NARCOTICS
THE COMMUNIST DRUG OFFENSIVE

By SUSAN L. M. HUCK in American Opinion, May, 1969

America is being subjected to a three-step campaign to spread drug addiction among members of the generation now attending schools and colleges. The stages of this escalating campaign are as follows. First, get them accustomed to using drugs by popularising the use of marijuana, or “pot”, a relatively mild but dangerous drug whose active ingredients are used in chemical warfare. Second, encourage the use of more potent drugs, for the purpose of introducing the use of the hypodermic needle to inject narcotics directly into the bloodstream. Third, and finally, provide heroin for those who have hurdled the first two barriers to hard-drug addiction.

Heroin is at once the most viciously addictive, and most available, of the “hard drugs”. It is made from opium, and the world’s largest single supplier of illicit opium and its derivatives, morphine and heroin, is Red China. The Chinese Communist regime has openly used opium as a weapon of war since 1941. While the use of narcotics is severely penalised within Red China, narcotics are mass-produced there for export to anti-Communist nations. Current opium production in Red China is estimated to be between ten and fifteen thousand tons, and the average annual “take” from its sale abroad has been at least half a billion dollars a year for the past ten or fifteen years. Annual income to Red China from the sale of illicit narcotics is today probably very close to a billion dollars.

Mao Tse-tung and his Communist bureaucracy know perfectly well how useful and profitable drug-peddling can be. Narcotics, aimed at the enemies of Communism, can corrupt, subvert, and weaken the people and their government in a thousand ways, meanwhile enriching Mao’s regime and its criminal allies abroad.

Subversion by deliberately planned and fomented corruption is hardly new in the pages of history, although the United States—has never before been the victim of anything like the present campaign. Just as the Far Left openly promotes and carries out acts of sabotage and terrorism, fomenting civil disorder in the United States on an unprecedented scale, it is also openly pushing upon us every conceivable sort of immorality from pornography to treason. It is America’s Establishment Left, however, which through its grip on government, education, and the mass media, has propagated for toleration of every form of moral and physical corruption.

We are now in the process of being taught to “tolerate” a wave of drug-abuse among the “under thirty” target popula-

* The Costa Mesa Pilot-Advertiser of September 25, 1968, reports a survey of students in the junior and senior high schools of Newport Beach, California, which found that eighty percent of the teenagers there had experimented with illegal drugs. The survey is, alas, far too typical.

(continued on page 4)
THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM
This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas. The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and abroad, post free: One year 4/-, six months 22/6, three months 11/6.

Offices: Business: 245 Cann Hall Road, Leytonstone, London, E.II.
   Telephone: 01-534 7395
   Editorial: Penrhyn Lodge, Gloucester Gate, London, N.W.1
   Telephone: 01-387 3893

IN AUSTRALIA
   Business: Box 2318V, G.P.O., Melbourne, Victoria 3001
   Editorial: Box 3266, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W. 2001

THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT

Vol. 49. No. 22 Saturday, January 24, 1970

FROM YEAR TO YEAR
The following is a “Week to Week” note from our issue for 4 April, 1959:

It is a widely held belief that because of the enormous expansion of knowledge, particularly in recent times, “we" know more than our ancestors. But by far the greater part of what is known is quite inaccessible to any individual — firstly because even a life-time of study could not encompass the field of knowledge, and secondly because the individual’s memory is limited. There is nothing to suggest that modern man can know more than ancient man, except in so far as the technique of acquiring knowledge has improved. The content of contemporary knowledge is generally very different from that of ancient times: it is more technical, and in many cases, almost exclusively so. Indeed, for the majority in industrialised communities, what they know is what is necessary for them to know to be “gainfully employed”, and little else.

Apart from this technical, “employable”, knowledge, we might class knowledge in a very broad way as a man’s knowledge of his experience. The fulness of experience must be independent of historical time. What did Shakespeare, Plato, the Buddha experience? Perhaps the answer is best expressed as intensity, as opposed to extensity: profundity, as opposed to superficiality. The profound can be discovered and experienced today in works of ancient time or of any time.

Modern knowledge is a collective attribute, and it is one part of the cultural heritage; its real importance to the individual is the importance of the field to the flower. To view it otherwise, as if it were a matter in which the individual should take pride, is to fall victim to the hypothesis of collectivism.

THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS
A personal interpretation
by Glubb Pasha (Sir John Glubb)
Fully revised and brought up-to-date in August, 1969
K.R.P. Publications Ltd., 245 Cann Hall Road, London, E.II

MEN WHO PLAY GOD
*(A BOOK REVIEW from American Opinion, Dec., 1969)*

I have been reading books about the Bomb for twenty-four years. The Smyth Report came out in 1945, One World Or None in 1946. There has been a prodigious stream of them since. All of them try to scare you. This is the first one that ever scared me!

My own book on the subject, The Secret War For The A-Bomb, didn’t scare me because (1) it was the product, not the cause, of my fear that the United States does not have a nuclear bomb which it can use, and (2) I realised that I might be wrong. Now comes Norman Moss, an expert journalist — clever and competent as the devil, and if not profoundly wise that is not to the point here — to prove beyond reasonable doubt that I was right, that the United States, for all practical purposes, is disarmed of the nuclear weapon on which we have staked our chances for national survival.

The “Disarmament Lobby”, as M. Stanton Evans called it in The Politics of Surrender, continues its propaganda, but actually its mission is accomplished.

Elsewhere in this December number of American Opinion — in the review of William J. Gill’s The Ordeal Of Otto Oteka,* and in the article “Amerussia” — I have suggested (1) the psychology, at once ego-centric and globally oriented, of the men who control American national security; (2) the collapse of internal security, an indispensable feature of national-security, (3) the exploitation of “stalemate”, the “balance of terror”; and “arms control” to institute a de facto world government centering on a virtual merger of Soviet and American policy-planning agencies. (Talk about the Sino-Soviet split being a phony! The biggest phony is the American-Soviet split!) In the present review of Men Who Play God (and I don’t much care whether you read the book or not — it’s based on “Liberal” premises, with ineritable inferential fallacies, but Moss is knowledgeable and sharp as a tack, so proceed at your own risk) I should like to bring out certain physical facts about the posture of the nuclear superpowers, as well as some further elaboration of the personal psychology of “men who play God” — including not just scientists, but politicians who play the scientists.

The most important thing in Moss’s book is his clear narration of steps taken in our government to guarantee that nuclear weapons cannot be used by our armed services. (Doctor Oppenheimer said, “An atomic bomb which you do not use is of no use to you.”) By Congressional action the decision to use a nuclear weapon is supposed to be made by the President himself, and this is interpreted as meaning that


* And, by what suicidal fatality does even the Conservative reading public, which has so commendably taken the young Indianapolis editor to its bosom, choose to ignore, of all the works which this indefatigable student of affairs has turned out, precisely the one which is far and away his most vital contribution to the common sanity?

* See T.S.C., 10 January, 1970.

the President must make each individual decision, that he
cannot delegate discretionary authority to any military com-
mmanders below him, not even to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
This basically administrative control was enough to take us
through the Korean War without any use of our nuclear
weapons, which if used (or credibly threatened to be used)
would certainly have prevented Red China’s crossing the
Yalu, and which would not (it is now admitted) have
brought the Russians in, for the Russians, despite the
“atomic explosion” of 1949 had no stockpile of nuclear
weapons at any time from 1950 to 1953, when the Korean
War was fought.

That ought to have made the advocates of effective
American unilateral nuclear disarmament happy, and no
doubt it did so for the moment, but then their anxieties re-
turned. What, they asked themselves nervously, if some
General (hideous creatures, Generals, unless like General
Zwicker they are attacked by Joe McCarthy, or like General
Eisenhower they snub Joe McCarthy) — what if some
General took the bit into his own teeth and used a nuclear
weapon without waiting for word from the President (who is
advised always by a Bundy, a Rostow, or a Kissinger)?
When General Edwin A. Walker was stationed in Bavaria, on
the left flank of the Red Army in the Soviet Zone of Germany,
this speculative possibility made the Amerussian cadres in
Washington and elsewhere really break out in a sweat.
Why do you think Walker was relieved of his German command?

The crisis in this affair (which was really a crisis of
“Liberal” nerves) coincided with the advent of the Kennedy
Administration in late 1960 and early 1961. Members of
the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy had
toured American bases in Europe where nuclear weapons
were installed, including Britain, Italy, Turkey, and —
notably — Germany. They told themselves, these Congress-
men, that they worried as to whether the host countries
might not in a crisis seize the weapons from our forces.

