III

"Social Credit fundamentally involves a conception of the relationships between individuals and their association in countries and nations, between individuals and their association in groups" (Douglas: The Approach to Reality).

Douglas also observed that similarity of organisation was an indication of similarity of purpose, whatever the ostensible aims of an organisation might be. Thus Communism in the U.S.S.R., Fascism in Italy, Nazism in Germany, Socialist planning along Fabian lines in Britain, and the New Deal in the U.S.A., were and are fundamentally identical in organisation and purpose—and in origin. The common characteristic is the subordination of the individual to the group.

It is quite obvious that individuals are more subordinate to the group now than they were fifty years ago: that is to say, that governments are more powerful in relation to the governed. This has been brought about by inflation, confiscatory taxation, annihilating death duties and progressive legislation. For independence from government really means independence of means. This fact was the fundamental premise of Economic Democracy: "The basis of independence is most definitely economic". The economic proposals which Douglas put forward were designed to secure, and extend in relation to industrial and technological progress, independence of this character.

But the attempt to secure and extend independence through economic adjustments failed, and Douglas came more and more to see that this was failure in the face of a conscious determination that it should not succeed, and that the strengthening of government was simply the buttressing of control previously exercised through control of the financial system—control depending on general ignorance of the nature of money.

What Social Credit was up against was conspiracy, and the essence of conspiracy is secrecy. Up to, including, and even after the end of the war, searching questions began to be asked, and some disturbing and sinister facts came to light. A few high level (but not inner circle) conspirators, appalled at the war shambles, idealists who, originally believing that the end justifies the means, on seeing the betrayal of Poland and the rape of Eastern Europe felt their ideals betrayed, and defectors from the Conspiracy and confessed to their own involvement. These people were investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by investigating committees of Congress—these latter functioning like Courts, with powers to subpoena witnesses, and take evidence on oath. Other people, with first-hand knowledge of some strange events, wrote books of their recollections, and some war diaries were published. The terrible story of Pearl Harbour became known. The Congressional committees published voluminous reports of their Hearings, including the evidence. These Reports, diaries, and other books were analysed and the information collated by researchers, so that it was found that what was an innocent revelation in one book acquired a fresh significance in the light of information from other sources.

As a result of all this it was proved beyond all doubt that indeed a Conspiracy existed, and was in control of the U.S. Government.

This Conspiracy is like an onion. The outside layer consists of rather shallow-minded liberal idealists. These are the people who either join or lend their names to all sorts of protest groups. Their thinking is done for them by slogans and columnists. They have been rather loosely mobilised to give evidence to the idea of 'public opinion'.

The next layer consists of the intellectual Liberals who want to see a New Order, and who deride old values. Some of these, probably the great majority, are entirely sincere, and hold their beliefs as a result of an educational system which has been increasingly brought under the influence of Fabian socialism. But within this layer are the more activist socialists, who form and direct the fronts of innocent innocents; and these form the third layer. The next layer is formed by selection from the third. These are people to some extent "in the know". Among these are the secret Communist agents of the U.S.S.R., highly trained and disciplined. These are organised into small cells, receiving orders from 'contacts' who themselves belong to a higher order of cell—a process which ends, of course, in the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow.

But parallel with the chain of cells (the "command and intelligence" structure) which leads into and out of Moscow, is another chain which leads into and out of the highest circles of finance—the world of the Federal Reserve Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the tax-exempt foundations, and other powerful—and outwardly respectable—Institutions. But within this structure lies the heart of the Conspiracy. The key to this group is the Council on Foreign Relations, which has international affiliations. And just as it is obviously impossible, at any rate at present, to penetrate the secrecy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in Moscow, so we cannot penetrate the secrecy which enshrouds the inner direction of the Finance-Foreign Relations group. But what we can be reasonably sure of is that the group within which the inner direction is to be found; and that some Directors will be (continued on page 4)
The Social Crediter

For Political and Economic Realism

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Some Facts Please

The neo-Christians, headed by bishops Robinson and Pike, have turned violently on the editor of Crockford who suggested that the luminaries of Southwark and Cambridge have caused a fall in the number of ordinands. Nevertheless they may feel embarrassed by their latest recruit, the Rev. Ernest Harrison, an Anglican of Quebec, who claims in his book A Church without God “that there is no God . . . and debunks the idea of life after death.” (Church Times, March 10, 1967). He should I suppose be called an theologian, and his views can have little in common with the Gospels or their protagonist who taught his followers to say “Our Father”. He would doubtless rewrite the beatitudes to the effect that, Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see that there is no God.

