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More Greatness
By C. H. DOUGLAS

(Originally published in The Social Crediter, October 8, 1938)

In all the weler of “views”, half-views, prejudices and superficialities which have deluged a bewildered public during the past few weeks, I have only seen one statement which appears to me to go to the root of the matter. There have been able “appreciations” of the international situation (perhaps the best was that reprinted last week in this paper) but that is not what I mean.

These bear, on the whole, the same relation to fundamentals as does a description of a battle during the past few weeks, I have only seen one statement which appears to me to go to the root of the matter. There have been able “appreciations” of the international situation (perhaps the best was that reprinted last week in this paper) but that is not what I mean.

The statement to which I refer did not proceed from a politician or an economist or even from the Archbishop of Canterbury. It was made by the Poet Laureate, Mr. John Masefield. Poets are intuitive not rational and Mr. Masefield’s elaboration of his fundamental statement need not detain us. He said in effect: “If we are to have a great war every twenty years, then individuals will get tired of great nations (groups). They will refuse to co-operate with them.”

Mr. Masefield, quite properly, did not explain how this non-co-operation could be achieved. It is not his business. But he stated a postulate correctly in relation to his hypothesis.

I have suggested many times to those who, for the most part, will read this article, and to others, that the fundamental problem of civilization is the relationship of the individual to the group. May I repeat that this does not mean the abolition of groups any more than (what is threatened) it means the abolition of the individual.

The proper sphere of the group is functional—ad hoc. We understand this quite clearly in daily life. We refer matters regarding cricket to the M.C.C., but not matters regarding golf or tennis, still less does any sane man suggest (so far) that a combination of the M.C.C., The Royal and Ancient Golf Club, and the All England Lawn Tennis Club should decide the games-playing destiny of every infant at birth.

Now the fine flower of the misapplied group idea is the Conference. If any proof were needed that the average conference is founded on either a deliberate plot of some interest, or a lack of sufficient ability to qualify its participants for serious business, the history of every major Conference ought to supply that proof.

Of course, the next conference is always going to be different. But to those who are sceptical of sudden reformations yet feel that the meeting of well disposed human beings ought to have a use, I may perhaps be allowed to make the following suggestion.

It is entirely proper to have a conference between people who are already in agreement about the specific objective.

A conference about Lower Rates, on the one hand, or whether Mr. Hargrave or Mr. G. F. Powell shall be the English Aberhart on the other is quite sound. Such conferences have already decided that they want lower rates or an English Mr. Aberhart.

A conference to decide Social Credit Policy, in case anyone should suggest it, would be about as sensible as a conference to decide whether there shall be Chemistry.

The problem of Social Credit is: How do we bring existing institutions under control? The objective is that they shall be free within their function and powerless outside it.

It is not: How do we start one more institution to deal with matters outside its competence. Please notice that although you may not have the faintest notion what the present crisis is about, the fighting was (or is) going to be done by you. It was on your doorstep that the evacuated children were to be dropped. Without in the least wishing to detract from the Greatness of the Leaders under whose guidance we stagger from one crisis to another (how fortunate that they were all alive at the same time, wasn’t it?) may I suggest that if we really, each of us, minded our own business, things could hardly be worse and as Mr. Masefield suggests, great wars would be impossible. And then we might learn the fallacies in the “get-together” beat.

Western Europe and the World

The following is an excerpt from an address to the 16th Meeting of the General Assembly of the Atlantic Treaty Association held in Lisbon on 14th October, 1968, by the Portuguese Foreign Minister, Dr. Franco Nogueira:

We all remember that the NATO Treaty was signed in 1949. At that time the whole of Western Europe and, indeed, the entire Western World, were seeking to recover from the scars left by the war, and the armies of the Soviet Union were all powerful. Grave indeed was the danger: Western Europe could be submerged by the Soviet military forces, thus turning all Europe into a huge communist camp. It cannot be doubted that NATO, with the co-operation of the United States, prevented this from happening, and I think it is only fair to say that the Alliance, then and for some years, was successful in its aims. But with the passage of time the situation changed completely. The Soviet Union and its satellites did not attack Western Europe: faced by a powerful shield and knowing that they could not touch it without unleashing a general war, the Soviet leaders div-

(continued on page 4)
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FROM WEEK TO WEEK

It is not surprising that the peoples of 'underdeveloped' countries have delusional ideas about self-determination, but what is alarming is that despite warnings and experience this Communist strategy is not recognised for what it is: war against Western Christian civilisation which stands as the obstacle to scientific, materialist World Government which assuredly wilt return has not already been passed, it will lie within 1969. The signs are that if the point of no explosion. The explosion will be brought about by the obstacle to scientific, materialist World Government will be brought about by the obstacle to scientific, materialist World Government. Britain, Portugal's oldest ally, and other member countries of the Commonwealth are not mentioned.

