Inside The State Department*

By Susan L. M. Huck

On March twenty-ninth, from 9.30 a.m. onward (and adhering beautifully to schedule), the U.S. Department of State provided foreign policy briefings for representatives of "the media." They winced a little, but they actually admitted a correspondent from The Review Of The News. Oh, even "approved" college newspapers were liberally represented, so it wasn't what you would call exclusive.†

Although some speakers were extraordinarily dull, the briefing was a most interesting experience. We were allowed to hear from, and to question, quite an array of upper-echelon officials, and it's always nice to have a solid grounding in official policy, dreadful as it is.

The wait for the last two speakers had thinned our ranks considerably by late afternoon, and bitter-enders like myself were glassy-eyed. But I was determined to hear what Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, might have to say with respect to Red China.

Mr. Green (the proper honorific is "Ambassador" — once an Ambassador, always an Ambassador), coming on at 4.45 to face an audience frazzled by his predecessors, achieved the difficult feat of getting our attention. The Assistant Secretary of State said he felt like Zsa Zsa Gabor's fifth husband—he knew what was expected of him, but he didn't know how to make it interesting. Then there was something about Red China, the country where the eggs were either too young or too old, and how he had been Ambassador to Australia, New Zealand, and here he was going down under for the third time, so "let's grab the bull by the tail and look the issues square in the face." Oh, Mr. Green is very sophisticated.

I was beginning to wonder who writes his material. But the Assistant Secretary proved so quick with zap replies, and is evidently so noted for his Gatling-gun puns, that the material is probably his own. In the context of the State Department, Marshall Green is a very funny chap. Irrelevant factors like that have been known to warp my judgment. Gay is one thing, funny quite another.

Well, what was in the Assistant Secretary of State's media briefing? Japan, he said, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia are all thundering ahead economically. (Red China was glaringly absent from his list.) East Asian armed forces are twice as large as they were ten years ago. (He seemed to consider this good.) There is a "growing" gap between rich and poor, both between and within Asian nations, and some governments are "too strong," but most are "more pragmatic," and they have lots of wonderful regional conferences. Mr. Green lumped together the late President Syngman Rhee of South Korea and the late Communist dictator Sukarno of Indonesia as types who preferred unity-through-crisis to regional conferences.

I thought that the respective situations of those two men were sufficiently different to make Green look rather foolish. Mr. Rhee saw his country chopped in half by the Glorious Allies of World War II, the northern half clamped under a Soviet puppet Government and driven to aggression against the South. Mr. Rhee was an anti-Communist patriot, and he didn't have to invent his crises! Sukarno, the Farouk of Southeast Asia who expected the State Department to do his procuring for him (nor was he disappointed) while "Liberals" hailed him as "the George 'Washington of Indonesia," was a different case. He had enough real crises floating around, such as his cup of Java overrunneth with Javanese, and his Chinese Communist friends were on the verge of bagging the whole country. Yet Sukarno hoked up a phoney war situation with Malaysia, a neighbor one-tenth his size, as a vehicle for megalomaniac posturings.

Rhee was a devoted patriot, a Princeton Ph.D., and an anti-Communist while Sukarno was a con man, a mass murderer, and a Communist. Rhee had devoted his life to achieving his country's independence from the Japanese, while Sukarno had been a puppet ruler for Japan during World War II. To cite Rhee and Sukarno in the same breath displays alarming ignorance of the sort that not all the wit in Ireland can ameliorate.

Anyway, we soon learned from Mr. Green that "the bipolar world and the Cold War is gone forever," but "the Sino-Soviet rift is a fundamental fault-line on the world's diplomatic crust." (Everything depends on whose polar you buy.) Red China, the Assistant Secretary told us, is moving "from extremism to participation." Japan is the "economic superstar," making problems with its exports to the United States, and making waves about our bases, but both the U.S. and Japan "recognize the imperative of mutual good relations."

"Divided countries" are the trouble. Vietnam and Korea are obvious; Laos and Cambodia are also on Mr. Green's list as "divided." He did not mention that the de facto division

†I learned from one of the college reporters that my alma mater, Syracuse University, had employed its television broadcasting facilities to present Deep Throat to its community of scholars.
of Laos, now about ten years old, was yet another “triumph” of American statesmanship. It was another of the “accomplishments” for which we are expected to revere W. Averell Harriman. His division of Laos was more or less lengthwise. It gave us the part with the politicians, and the Communists the part with the Ho Chi Minh Trail. 

What Mr. Green meant about Cambodia was clarified later on, when an overwrought longhair asked him why we were still bombing civilians in North Vietnam and Laos. Assistant Secretary Green replied that we were not bombing civilians, and that in fact we were not bombing anybody at all in either half of Vietnam or in Laos.

“Well, wherever,” the Youth snapped impatiently. It was clear to me that he grasped propaganda a lot faster than geography, but young longhairs seem to have this trouble with all manner of actual facts.