But despite these inconsistencies, the “new theologians” preserve a rigid orthodoxy on such questions as abortion, the United Nations, Race and collectivism, leaving little to distinguish them from Marxist fanatics, and while drawing attention to imperfections in the results of financial distortion, they fail to probe into the financial system itself. They are consistently anti-British and anti-white; racialists indeed.

In an editorial (March 9, 1967) about Aden, for instance, the New Christian advocates massive support for a UN peace-keeping force, which would be “a step forward in rehabilitating the UN itself,” but which would require “real evidence of belief in the UN”. Yet recent events in Aden have shown the anti-British prejudice of the UN party whose presence resulted in still more violence.

The same chronicle carries a survey of church attendance in Billingham which, as one might expect, reveals a decline, but the Catholic Herald (March 19, 1967) reports that “the Catholic population of England and Wales is outstripping the clergy at an alarming rate.”

And the same number asks in the course of an article called “The Dilemma of the Church in Rhodesia”, what happens to the duty of bishops and priests to “banish and drive away all erroneous and strange doctrines” if the time has passed since bishops spoke and politicians trembled. We could mention in reply the rugged sense of the Dean of Gibraltar who preached in the Anglican Cathedral shortly after the Tiger incident. The Very Reverend G. S. H. Worsley calls the Prime Minister’s action not merely immoral but “one of utter folly.” For after reaching agreement, Mr. Wilson then demanded capitulation, and so flung aside the opportunity to solve the problem. He sowed the seeds of armed conflict among people who need a stabilising influence in their midst.

Granting premature self-rule to uneducated Africans has proved morally wrong and “worries my conscience as a Christian,” says the Dean, who shows his impartiality by calling the phrase wind of change one of the “most unfortunate ever made by a politician.”

The Dean asks, Why the haste? Why the speed? and mentions some of the tragedies resulting from premature majority rule. He is aware of faults in South Africa and Rhodesia, but admires their refusal to be intimidated and their firm stand. He concludes, “May God forgive our leaders in Britain for betraying those much maligned men (the Rhodesian government) . . . and all those p British civil servants who have laboured . . . to bring a gradual civilization to what was a jungle. May God forgive them, lest by their fervour and folly it becomes a jungle again.” —H.S.

Portugal and the Rhodesia Sanctions

The following are English versions, supplied by the Portuguese Embassy, London, in Portugal Information Bulletin, February 27, 1967, of two Notes addressed by Dr. Franco Nogueira, Portuguese Foreign Minister, to U Thant, Secretary-General of the U.N., on February 3, 1967. The first is on the subject of compensation to Portugal, under Article 50 of the Charter, for losses to the Nation’s economy (assessed at £10m.) resulting from the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. The second presses for replies to the points raised by Portugal in previous Notes in connection with Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions.

“I have the honour to communicate to Your Excellency that, by reason of the application of measures envisaged in the Security Council resolutions of April 9 and December 16, 1966, the economy of the Portuguese Province of Mozambique is suffering grave financial and economic losses which the Portuguese Government estimates at about £10m. heroing up to the end of 1966. In an annexe attached hereto, Your Excellency will find a breakdown of this total under various headings, the Portugal Government reserving for a suitable opportunity the documentation of all the items mentioned.

“Under the terms and for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter, the Portuguese Government desires that consultations be initiated between the Security Council and the Portuguese Government with a view to establishing the forms of payment of the indemnity to which the Province of Mozambique is entitled.

“I therefore request you to be good enough to submit the foregoing to the consideration of the Council, and inform Your Excellency that the Portuguese Government will now await a reply with the urgency which the case calls for.”

“I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency’s Note of the 17th December, 1966, in which Your Excellency informs me of the approval by the Security Council on the 16th of that month of Resolution
S/RES/232 (1966) relating to Rhodesia, and asks for information as to the measures the Portuguese Government may have taken in accordance with the same resolution. I have also the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's Note of January 13, 1967, in which the previous request is reiterated and a reply requested by February 15, and to which Your Excellency attaches a questionnaire to be completed and answered on a monthly basis, regarding imports and exports to Rhodesia mentioned in the above resolution of December 16 last.

