The TFX Scandal

MANY OF OUR READERS WILL HAVE READ THE FOLLOWING CHAPTER FROM DR. MEDFORD EVANS’S The Usurpers. TO THOSE IT WILL BE RE-READING. TO OTHERS IT WILL BE REVEALING.

There is one important event in the disarmament activities of the former Secretary of Defense which can just as well stand for everything else, since in it are manifest all the personal characteristics of the man, especially his implacable refusal to countenance the least consideration for American victory on the field of battle.

The event to which I refer is known as the “TFX Scandal”, which had been the subject of extensive Congressional investigation, and was cut off just as it was reaching a first crisis by the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

“The multibillion-dollar TFX warplane contract was the most coveted prize the Pentagon ever dangled before bidders”, writes Liberal journalist Clark Mollenhoff in his book The Pentagon.

Government spending, it was estimated, would exceed $6.5 billion [it was to run much higher] the largest contract for military planes in the nation’s history. The program was planned to include more than 1,700 planes for the Navy and the Air Force. Such a contract could mean prosperity for an entire state, and the competition was intense.

Nineteen-sixty-two was the year of decision. There were two main competitors—Seattle-based Boeing, which proposed to build the plane at its Wichita, Kansas plant, and General Dynamics, which in cooperation with Grumman intended to produce the Air Force version at its Convair plant in Fort Worth, and the Navy version at Bethpage, New York. The states of Washington, Kansas, Texas, and New York were politically interested. The first two are hardly a match in political influence for the last two, even waiving the fact that the Vice President was from Texas. But that was something no one was quite willing to waive, particularly in view of Johnson’s well-earned reputation for arm-twisting in the clinches. Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson in his 1965 book Despoilers of Democracy, tells of his own interview of McNamara, who received him in friendly fashion, leading off with flattering references to Mollenhoff’s intellectual capacity. Mollenhoff does have intellectual capacity. He knows when he is getting the run-around. He poured pressure on the Secretary of Defense:

‘How will you justify discarding the low bid on the basis of a rough judgment and without cost studies?’ I asked.

‘I’m a $500,000 a year executive,’ McNamara snapped back. ‘I was the second-highest-paid accountant in the United States. I was paid for my judgment on contracts involving millions of dollars.’

‘But Mr. Secretary,’ I said, ‘assuming that you can make these judgments on multi-billion-dollar contracts, do you feel it is good government operations when there are no documented cost studies to justify throwing out the low bids?’

‘I know what I’m doing,’ he snapped, a little angry now. ‘I was the second-highest-paid accountant in the United States.’ (pp. 190-191.)

That interview was a good day in the education of Clark Mollenhoff, and he has since done good work in contributing to the education of American voters and taxpayers.

On November 24, 1962 General Dynamics got the TFX contract. One wonders how this could have been, considering:

(1) All four services—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps—expressed a preference for the Boeing plane, technically.

(2) The Boeing plane was $100 million cheaper than General Dynamics in the experimental phase, and was estimated at more than $400 million cheaper on the total contract.

(3) The Pentagon Source Selection Board, a top-level group of generals and admirals, were unanimous in preferring Boeing, both for performance and economy.

In spite of the foregoing facts, Defense Secretary McNamara, supported by Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, Air Force Secretary Eugene Zuckert, and Navy Secretary Fred Korth ruled that General Dynamics should get the contract. Challenged as to why, McNamara replied, essentially: ‘Because!’ The arrogance of this decision was incredible. Indeed, the sheer preposterousness of the thing through shock value, seemed to be a kind of protection. Nobody could quite believe that an allegedly logical man like McNamara would not only make, but doggedly stick to, a decision of such importance without one shred of logic whatsoever to support him. That's what he did, Mollenhoff, in his book Despoilers of Democracy, tells of his own interview of McNamara, who received him in friendly fashion, leading off with flattering references to Mollenhoff’s intellectual capacity. Mollenhoff does have intellectual capacity. He knows when he is getting the run-around. He poured pressure on the Secretary of Defense:

(continued on page 3)
THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FAR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

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The present issue of Intelligence Digest was specially written by a Soviet-trained adviser who has been gathering information for six years. In 1959 he was taken over by the Communists. The "power-house" of West German Government. How far are we really to trust in the "West", build "West" Germany under the shadow of NATO into "the most powerful and prosperous State in Europe", and then "re-unify" the "two" Germanies?

Once Communists seize power, they never let go. Democratic forms are preserved so long as they conceal what is going on behind the scenes; but what is the "power-house" really for? For the use of a "right wing" Government after the swing of the pendulum? Oh no; that would be a revival of Nazism, up with which the Soviets would never put! From now on, the Brezhnev doctrine applies.

This is all so 'legal' that it goes without saying that there is absolutely no pretext for America's use of 'strategic' nuclear weapons. But where does it leave Britain?—Well, nowhere now, except 'peacefully' to go into the Common Market, where the British can come under the computer control of the "power-house".

