National Suicide Is Not Necessary*

By Medford Evans

How did we get into this mess? Probably no question is more exasperately asked by Americans these days, and none is more appropriate, since we are not likely to get out unless we understand how we got in.

The answer is simple: We got into it by first exaggerating the power of the Soviet Union, and then—as if to make our own word good—providing essential contributions to the development of that power. The famous “muckraking” journalist Lincoln Steffens visited Russia in 1919, and on his return told Bernard Baruch, “I have been over into the future and it works.” To understand how astonishing it was that an American should say such a thing at that point in time, compare the following by the even more famous English “Liberal,” H. G. Wells, who visited Russia in 1920:

Our dominant impression of things Russian is an impression of vast irreparable breakdown. The great monarchy that was here in 1914 and the administrative, social, financial, and commercial systems connected with it have, under the strains of six years of incessant war, fallen down and smashed utterly.

That is quoted from Russia In The Shadows (New York, George H. Doran Company, 1921), the first chapter, “Petersburg In Collapse.”

But more astonishing, and far more unfortunate, than Lincoln Steffens’ saying of that “vast irreparable breakdown” that “it works” is the fact that succeeding generations of Americans have believed what Steffens said. I myself in the 1930s heard hardheaded American businessmen—men who despised Franklin D. Roosevelt—say of Joseph Stalin: You’ve got to hand it to him; he gets things done. (What Stalin got done was massive murder, unending terror, and contracts with American businessmen from whom only the Stalinist regime benefited.) And our last plain-speaking President said, “I like old Joe.” Now Harry Truman wouldn’t have said that, would he, if he hadn’t thought Stalin was a down-to-earth practical type? Harry was so far from having a Leftist mentality that he obviously could never understand that such a thing existed.

Neither could the millions of Americans who four times voted Franklin Roosevelt into power. For that matter, neither (as indicated above) could the thousands who hated Roosevelt. All were bewitched by the illusion that government operation of the economy would work. The pro-Rooseveltians thought it would work in America; the anti-Rooseveltians thought it was working in Russia. The political success of the New Deal grew out of a widespread feeling in America of the Depression that what Lincoln Steffens had said ten years earlier was true.

Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet Union in November 1933 caused not a ripple of reaction in the American public. If the Russians’ system worked for them, let them have it. We might even learn something from them. Even among the American intelligentsia, sympathy for Communism was in proportion to actual belief that the Communist system had at least raised the Russian people above the level they had known under the Czar. The belief is demonstrably false, but few waited for the demonstration.

August 1945 was a turning-point in history fully comparable to August 1914 as determining an era. That the United States and the Soviet Union had been allies in victory over the Axis powers meant that Americans felt more sympathy for Russians than ever before, and assumed more blithely than ever that the Soviet system somehow worked. But that the victory was due in such tremendous measure to the marvel of American wartime industry, capped by successful development of the atomic bomb, meant that there was an element of the patronizing in the American attitude, and—quite briefly—an almost worldwide assumption that the United States would retain worldwide hegemony, that this would be “the American century.”

The assumption was abruptly dispelled. And the transformation depended wholly on a developing image of Soviet power in which the critical events were the announcement by President Truman in September 1949 of an atomic explosion in the Soviet Union, and the announcement by the New York Times and the National Broadcasting Company in October 1957 of the launching by the Russians of Sputnik 1. Both announcements were inherently incredible; nevertheless, they were generally credited.

It is fair to say that the whole course of international affairs since 1945—to the degree that such affairs have a discernible course—has been determined by the concept of the United States and the Soviet Union as two nuclear superpowers—each able to strike from space—in Doctor Julius Robert Oppenheimer’s famous simile, “like two scorpions in a bottle,” each able to kill the other, but at the cost of his own life.

The concept is a fraud.

Over the past six years Antony C. Sutton, a scholar little

known to the general public, has produced a body of work exhaustive in research and unexceptionable in methodology which establishes beyond the possibility of refutation that the image of the Soviet Union as a superpower is an illusion. The Soviet Union, because of its size and strategic position—and especially because of the feral intensity of its ruling class—may be considered as a great power, but it is markedly inferior not only to the United States but also to Western Europe and Japan in technological development. If one compares the United States, Western Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and Red China, there is little difficulty in concluding on the basis of technological development that the Soviet Union is the only one of these entities which may be seriously regarded as a “superpower.” Oddly enough, all the others seem, more or less silently, so to regard the United States; only the United States seems doubtful of its own unique status, which does not mean that the doubt is inconsequential.

