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Amerussia*

MAXIMUM CONGLOMERATE
By Medford Evans

(Continued)

Each major component of the maximum conglomerate must furnish some unique contribution. What is Russia's? Certainly not industry, nuclear or any other kind. Not population—that is China's department, and India's. Not necessarily much of a contribution anyhow. Populations are to be ruled, not to rule.

Russia's unique asset is geographic position. The geopoliticians were right—or at least not wholly wrong. The land masses of the earth and the population of the earth—both to be dominated—lie principally in the Northern hemisphere. Moscow is the most northerly of the great capitals of the world—is the only one from which land attacks can be directed into Europe and into several distinct regions of Asia, including Turkey, Iran, and China. ('The Indian subcontinent is rather well barricaded by the Himalayas, the Pamirs, and the Hindu Kush mountains.)

The lines of march are not two-way streets. It is a great deal easier for Moscow to strike at Berlin, or Ankara, or Teheran, or Peking than for any one of those four to strike at Moscow. The geopolitical position of the U.S.S.R. was enormously strengthened, of course, by annexation and the system of satellite nations established after World War II. More recent developments in the Middle East have given Moscow some kind of land bridge to Africa, though the usability of that is rather in doubt. In this connection, the Mediterranean, being a land-locked sea, greatly augments the land bridge to Africa if Russian naval power in the Eastern Mediterranean is indeed increasing as one hears.

But regardless of details, there can be no argument that from the point of view of geopolitical advantage Moscow has no rival among the great capitals of the earth. The only quarter from which Moscow could be readily attacked in an air and missile age is from the North with planes or weapons originating in North America.

Well here we are back to an Amerussian combination. Mackinder said, "Who controls Eastern Europe [Russia does] controls the Heartland [meaning Central Asia and Siberia]. Who controls the Heartland [Russia does, obviously] controls the World Island [Europe, Asia, Africa]. Who controls the World Island controls the world".

The great modification of Mackinder in the air-missile age would have to be: Who controls the Heartland and North America controls the world.

This may be more or less a new thought to you and me, but it has long been crystal clear to the sophisticated political intelligentsia, people like Walt Rostow, who taught Washington to think in terms, not of East and West, but North and South.

You understand that most of the stuff you read in the "Liberal" Press about Northern and Southern hemispheres indicates that the purpose of getting the Northern countries together is to help the more impoverished Southern countries—Africa, Latin America, the Southern tier of Asia (but decidedly not Australia)—to improve their standard of living, to gratify their "rising expectations". Maybe so, maybe not. What is clear enough is that the unified North—meaning specifically the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., with Western Europe caught in the middle—would be the world power.

If such a maximum conglomerate chose to exercise its unique power benevolently, fine! If not, there would be nothing any other political body could do about it. Actually, since such a conglomerate can be rendered viable only under Communist leadership (for the Communists would never accept non-Communist leadership) it goes without further saying that the power would not be used benevolently but with ruthless and destructive cruelty. Why? Man, they can't help it! That's their nature!

Who controls the Heartland and North America controls the world. Well, it is an obvious nuisance to have two capitals. It can be, has been done—the outstanding case being that of Rome and Byzantium—but it is awkward, and in the classic instance resulted in dismemberment of the empire. The question therefore arises: Which is the more valuable to the Amerussian conglomerate—Russia or America?

The answer is all too clear as soon as we consider the point that the U.S. contribution to the common assets—i.e., industrial production—is transferable to Russia, while the Soviet contribution—the Heartland—cannot be transferred.

We can sit here and think about that for a while, but there is not really anything else to say about it, is there? American nuclear weapons—and other useful artifacts—can be taken to and stored in Russia. But Russia's position on the globe cannot be moved anywhere else. It would not then be the same position. So a global directorate based on Russian land and American products will, if it wishes to consolidate its assets and centralize its control (which naturally it will wish to do as far as possible), move the American products to Russia, since it cannot move the Russian location to America.

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FROM WEEK TO WEEK

Writing in the Illustrated London News (Nov. 15, 1969) Sir Arthur Bryant remarks: "And out of this testament of a casual onlooker, who has happened also by profession to be a historian, arises the unanswerable question, how can we hope to fulfill ourselves, either as individuals or a people, if we ignore our past; if we grow careless of our character and identity; if we lose all pride in patriotism, if we do not combat the erosion of our freedoms, if we repudiate the faith which has been the mainspring of our civilisation for a thousand years?"

But what if "our" educational system has been perverted to falsify the records of our past; if our character and identity has been swamped by a carefully promoted alien influx (not all of it coloured); if patriotism is officially subordinated to internationalism and disarmament and economic unity at the behest of alien doctrines; if faith is being undermined by its Ministers in the pursuit of permissiveness?

