Mr. Kissinger

A Would-Be Usurper

By Medford Evans in American Opinion, June, 1969

(Continued)

II

The first thing to get straight is that Henry A. Kissinger is not, repeat not, a pseudo intellectual. He is the genuine article. I do not say that, of course, simply because of his Ph.D. from Harvard, or even because of his Harvard B.A. summa cum laude, which represents a finer screen as far as native intelligence is concerned. I say it primarily because I have read four of his books.

The one about N.A.T.O., The Troubled Partnership (1965), was really rather dull. It's just that N.A.T.O. seems to be intrinsically a dull subject, I suppose because no one ever took the professed aims of the organization seriously. The other three Kissinger books I have read are Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy (1957), The Necessity For Choice (1961), and American Foreign Policy (1969) — are more directly concerned with the still unresolved crisis created in the world by the development of atomic and hydrogen warheads and of advanced systems for their delivery on target.

I have been reading published material on "the atom" since 1945, and most of it is either tedious or preposterous. When Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy appeared in 1957 and I began reading it, "Then felt I like some watcher of the skies, / When a new planet swims into his ken". That was the same year Sputnik I was allegedly launched, and while others saw in that their "new planet", I was more impressed by finding an American writer who made sense on the atom. (I did not know until this year that Kissinger was foreign born, which is a fact I don't hold against him, but which I do think is relevant, and which is not indicated in the publisher's note about the author, even in the 1961 book, The Necessity For Choice.) At the same time I was disturbed by the conviction that the sense Kissinger made on the atom was so alloyed with One-World political propaganda as to make what was good in the book the servant of what was bad — the total mixture being more dangerous by far than the fatuities of, say, Norman Cousins in the Bulletin Of The Atomic Scientists.

I find that in 1957 I wrote in pencil in the flyleaf of my copy of Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy: "If Kissinger is not O.K. he is brilliant. If he is O.K. he is obtuse". Now here it is 1969 and Kissinger is next to the President of the United States, and I am sure Kissinger is brilliant.

I shall not try to prove it. How could I? To me he seemed brilliant because he said things with which I agreed and which few other people were saying at the time. For instance, he wrote:

Because harmony between different social systems is explicitly rejected by Soviet doctrine, the renunciation of force in face of it will create a vacuum into which the Soviet leadership can move with impunity. (Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy, Page 6.)

To me that seemed clear and incontrovertible. It was only later that I began to wonder whether Kissinger was for or against the renunciation of force. In that particular book he indicated that he was for limited force. Now everybody is for limited force in the sense that more force should not be used than is necessary to achieve the desired objective. What is not unambiguous in Kissinger's case is the nature of the ultimate objective. I think I now know, and will return to the subject below. It is not, I'm afraid, exactly a chauvinistic objective. The immediate point is simply that whereas other One-Worlders based their arguments on absurd generalizations, such as There is no longer any alternative to peace, or, Modern Man is obsolete, both of which are false on their face, Kissinger sprinkles his work generously with intrinsically sage observations such as the one above, or such as this concerning the Russian reaction to Hiroshima:

... while Soviet leadership could not do anything immediate about our possession of the atomic bomb, it might undermine the will to use it by a worldwide campaign against the horrors of nuclear warfare. (Op.cit., Page 363.)

When somebody like me says things like that (as I did in The Secret War For The A-Bomb four years before Kissinger's book came out) he is widely regarded as an extremist, if not a paranoid; but when Kissinger said them he went on to draw "Liberal" or ambiguous inferences, and was therefore hailed as a precocious sage (he was thirty-four at the time).

Kissinger made two invaluable contributions to the cause of the Liberal Establishment in the 1950s — one of method in discourse, the other of strategic concept. Neither, of course, was original, for both have been employed for good and bad purposes at least since the time of the ancient Greeks; yet both had fallen into neglect or been imperfectly

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THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM
PUBLISHED FORTHRIGHTLY

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat which was founded in 1937 by Clifford Hugh Douglas.

The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

Subscription rates: Home and abroad, post free: One year £1; Six months £0.50.

Three months £0.25.