Dr. Caetano

Cordial messages of congratulation on his appointment as Prime Minister were received by Dr. Marcello Caetano from the Heads of State of Brazil, Spain and the United States of America, and the Prime Ministers of France, Germany, Italy, and South Africa. The Vice-President of the Spanish Government, the Minister for Information (while acting Foreign Minister), and the Foreign Minister of Spain, as well as Mr. Ian Smith, also sent messages.


The Powell Protest

The Archbishop of Canterbury has accused Mr. Powell of inaccuracy, The Catholic Herald (Nov. 22, 1968) heads its leader “Enoch’s Black Thoughts”, and the Bishop of Stepney (Trevor Huddleston) recalls the days of slavery and says that England “has a massive debt to repay”. (The Times, Nov. 21, 1968). The bishop mentions “colonial adventures”, but Britons have not always behaved as adventurers abroad and have brought law and order to many savage places, and the “white minorities” he so detests still preserve peace in parts of Africa. Perhaps a white minority would have averted the Nigerian civil war.

Mr. Powell however manages to answer his critics and looks on himself as a safety-valve; for unless there were a problem at the present and in the making, his words would have awoken no kind of response, nor could people have taken to heart the American experience of racial tension and violence. Even in Canada, large numbers of French and British people find it hard to work together, although they share a European background, while small numbers of Dutch or other groups blend in without much difficulty.

Lord Wigg surmised that Mr. Powell was “on to a good thing” for political advantage, but The Church Times (Nov. 22) and indeed the Archbishop allow him sincerity. Mrs. Renée Short, M.P., wanted to prosecute him, but “urged a ban on further work vouchers for immigrants to Wolver- hampton” and said that she “did not necessarily oppose a scheme for voluntary repatriation of immigrants”. Daily Telegraph, Dec. 4.) I do not know whether these statements involve political opportunism.

So the issues of numbers and of repatriation do not divide the adversaries, rather the use of language, for Mr. Powell has been accused of using inflammatory language. Certainly his words avoid the twisting vagueness of his critics, and some New Testament language was vivid enough, especially that directed against hypocrites. Perhaps Mr. Powell has offended principally in speaking for the interests of his constituents and fellow Englishmen. I can remember a man telling me proudly before the war, “Me British, me not English”, he quite understood the cultural difference.

Many politicians are so familiar with the language of hatred for their fellow countrymen that they cannot adjust to another situation, just as Bishop Huddleston cannot distinguish between the rulers of South Africa and the workers of the Midlands, nor could they recognise integrity or sincerity if they saw it. Mr. Powell, who has given expression to some reactions which were not supposed to exist, cannot be expected to reveal confidences to those whom Mrs. Short calls the “press boys”.

—H.S.

The Brief for the Prosecution

A penetrating examination of the period of uneasy truce between 1918 and 1939, wherein C. H. Douglas lays bare a coherent, conscious, over-riding policy in full operation in every country and traceable to a central origin. This policy is still in operation today.

9/6 posted

The Treaties
What Czecho-Slovakia Really Means
By MEDFORD EVANS in American Opinion, December, 1968
(Continued)

Of course, the treaty has not yet been ratified. And it may very well never be ratified. Which is an optimistic thought you might hold as you do everything you can do to keep the Senate from ratifying it.

As I write, these are optimistic days, despite the intensification of many problems, such as the worsening of the Western defenses in Central Europe following the Russian occupation of Czecho-Slovakia. The optimism derives from the astonishing evidence of a general awakening of the American people to the need for a radical change in our national leadership. Whatever the vote on November fifth—and you will know what it is by the time you read this, though I do not know as I write—the real history of the 1968 Presidential campaign has been written by the Wallace campaign. Any year in which a man like Wallace can get on the ballot of fifty states clearly marks the grand climactic of the Liberal Establishment.