What does it mean when Spectator (Nov. 22, 1969) can boldly assert "that it is abundantly clear that Parliament cannot believe a word the Foreign Secretary says", and includes by implication Mr. Wilson? And while it thinks that there must be a limit to the number of Mr. Stewart's "lies and evasions" that the Shadow Cabinet is prepared to swallow, why should the Shadow Cabinet swallow a single one? Why is the Shadow Cabinet "supporting the present government to the hilt" on its Nigerian policy?

It is more than a question of fulfilling ourselves; it is a matter of our survival as an identifiable people. "A national culture is the soul of a people, and the idea that a people can lose its soul and retains its identity is of a piece with the rest of dialectical materialism" (C. H. Douglas). The British people is having its soul destroyed in the interests of Marxian (if it is Marxian) internationalism. Since this goes against the British grain, we have the spectacle of government by "lies and evasions", with the implicit collusion of the Tories. And the Tories, if they win an election, for their sins of omission are almost certainly going to find themselves with the unavoidable task of finally writing Britain off as a dead loss—because it has been planned that way. Not until we hear charges of treason rather than of "failures" and 'incompetence' shall we see a glimmer of hope.

Chapman Pincher (Daily Express, Nov. 21, 1969) reports that there is likely to be a U.S. demand that Britain's Polaris missiles must be fitted with American war-heads under U.S. electronic control. The 'excuse' for this would be that it would be required by Soviet Russia as a condition of some sort of agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The rationale of this pretty plot, which is sure to appeal to Messrs. Wilson and Healey as a cover for their own intentions ("A Defense policy which does not contain within itself the seeds of progress towards disarmament is one ... which we can no longer regard as appropriate")—Wilson—is that if Russia is to concede the 'defence' of Europe to the U.S., the U.S. must be in a position to guarantee that the protégée cannot get out of hand. For example, suppose that following industrial unrest in say Italy the Communists were elected in sufficient strength to form a Government, and then, as in the take-over in Czechoslovakia, proceeded to eliminate their opponents and signal the Warsaw Pact, this would be a purely internal affair from the U.S. point of view; but of course would come under the Brezhnev Doctrine from the Russian point of view. And if the process were repeated in, say, France—democratically, of course—; and if West Germany, more prosperous than Italy and France, became a bit 'reactionary' and nervous about the aid the Soviets were giving to their Socialist brethren, well, who could be happy about some British fool with his finger on the nuclear trigger???

So, as Mr. Pincher says, "Financial pressure may be exerted from Washington, especially as the Government is hoping to secure a delay in the repayment of certain big loans". Well, yes; maybe.

This "demand", to be put forward by the U.S. on Russia's behalf, so exactly follows the line which began with the U.S.'s abrupt scrapping of the Skybolt missile (to Mr. Macmillan's apparently dismayed astonishment), the scrapping of the proved TSR-2 in favour of the dubious F 111, and the cancellation of the order for the latter, as to give it a high degree of probability.

The importance of the Polaris missiles is not that they might deter Russia from starting a war, BUT THAT THEY MIGHT DETER WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW FROM COMING TO AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD LEAVE EUROPE, INCLUDING BRITAIN, HELPLESS IN THE FACE OF THE MACHINERY OF WORLD GOVERNMENT. The Big Idea of Finance-Communism is not to destroy the world through nuclear war, but TO TAKE IT OVER AS A GOING CONCERN, with resistance to rule by International Decree made impossible by the strategic deployment of Russian arms, already accomplished.†

We do not think that even if the great majority of the British public understood what is really going on (which it does not) and protested against it, the electorate would have the slightest hope of success. But there may be a chance, for a few months more (the Polaris situation sets a time-table) that a properly researched and prepared Censure Motion in the British House of Commons might get somewhere (though the treatment accorded Mr. Powell from both sides of the House in the Immigration debate dims the prospect). Party

† See The Moving Storm p. 152 ff.
Politics—the Box and Cox Circus—as a way to salvation was finished years ago. But while, and only while, Britain has an independent deterrent in the sense defined above, patriotism and courage in Parliament still offers just a hope. The 'trap' of international financial agreements must be exposed and repudiated, even at the risk of provoking military sanctions (not such a great risk while the deterrent remains); Britain's economic necessities must be provided for through Anglo-Saxon Commonwealth agreements (the old Empire of Dominions is an easily independent economic unit, though Australia is fast being bound into the Asian province of the New York financial Empire under Japanese governorship); and disincentive taxation must be replaced by an incentive system, and the erosion of purchasing-power reversed.

