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THE BIG IDEA (VIII)

By C. H. DOUGLAS

Mr. Henry Ford ("Cars, Tractors, and Retractions") is credited with the opinion that history is bunk. Mr. Ford's opinions, like his cars, appear to be arranged for replacement on advantageous terms, but in this case he would appear to have noticed something which, seen in its proper relation to other knowledge, is worth examination. The first modifying factor is that the reference was to *written* history.

Writing differs from memory in being two-dimensional instead of four-dimensional. It is only possible to write about one thing at a time. Genuine history, that is to say, the flow of events, is just as unwritable as a spring morning. You can pick out certain facts about it, which you think are important, but there are infinitely more contemporaneous happenings than you can possibly mention. In other words, written history is five per cent. fact, and ninety-five per cent. historian, even at its best. What value it possesses, and that may be considerable, depends primarily on the historian, and secondarily, on the equipment of the reader—on his ability to see the related facts in their true perspective.

But there is a type of history which is four-dimensional. Everyone has a certain amount of it, and where it relates to something of the nature of a profession, this memory-history, over the period of a lifetime, has a practical value out of all proportion to anything available in print. It forms the basis of effective ability. We call it experience.

There is, however, a memory-history of still greater importance, and that is hereditary. Many of the country villages of England and Scotland were full of it. The first essential to its growth is stability.

One cannot fail to notice the curious contradiction involved in the passionate study of race-horse pedigree which was so popular in the distant days of uneasy peace, and the carefully fostered contempt for "family" in the human race, which is contemporaneous with Socialism. The subject is complex, and is obscured by the confusion introduced by the rapid growth of a pseudo-aristocracy which possesses no discernible characteristics other than rapacity. I merely wish to refer to it in connection with this most important fact of family-traditional-history, which may take the form of "feeling for the land," water-divining, boat-building, or anything else which has been carried on in the same place by the same families over a considerable period. For the purpose of a "feeling for policy," which is really a subconscious memory of trial and error, the same consideration is equally true if we are to accept the theory of a continuous policy. I do not believe there is any substitute

for it, although it requires checks and balances.

Now, I do not think it is possible that anyone who will take the trouble to consider the evidence, can ignore the purposeful endeavour which has been made over at least three hundred years to break up and destroy this hereditary memory of policy. I should not exclude the Crusades from consideration in this respect, but it is sufficient to begin with the decimation of the country families by duelling in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries.

As this began to wane by the recognition of its trend, a wave of the most absurd gambling set in, in which estates which had been in the same family for centuries, changed hands overnight, often accompanied by the suicide of the loser. Both this mania and duelling had the same common feature; they were insidiously stimulated by psychological methods—they were not merely "fashionable," but were, for the country squire, and only for the country squire, an almost inescapable accompaniment to the intercourse with his fellows by which alone his instincts could affect the course of events. "A poor spirited fellow" was not likely to be listened to with much attention.

It is notable that exactly the same sequence of events occurred somewhat later in America. It is commonly forgotten that the United States, between the War of Secession and the American Civil War, was in essence a country of squires, of the George Washington type. Among these, more particularly in the Southern States, duelling and gambling appeared like an epidemic. By the time the Civil War broke out, the class was sensibly weakened. The war practically eliminated it.

The French Revolution, to the records of which Mr. Ford's kind of history is specially applicable, was primarily a massacre of the French hereditary aristocracy. So was the Russian Revolution of 1917.

Anyone who will take the trouble to go through the casualty lists of the 1914-1942 war, can verify the disproportionate percentage of "hereditary" families appearing in them. This does not apply to one side only. The hereditary memory is being eliminated everywhere.

I can imagine many readers, at this point, feeling the inclination to comment in accordance with the orthodox conception of a downtrodden peasantry rising spontaneously to rid themselves of a vicious tyranny. Like so many of these "all black and pure white" pictures, this idea is more remarkable for simplicity than accuracy. Quite apart from the important truth so well put by Sir William Gilbert, that "Hearts just as pure and fair, may beat in Belgrave Square, as in the lowlier air, of Seven Dials," and that, if it were

not so, we ought at all costs to treasure our slums as the only school of virtue, there are three significant facts which apply to both the French and the Russian Revolution.

The first is that they were not spontaneous. The second is that neither of them was a peasant revolution—that is to say, while both of them attacked and massacred the landowners, it was not the tenants of these landowners who were active—it was town mobs and mutinied soldiers. And the third and most significant of all, is that both of these revolutions cut short a period of high prosperity.

(1) "There is a greater amount of artificiality in revolution than is believed. This is not solely to be imputed to the Jews. It is not certain that they form its most numerous elements, but thanks to their racial qualities, they are the strategists and directors of the movement, from which they almost alone derive advantage. —LEON DE PONCINS: *The Secret Powers behind Revolution*, p. 239.