But though the winter of our discontent may be in process of finding a dissolution in the glorious summer and early autumn of 1968, one happy event came just too late from the point of view of the European crisis. Wallace's choice of General Curtis E. LeMay, and LeMay's courageous acceptance, did indeed call in question this nation's existing (and disastrous) policy on nuclear weapons. The Press correctly sensed this at once and leaped to expose what reporters took to be a military attitude as radical as Wallace's alleged 'racism'.

LeMay, a 'big-bomber man', having quit or been eased out of the Johnson Administration while clearly at odds with the dove of peace (Picasso's?) in the office of Secretary of Defense, was instantly suspected of wanting to use, or at least being willing to use, nuclear weapons. And since George Wallace must have known as much as anybody else about LeMay when he asked him to be his running mate, it followed that Wallace too must have lurking somewhere in the recesses of his shrewd mind a provisional willingness to order the use of nuclear weapons in combat.

The Press was quite right in identifying such a possible attitude on the part of any Presidential or Vice Presidential candidate as the most newsworthy aspect of Wallace's selection of LeMay. For the United States has not had since Harry Truman a President who could conceivably have ordered the use of nuclear weapons. It seems to be not generally recognized that the phrase 'credibility gap' did not in the first instance mean simply that Lyndon Johnson felt it was now safe to occupy Czecho-Slovakia, but rather that in the game of psychological warfare called deterrence there may come a time when an enemy will not believe you to be capable of actually using the weapon with which you ostensibly threaten him.

You will remember that John F. Kennedy's proudest boast was that he negotiated the Test-Ban Treaty of 1963. (If nuclear weapons are too dangerous to test, you know they are too dangerous to use in war—but if we can't use them in war why do we have them, why do we spend all that money on them, why do we make all three military services so heavily dependent on them?—hush, you ask too many questions.) This was a boast under Kennedy, and under Johnson, who completed the matter begun by Kennedy of giving $50,000 to J. Robert Oppenheimer, who said he had known sin because he helped make the first nuclear weapon. Lyndon Johnson, of course, saw Kennedy's Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty and raised him with the Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968—under Kennedy and Johnson the world, the Press, and the Soviet Union were finally and fully convinced that the United States would never under any circumstances use nuclear weapons. And therefore the Soviet Union felt it was now safe to occupy Czecho-Slovakia.

But what if George Wallace's graph had lifted off as it soon did, and he had been joined by Curtis LeMay, in June instead of October? The Russians would have stayed out of Czecho-Slovakia, kiddo, you better believe it. Not that they would have sworn off forever. They never do that. But they sure would have waited till after the election. They have patience and they don't take foolish chances. The American vote for Wallace and LeMay—and as I write I do not know what it will be, but it will be more than anyone thought in June it would be—is the first genuine step toward serious deterrence, toward closing the credibility gap that counts in foreign affairs, to have been taken in this country at least since the setting up in 1961 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the issuance of State Department Publication 7277 calling for "General and Complete Disarmament".

Sometimes election campaigns are more important than who wins the election. The most important thing about the 1964 campaign was not that Lyndon Johnson won and Barry Goldwater was defeated, but that Goldwater's defeat was interpreted as a rejection by the American people of a possible actual use—straight or tactical, but especially tactical—of nuclear weapons. It is one of the defects in our legislation on the subject that nuclear weapons can be used only on express order of the President, so that a Presidential election is interpreted as a plebiscite on the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, such use is not at all a suitable issue for a plebiscite—being a technical question, and very few voters being technically qualified to vote on it. The technique at issue, by the way, is not in the field of the physical sciences, which are involved in making the weapons, but in the field of military science, which determines proper use of weapons.

Waiving, however, discussion of that point, Presidential elections involve many factors, and it is plainly impossible to know for sure just how much Goldwater's handling of the nuclear issue had to do with his defeat in 1964. It seems to me that he did not handle it well, for he assumed a defensive attitude, saying in effect to those who accused him of wanting to incinerate innocent children, I do not! Perhaps the vote would have been more in his favor if, instead, he had counterattacked and charged, what I consider to be the truth:

Lyndon Johnson is endangering the innocent children of America and the free world by depriving them of the armed defense necessary to preserve and protect civilization and the very lives of civilized people. In today's world an America without the use of nuclear weapons is an unarmed America, an America in danger. I am accused of having an itchy finger for the nuclear trigger, but I say to you that Lyndon Johnson has so disconnected the trigger mechanism of our...
nuclear weapons that there is the gravest doubt as to whether they CAN be fired when they are needed.

