Perhaps the proper study of Watergate begins A.D. 687, when Pepin of Heristal, Austrasian mayor of the palace, defeated the nobles of Neustria at Tertry and made himself master of the Franks (except in Aquitaine), while permitting the Merovingian dynasty to keep the royal title another sixty-four years. In 751 his grandson Pepin the Short, father of Charlemagne, with the cooperation of the pope, Saint Zacharias, forced the last Merovingian (Childeric III) into a monastery, and had himself proclaimed king.

You don't have to remember all those names and dates (which I just looked up in an encyclopedia). But you can bet that Henry Kissinger, himself a native of the land known in Frankish days as Austrasia, would know them like the back of his hand. Henry is a mayor of the palace if there ever was one. Almost certainly he reenacts the role of Pepin of Heristal, who merely turned the office to decisive practical advantage, not of Pepin the Short, whose diplomacy eventually secured his own coronation with the diadem of legitimacy.

"Mayor of the palace" is defined in Webster's unabridged as "an official under the Frankish kings who originally was the chief officer of the royal household, later prime minister, and under the later Merovingians practically sovereign." Can you imagine a better analogue of the office of Henry A. Kissinger? Well, possibly, you can, since no analogy is perfect, but I believe this one will serve to make the following point about Watergate, which frankly I believe is the most essential point to be made:

Forget the cries of weary Watergate-watchers and of royal Richard himself that the great affairs of the nation have been neglected as the Hearings have worn on through an inglorious summer. The great affairs of the nation have never been pursued with more revolutionary dispatch. Specifically, important commitments have evidently been made regarding U.S. relations with Soviet Russia, with Red China, and with Western Europe. These commitments are intended to bring about that merger of the "super-powers" (including Red China), the Common Market, and possibly Japan, which has been so long contemplated by the Insiders of the international Establishment.

While the matter is obviously not yet subject to proof, and I hope will never be proved, it remains alarmingly probable that 1973 has seen unprecedented advances toward revolutionary liquidation of national independence, and establishment of a World Government with a nuclear monopoly. Prerequisite to any such advance would be concealment of operations, plus diversion of public attention from matters too great to be wholly concealed.

Programs such as those labelled "Disarmament" and "Trade" are too vast to be entirely hidden, but if the public is discouraged from thinking seriously about them they can be effectively distorted into the appearance of programs for "Peace." Much of the desired discouragement can be achieved through emphasis of technical aspects, tempting the citizenry in general to feel that it might as well leave such matters to the experts. Yet there are experts around who are not in on the plot, and who have great gifts of clear exposition. I am thinking, for example, of Anthony Sutton, the country's leading authority on Soviet industry's debt to Western technology. If general public discussion should develop, as it might well do were there a prolonged "great debate" on the subject in Congress, many more Americans might come to realize the liaison between "Trade and Treason" which Elder Ezra Taft Benson, former U.S. Secretary of Agriculture, has more than once revealed from the platform and in print.

The Insiders cannot entirely prevent discussion of the dangers of trade with Russia and Red China, but they must keep such discussion to a minimum or their plans for merger will be exposed. Similarly with SALT, the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks; similarly with the conference in Vienna on "Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction," and the "European Security Conference" in Helsinki. President Nixon complained in his televised address to the nation on August fifteenth that the Watergate Hearings had interrupted such truly momentous affairs as those talks and conferences and deals. The Hearings have interrupted nothing, but they have concealed or diverted attention a great deal.

The President's own role in the great World Government enterprise is ambiguous. Certainly by his trips to Peking and Moscow he forwarded that enterprise more dramatically than any "Liberal" politician, intellectual, or journalist could have done. It is possible that he was grabbing for personal control of the contemplated World Government. It is also possible (likely even) that he remains an outsider to the inner circle of the Insiders, however much he may now be their captive.