(2) Amongst much other evidence to the same effect, numerous passages in Disraeli's writings, such as the well known reference in *Coningsby* to the occult powers directing affairs, and that, already quoted, in the biography of Lord George Bentinck, which states categorically that the French Revolution was not a popular uprising, may be cited.

(3) The condition of France just prior to the Revolution was one of almost unequalled prosperity, recalling that of England in the later days of the nineteenth century. Chancellor Pasquier, in his *Memoires*, writes:

"I firmly believe that at no time since the beginning of the Monarchy, had France been so happy as at this period (1783)."

Rivarol, in a typically Calvinistic comment on the same period, remarks "La maladie du bonheur les gagne"—they are attacked by the disease of good Fortune.

(To be continued)

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PARLIAMENT

FEBRUARY 24.

Oral Answers to Questions (26 columns)

AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION (FORMS)

Mr. Ellis Smith asked the Minister of Aircraft Production whether he can state the size of M.A.P. Form 2077, Plant and Equipment Form No. 1; how many copies are sent to firms; and whether he is aware that in some cases the answer will occupy one line of type?

The Minister of Aircraft Production (Colonel Llewellyn): The form measures 16 inches by 13. The number of copies sent to firms varies; the most is six. It is true that the space is sometimes not fully used, but this is exceptional. The form is, however, shortly due for reprinting, and I propose to review both its size and the need for the number of copies at present used.

WAR SITUATION

Sir Cyril Entwistle (Bolton): . . . I suggest that the greatest service a junior Minister could do to-day—this applies to every one of them in every Department—would be to devote practically the whole of his time for a week, two weeks or a month to examining his departmental machine from top to bottom in all its essentials, with the

one object of simplifying the routine and getting rid of the red tape, and above all of finding out whether, in the various posts, and particularly the subordinate posts, which in war-time are frightfully important. . . the people are or are not badly chosen and inefficient. If they are, there is the explanation of a good deal of dissatisfaction at the inefficiency of working of our bureaucratic machine. The public all unite upon one demand that the inefficient in the machine should be ruthlessly sacked. . . .

I respectfully suggest to the Government that the junior Ministers could take up that task of seeing whether it is possible to get rid of some of the peace-time methods and red tape procedure in our Departments, and produce more efficiency. Of course, the Minister himself is responsible for this task, and one has been told often that, however powerful a Minister may be, the machine will beat him in the end, as he cannot get over the normal working of the bureaucratic machine. On the other hand it is the general view of the public and Members of this House that in war-time a Minister ought, at any rate, to be able to shake up that machine so as to be able to get rid of the complaints of red tape which are so prevalent. . . .

Lieut.-Colonel Rayner (Totnes): . . . The local papers are full of stories of these highly democratic committees where the free flow of opinion leads to an absolute paralysis of action, of stories of refusal to take responsibility, of passing the buck, of too much delay at the top and of too little decentralisation at the bottom. We could all give first-hand instances, I have a lot in my pocket, all tending to slow up our war effort in a war in which speed is the first essential. Our Government and their Departments throw off circulars and instructions and pamphlets as if all that paper stimulated action and increased speed. The House will have heard of the manufacturer who turned up the other day at an office not far from this Chamber to inquire about a case in which he was interested. The departmental clerk did what he could for him, and came back after a couple of hours and said he was beaten. He advised the manufacturer to go home, and remarked, "Of course, you know, things take so much longer since the war." This is purely destructive criticism. I have no idea how these problems can be solved. I quite understand that in the middle of a war like this you cannot upset the whole national organisation. But solved they must be, speed we must have, and we look to the Prime Minister's new team to find the solution.

You will note that the initials of that new team make up the word "Cabel." If I knew the Foreign Secretary well enough to call him by his Christian name, it would make up the word "Cabal." . . .

Mr. Culverwell (Bristol, West): . . . During the fall of France we heard M. Reynaud talk about incredible mistakes. We seem to have made incredible mistakes; at any rate, we have made mistakes which an amateur strategist like myself has anticipated would lead to disaster.

I ask myself one or two questions. Is it that political and sentimental considerations override military opinion? I do not know. That would be the kindest excuse one could make for our failures. If that be so, if military strategy and the conduct of the war are made subservient to sentimental considerations and popular clamour, I am astonished that the Government did not launch an expedition on the coast of France or the Netherlands in deference to the outcry and clamour made by some sections of the public and the Press. If that be so, and military strategy is sub-

servient to political and sentimental considerations, I beg the Government not to bow to it any longer. The other alternative is that our expert advisers do to employ common sense and imagination. . . .

