Barbarism is a condition of life characterised by primitive standards and methods of living, superstition, and absence of moral and spiritual ideas. What we call civilisation is the emergence from this condition and the in-building into society of the ideas and institutions of moral order and spiritual values.

In this conception, progress consists in the incarnation in customs, behaviour and institutions of Reality ever more profoundly understood: true progress is moral progress, of which the outward manifestation is Art. In all this, science is no more than a tool for the exploration of Reality and while technology may display art, it too is a tool.

Yet science and technology have come to be accepted as ends in themselves, and increasingly the very idea of progress becomes identified with the now self-sustaining and largely meaningless expansion of a technology which has subordinated science to its own indefinite ends, and displaced spiritual values in favour of economic indices. In this view, the end of Man is no longer ultimate union with God, but the part he plays in the expansion of the gross national product. All this is simply a reversion to a new but complex and highly dangerous barbarism.

In his Massey Lectures for 1966, broadcast by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation under the title *American Moral Ambiguity*, Dr. Paul Goodman, an American, examines in depth contemporary American society, with its "warnings of ecological disaster, pollution, congestion, poisoning, mental disease, anomie". Anomie, which Dr. Goodman uses in a substantive way, is defined in Webster’s Dictionary as "a state of normlessness; a state of society in which normative standards of belief or conduct have weakened or disappeared; a similar condition in an individual commonly characterised by personal disorientation, anxiety, and social isolation".

Man invented and devised technology, and used it. But as the technological machine grew, it began to use man. Technological requirements displaced man’s purpose. But now with the progress of automation it is beginning to reject man. Although more and more children must be processed (they still call it education) for the purposes of the machine, fewer are selected. And those that are selected are fitted like parts into a machine whose purpose becomes all the time less comprehensible and less subject to control. "Modern corporate societies that can wield a high technology are liable to a unique temptation: since they do not exploit common labour, they may tend to exclude the majority of human beings altogether, as useless for the needs of the system and therefore as not quite persons."

Dr. Goodman mentions three incompatible predictions about America during the next generation: that there will be an empty and meaningless success of the American style imposed on the whole world; that the country is over-reaching and bound for doom; or a rise in protest, already expressed in the revolt of the young with immorality, drug addiction, and rejection of traditional values and standards, which will end in conflict, "which will hopefully be non-violent", but by which we may learn. Dr. Goodman regards this last as the most hopeful outcome, but considers the evidence stronger for either empty success or crack-up.

It is easy to take the view, as Dr. Goodman seems to, that all this, like Topsy, "just happened"; and this view is encouraged by the present self-sustaining nature of the process. Technology raises its own problems, which, of course, have to be met: we have no choice, and no control over policy.

But in the larger view, this self-sustaining and from the human point of view meaningless expansion is not viable, for it is squandering the resources of the earth at a rate which in terms of centuries is suicidal. And even so, the bombs may go off, or the population explosion become a present reality.

And here we must remember that wisdom was not born in this generation. The fundamental problem of Man is survival—first as an individual and then as a group. The problems of this present must have been foreseen in the past, and the present destructive expansion may be a phase to lay the foundations for a World Government to curb it. There is mounting evidence for this view, which indeed is the only one which gives us ground for hope. For if the meaningless expansion is not after all mindless, if, behind it all, there is a policy which at present we are powerless to alter, it is a policy which can be altered when we can get the minds behind it. Social Crediters know there is an alternative policy, but have learnt that as things have become, they cannot apply it. Dr. Goodman sees that instead of spending 20,000 dollars to urbanise a displaced farmer, it would be much better to put him back on a farm and give him a thousand dollars a year for twenty years. If it is mere foolishness which causes the decision not to do this, we have no hope; but if it is part of a plan of wilful destruction, we may be able to destroy the destroyers: a slender hope, but all we have.

American Moral Ambiguity
by Dr. Paul Goodman

Supplies of this book have been ordered from Canada and should be available in late October or early November.