Mr. Wilson and Herr Brandt are, of course, long-term buddies; they are both international socialists, to whom national boundaries are an anachronism and anathema; but to say so is not the way to win elections while elections are necessary for the sake of appearances. We may be sure that Mr. Wilson knows very well what Herr Brandt and his Soviet trained advisers are up to; whether Mr. Heath does too is another question. If he does not, and is elected to power thinking he can better Mr. Wilson's much publicised "incompetence", he will find himself presiding over Britain's final, and probably disgraceful, downfall. A country cannot pursue a 'national' policy without the means of national defence of that policy, and Britain no longer has that. Herr Wilson has pre-empted Mr. Heath's options—though 'Conservatives' paved the way. So it may very well appear to Mr. Heath that a statesman-like surrender to internationalism, Soviet-style, by "paying the price" (or tribute) of signing the Treaty of Rome is all that is left, since he rejects the arrangement of Wilson for treason which is the only national alternative.

If anyone thinks this is all very theoretical and that it really does not matter, whether or not Britain joins the Common Market, let him reflect that the Common Market is Socialism, and that under fully established Socialism, strikes (or any forms of protest) are political crimes. The overall objective of international socialism is going to be the redistribution of the wealth of the 'exploiting' imperialist nations to help the downtrodden 'underdeveloped' nations (Wilson: "Commodity agreements for temperate foodstuffs must provide the machinery for channelling the overspill of our advanced countries into the hungry countries. But why food only?"). Our advanced countries. Who are 'we'?

In the seventy years of this century the whole world might have advanced, under a benevolent colonialism, towards a general prosperity and freedom. That it has not done so is
due to a conspiracy to establish a permanent World Government. Both world wars, and the depression, and the increasing anarchy of the post war years are all the outcome of this conspiracy. How can anyone suppose that good can come out of so much evil? How can anyone now suppose that an electoral 'victory' for the Conservatives will do anything but cover up still further what has been and is being done, unless the Conservatives are prepared to face up to and expose the conspiracy? Why not expose it now, while they are the 'Opposition'—Her Majesty's loyal Opposition? The present 'British' Government represents the enemy—international socialism, with Germany rapidly becoming its European spearhead, with Soviet backing. Well, if international socialism, which in the last resort is Communism, is not fought, it will win without a fight, as Krushchev predicted.

Almost up to the week of the Munich Crisis of 1938—how long ago that seems, with a new generation grown up that knows nothing of it—people generally could not believe that there could really be war. And just so, even today, people cannot believe that International Communism really does mean to take over the world. But what else can the massive deployment of Soviet forces mean? No country but the U.S.A. could attack Russia; and there has never been any sign that America had any such intention; nor would America permit Germany to re-arm to such an extent as to be able to do so. But it was Stalin who said: "Hitlers come and Hitlers go, but the German people remain". International Socialists like Wilson and Brandt believe in victory for Socialism, including Russian socialism. Victory means disarmament; but equally, disarmament means victory. Kremlin-trained Communists like Wehner do not alter their convictions; they know too many top secrets for their lives to be safe if they did. As Benjamin Gitlow revealed*, a training in the Kremlin is a training in how to take over a country by deception rather than by revolution. Once trained operators have their hands on the levers of power—i.e., in the administrative positions—they have no fear of elections—if they permit them at all. Intelligence Digest's correspondent reports: "What the SPD is doing in Bonn is nothing else but the conspiracy—international socialism, with Germany rapidly becoming its European spearhead, with Soviet backing. Well, if international socialism, which in the last resort is Communism, is not fought, it will win without a fight, as Krushchev predicted.

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(continued from page 1)

Somebody has done some reading—and thinking. World Bank promotion or no World Bank promotion, Robert McNamara cannot in 1968 say as he did in effect in 1962: "I am Sir Oracle, And when I ope my lips let no dog bark!"

The year 1963 was a turning point in many lives, though in the case of Robert Strange McNamara the effect was not yet to be conspicuous. Close-up observers in Washington, such as reporter Clark Mollenhoff, and a few Congressmen, began to learn with the McClellan Committee Hearings, initiated in February 1963, such indigestible facts as these:

(1) By all the ordinary rules of contractor-selection Boeing won the competition with General Dynamics hands down; the Boeing plane was better, it was cheaper, it was more suitable to defense needs.

(2) Secretary McNamara hardly bothered even to allege reasons for his arbitrary selection of General Dynamics, except (a) to cite his own reputation, and (b) to predict long-term savings resulting from "commonality" of parts between the Air Force and Navy versions of the plane—a contention in part purely speculative and in part dependent on a degree of similarity between the two versions which resulted, chiefly because of excess weight, in an inferior Navy plane. The Secretary also implied (c) that General Dynamics' higher bid was more realistic than Boeing's lower one! Thus, what might have been thought a Boeing advantage was turned into a liability. The reason McNamara knew General Dynamics' higher bid was actually more economical than Boeing's lower bid was that he could just tell.