I should like to know whether it is the Government or their expert advisers who are to blame for the failures we have suffered. It is no good changing Ministers if it is their expert advisers who are at fault. Are the expert advisers who advised us on abortive expeditions to Norway, to Finland, to Greece, and who advised us on the Libyan campaign and so on, still there? I do not know whether they are all there, but some certainly are. I should like to know to what extent the War Cabinet overrides military opinion and expert advice. I should like to know why we defied aerial supremacy in Norway and in Greece, when the danger was perfectly obvious. . . .

FEBRUARY 25.

WAR SITUATION (92 columns)

Mr. Hore-Belisha (Devonport): . . . We are building up a system of government under which individual responsibility is being reduced to a minimum. No one knows in any given set of circumstances where it is to be placed, whether on the Admiralty or on the Air Force, on this Minister or that Minister. There is a complete interlocking of committees, and these grow with the passage of time. Thus you never have improvisation in our war system. The Japanese seize sampans and rafts, and they move formations with great rapidity, but if we wish to move divisions of the Army, very careful consideration has to be made of shipping and all other matters, and delay is caused which results very frequently in the missing of an opportunity. I think we should restore spontaneity to our Government and give to Ministers the responsibility which traditionally they should have. . . .

Mr. J. J. Davidson (Glasgow, Maryhill): . . . Speaker after speaker has referred to the complete inefficiency of War Office administration. . . . We have heard complaint after complaint with regard to War Office administration, and yet, to appease a critical House of Commons, the Minister, who, generally speaking, accepts the guidance and advice of his Permanent Secretary, is changed for the man who could really be held responsible. It is not only a funny position; it is an ominous position for every Minister. How are they to treat their Permanent Secretaries in the future? Is there to be distrust brought into Departments, and will Ministers feel confident that nothing is being done to undermine them? Will Ministers be sure of the advice they receive? This is a departure from a practice of the House of Commons which has been observed for very many years. I want to ask my right hon. and learned Friend to submit to this House a reasoned answer as to why this change took place. . . .

PEACE AIMS (DECLARATION)

Mr. Rhys Davies asked the Prime Minister whether His Majesty's Government have been approached by the Washington Government on the subject of a declaration of peace aims to be termed the Pacific Charter being made by the Allied nations?

Mr. Attlee: No, Sir.

Mr. Davies: In view of the fact that this country was

deeply involved in the drawing up of the Atlantic Charter, would His Majesty's Government consider taking the initiative with a view to getting such a declaration covering the Pacific?

Captain McEwen: Ought there not to be a limit to the number of charters that we have?

FEBRUARY 26.

SUPPLY: NAVY ESTIMATES (123 columns)

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes (Portsmouth, North): . . . Over and over again the Prime Minister has felt that he must reject his own inclinations in regard to matters on which he had received expert advice because he had to be bound by the advice of his constitutional Service chiefs. He then gave us a list of the various committees, which he said operate flexibly, in his war machine. You cannot make war by committees. You must have someone ready to accept great responsibilities. When a project is put up to these Committees—I think he mentioned three of them—even when it has the approval of the Chiefs of Staff, they find out all its difficulties and dangers and persuade the Chiefs of Staff that the odds against them are too heavy. . . .

The readiness to accept responsibility is the whole essence of the conduct of war. We hear a great deal about youth and the need for youth, and of course it is a war for youth, and when you find a man who is ready to accept responsibility, he should receive strong support from the Board of Admiralty. But how under the present system, with that dreadful thing called wireless, is a young man to exercise initiative, when the wireless not only gives him orders, but listens to what he is saying to other people? I have suffered from that. I could give examples if it would interest the House. [HON. MEMBERS: "It would."] You may remember the sinking of the "Aboukir," "Cressy," and "Hogue," an action in which we lost 1,400 men, more than were lost in the Battle of Trafalgar. I happened to be able to go to sea with a force of 20 or 30 destroyers and a light cruiser, and I thought it would be a splendid opportunity to hit the enemy back. . . . I felt that it was no use telling the Admiralty, but thought I ought to let the Commander-in-Chief know. I told him what I was going to do, and he said he would send some cruisers to support me at dawn and told me not to stay too late. My wireless conversation with the Commander-in-Chief was heard at Ipswich, was telephoned to the Admiralty, and I received a peremptory order to return to harbour at once. I am sure that those few enemy destroyers could not have escaped.

How is an officer to exercise any initiative under such conditions? It happened over and over again in the Norwegian campaign. . . . Take the case of the "Renown." With some destroyers she fought a gallant action against a force superior to her in gun-power. She drove them off and prevented them going into Narvik, and was then going into Narvik to destroy the nine German destroyers which were there. She was stopped at the last minute by wireless. Then a gallant Captain commanding four destroyers was given the option of going in to attack. Of course he did not hesitate to attack a vastly superior force, and lost his life, and we lost two destroyers. Then a day or two later the "Warspite" was sent in with destroyers to do what the "Renown" could have done days before. It is impossible for men to act with initiative if they are ruled by wireless from Whitehall all the time. . . .