"The Security Council resolution referred to constitutes an amplification of the resolution, also relating to Rhodesia, which was submitted to the vote of that organ of the United Nations on April 9, 1966.

"As Your Excellency will recall, and in relation to this matter, I addressed a letter to Your Excellency, dated the 27th of that month, in which, in the name of the Portuguese Government, I submitted to Your Excellency a number of doubts and questions, suggesting that an opinion on these should be obtained from the Juridical Department of the United Nations. In the absence of a reply, a request for clarification was again asked for in a Note of May 14, 1966. Your Excellency replied on June 21 that you considered the doubts raised by the Portuguese Government to be unfounded, adding, however, that you could not acquaint them with the legal judgment of the Secretariat in view of the fact that this department could only publicly pronounce itself if requested to do so by one of the principal organs of the United Nations.

"In the face of this reply from Your Excellency and always in the desire for clarification of their doubts, the Portuguese Government addressed a Note to the President of the Security Council on July 29, 1966, in which the previous questions were repeated and others formulated which had in the meantime arisen in their minds, and asking that the Security Council, which is without doubt one of the principal organs of the U.N.O., should obtain from the Secretariat the juridical opinion which the member Governments, individually, do not appear to be authorised to obtain. A communication of six lines was received from the President of the Security Council on August 8, 1966, merely stating that the matter would be brought to the knowledge of members of the Council for their consideration. By reason of this fact, the Portuguese Government waited, and only on September 20, 1966, in the absence of any reply, did they address a new Note to the President of that organ, once again emphasising doubts the elucidation of which may be said to be of interest to all the member nations and to the United Nations itself. No further reply was obtained.

"Your Excellency will recall that, in their enunciation, the Portuguese Government expressed the wish to know of the extreme advantage to all that an authoritative clarification of these matters be obtained at the earliest possible moment. Their note was transmitted to the Security Council on August 27, 1966, and the Council thereupon decided to bring into focus above. The Portuguese Government consider themselves entitled to be elucidated, and it cannot be asked of them that they should pronounce themselves on a matter of such gravity without knowing all the implications of the attitude to be taken. For this reason, the Portuguese Government hopes that, with the requisite urgency, they will now be given elucidation.

(a) The Security Council being constituted by 15 members, and seven abstentions being required to defeat a resolution (if, on the other hand, a veto by a permanent member has not been used or there has not been a majority against the resolution), is it to be understood that, in the face of Article 27 of the Charter, a resolution is considered valid when all the five permanent members have abstained, or even only one of them?

(b) Since the freedom of the seas and free access to land-locked countries are laid down in international conventions, and the above-mentioned resolutions of the Council constitute a clear negation of such principles, can the Security Council deliberate and legislate against international conventions?

(c) The various organs of the United Nations having discussed the problem of Rhodesia, and the United Kingdom having taken the initiative of referring it to the Security Council more than once, and the British delegation having actively participated in the debates and voting, should the matter still be held to be of the exclusive competence of the United Kingdom or does it henceforth come under international jurisdiction?

(d) The Security Council having considered the whole matter in the light of Chapter VII of the Charter and decided to act in the terms of Article 42, and having entrusted the implementation of certain coercive measures to forces of a member State, should such forces, having regard to Article 42, have a national or an international status?

(e) If such forces retain a national status, and if they take action giving rise to disagreement or being prejudicial to the interests of third parties, what entity or organisation will it be possible to resort to and protest?

"Your Excellency will recognise the close connection between the problems enunciated above and the resolution of December 16 regarding Rhodesia and, on the other hand, the absolute pertinence of such problems and of the extreme advantage to all that an authoritative reply should be given to them.

"Your Excellency now asks the Portuguese Government to indicate what measures they propose to take in compliance with the aforementioned resolution, but the reply to this question must, inevitably, be considered in the light of the replies to the points which have been brought into focus above. The Portuguese Government consider themselves entitled to be elucidated, and it cannot be asked of them that they should pronounce themselves on a matter of such gravity without knowing all the implications of the attitude to be taken. For this reason, the Portuguese Government hopes that, with the requisite urgency, they will now be given elucidation.

