The crucial event of 1968 is the Soviet occupation of Czecho-Slovakia. It is thirty years since Hitler extracted the Munich agreement from Britain and France and forthwith proceeded to occupy the Sudetenland—a portion of Czecho-Slovakia. This year the Soviet Union found the equivalent of Munich in the signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty on July first by the United States, and proceeded in August to saturate with its forces the whole of Czecho-Slovakia.

Though alleged liberalization of the country furnished the Russians a pretext for a Stalinoid crackdown, it was undoubtedly American appeasement in the form of anxiety to disarm, shown by the Nonproliferation Treaty, which emboldened the Kremlin: Thus the Soviet's massive mobilization in the strategic center of Europe, flaunting its contemptuous conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (N.A.T.O.) is a paper pussycat.

Never has anyone doubted that N.A.T.O. is precisely as strong as the determination of the United States to use nuclear weapons promptly in the defense of Western Europe. Doubt of this determination furnished General Charles de Gaulle with a rationalization for his anti-American line and separation from N.A.T.O. while at the same time he began to openly court the Soviets, against whom he had demanded that the Americans should protect him. It was all a not too amusing farce.

Insofar as N.A.T.O. was an operational land force in Western Europe, de Gaulle scotched it. But since its function had been announced as that of a “trip wire” (or indirect means) of setting off nuclear defenses, the major force of N.A.T.O., which had always been nuclear weapons under U.S. control, was not decisively affected.

De Gaulle did not disarm N.A.T.O. No one could disarm N.A.T.O. except the United States, because it was the United States which furnished N.A.T.O. its essential nuclear arms. In the evident judgment of the Kremlin, however, N.A.T.O. had by the summer of 1968 been effectively disarmed. This stupendous feat, opening wide the corridors of Central Europe to Moscow’s Red Armies, had been accomplished not by furtive international adventures but by duly constituted agencies of the United States Government—by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the State Department, and the White House.

President Johnson said proudly on July 1, 1968:

The conclusion of the Nonproliferation Treaty encourages the hope that other steps may be taken... Agreement has been reached between the governments of the Union of Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.

Thus was it implied by the American Chief of State, speaking in a context concerned with treaty obligations (which are part of the “supreme law of the land”), that both strategic nuclear weapons and also, oddly enough, defense against such weapons (for ballistic missiles inferentially carry nuclear warheads) are inherently evil. A country whose President so hails such a treaty—as of course he would, for his own State Department and his own Arms Control and Disarmament Agency engineered the treaty—such a country will not in the season of the signing of that treaty employ these “evil” weapons for any reason short of a direct attack on its own soil with similar weapons— if then.

“Liberal” voices have already, and rather frequently, observed that while we certainly must never use nuclear weapons first, we really should not plan to use them second either, for once you have been hit, retaliation serves no purpose, but constitutes a paroxysm of futile vindictiveness. Such a country—in this case the United States—is psychologically disarmed of nuclear weapons.

And this was all the Kremlin needed to know. It felt confident enough to move troops into Czecho-Slovakia.

People have wondered why the U.S.S.R. would break off the warm relationship with America indicated by the Nonproliferation Treaty and other signs of U.S. eagerness for détente—all of which seemed to be advantageous to the Soviet Union. Why would the Soviet Union, by suddenly occupying Czecho-Slovakia, so rudely rebuff the almost pathetic advances of the United States to the concessions table? ANSWER: The Soviet Union had what it wanted: assurance doubly sure that the Soviet Union itself did not use nuclear weapons, which in view of its manpower resources and comparative inferiority of nuclear capability (except psychologically) it had no temptation to do.

Having disarmed N.A.T.O. of the nuclear weapon, Moscow could see no obstacle to full and immediate occupation of the high and central ground, the commanding position, which Czecho-Slovakia represents in Europe, completely outflanking Austria and at once seriously menacing West Germany, including already beleaguered West Berlin.
THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM
This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas. The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and abroad, post free: One year 45/-; Six months 22/6; Three months 11/6.