Office: Business: 245 High Holborn, London, W.C.1. Tel: 01-534 7395

Editorial: Penrhyn Lodge, Gloucester Gate, London NW1. Tel: 01-387 3893

IN AUSTRALIA-

Business: Box 2318V, G.P.O., Sydney N.S.W. 2000 (Editorial Head Office)

THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT


FROM WEEK TO WEEK

We do not know whether Dr. Medford Evans has ever read any of C. H. Douglas’s works, or studied Social Credit in any way; but more than any other commentator we have heard, he comes closest to the financial heart of the Conspiracy. We referred some weeks ago to some of his observations in his book The Usurpers. In a review of Edward Luttwark’s book Coup d’Etat in American Opinion, Sept. 1969, after referring to Luttwark’s reference to the failure of the 1956 revolution in Hungary to consolidate its success after gaining control of all the ‘traditional instruments of power’—armed forces, police, communications—as being due to the fact that control of the Red Army was in Moscow, so that the revolt would have had to be carried out in Moscow where the major source of political power lay, Dr. Evans writes: “Since we are using names of cities metonymically for political forces, let’s say that New York was a power in the modern world before either Washington or Moscow; that it played an essential role in the elevation of each of those capitals to formal dominance in half the world; and that it remains far more nearly than either an operationally indispensable nucleus of contemporary civilisation. Put quite simply, you could move Washington to New York a lot more easily than you could move New York to Washington. And I believe the same goes for Moscow vis-à-vis New York... Neither the United States, nor Britain, nor the Soviet Union would ever have had nuclear weapons had it not been for industrial enterprises headquartered or financially supported in New York”.

Douglas referred to New York as the headquarters of world financial power, and Dr. Evans evidently sees it as the centre from which the balance of nuclear terror is manipulated. This concept that there is a Storm Centre for the world’s troubles is of the same order of importance in understanding international affairs as was the heliocentric theory of planetary motion in understanding the observations of astronomy—a theory which, in the face of existing preconceptions of the time, it took over fifty years to establish.

The analogy of a Storm Centre is highly illuminating. Meteorologically, the centre of a hurricane is an area of calm, where nothing appears to be going on. Actually it is an area of the ocean operating as a gigantic heat engine, generating on its periphery gale-force winds, involving forces of perhaps billions of horse power. In tropical waters, this system will persist indefinitely; but if it passes on to land, the heat-engine effect is cut off, and the storm degenerates. In just the same way, so long as international finance exists as a Centre of world power, the world will be ravaged by its destructive consequences. It was that Centre which financed the Russian Revolution, and German re-armament, as well as the atom bomb (the Manhattan project). This is a measure of the real forces civilisation is up against.

The political equivalent of a storm’s centre moving inland and thus losing power is the exposure of the financial centre’s activities. In this situation, conventional party politics, particularly British-style, is probably less effective than animal sacrifice to divert a hurricane (in this latter case, chance may intervene).

We believe that there is no periodical in the world which, since its inception, has so consistently and accurately portrayed the development of international events as has The Social Crediter; but we have a confirmed impression that most of what we have published has, for most people, gone in one eye and out the other. It is hard to believe that there are not a few patriotic Members of the British Parliament with the intellect and integrity to study the “Storm” theory and face up to the consequences. That they are not to be found is perhaps a tribute to the intensive brainwashing which effectively insulates them from the real currents of international—and national—affairs. As things are, we can only re-iterate our conviction that, unless the agenda is drastically changed rather than merely shuffled, unless complicity rather than competence is an issue, the next British election will mark the final decline of distinctively British culture and influence.

Ilusion and Reality

The following letter appeared in the Times of Aug. 8, 1969.

From Professor Fred Hoyle, F.R.S.

Sir,—Now that the Common Market is again becoming a matter of public debate I would like to point out the reason why there is such a large divergence of opinion on this issue. There are two quite different pictures of what joining the Common Market would mean.

According to the first picture, held by opponents, the recent French softening is due to the state of the French balance of payments, which is now much in need of the £300m—£400m. p.a. that it would hope to receive from the agricultural levy on Britain. The effect of this levy on our economic position would be to induce still further deflationary measures in Britain, with the effect of a further reduction in our industrial expansion rate. This in turn would permit west German industry to overwhelm us.

The second picture, held by many supporters of the Common Market, is that British political skills are so great that Britain would soon emerge as the political leader of Europe. This would enable us to take a leading role not just in the affairs of Europe but of the whole world. In short, we would then be in a position to rap the Russians and Americans over the knuckles just as we used to do in the days of yore.
I suggest that the first picture corresponds to reality and the second to illusion.

Yours, &c.,

FRED HOYLE.

1 Clarkson Close, Cambridge, Aug. 1.

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The Immorality of Sanctions Against Rhodesia

By Father Robert Stuart, M.A. (Oxon.)
Barrister-at-Law

Sanctions against Rhodesia have so far proved ineffective in attaining their avowed objective. They can never succeed and should be discarded immediately for reasons of expediency if from no more worthy motives. From the moral point of view, they have been inexcusable from their inception. They are inhuman, unChristian and repugnant to the principles of all reputable systems of morality.

