Winston Churchill—out of office—could mobilize his countrymen to attend to the growing menace of Nazi Germany.

The task of private citizens today is to help provide an educational substitute for Dunkirk and Pearl Harbor. In the nuclear age, democracies cannot wait for a dictator's surprise assault to alert them to danger. Moreover, since Communists prefer to wage undeclared "twilight war," civilians are as close to the front line as the career military—and being that close to a competent antagonist, they should be familiar with his tactics, strategy, and objectives.

One further fact underlines the need to involve the private citizen in geopolitics, foreign policy, and national defence. In the U.S.S.R. the Communist Party can mobilize the total resources of the Russian empire through total government. In America we have a limited government in Washington, with powers reserved to the states and people. Washington cannot compete with Moscow on many of the squares of the cold war chessboard which relate to political science, motivation, economic vitality and ultimate beliefs.

Americans do not want a censored press, a controlled pulpit, regimented school curricula, or a Ministry of Propaganda. But, since limited government cannot match totalitarian government—in ideological and economic warfare, for example—this suggests the need for volunteer action by the powerful private sector: labour unions and corporations, foundations, universities, professional societies and trade associations. As the private sector becomes professional in the realm of confident management, Communist nonmilitary warfare techniques can be blunted. There is a clear case, therefore, for sophisticated programmes of instruction and orientation in the cold war arena.

Either we will create for ourselves a healthy climate of opinion based on facts, or we may have American opinion manipulated for us by conflict managers who have learned from Pavlov, Goebbels and Lenin on how to advance their goals through nonmilitary warfare.

THE MENACE OF COMMUNISM

This brochure has now been reprinted. With particular reference to Rhodesia, it poses the question, "Why does the West pursue in Africa the policies so vigorously advocated by the U.S.S.R and Communist China? Is it by accident, incompetence or design?" A comprehensive list of books on the International Communist Conspiracy indicates where the answer may be found.

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