Offices: Business: 245 Cann Hall Road, Leytonstone, London E.11.
Editorial: Penrhyn Lodge, Gloucester Gate, London NW1.
Telephone: 01-387 3895

IN AUSTRALIA-
Business: Box 2318V, G.P.O., Melbourne, Victoria 3001
Editorial: Box 3266, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W. 2001
(Postal Head Office)

THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT

FROM WEEK TO WEEK
One of the late C. H. Douglas's guiding maxims was that it was not what anyone said, but what he did that had to be taken seriously. The leading article in the Times, Dec. 5, 1968, professes surprise that Pravda yesterday wrote as though the Labour Government had been waiting for something like the invasion of Czechoslovakia simply and solely to use it as an excuse for reviving the cold war. But the article notes "the entry of the massive Soviet divisions into the advanced strategic area of central Europe".

The whole tone of this article expresses more hurt by what Pravda says than concern at what Russia has done. Yet the same issue carries a report of a speech by Air Chief Marshal Sir Edmund Huddleston: "If the idea of using prolonged conventional defence to meet any Soviet thrust in Europe is to be pursued by Britain she must either reintroduce conscription, quadruple the size of the airforce and build up a reserve of aircraft and logistic support at least equal to the front line, or capitulate" (emphasis added).

Sir Edmund's estimate is that NATO's ground forces are outnumbered by probably three to one, with at least the same disproportion in the air.

The same article reports Admiral W. F. A. Wendt, commander-in-chief of U.S. Naval Forces in Europe, as saying that Britain and the United States "were no longer the two major sea powers". Yet the Times leader, after noting that "twice in living memory this country has been in mortal peril from submarine fleets", and referring to Russia's "prodigiously large submarine fleet", merely comments that if Russia "took military action elsewhere in Europe relations would suffer disastrously".

It is quite evident from the statements of military experts that Russia has achieved a decisive advantage. What ought to be equally evident is that even to restore what the Times calls "the carefully safeguarded balance of power in Europe" is an impossibility. It would take years to "quadruple the size of the airforce"; and what would Russia be doing in those years?

There is no conventional military solution to the existing situation. That is to say, the moment it becomes clear that the U.S.A. will not use strategic nuclear weapons, NATO has no alternative to capitulation.

Less than a week after the Times article, and in the middle of the American inter-Presidental period, when Mr. Johnson's authority is waning and Mr. Nixon's not established, it was announced that America's defence spending is to be heavily cut back, involving a slow-down of arms production and retrenchment of personnel. It was stated that this would not affect America's military preparedness in South-East Asia, so that the inference must be that it will affect preparedness in Europe, the Middle East, and the Mediterranean. At the same time, it was announced that the Russians are increasing 'defence' spending and, as a "Mediterranean Power", are determined to preserve peace in the Middle East. Let no one imagine that this is a threat aimed at Israel. It is a warning to American public opinion (for the Administration is in collusion with the Soviets) that any attempt to "safeguard the balance of power" in the area will be treated as 'imperialist aggression'.

The objective of all this is paralysis of Western initiative in the pre-take-over period which is upon us. The international monetary system is visibly breaking down through persistent inflation of prices which inevitably leads to strikes, and ultimately revolution—the pretext for Soviet intervention.

It is many years since Douglas warned that Parliament might not persist much longer; but while it did, it was the sole agency through which the pressure of public opinion might be brought to bear on those responsible for the disastrous policies which have since encompassed the downfall of the British Empire, and reduced Great Britain to a mendicant at the seats of financial power. Britain's potential physical capacity to have sustained the Empire which she created is greater than ever; the ruin has been caused by the traitorous permeation of Fabianism in the interest of internationalism—the subordination of British national sovereignty to the authority of international institutions, the organs of World Government, by those in control of the International Financial System.