Consider that, from the point of view of those who wish to bring about the merger of Russia and America, the President of the United States presents a peculiar problem. On the one hand, his agreement in principle with what they want to do, and his official sanction of their program in one guise or another, are of enormous assistance to them if not indispensable. On the other hand, once such agreement and

sanction are obtained, his active presence in their counsels would be at best an embarrassment, at worst an occlusion of their own total control.

Where the purpose is a rapprochement between the United States and the Communist world, nothing could be more helpful than to have such a move formally initiated by a President of the United States who had originally become famous as a vigorous anti-Communist; yet nothing could be more inconvenient or cause greater perturbation of mind than for sincere pro-Communists to be subjected to prolonged daily association, and forced cooperation, with such a person. To be subjected to his authority would be unthinkable.

The Insiders' solution of this dilemma seems to have been brilliant. By one means and another, Richard Nixon was induced to go to Peking and Moscow in 1972, inaugurating an era of conciliation with Communism. Then, largely by securing (through bipartisan means, it appears) the Democratic nomination for the very unpopular George McGovern, a landslide re-election victory for Nixon was produced, which could be, and was, interpreted as a mandate for further conciliation of Communism, though, actually—since so many Nixon voters were motivated by fear of McGovern's New Left image—it amounted to the opposite kind of mandate. But the interpretation which Nixon himself, and those personally closest to him, began to assert was a mandate for the President to do whatever he wanted to do. The Insiders seemed, as of late 1972 and early 1973, to have created in Richard Nixon a Frankenstein's monster. The Watergate Challenge was organized to cut this monster down to size, and has rather effectively done so.

At the same time, Watergate is busy work (as teachers call chores they assign just to keep children out of mischief) for the President, the Senate Committee (with inevitable repercussions throughout the rest of the Congress), and the American public. As a result of such busy work, Richard Milhous Nixon has had scant time to keep abreast of developments at the international military conferences in Vienna, Helsinki, and Geneva (SALT II), or of "progress" in Russo-American, and Sino-American, trade. The President must feel the pressure of this situation, and knowing that he will be held accountable for results, is understandably anxious to get back to the reports in his In-basket on Geneva, Vienna, and the others.

So what has been happening in the big world while Richard Nixon has been busy at the Watergate and Henry Kissinger has been minding the store? Perhaps we know most about the new Communist customers that Kissinger—possibly on the advice of rich friends, such as David Rockefeller—has put on the books for a pretty steep line of credit. Since "Rocky" means Nelson, we might call David "Hard Rock." (Hard on American taxpayers, not the Soviets.) He was interviewed recently by U.S. News & World Report and reportedly said, among other things: "It is really only since the initiatives of President Nixon with Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin that some of the serious stumbling blocks, obstacles to trade, have been eliminated. That accounts for the sudden pickup in activity."

David Rockefeller's Chase Manhattan Bank has lent the Kremlin $86 million to help build the Kama River truck plant. Hard Rock trusts the Politburo so completely that the loan was made without a guarantee by the U.S. Government. However, the Export-Import Bank, which is the U.S. Government, has furnished a matching $86 million for the same truck plant. You have three guesses as to which loan gets paid first, if either gets paid at all. Notice that Hard Rock gives President Nixon full credit (but not $86 million worth) for the "sudden pickup" in Soviet-American trade. That is very modest of Hard Rock, as it is widely believed that he has great influence with Mr. Nixon in such matters. It is even more widely believed that he has great influence with Mr. Kissinger, a sometime employee of the Council on Foreign Relations, of which Hard Rock is Chairman of the Board. One senses that, despite his bow to President Nixon, David Rockefeller feels much more secure to have Nixon pre-occupied with Watergate and Kissinger on top of the international trade ball, than he would feel if the roles of those two were reversed.