Granted that a loaded pistol in a household is of some danger unless it be safely stored, there is greater danger to the security of the whole house if the head of the family thinks he has a loaded pistol to fend off those who would attack his wife and children in cold blood, and learns when he pulls the trigger that someone has removed the live ammunition and inserted blanks.

Who knows how the American people would have voted if Barry Goldwater had said something like that, and—as he could have done—supported it with chapter and verse? if Barry Goldwater had said something like that, and—as Nonproliferation Treaty, and on the cumulative record cli-

pair of "nuclear hawks" (I don't like the phrase, but in this case you phrase it doesn't greatly matter) received on November 5, 1968 a shocking number of votes.

The sedative effect of that kind of shock therapy will be felt all the way to Moscow.

Western Europe and the World (continued from page 1) ered their attacks to other areas of the World. In doing so, they did not merely seek to avoid a frontal and direct clash but, at the same time, to spread their communist ideology so as to fulfill their programme of world revolution, thereby destroying the Western positions one by one, weakening the free world, dividing it and restricting it more and more.

Progressively, it became clear that the Soviet Union did not want a general war and would not therefore attack the sole front which, if attacked, would unleash such a war. After all, the Soviet Union did not even need to run the risk of a large-scale conventional war: for, throughout the world, the Western positions were being lost in speedy succession and their place taken by communist ideology or those nations which are supposed to be non-aligned but which, in reality, follow an anti-Western orientation. And so, we have all reached the present world situation. Communist countries, whether of Soviet or Chinese affiliation, attack on all fronts. The communist siege in South-East Asia and the Far East in general is powerful; communist propaganda and activity give no quarter in Latin America; and communist infiltration in the African Continent is far deeper and more efficient than some of us seem to want to recognize. The United Nations Organisation is today undoubtedly very far from the Western standpoint and it may be said that it constitutes an absolute failure as peace keeper, guardian of the Law, and upholder of Right. No country today can count on UNO for the protection of its vital interests or even of its territorial integrity. The Soviet fleet sails at will in the Mediterranean and the balance of power no longer exists, and this works to the detriment of the West. Any army or naval officer here present will—I have no doubt—agree with me if I say that Soviet warships are sailing freely across all the oceans of the world and already enable political pressures to be brought to bear on coastal countries. Soviet ships are sailing in the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic. And this has far-reaching consequences for the balance of military and political power throughout the World.

Finally, we have witnessed the invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia which have brought Russian arms to the heart of Central Europe and the frontiers of one of our allies—the Federal German Republic.

Some of you may think that this picture is too crude and too sombre. It may be. But speaking for myself, I think that the time has long passed when we could afford in large measure to be indulgent about ourselves. I think we should accept two main conclusions: first, that the communist attack is world-wide and global in character; second, that the 'de'ente', in which many of us believed and trusted, has received a hard blow, it having become clear that the Soviet bloc has unmasked itself and does not, when it is a question of defending what it considers to be its vital interests, hesitate to ignore international opinion, without taking into account what the national communist parties may feel or what the Third World may think.

Today, the question which it is up to us to answer is: Where does our Alliance stand?

It seems to me that, on the military plane, we remain prepared and able to meet an attack on Western Europe, and only for this area are we ready; but we know, on the other hand, that in normal circumstances such an attack will not take place.

On the political plane, we affirm the solidarity of NATO and its support within the geographical area covered by the Treaty; but we ignore the one and the other whenever problems arise beyond the confines of that area. In other words, and to summarise, we are all facing a world, a global, attack, and seek to meet it with a limited and restricted solidarity. I suggest, gentlemen, that we consider the consequences of this political attitude . . .


Erratum

In the reference in our last issue to the collusion between Russia and America (page 4, column 1, paragraph 4) we regret a mistake. Line 5 should read . . . such collusion is not realistically to be expected . . . .

The State of the World

The state of the world has grown steadily worse since 1945, and appears now to be on the brink of explosion. The evidence of conspiracy, once in the main largely conjectural, is now abundant, clear and readily available, but not through the usual channels. This review of world affairs was originally published in 1946. It was reprinted in 1967 with some added notes. The essential thesis remains unimpaired; and foresight is more convincing than hind-sight.

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