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Saturday, March 7, 1942.

How The Economist Won the War

"The superlative Hebrew conjurer, spell-binding all the great Lords, great parties, great interests of England to his hand, and leading them by the nose like helpless, mesmerised, somnambulant cattle." — THOMAS CARLYLE of Disraeli.

The Economist is fast displacing *The Times* as the index of higher-than-Governmental policy. For this reason its disclosure on the last day of the past month concerning what it would like Sir James Grigg's appointment to mean is noteworthy, disconcerting and provocative. As though the existing bureaucracies had not done their damndest to keep up with the Higher Socialism of the *Economist*, the paper complains that the 'clean-ups' so far effected have removed only the political chiefs. The plans for the mobilisation of the nation 'inadequate not only in scale but also in method' were the work of men still in their offices.

The Economist thinks they ought to go. It wants 'young' men to replace them. "What is wanted now is men of imagination and elasticity and energy, not men of knowledge or of eminence or of experience, least of all men who 'represent' anything but their own competence."

Has any one ever heard a more dangerous doctrine? Competence means simply sufficiency in strife. It does not matter what the contestant is struggling for, or whom he is struggling with. The black-market racketeers for whom the death penalty is being sought are 'competent.' An incompetent *agent provocateur* or specialist in sabotage soon returns to a perhaps more helpful occupation or seeks another outlet for his subversive tendencies. It is not much good a man's being competent, unless he is competent in the public interest. Grave doubts may be entertained, and, for the time being, they may even be expressed (such is the desire of His Majesty's Government for constructive criticism) concerning the bearing of *The Economist's* recommendations, which go hand in hand with its desire that 'ignorant, obscure and inexperienced' young men, representative of nothing but 'capacity for strife' should be let loose on the British Army with "power of decision." We have not overstated the case, for 'ignorant' is the correct adjective to apply to a man who is not 'a man of knowledge'; 'obscure' is the opposite of 'eminent'; and 'inexperienced' the opposite of 'experienced.' To obscure such qualities under the cloak of 'imagination, elasticity and energy' is hardly to hide them. Like the last meal of the gorged python, 'they show'!

"Of the qualities of the higher command," says *The Economist*, "only those who know the facts are really in a position to judge; the outsider, judging by results, cannot

help but be doubtful." Evidently *The Economist* does not like judgement by results (which, by the bye, does not mean allocation of blame beyond the point of responsibility). "But every citizen [*sic!*] is in a good position to judge the junior officers and other ranks." Since most 'citizens' are now either 'junior officers or other ranks,' this extraordinary assertion possibly means that John Citizen, being quite close to John Citizen, is in a very good position to give him a hiding (if he can) to punish him for making a mess of the war; but is in a very poor position either to detect or to punish the arch mischiefmaker; and, in that form, the statement is largely true, but action in the light of it would produce complete disintegration in His Majesty's Forces.

The boasted 'democracy' of the new British Army is, in *The Economist's* opinion, apparently, no more than 'a façade.' Someone has sent a list of old boys serving in the forces to the high financial authority (which, on another page, alleges that "finance is not a means of making war. It is a means of distributing the burden of sacrifice among civilians."). The list contains, on 'page after page of names,' 'the merest sprinkling who are anything but officers and cadets. Can it really be said, *in face of facts like these, that there is unbiassed selection?*' Why not? Facts 'like these' are, after all, only 'facts like these.' And what are these like, when viewed after the removal of one's scarlet glasses? Where does the Editor of *The Economist* expect the boys of 'a certain public school' to be? In a labour battalion? "To put the matter quite bluntly," says the writer, "the troops do not believe their officers are selected for their soldierly competence, but for their possession of qualities *beyond the ordinary man's reach.*" Don't we want our generals to be possessed of qualities above the ordinary? And if they aren't, shall't we be rather hard put to it by armies more numerous than our own, well-disciplined, and led by men possessed of qualities above the ordinary? *The Economist* concludes its fatuous paragraph by flying a kite for education in politics; "but the British Army cannot be taught politics [like the 'successful' German and Russian armies] because nobody knows what its [*sic!*] politics are." Now isn't that a pity? If anyone knew what the British Army's politics were, a little band of tie-less dialecticians could go out and teach it to them! At present the place in the British Army's mind which ought to be full of politics is a 'vacuum,' and *The Economist* wants the Cabinet to fill it.

T. J.

PUBLICITY

We are indebted to the *Jewish Chronicle* for drawing our attention to the following, signed "DOUBTFUL," in the *Yorkshire Observer*:—

"It is a peculiar trait of Jews, generally, to say or do something one day which suits their purpose and deny it the next day when it has ceased to be of use to their purpose. This statement, of course, appertains to the Jewish leaders, the average Jew being ignorant and innocent of their leaders' policy."