David Rockefeller is not the only one to give President Nixon nominal credit for our new friendly intercourse with the men in the Kremlin. In the Wall Street Journal of August eighth, Ray Vicker reported from Moscow that "in the 12 months ending last June [i.e., June 1973], about 3,000 U.S. businessmen visited here, in connection with possible commercial transactions. And since the recent meeting between Soviet Communist Party Chief Leonid Brezhnev and President Nixon in the U.S., the trade pace has accelerated." Elsewhere in the Wall Street Journal article we read that "trade nearly tripled to $742 million in 1972 from the 1971 figure" and that "Soviet purchases from the U.S. for all this year [1973] are estimated at $1.4 billion [i.e., about twice the 1972 figure], about $1 billion of that in agricultural products." Noticed your grocery bill lately?

But surely there is a quid pro quo! Oh yes, and observe in what ratio. "Soviet exports to the U.S.," says the Journal, "will be about $100 million." They buy $1,400 million from us, we buy $100 million from them. I suppose that will be counted somewhere as a favourable trade balance. What it will mean in practice will not be known until we see how much of the $1,300 million that's on the cuff they will actually pay for. Right now, at any rate, the skies are blue in Moscow. Reports the Journal's Vicker:

... Soviet officials are optimistic ... "The trade potential between the Soviet Union and America is substantial," says Nikolai N. Smelyakov, deputy minister for foreign trade. He adds: "And we are experiencing no difficulties at all in obtaining credits for our trade."

Last I heard, by the way, the Russians do not have to pay even the prime interest rate given the most favored borrowers over here. No wonder that, as the Journal observes, "Soviet-U.S. trade is lopsided, with the Russians doing much of the buying and comparatively little selling." There follow some rather inane speculations by experts as to the reason for this. What further reason is needed than that the Russians can buy from us on credit in a market where we have no way to force collection short of war, which is "unthinkable"? So far from our being able to foreclose if they default, the whole thing is likely to work out to where the delinquent Russian debtor will foreclose on the stupid American creditor.
Antony Sutton, in a brilliant article in *Human Events* (August 18, 1973), points out American vulnerability in the case of the Siberian natural gas project, where we would build a pipeline across the Eurasian continent on Russian territory, and they would pay for it by supplying us with gas. Sutton comments:

**OK, but what happens if détente turns to crisis? What happens if the Soviets get peeved about American Jews complaining about Russian Jews? Simple! The Soviets close off the gas valves and Uncle Sam is left high and dry without gas.**

Now look at the other side of the picture. Can we close off our technology exports to the USSR? No. The equipment is already installed, on credit, with U.S. Ex-Im [Export-Import Bank] loans and guarantees (and probably unpaid for). So the Soviets get the technology and we get a debt subsidized and guaranteed by the taxpayer.

Sutton adds—and *Human Events* prints in boldface: “In other words, the Siberian natural gas proposal is absurd on economic grounds, on political grounds, on national security grounds and even on grounds of plain old common sense.”

Yet the U.S. businessmen who seem thus to walk into a trap are not fools. Not according to their own (weird strobe lights). These men doubtless believe in all sincerity that before the loan come due the Soviet Government and the U.S. Government will be fully merged, and there will then be between them no national security problems. These are highly intelligent men. And they will even extol openly the idea of One World in which national boundaries have disappeared. Sincere or not, however, because they are intelligent they do not want you and me to know that they are making business deals now on the assumption that very shortly we shall actually have One World with no national boundaries. For these men do not believe that you and I are so intelligent as they are, and they have to deceive us slightly out of deference to our bigotry.

Also, of course, they have to contain a man like Richard Nixon, who is insistently ambitious and immutably Middle American. That he may be untrue to Middle America is no excuse. It may make him at times more useful to sophisticated *Insiders*, but it cannot make him more trustworthy to them any more than to anybody else. For a man they can trust they turn to someone like Henry Kissinger—a man unquestionably loyal to the *Insiders* and whose cosmopolitanism can hardly be altered by exposure to Middle America. Watergate has been a means of containing Nixon while allowing Kissinger to function, free not only of the supervision of the President, but free also of the spotlight, now directed at the Watergate affair, from which Henry had been in some danger because of his own affairs.