As you know, all modern technology is of Western origin. “Western” means, directly or indirectly, from Western Europe. The United States is the largest and technologically most successful colony of the West Europeans; Japan is the most enterprising emulator of the West; the Soviet Union, and to a far lesser degree Red China, are the chief beneficiaries of the kind of Western colonialism which in their official doctrine they deplore. Western Europe itself might well rival or surpass the United States as a superpower, except for its obvious lack of unity. The United States is in the gravest kind of danger of forfeiting its own superpower status by a less obvious, but even more deadly, kind of disunity.

The danger to America is not the threat of being technologically bested but the danger of intellectual and moral corruption, paradoxically most evident in our most highly educated classes. It is a failure of will and judgment deriving from a loss of, or confusion regarding, national identity—a confusion worse confounded by the deliberate machinations of those in America itself who prefer the system of the Soviet Union and Red China (basically the same) and wish to see it incorporate the material advantages of America, Western Europe, and the Third World.

The foregoing conceptualization is not expressed in terms borrowed from Antony Sutton, nor is it even derived from reading Antony Sutton—either his stunning popular presentation, National Suicide: Military Aid To The Soviet Union, or his monumental three-volume scholarly treatise, Western Technology And Soviet Economic Development. A number of observers, the present writer included, have discerned the general shape of events these past twenty years and more. What Sutton has done is to provide, in his longer work, overwhelming documentary proof that the Soviet Union is almost completely supported technologically by the West; in the briefer book, National Suicide, Sutton has both summarized the evidentiary material of his magnum opus, and extrapolated judiciously prophetic warnings and exhortations. I know of no other work which so succinctly delineates the danger confronting the American people today.

Antony Sutton writes in general without rhetoric—which, to be sure, can be the most effective kind of rhetoric. For example, he cites instances in which U.S. armed forces have been used to redeliver refugees to the Soviet terror, as in the massive Operation Keelhaul of 1945, or the 1971 episode in which our Coast Guard surrendered to Soviet sailors who boarded an American vessel in American waters a Lithuanian seaman who had requested political asylum. (We fought the War of 1812 for less provocation by the British.) Sutton summarizes that such cases “shock and horrify any decent person”; then he adds that they “have no impact at all on the policymakers in Washington.” You should read this book to understand what is going on. More important, read it to understand what is not going on. What is not going on is any rational defense of American national interest.

Obviously, I cannot give you in this space the volume of documentation which Sutton’s Western Technology And Soviet Economic Development affords. Even his own short book, National Suicide, necessarily presents the case, as he says, in general rather than in exhaustive detail. That is true not only for reasons of space, but also because official files, to which he had access in treating earlier periods, have been closed to him for the years following 1965. (He had no Ellsberg to steal them for him.) Probably the new reticence of the Department of Defense is due to the stern bureaucratic necessity of keeping everything about Vietnam as secret as possible, but it is also no doubt due in part to awareness in the highest bureaucratic circles of what Sutton did with the information he got concerning the years 1917 to 1965. What he did was (1) to tell the truth, and (2) to draw logical inferences—to put, as we say, two and two together. Since he never went to M.I.T., he never makes anything out of it but four.

To illustrate the kind of facts with which Antony Sutton deals, I select some of his data concerning Western, especially American, contributions to the development, construction, and operation of the Soviet military-industrial complex, including facilities for production of weapons, tanks, aircraft, missiles, and other military hardware.

In this connection Sutton clarifies and emphasizes the uninterrupted continuity of activities throughout the “civilian” and “military” sectors. He cites the judgment of Krasnaya Zvezda—“Red Star,” organ of the Red Army—which he paraphrases as follows:

In this era of complex weapons systems, all of heavy industry—from steel to electronics—and not only the pure defense industries producing military end products, represents the foundation of military power.

On the basis of his own exhaustive research, Sutton adds, “The interdependence of the Soviet military and civilian sectors is in fact greater than the above quotation from Krasnaya Zvezda suggests... since the late 1920s all Soviet industrial plants have been designed first to produce end-products for military use and only second for civilian output.” Such a concept underscores the seriousness of the enormous amount of American assistance now, in 1974, being given to the Soviets in the construction of the Kama River truck plant.

Sutton notes the deceptive double image which American officials and journalists generally give of a Soviet economy divided into military and civilian sectors with a watertight bulkhead between. “Obviously,” he comments, “no country
would erect steel mills or aluminum rolling plants or fastener factories just for its military sector." Nor would the Soviet Union erect them just for its civilian sector. The pretext of some such absurdity provides the excuse which Washington seems to feel it needs to forbid American-Russian trade in "strategic products," while permitting American exports to Russia of "non-military products." Sutton adds, "As there is in fact no such distinction, it is not surprising that in the past two decades the definition of a strategic product has eroded under constant political and business pressures."