"It appears very likely that the plea for a Jewish self-contained army emanates from the same source as the Jewish proposal for 'Federal Union,' a proposal which would place the economic, military, and naval forces of all countries under the control of central Jewish influence."

MOBILISING THE WOMEN

By B. M. PALMER

P.E.P.'s broadsheet on mobilising woman-power and part-time employment falls naturally into two parts, according to whether the difficulties dealt with are real or unreal. This classification is not, of course, recognised by the compilers of the pamphlet, but it is glaringly apparent to those who know that war cannot be won without an increase in social credit more than commensurate with the advantage which the axis powers are at the moment enjoying. The leeway to be made up has been increased lately. This has been recognised by all, and real anxiety is felt (and shewn) by those individuals known as the public.

The position as stated is this: the ordinary reserves of women workers are now practically exhausted, and the supply of women over thirty who can be drawn in as full-time substitutes is limited. The Ministry of Labour has therefore been compelled "to fall back on that large reserve of women, mostly married, who could give some, but not the whole of their days or weeks to the service of the country in its hour of need."

An advertisement in the *Birmingham Post* for part time factory workers, worded, "Release your younger sisters for the A.T.S., the W.A.A.F.S. and the W.R.N.S.," brought 600 applicants in a few days, and a larger advertisement the following week brought 1,000. There is real determination to win the war and little doubt that the women will do their best; but that the wives of service men should be obliged to work to supplement their meagre allowances, and so support their children is one of those unreal difficulties which, so long as it is regarded in any quarter as advantageous, must militate against the war effort. To add unnecessary anxieties to the heavy load the soldiers' wives have to bear will not make them more efficient workers. To help to end the war and to get her man back again is quite enough incentive for most women.

The real problem can be summed up in a few words — to get the optimum output in the minimum of time. This means that, having due regard to circumstances, every process must be completed in the best possible way.

The short sighted view that long hours of work over long periods would in the long run give us the production we need has already been proved mistaken. The Medical Research Council of the Industrial Health Board has stated that as soon as the working hours exceed sixty a week, labour wastage increases proportionately. A very interesting side light is thrown on this by the P.E.P. report, which states that in two factories at least, J. Lucas (Birmingham) and Hoover's, part-time women workers are found to be more efficient than full-time workers. Hoover's experience is probably typical. "When the first set of part-timers appeared in the factory and all proved to be fairly elderly, very gloomy forebodings were expressed as to the effect of the scheme on production, but in actual fact in the fuse assembly department, which is entirely manned by part-time workers, production is now well above the level attained when it was staffed by full-time workers."

There is no need to emphasise the significance of this in respect of the social credit—it is a "lesson" which if we could "learn" it now and remember it when the war is over,

might be of great value if it could be dissociated from the unreal difficulties with which our productive system is hemmed in on every side.

P.E.P., as can be expected, gives great prominence to these in regard to the part-timer, and small help as to how they may be dealt with. Here are some of them—additional work for wages department and clerical workers, double payment of health and unemployment insurance, double training to get one full day's work, high transport charges, and income tax.

It is interesting to note that the universal development of day nurseries which "has not been achieved in time" (*sic*) has not been such a deterrent as was expected. Women who have *wanted* to help in the war have found their own solution to their domestic problems. And even P.E.P. see that to find staffs for a large number of day nurseries, so far from increasing the labour supply, will actually diminish it.

But income tax! Some months ago (May 10, 1941) I told of a conversation with some workmen who made it plain that they were *not* income-tax minded. Since that time they have fully experienced the working of the Act, and have *not* become reconciled. The friction, worry and discontent it is causing will soon be realised by all. A workman was overheard to say last week that his wife had "cut up rough" at the idea that some of the tax might be taken from her housekeeping allowance. Propaganda placards (themselves arithmetically inaccurate) in the factories proclaiming "the more you earn the more you have left over after paying income tax" are not likely to breed contentment among the less well-paid, especially those on a fixed weekly wage who know that however hard they work they can receive no more. Letters have been written to *The Times* asking that the B.B.C. should "explain" these things to wives, and perhaps their objection to going out to work would be lessened.

The instincts of these people are sound. They think they are Socialists. But they don't know what Socialism is, and when they experience its *results* they detest them.

What is Socialism?

"It is simply more law, an extension of exactly the process which has stultified the progress of the industrial arts. There is no more prospect of producing a tolerable state of Society by passing more Laws, and imposing more sanctions, than there is of repairing a motor car suffering from a choked carburettor by devising a fresh tax upon it. The world is suffering from a fantastic and unnecessary book of Regulations, every additional one of which, while apparently beneficial at the moment, exacerbates the disease."
— C. H. DOUGLAS: *Where the Carcase Is*.