Prior to Watergate, Kissinger was not fully the mayor of the palace. Since the Watergate affair achieved orbit in March—thanks in great measure to those selfless astronauts Jim McCord and John Dean—Henry's position has been greatly strengthened. The men who have departed or been removed have been men who were never Kissinger's type to begin with. John Ehrlichman, H. R. Haldeman, Richard Kleindienst, L. Patrick Gray—all these have the Middle America stigma, though it is a bit faint in the case of Klein- dienst, and all were believed to be loyal to the ambitions of Richard Nixon. What of their replacements?

The most obviously significant thing is that Ehrlichman has not been replaced at all. He was supposed to be on the same level regarding “Domestic Affairs” as was Kissinger regarding “National Security Affairs” (as if domestic affairs could not involve national security). Now that Ehrlichman’s job has apparently been abolished, we must assume that Henry has no equal on the White House table of organization.

The more restricted but still highly important position which Haldeman held is now held by Alexander Haig, who gave up four stars to remain at Kissinger’s side in the White House, where he is a sort of junior-grade mayor of the palace himself. Haig, it appears, does have charge of the White House staff, but has no functional authority beyond the White House, while Henry’s writ runs to the uttermost parts of the earth.

The substitution of Elliot Richardson for Richard Kleindienst as Attorney-General is undoubtedly of the utmost importance. Kleindienst may have had something of a foot in two camps. Against his predecessor John Mitchell he took the word of his subordinate Henry Petersen. Describing Mitchell as one of “the closest friends I have in my life,” Kleindienst told the Ervin Committee that the night after he did whatever he did on hearing Petersen’s report on Mitchell, he “wept.” This may explain something, for one is under the impression that Elliot Richardson would not weep. But if Kleindienst was soft on Mitchell, he was probably also a bit soft on Nixon, and that in the transitional era of Watergate would never do.

For not the least astonishing feature of the containment of President Nixon, or of his “taming” as I called it in an earlier article (*The Review Of The News*, May 30, 1973[*]), is that his own Attorney General has become the avowed adversary, as he has more expressly become the adversary of Vice-President Spiro Agnew, whose fate is now hardly to be extricated from that of President Nixon, and vice versa.

It is to be remembered that Archibald Cox, special Watergate prosecutor, is an appointee of Elliot Richardson, who in turn is an appointee of Richard Nixon. Thus it is baffling to find Cox on August thirteenth going into federal court in Washington with a 68-page brief in which among other things he virtually threatens Nixon with fines or imprisonment if the President does not recognize the authority of the court. Sarcastically, the language of the brief reads in part: “The evidence on the tapes may also be material to public accusations against respondent himself [the President]—a question to which he can hardly be indifferent.” I don’t see how he can be indifferent to Archibald Cox. Why doesn’t Nixon order Richardson to fire Cox? And if Richardson won’t do it, why doesn’t Nixon fire Richardson? Who’s running the Executive Branch, anyhow? Apparently not Richard Nixon.

Note that the demand by the Ervin Committee for the tapes is of a different order than that by Prosecutor Cox. The Committee, whose demand may be rejected because it goes from one equal branch of government to another, may clearly justify making the demand on the same ground, as there may well be duties which equals owe to each other. But how can a subaltern two echelons down in the same

branch—Nixon and Cox are both in the Executive branch—
how can such an underling make such demands of his
chief? Sure, he runs over to the Judicial branch to process
the demand, but why does not the Chief have the underling
removed for thus jumping to the other branch? Maybe be-
cause the underling is not really an underling, or because
the Chief is not really a chief.

The polls tell us that a majority of the American people
suspect that the President is guilty of something, but an
equal majority believe that he should not be impeached. If
this attitude prevails, we face three and a half more years
in which a President without moral authority will increasingly
preside but not govern. Viewing that prospect, some have
warned us of the danger of no government. There will,
however, be government of some kind. Perhaps Henry or a
successor as mayor of the palace will manage to build that
office into a premiership. Perhaps a Joint Congressional or a
State Committee will evolve into a directory of some kind.
Perhaps the Supreme Court will go an apparently shorter
distance to the same oligarchical goal. Most ominously pro-
able is that the strategy here imputed to the authors of
Watergate will succeed.