The price is not yet known.

Books on Social Credit, and on
The International Communist Conspiracy

Comprehensive list available on request


*C.B.C. Publications, Box 500, P.O., Toronto.
The Social Crediter

For Political and Economic Realism

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas. The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.


In Australia—

The Social Credit Secretariat

From Week to Week

The Daily Express, Aug. 25, 1967, carried a report that Russia has rapidly built up its naval strength in the Mediterranean to a present fifty vessels. This build-up began with the stage-managed Israel-Arab 'war', and the fleet has bases in Port Said, Alexandria, Port Sudan, and Hodeida, and supplies are ensured by a flotilla of supply ships, which have short (in relation to those of the U.S. navy) supply lines to the armouries of the USSR. There is a growing fleet of troop and tank landing craft.

Europe is a relatively narrow South-West projection from the Heartland (see T.S.C., Sept. 23, 1967) and the great Asian land mass. To the North-east lies the Baltic Sea, virtually a Russian lake. To the South is the Mediterranean, open only via Gibraltar at one end, and Suez at the other.

Thus it can be seen that Europe, navally, is now virtually completely out-flanked. NATO, effectively, has been dismantled. And the question of German 're-unification', is still an unsettled issue, which could at any time that suits the USSR become a live one. The European situation now is one in which the U.S. could hardly intervene. The problems of logistics increase while the American and British-built bases diminish and even pass into Communist-controlled hands. Just about all that is left is the threat of a nuclear confrontation, and even this becomes less credible as we are told, whether truthfully or not, that the USSR is closing the nuclear 'gap' and perfecting a system of anti-missile missiles while the American Secretary for 'Defence' steadily refuses even to initiate such a system, which at this stage would require more time to complete than almost certainly is now available. Khrushchev meant that he would bury us, and his boast that our grandparents would be Communists probably disguised the intent to consolidate victory well before most of us have grandchildren.

Our fate looks more and more inevitable. Nevertheless, it is a contrived fate, the outcome of conspiracy and subversion working towards monolithic world government, and this ultimate in pyramidal control is, as Douglas pointed out, the most susceptible to collapse, particularly in the face of informed public opinion. There are now hundreds of thousands of people with an increasing knowledge and understanding of the truth. Probably only people in positions of power like what is going on; and the discontent of the remainder, once informed and focused, could still stop it. The people of the 'free' world still have representatives in Parliaments, who should be subjected to all the pressure it is possible to exert to stop their Governments trading with the enemy as exemplified by the Communist-bloc countries, and to treat treason at home for what it is. We are in the midst of the gravest crisis in history, which will be resolved to our ruin unless those who recognise the reality exert themselves.
"East Europe"
It's Really Central Europe, Of Course


(Continued)

"Where will the Kiesinger-led Grand Coalition lead Germany?" Thayer asks, and begins his reply by stressing "two innovations," one of which has now been noted in this article, the other of which we note now: (1) "diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries, to improve the atmosphere for eventual reunification of Germany" (since the first country involved is Romania, I didn't put sic! after "Eastern"); (2) "rapprochement with France." Readers of American Opinion for September 1966 may recall an article on "De Gaulle, Double-Crosser of Lorraine", which theorized on le grand Charles' ambition to see France the leader of a Communist world, and concluded: De Gaulle went to Moscow (in June 1966) to see what was worth shipping to Paris." Now, of course, whatever couldn't be flown over would have to be shipped through Germany. Rapprochement between Germany and France at the present point in time not only means, as Thayer says, that the American Era has ended and a new era in German foreign policy has begun", it also means a step toward the incorporation of Germany into the Communist bloc. It seems to me of enormous significance that de Gaulle not only supports Poland's claim to the Oder-Neisse boundary, but has done so since 1944, or longer than the Communist Government of Poland has existed. The German régime which now approaches de Gaulle of course knows all this.