The bombing is in Cambodia, quoth Green. We bombed in Vietnam and got a cease-fire; we bombed in Laos and got a cease-fire. We don’t have a cease-fire yet in Cambodia, and we won’t get one without bombing, because (in effect) the 25,000 North Vietnamese regulars, plus 30,000 Red Cambodian troops (his figures), will find Cambodia a walkover if we stop.

That, alas, is one way to “reunify” Cambodia—let the Reds have all of it. But we seem to be going for a “divided” Cambodia, as we went for a divided Laos and a divided Vietnam—and now a divided South Vietnam.

Which brings us to the Leopard Spot Solution. This is not a cleaning fluid which gets the spots off leopards, but another “triumph” of State Department diplomacy. As anyone knows who has followed history’s most tiresome war, however perfunctorily, there is this problem of Communist-controlled areas—Leopard Spots—in South Vietnam.*

If you draw a map, however dubious, showing the Spots where the Reds are, and say “now let’s keep it that way,” then you are, of course, dividing Vietnam once more. It’s something like cutting heroin; you “hit” it once, cutting it to 50 percent pure. Hit it again and cut it to 25 percent. And again—12.5 percent. So Vietnam has been “hit”—once in 1954, again (with Leopard Spots) in 1973.

But Mr. Green was sanguine about the Leopard Spot Solution, even though several reporters taxed him about the tens of thousands of casualties which had occurred during the “cease-fire.” (“The standard answer is, “Not to worry, be patient, it’s slackin’ off.”) As I said, Mr. Green is a very funny fellow, and it is just possible that he was kidding, again, when he explained why he was so optimistic about the efficacy of the Leopard Spot Solution. He told us that, in all the history of diplomacy, such a solution had never before worked, so that the least sign of success would be breaking records!

Looking at it in that light, seven thousand reported cease-fire violations in six weeks isn’t bad. There could have been . . . . who knows how many? Seventeen thousand killed in six weeks of “peace with honor”—well, it could have been more, right?

In open questioning, some reporters noted that the notion of “aid” to North Vietnam was not going over well in Congress. Suavely, Mr. Green granted that this was an understandable reaction. But now if the North Vietnamese “live up to the arrangements,” then maybe in a year or two there would be “a persuasive case” to be made for them. He trotted out “humanitarianism” and the binding-up-the-wounds-of-war bit, but after my day-long dose of Statethink, I’ve got to respect Mr. Green for respecting me enough not to trot out that shamelessly phony comparison with Germany and Japan after World War II.

Undersecretary of State Kenneth Rush had subjected us to this, among other indignities, just before lunch. Mr. Rush managed to overlook the fact that Germany and Japan were unconditionally surrendered, fully Occupied, and under military government at the time. That’s just a little different than things are today. A fair comparison would be offering Hitler a couple of billion dollars in 1943.

Undersecretary Rush further invited us tc pity North Vietnam’s leaders! After all, he said, “They’ve been in power for over thirty years, and have known only war.”

Whoever was in charge of the massed violins missed his cue.*

Kenneth Rush had just finished telling us that, although the Soviet Union has been granted by the S.A.L.T. agreement some fifty percent more missiles than the United States, such a situation is “acceptable” because ours are technically superior. He mentioned that the Russians didn’t have M.I.R.V. technology. A reporter in the audience asked whether we were proceeding with our M.I.R.V. program at top speed. Undersecretary Rush replied that “we weren’t going all out at all.” Our progress is “satisfactory.” I then asked in the light of Mr. Nixon’s trade policy if we are in danger of losing this technological lead? I pointed out that such trade includes computer hardware and software and machinery for making precision miniature ball bearings used only in stable platforms of missiles. Mr. Rush, sounding as if he had heard all this before, repeated the old chestnuts that we send the Russians nothing strategic and nothing they cannot get elsewhere. Rush is an accomplished diplomat: He says the most absurd things with a straight face. When in doubt about the answer to a tough question, he simply lies.†

Later I had a similarly pointed question for Mr. Green on Vietnam, but my waving hand went grimly ignored by Mr. Blair of Media Affairs for a solid twenty minutes, all of the time that was remaining in the auditorium session. I believe he had had his fill of my questions. (Frankly, I hadn’t expected to get in more than one shot all day, but I managed three.)

*Mr. Green noted, in response to other questions, that North Vietnam has rejected generous offers of Japanese “aid.” This leads me to suspect that perhaps the U.S. Government had been pressing upon the Communist leadership not only multi-billion-dollar bribes, but courses in ichibana and origami, those harmless Japanese arts of flower-arranging and paper-folding.

†Undersecretary Rush is a former director of the Far Left’s Foreign Policy Association and of the Establishment Insiders’ Council on Foreign Relations.
Later, though, when we were all mellowed by “free”
drinks and more puns, I was able to tell Mr. Green about
my horrible fantasy.