It is a fundamental rule of all moral systems that it is never in any circumstances permissible to do evil with the deliberate intention by means of that evil action of attaining even a just end. In other words the end never justifies the means in the sense that a righteous end can justify the use of unrighteous means.

The waging of war and the imposition of sanctions or blockades are not regarded by moralists as being necessarily evil in themselves. They are classified as "indifferent means", justified or not according to the moral legitimacy of the end envisaged. In this sense it may correctly be said that "the end justifies the means".

In certain circumstances it is morally permissible to perform an act which is intended to effect a righteous end even though it is feared (but not desired) that one or more evil effects may result, but only if all three rules of what is known as "the principle of the double effect" are complied with.

This principle is summarised by the Reverend Henry Davis, S.J., in a well known text book entitled Moral and Pastoral Theology, a Summary published by Sheed and Ward 1952, pages 3-4. I quote the relevant passage adding in brackets its application to the question under discussion:

"I am morally allowed to set in motion a cause which will have two effects, one good and the other evil, under these conditions:

(a) If the cause set in motion [here the application of sanctions] is not morally evil in itself, i.e., illegitimate and unjustifiable.

(b) If the good effect which alone may be intended [here the surrender of Mr. Ian Smith's Government to the British demands, an effect which many millions of people, among whom I am proud to number myself, would regard as a disaster of the first magnitude] either precedes the evil effect which is not intended [suffering for millions of black Africans who are not interested in or in any way responsible for Mr. Wilson's dispute with Mr. Smith, loss of trade, economic hardship of all kinds throughout the world, not forgetting the incidental inroads into the pockets of the British tax payer, fomentation of violence, etc., etc.] or results as immediately as the evil effect.

(c) If I have a proportionate reason for allowing the evil effect to happen, having regard, that is, to the preponderance of the good over the evil."

Whatever judgement one may form with regard to rules (a) and (c) it cannot be denied that the application and continuance of sanctions against Rhodesia wholly fail to comply with rule (b).

From the moral standpoint these sanctions are to be condemned absolutely, without any qualification whatsoever.

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Mr. Kissinger (continued from page 1)

understood by the Establishment prior to the publication of Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy. Kissinger's contribution of method was simply, as indicated above, to abandon reliance on patently foolish rhetoric — such as, War is unthinkable — and instead to rationalize skillfully through combinations of carefully selected topical observations and adroitly applied maxims of traditional wisdom. Thus could an apparently Conservative approach lead to a "Liberal" conclusion.

The concept which he contributed — or, rather, made articulate, since it had already been used in the Korean conflict — was that of limited war. He describes in some detail how Mao Tse-tung, for example, used guerrilla tactics strategically in Korea to the Communist advantage, and in effect advises us to fight fire with fire. He is often very persuasive. Yet sometimes, from what I take to be his own point of view, he strikes a false note. For example:

... limited war is not considered by Soviet doctrine as a strategic aberration, but as a strategic opportunity. It is the form of conflict best suited to take advantage of the preconceptions and inhibitions of status quo powers. (Op. cit., Page 349.)

Which raises the question, I should think, Why is limited war recommended for the greatest of the status quo powers, the United States of America? I find that in 1957 I wrote in the flyleaf of my copy of Kissinger's Nuclear Weapons And Foreign Policy the following:

The effect of the recommendations in this book is liable to be that we shall fight a series of limited wars, each of which is indecisive in relation to the long-range tension between the Communist world and ourselves.

What is needed is a limited action which is, however, so designed as to produce a decisive effect against Communism. We should choose a time and place and strike at some (any) vital organ of Communism.

Since then we have had Vietnam, and we have never struck at anything vital to Communism.

I am not prepared to say that Kissinger intended for us to have Vietnam. I am not prepared to say who intended Vietnam, or why. It is the most incomprehensible war of which there is record.

Again, Kissinger seems to be in agreement.

Writing at the end of 1968 he said of the Paris peace talks, "Before we go much further in negotiation, we need
an agreed concept of ultimate goals”. But apparently we
needed no concept of ultimate goals before counting our costs
in tens of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of Ameri-
can lives. Concluding his now famous article in Foreign
Affairs for January, 1969, from which the foregoing was
quoted, Kissinger writes: “However we got into Vietnam
(there is that he doesn’t know), whatever the judgment
of our actions, ending the war honorably is essential
for the peace of the world”. The only way to end anything
honorably which was not honorably begun is to admit your
mistake and make a new start. And if you don’t know how
you got into the mess you should try to find out.