In short, the Opposition must totally and realistically oppose the policy of the Government as evidenced in its practice (not in those of its "lies and evasions" which the Tories choose to swallow). Otherwise, the Opposition is either consciously playing the enemy's game or, under the delusion of superior 'competence', playing into the enemy's hands. The Conservatives were for a long time fooled by Hitler; and they should remember this as a first step towards recognising that they are being fooled by Washington. But this time the game is for keeps. It is Battle for Britain, or eternal liquidation as a people.

Terra Firma

Mr. Healey, the Defence Minister, suggested unctiously during the recent five by-elections, that the voters would favour a party who managed the country well. But, apart from the question of treacherous mismanagement, this argument can apply to others, to Rhodesia for example. In a recent leader, called Nigeria Blunders, The Daily Telegraph (Nov. 3, 1969) points out that there are still stocks of Red Cross food, but "to distribute them appears beyond the Nigerian bureaucracy... no more food stocks for refugees and few cash contributions have reached Nigeria since it turned out the IRC...". What is the answer to this African tragedy of pride and incompetence? The same facts, let us face it, bedevil not only Nigeria but other States whose advent on the wind of change was gaily hailed a decade ago. A further irony must be faced. It is in those parts of Africa that have retained European administration, the much detested Southern States, that people fare best". Mr. Smith of course cannot be expected to abdicate his responsibility or to deliver his country to the possibility of chaos to please some distant self-important rulers.

To reach stability in thought—and I take it that most people would prefer a rock under their feet to a process—we often have to look back, and as this argues against evolution and process as a total explanation, it is denigrated as reaction. One still finds more common sense in Abraham Lincoln's Ten Rules of Conduct than in the whole of modern socialism. For he pointed out that you 'cannot strengthen the weak by weakening the strong, help small men by tearing down big men, help the poor by destroying the rich, build character and courage by taking away man's initiative and independence, help men permanently by doing for them what they could and should do for themselves". (Task Force, Aug. 1969) The words could have been written today in M. Belguin's Worship of Quality, but they expose the non sequiturs of socialism and so are rarely quoted.

The same clarity enlightened the earlier presidents, and James Madison wrote in Political Observations in 1795 that "the separation of the power of creating offices from that of filling them is an essential guard against the temptation to create offices for the sake of gratifying favourites or multiplying dependents". (Task Force, Sept. 1969.) Today, in addition to the abuse which Madison noted, we suffer from confusion of thought in which separate ideas are not kept separate, which is as essential as the separation of powers.

For instance, the Rev. Kenneth Slack writes (The Times, Nov. 10, 1969), a violent attack on the Springboks whose presence he feels is "morally offensive". He goes on to say that "racism" represents a threat to world peace "of no less magnitude than the totalitarianism that almost destroyed us". He fails to mention the totalitarianism that threatens to destroy us now, ("We will bury you"), or the violence that has broken out when the race question is mishandled or disregarded, let alone the facts mentioned, if reluctantly, by the Daily Telegraph. The confusion between Nazism and South Africa which he fosters only adds to the chaos of modern thought. We shall not reach firm ground this way, however deep we sink.

—H.S.

Amerussia

(continued from page 1)

Has this moving of products been done? Obviously, Russian pretensions in nuclear capability and space are undoubtedly exaggerated beyond all reason; yet, plausibly, nuclear shots have been fired and spacecraft launched within Russian territory. The abnormal degree of secrecy about these means that there is something to hide. The Muscovites show off what they can show off—witness the external casings of giant rockets which they parade on May Day in Red Square. Probably what they must hide concerning any missiles which really are test-fired in their territory is the non-Russian origin of much if not all of the hardware.

Any review of Soviet industrial resources, beginning with the devastation left by World War II and taking into account permanent factors of Soviet land and society, must conclude that the achievements attributed to the Russians since 1949 are far more credibly explained by the predominance of clandestine imports from Western Europe and America than by any rationally conceivable development of native Soviet industry. Even the Czech and Central German contributions are inadequate to explain what the U.S.S.R. has allegedly accomplished technologically since 1945.

When Russia wants an automobile plant she goes to Fiat in Italy to buy one. She cannot openly approach the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in the same manner, but there is now admittedly a black market in U.S. nuclear materials, and that market undoubtedly existed long before it was admitted. It would be natural, as we have seen, for an international power clique to program a whole unpublicized system of industrial lend-lease to Russia, with supplies from numerous countries, but chiefly from the United States of America.

Within the United States, in precisely the years when the Russian technical "progress" has occurred, the system of in-
ternal security, which would have had as its first duty the prevention of clandestine exportation of nuclear materials and other products of modern American industry, has been systematically destroyed. No one is surprised that a Boeing 707 jet flying under the flag of Kuwait or India was actually manufactured in Seattle or Wichita. No one should be surprised if a hydrogen bomb or a moon rocket fired in Russia should have parts that originated in Tennessee or Long Island. Of course it is strictly against the law for such exports to be made from the United States—but precisely those security officers most concerned with the enforcement of such laws have been the personnel most savagely discredited in the United States through the mass media, the college classrooms, and the best established pulpits.