The control at that time, says Moss, consisted of a key
around the neck of an American officer — and another “round
the neck of the officer of the “host” country. Both keys had
to be used to activate the nuclear weapon. But suppose the
hosts became sufficiently agitated to knock the American
in the head and take his key? This was a gratuitous worry;
there were any number of reasons why none of the hosts
would have wanted to do that; besides, in Germany both
keys were in American hands.
There was the real worry — real in the minds of the arms-controllers in Washington —
what American soldiers in the field might do. Moss relates
developments as follows:

As well as tightening their administrative and in-
tellectual control over nuclear weapons, the Kennedy
Administration established a new kind of physical con-
trol, called the permissive action link or p.a.l. This was
to be put on nuclear weapons, despite the protests of
many of the men handling them, to ensure that their
unauthorised use was physically as well as administratively
impossible.

The Chairman of the (Joint) Committee on Atomic
Energy, Representative Chet Holifield of California,
saw Kennedy soon after his inauguration, and urged
some kind of remote control device. Work was set in
motion at Los Alamos... design work was also being
done at the Sandia Corporation in Albuquerque, and
also at the Livermore (California) laboratory. The
scientists and engineers were seeking a compromise be-
tween a locking device so loose that it could easily be
broken, and one so tight and cumbersome that the
weapon could not be unlocked and used... Which
lock was chosen, and how much weapon-effectiveness
was to be sacrificed for safety, was a political decision.

The lock that was chosen was not, strictly speaking,
an electronic lock, opened by an electronic signal.
Rather, it was a kind of combination lock. To arm the
bomb for firing, one had to know the combination, and
the men handling the bomb would not know it. It
would be sent to them in a radio message, along with the
order to fire.

Simple, isn’t it? I think you and I are simple. We read all
the stuff about the red phones at Offutt Air Force Base, HQ
of the Strategic Air Command near Omaha, Nebraska, and
about continual airborne command planes for emergency use
in case anything happens to Offutt. We read about hardened
missile silos in Montana or somewhere, with nuclear-tipped
“Minutemen” poised for condign retaliation against Moscow
or wherever. Tough, man, this old U.S.A. is really tough!
All the time not one of those missiles, not one of those
B.52s, can do a thing — all Offutt can do is tell the planes
where to fly, it cannot enable them to drop the bomb after
they get there — none of them can get the gun out of
the holster till a McGeorge Bundy or a Walt Rostow or a Henry
Kissinger in the White House radios them the order to fire
(that will be the day) and the combination to the lock on
the weapon! If the static was bad the poor guy in the cock-
pit or the silo wouldn’t be able to read the signal. And of
course the worst static could well be in the mental processes
of that key security advisor in Washington.

What those key mental processes have been is indicated by
Moss’ report that “Kennedy decided to push ahead with the
locking programme faster than the inventors had intended”,
and, “In a still more drastic decision, he ordered the instal-
lation of the locks on nuclear weapons in the American
services”.

Remember that the rationalisation for initiating this exag-
gerated safety-catch approach had been that some of our
European allies might get such itchy fingers for the nuclear
gun that they would slug our peace-loving custodians overseas.
Obviously the real target all along was the American
soldier, airman, or sea captain. Remember, too, that John
Kennedy would not, and possibly could not, move one way
or the other in this matter without the consent as well as
advice of his official “national security” advisor McGeorge
Bundy, and his “science” advisor Jerome Wiesner (Ros-
tow’s companion on the notorious Moscow junket of Novem-
ber 1960). Locking American weapons against use by
American commanders was a bit much even for many “Liber-
als”. Moss reports:

Members of the Congressional Committee wrote to
the President protesting... “We told him that the
object of the device was to prevent the seizure of
nuclear weapons, and American officers are not going
to seize their own weapons.” Most of the scientists and
engineers who devised the lock were similarly opposed
to this, and a few blamed Wiesner, with his supposedly
"extreme" advocacy of arms control schemes. "Wiesner's attitude," one of them said with some bitterness, "is that if you can't get rid of nuclear weapons, the next best thing is to lock them up and throw away the key."

Moss further reports that Wiesner, with Kennedy's permission, gave the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin, "an outline of the lock's purpose and nature." Dobrynin asked (nervously?) whether the locks would really work. Wiesner assured him that they were "proof against the most expert electronic lock-breakers for a few hours," adding "But if the weapons are captured by an enemy, then very sophisticated technologists can break the locks." In other words, the average American Air Force officer could not make the lock work promptly if he failed for any reason to get the signal from Washington (after Washington had checked it on the hot line with Moscow?) but should the weapons ever be captured by an enemy (the whole "balance of terror" Weltanshauung hinges on the theory that the U.S. and the U.S.S.R may abruptly become "enemies"), and said "enemy" had any "very sophisticated technologists," then friend enemy could add the weapons, in a more usable condition, to his stockpile. Well, it seems likely that if that enemy captured these weapons he would find enough sophisticated technologists in America willing to go over to the other side. At any rate, Wiesner filled the Russian Ambassador in well enough.