But this is not the place to ponder the great mystery
of the Vietnam War. This is, however, the place to observe
that the current negotiations to bring about a “phased withdrawal”
of American and North Vietnamese forces from South Viet-
am are being directed, as far as one can judge from the
outside, by Henry Kissinger, who is plainly more important
in the Nixon Administration than any one man was in the
Johnson Administration.

In quoting from Kissinger in this section my primary ob-
ject has been to suggest the quality of his (I think) quite
superior intelligence. At the same time it is impossible to
consider passages from his writings without becoming in-
volved in the controversy which caused them to be written.
I have therefore tried to indicate in part at least wherein
and why I think he is wrong while showing at the same time
certain facets of his brilliance.

One thing more needs to be added before proceeding to a
somewhat less sketchy analysis of Kissinger on arms control,
which is the specialty of his house. Is he where he is because
of his brilliance? Is the position of possibly unique power
which he occupies for the moment the well earned reward
of intellectual genius? It is that, in part. Others would have
liked his job — others with the same “connections” Kissin-
ger has. His brilliance separates him from those others. But
nobody is brilliant enough to earn the kind of power Kissinger
now has. Such power depends on organization. He is not a
showman, not “charismatic”, cannot appeal directly to the
general public as Franklin Roosevelt did or as Martin Luther
King was perhaps beginning to do. Kissinger is an organiza-
tion man.

His organization, of course, is the Council on Foreign
Relations, of which Gary Allen’s description (American
Opinion, April 1969) is less polite than accurate: “Con-
spiracy To Rule The World”.

It seems of particular importance to note that Kissinger
is hardly Nixon’s man. They both are, or have been, mem-
ers of the C.F.R., but Kissinger’s prestige in that organiza-
tion would certainly be higher than Nixon’s. The two men
first met, according to Time, “at a Christmas party” in 1967.
The following summer Kissinger went to work for Nelson
Rockefeller in the latter’s campaign for the Republican nomi-
nation which Nixon, with the aid of Strom Thurmond, ulti-
ately obtained. While this means that Nixon was ac-
quainted with Kissinger somewhat longer before appointing
him than Kennedy was with Rusk and McNamar, it does
not suggest — on the surface, at least — that the acquain-
tance was one of either close friendship or mutual admiration.
As with the Rusk and McNamara appointments in 1960,
someone evidently advised the President-elect in 1968 whom
to appoint.

Kennedy’s advisor was, according to Arthur Schlesinger,
who surely knows, the super Establishmentarian Robert A.
Lovett. We don’t know who advised Nixon to select Kissin-
ger. Maybe it was Kissinger. He’s on the Editorial Advisory
Board of C.F.R.’s Foreign Affairs (the world’s most influen-
tial quarterly review), along with, for example, Ford Founda-
tion’s McGeorge Bundy and Chase Manhattan’s John J.
McCloy. Dick Nixon, who is hardly an Insider himself, has
peeped through the door often enough to have seen Henry
Kissinger in there — to know, in fact, that Professor Kissin-
ger is an Insider’s insider.

(To be continued)

Then and Now

“It is not glory, it is not riches, neither is it honour, but
it is liberty alone that we fight and contend for, which no
good man surrenders but with his life.”


“If all-out war should occur, Christians should urge a
cease-fire, if necessary on the enemy’s terms, and resort to
non-violent resistance.”


THE C.F.R.
Conspiracy to Rule the World

By GARY ALLEN

Hindsight and patient research have revealed that the
First World War in both its inception and conduct was the
first major step in a conspiracy to institute an all-powerful
World Government. The revered Cecil Rhodes with his
starry-eyed ideals of World Empire founded on the British
model now stands revealed as a cat’s-paw in the hands of a
secret but existing World Empire of Financiers, whose ac-
tivities and objectives became manifest in the behind-the-
scenes manipulations of the Peace negotiations, culminating
in the Versailles Treaty. The manipulators were the members
of the Round Table Group, a secret organisation of financiers
and cartelists which formed the semi-secret Royal Institute
of International Affairs for the subversion of Great Britain,
and the Council on Foreign Relations for the subversion of
the United States. Members of this Council virtually con-
stitute the real Government of the U.S. Gary Allen’s pene-
trating essay is the most succinct and definitive proof of con-
sspiracy by finance-cartelists to rule the world that we have
seen. Anyone who remains unconvinced by these revelations
simply does not care what the future may bring.

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K.P.R. Publications Ltd. 245 Cann Hall Road, London, E.11

Printed by E Fish & Co Ltd Liverpool