“I keep thinking of Pham van Dong sitting in Hanoi,
and in one hand,” I said, “he is weighing this sort of ‘iffy’ $2.5
billion bribe, and in the other hand, the assessed valuation
of South Vietnam. Suppose he . . . .”

“You’ve hit it exactly on the head,” said Mr. Green,
“That’s exactly what he’s doing right now.”

I was too astonished at having an Assistant Secretary of
State agree with my analysis of anything to press on about
“suppose he decides he’d rather have South Vietnam?” I
suspect that is classified as Thinking the Unthinkable.

And, in regard to Red China, I had both barrels loaded
with double-O buckshot, but never got to fire either one.
Let me first report, however, what Marshall Green had
said about our newfound buddies in Peking. In 1971, he
said, the U.S. and Red China had differing but equally
strong reasons for getting together. What were Red China’s?
Well, he would never try to explain other people’s motivations.
But we thought that somebody had to reach out,
lessen tensions, draw China [sic] into the mainstream. After
all, there are these global problems of “law and order” such
as, he said, “narcotics” and the environment and so on.

Naturally, I had perked up at this mention of the need
to get together with Red China about that little old narcotics
problem. The line has always been, officially, that just about
everybody in Asia peddles dope except Red China. If that
were true, why should we go to all this trouble to discuss a
non-problem? It was undoubtedly a question Mr. Blair of
Media Affairs could see coming. I was never recognized to
ask it.

Timing, Mr. Green said, had been very important. We
couldn’t draw together (for the purpose of mulling over
our private concerns about the heroin business) before 1969
because of the Cultural Revolution, nor could we delay
beyond 1971 “else the clouds move in.” The problem
was to establish “civil discourse.” (With Communists, this
is always a big problem, as they are not much given to it.)
But “we learned to talk the language of Red Chinese
diplomacy,” to “set ideology aside” . . . . “find mutual
interests” “base policies on realism, not legalism” . . . .
“extend the hand of friendship” . . . . “negotiate” . . . .
“compromise.” Mr. Green deemed “smiles and subversion” preferable
to “military Armageddon.” Then he admitted: “Maybe
they want to do us in, for all I know,” but peacefully . . . .

The Assistant Secretary of State was proud to announce
that “by next year, the United States should be [Red]
China’s second largest trading partner.” Trade amounted to
$5 billion in 1971, $150 million in 1972, and between
three and four hundred million so far this year. (Most of our
exports, he said, were in “the agricultural sector”—a Grain
Steal for China, probably, so they don’t feel wounded and
left out by last year’s deal with the U.S.S.R.) Naturally, it
is in the nature of one-way exchange; Red China has “an
enormous appetite” for our products, but squeezing payment
out of that economy was, he said, pretty tough.

As I had occasion to note two years ago, when writing
about the then almost unthinkable but nonetheless pending
sale of Boeing 707’s to Red China, there is not a great deal
they can export to us other than that officially unmentionable
product, heroin. There is a limit to the market for Chinese
delicacies, handicrafts, human hair, yak-tails for Santa Claus
beards, and so on.

So my double-barreled load of questions about Red China
involved 1) the nature of our discussions with Red China
about narcotics, and then 2) I had one about what a
Congressional Committee has called The Human Cost
Of Communism In China. The State Department’s information
packet for this briefing included the latest version of State’s
Red China booklet, this one dated October 1972. I was some-
what surprised to find that it retained a remark or two
which provided at least food for thought on “The Human
Cost” of Mao’s dictatorship. It is presented in the context
of “the China population game,” as the game of guesstimating
the number of Chinese is called. There are two pages on
this, which do not exhaust the subject. Consider:

In September, 1961, Mao told Viscount Montgomery
that the annual growth in the registered population had
slowed from 15 million (1955-57) to 10 million as a
result of “Great Leap” hardships . . . .
Population increase, of course, represents excess of births
over deaths. A lower increase means either fewer births, or
more deaths, or both. Now read on:

During the early 1960’s, Peking began to distrust
the registration figures [of population]. Chinese
demographers noted that registration figures appeared to
show that the decline in growth during the “Great
Leap” hardships resulted from a decrease in births
rather than an increase in deaths. This development
was considered to be unlikely. The demographers con-
cluded that the commune leaders deliberately concealed
deaths in order to show larger populations and to re-
duce the amount of grain they were obliged to deliver
to the government.

As a result of “an intensive check” of population, the boys
at State admit, the Red Chinese Government came up with
figures “which imply that the population was set back by
40-50 million persons in the Great Leap hardships.”