(3) General Dynamics desperately needed a financial windfall; since 1957, when under the late John Jay Hopkins the firm had earned $56 million on sales of $1.7 billion, it had, under placid former Army Secretary Frank Pace, sustained the biggest loss on one project in American corporate history—a loss of $425 million, more than twice as much as Ford Motor Company lost on McNamara's Edsel.

(4) Involved in awarding the life-saving multi-billion-dollar contract was McNamara's Deputy, Roswell L. Gilpatric, a New York lawyer friend of Frank Pace. Gilpatric had represented General Dynamics. His firm, Cravath, Swaine

& Moore, still did. He had quit the firm he said, but the record showed that he was still carried by the firm's group insurance. When, eventually (1964), Gilpatric resigned from the Defense Department he went right back to the law firm.

(5) Also involved in awarding the contract was Fred Korth, a Fort Worth banker whom John Kennedy had named as Secretary of the Navy when John Connally resigned to run for Governor of Texas. Odd facts about Korth: He was, in 1952-53, Assistant Secretary of the Army under the ubiquitous Frank Pace. Though Korth was Kennedy's Secretary of the Navy for nearly two years, his name does not appear in the indexes of Arthur Schlesinger's, Ted Sorenson's, or Pierre Salinger's books on Kennedy. Korth, who plainly knew nothing about naval aviation, overruled his top admirals' analytically documented preference for the Boeing plane, so that he could sign, along with Air Force Secretary Zuckert and Robert McNamara, the award of the contract to General Dynamics. Korth's bank had made a loan of $400,000 to General Dynamics, which loan was outstanding while Korth was deliberating the TFX contract.

The foregoing is the merest suggestion of what came out during Senator McClellan's 1963 investigation of the TFX contract. It became crystal clear that Robert McNamara, supported by Gilpatric, Zuckert, and Korth, had arbitrarily, in defiance of every rational indication of the merits in the case, awarded the biggest contract in history to a firm threatened with bankruptcy, having business and financial ties to Gilpatric and Korth, and—of course—having its Convair plant in Fort Worth in the home state of the then Vice President of the United States.

President Kennedy had said that he saw nothing improper in the handling of the TFX contract award—but at the same time he made it plain enough that the White House had not been directly involved, that the whole deal was handled by the Department of Defense.

Hindsight is easier to acquire than foresight. In the case of the TFX contract the hindsight available in 1968 confirms the foresight which began to dawn on Clark Mollenhoff, Senator McClellan, and a few others in 1965. For we know now that McNamara's decision was not only arbitrary and unreasonable. It was wrong.

From an abundance of documentation available, I take from Science News of October 21, 1967, an article entitled, "The Flying Edsel". Writes science reporter Jonathan Eberhart:

Five years ago, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara overruled his source selection board and picked General Dynamics over Boeing to build the TFX, a jet superfighter now famous—or notorious—as the F-111.... The plane's big advantage was supposed to be that both the Air Force and the Navy could use it.... This, said the Secretary, would save at least $1 billion.... It hasn't worked out that way.

Eberhart reports how Grumman Aircraft, responsible as a General Dynamics co-contractor and subcontractor, objected to the very concept of "commonality" of parts between the Air Force and Navy versions—though "commonality" was the only understandable piece of rationalization which McNamara had offered in support of his otherwise patently bad judgment. The problem was that the Navy needed a lighter plane than the Air Force did—to operate from carriers. But if in the interests of "commonality" the Navy was stuck with various features which the Air Force wanted, then there was no way to get the weight down to a usable level for the Navy. Eberhart quotes Grumman as writing:

The weight savings achievable... are directly proportional to the permissible reduction in airframe commonality, [which Eberhart translates]: 'This airplane is too heavy and it's going to stay that way as long as the Navy has to worry about the Air Force's design limitations.'

Actually, the TFX (Tactical Fighter, Experimental) turned into three planes for production: the F-111A, for the Air Force, the F-111B, for the Navy; and the FB-111, a strategic bomber, to replace the B-52, for heaven's sake! Don't ask why a plane which is already a mess because of attempts to make it serve incompatible purposes as (a) a land, and (b) a sea fighter, is now selected to fulfill also the radically different purpose of strategic bombing.

Meanwhile, all three versions are a continual headache to the military. The Air Force version is apparently least objectionable, but it too has "troubles of its own", according to Eberhart. Its loaded takeoff weight is six tons, or 17 per cent, more than what the contractor had guaranteed. There is a "speed brake" which "vibrates enough to cause buffeting of the aircraft", "improper location of... the center of gravity" has made landing hazardous, and finally—and inevitably—"production schedules have gone completely to pot". The Navy version is at present three years behind schedule—while the Navy's presence in Vietnamese waters is well ahead of schedule. Costs are astronomical. Both Air Force and Navy style F-111's were originally to have come to $2.9 million apiece. The Air Force version is now estimated at $3.5 million (an increase of 21 per cent), the Navy version at a cool $6 million each, or an increase in unit cost of 175 per cent!

(To be continued)