There is little reason to suppose that the Kiesinger-Brandt-Wehner régime represents the feeling of the majority of Germans in this matter. Thayer's opinion is that disappointing as the alliance with America has been, it symbolizes to most Germans security against absorption by the Soviet Union, and "is the prevailing choice of the German public outside the Bonn hothouse". Unhappily, the men of Bonn, whatever their own age, undoubtedly know better than the German public how little Washington's protection against Moscow is worth and how little the alleged hostility between L.B.J. and de Gaulle really means. And it should not be forgotten that there are in Germany, as elsewhere, Insiders who give direction if not directions to the holders of public office. Thayer, it seems, has access to certain inside areas.

"Seated", he writes, "in the directors' dining room of a well-known Frankfurt international banking house, a young, keen and pro-American German said to me: 'The eastern territories, we all know, are gone. East Germany is a separate state, growing more self-reliant every day. Let us be honest and recognize these facts and get on with our business.'"

Of course, the way The Ratchet works, the recognition by non-Communist Germany that there are two Germanies is simply a prelude to subsequent recognition that there is one, Communist, Germany.

I agree with Alice Widener (I often do) in her trenchant summary of the situation, as follows: "Unhappily, there are in Washington, D.C., ardent advocates of a US-USSR entente who look on (Herbert) Wehner as the man to bring about first a Bonn-East Berlin entente and then an all-German-Soviet entente. Since the Kremlin never would consent to a capitalist unification of Germany, chances are that there might be a Socialist one. This wouldn't be at all objectionable to left-of-centre forces in Washington and London. In fact, they would like to see it. But a unified Socialist Germany tied in close friendship with the Soviet Union probably could not survive for very long. Gradually since 1960 the German Christian Democrats have been losing faith in our willingness to defend them against Soviet intimidation and worse. The present Administration in Washington has done little to correct the mistakes made by the Kennedy Administration in Europe that wrecked NATO. Discouraged and afraid, many Germans believe Bonn can play the entente game as well as Washington and that in Herbert Wehner they have the captain of a winning team." (Quoted from Human Events, April 29, 1967, Page 7.)

Confirming Alice Widener's summation of German-American relations since 1960, U.S. News and World Report for May 15, 1967 attributes the obvious reorientation of German diplomacy from Washington toward Paris to Konrad Adenauer's distaste for the frivolity of the late President Kennedy and his entourage from Camelot, or wherever. In contrast, Adenauer found great dignity in de Gaulle. It is not necessary to share whatever confidence Adenauer had in de Gaulle to understand his uneasiness with the tragically miscast Kennedy.

Germans have these days abundant reason to be disgusted with the United States. It seems all too probable that Americans may soon have reason to be disgusted with the Bonn Government. But the Left turn which Bonn is visibly maneuvering is not the result simply of Leftwingers in the Bonn Government. That there should be Leftwingers in the Bonn Government is, rather, the logical consequence of American policy.

VI

Could a unified Germany within the Soviet bloc perhaps dominate or, failing that, break up the Soviet bloc? The answer is near enough a toss-up to tempt both the Soviet Union and Germany to the trial. Existing Communist advantage in resources for terror and suppression of civilian populations through Party cadres, secret police, and Red Army forces—as demonstrated in East Berlin, Poznan, and Budapest—would be offset to an indeterminable degree by German superiority in science, industry, commerce, and other resources of an advanced civilization, very much including a tradition of competence in military strategy and tactics. A German bid to replace Russia as Number One in the new New World would make Red China's alleged efforts in that direction appear as primitive in method and paltry in consequence as inevitably they must be. Particularly, if a New Berlin régime could proselytize the present Central and Eastern European satellites of Soviet Russia, then the geopolitical dreams of General Doctor Haushofer might begin to look pretty substantial. Trouble is—and a tremendous trouble it is—the inveterate fear and hatred of Germany in neighbouring lands, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia. In many of the satellites, however, notably Hungary, hatred of Russia would be the greater. And it should not be forgotten that Central Germany itself is a Soviet satellite now, and doubtless it would not object to German hegemony within the bloc. Even Czechoslovakia and Poland would be to some degree propitiated by Bonn's new orientation toward Gaullist France. In so speculative a field only one thing is certain: West Germany if swallowed might well be more than the Russian Bear could digest. Or to vary the metaphor, if the Communist bloc, already somewhat unstable, should
capture the neutron at Bonn, the whole might undergo fission.