Congressional data indicate that twenty years of Com-
munist dictatorship may have resulted in 65 million politi-
cally-caused deaths. The Great Leap (nobody says Forward
any more) refers only to a period of about four years when
famine and other good things were spread around liberally.
This, of course, was followed almost immediately by another
form of dementia, the Cultural Revolution, which also
cost a lot of lives, but which specialized in intense
psychological cruelties and perversions. (continued on page 8)

A firsthand description of that experiment in government-sponsored
insanity can be found in Ken Ling’s The Revenge Of Heaven
THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas.

The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and abroad, post free: One year £2.50 (52/·), Six months £1.30 (26/·).

OFFICES:
Business: 245 Camil Hall Road, Leytonstone, London. E.11. Tel. 01-534 7265
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IN AUSTRALIA—
Business: Box 2318, C.P.O., Melbourne, Victoria 3001
Editorial: Box 3266, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W. 2001 (Editorial Head Office)

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Vol. 53. No. 3

FROM WEEK TO WEEK

June, 1973

The late C. H. Douglas once wrote to the effect that the outbreak of World War One awaited the setting-up of the Federal Reserve Board in the U.S.A. The skullduggery surrounding this establishment has been described in Gary Allen's The Naked Capitalist. The background to the war is the continuing expansion and deployment of existing European civilisation with a view to replacing it with a Socialist or Communist order (it could hardly be called civilisation).

This is the setting of the Watergate scandal which is receiving such huge publicity.

The effective government of the U.S.A. is largely centred in the Council on Foreign Relations, and it is largely a matter of indifference which Party is nominally in power or what candidate becomes President. The secrets of all Parties are known to the C.F.R., and the idea that additional information of any significance could be obtained by bugging is quite untenable. The present time the C.F.R. and its associated institutions—the international financial institutions, the Foundations, the Inner Communist Party and the Fabian Society and its derivatives—are all-powerful, appointing and removing officials in and out of government to further its purposes. The only thing that can bring this situation to an end is wide-spread public recognition of the fact of conspiracy on a much deeper level than such a caper as the Watergate affair, followed by reform of the financial system by decentralising the initiative which at present inheres in the centralised control of credit-issue.

Against this background it can be seen that the Watergate scandal is a massive attack to discredit what remains of true Republicanism—balance, powers of government—in the U.S.A., to prepare the way for Communist-type government (whatever name it eventually goes under) on a world scale by the fusion of like-type governments internationally. Robert Welch sums up the matter in the John Birch Society Bulletin for May, 1973: "The whole episode has blossomed out with such deadly precision, and in such an inequitable manner, to do Nixon the greatest possible damage, that it is hard to ignore the possibility of the melodrama having been plotted, and carried out brilliantly at the proper speed for the greatest effect, by spies among spies."

And all this is occurring in the context of a visibly approaching universal economic crisis, precipitated by inflation which could be reversed by mere book-keeping methods.

The key to this aspect of the situation is persistence in monetary policies which are, and in the highest quarters are known to be, entirely artificial. And the other major factor in the situation is the continued expansion and deployment of Red Army forces grossly beyond the requirements for the defence of 'Russia'. They are the international police of the projected One Socialist World of Commissars and lumpenproletariat.

Do you really think otherwise?

Will America Surrender?*

This is a great book. Though I am frequently enthusiastic about books, I don't know when I have previously in these columns called a new book great. I thought a long time about it before I so classified this one. "Colloquially, we say things are great when they so much as pleasantly excite us, but a book should not be called great unless it unites superior intellect and profound emotion in a message of universal importance, conveyed in a style which of itself testifies to the origin of the message in the mind and heart of an author speaking from experience. By such a criterion, Slobodan M. Draskovich's Will America Surrender? qualifies as a great book.

Perhaps I am influenced in my judgment—but I don't know why I should not be so influenced—by the fact that as I write Secretary of State William Rogers has just urged that the United States pay what amounts to war reparations to North Vietnam. Predictably, such a payment will be made. The significance will be less in the amount (though who knows how much that may ultimately be?) than in the symbolic admission of U.S. defeat and surrender to Communism—a surrender the terms of which are apparently now being discussed (this is three days after Rogers' plea that we pay North Vietnam at least $2 billion). Predictably, such a payment will be made.

reparation(s) as "compensation in money or materials payable by a defeated nation for damages to or expenditure sustained by another nation as a result of hostilities with the defeated nation"), the stupendous fact of America's surrender to Communism in Vietnam is manifest in our withdrawal from a theatre of war where the enemy who has defeated us remains. Our only consolation is that certain prisoners of war have been returned—in itself a wonderful blessing, but one scarcely mitigating the fact of the surrender. (We returned German P.O.W.s after World War II.) Indeed, the return of our prisoners of war from North (and from South) Vietnam reminds us of the fifty thousand dead or missing in action who will never return, and emphasizes the question of why they were ever there in the first place, since it was evidently not to fight Communism—or not to fight it with any intention of winning, as might have been done at any time.