The indivisibility of the military and civilian sectors rather than the hypocrisy of our officials and tycoons is the reason why products inevitably slip from the "strategic" to the "non-military" category. The hypocrisy of our officials and tycoons consists in ever pretending in the first place that the two categories could be kept separate.

It is not to be thought that American participation in the military build-up of the Soviet Union is a new thing. Nor even that it began with Lend-Lease assistance in World War II, though that did constitute no doubt the largest international military-industrial blood transfusion in recorded history. Let me quote Antony Sutton at some length:

The fundamental construction agreement creating the Soviet military-industrial complex was made in February 1930 with Albert Kahn, Inc., of Detroit, builders of the Ford River Rouge, General Motors, Packard, and other large plants in the United States. [Reminds me of hearing the late Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana, who had travelled extensively and sympathetically in the Soviet Union, tell a college audience in 1957 that Russia was the only country in the world where you could find "a new 1936 Packard."]

The units designed and started in 1929-32 under the Kahn plan were of truly gigantic size—far larger than units designed and built by the same construction firm in the rest of the world—and, in addition, had separate shops or plants for the manufacture of inputs and spare parts. [There would have been no place else in the Soviet Union to get those.] The Ural Elinash plant in Stalin's "steel triangle" multiplied Soviet electrical-equipment manufacturing capacity by a factor of seven. The KHMZ plant at Kharkov, designed by the General Electric Company, had a turbine-manufacturing capacity two and one-half times greater than GE's main plant in Schenectady. [Which still did not make Kharkov another Schenectady, any more than Ford assembly plants in Dallas and Atlanta make those cities the automotive equals of Detroit.] Magnitogorsk, also in the "steel triangle," a replica of the U.S. Steel plant at Gary, Indiana, was the biggest iron and steel plant ever built. The Soviets do not exaggerate when they claim that these units are the "largest in the world."

Ordinarily, however, the Soviets do not add to their claim of the largest steel plant in the world the fact that it was designed and built by Americans. They have nothing to brag about there. Neither do we.

Lenin said Communism depended on electrification.

Sutton details the contractual arrangements through which electrical technology and equipment were provided for the Soviet Union by the Radio Corporation of America and General Electric. These international agreements have continued from 1927 to the present point in time. Recent and significant transactions are as follows:

... General Electric from 1959 to 1970 sold to the Soviet Union through its European subsidiaries a range of its medium-capacity computers, including the fastest of the 400-series.

Of perhaps even greater significance are sales by English Electric, which include third-generation microcircuit computers utilizing Radio Corporation of America technology.

The largest single supplier of computers to the USSR has been International Computers and Tabulation, Ltd., of the United Kingdom, which also licenses RCA technology, and has supplied at least twenty-seven of the thirty-three large computers presently in Russia.

The marginal utility to the East of these West-East transfers zooms right off the graph paper, as Antony Sutton makes clear when he adds to the foregoing: "Given the complete lack of indigenous Soviet computer technology (and Dr. Judy of the University of Toronto agrees with the author's conclusions on this point), the Soviets have to use either imported computers or imported technology for weapons-design work."

Page after page, the scholarly Antony Sutton illustrates what he meant when in August 1972 he told Subcommittee VII of the Republican Platform Committee at Miami Beach: "In a few words: there is no such thing as Soviet technology." Sutton's full statement to that committee is reprinted in this book as Appendix B; it was printed in The Review Of The News for August 30, 1972. It is unfair to say that the business and political leaders of the country do not know what they are doing. It is very unfair, because it lets them off the hook of full responsibility. It is American Big Business and Big Government that have armed the Soviet Union. Granted, they have had help from their counterparts in Western Europe.

Following Sutton, let us illustrate further the enormity of the situation. Consider this simple—but quite vital matter:

Ball bearings are an integral part of many weapons systems; there is no substitute. The entire ball bearing production capability of the Soviet Union is of Western origin—utilizing equipment from the United States, Sweden, Germany, and Italy. . . All Soviet tanks and military vehicles run on bearings manufactured on Western equipment or copies of Western equipment. All Soviet missiles and related systems including guidance systems have bearings manufactured on Western equipment or Soviet duplicates of this equipment.

Those S.A.M.s that shot down so many Israeli planes last October would never have been there without the co-operation of American business and the American government.

The full account is too long to quote here, and too succinctly stated already to abbreviate satisfactorily; so I will simply urge you to read (along with the rest of National
Suicide) Antony Sutton’s narrative (Pp. 91-100) of how in 1960-1961 the Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont, together with the U.S. Department of Commerce, the State Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, overriding objections from the Defense Department, agreed to supply the Soviet Union with forty-five "Centalign-B" machines for precision mass production of ball bearings essential to production of advanced weapons systems.