Which brings to mind something that would make a difference.

Does Germany have the atom bomb?
Which Germany?

Either one—perhaps I should say, any one of the three

How can you ask such a question? Everybody knows the
"Nuclear Club" has five members: United States, U.S.S.R.,
Britain, France, and Red China.

Everybody knows a lot that ain't necessarily so. More especially, everybody does not know much. I for one happen not to believe that Red China has any nuclear weapons of its own manufacture. I don't believe the Soviet Union is capable of an independent atomic energy industry. I believe that the "Liberals" are right about one thing: as far as the published statistics show that of about 400,000 grams all-to-use a "Liberal" vogue word—a sobering amount. Where approximately 2.530 kilograms of U-235, Germany. 2.650 kilograms already distributed. well over ninety percent went to West Germany. It seems fantastic to recall that in the spring of 1949 a national crisis of sorts was produced by disclosure that 4 grams of U-235 were missing from the Argonne National Laboratory near Chicago. Now a hundred-thousand times that much plutonium handed over to a foreign country is matter for an obscure footnote in a government report.

Even the German-haters, who are powerful with the American Press, make no outcry over this quantity of fissionable material, which equals the amount in perhaps forty atomic bombs. Yes, I know there are "safeguards": Nevertheless, I suggest that we've already got "proliferation".

In the case of Germany, it would be foolish, I agree, to think that this material, safeguards or no, was going to be incorporated into clandestine nuclear weapons. The Germans will undoubtedly use the material exactly as they say they will, in the conduct of experiments. Two points here seem of interest: (1.) Germans have been in the forefront of nuclear science from the beginnings, (2.) fast breeder reactors are in theory (which may in due course be converted into practice) a means of multiplying the nuclear value of natural uranium by a factor in excess of two hundred. Don't count the Germans out of the atom race.

Communists have a terrible time trying to decide what to say about Germany's prospects for developing nuclear capability. So long as they are not sure of capturing Germany—and they are not, they are not even sure of being captured by Germany, as I have half suggested above they might be—the thought of nuclear weapons in the possession of some Fourth Reich drives them absolutely frantic. They do not want to admit that anything which they so dread to think of happening could happen. At the same time, they have long been committed to a propaganda line that the secrets of nature know no national boundaries. That is why, they insist, it was only to be expected that the Soviet Union would develop an atomic industry of its own, as, they insist, it has done. But who, on reflection, is going to believe that Russia could develop any kind of modern industry that Germany could not also develop? It is actually more than a bit curious that we have heard no outcries of alarm from Russia could develop any kind of modern industry that Germany could not also develop? It is actually more than a bit curious that we have heard no outcries of alarm from the Left over the possibility that Germany might be secretly building its own nuclear arsenal. The only fears of this general nature that are voiced are fears that through a multilateral force, or somehow, the United States and/or Britain and/or France might give Germany nuclear weapons or a hand on the trigger of, say, American nuclear weapons.

(To be continued)

**AMERICAN OPINION**

**Scoreboard 1967**

Those who prefer to acquaint themselves with the truth, however disconcerting, about the steady advance of Communism all over the world, cannot do better than study the appalling evidence as set out, country by country, in the Scoreboard 1967 edition of *American Opinion*. It is a composite by several authors, each an expert in his own field. The information is all the more valuable because the mass media in this country play it down almost to the point of complete suppression.

8/3 posted


Printed by E. Fish & Co. Ltd., Liverpool