Could it be that the Vietnam War was intended to have the result which it did have—which is to say, to gain recognition for the Communist Vietcong in South Vietnam, and unite with them Communist forces from North Vietnam? But the even greater result is to have demonstrated in the eyes of the world the apparent futility of American military opposition to Communism. Anywhere, for if we could not win in Vietnam, where could we win? This demonstration was arranged on the American side by the "Liberal" Establishment. Nothing is more important to bear in mind than that every Secretary of State since General Marshall, every Secretary of Defense since General Marshall, and every advisor on National Security since McGeorge Bundy, has had the same attitude toward Communism—which is, to confront it, and then to yield, to surrender.

There has been, to borrow a phrase, not a dime's worth of difference between the Rusk-Rostow-McNamara combination of the Kennedy Administration and the Rogers-Kissinger-Laird combination of the Nixon Administration—except the mildly confusing difference that the Kennedy team, which was thought to be by nature the more "Liberal" and dovish, escalated the war, while the Nixon team, considered to be more Conservative and hawkish, carried out the retreat and surrender. Yet the essential continuity is not in doubt. Henry Kissinger, the current man of the hour in the Nixon Administration, established himself as an expert in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations.

The foregoing reflections are my own, and to the best of my recollection represent my thinking as it was even before I read Doctor Draskovich's book. (I'm boasting.) But I understand my own thoughts better since reading Will America Surrender? And am confirmed in my Birchole views. I was much struck to read in the February Bulletin of The John Birch Society, which arrived as I was in the midst of preparing for this review, Robert Welch's identification of the instruments of Communism as "War—Money—Hatred." I had just finished Draskovich's chapter on The Nature Of-Communism," which has the subheadings: Power, War, Hatred. I have myself written elsewhere that the great commandment of Marxism-Leninism is, like so much Communist doctrine, an inversion of Christian teaching. Lenin in effect taught: "Thou shalt hate God, and thy neighbor as thyself." I suppose it is the inherent sadomasochism which attracts "Liberals" to Communism.

It would be very difficult for a "Liberal" intellectual to read the Draskovich book. Not that it is hard to understand. It is easy to understand. Not that "Liberal" intellectuals are stupid. They are generally intelligent and often brilliant. How is it, then, that such a possibly brilliant person might be unable to read so lucid and self-explanatory a book? Simply because—since it is lucid and self-explanatory—reading it would make impossible any further self-deception of the kind to which "Liberals" are accustomed, on which—as a junkie on dope—they are dependent. Slobodan Draskovich could have said to all "Liberals" what Hamlet said to his mother:

"Come, come, and sit you down;
you shall not budge;
You go not till I set you up a glass
Where you may see the innermost part of you.

Who wants such a mirror? Certainly tripping "Liberals" don't.

I don't like to say this, but it often looks as if ordinary Americans don't want, any more than do the "Liberals," to see themselves as they are, or their situation as it is. I for one once thought that there would be a widespread reaction against Richard Nixon for his pilgrimage first to Peking and then to Moscow. Instead, those journeys seem to have made him popular—for the first time. He was known as Tricky Dick until he consummated the great betrayal by the dirtiest trick of all. And there is no use saying the people excuse Nixon by putting the blame on Kissinger. They apparently like Kissinger!

The tragic fact is that on the record to date the answer to the question, "Will America Surrender?" is: Probably, yes. The saving grace is that we do live in a changing world, and among the things that can change are (1) the neurotic death wish of the "Liberals," (2) the stunned-ox reflexes of Middle America, and (3) the luck of the Insiders (which consists largely of (1) and (2)).

Doctor Draskovich, who does not use the term Insiders, but whose cogent analysis does not exclude the appropriate use of such a term, sets forth the contemporary world situation basically as follows:

Communism "is and has been from the beginning (the Communist Manifesto, 1848) an ideology, pseudo-science and political movement to destroy existing society and world order and to install communist dictatorship throughout the whole world." (I take it that this does not exclude recognition of the fact that the Communist movement, as it took shape in 1848, had a series of predecessors. Otherwise, there would never have occurred, as there did occur, the rash of European revolutions, or attempted revolutions, in 1848. There would have been no previous French Revolution.)

As to the nature of the proposed Communist dictatorship—"dictatorship of the proletariat"—Draskovich quotes Lenin:

"The scientific concept dictatorship, means neither more nor less than unlimited power resting directly on force, not limited by anything, not restricted by any laws or any absolute rules. Nothing else but that."
Emphatically, Slobodan Draskovich repeats in his own paraphrase of Lenin: "Total global power, unrestricted by law, for an unlimited time, is communism."

Under the heading Communism Is Permanent War, Draskovich writes: "Part of the necessary understanding of the essence of communism is the understanding that such an ambitious goal could not be achieved simply and easily. The total destruction of a society and the seizure and exercise of total power for an indefinite time could obviously be achieved only through a permanent total struggle-war—in all fields, against that society . . . The birth of the communist movement was a declaration of war on existing society and world order."