At the same time that prevailing propaganda has made it feasible for clandestine nuclear supplies to go to Russia from America, any military use by America of what remains in America has been rendered psychologically impossible. Not only is there a firm interdiction of "first strike" use of nuclear weapons by the United States, but the implements of war are continually removed from the American arsenal.

Robert McNamara, now head of the World Bank, did more, possibly, than any other one man to disarm the United States. He refused to develop the RB-70 aircraft, he cancelled the Skybolt missile (thereby further alienating the British ally as well as getting rid of an intrinsically useful weapon), he substituted inert "Minutemen" missiles for the more powerful Atlas and Titans (wonder where they are?), he junked thousands of B-47 bombers (allegedly obsolete, but better than most of the world's fighting aircraft), he phased out the B-58 "Hustler" (a red-hot number) and insisted on production of the disastrous F-111.

Note that the pretense that the F-111 contract award to General Dynamics was ordinary political crookedness to favor a plant in President Johnson's home state will not wash as a total explanation of the F-111 (or T.F.X.) affair, since the B-58 was also a bonanza for General Dynamics' Convair plant in Fort Worth. Nonetheless, McNamara did not hesitate to cut off the B-58!

Yes, I mean to say just what you think I mean to say.

When Walt Rostow and M.I.T. Dean Jerome Wiesner went to Moscow in November 1960 and negotiated with Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, they were evidently usurping authority, for though both were confident of holding high position in the Kennedy Administration, that Administration had not yet been formed, much less installed. Dwight Eisenhower was still President, and it is not of record that he authorized Rostow and Wiesner to negotiate with the Russians.

Despite the fact, however, that what Rostow and Wiesner did in Moscow that autumn was almost certainly criminal in a technical sense, it must be admitted that they undoubtedly spoke for the ruling class in America, which is identified sometimes as the Liberal Establishment, sometimes as the Military-Industrial Complex, the two being en fond—paradoxical as this may sound—one and the same. Of course, if Rostow and Wiesner had not represented the American power elite, they could never have got an audience with Kuznetsov.

While neither the Russian nor the Americans were at the summit of power, they were all near enough the top to feel considerable freedom of action in arranging a rendezvous for their respective countries. Two years later, in the denouement of the spurious "missile crisis", their respective Heads of State—Khrushchev and Kennedy—were to conclude a secret alliance uniting the Soviet Union and the United States in defense of the Castro régime in Cuba. Ordinary Americans not only did not have a voice in that arrangement, they knew nothing of its existence until years later, and indeed at the time were led to believe that something very like the opposite had occurred—that the United States had won a victory over a hostile Soviet Union, that the two had been "eyeball to eyeball", and that the Russian had "blinked". Actually, when the Soviet and the American Commander-in-Chief looked at each other, neither one blinked. They both winked.

The great significance of the "missile crisis" of October 1962 was not that "nuclear holocaust" was avoided—there was never any danger of such a holocaust. And not that Khrushchev was forced to "back down"—there is no solid evidence that he did back down (i.e., the missiles may still be in Cuba) and no solid evidence that he ever had anything to back down from (i.e., there may not have been any missiles in Cuba in the first place). The significance of the "missile crisis" was that its "solution" involved the first officially if secretly established Russo-American condominium over an entire country.

In analysing this kind of power politics the obvious point can never be overemphasized that decisions are made and actions taken by a minuscule minority whose positions of power enable them to determine the destiny of hundreds of millions of human beings who are consulted no more than the control-tower at Kennedy Airport consults the passengers on an incoming 707.

At Independence Hall in Philadelphia on the Fourth of July, 1962, President John F. Kennedy urged a "Declaration of Interdependence" to join "the new union now merging in Europe and the old American union". I suggest that this reflected rhetorically a redefinition of sovereignty which was already operating practically in areas that are absolutely vital to nationhood.

Much more recently, President Kennedy's advisor on national security, McGeorge Bundy, now President of the Ford Foundation, wrote in Foreign Affairs (October 1969) of Russia and America that "each great power must move from a zealous concern for its own advantage to a sober acceptance of parity". This is the attitude of a board member equally concerned for two subsidiaries.

It is the nuclear physicists who are the nucleus of the contemporary intellectual community. Since 1945 they have insisted that national sovereignties should be merged into one world sovereignty. They do not say either that they would wield that sovereignty, or that it would begin with a union of Russia and America, but it is sufficiently obvious that they think that is obvious. "Amerussia" is not an end in itself, but represents the major way station on the road to One World.

Or, as they threatened, None.

(Concluded)

A HAPPY CHRISTMAS TO ALL OUR READERS

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