In a letter to *The Times* of February 16, Mr. C. S. Wade says:—

"I doubt if more than a few people realise how very costly and cumbersome the present system is. In the building and civil engineering trades some 85,000 firms employ more than 1,000,000 men on casual labour terms, and it is quite normal for a worker to change his employer 10 or more times in 12 months. Acting upon orders from the Inland Revenue Department the employers are filling in millions of cards and forms for the current half-year and are now deducting tax assessed on last year's earnings from

a very small percentage of the men on their present pay rolls.

"In future this form filling will continue to harass employers and their depleted and overworked staffs, who had quite enough forms to struggle with before this latest imposition. Much more could be said on this subject, but I will resist the temptation for, whatever the news from the war fronts may be, forms must be dealt with."

Thus it seems that the contribution women part-time workers can make to the war effort is valuable, and indeed indispensable to victory, and that the chief difficulties in the way have been created by the regulations and restrictions of bureaucratic socialists, who see to it that they shall work, as their men do, with one hand tied behind their back.

FROM WEEK TO WEEK

Moscow, February 18, 1937.

"The bureaucracy all live very well, and many of them have their country houses, or dachas."

Moscow, March 12, 1937.

"While there is no question that, in its present phase, its [U.S.S.R.'s] efficiency cannot compare with Capitalist States, and possibly never will, nevertheless, in the absence of competition with capitalist states, *such inefficiencies need not and will not appear.* [Italics added.]

"At the present rate at which differentiation and increases in compensation are growing, it will be but a short time before there will be very marked class distinction based on property."

—JOSEPH E. DAVIES, U.S. Ambassador to Russia, 1936-1938.

The following letter appeared in the *Dundee Courier and Advertiser* replying to one suggesting that we send to Russia for generals, military strategists and civil administrators because "as a matter of fact our Commanders and staffs have never been conspicuously successful in any past war." and that Russia should take over and manage those branches of civil administration which affect the war:—

"Sir,—I have read Lieut.-Col. Nunn's letter in the *Courier* of February 18. Russia is a country of some 170 million people, and a country which has been preparing for war for 20 years with, allegedly, a highly superior manufacturing and social service.

"It has admittedly a brave and fatalistic soldiery amounting to twice that of Germany; it is fighting on its own soil, and with the shortest possible lines of communication.

"So far from its performance being spectacularly good, it is, although very helpful to us, far poorer than that put up by any other of the combatants, except perhaps France, and is not to be compared with that of Greece.

"It is obliged to call in a country of 45 millions (which, in spite of Lieut.-Col. Nunn's views on incompetence, has single-handed for over a year opposed the whole continent of Europe) to provide it with munitions.

"The cause of this country's difficulties, and, indeed, of the war, is perfectly plain to any one who will look at

the facts—it is due to the suppression of the knowledge that Germany was rearming, and the persistent refusal of the Socialist party to allow the rearming of this country in time to present Germany with a threat of overwhelming force.—I am, &c., EDITH M. DOUGLAS."

"There is an old Icelandic proverb which I often wish we had put up as a streamer across the end of this building as a perpetual warning to us. That proverb is: 'Long do men live who are slain with words.'" —MR. DENMAN, M.P., in the debate on the War Situation.

Captain Crookshank, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, described the functions of Public Relations Officers in government departments as "the promotion of a proper understanding between their departments and the general public."

According to the accompanying table of salaries of these gentlemen, the general public finds its relations with the Treasury, the Food Ministry and the Ministry of War Transport more puzzling than those with any other departments to the extent of £200 p.a. in the salaries of their respective publicity chiefs.

Of course it needs some skill to sugar the income tax pill.

The Democratic Monetary Reform Organisation of Canada

The text of a statement by Mr. WILLIAM ABERHART, Prime Minister of Alberta and National President of the Democratic Reform Monetary Organisation.

There appears to be some misunderstanding in certain quarters regarding the nature of The Democratic Monetary Reform Organisation of Canada. Contrary to these views, the D.M.R.O. is *not* "just another political party."

Let me make it plain beyond any possibility of being misunderstood. We monetary reformers look upon the old game of party politics as a vicious and alarming negation of democracy in its true essence.

A party political system which has consistently produced conditions grossly unsatisfactory to the people generally is manifestly undemocratic and certainly most undesirable. I should go a step further and add that since it has resulted in generating strife and distrust among our citizens, and has deprived them of economic security, by selfish intrigue, invidious skull-duggery and the unscrupulous methods which have brought politics generally into disrepute, the party system has actually become a national menace, which must be expurgated if we hope to maintain our democratic liberties.