Prosecution of such long-term and far-flung war requires a clear, firm strategy and powerful motivation. Considering those in reverse order, Draskovich writes:

To wage the difficult and complicated permanent war for world power, it was obviously necessary to possess, to be able to draw upon some very powerful and replenishable, explosive emotional fuel . . . .

The communists have thought of that and they have found the answer: hatred. All the "science" of Marxism-Leninism, all its practice, all its policies are imbued with this powerful passion . . . .

And not only in the USSR but in all communist-dominated countries, hatred is the central emotional motive around which all education is built . . . .

The public in the West is exposed to less propaganda of hatred against communism in one whole year than the communist powers (from the Soviet Union to Albania) ladle out to their own people and the world in one hour [against everything "bourgeois"].

Before noting salient features of Communist strategy for gaining total power through surrender by its enemies, we need clarification as to what Draskovich means by "surrender." He means more than formal military surrender. Formal military surrender may be made without final surrender by a nation of its nationhood. Draskovich reminds us that the German surrender at the end of World War I, the Japanese surrender at the end of World War II, and the Communists' own surrender to the Germans at Brest Litovsk prior to the end of World War I in the West, did not mean the end of sovereign independence for any of those parties. In each case, military surrender meant a breathing space at the end of a round. Determination to continue corporate existence was still there.

"On the other hand," Draskovich continues, "history is full of real surrenders of nations too weak to assert themselves, too naive to understand political reality and international life, too spoiled by a good life and loose morals to muster the strength to discipline themselves, to face and defeat their enemies and set their house in order. In most cases, there was no formal surrender. There was simply no longer the will to live, the determination to fight, the pride to assert one's identity against foreign enemies, the noble ambition to be worthy of the ancestors and the responsibility to prepare a better future for the coming generations."

That kind of surrender is national suicide. It is the kind about which Draskovich is, and all Americans should be, concerned. The surrender which the Nixon Administration has made, is making, in Vietnam is intrinsically shameful, since in the name of "Peace with Honor" it brings neither peace nor honor; but in itself it is not an irretrievable disaster.

We wondered at the outset of this review whether it might not be too late to ask a question which, like the one in the title of this book, has in a sense already been answered. But Draskovich's explanation as just quoted clears up this matter. We have not made the final surrender, and no Administration can make it, if the determination to preserve American independence is kept alive in American hearts.

Whether that will be, who can say? I have admitted above some doubt. I would put it this way: The American people will not surrender to a foreign enemy, but they may surrender to the "Liberal" Establishment which will surrender to a foreign enemy. To sharpen that a bit, the "Liberals" have in their minds and hearts surrendered to the Communists—that is, they have resolved not to resist Communism on any vital issue, but to fight anti-Communism without mercy; and the American people have surrendered to the Establishment—that is, they continue to believe that the experts in Washington and New York and Cambridge, Massachusetts, know what they are doing and would not actually sell out the United States. So long as this attitude continues, the selling out of the United States will continue—passing the point of no return who knows when? This paragraph is my wording, not Draskovich's, but I think it is consistent with the thrust of his book.

All such gloomy analyses raise the question whether we are not ourselves aiding and abetting Communist propaganda by making the triumph of Communism seem inevitable. Certainly the doctrine of the inevitable triumph of Communism is a major feature, perhaps the major feature, of Communist propaganda. But the fact that the triumph of Communism is not inevitable is what makes the present possibility of its triumph over America so tragic. It is not tragic when an old man dies, full of years and in honor. It is not tragic when a young man dies in a hazardous and honorable exploit. It is not even tragic, though it is heart-rending, when "the good die young," for they die in beauty. But it is tragic when man, woman, or nation, in the fullness of legitimate power, comes to an untimely death through willful, rash, or otherwise fatal error. There is no need for America to surrender and die. Yet that is what will happen if we do not take up the challenge and destroy Communism before it destroys us.

The crux of the matter is the will to survive. Essential in an individual, such a will is even more obviously essential in a nation. Since will and mind are inextricably interrelated, the Communist war on America is first of all a campaign for control of the American mind.

In this campaign they have been devastatingly successful. The majority accept as mainly true what they learn through the media, the media disseminate news and views in accordance with Establishment policy, Establishment policy is determined ultimately on the basis of optional opinions formulated by experts trained in the universities, the universities are dominated by certain ideas that are regarded as
axiomatic, including: (1) that mankind is, or ought to be, one, that wars should cease, that all divisions of mankind into races or nations which might be severally capable of making war should be ended, (2) that man is his own master and can through knowledge achieve perfection if only men are perfectly united, (3) that such union requires leadership with global authority, (4) that past failure to achieve unity and perfection indicates that a social revolution is required. Many different propositions may be derived from such ideas accepted as axioms, and not all doctrine so derived is Communist doctrine. But it is all more compatible with Communism that it is with anti-Communism.