Although its effectiveness vis-à-vis the Cabinet has declined enormously, and, since the destruction of the home defence forces (a potential challenge to Cabinet authoritarianism), almost vanished, Parliament still exists; on behalf of the British people whom it represents, it should call to account those responsible for our destruction. Douglas's warnings, now proved to have been completely accurate, have been continuously available to those in responsible positions. If these latter have ignored them through mental incompetence, they should be certified accordingly and put away. But if, as increasingly seems to be the case, it is conscious betrayal of national sovereignty which underlies the imminent catastrophe, impeachment is the last recourse.

The Treaties (continued from page 1)
That intimidation of Germany was the primary purpose of the Russian occupation of Czechoslovakia is indicated by Moscow's allegation that the reason for the move was "security of the border" with West Germany. To charge a prospective victim with harboring intent to attack you is a tactic not limited to Communists, but peculiarly suited to their revolutionary practice of asserting not random lies or mere exaggerations but the precise opposite of the truth. When they say West Germany is about to attack them, they
mean they are about to attack West Germany. This is so elementary that they would be almost offended if you took them to mean anything else.

But Moscow could not thus openly threaten West Germany, and eventually the whole of Europe, without assurance that N.A.T.O. was really dead, and that is just the assurance we seemed to give them by signing the Nonproliferation Treaty. Louis J. Halle, who was an official of the State Department when the N.A.T.O. Treaty was signed, and during the early years of the Eisenhower Administration a member of the Department's Policy Planning Staff, writes in his book The Cold War as History (Harper & Row, 1967):

The Americans who sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948 and 1949 did not see any immediate prospect that a barrier of ground forces on a scale to be effective in itself could be erected in the path of Russia's westward expansion. It was thought, rather, that without the American guaranty contained in the Treaty, with the atomic bomb behind it, the Europeans would feel so hopeless about their future, faced as they were by the unmatchable Russian might, that they would hardly have the heart for the effort that their own rehabilitation required. The American guaranty, rather than an actual build-up of forces, was the point of the (N.A.T.O.) Treaty—and its purpose was largely psychological. (Page 184, emphasis added.)

To destroy precisely that psychological effect has been the evident objective of the dominant "intellectual" community in America these past twenty years, and by the summer of 1968 the objective had been, in the apparent judgment of Moscow, at least provisionally attained.

The American "intellectuals" felt pretty good about it, too, whether they did or did not draw from the situation the same political conclusions as Moscow. Writing for the September 1968 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology—on the topic, "After the Nonproliferation Treaty—What Next?"—Professor B. T. Feld answered what next in effect (but certainly without wishing to have the answer so worded): Germany today, tomorrow the world!

"The signing of the nonproliferation treaty (N.P.T.)," says Feld, "could represent a significant turning point in the continuing, but until now rather discouraging, quest for significant international control over nuclear weapons. Despite formidable opposition from influential members of their own governments (sounds like we have some friends in our own government—wonder who they are?), the patient and skillful efforts of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (A.C.D.A.) negotiators, as well as those of their Russian counterparts, finally achieved the agreement and concurrence of reluctant allies." (Page 2, italics added.)

Mr. Feld was writing before the Russians invaded Czechoslovakia on August twentieth. It is perhaps idle to speculate whether he is disturbed by that logical consequence of the treaty which so proudly he hails as a harbinger of international control of nuclear weapons—which would be tantamount to control of the world. Since control of the world is the highest dream of the "intellectuals", presumably remaking the map of Europe by whatever deployment of Soviet ground forces may be required or incidental is a small price to pay.