There were at the time sixty-six such machines in the United States, twenty-five of them operated by one company, 85 percent of whose output went to military applications. The Bryant company, maker of the machines, had a virtual world monopoly, as expert testimony quoted by Sutton shows. But neither Bryant nor the U.S. Government, as represented by the Inter-Departmental Advisory Committee on Export Control, apparently wanted to take monopolistic advantage of the Soviet Union and interfere in any way with their production of military missiles which depend on the miniature precision ball bearings to the manufacture of which Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont, held the key. These Yankees are shrewd traders.

So shrewd that they caused Sutton for once (and to his credit) to lose his cool. Reporting that in 1972, just before the election, Bryant Chucking Grinder Company of Springfield, Vermont, announced another contract with the Soviet Union—this one for 164 machines (proportional, it may be inferred, to the increased number of Soviet missiles), Sutton indignantly exclaims:

Where is Congress? Where is the press? We are so far down the road to national suicide that we now supply bearings for Soviet missile guidance systems and no one even bothers to protest.

The "energy crisis" has reminded us all that in peace or war mobile modern society cannot function without automotive equipment, from tractors and tanks to command cars and personnel carriers, from motor cycles and sedans to pickups and tractor-trailer rigs. The great difference between the U.S.S.R. and the United States in this regard is our emphasis on passenger cars, their emphasis on heavy stuff. Sutton takes us back to the beginning, during the Soviet Five Year Plan (which was a triumph of American industry), with a detailed account of which this is a sample: The Stalingrad Tractor Plant, the largest in Europe, was a packaged factory built in the United States, dismantled, shipped to the U.S.S.R., and re-erected at Stalingrad under the supervision of American engineers. All its equipment was manufactured in the United States by some eighty firms; it went into production with the Harvester 15/30 model and the T-37 3-ton tank.

Mobility at sea is also a requisite for a great (not to say super) power. In Appendix C of his book Antony Sutton lists, "from an authentic Soviet source," specifications of ninety-six ships used to transport weapons to Haiphong for use against the United States and allied forces in Vietnam. Sutton observes that "while the ships on the Haiphong run may fly the Soviet flag, most of them are certainly not Soviet in construction," and adds: "Moreover, all their propulsion systems originated outside the Soviet Union."

Page after page Antony Sutton documents Soviet dependence on Western models, supplies, and assistance in development of machine-guns, aircraft (propeller and jet), missiles, and spacecraft. This is not to be construed as disparagement of Russian intelligence; on the contrary, it amounts to disparagement of Western, and particularly of American intelligence. They capitalize on our labour. A particularly important example is that of the famed MiG fighters, powered by Rolls-Royce engines, first bought, then copied, from Britain. These were installed in the MiG-15, which was put into production under the names of the Russian designers Mikoyan and Gurevich, but was originally designed by the captured German, Dr. Siegfried Günther, previously chief designer for Heinkel.

One could go on. In the repetitive landscape of the Soviet's dependence on the West, "Hills peep o'er hills, and Alps on Alps arise!" I have not touched the nuclear field. Neither does Sutton in this book. I could not, of course, keep from thinking as I read his repeated references to General Electric as a longtime contractor with the Soviet Union, that the company is also one of the three giant production contractors of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. (The other two are Union Carbide and duPont.)

Reviewing Antony Sutton's Western Technology And Soviet Economic Development (Volumes I and II) a couple of years ago, I said that here was "the most important book since the Bible." I intended no sacrilege and no unfairness to Sutton by the comparison. If I did risk an accusation of hyperbole, I stood and stand ready to defend the statement by pointing out that no more massive error has deluded mankind since the Fall than the aura of virtually unlimited and irresistible power which surrounds the Soviet Union and the Communist Party Insiders who control the Soviet régime. No one else has equalled Antony Sutton in turning the dry light of scholarship on that aura and dispelling it as an illusion. In this the great age of technology Sutton says, and makes good the statement: "There is no such thing as Soviet technology." If you are uneasy at comparing this word of truth with Scripture, let me say that it is at least the semantic equivalent of, and more soundly based than, Franklin Roosevelt's, "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself."

We do not have to help the Soviet régime, and we ought not to do so. Insiders in Washington and New York would confer superpower status on the Soviet Union as a prelude to consolidating world power for themselves and their fellow Insiders in Moscow. But from the point of view of the American people, and the people of the rest of the world, too, the Communist régime in Moscow, together with its affiliates throughout the world, needs to be, and can be destroyed.