The strategy behind Watergate has been to probe what
the President and some of his close associates may have
done in secret, in order to divert attention from what has
been done in public by his authority and through his Ad-
ministration. In the large view it is no secret, though secrecy
was involved in the methods, and much secrecy too, that the
Nixon Administration has surrendered to Communism in
Southeast Asia, after negotiations at a summit meeting in
Peking in February 1972, and has at another summit
meeting in Moscow in May 1972 signed a nonaggression
pact with the Soviet Union, confirming it with Brezhnev-
Nixon consultations in Washington and at Camp David
thirteen months later. This pact differs from the 1939 pact
between Russia and Germany largely in the fact that then
both the Communists and the Nazis had some reason to be-
lieve they would gain advantage from the bargain, while
now the emerging merger between Russia and America can
benefit only the Soviet Union, or the coming World
Government, or both, which after all may be the same thing.

The gargantuan program of international unification upon
which we as a nation are embarked, guided (for the time)
by Henry Kissinger, is too enormous to be wholly concealed;
the reader's mind as to the nature and reality of the evil fate
which threatens us.

The real Government of America for some time past has
been in the hands of Usurpers whose object is to manage
rather than represent the American people, with the objective
of consolidating an oligarchic government of the world. It is
with some of the history of this usurpation, and with some
key events such as the fantastic loss of the U.S.S. Pueblo
and the TF-X (F111) scandal, and with the lives and activities
of some key Usurpers—Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, McNamara,
Clark Gifford and others—that Medford Evans deals. The story
as Evans relates it, with clarity and wit, would be first-class
entertainment were it not for the appalling revelations it con-
tains and documents. There can be no doubt left in the
reader's mind as to the nature and reality of the evil fate
which threatens us.

50p.

Recent Additions to Our Book List

THE SELLING OF AMERICA
By ROSE L. MARTIN
Reviewed in T.S.C. July, 1973
£2.25

A COMMUNESE-ENGLISH DICTIONARY
By ROY COLBY
50p.

ONE HUNDRED AND ONE THINGS YOU SHOULD
KNOW ABOUT MARIJUANA
By ROBERT PELTON
50p.

BLU PRINT FOR TYRANNY
The complete text of Executive Order 11490 which permits
the United States Government to assume virtual dictatorial
controls "in an emergency-type situation"
50p.

Prices include postage

K.R.P. PUBLICATIONS LTD.
245 CANN HALL ROAD, LONDON, E11 3NL

THE SOCIAL CREDITER
FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALISM

This journal expresses and supports the policy of the Social Credit
Secretariat, which was founded in 1933 by Clifford Hugh Douglas.

The Social Credit Secretariat is a non-party, non-class organisation
neither connected with nor supporting any political party, Social Credit
or otherwise.

SUBSCRIPTION RATES: Home and abroad, post free: One year £2.60
(£2.10), Six months £1.30 (£1.05).

Office—Business: Box 3266, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W. 2001
Editorial: Penrith Lodge, Gloucester Gate, London, N.W.1. Tel. 01-387 3893

IN AUSTRALIA—
Business: Box 2318Y, G.P.O., Melbourne, Victoria 3001
Editorial: Box 3266, G.P.O., Sydney, N.S.W. 2001 (Editorial Head Office)

THE SOCIAL CREDIT SECRETARIAT
Personnel—Chairman: Dr. B. W. Monahan, 4 Forbes Street, Red Hill,
Camberwell, Victoria 3124; Deputy Chairman: British Isles: Dr. Basil L. Steele,
Liaison Officer for Canada: Monsieur Louis Even, Maison Saint-Michel,
Rougement, P.Q. General Deputy Chairman and Secretary, H. A. Scoular,

72