It can hardly be sufficiently emphasized that the internal policing of Czech-Slovakia is not the rational explanation for Russian occupation of the country. Actually, there is no credible evidence of any genuine rift between the leaders of the Czech Communist Party and their organizational superiors in Moscow. If there had been such a rift, Alexander Dubcek and company could have been easily disposed of without moving in seventeen divisions. A valuable report by Paul Scott in the newspapers of September eleventh reads in part as follows:

While the public spotlight has been focused on Soviet troops in Prague, the elite Russian divisions were moved in strength from Russia directly to the West German border . . . This strategic deployment of Soviet ground forces . . . also was accomplished by a tremendous Soviet Air Force build-up inside Czechoslovakia . . . None of these military moves on the West German border, U.S. Intelligence officials say, were needed to establish control in Czechoslovakia.

Most significantly, Scott also reports that "Soviet troops, in most instances, were guided to their new border positions by units of the regular Czech-Slovakia army, which never fired a shot against the Russian 'invaders'." Rather significant, don't you think?

It is absurd to suppose that the Czech Communist Party has ever at any time contemplated defiance of the Soviet Party. Dubcek is no more a rebel against Moscow than is Gomulka—that sometime symbol of the "Polish October". Heralded in 1956 as creator of a rift in the Communist lute, Gomulka is now recognized as virtually a "Stalinist", which, indeed, they all are. The whole "Liberalization" of the Czech Communist Party, so ballyhooed last spring and early summer, is most plausibly viewed as another stage-managed diversion for (and by) Western "Liberals". In part it was very possibly intended to suggest that while it is winked "McCarthyism" to think that a "Liberal" is a Communist, it is heart-warming to imagine that a Communist is a "Liberal". In larger part, however, the charade of "Czech Liberalization" was doubtless intended to serve as a pretext for the Soviet military move into Czechoslovakia. The Communists are oddly addicted to pretexts even when it seems unlikely that anyone is going to be fooled.

It is a vulgar fallacy to suppose that Communism is one thing in one country, another thing in another. (And every steeled Communist will agree with me about that.) True, Stalin's slogan of "Socialism in one country", so parallel in concept as well as in method (force and fraud) with Hitler's "National Socialism", suggests that the Communist program may not move at the same rate in all countries. But, this has nothing to do with, and certainly does not mean, any variation whatever in basic Communist theory or the objectives of Communist practice from one nation to the next. Nor does it least of all impugn the principle of unity of command in the worldwide Communist conspiracy.

Insofar as the Russian occupation of Czech-Slovakia has an internal purpose, we may be sure it is not so much the capture and punishment of a maverick about to escape from the herd, as the final yoking of a nation (one writes it reluctantly) "stolid and stunned, a brother to the ox". The Czechs have been from the start the most docile of the Soviet "satellites", in spite of the fact that until the present "invasion" they have been the least subject to direct Soviet military pressure, and in spite of the fundamental fact that
of all the satellites except the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia is historically and culturally the most Western. Indeed, the subjugation now being perfected in Czechoslovakia is a subjugation of part of the West.

The Communist Conspiracy, it should be remembered, is of Western origin—being Eastern only in the sense that its initial operational successes were, and therefore its present geographical center is, in the East. Roman Caesar attained his first success in the then remote region of Gaul and Britain, but Rome was always his objective, and to Rome he returned.

"Czecho-Slovakia", writes Louis Halle, "although bound by strong ties to the West before Munich, was (this is as of 1943-1946) the most pro-Russian, or the least anti-Russian, of the countries along Russia's western border." For a brief time at the end of World War II the Czechs under their President Eduard Benes seemed to have hoped to be a "bridge" between East and West, more specifically between Russia and America, the two countries to which they felt most closely bound.

They were bound to Russia by an asserted Slavism (though German culture and German blood were certainly of equal historical influence), by a "Liberal" ideology which looked favorably on a "Union of Socialist Republics", and by a kind of half-articulated pacifism which looked with almost cringing respect on the masses of the Red Army. They were bound to America as, politically speaking, the country of their origin; for not only did the post-World War I creation of Czechoslovakia depend on Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-determination of peoples, but the first proclamation of the new Czech State was issued from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in October 1918. The first President of Czechoslovakia, Thomas G. Masaryk, spent significant years of his life in the United States and greatly influenced Wilson.