It is true that every party was originally founded to achieve an ideal, but as the party grew and its influence became rooted in the minds of its followers, the original objective was pushed into the background and the preservation of the party itself, together with the advancement of opportunists who were able to use the party for their own ends, became the dominating considerations. Thus they became easy prey for the large interests who could provide

the party with funds. Party politics was thereby degraded to the level of two or more warring groups manoeuvring to gain office, and the people were considered merely pawns to be used in gaining that end through propaganda, profit-mongering, promises of patronage, pandering, panic-raising, and any other pernicious practices which were considered effective. That is not democracy—but it is the form in which democracy has been rendered impotent. It is this horrible example of impoverishment, this spectacle of the magnificence of Democracy, shorn of its vitality, like Samson grinding in the prison house, that inspires and encourages sincere people on every hand to hope and work for its deliverance.

I know that there will be some persons who will resent that indictment of party politics, but it is the truth, nevertheless, and we must learn to-day to face facts as they are, not as we might hope them to be.

In its highest and truest form, democracy is government in accordance with the will of the people as a whole. This means that all the people should be enabled unitedly to state clearly and definitely *the results* they want from the management of their affairs.

These results on which the overwhelming majority of electors are united would constitute the greatest common measure of agreement as an expression of "the will of the people," and should take precedence in the administration of national affairs, over objectives which have less general support.

In order to secure democratic government along these lines two things are necessary. In the first place the people must be able to decide for themselves unitedly as to which results they want. In the second place, the people must be in a position to insist on obedience to their decisions. Both these essentials can only be attained effectually when the people have been fully organised and properly informed. Unless they are enlightened and organised to assert their constitutional democratic rights, they will of necessity continue to be helpless. It is impossible to stress this seemingly obvious fact too strongly.

Party politics cannot provide this essential machinery of democracy, for party politics create a permanent division in the ranks of the people. Hence the greatest common measure of agreement can never be expressed. Party politics simply give the people an opportunity periodically to choose between representatives of one party or another. When elected these candidates represent *their* party and must submit to party control. The common interests of the people are usually relegated to a very secondary position.

Parties, in turn, are controlled by those interests who provide the party funds. So we get the undemocratic result of the people's elected representatives submitting to the control of vested interests. And as these interests finance all parties, they are able to control any party which is elected.

That is why in the past the people have always got the results they did not want, namely unnecessary poverty, wide-spread insecurity, growing unemployment, inequitable wages and prices, crushing debt and grinding taxation, irrespective of what particular party was in office.

The method which has always been employed by the few to control and manipulate the many is to "divide and rule." Party politics, therefore, is an ideal method of

performing this function. It is the machinery par excellence in the hands of the Oligarchs.

Had The Democratic Monetary Reform Organisation formed another political party, it would have merely created a further division in the ranks of the people and thus the very forces of financial domination which it seeks to overcome would have been more firmly entrenched.

Therefore we decided not to enter the political field as a party. Our policy is simple and straight-forward. We exist to enable the people of Canada to unite in a clear demand for the results they want in common, and to organise themselves both for securing the information they want and for gaining obedience to their wishes.

If any government in office will carry out the wishes of the people as expressed through their organisation, it will receive that organisation's support. But if the government in office refuses to obey the will of the people, then the people will have the necessary organisation to put their own candidates in the field and to elect them.

In short The Democratic Monetary Reform Organisation exists to make democracy a vital and functioning reality in both the political and economic spheres of national life—and to get rid of the curse of financial domination which has been and remains a constant menace to democratic government.

For purposes of ensuring the most effective form of organisation, every province, when organised, will be an autonomous unit. The D.M.R.O. will serve merely as a co-ordinating body for purposes of national action on national issues.

The increasing pressure of war needs on our over-taxed and antiquated economic and financial systems, and the growing realisation of the need for preparing in advance to meet the looming problems of post-war reconstruction, are mainly responsible for the manner in which support for democratic monetary reform is beginning to sweep the country. It is the voice of the people seeking expression—and the D.M.R.O. exists to enable it to function effectively.

OFFICERS OF THE D.M.R.O.

The principles and objectives of the Democratic Monetary Reform Organisation of Canada have already been published in "The Social Crediter" (January 10, 1942). The officers of that organisation, elected at the Winnipeg Convention, are as follows:—

President: Honourable William Aberhart.

Vice-President: Mr. Paul Prince.

Secretary-Treasurer: Hon. Solon E. Low.

Regional Deputies:

For Alberta and British Columbia: Mr. Ernest G. Hansell, M.P.

For Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Northern Ontario: Rev. H. W. Ferrier.

For Western and Eastern Ontario: Mr. H. H. Hallatt.

For Quebec: Mr. Walter Kuhl, M.P.

(Temporarily until Quebec region is organised.)

For the Maritimes: Mr. J. H. Blackmore, M.P.

(Temporarily until the Maritimes are organised.)

Directors: British Columbia: Major A. H. Jukes, D.S.O., O.B.E. Alberta: Mr. F. D. Shaw, M.P.