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Social Credit in 1967  (continued from page 1)
common to both the Central Committee and the top direction of the financial system.

It is, of course, the secrecy and the cellular structure which has made the Conspiracy so hard to detect. But its existence has been proved; it is known where to look for the prime movers, and sufficient exposure of the levels and individuals who have been identified may lead public opinion to force the breaking open of the whole Conspiracy, and to the identification of those ultimately responsible for the disasters of this century.

The relation between Finance and Communism (and its important off-shoot, Fabian Socialism) is that Finance by its policies creates the conditions in which Communism can progress, and also, by its centralising policies leading to cartels, prepares the way for control of the world's raw materials by international consortia, these, of course, to be in the control of a World Government.

IV

Walter Lippmann is a vintage Fabian Socialist. He was very much on the inside of the group, headed by Colonel House, which advised President Wilson on what America's post-World War 1 aims should be, and which was associated with the foundation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and the Council on Foreign Relations. Referring to the 1964 U.S.A. Presidential campaign, Lippmann in his syndicated column on Nov. 8, 1964 wrote: "The campaign did not produce a debate about specific problems, and this was fortunate. For the real business of the campaign was not to map out a course for the future. It was to beat and crush a rebellion against the established line of domestic and foreign policy which was laid down in the generation which followed the great depression and the second world war."

Precisely what Lippmann is alluding to in these 'words to the wise' is described in Garret Garrett's book, The People's Potage. With the inauguration of Franklin Roosevelt as President of the U.S.A. in 1933, a trained and prepared group of Socialists and some secret Communists moved into positions of power in the administration, and put into operation a carefully conceived plan by which in the short period of three months they laid the foundation for increasingly total government from Washington. Since then, Presidents have come and gone, but this conspiratorial revolutionary group, continuously selecting its own successors, has been the real but largely invisible government of the U.S.A.

This seizure of power in the U.S.A. was as definite an act as the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia, and ultimately proceeded from the same source. But the problem of seizing power in the U.S.A. was different from the problem in Russia in 1917. In both cases, however, it is perfectly clear in retrospect that a prepared plan was put into operation, the objective of which was to make rebellion impossible, as Lippmann tacitly admits—or boasts. In a rich country such as the U.S.A. the task is naturally far more complex and difficult, to be accomplished by stealth and under cover of misleading slogans and various crises, including war and civil strife. But the power and purpose of the real government in the U.S.A. to "beat and crush" rebellion was demonstrated in 1964. Control of propaganda sufficed then; but who can doubt that force would be used if rebellion showed signs of success?

The ground has been prepared by promoting civil strife under cover of promoting civil 'rights'. It has recently been shown that the U.S.A. is no longer self-sufficient agriculturally. A series of Executive Orders, giving the government control over food-rationing, housing, transport, communications, etc., have been signed and are ready for use in an emergency—which can be brought on in a very short space of time when the situation requires it.

But behind all this another situation is being prepared—the disarming of the U.S.A. in relation to the U.S.S.R. under cover of the so-called nuclear deterrent. It will suddenly be 'discovered' that the U.S.S.R. has achieved nuclear 'superiority', and that the U.S.A. has no alternative but to surrender to a U.S.S.R. ultimatum. Plans have already been drawn up for what is called a phased surrender.

(To be continued)

South Africans "quite happy"

The three-man ministerial mission from Malawi which visited the three southern-most countries of the African continent during the past fortnight have left Johannesburg on their way home full of praise for the governments of all three states—the republics of South Africa and of Botswana and the Kingdom of Lesotho.

At a farewell press conference they expressed their gratitude to the government of the Republic of South Africa for the friendly and hospitable way in which they were treated during their stay.

The ministers said they were highly impressed by the progress which South Africa had made in research in various fields which were relevant to Malawi's economic development.

"We noticed that the entire population of South Africa is quite happy, and we paid close attention to the great work you have done in connection with housing, hospitalisation and education for Bantu."

They had ample opportunity of speaking to anybody in all walks of life, but they emphasised that they did not come to South Africa to put their noses in the Republic's affairs but for specific reasons—such as the signing of a trade agreement and the discussing of matters of mutual interest.

—South African Digest, April 7, 1967.