Some suspicion exists that the Czechs and Slovaks (who, incidentally, have historic differences between themselves) have, in this thirtieth year after Munich, been betrayed by their two big brothers, Russia and America, acting in collusion. And, such collusion is not realistically to be expected; for we know the whole thing must have been cleared with top Communists all round the world, including ours here in the United States. Which is a pretty important insofar as David Lawrence reported on September seventh:

The United States government knew of the preparations for the invasion of Czechoslovakia at least twenty days before it happened. A memorandum prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency was distributed throughout the government on August 2 to the effect that military preparations had been completed in a fortnight's time which would be adequate for an intervention in Czechoslovakia if deemed necessary.

Showing that Lawrence was understating the case is a U.P.I. dispatch in the F.M.'s of July twenty-fourth beginning:

MOSCOW (U.P.I.)—As the Soviet Union today massed armies from the Black to the Baltic Seas in the face of defiant Czechoslovakia, diplomatic sources said the Soviet-Czech crisis is now "very grave". The sources said Russian armed intervention against the Communist party reform régime in the former captive nation cannot be ruled out.

Obviously Washington knew what Moscow was going to do, and did nothing to prevent it or warn against it. Not that that proves outright collusion by Washington. (Or does it?)

Possibly the chief reason to wonder whether our own government aided and abetted the Russians in their occupation of Czechoslovakia is simply the fact that Secretary of State Dean Rusk went to the trouble to disavow specifically any such thing. An A.P. story datelined New Haven in the A.M.'s of September thirteenth said Rusk denied "that the United States has made a deal giving the Soviets a blank check to move against Czechoslovakia . . . Aides said Rusk was particularly anxious to counter allegations abroad to the effect that Washington and Moscow have divided Europe into areas in which each allows the other to dominate". Seems de Gaulle had alleged as much (and you know the old scoundrel would know, whether he was leveling or not) and Rusk felt that that was cutting much too close to the quick.

But, denial or no denial of a "deal" between Washington and Moscow, our own Mr. State Department (Rusk has been Secretary longer than anyone else in the Twentieth Century except Cordell Hull, who served under only one President) went on to say, according to A.P., that "under present circumstances, President Johnson recognizes little can be done militarily to help an East European country without getting into a general war with Russia".

It seems taken for granted by these people that of course we cannot get into a general war with Russia, for that would mean a nuclear exchange, a nuclear exchange would mean nuclear holocaust, and nuclear holocaust would mean mutual national suicide, end of the human race, and of course no victory for anybody. In my judgment none of that is true. But if it were true, then of course it would mean the end of N.A.T.O., which was formed as a defense against Russia. But if you can't fight Russia at all, then there is no defense against Russia, and N.A.T.O. is useless. There is indeed, if you can't fight Russia at all, nothing to do but to make a deal with Russia.

If it were true, it would mean the end of N.A.T.O. It does mean the end of N.A.T.O. even though it is not true, if our government continues to act as though it were true. To sign—not merely to sign but to promote—a "Nonproliferation Treaty" is to act as if war with Russia is unthinkable, and is—quite obviously, when you think about it—a part of a deal with Russia. Maybe that is the deal de Gaulle was talking about. The Nonproliferation Treaty supersedes the North Atlantic Treaty. It makes N.A.T.O. obsolete, and it opens all Europe to the masses of the Red Army.

General Lyman L. Lemnitzer said on October fourteenth from Lisbon that the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia means that N.A.T.O. strategic plans will have to be revised to allow for use of nuclear weapons sooner in the scenario than heretofore contemplated.

That will be the day!

To advance the probable use of nuclear weapons by a government (ours) which has just concluded with the country the weapons would be used against (Russia) a Nonproliferation Treaty! That's some credibility gap.

(To be continued)