Saskatchewan: Mr. F. E. Werry. Manitoba: Mr. F. F. Siemans. Ontario: Mr. J. S. MacFarlane. Quebec: Not elected as yet. Prince Edward Island: Mr. E. Burke Murphy, M.C. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick: Not yet elected.

Women's Liaison Officer, suggested at an Executive meeting held in the early morning of Thursday, October 30, 1941, at Winnipeg: Mrs. R. H. Berry.

THE JOYS OF INCOME TAX—ADVICE TO BEGINNERS

"Take comfort in the thought that even if you had the money, you will find difficulty in spending it for many of the things you want."—DOROTHY THOMPSON in *The Edmonton Bulletin*, January 19, advising Americans on *How to Pay their Income Tax*.

"THE SOCIAL CREDITER"

Difficulties arising from the paper shortage make it necessary to print this issue on less substantial paper which will not bear the usual stapling. Readers are asked to help in this contingency by cutting the pages of their copies.

To all Social Credit Groups and Associations, Home and Overseas

Affiliation to the Social Credit Secretariat, which was accorded to Groups of Social Crediters, has been replaced by a new relationship and all previously existing affiliations were terminated as from January 1, 1942. This new relationship is expressed in the following Form which Associations* desiring to act in accordance with the advice of the Secretariat are asked to fill in:—

Name, address, and approximate number of members of Association

.....

.....

We desire to follow the advice of the Social Credit Secretariat†.

To acquaint ourselves with the general character of this advice and the reasons underlying it, we agree to subscribe to *The Social Crediter* regularly in the proportion of at least one copy to every five members.

We agree not to discuss with others, without authorisation, the details of special advice received from the Secretariat.

Date..... Signature.....

A brief statement is also requested giving the history or account of the initiation of the group, and its present activities and intentions.

HEWLETT EDWARDS,
Director of Organisation
and Overseas Relations.

*For this purpose an Association to consist of three or more Social Crediters.

†The Secretariat is the channel used by Major Douglas, the Advisory Chairman, for the transmission of advice.

BOOKS TO READ

By C. H. Douglas:—

- Economic Democracy(edition exhausted)
- Social Credit 3/6
- The Monopoly of Credit3/6
- Credit Power and Democracy (edition exhausted)
- Warning Democracy(edition exhausted)
- The Use of Money6d.
- "This 'American' Business" 3d. each
- Social Credit Principles1½d. each.

ALSO

- The Bankers of London by Percy Arnold4/6
- Hitler's Policy is a Jewish Policy
by Borge Jensen and P. R. Masson6d.
- Southampton Chamber of Commerce Report6d.
- Is Britain Betrayed? by John Mitchell2d. each
- How Alberta is Fighting Finance2d. each

Leaflets

- The Attack on Local Government
by John Mitchell9d. doz.; 50 for 2/6
- Taxation is Robbery50 for 1/9; 100 for 3/-
(Please allow for postage when remitting).

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49, PRINCE ALFRED ROAD, LIVERPOOL, 15.

SOCIAL CREDIT LIBRARY

A Library for the use of annual subscribers to *The Social Crediter* is in the course of formation. It will contain, as far as possible, every responsible book and pamphlet which has been published on Social Credit, together with a number of volumes of an historical and political character which bear upon the subject, as well as standard works on banking, currency and social science.

A deposit of 15/- will be required for the cost of postage which should be renewed on notification of its approaching exhaustion.

For further particulars apply Librarian, 49, Prince Alfred Road, Liverpool, 15.

REGIONAL ACTIVITIES

Information about Social Credit activities in different regions may be had by writing to the following addresses:

- BELFAST D.S.C. Group: Hon. Sec., 20 Dromara Street, Belfast.
- BIRMINGHAM (Midland D.S.C. Association): Hon. Sec., 20 Sunnybank Road, Boldmere, Sutton Coldfield.
- BRADFORD United Democrats: R. J. Northin, 11 Centre Street, Bradford.
- CARDIFF S.C. Association: Hon. Sec., 8, Cwrt-y-vil Road, Penarth, South Wales.
- DERBY: C. Bosworth, 25 Allestree Road, Crewton, Derby.
- LIVERPOOL S.C. Association: Hon. Sec., 49 Prince Alfred Road, Liverpool, 15. Wavertree 435.
- LONDON Liaison Group: Mrs. Palmer, 35 Birchwood Avenue, Sidcup, Kent. Footscray 3059.
Lunch hour re-unions on the first and third Thursdays of the month at 12-30 p.m., at The Plane Tree Restaurant, Great Russell Street, W. C. 1. Next Meeting March 19.
- NEWCASTLE-on-Tyne Douglas Credit Association: Hon. Sec., 10 Warrington Road, Fawdon, Newcastle, 3.
- SOUTHAMPTON D.S.C. Group: Hon. Sec., 19 Coniston Road, Redbridge, Southampton.