The very fact that the Communists are trying to conquer the world shows that they prize unity. That they profess to be agents, not of any one nation or race, but of "scientific socialism" and "history," means that on American campuses their theory at least is tentatively acceptable, and since they insist that they unite theory and practice (in spite of flagrant instances to the contrary) they are accorded a patient if not always sympathetic hearing. In contrast, whatever is recognized as emanating from (say) The John Birch Society is generally ignored or dismissed with disdain.

Into the situation as I have attempted to describe it in the last few paragraphs (and I have digressed somewhat from simply summarizing Draskovich) the Communists have introduced massive propaganda organized around four great shibboleths—and here I return to Doctor Draskovich's analysis: 1. Peace. 2. United Nations. 3. Anti-Colonialism. 4. Coexistence. The importance of each of these in the advance of Communism may be briefly indicated.

1. Peace, employed as a mindlessly repetitive slogan, implies that the great danger to mankind is war, not Communism. Indeed, since in the special meanings which words acquire Peace means Communism, while anti-Communism means fascism, imperialism (last stage of capitalism) and war, a severe danger to mankind arises when anti-Communists go to war, but peace is protected when Communists go to war.

2. The United Nations, having been founded as an anti-fascist organization after the defeat of the Axis Powers, is by definition properly a pro-Communist organization. The favored position of the Soviet Union, which has three votes, while no other "nation" has more than one, emphasizes that like other united fronts with Communism the U.N. can function only in favor of Communism and never against it.

3. Before the Second World War the principal enemy of Communism (from their point of view) was not the United States, but the British Empire. Other empires were also targets. Thus Anti-Colonialism became for a time the principal war cry for peace. (It is now in part superseded by, in part dovetailed with, the Struggle Against Racism.) The United States was sucked in to support this slogan by being reminded that the original States had once been Colonies. Even American Conservatives have seldom noted the equivocation in such a reminder, an equivocation most bitterly ironic in the case of Algeria. The late John F. Kennedy, as Senator and President, supported the Algerian rebels against the French, invoking as he did so our own "colonial" past, and overlooking or ignoring completely the fact that George Washington and our other Revolutionary forefathers were historical parallels, not of the Algerian rebels, but of the French colons (colonials), whose slogan was Algerie Francaise! American Patriots of 1776 fought for their rights as freeborn Englishmen. The Algerian rebels paralleled the Red Indians, who ignored the fight between Washington and George III, or often sided with the latter. (That is a digression, but I trust not wholly irrelevant.)

4. Draskovich writes of Co-existence:

The "dialectical" catch in the device of coexistence, which the West satiately ignored, although the communists never concealed it, was that it concerned military war, but not political warfare, not subversion. So, it pledged the free world to coexist with communism, which meant to accept its existence as a final unalterable fact of international life, but it did not pledge communism to coexist with the free world!

Draskovich identifies in basic Communist strategy the concept of "maximal" and "minimal" programs. The former means the overthrow of the existing capitalist order and establishment of the Communist dictatorship; the latter means the tasks of Communists prior to the time when the maximal program becomes feasible. The four-point scheme of Peace, United Nations, Anti-Colonialism, and Coexistence—which became the Communist minimal program following World War II and the establishment of satellite regimes in Central Europe, was also, Draskovich points out, "to become the U.S. foreign policy program to stop communism and save freedom in the world!"

I had hoped to give you a fuller account of the substance of this remarkable book. There is a chapter on Vietnam written in 1968 which is as valid today as when it was written. It seems more valid, because even those with less insight than Doctor Draskovich can now hardly fail to see that he was right. There is an excellent treatment of the problem of "Liberalism." Not that he entirely clears that up. I don't know how one could. The "Liberals" engineered the acceptance of Communism, though they must know that Communism means the end of "Liberalism." Of course, among the "Liberals" are Insiders, and the top (generally crypto) Communists are Insiders. There remain many "Liberals" who are just "Liberals." Draskovich writes:

It is the alienation of the liberals from reality and public responsibility, and the helpless submission to Marxist versions of reality and "correct" policies, which is at the basis of the Great Society, of the travesty of foreign aid, of the "war on poverty," of the breakdown of law and order, of the elevation of the criminal element of society as the main benefactor of the rule and concern of the protection of the law, of the barbarization of American universities and the rest.

Doctor Draskovich offers a solution, which is at once simple and yet strong enough to support a complex program of our own. It is national "self-assertion," the simple determination, expressed in governmental policy (it would have popular support), of maintaining American interests and American independence against all enemies foreign and domestic. So far from being "selfish," this is our national duty. A nation is not an individual, but an entity of which the purpose is to benefit first its own citizens—and all others
as far as consistent with that original self-protection. A President who gives away interests of his own country without return is not being generous, but unfaithful to his trust. He is worse than a bank president who gives away all the assets of his bank. No personal generosity is involved.