Maybe you had better make a point of reading this book. If you've stayed with me thus far, you're mature enough to be told the facts of life, and Moss does tell a lot of those facts with, actually, a minimum of emphasis on the underlying "Liberal" premises which he apparently accepts. He does not say, as I would, that the handcuffing of our Strategic Air Command is a betrayal of America, but he makes it plain that the Strategic Air Command is handcuffed. For example, he writes:

"There are far more ways to prevent a missile from being launched than there are to launch one. It is easier to lock the weapon than to unlock it, even without the permissive action link. On the ground, as when the rocket is in flight, everything is done to make certain that if there is an error, it will mean that an H-Bomb does not explode that should, rather than the other way around."

Barry Goldwater took a beating in 1964 on the fraudulent ground (and his opponent knew it was fraudulent) that he had an itchy finger for the nuclear trigger. He should have replied, as he truthfully could have done, that his opponent, advised by Walt Rostow, Jerome Wiesner, and the like, had filed the nuclear trigger off the gun and soldered the safety catch on so that it could not be released.

Oh, go read the book! I can't begin to get into this space all the things you really ought to know that are clearly indicated if not fully spelled out in Norman Moss's strikingly competent report. Let me leave you with this. Most Americans assume that while the United States would never launch a nuclear war, we stand ready to retaliate if any "potential aggressor" should ever launch nuclear war against us. But at the Rand Corporation, which is a "think tank" wholly owned, but not controlled, by the United States Air Force, it is a commonplace idea that "if deterrence failed (meaning, if the Russians hit us with X number of H-Bombs), the question of what to do next would be an open one." The emerging concept is this: We can never use nuclear weapons first, but if the enemy uses them first we still should not use them, for to do so would only be a meaningless gesture of vengeance in an already devastated world.

That's my wording, but you'd better believe it is not my thinking. It is the thinking of the advanced Amerussian intellectuals. Don't waste time asking, How can they think like that? They do. Wake up and read Moss and you'll see what I mean.

— MEDFORD EVANS

NARCOTICS

(continued from page 1)

The child of the marijuana user may show this damage, or his child may show it.

The source of this danger, the marijuana plant, will grow in almost any warm climate, although (as in the case of tobacco) climate and soil conditions affect its quality. In general, the more tropical the climate, the more potent the marijuana. Most of the marijuana entering the United States comes from Mexico, and what is reputed to be the best type comes from the state of Guerrero — the hinterland of Acapulco.

"It's coming across by the ton," said one Customs Inspector in Calexico, California. "It's just tremendous; as if somebody had pulled the plug." He told me he felt as if he were trying to hold back the tide with a broom — almost as if it were hardly worth bothering about intercepting less than hundred-pound lots. Arrests are up, seizures are up, but nothing seems to slow down the flood of "grass" across that long, lonely border. Look magazine of March 5, 1968, estimated that three to five tons of it are being smuggled every week into California alone.

A new road to popularity has been opened on many campuses to the more affluent and less honest students. Those who can afford long trips, and fairly large, risky investments, can and do go on contrabanding expeditions to Mexico. Getting students — especially middle-class college students — accustomed to ignoring or defying the law by smoking "pot" is only the beginning, you see. The Acapulco Gold Rush is luring countless otherwise passable young people into smuggling for profit, or just plain drug-dealing around the campus, while the less enterprising take their first step into what is called the "illicit-drug subculture" by making a practice of dealing with criminals.

Naturally, it just so happens that the whole pattern meshes nicely with the Communist campaign to generate hostility toward law-enforcement personnel, and to foment conflict between the generations. It is therefore not at all surprising that at the base of the promotion of marijuana are hundreds of "underground" Marxist tabloids, pushing drugs at American youth as instant Nirvana.

Thus far we have said rather little about the Communists. That is because they do not seem to loom very large in the actual production of marijuana. In fact, the major Red role seems to be in popularising the use of drugs, and developing the formerly marginal, outcast "illicit-drug subculture" into a large element of the adolescent life-style in the United States.

(To be continued)