Doctor Draskovich, a distinguished Serb by birth, is keenly aware that Yugoslavs, Poles, Hungarians, and other people of Central Europe, and also Russians, Ukrainians, and people of Eastern Europe, are not in general Communists, but are themselves the slaves of Communism. They would be the first to hail a vigorous anti-Communist policy of the United States, but if we continue to keep in power Administrations which cooperate with the Communist masters of China and Russia, the billion people under Communist regimes, now our potential allies, will grow bitterly disillusioned and become our enemies. Thus, danger to the United States consists not in offending the Communist Governments of Russia and China, but actually in not offending them, and so condemning all whom they have subjugated.

I said at the outset that this is a great book. The greatness of a book can never be conveyed, though it can be remarked in a review. The author of Will America Surrender writes with authority—the authority of knowledge, knowledge gained both academically (his doctorate, magna cum laude, is from the University of Munich) and from experience. His father, Milorad Draskovich, who served in the Cabinet of Serbia before 1918 and that of Yugoslavia after 1918, was in 1921 assassinated by a Communist. He resides in Chicago, and edits a Serbian newspaper with a worldwide circulation.

There is repetition in the book. There should be. It takes prolonged and repeated knocking to wake the narcotized. Like any great work, Will America Surrender is a poem, and poems involve deliberate repetition. There are two beneficial consequences of this: (1) if you are fortunate enough to be able to read the whole thing, you will have driven home to your mind the irrefutable truths of the present struggle for the world, (2) if you only dip into the book at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end, you will still gain new and powerful insight into the nature of the present world crisis. Draskovich writes on the last page:

With the present U.S. foreign policy, there is no hope for the U.S. Anybody (e.g. North Vietnam) can beat us, the mightiest power ever.

If, however, we decide to fight, rejecting surrender and waging our political war for freedom, nobody can beat us. Not one of them and not all of them together. For all our energies will be brought to life and mobilized, and the whole world will be with us.

To the many longtime subscribers to American Opinion who may be tempted to say, This is an old story, I say: Read it! You’ve seldom heard it so good.

—Medford Evans.

**WILL AMERICA SURRENDER?**

Orders for Will America Surrender for delivery in approximately two months will be accepted by K.R.P. Publications Ltd. The price will be £5 including postage.

**Inside the State Department** (continued from page 3)

These figures, remember, relate to the activities of a Government to which Mr. Nixon has extended the hand of friendship, whose language he has learned to talk, diplomatically speaking. As a card-carrying extremist, I hate to see a major portion of our foreign policy based upon overlooking the record of those guilty of such peccadilloes as murdering the equivalent of the entire American population west of the Mississippi. But I never had a chance to ask Mr. Green about that, either.

Altogether, it was quite a day. I returned home just in time for a remarkable TV dramatization of the Pueblo story, one which was aired by the American Broadcasting Company, and which hewed closely to the facts, the testimony, and the emotional aspects of that tragic, sickening, disgraceful episode. (Mr. Green had mentioned that the Pueblo incident was an occasion on which we had, after all, “avoided war.” He noted gravely that “there were 700,000 troops confronting each other in Korea.” By doing absolutely nothing about the capture of the Pueblo and torture of her crew . . . )

After that came the eleven o’clock news, and the first officially permitted descriptions of North Vietnamese tortures inflicted upon our prisoners of war. In many cases, the purpose of these inhuman measures was to secure a “statement” to be used by vicious people here at home—under a government which protected them from the consequences of public outrage!

Any time American TV so much as mentions Communist atrocities it is a remarkable day. Combine it with ten hours of nose-to-nose contact with State Department brass and you have really had an experience!

My mind went back to a warm, jolly little anecdote—I forget who related it, but probably Assistant Secretary Green—about Henry Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in Moscow last May. It seems that so many copies of so many agreements and whatnot were needed that the Xerox machine at the Embassy broke down. So Kissinger appeared at some palace or other in the Kremlin with one of these papers we had not been able to reproduce, and stood there talking to Gromyko while holding it, face up, on top of his head. Gromyko, it appears, finally bit and asked him what he was doing. Kissinger is said to have replied that the Xerox was broken down, but that he figured on getting good enough copies from the spy-cameras in the ceiling. Gromyko, chuckling warmly (oh, try to imagine it) said not to be so certain—after all, they had been installed under Ivan the Terrible.

Isn’t that sweet? Whatever happens, these fellows are floating around palaces, nibbling caviar and escargot, making their little jokes. At worst, they have to put up with rudeness and boredom. Little wonder so many of them strain themselves trying to be gay.

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Printed by Circular Press Limited, Colwyn Bay.